Psy2

Due September 24

 

Text: Psychology Core Concepts: Zimbardo, Johnson and Hamilton 7
TH EDITION (978-0-205183463) I cant found the text online maybe you can

 

Or You can access The Discovering Psychology video series on the internet for free!

  

1. Go to www.learner.org

2. Click on the blue tab near the top that reads “view programs”

3. Many film series will be listed. They are in alphabetical order. Scroll down to Discovering Psychology: Updated Edition. Click on it.

4. All 26 episodes from the series are listed in order. Double click on the box that says “VoD” next to the episode you wish to view. That’s it!

    

   Type 1 page for each ½ hour video unit where you submit bullets outlining the content of each ½ hour lecture (not more than one page in length) AND, SEPARATELY, ANSWER ALL LEARNING OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FROM THE ATTACHED/ENCLOSED PACKET( state each question before each of your responses. Make sure you cite page references from the text for each of your answers).

    

   ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS CAN BE FOUND IN VIDEO AND TEXT INSIDE FRONT AND BACK COVER OF TEXT WILL TELL YOU WHAT CHAPTERS CORRELATE WITH WHICH VIDEOS).

  

Objectives 3

After viewing the television program and completing the assigned readings, you should be able to:

 

1. Explain the major concepts of evolutionary theory, such as natural selection and variation.

2. Identify several methods used to study the brain and give a significant finding associated with each.

3. Identify the major structures and specialized functions of the brain.

4. Cite examples of how the endocrine system affects mood and emotion.

5. List and describe the major divisions and subdivisions of the nervous system and the functions of each.

6. Describe the structure of a neuron.

7. Explain the mechanism of neural transmission.

8. Describe the process of synaptic transmission and list the six important neurotransmitters.

9. Describe hemispheric separation and individual differences pertaining to it.

10. Explain how amnesic patients can be studied to understand normal memory processes.

 

Objectives 4

After viewing the television program and completing the assigned readings, you should be able to: 

1. Cite examples of the brain’s capacity to adapt to environmental change.

2. Explain how early experience can affect brain mechanisms that influence stress tolerance in later life.

3. Cite research studies that contribute to an understanding of the role enriched environments play in brain development.

4. Describe the concept of critical periods of development and cite the evidence that supports or contradicts it.

5. Explain how individual maturation is controlled by social needs and group behavior.

6. Describe the sociobioloigcal approach to the explanation of behavior and compare it to the explanation given by proponents of human behavior genetics.

7. Explain the value of observation studies of animals in their natural habitats and how these studies complement laboratory research.

8. Describe various methods currently in use for studying the brain.

9. Describe the interactions between the brain and the endocrine system.

10. Indentify the specialized functions associated with each of the four lobes of the brain.

  

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If you’re wondering why we’re bringing
you a new edition of Psychology: Core
Concepts . . .
1 In the new seventh edition, we feature new cutting-edge
research on the neuroscience of social interaction, cul-
tural influences on perception, daydreaming, taste, and
meditation, as well as updates on bullying, the slower
rise of IQ scores (the Flynn effect) in developed coun-
tries, the myth of multitasking, and much more. We also
introduce readers to a groundbreaking modification of
Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs, newly framed by
evolutionary psychologists.
2 Our lead author Philip Zimbardo has recently published
a detailed description and analysis of his famous Stanford
Prison Experiment in The Lucifer Effect: Understanding
How Good People Turn Evil. We are pleased to include
in Psychology: Core Concepts some of the insights he
presented in Lucifer—particularly the notion of the effect
of impersonal social systems, as well as social situations,
on human behavior. Ours is the only introductory text
in which you will find a discussion of how these social
systems, such as organizations and bureaucracies, create
a context that can profoundly influence the behavior of
groups and individuals.
3 Dr. Zimbardo has also done important new work on the
differences among people in their time perspective, re-
ferring to a focus on the past, the present, or the future.
This text is the only introduction to psychology to dis-
cuss the powerful influence of time perspective on our
decisions and actions.
4 In this edition, Read on MyPsychLab icons appear in
the margins indicating that additional readings are
available for students to explore. For example, one of
the Read features in Chapter 3 (Sensation and Percep-
tion) deals with the classic study of backward masking.
In Chapter 12 (Disorders and Therapy), you can read
more about an African perspective on mental disorder.
5 One of our goals in this new edition is, again, to help
you learn to “think like psychologists.” To do so, we have
placed new emphasis on two kinds of psychological think-
ing: (1) problem solving and (2) critical thinking. Every
chapter begins with a Problem and ends with a critical
analysis of an important psychological question, such as
gender differences or repressed memory.
6 We have made a special effort in the seventh edition to
provide clues throughout the chapter to help you un-
derstand the solution to the chapter-opening Problem—
which proved to be a popular feature in the last edition.
The Chapter Summary now gives a brief “answer” to
the problem as well.
7 We have designed the Critical Thinking applications at the
end of each chapter to build upon a set of critical thinking
skills introduced in Chapter One. Each of these focuses on
an issue that is popularly misunderstood (e.g., the Mozart
Effect) or contentious within the field (e.g., the evidence-
based practice debate within clinical psychology). In this
edition, we have also included the gist of the Critical
Thinking section in the Chapter Summary.
8 Reflecting advances in multicultural and cross-cultural
research, we have added even more coverage of culture
and gender throughout the text. Our goal here is two-
fold: We want you to see the relevance of psychology in
your life, and we want you to understand that psychol-
ogy is the science of behavior and mental processes that
both generalizes and differs across cultures.
Why Do You Need
This New Edition?

This page intentionally left blank

Psychology
Philip G. Zimbardo
Stanford University
Robert L. Johnson
Umpqua Community College
Vivian McCann
Portland Community College
Boston Columbus Indianapolis New York San Francisco Upper Saddle River
Amsterdam Cape Town Dubai London Madrid Milan Munich Paris
Montreal Toronto Delhi Mexico City São Paulo Sydney Hong Kong Seoul
Singapore Taipei Tokyo
Seventh Edition
Core Concepts

Student Edition
ISBN-10: 0-205-18346-8
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-18346-3
Instructor’s Review Copy
ISBN-10: 0-205-21513-0
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-21513-3
Books à la Carte
ISBN-10: 0-205-21505-X
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-21505-8
Editorial Director: Craig Campanella
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Text Font: SabonLTStd-Roman, 10/12
Credits and acknowledgments borrowed from other sources and reproduced, with permission, in this textbook appear on pages C-1–C-2.
Copyright © 2012, 2009, 2006 by Pearson Education, Inc.
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This publication is protected by Copyright and permission should be obtained from the
publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
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Permissions Department, One Lake Street, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458 or you may fax your request to 201-236-3290.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Zimbardo, Philip G.
Psychology : core concepts / Philip G. Zimbardo, Robert L. Johnson, Vivian McCann. — 7th ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-18346-3
ISBN-10: 0-205-18346-8
1. Psychology. I. Johnson, Robert L. (Robert Lee) II. McCann, Vivian. III. Title.
BF121.Z53 2012
150—dc23
2011027587
1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science 2
2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature 40
3 Sensation and Perception 86
4 Learning and Human Nurture 132
5 Memory 170
6 Thinking and Intelligence 212
7 Development Over the Lifespan 264
8 States of Consciousness 322
9 Motivation and Emotion 362
10 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person 412
11 Social Psychology 458
12 Psychological Disorders 514
13 Therapies for Psychological Disorders 554
14 From Stress to Health and Well-Being 596
Glossary G-1
References R-1
Answers to Discovering Psychology Program Review Questions A-1
Photo Credits C-1
Name Index I-1
Subject Index I-7
B R I E F C O N T E N T S
v

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vii
C O N T E N T S
CHAPTER 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science 2
PROBLEM: How would psychologists test the claim that sugar
makes children hyperactive? 3
1.1 What Is Psychology—And What Is It Not? 4
Psychology: It’s More Than You Think 4
Psychology Is Not Psychiatry 6
Thinking Critically about Psychology
and Pseudo-Psychology 7
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 10
1.2 What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives? 11
Separation of Mind and Body and the Modern Biological
Perspective 12
The Founding of Scientific Psychology and the Modern
Cognitive Perspective 13
The Behavioral Perspective: Focusing on Observable
Behavior 16
The Whole-Person Perspectives: Psychodynamic, Humanistic,
and Trait and Temperament Psychology 17
The Developmental Perspective: Changes Arising from Nature
and Nurture 19
The Sociocultural Perspective: The Individual in Context 19
The Changing Face of Psychology 20
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Psychology as a Major 22
1.3 How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 23
Four Steps in the Scientific Method 24
Five Types of Psychological Research 27
Controlling Biases in Psychological Research 31
Ethical Issues in Psychological Research 32
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Perils of Pseudo-Psychology 33
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Facilitated Communication 35
Chapter Summary 36
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 38
PROBLEM: What does Jill Bolte Taylor’s experience teach us
about how our brain is organized and about its amazing ability
to adapt? 42
2.1 How Are Genes and Behavior Linked? 43
Evolution and Natural Selection 43
Genetics and Inheritance 45
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Choosing Your Children’s
Genes 48
2.2 How Does the Body Communicate
Internally? 49
The Neuron: Building Block of the Nervous System 50
The Nervous System 56
The Endocrine System 58
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: How Psychoactive Drugs Affect
the Nervous System 60
2.3 How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental
Processes? 62
Windows on the Brain 63
Three Layers of the Brain 65
Lobes of the Cerebral Cortex 69
Cerebral Dominance 73
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 79
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Left Brain versus Right Brain 80
Chapter Summary 81
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 84
CHAPTER 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature 40
CHAPTER 3 Sensation and Perception 86
PROBLEM: Is there any way to tell whether the world we “see”
in our minds is the same as the external world—and whether
we see things as most others do? 88
3.1 How Does Stimulation Become Sensation? 89
Transduction: Changing Stimulation to Sensation 90
Thresholds: The Boundaries of Sensation 91
Signal Detection Theory 93
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Sensory Adaptation 93
3.2 How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 94
Vision: How the Nervous System Processes Light 94
Hearing: If a Tree Falls in the Forest . . . 100
How the Other Senses Are Like Vision and Hearing 104
Synesthesia: Sensations across the Senses 108
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Sense and Experience of Pain 109
3.3 What Is the Relationship between Sensation
and Perception? 112
Perceptual Processing: Finding Meaning in Sensation 112
Perceptual Ambiguity and Distortion 114
Theoretical Explanations for Perception 117
Seeing and Believing 124
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 125
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Subliminal Perception and Subliminal
Persuasion 126
Chapter Summary 128
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 130 vii

viii C O N T E N T S
CHAPTER 4 Learning and Human Nurture 132
PROBLEM: Assuming Sabra’s fear of flying was a response she
had learned, could it also be treated by learning? If so, how? 134
4.1 What Sort of Learning Does Classical Conditioning
Explain? 136
The Essentials of Classical Conditioning 137
Applications of Classical Conditioning 139
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Taste Aversions
and Chemotherapy 142
4.2 How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant
Conditioning? 142
Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism 143
The Power of Reinforcement 143
The Problem of Punishment 149
A Checklist for Modifying Operant Behavior 152
Operant and Classical Conditioning Compared 153
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 155
4.3 How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning? 156
Insight Learning: Köhler in the Canaries with Chimps 157
Cognitive Maps: Tolman Finds Out What’s on a
Rat’s Mind 158
Observational Learning: Bandura’s Challenge to
Behaviorism 159
Brain Mechanisms and Learning 161
“Higher” Cognitive Learning 162
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Fear of Flying Revisited 162
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Do Different People Have Different
“Learning Styles”? 164
Chapter Summary 166
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 168
CHAPTER 5 Memory 170
PROBLEM: How can our knowledge about memory help us
evaluate claims of recovered memories? 172
5.1 What Is Memory? 172
Metaphors for Memory 173
Memory’s Three Basic Tasks 174
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Would You Want a “Photographic”
Memory? 175
5.2 How Do We Form Memories? 177
The First Stage: Sensory Memory 178
The Second Stage: Working Memory 180
The Third Stage: Long-Term Memory 184
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: “Flashbulb” Memories: Where Were
You When . . . ? 189
5.3 How Do We Retrieve Memories? 190
Implicit and Explicit Memory 190
Retrieval Cues 191
Other Factors Affecting Retrieval 193
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: On the Tip of Your Tongue 194
5.4 Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us? 195
Transience: Fading Memories Cause Forgetting 196
Absent-Mindedness: Lapses of Attention Cause
Forgetting 198
Blocking: Access Problems 198
Misattribution: Memories in the Wrong Context 199
Suggestibility: External Cues Distort or Create Memories 200
Bias: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Opinions Distort Memories 201
Persistence: When We Can’t Forget 202
The Advantages of the “Seven Sins” of Memory 202
Improving Your Memory with Mnemonics 203
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 204
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Recovered Memory
Controversy 206
Chapter Summary 207
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 210

C O N T E N T S ix
CHAPTER 7 Development Over the Lifespan 264
PROBLEM: Do the amazing accounts of similarities in twins
reared apart indicate we are primarily a product of our genes?
Or do genetics and environment work together to influence
growth and development over the lifespan? 266
7.1 What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess? 268
Prenatal Development 268
The Neonatal Period: Abilities of the Newborn Child 269
Infancy: Building on the Neonatal Blueprint 271
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Not Just Fun and Games: The Role
of Child’s Play in Life Success 277
7.2 What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 279
How Children Acquire Language 279
Cognitive Development: Piaget’s Theory 282
Social and Emotional Development 288
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Puzzle of ADHD 294
7.3 What Changes Mark the Transition of Adolescence? 296
Adolescence and Culture 296
Physical Maturation in Adolescence 297
Adolescent Sexuality 298
Neural and Cognitive Development in Adolescence 299
Moral Development: Kohlberg’s Theory 300
Social and Emotional Issues in Adolescence 302
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology: Cognitive Development in College Students 304
7.4 What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face? 305
Early Adulthood: Explorations, Autonomy, and Intimacy 306
The Challenges of Midlife: Complexity and Generativity 308
Late Adulthood: The Age of Integrity 310
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: A Look Back at the Jim Twins
and Your Own Development 313
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Mozart Effect 315
Chapter Summary 316
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 320
CHAPTER 6 Thinking and Intelligence 212
PROBLEM: What produces “genius,” and to what extent are
the people we call “geniuses” different from others? 214
6.1 What Are the Components of Thought? 215
Concepts 215
Imagery and Cognitive Maps 217
Thought and the Brain 218
Intuition 219
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Schemas and Scripts Help You
Know What to Expect 221
6.2 What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess? 223
Problem Solving 223
Judging and Making Decisions 227
Becoming a Creative Genius 229
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 232
6.3 How Is Intelligence Measured? 233
Binet and Simon Invent a School Abilities Test 234
American Psychologists Borrow Binet and Simon’s Idea 235
Problems with the IQ Formula 236
Calculating IQs “on the Curve” 237
IQ Testing Today 238
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: What Can You Do for an Exceptional
Child? 239
6.4 Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities? 242
Psychometric Theories of Intelligence 242
Cognitive Theories of Intelligence 243
The Question of Animal Intelligence 247
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Test Scores and the Self-Fulfilling
Prophecy 249
6.5 How Do Psychologists Explain IQ Differences
Among Groups? 250
Intelligence and the Politics of Immigration 251
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence Is Influenced
by Heredity? 251
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence is Influenced
by Environment? 252
Heritability (Not Heredity) and Group Differences 253
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Stereotype Threat 256
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Question of Gender Differences 258
Chapter Summary 259
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 262
CHAPTER 8 States of Consciousness 322
PROBLEM: How can psychologists objectively examine the
worlds of dreaming and other subjective mental states? 324
8.1 How Is Consciousness Related to Other Mental Processes? 324
Tools for Studying Consciousness 326
Models of the Conscious and Nonconscious Minds 327
What Does Consciousness Do for Us? 329
Coma and Related States 330
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 331
8.2 What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness? 332
Daydreaming 332
Sleep: The Mysterious Third of Our Lives 333
Dreaming: The Pageants of the Night 338
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Sleep Disorders 341
8.3 What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 344
Hypnosis 345
Meditation 347
Psychoactive Drug States 348
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Dependence and Addiction 354
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Unconscious—Reconsidered 356
Chapter Summary 358
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 360

x C O N T E N T S
CHAPTER 10 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person 412
PROBLEM: What influences were at work to produce the
unique behavioral patterns, high achievement motivation,
and consistency over time and place that we see in the
personality of Mary Calkins? 414
10.1 What Forces Shape Our Personalities? 415
Biology, Human Nature, and Personality 416
The Effects of Nurture: Personality and the Environment 416
The Effects of Nature: Dispositions and Mental
Processes 417
Social and Cultural Contributions to Personality 417
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Explaining Unusual People
and Unusual Behavior 418
10.2 What Persistent Patterns, or Dispositions, Make Up
Our Personalities? 420
Personality and Temperament 421
Personality as a Composite of Traits 422
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Finding Your Type 426
10.3 Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 428
Psychodynamic Theories: Emphasis on Motivation
and Mental Disorder 428
Humanistic Theories: Emphasis on Human Potential
and Mental Health 439
Social-Cognitive Theories: Emphasis on Social
Learning 442
Current Trends: The Person in a Social System 445
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 445
10.4 What “Theories” Do People Use to Understand Themselves
and Others? 447
Implicit Personality Theories 447
Self-Narratives: The Stories of Our Lives 448
The Effects of Culture on Our Views of Personality 449
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Personality of Time 450
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Person–Situation
Controversy 453
Chapter Summary 454
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 456
CHAPTER 9 Motivation and Emotion 362
PROBLEM: Motivation is largely an internal and subjective
process: How can we determine what motivates people like
Lance Armstrong to work so hard at becoming the best in the
world at what they do? 364
9.1 What Motivates Us? 364
Why People Work: McClelland’s Theory 365
The Unexpected Effects of Rewards on Motivation 367
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 368
9.2 How Are Our Motivational Priorities Determined? 369
Instinct Theory 369
Drive Theory 370
Freud’s Psychodynamic Theory 371
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 372
Putting It All Together: A New Hierarchy of Needs 373
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Determining What Motivates
Others 374
9.3 Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational
Hierarchy? 375
Hunger: A Homeostatic Drive and a Psychological
Motive 376
The Problem of Will Power and Chocolate Cookies 379
Sexual Motivation: An Urge You Can Live Without 380
Sex, Hunger, and the Hierarchy of Needs 384
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The What and Why of Sexual
Orientation 385
9.4 How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us? 387
What Emotions Are Made Of 388
What Emotions Do for Us 389
Counting the Emotions 389
Cultural Universals in Emotional Expression 390
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Gender Differences in Emotion
Depend on Biology and Culture 391
9.5 What Processes Control Our Emotions? 392
The Neuroscience of Emotion 393
Arousal, Performance, and the Inverted U 396
Theories of Emotion: Resolving Some Old Issues 397
How Much Conscious Control Do We Have Over Our
Emotions? 399
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Detecting Deception 403
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Do Lie Detectors Really
Detect Lies? 405
Chapter Summary 407
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 410

C O N T E N T S xi
CHAPTER 11 Social Psychology 458
PROBLEM: What makes ordinary people willing to harm other
people, as they did in Milgram’s shocking experiment? 461
11.1 How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 462
Social Standards of Behavior 463
Conformity 465
Obedience to Authority 471
Cross-Cultural Tests of Milgram’s Research 475
Some Real-World Extensions of the Milgram Obedience
to Authority Paradigm 477
The Bystander Problem: The Evil of Inaction 478
Need Help? Ask for It! 480
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: On Being “Shoe” at Yale U 482
11.2 Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our
Judgments of Others? 483
Interpersonal Attraction 484
Loving Relationships 488
Making Cognitive Attributions 490
Prejudice and Discrimination 492
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Stereotype Lift and Values
Affirmations 498
11.3 How Do Systems Create Situations That Influence
Behavior? 500
The Stanford Prison Experiment 500
Chains of System Command 502
Preventing Bullying by Systematic Changes and Reframing 504
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 507
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Is Terrorism “a Senseless Act of
Violence, Perpetrated by Crazy Fanatics”? 508
Chapter Summary 510
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 512
PROBLEM: Is it possible to distinguish mental disorder from
merely unusual behavior? That is, are there specific signs
that clearly indicate mental disorder? 516
12.1 What Is Psychological Disorder? 517
Changing Concepts of Psychological Disorder 518
Indicators of Abnormality 521
A Caution to Readers 522
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Plea of Insanity 522
12.2 How Are Psychological Disorders Classified
in the DSM-IV ? 524
Overview of the DSM-IV Classification System 524
Mood Disorders 526
Anxiety Disorders 530
Somatoform Disorders 534
Dissociative Disorders 535
Schizophrenia 537
Developmental Disorders 541
Personality Disorders 542
Adjustment Disorders and Other Conditions: The Biggest
Category of All 544
Gender Differences in Mental Disorders 544
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Shyness 544
12.3 What Are the Consequences of Labeling People? 545
Diagnostic Labels, Labeling, and Depersonalization 546
The Cultural Context of Psychological Disorder 546
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 547
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Insane Places Revisited—Another
Look at the Rosenhan Study 548
Chapter Summary 550
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 552
CHAPTER 12 Psychological Disorders 514

xii C O N T E N T S
Glossary G-1
References R-1
Answers to Discovering Psychology Program Review Questions A-1
Photo Credits C-1
Name Index I-1
Subject Index I-7
CHAPTER 14 From Stress to Health and Well-Being 596
PROBLEM: Were the reactions and experiences of the 9/11
firefighters and others at the World Trade Center attacks
typical of people in other stressful situations? And what
factors explain individual differences in our physical and
psychological responses to stress? 598
14.1 What Causes Distress? 600
Traumatic Stressors 601
Chronic Stressors 606
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Student Stress 611
14.2 How Does Stress Affect Us Physically? 613
Physiological Responses to Stress 614
Stress and the Immune System 617
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Cognitive Appraisal of Ambiguous
Threats 619
14.3 Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress? 620
Type A Personality and Hostility 622
Locus of Control 623
Hardiness 624
Optimism 625
Resilience 626
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 628
14.4 How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive
Life Strategies? 629
Psychological Coping Strategies 630
Positive Lifestyle Choices: A “Two-for-One” Benefit to Your
Health 634
Putting It All Together: Developing Happiness and Subjective
Well-Being 637
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Behavioral Medicine and Health
Psychology 639
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Is Change Really Hazardous
to Your Health? 641
Chapter Summary 643
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 646
CHAPTER 13 Therapies for Psychological Disorders 554
PROBLEM: What is the best treatment for Derek’s depression:
psychological therapy, drug therapy, or both? More broadly,
the problem is this: How do we decide among the available
therapies for any of the mental disorders? 556
13.1 What Is Therapy? 556
Entering Therapy 557
The Therapeutic Alliance and the Goals of Therapy 557
Therapy in Historical and Cultural Context 559
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Paraprofessionals Do Therapy,
Too 560
13.2 How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 561
Insight Therapies 562
Behavior Therapies 568
Cognitive–Behavioral Therapy: A Synthesis 571
Evaluating the Psychological Therapies 574
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Where Do Most People Get
Help? 576
13.3 How Is the Biomedical Approach Used to Treat
Psychological Disorders? 577
Drug Therapy 577
Other Medical Therapies for Psychological Disorders 581
Hospitalization and the Alternatives 583
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: What Sort of Therapy Would You
Recommend? 584
13.4 How Do the Psychological Therapies and Biomedical
Therapies Compare? 585
Depression and Anxiety Disorders: Psychological versus
Medical Treatment 587
Schizophrenia: Psychological versus Medical
Treatment 587
“The Worried Well” and Other Problems: Not Everyone Needs
Drugs 588
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology 588
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Evidence-Based Practice 589
Chapter Summary 592
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 594

P R E FA C E xiii
T O T H E S T U D E N T . . .
There is one simple formula for academic success, and the following demonstration will show you what it is. Study this array of letters for a few seconds:
I B M U F O F B I C I A
Now, without peeking, write down as many of the letters as you can (in the correct
order).
Most people remember about five to seven letters correctly. A few people get them
all. How do these exceptional few do it? They find a pattern. (You may have noticed
some familiar initials in the array above: IBM, UFO, FBI, CIA.) Finding the pattern
greatly eases the task because you can draw on material that is already stored in mem-
ory. In this case, all that needs to be remembered are four “chunks” of information
instead of 12 unrelated letters.
The same principle applies to material you study for your psychology class. If you
try to remember each piece of information as a separate item, you will have a difficult
time. But if instead you look for patterns, you will find your task greatly simplified—
and much more enjoyable.
USING PSYCHOLOGY TO LEARN PSYCHOLOGY
So, how can you identify the patterns? Your friendly authors have developed several
learning features that will make meaningful patterns in the text stand out clearly:
Core Concepts We have organized each major section of every chapter around a single
big idea called a Core Concept. For example, one of the four Core Concepts in Chapter 5,
Memory, says:
Core Concept 5.4
Human memory is an information-processing system that works
constructively to encode, store, and retrieve information.
The Core Concept, then, becomes the central theme around which about 10 pages of
material—including several new terms—are organized. As you read each chapter, keep-
ing the Core Concept in mind will help you encode the new terms and ideas related to
that concept, store them in your memory, and later retrieve them when you are being
tested. To borrow an old saying, the Core Concepts become the “forest,” while the
details of the chapter become the “trees.”
Key Questions Each Core Concept is introduced by a Key Question that also serves as
a main heading in the chapter. Here, for example, is a Key Question from the Memory
chapter:
5.4 KEY QUESTION
Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us?
Key Questions such as this will help you anticipate the most important point, or the
Core Concept, in the section. In fact, the Core Concept always provides a brief answer
to the Key Question. Think of the Key Question as the high beams on your car, helping
xiii

xiv T O T H E S T U D E N T
you focus on what lies ahead. Our Key Questions should also serve as guides for you
in posing questions of your own about what you are reading.
Both the Key Questions and the Core Concepts later reappear as organizing fea-
tures of the Chapter Summary.
Psychology Matters Psychology has many captivating connections with events in the
news and in everyday life, and we have explored one of these connections at the end
of each major section in every chapter. To illustrate, here are some examples from the
Memory chapter:
• Would You Want a “Photographic” Memory?
• “Flashbulb” Memories: Where Were You When . . . ?
• On the Tip of Your Tongue
Such connections—practical, down to earth, and fascinating—will help you link your
study of psychology with your real-life experiences. They will also help you critically
evaluate many of the psychological ideas you encounter in the media—as when you see
news stories that begin with “psychological research shows that . . .” By the end of this
course, you will become a much wiser consumer of such information.
Psychology Matters: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology A special Psychology
Matters section in every chapter explains how you can apply new knowledge from
the chapter to make your studying more effective. For example, in Chapter 2,
Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature, we tell you how to put your
understanding of the brain to work for more efficient learning. Similarly, at the end
of Chapter 9, Motivation and Emotion, we explain how to use the psychological
concept of “flow” to boost your academic motivation. Thus, Using Psychology to
Learn Psychology not only reinforces points that you have studied but also brings the
material home with immediate and practical applications to your life in college.
Do It Yourself! Throughout the book we have scattered active-learning demonstrations
like the one in which you were asked to memorize the letters I B M U F O F B I C I A.
Besides being fun, these activities have the serious purpose of illustrating important
principles discussed in the text. In Chapter 5, for example, one Do It Yourself! box
helps you find the capacity of your short-term memory; another lets you test your
“photographic memory” ability.
Check Your Understanding Whether you’re learning psychology, soccer, or the
saxophone, you need feedback on your progress, and that’s exactly what you will get
from the Check Your Understanding quizzes. These quizzes appear at the end of every
major section in the chapter, offering you a quick checkup indicating whether you have
assimilated the main points from what you have read. Some questions call for simple
recall; others call for deeper analysis or application of material. Some are multiple-
choice questions; some are short-answer essay questions. These exercises will help you
determine how well you have mastered the material.
MyPsychLab Integration Throughout the text, you will find marginal icons that link to
important videos, simulations, podcasts, and activities you can find on MyPsychLab.
New to this edition, we have developed reading activities (called Read on MyPsychLab)
that will allow you to explore interesting topics more deeply. There are many more
resources on MyPsychLab than those highlighted in the text, but the icons draw
attention to some of the most high-interest materials. If you did not receive an access
code with your text, you can purchase access at www.mypsychlab.com.
Connection Arrows Links to important topics discussed in other chapters are often
cross-referenced with an arrow in the margin, as you can see in the sample here.
These links will help you integrate your new knowledge with information you have
already learned, or will show you where in a later chapter you can find out more
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
Read the Document at MyPsychLab
Simulate the Experiment at MyPsychLab
Explore the Concept at MyPsychLab
Watch the Video at MyPsychLab
Listen to the Podcast at MyPsychLab

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T O T H E S T U D E N T xv
about what you are reading. Connecting these concepts in your mind will help you
remember them.
Marginal Glossary The most important terms appear in boldface, with their glossary
definitions readily accessible in the margin. We list these key terms again in the Chapter
Summary. Then, at the end of the book, a comprehensive Glossary gathers together all
the key terms and definitions from each chapter in one easy-to-find location.
Chapter Summaries We have written our Chapter Summaries to provide you with an
overview of main points in each chapter—to help you preview and review the chapter.
The summaries are organized around the Key Questions and Core Concepts introduced
within the chapter to facilitate review and mastery of chapter material. But we offer
one caution: Reading the Chapter Summary will not substitute for reading the entire
chapter! Here’s a helpful hint: We recommend that you read the summary before you
read the rest of the chapter to get a flavor of what’s ahead, then reread the summary
after you finish the chapter. Reading the summary before will provide a framework for
the material so that it can be more easily encoded and stored in your memory. And,
naturally, reviewing the summary after reading the chapter will reinforce what you
have just learned so that you can retrieve it when needed on an examination.
THINKING LIKE A PSYCHOLOGIST
Learning all the facts and definitions of psychology won’t make you a psychologist.
Beyond the facts, thinking like a psychologist requires learning some problem-solving
skills and critical thinking techniques that any good psychologist should possess. With
this goal in mind, we have added two unique features to this book.
Chapter-Opening Problems Each chapter begins with an important problem that you will
learn how to solve with the tools you acquire in your reading. Examples of the chapter-
opening problems include testing the claim that sweet treats give children a “sugar high,”
evaluating claims of recovered memories, and judging the extent to which the people we
call “geniuses” are different from the rest of us.
Critical Thinking Applied At the end of each chapter, you will be asked to consider
issues disputed among psychologists and issues raised in the media, such as the nature
of the unconscious mind and the effects of subliminal persuasion. Each of these issues
requires a skeptical attitude and the application of a special set of critical thinking skills
that we will introduce in Chapter 1.
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIDEOS
At the end of each chapter, you will notice viewing guides for Discovering Psychology,
a 26-part video series produced by WGBH and Annenberg Media and narrated by the
lead author of this textbook, Phil Zimbardo. The videos provide an overview of his-
toric and current theories of human behavior and feature many of the researchers and
studies introduced in this textbook. You can access the Discovering Psychology videos
and additional viewing resources through MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com), the
online companion to this textbook.
We have one final suggestion to help you succeed in psychology: This book is filled
with examples to illustrate the most important ideas, but you will remember these
ideas longer if you generate your own examples as you study. This habit will make the
information yours as well as ours. And so we wish you a memorable journey through
the field we love.
Phil Zimbardo
Bob Johnson
Vivian McCann

www.mypsychlab.com

T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R . . .
Psychology has undergone remarkable changes since 2008, when we finished writing the previous edition of Psychology: Core Concepts. Here are just a few
examples of the new developments we have included in this seventh edition:
• The brain’s “default network,” involving parts of the temporal lobe, the prefrontal
cortex, and the cingulate cortex, becomes active when people focus their attention
internally—when they are remembering personal events, making plans, or imagin-
ing the perspectives of others. Unfortunately, daydreamers activating this default
network while studying will probably not remember the material they have just
studied.
• New research shows that analgesics such as Tylenol, normally used to treat
physical pain, can reduce the painful psychological sensations resulting from
social rejection and ruminating about unhappy relationships.
• Also in the realm of sensation, taste researcher Linda Bartoshuk has discovered a
“Rosetta Stone,” enabling her to compare objectively the intensities of taste
sensations experienced by different individuals.
• Meanwhile, perceptual psychologists have recently used brain scans to confirm the
assertion that Americans and Asians perceive scenes differently.
• Brain scans have also enabled researchers to assess patients who have been classi-
fied as in persistent vegetative states—and predict which ones might improve.
• In healthy individuals, scans have detected changes in the brains of volunteers who
have undergone intensive training in meditation. The changes are most obvious in
brain areas associated with memory, emotional processing, attention, and stress
reduction.
• As cognitive psychologists continue to puzzle over the Flynn effect, IQ scores con-
tinue to rise—but new studies show that the rise is slowing in developed countries
of the West.
• Cognitive research also shows that one in four auto accidents results from the
driver failing to notice hazardous conditions while using a cell phone—a bad
decision probably deriving from a mistaken belief in multitasking. (Perhaps
future research will determine whether the IQs of these drivers fall above or
below the rising average.)
• New research by our own Phil Zimbardo shows that decisions can also be
influenced by a personality trait that he calls time perspective—referring to
a past, present, or future orientation.
• However, the ultimate influence on our decisions lies in natural selection, accord-
ing to evolutionary psychologists—who have recently proposed a major new and
controversial modification of Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs.
In all, we have included some 350 new references in this new edition—gleaned from
literally thousands we have perused. Which is to say that psychological knowledge
continues to grow, with no end in sight. As a result, many introductory textbooks have
grown to daunting proportions. Meanwhile, our introductory courses remain the same
length—with the material ever more densely packed. We cannot possibly introduce
students to all the concepts in psychology, nor can our students possibly remember
everything.
The problem is not just one of volume and information overload; it is also a prob-
lem of meaningfulness. So, while we have aimed to cover less detail than do the more
encyclopedic texts, we have not given you a watered-down “brief edition” book. The
result is an emphasis on the most important and meaningful ideas in psychology.
xvi

T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R xvii
Our inspiration for Psychology: Core Concepts came from psychological research:
specifically, a classic study of chess players by Dutch psychologist and chess master
Adriaan de Groot (1965). His work, as you may recall, involved remembering the
locations of pieces on a chessboard. Significantly, when the pieces were placed on
the board at random, chess experts did no better than novices. Only when the pat-
terns made sense—because they represented actual game situations—did the experts
show an advantage. Clearly, meaningful patterns are easier to remember than random
assignments.
In applying de Groot’s findings to Psychology: Core Concepts, our goal has been
to present a scientific overview of the field of psychology within meaningful patterns
that will help students better remember what they learn so that they can apply it in
their own lives. Thus, we have organized each major section of every chapter around
a single, clear idea that we call a Core Concept, which helps students focus on the big
picture so they don’t become lost in the details.
From the beginning, our intention in writing Psychology: Core Concepts has been
to offer students and instructors a textbook that combines a sophisticated introduc-
tion to the field of psychology with pedagogy that applies the principles of psychology
to the learning of psychology, all in a manageable number of pages. Even with all the
new material we have included, the book remains essentially the same size—which, of
course, meant making some tough decisions about what to include, what to delete, and
what to move into our extensive collection of ancillary resources.
Our goal was to blend great science with great teaching and to provide an alter-
native to the overwhelmingly encyclopedic tomes or skimpy “brief edition” texts that
have been traditionally offered. We think you will like the introduction to psychol-
ogy presented in this book—both the content and the pedagogical features. After all,
it’s a text that relies consistently on well-grounded principles of psychology to teach
psychology.
NEW TO THIS EDITION
This edition of Psychology: Core Concepts is certainly no perfunctory revision or slap-
dash update. And here’s why . . .
We have reconceptualized our goal of helping students learn to “think like
psychologists.” These days, of course, everyone emphasizes critical thinking. The new
edition of Psychology: Core Concepts, however, gives equal weight to that other essen-
tial thinking skill: problem solving.
To encourage the sort of problem solving psychologists do, every chapter begins
with a Problem, a feature we introduced in the last edition. The Problem grows out of
the opening vignette and requires, for its solution, material developed in the chapter. In
this edition, we have focused on helping readers discover, throughout each chapter, the
“clues” that lead to the solution of the problem.
But we have not neglected critical thinking. Throughout the text, we deal with
common psychological misconceptions—such as the notion that venting anger gets it
“out of your system” or the belief that punishment is the most effective way of chang-
ing behavior. And in our Critical Thinking Applied segment at the end of each chapter,
we also focus on an important psychological issue in the popular media or an ongoing
debate within the field:
• Can “facilitated communication” help us understand people with autism?
• Left vs. right brain: Do most of us use only one side of the brain?
• Can our choices be influenced by subliminal messages?
• Do people have different “learning styles”?
• The recovered memory controversy: How reliable are reports of long-forgotten
memories of sexual abuse?
• Gender issues: Are we more alike or more different?
• The “Mozart Effect”: Can music make babies smarter?

xviii T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R
• The Unconscious reconsidered: Has modern neuroscience reshaped Freud’s
concept of the unconscious mind?
• Do lie detectors really detect lies?
• The person-situation controversy: Which is the more important influence on our
behavior?
• Is terrorism “a senseless act of violence, perpetrated by crazy fanatics”?
• Insane places revisited: Did Rosenhan get it right?
• Evidence-based practice: Should clinicians be limited by the tested-and-true?
• Is change really hazardous to your health?
But that’s not all. We have made extensive updates to the text (in addition to the new
research listed above). And we have improved the pedagogical features for which
Psychology: Core Concepts is known and loved. To give a few examples, we have:
• added MyPsychLab icons throughout the margins to highlight important videos,
simulations, podcasts, and additional resources for students to explore online. New
to this edition, we have created Read on MyPsychLab activities that allow students to
read and answer questions about many interesting topics more deeply online.
• shifted the focus of psychology’s six main perspectives to practical applications,
giving a concrete example of a real-life problem for each.
• clarified and updated our discussion of the scientific method to reflect more
accurately how research is done in a real-world context.
• added material on interpreting correlations—to help students use the notions of
correlation and causation more accurately in their everyday lives.
• simplified and consolidated our discussion of the split-brain experiments.
• updated material on flashbulb memories, using up-to-date examples.
• created a new section on cognitive theories of intelligence.
• added a new Psychology Matters piece entitled “Not Just Fun and Games: The
Role of Child’s Play in Life Success,” telling of the growing role of self-control in
life success, and how parents and teachers can help nurture this important ability.
• added new material on Vygotsky’s theory, including scaffolding and the zone of
proximal development, plus new material on neural development in adolescence.
• revised and expanded the sections on daydreaming and on both REM and NREM
sleep to reflect important new research.
• changed the order of topics in the Motivation and Emotion chapter, bringing
in new material on practical ways of motivating people, updating the section on
sexual orientation, and presenting a revised hierarchy of needs based in evolutionary
psychology.
• added new material on cross-cultural differences in shyness, Carol Dweck’s
research on mindset, and individual differences in time perspective.
• updated the section on positive psychology.
• updated the Heroic Defiance section, including new examples from the recent
Egyptian protests and new material on events at the Abu Ghraib prison.
• added new examples of recent replications of Milgram’s obedience experiment.
• added new material on bullying, the jigsaw classroom, and stereotype lift.
• reconceptualized depression in terms of Mayberg’s model, which emphasizes three
factors: biological vulnerability, external stressors, and abnormality of the mood-
regulation circuits in the brain. Also presented the new studies on the value of
exercise in combating depression and the anxiety disorders.
• added new material on psychopathy—which is attracting increasing interest but is
not a DSM-IV disorder.
• discussed the growing rift within clinical psychology (and between APA and APS)
over empirically supported treatments and empirically based practice.

T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R xix
• updated the information on telehealth therapy strategies.
• connected the discussion of traumatic stress to the 2011 earthquake in Japan.
• added a new Do It Yourself! The Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire: How Stressed
Are You?
We think you will find the seventh edition up-to-date and even more engaging for
students than the previous edition. But the changes are not limited to the book itself.
Please allow us to toot our horns for the supplements available to adopters.
TEACHING AND LEARNING PACKAGE
The following supplements will also enhance teaching and learning for you and your
students:
Instructor’s Manual Written and compiled by Sylvia Robb of Hudson County Community
College, includes suggestions for preparing for the course, sample syllabi, and current
trends and strategies for successful teaching. Each chapter offers integrated teaching
outlines, lists the Key Questions, Core Concepts, and Key Terms for each chapter for quick
reference, an extensive bank of lecture launchers, handouts, and activities, crossword
puzzles, and suggestions for integrating third-party videos, music, and Web resources.
The electronic format features click-and-view hotlinks that allow instructors to quickly
review or print any resource from a particular chapter. This resource saves prep work and
helps you maximize your classroom time.
Test Bank Written by Jason Spiegelman of Community College of Baltimore County,
has provided an extensively updated test bank containing more than 2,000 accuracy-
checked questions, including multiple choice, completion (fill-in-the-blank and short
answer), and critical essays. Test item questions have been also written to test student
comprehension of select multimedia assets found with MyPsychLab for instructors
who wish to make MyPsychLab a more central component of their course. In addition
to the unique questions listed previously, the Test Bank also includes all of the Check
Your Understanding questions from the textbook and all of the test questions from the
Discovering Psychology Telecourse Faculty Guide for instructors who wish to reinforce
student use of the textbook and video materials. All questions include the correct answer,
page reference, difficulty ranking, question type designation, and correlations to American
Psychological Association (APA) Learning Goal/Outcome. A new feature of the Test Bank
is the inclusion of rationales for each correct answer and the key distracter in the multiple-
choice questions. The rationales help instructors reviewing the content to further evaluate
the questions they are choosing for their tests and give instructors the option to use the
rationales as an answer key for their students. Feedback from current customers indicates
this unique feature is very useful for ensuring quality and quick response to student
queries. A two-page Total Assessment Guide chapter overview makes creating tests easier
by listing all of the test items in an easy-to-reference grid. The Total Assessment Guide
organizes all test items by text section and question type/level of difficulty. All multiple-
choice questions are categorized as factual, conceptual, or applied.
The Test Bank comes with Pearson MyTest, a powerful assessment-generation
program that helps instructors easily create and print quizzes and exams. Ques-
tions and tests can be authored online, allowing instructors ultimate flexibility and
the ability to efficiently manage assessments anytime, anywhere! Instructors can easily
access existing questions and then edit, create, and store them using simple drag-and-
drop and Word-like controls. Data on each question provide information relevant to dif-
ficulty level and page number. In addition, each question maps to the text’s major section
and learning objective. For more information, go to www.PearsonMyTest.com.
NEW Interactive PowerPoint Slides These slides, available on the Instructor’s Resource
DVD (ISBN 0-205-58439-7), bring the Psychology: Core Concepts design right into
the classroom, drawing students into the lecture and providing wonderful interactive

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xx T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R
activities, visuals, and videos. A video walk-through is available and provides clear
guidelines on using and customizing the slides. The slides are built around the text’s
learning objectives and offer many links across content areas. Icons integrated throughout
the slides indicate interactive exercises, simulations, and activities that can be accessed
directly from the slides if instructors want to use these resources in the classroom.
A Set of Standard Lecture PowerPoint Slides Written by Beth M. Schwartz, Randolph
College, is also offered and includes detailed outlines of key points for each chapter
supported by selected visuals from the textbook. A separate Art and Figure version
of these presentations contains all art from the textbook for which Pearson has been
granted electronic permissions.
Classroom Response System (CRS) Power Point Slides Classroom Response System
questions (“Clicker” questions) are intended to form the basis for class discussions as
well as lectures. The incorporation of the CRS questions into each chapter’s slideshow
facilitates the use of “clickers”—small hardware devices similar to remote controls,
which process student responses to questions and interpret and display results in real
time. CRS questions are a great way to get students involved in what they are learning,
especially because many of these questions address specific scientific thinking skills
highlighted in the text. These questions are available on the Instructor’s Resource DVD
(ISBN 0-205-85439-7) and also online at http://pearsonhighered.com/irc.
Instructor’s Resource DVD (ISBN 0-205-85439-7) Bringing all of the Seventh Edition’s
instructor resources together in one place, the Instructor’s DVD offers both versions of
the PowerPoint presentations, the Classroom Response System (CRS), the electronic
files for the Instructor’s Manual materials, and the Test Item File to help instructors
customize their lecture notes.
The NEW MyPsychLab The NEW MyPsychLab combines original online materials
with powerful online assessment to engage students, assess their learning, and help
them succeed. MyPsychLab ensures students are always learning and always improving.
• New video: New, exclusive 30-minute video segments for every chapter take the
viewer from the research laboratory to inside the brain to out on the street for
real-world applications.
• New experiments: A new experiment tool allows students to experience psychol-
ogy. Students do experiments online to reinforce what they are learning in class
and reading about in the book.
• New BioFlix animations: Bring difficult-to-teach biological concepts to life with
dramatic “zoom” sequences and 3D movement.
• eText: The Pearson eText lets students access their textbook anytime, anywhere, in
any way they want it, including listening to it online.
• New concept mapping: A new concept-mapping tool allows students to create
their own graphic study aids or notetaking tools using preloaded content from
each chapter. Concept maps can be saved, e-mailed, or printed.
• Assessment: With powerful online assessment tied to every video, application, and
chapter of the text, students can get immediate feedback. Instructors can see what
their students know and what they don’t know with just a few clicks. Instruc-
tors can then personalize MyPsychLab course materials to meet the needs of their
students.
• New APA assessments: A unique bank of assessment items allows instructors to
assess student progress against the American Psychological Association’s Learning
Goals and Outcomes. These assessments have been keyed to the APA’s latest pro-
gressive Learning Outcomes (basic, developing, advanced) published in 2008.
Proven Results Instructors and students have been using MyPsychLab for nearly ten
years. To date, more than 500,000 students have used MyPsychLab. During that time,

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T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R xxi
three white papers on the efficacy of MyPsychLab were published. Both the white
papers and user feedback show compelling results: MyPsychLab helps students succeed
and improve their test scores. One of the key ways MyPsychLab improves student
outcomes is by providing continuous assessment as part of the learning process. Over
the years, both instructor and student feedback have guided numerous improvements,
making MyPsychLab even more flexible and effective.
Please contact your local Pearson representative for more information on MyPsychLab.
For technical support for any of your Pearson products, you and your students can contact
http://247.pearsoned.com.
NEW MyPsychLab Video Series (17 episodes) This new video series offers instructors
and students the most current and cutting-edge introductory psychology video content
available anywhere. These exclusive videos take the viewer into today’s research
laboratories, inside the body and brain via breathtaking animations, and onto the street
for real-world applications. Guided by the Design, Development and Review team, a
diverse group of introductory psychology instructors, this comprehensive series features
17 half-hour episodes organized around the major topics covered in the introductory
psychology course syllabus. For maximum flexibility, each half-hour episode features
several brief clips that bring psychology to life:
• The Big Picture introduces the topic of the episode and provides the hook to draw
students fully into the topic.
• The Basics uses the power of video to present foundational topics, especially those
that students find difficult to understand.
• Special Topics delves deeper into high-interest and cutting-edge topics, showing
research in action.
• In the Real World focuses on applications of psychological research.
• What’s in It for Me? These clips show students the relevance of psychological
research to their own lives.
Available in MyPsychLab and also on DVD to adopters of Pearson psychology text-
books (ISBN 0-205-03581-7).
Discovering Psychology Telecourse Videos Written, designed, and hosted by Phil Zimbardo
and produced by WGBH Boston in partnership with Annenberg Media, this series is a
perfect complement to Psychology: Core Concepts. Discovering Psychology is a landmark
educational resource that reveals psychology’s contribution not only to understanding the
puzzles of behavior but also to identifying solutions and treatments to ease the problems of
mental disorders. The video series has won numerous prizes and is widely used in the United
States and internationally. The complete set of 26 half-hour videos is available for purchase
(DVD or VHS format) from Annenberg Media. The videos are also available online in a
streaming format that is free (www.learner.org), and, for the convenience of instructors and
students using Psychology: Core Concepts, links to these online videos have been included
in the MyPsychLab program that accompanies the textbook. A student Viewing Guide
is found at the end of every chapter within Psychology: Core Concepts, with additional
Viewing Guide resources also available online within MyPsychLab.
Discovering Psychology Telecourse Faculty Guide (ISBN 0-205-69929-4) The Telecourse
Faculty Guide provides guidelines for using Discovering Psychology as a resource within
your course. Keyed directly to Psychology: Core Concepts, the faculty guide includes the
complete Telecourse Study Guide plus suggested activities; suggested essays; cited studies;
instructional resources, including books, articles, films, and websites; video program
test questions with answer key; and a key term glossary. Test questions for Discovering
Psychology also reappear in the textbook’s test bank and MyTest computerized test bank.
Student Study Guide (ISBN 0-205-25299-0) This robust study guide, written by
Jane P. Sheldon of University of Michigan-Dearborn, is filled with guided activities and
in-depth exercises to promote student learning. Each chapter includes worksheets that

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xxii T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R
give students a head start on in-class note taking; a full list of key terms with page
references; a collection of demonstrations, activities, exercises, and three short practice
quizzes; and one comprehensive chapter exam with critical-thinking essay questions
and concept maps to help you study for your quizzes and exams. The appendix includes
answers to all of the practice activities, tests, and concept maps.
ACCESSING ALL RESOURCES
For a list of all student resources available with Psychology: Core Concepts, Seventh
Edition, go to www.mypearsonstore.com, enter the text ISBN (0-205-18346-8), and
check out the “Everything That Goes with It” section under the book cover.
For access to all instructor supplements for Psychology: Core Concepts, Seventh
Edition go to http://pearsonhighered.com/irc and follow the directions to register
(or log in if you already have a Pearson user name and password). Once you have
registered and your status as an instructor is verified, you will be e-mailed a log-in name
and password. Use your log-in name and password to access the catalog. Click on the
“online catalog” link, click on “psychology” followed by “introductory psychology,”
and then the Zimbardo/Johnson/McCann, Psychology: Core Concepts, Seventh Edition
text. Under the description of each supplement is a link that allows you to download
and save the supplement to your desktop.
You can request hard copies of the supplements through your Pearson sales representa-
tive. If you do not know your sales representative, go to http://www.pearsonhighered.com/
replocator/ and follow the directions. For technical support for any of your Pearson prod-
ucts, you and your students can contact http://247.pearsoned.com.
A NOTE OF THANKS
Nobody ever realizes the magnitude of the task when taking on a textbook-writing
project. Acquisitions Editor Amber Chow and Executive Editor Stephen Frail deftly
guided (and prodded) us through this process. The vision of the seventh edition con-
fronted reality under the guidance of Deb Hanlon, our tenacious Senior Development
Editor, who made us work harder than we had believed possible. Assistant Editor Kerri
Hart-Morris managed our spectacular ancillaries package.
The job of making the manuscript into a book fell to Shelly Kupperman, our
Production Project Manager at Pearson Education; Andrea Stefanowicz, our Senior
Project Manager at PreMediaGlobal; and Kim Husband, our copyeditor. We think they
did an outstanding job—as did our tireless photo researcher, Ben Ferrini.
We are sure that none of the above would be offended if we reserve our deepest
thanks for our spouses, closest colleagues, and friends who inspired us, gave us the
caring support we needed, and served as sounding boards for our ideas. Phil thanks
his wonderful wife, Christina Maslach, for her endless inspiration and for modeling
what is best in academic psychology. He has recently passed a milestone of 50 years
of teaching the introductory psychology course, from seminar size to huge lectures to
more than 1,000 students. Phil continues to give lectures and colloquia to college and
high school groups throughout the country and overseas. He still gets a rush from lec-
turing and from turning students on to the joys and fascination of psychology. His new
“psych rock star” status comes mostly from generations of students who have grown
up watching him perform on the Discovering Psychology video series in their high
school and college psychology courses.
Bob is grateful to his spouse, best friend, and best editor Michelle, who has for years
put up with his rants on topics psychological, his undone household chores, and much
gratification delayed—mostly without complaint. She has been a wellspring of understand-
ing and loving support and the most helpful of reviewers. His thanks, too, go to Rebecca,
their daughter, who has taught him the practical side of developmental psychology—and
now, much to her own astonishment and an undergraduate lapse into sociology, pos-
sesses her own graduate degree in psychology. In addition, he is indebted to many friends,

www.mypearsonstore.com

http://247.pearsoned.com

http://www.pearsonhighered.com/replocator/

http://www.pearsonhighered.com/replocator/

http://pearsonhighered.com/irc

T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R xxiii
most of whom are not psychologists but who are nevertheless always eager to raise and
debate interesting issues about the applications of psychology to everyday life. Readers
will find topics they have raised throughout the book and especially in the chapter-opening
“problems” and in the critical thinking sections at the end of each chapter.
Vivian’s thanks go first to her husband, Shawn, and their sons, Storm and Blaze.
All three of these amazing men are endless sources of love, support, inspiration, fun,
and delight. They also generously allow Vivian to use them as examples of a multi-
tude of concepts in her classes! Vivian also appreciates the many students, friends, and
colleagues who have both encouraged and challenged her over the years.
We would especially like to thank Michelle Billies, Nikita Duncan, George Slavich,
and Christina Zimbardo for their exceptional help as we revised and prepared this
edition for print.
Many psychological experts and expert teachers of introductory psychology also
shared their constructive criticism with us on every chapter and feature of the seventh
edition of this text:
Thomas Beckner, Trine University
Chris Brill, Old Dominion University
Allison Buskirk-Cohen, Delaware Valley
College
Christie Chung, Mills College
Elizabeth Curtis, Long Beach City College
Linda DeKruif, Fresno City College
Meliksah Demir, Northern Arizona
University
Roger Drake, Western State College of
Colorado
Denise Dunovant, Hudson County
Community College
Arthur Frankel, Salve Regina University
Marjorie Getz, Bradley University
Nancy Gup, Georgia Perimeter College
Carrie Hall, Miami University
Jeremy Heider, Stephen F. Austin State
University
Allen Huffcutt, Bradley University
Kristopher Kimbler, Florida Gulf Coast
University
Sue Leung, Portland Community College
Brian Littleton, Kalamazoo Valley
Community College
Annette Littrell, Tennessee Tech University
Mark Loftis, Tennessee Tech University
Lillian McMaster, Hudson County
Community College
Karen Marsh, University of
Minnesota–Duluth
Jim Matiya, Florida Gulf Coast University
Nancy Melucci, Long Beach City College
Jared Montoya, The University of Texas
at Brownsville
Suzanne Morrow, Old Dominion
University
Katy Neidhart, Cuesta College
Donna Nelson, Winthrop University
Barbara Nova, Dominican University of
California
Elaine Olaoye, Brookdale Community
College
Karl Oyster, Tidewater Community
College
Sylvia Robb, Hudson County
Community College
Nancy Romero, Lone Star College
Beverly Salzman, Housatonic
Community College
Hildur Schilling, Fitchburg State College
Bruce Sherwin, Housatonic Community
College
Hilary Stebbins, Virginia Wesleyan
College
Doris Van Auken, Holy Cross College
Matthew Zagummy, Tennessee Tech
University
We also thank the reviewers of the previous editions of Psychology: Core Concepts
and hope that they will recognize their valued input in all that is good in this text:
Gordon Allen, Miami University
Beth Barton, Coastal Carolina
Community College
Linda Bastone, Purchase College, SUNY
Susan Beck, Wallace State College
Michael Bloch, University of San Francisco
Michele Breault, Truman State University
John H. Brennecke, Mount San Antonio
College
T. L. Brink, Crafton Hills College

xxiv T O T H E I N S T R U C T O R
Jay Brown, Southwest Missouri State
University
Sally S. Carr, Lakeland Community
College
Saundra Ciccarelli, Gulf Coast
Community College
Wanda Clark, South Plains College
Susan Cloninger, The Sage Colleges
John Conklin, Camosun College (Canada)
Michelle L. Pilati Corselli (Rio Hondo
College)
Sara DeHart-Young, Mississippi State
University
Janet DiPietro, John Hopkins University
Diane Finley, Prince George’s
Community College
Krista Forrest, University of Nebraska at
Kearney
Lenore Frigo, Shasta College
Rick Froman, John Brown University
Arthur Gonchar, University of LaVerne
Peter Gram, Pensacola Junior College
Jonathan Grimes, Community College of
Baltimore County
Lynn Haller, Morehead State University
Mary Elizabeth Hannah, University of
Detroit
Jack Hartnett, Virginia Commonwealth
University
Carol Hayes, Delta State University
Karen Hayes, Guilford College
Michael Hillard, Albuquerque TVI
Community College
Peter Hornby, Plattsburgh State
University
Deana Julka, University of Portland
Brian Kelley, Bridgewater College
Sheila Kennison, Oklahoma State
University
Laurel Krautwurst, Blue Ridge
Community College
Judith Levine, Farmingdale State College
Dawn Lewis, Prince George’s
Community College
Deborah Long, East Carolina University
Margaret Lynch, San Francisco State
University
Jean Mandernach, University of
Nebraska, Kearney
Marc Martin, Palm Beach Community
College
Richard Mascolo, El Camino College
Steven Meier, University of Idaho
Nancy Mellucci, Los Angeles
Community College District
Yozan Dirk Mosig, University of
Nebraska
Melinda Myers-Johnson, Humboldt
State University
Michael Nikolakis, Faulkner State
College
Cindy Nordstrom, Southern Illinois
University
Laura O’Sullivan, Florida Gulf Coast
University
Ginger Osborne, Santa Ana College
Vernon Padgett, Rio Hondo College
Jeff Pedroza, Santa Ana College
Laura Phelan, St. John Fisher College
Faye Plascak-Craig, Marian College
Skip Pollock, Mesa Community College
Chris Robin, Madisonville Community
College
Lynne Schmelter-Davis, Brookdale
County College of Monmouth
Mark Shellhammer, Fairmont State
College
Christina Sinisi, Charleston Southern
University
Patricia Stephenson, Miami Dade
College
Mary Ellen Dello Stritto, Western
Oregon University
Mario Sussman, Indiana University of
Pennsylvania
John Teske, Elizabethtown College
Stacy Walker, Kingwood College
Robert Wellman, Fitchburg State
University
Alan Whitlock, University of Idaho
Finally, we offer our thanks to all of the colleagues whose feedback has improved our
book. Thanks also to all instructors of this most-difficult-to-teach course for taking on
the pedagogical challenge and conveying to students their passion about the joys and
relevance of psychological science and practice.
If you have any recommendations of your own that we should not overlook for
the next edition, please write to us! Address your comments to Dr. Robert Johnson,
CoreConcepts7@gmail.com.

A B O U T T H E A U T H O R S
Philip Zimbardo, PhD, Stanford University professor, has been teaching the
introductory psychology course for 50 years and has been writing the basic text for
this course, as well as the faculty guides and student workbooks, for the past 35 years.
In addition, he has helped to develop and update the PBS-TV series, Discovering Psychol-
ogy, which is used in many high school and university courses both nationally and
internationally. He has been called “The Face and Voice of Psychology” because of
this popular series and his other media presentations. Phil also loves to conduct and
publish research on a wide variety of subjects, as well as teach and engage in public
and social service activities. He has published more than 400 professional and popular
articles and chapters, including 50 books of all kinds. He recently published a trade
book on the psychology of evil, The Lucifer Effect, that relates his classic Stanford
Prison Experiment to the abuses at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib Prison. His new book is The
Time Paradox, but his new passion is helping to create wise and effective everyday
heroes as part of his Heroic Imagination Project. Please see these websites for more
information: www.zimbardo.com; www.prisonexp.org; www.PsychologyMatters.org;
www.theTimeParadox.com; www.LuciferEffect.com; www.HeroicImagination.org.
Robert Johnson, PhD, taught introductory psychology for 28 years at Umpqua
Community College. He acquired an interest in cross-cultural psychology during a
Fulbright summer in Thailand, followed by many more trips abroad to Japan, Korea,
Latin America, Britain, and, most recently, to Indonesia. Currently, he is working on a
book on the psychology in Shakespeare. Bob is especially interested in applying psy-
chological principles to the teaching of psychology and in encouraging linkages be-
tween psychology and other disciplines. In keeping with those interests, he founded
the Pacific Northwest Great Teachers Seminar, of which he was the director for
20 years. Bob was also one of the founders of Psychology Teachers at Community
Colleges (PT@CC), serving as its executive committee chair during 2004. That same
year, he also received the Two-Year College Teaching Award given by the Society
for the Teaching of Psychology. Bob has long been active in APA, APS, the Western
Psychological Association, and the Council of Teachers of Undergraduate Psychology.
Vivian McCann, a senior faculty member in psychology at Portland Community
College in Portland, Oregon, teaches a wide variety of courses, including introductory
psychology, human relations, intimate relationships, and social psychology. Born and
raised in the California desert just 10 miles from the Mexican border, she learned
early on the importance of understanding cultural backgrounds and values in effective
communication and in teaching, which laid the foundation for her current interest in
teaching and learning psychology from diverse cultural perspectives. She loves to travel
and learn about people and cultures and to nurture the same passions in her students.
She has led groups of students on four trips abroad, and in her own travels has visited
24 countries so far. Vivian maintains a strong commitment to teaching excellence and
has developed and taught numerous workshops in that area. She has served on the
APA’s Committee for Psychology Teachers at Community Colleges (PT@CC) and is
an active member of the Western Psychological Association and APS. She is also the
author of Human Relations: The Art and Science of Building Effective Relationships.
xxv

www.zimbardo.com

www.prisonexp.org

www.PsychologyMatters.org

www.theTimeParadox.com

www.LuciferEffect.com

www.HeroicImagination.org

Mind, Behavior, and
Psychological Science1
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
1.1 What Is Psychology—and What
Is It NOT ?
Psychology: It’s More Than You Think
Psychology Is Not Psychiatry
Thinking Critically about Psychology and
Pseudo-Psychology
Psychology is a broad field with
many specialties, but fundamentally,
psychology is the science of behavior
and mental processes.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
In this book, Key Questions and Core
Concepts help you organize what you
learn.
1.2 What Are Psychology’s Six Main
Perspectives?
Separation of Mind and Body and the
Modern Biological Perspective
The Founding of Scientific Psychology and
the Modern Cognitive Perspective
The Behavioral Perspective: Focusing on
Observable Behavior
The Whole-Person Perspectives:
Psychodynamic, Humanistic, and Trait
and Temperament
The Developmental Perspective: Changes
Arising from Nature and Nurture
The Sociocultural Perspective: The
Individual in Context
The Changing Face of Psychology
Six main viewpoints dominate
modern psychology—the biological,
cognitive, behavioral, whole-person,
developmental, and sociocultural
perspectives—each of which grew out
of radical new concepts about mind
and behavior.
Psychology as a Major
To call yourself a psychologist, you’ll
need graduate training.
Psychologists, like all other scientists,
use the scientific method to test their
ideas empirically.
The Perils of Pseudo-psychology
Critical thinking failures often result in
disastrous consequences.
CHAPTER PROBLEM How would psychology test the claim that sugar makes children hyperactive?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Facilitated Communication
1.3 How Do Psychologists Develop
New Knowledge?
Four Steps in the Scientific Method
Five Types of Psychological Research
Controlling Biases in Psychological Research
Ethical Issues in Psychological Research

3
A FTER THE KIDS HAD ALL THAT SUGAR—THE CAKE, ICE CREAM, PUNCH, and candy—they were absolutely bouncing off the walls!” said one of our friends who was describing a birthday party for her 8-year-old daughter.I must have had a skeptical look on my face, because she stopped her story
short and asked, “You don’t believe it?” Then she added, “You psychologists just don’t believe
in common sense, do you?”
I responded that what people think of as “common sense” can be wrong, reminding her
that common sense once held that Earth was flat. “Perhaps,” I suggested, “it might be wrong
again—this time about the so-called ‘sugar high’ people think they observe.
“It could have been just the excitement of the party,” I added.
“Think they observe?” my friend practically shouted. “Can you prove that sugar doesn’t
make children hyperactive?”
“No,” I said. “Science doesn’t work that way. But what I could do,” I ventured, “is perform
an experiment to test the idea that sugar makes children ‘hyper.’ Then we could see whether
your claim passes or fails the test.”
My timing wasn’t the best for getting her involved in a discussion of scientific experiments,
so let me pose the problem to you.
PROBLEM: How would psychology test the claim that sugar makes children hyperactive?
We invite you to think about how we might set up such an experiment. We could, for example,
give kids a high-sugar drink and see what happens. But because people often see only what
“

4 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
they expect to see, our expectations about sugar and hyperactivity could easily influence our
observations. So how could we design an experiment about sugar and hyperactivity that also
accounts for our expectations? It is not an easy problem, but we will think it through together,
and by the end of this chapter, you will have the tools you need to solve it.
Every chapter in the book will begin with a problem such as this—a problem aimed at
getting you actively involved in learning psychology and thinking critically about some impor-
tant concepts in the chapter. Solving the problem with us, rather than just passively reading
the words, will make the concepts more meaningful to you and more easily remembered (see
Chapter 5 to find out why).
The important concept illustrated by the “sugar high” problem is one of the most fun-
damental concepts in all of psychology: using the scientific method to explore the mind and
behavior. But before we get into the details of the scientific method, let’s clarify what we mean
by the term psychology itself.
1.1 KEY QUESTION
What Is Psychology—and What Is It NOT?
“I hope you won’t psychoanalyze me,” says the student at the office door. It is a frequent
refrain and an occupational hazard for professors of psychology. But students need not
worry about being psychoanalyzed, for two reasons. First, not all psychologists diagnose
and treat mental problems—in fact, those who do are actually in the minority among pro-
fessors of psychology. Second, only a few psychologists are actually psychoanalysts. The
term psychoanalysis refers to a highly specialized and relatively uncommon form of ther-
apy. You will learn more about the distinction between psychologists and psychoanalysts
later in the chapter—but, in the meantime, don’t fret that your professor will try to find
something wrong with you. In fact, your professor is much more likely to be interested in
helping you learn the material than in looking for signs of psychological disorder.
So, you might wonder, if psychology is not all about mental disorders and therapy,
what is it all about?
The term psychology comes from psyche, the ancient Greek word for “mind,” and
the suffix -ology, meaning “a field of study.” Literally, then, psychology means “the
study of the mind.” Most psychologists, however, use the broader definition given in
our Core Concept for this section of the chapter:
Core Concept 1.1
Psychology is a broad field, with many specialties, but fundamentally
psychology is the science of behavior and mental processes.
One important point to note about this definition: Psychology includes not only
mental processes but also behaviors. In other words, psychology’s domain covers both
internal mental processes that we observe only indirectly (such as thinking, feeling,
and desiring) as well as external, observable behaviors (such as talking, smiling, and
running). A second important part of our definition concerns the scientific compo-
nent of psychology. In brief, the science of psychology is based on objective, verifiable
evidence—not just the opinions of experts and authorities, as we often find in non-
scientific fields. We will give a more complete explanation of the science of psychol-
ogy in the last part of this chapter. For now, though, let’s take a closer look at what
psychologists actually do.
Psychology: It’s More Than You Think
Psychology covers more territory than most people realize. As we have seen, not
all psychologists are therapists. Many work in education, industry, sports, prisons,
psychology The science of behavior and mental
processes.

What Is Psychology—and What Is It NOT? 5
government, churches and temples, private practice, human
relations, advertising, and in the psychology departments of
colleges and universities (see Figure 1.1). Others work for
engineering firms, consulting firms, and the courts (both the
judicial and the NBA variety). In these diverse settings, psy-
chologists perform a wide range of tasks, including teaching,
research, testing, and equipment design—as well as psycho-
therapy. In fact, psychology’s specialties are too numerous
to cover them all here, but we can give you a taste of the
field’s diversity by first dividing psychology into three broad
groups.
Three Ways of Doing Psychology Broadly speaking,
psychologists cluster into three main categories: experi-
mental psychologists, teachers of psychology, and applied
psychologists. Some overlap exists among these groups, how-
ever, because many psychologists take on multiple roles in
their work.
Experimental psychologists (sometimes called research psychologists) constitute
the smallest of the three groups. Nevertheless, they perform most of the research
that creates new psychological knowledge (Frincke & Pate, 2004).1 For example, an
experimental psychologist would be well equipped to study the effects of sugar on
hyperactivity in children. While some experimental psychologists can be found in in-
dustry or private research institutes, the majority work at a college or university, where
most also teach.
Teachers of psychology are traditionally found at colleges and universities, where
their assignments typically involve not only teaching but also research and publica-
tion. Increasingly, however, psychologists can be found at community colleges and
high schools, where their teaching load is higher because these institutions generally
do not require research (American Psychological Association, 2007b; Johnson &
Rudmann, 2004).
Applied psychologists use the knowledge developed by experimental psychologists to
tackle human problems of all kinds, such as toy or equipment design, criminal analy-
sis, and psychological treatment. They work in a wide variety of places, ranging from
schools, clinics, and social service agencies to factories, airports, hospitals, and casinos.
All told, about two-thirds of the doctoral-level psychologists in the United States work
primarily as applied psychologists (Kohout & Wicherski, 2000; Wicherski et al., 2009).
Applied Psychological Specialties Some of the most popular applied specialties
include:
• Industrial and organizational psychologists (often called I/O psychologists)
specialize in personnel selection and in tailoring the work environment to
maximize productivity and morale. They may, for example, create programs to
motivate employees or to improve managers’ leadership skills. I/O psychologists
also conduct market research and examine current issues such as attitudes toward
pregnancy in the workplace (Shrader, 2001).
• Sports psychologists help athletes improve their performance by planning effective
practice sessions, enhancing motivation, and learning to control emotions under
pressure. Some focus exclusively on professional athletes, and others work with
recreational athletes. Sports psychologists may also, for example, study various
types of personalities and their relation to high-risk endeavors such as firefighting,
parachuting, or scuba diving.
1Throughout this book, you will find citations in parentheses, calling your attention to a complete bibliographic
reference found in the References section, beginning on p. R-1, near the end of this book. These brief in-text
citations give the authors’ last names and the publication date. With the complete references in hand, your library
can help you find the original source.
experimental psychologists Psychologists
who do research on basic psychological processes—as
contrasted with applied psychologists. Experimental
psychologists are also called research psychologists.
teachers of psychology Psychologists whose
primary job is teaching, typically in high schools,
colleges, and universities.
applied psychologists Psychologists who use
the knowledge developed by experimental psychologists
to solve human problems.
FIGURE 1.1
Work Settings of Psychologists
Source: 2009 Doctorate Employment Survey, APA Center for Workforce Studies. March
2011.
Independent
practiceOther counseling
sevices
Other educational
settings
Government
Business,
Consulting,
Other
Hospitals and
HMOs
Universities, colleges,
and medical schools
6%
6%
8%
33%21%
15%
11%
Read
MyPsychLab
about I/O Psychology at

6 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
• School psychologists are experts in teaching and learning.
They deal with issues impacting learning, family or personal
crises influencing school performance, or social conditions
such as gangs, teen pregnancy, or substance abuse. They
sometimes diagnose learning or behavioral problems and
work with teachers, students, and parents to help students
succeed in school. Many school psychologists work for
school districts, where their work includes administering,
scoring, and interpreting psychological tests.
• Clinical and counseling psychologists help people improve
social and emotional adjustment or work through difficult
choices in relationships, careers, or education. Almost half
of all doctoral-level psychologists list clinical or counseling
psychology as their specialty (Wichersky et al., 2009).
• Forensic psychologists provide psychological expertise to the
legal and judicial system. One of the most recently recognized
specialties in psychology, forensic psychology has gained
rapid popularity due in part to such TV shows as
Criminal Minds, Profiler, and CSI. And, while a real day in the life of forensic
psychologists may not be as glamorous or fast paced as their television counter-
parts, the field is burgeoning with opportunities. Forensic psychologists may test
inmates in prisons or forensic hospitals to determine readiness for release or fitness
to stand trial, evaluate testimony in cases of rape or child abuse, or help with jury
selection (Clay, 2009; Huss, 2001).
• Environmental psychologists aim to improve human interaction with our envi-
ronment. They may, for example, study the impact of inner-city garden spaces on
children’s academic performance or determine how best to encourage environmen-
tally friendly behavior such as recycling. In private practice, environmental psy-
chologists sometimes help clients maintain their commitment to sustainability or
conduct workshops teaching people the mental health benefits of interacting with
nature (Novotney, 2009).
More information on career possibilities in psychology can be found in Careers in
Psychology for the Twenty-First Century, published by the American Psychological
Association (2003a) and available online at www.apa.org/careers/resources/guides/
careers .
Psychology Is Not Psychiatry
Just as beginning psychology students may think all psychologists are clinical psychol-
ogists, they also may not know the distinction between psychology and psychiatry. So
let’s clear up that confusion, just in case you encounter a test question on the topic.
Virtually all psychiatrists, but only some psychologists, treat mental disorders—and
there the resemblance ends. Psychiatry is a medical specialty, not part of psychology at
all. Psychiatrists hold MD (Doctor of Medicine) degrees and, in addition, have special-
ized training in the treatment of mental and behavioral problems, typically with drugs.
Therefore, psychiatrists are licensed to prescribe medicines and perform other medical
procedures. Consequently, psychiatrists tend to treat patients with more severe mental
disorders (such as schizophrenia) and also to view patients from a medical perspective,
as persons with mental “diseases.”
By contrast, psychology is a much broader field that encompasses the whole range
of human behavior and mental processes, from brain function to social interaction and
from mental well-being to mental disorder. For most psychologists, graduate training
emphasizes research methods, along with advanced study in a specialty such as those
listed earlier. Moreover, while psychologists usually hold doctoral degrees, their train-
ing is not usually medical training, and thus they are not generally licensed to prescribe
medications (Carlat, 2010; Practice Directorate Staff, 2005). Psychologists, then, work
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Clinical psychologists help
people deal with mental
disorders and other psychological
problems (p. 558).
psychiatry A medical specialty dealing with the
diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.
Applying psychological principles of learning and motivation, sports
psychologists work with athletes to improve performance.
Explore the Concept Psychologists at
Work at MyPsychLab

www.apa.org/careers/resources/guides/careers

www.apa.org/careers/resources/guides/careers

What Is Psychology—and What Is It NOT? 7
in a wide variety of fields, all of which view people
from a psychological perspective. This perspective is il-
lustrated by clinical and counseling psychologists, who
are likely to view the people they are helping as clients
rather than patients.
So, now you know that psychiatry is not psychol-
ogy. Next, we’ll look at something else that often gets
confused with psychology: pseudo-psychology.
Thinking Critically about Psychology
and Pseudo-Psychology
TV series like Medium and Supernatural continue a
long tradition of programs that play on people’s fasci-
nation with claims of mysterious powers of the mind
and supernatural influences on our personalities. Your
daily horoscope does the same thing—never mind that
astrology has been thoroughly debunked (Schick &
Vaughn, 2001). Neither is there any factual basis for
graphology (the bogus science of handwriting analysis),
fortune telling, or the supposed power of subliminal messages to influence our behavior.
All these fall under the heading of pseudo-psychology: unsupported psychological beliefs
masquerading as scientific truth.
Certainly horoscopes and paranormal claims can be fun as pure entertainment, but
it is important to know where fact-based reality ends and imagination-based fantasy
begins. After all, you wouldn’t want to stake an important decision about your health
or welfare on false information, would you? Thus, one of the goals of this text is
to help you think critically when you hear extraordinary claims about behavior and
mental processes.
What Is Critical Thinking? Those who talk about critical thinking often find them-
selves in the position of Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, who famously was
unable to define pornography but concluded, “I know it when I see it.” Like Justice
Stewart, your fearless authors (Phil, Bob, and Vivian) cannot offer a definition of criti-
cal thinking with which everyone will agree. Nevertheless, we are willing to jump
into the fray with a list of six critical thinking skills we wish to emphasize in this text.
Each is based on a specific question we believe should be asked when confronting new
ideas.
1. What is the source? Does the person making the claim have real expertise in the
field? Suppose, for example, you hear a newscast on which a politician or pundit
declares that juvenile lawbreakers can be “scared straight.” The story explains that,
in the program, first-time offenders receive near-abusive treatment from felons who
try to scare them away from a life of crime with tales of harsh prison life. Such
programs have, in fact, been tried in several states (Finckenauer et al., 1999). But
does the person making the claim have any real knowledge of the subject? Does
the claimant have legitimate credentials, or is he or she merely a self-proclaimed
“expert?” One way to find out is to go online and examine the individual’s ref-
erences and standing within the field. Also, find out whether the source has
something substantial to gain from the claim. If it’s a medical breakthrough, for
example, does the claimant stand to make money from a new drug or medical
device? In the case of a “scared straight” program, is the source trying to score
political points or get votes?
2. Is the claim reasonable or extreme? Life is too short to be critical of everything,
of course, so the trick is to be selective. How? As the famous astronomer Carl
Sagan once said about reports of alien abductions, “Extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence” (Nova Online, 1996). Critical thinkers, then, are skeptical
pseudo-psychology Erroneous assertions or
practices set forth as being scientific psychology.
critical thinking skills This book emphasizes
six critical thinking skills, based on the following ques-
tions: What is the source? Is the claim reasonable or
extreme? What is the evidence? Could bias contaminate
the conclusion? Does the reasoning avoid common
fallacies? Does the issue require multiple perspectives?
Fortune tellers, astrologers, and other practitioners of pseudo-psychology
don’t bother to verify their claims with careful research—nor do their clients
engage in critical thinking about such practices.

8 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
of claims touted as “breakthroughs” or “revolutionary.” Certainly, there are
occasionally breakthroughs or revolutionary new treatments that work—but they
are relatively rare. Most new scientific developments are extensions of existing
knowledge. So, claims that conflict with well-established knowledge should raise a
red flag. For example, beware of ads that promise to help you quit smoking or lose
weight with little or no effort. In the case of “scared straight” programs or any
other quick fix for a difficult problem, remember that simple solutions to complex
problems rarely exist.
3. What is the evidence? This is one of the most important guidelines to critical think-
ing, and you will learn more about what constitutes scientific evidence in the last
section of this chapter. For now, though, beware of anecdotal evidence or testimoni-
als proclaiming the dramatic effects of a new program. These first-hand accounts
tend to be quite convincing, so they often lure us into believing them. Testimonials
and anecdotes, though—no matter how compelling—are not scientific evidence.
They merely represent the experiences of a few carefully selected individuals. It
would be risky, and perhaps even dangerous, to assume that what seems true for
some people must also be true for everyone.
What does the evidence say about “scared straight” programs? Not only do
they not work, but they can also actually inoculate juveniles against fears about
prison. Surprising as it may seem, the hard evidence indicates that teens exposed to
such treatments, on average, subsequently get into more trouble than do those not
given the “scared straight” treatment (Petrosino et al., 2003).
4. Could bias contaminate the conclusion? Critical thinkers know the conditions
under which biases are likely to occur and can recognize common types of bias
we will examine in this chapter. For example, they would question whether medi-
cal researchers who are involved in assessing new drugs can truly remain unbiased
if they are receiving money from the companies whose drugs they are testing
(McCook, 2006).
The form of bias most applicable to our “scared straight” example is
emotional bias: People not only fear crime and criminals but also are often in
favor of harsh treatments for criminal behavior, as evidenced by the recent spate
of “three strikes” laws (which mandate a lifetime in prison after three felony
convictions). Accordingly, the “scared straight” approach may appeal to people
simply because of its harshness. Also, people with a loved one who has gotten
into some trouble may be especially vulnerable to promises of easy reform: Their
desire for help can interfere with clear thinking.
Another common form of bias is confirmation bias, the all-too-human ten-
dency to remember events that confirm our beliefs and ignore or forget contra-
dictory evidence (Halpern, 2002; Nickerson, 1998). For example, confirmation
bias explains why people persist in their beliefs that astrology works: They
remember the predictions that seemed accurate and forget the ones that missed
the mark. Confirmation bias also explains why gamblers have better recollections
for their wins than for their losses, or why we persist in thinking a particular
object is our lucky charm. Amazingly, recent research reveals this bias may be
partly biological in nature. In a study done before a recent presidential election,
people listened to their favorite politicians making statements that contradicted
themselves. Upon hearing the contradictory statement, brain circuits associated
with reasoning in the listeners suddenly shut down, while brain regions most in-
volved with emotion remained active (Shermer, 2006; Westen et al., 2006). It was
as though the brain was saying, “I don’t want to hear anything that conflicts with
my beliefs.” Thus, we may have to exert extra effort and diligence to overcome
this bias.
5. Does the reasoning avoid common fallacies? We will study several common logical
fallacies in this book, but the one most applicable to the “scared straight” example
is the assumption that common sense is a substitute for scientific evidence. In fact,
emotional bias The tendency to make judgments
based on attitudes and feelings, rather than on the
basis of a rational analysis of the evidence.
confirmation bias The tendency to attend to
evidence that complements and confirms our beliefs or
expectations, while ignoring evidence that does not.
anecdotal evidence First-hand accounts
that vividly describe the experiences of one or a few
people, but may erroneously be assumed to be
scientific evidence.

What Is Psychology—and What Is It NOT? 9
in many cases there exists common sense to support both sides of an issue. For
example, we hear that “Birds of a feather flock together”—but we also hear that
“Opposites attract.” Similarly, we are told that “The early bird gets the worm,”
but aren’t we also cautioned that “Haste makes waste?” Which, then, is true? Only
an examination of the evidence can reliably provide the answer. Stay tuned later
in this chapter, and in Chapter 6, for other common fallacies that derail critical
thinking.
6. Does the issue require multiple perspectives? The “scared straight” intervention
makes the simplistic assumption that fear of punishment is the best deterrent
to delinquency, so inducing fear will prevent delinquency. A more sophisticated
view sees delinquency as a complex problem that demands scrutiny from several
perspectives. Psychologists, for example, may look at delinquency from the stand-
points of learning, social influence, or personality traits. Economists would be
interested in the financial incentives for delinquency. And sociologists would focus
on such things as gangs, poverty, and community structures. Surely such a multi-
faceted problem will require a more complex solution than a threatening program.
Thinking Critically about the Chapter Problem How would you apply these criti-
cal thinking guidelines to the chapter-opening problem about whether sugar makes
children hyperactive? First, consider the source: Is the mother of an 8-year-old an ex-
pert on biological effects of sugar? Assuming she is not, you’d have to wonder if the
source of her belief is a reliable one or if she is just repeating some “common sense”
she’s often heard but never questioned. Second, examine the evidence: Have scientific
tests been conducted to measure the effects of sugar on children? Third, could any bi-
ases be at work? For example, if we expect children to be hyperactive after consuming
sugar, that is likely what we will observe. Fourth, is the claimant avoiding common
fallacies in reasoning? In this case, even if we can prove that kids who consume more
sugar are more hyperactive, we can’t be sure that sugar is the cause: Alternatively, per-
haps kids who are already hyperactive eat more sugar as a means of maintaining their
high need for activity. Finally, we should recognize that there are probably other rea-
sons kids get excited at parties. We will explore some of these competing perspectives
in the second section of this chapter.
You may have seen the “scared straight”
issue parodied on the TV show Saturday
Night Live.

10 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Throughout this book, we show you how to use psychology to learn psychology. For
example, we have built in learning tools to help you construct a mental map (sometimes
called a cognitive map or concept map) of every chapter, which is guaranteed to make
your studying of psychology easier. Among the most important are the numbered Key
Questions and Core Concepts. And in MyPsychLab, you will find a tool specially de-
signed to help you to construct concept maps of each chapter.
The Key Questions, which act as the main headings in each chapter, give you a
“heads up” by signaling what to watch for as you read. For example, Key Ques-
tion 1.1 for this section of the chapter asked, WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGY—AND
WHAT IS IT NOT? This tells you this section will define psychology and make
some distinctions between psychology and other fields with which it may be con-
fused or overlap. You are much more likely to remember new concepts if you ap-
proach them with an appropriate Key Question in mind (Glaser, 1990). You can
also use the Key Question to check your understanding of each section before an
exam. If you have a study partner, try asking each other to give detailed answers
to the Key Questions.
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE OR PSYCHOBABBLE?
Now, let’s put a sampling of your psycho-
logical beliefs to the test. Some of the
following statements are true, and some
are false. Don’t worry if you get a few—or
all—of the items wrong: You will have lots
of company. The point is that what so-
called common sense teaches us about
psychological processes may not withstand
the scrutiny of a scientific test. Mark each
of the following statements as “true” or
“false.” (The answers are given at the end.)
1. _________ It is a myth that most people
use only about 10% of their brains.
2. _________ During your most vivid
dreams, your body may be paralyzed.
3. _________ Psychological stress can
cause physical illness.
4. _________ The color red exists only as
a sensation in the brain. There is no
“red” in the world outside the brain.
5. _________ Bipolar (manic–depressive)
disorder is caused by a conflict in the
unconscious mind.
6. _________ The newborn child’s mind
is essentially a “blank slate” on which
everything he or she will know must be
“written” (learned) by experience.
7. _________ Everything that happens to us
leaves a permanent record in memory.
8. _________ You were born with all the
brain cells that you will ever have.
9. _________ Intelligence is a nearly pure
genetic trait that is fixed at the same
level throughout a person’s life.
10. _________ Polygraph (“lie detector”)
devices are remarkably accurate in
detecting physical responses that, in
the eye of a trained examiner, reliably
indicate when a suspect is lying.
Answers The first four items are true; the rest
are false. Here are some brief explanations
for each item; you will find more detail in the
chapters indicated in parentheses. 1. True:
This is a myth. We use all parts of our brains
every day. (See Chapter 2, “Biopsychology,
Neuroscience, and Human Nature.”)
2. True: During our most vivid dreams, which
occur during rapid eye movement sleep
(REM), the voluntary muscles in our body
are paralyzed, with the exception of those
controlling our eyes. (See Chapter 8, “States
of Consciousness.”) 3. True: The link between
mind and body can make you sick when you
are under chronic stress. (See Chapter 14,
“From Stress to Health and Well-Being.”)
4. True: Strange as it may seem, all sensations
of color are created in the brain itself. Light
waves do have different frequencies, but they
have no color. The brain interprets the various
frequencies of light as different colors. (See
Chapter 3, “Sensation and Perception.”)
5. False: There is no evidence at all that
unconscious conflicts play a role in bipolar
disorder. Instead, the evidence suggests a
strong biochemical component. The disorder
usually responds well to certain drugs, hinting
that it involves faulty brain chemistry. Research
also suggests that this faulty chemistry
may have a genetic basis. (See Chapter 12,
“Psychological Disorders,” and Chapter 13,
“Therapies for Psychological Disorders.”)
6. False: Far from being a “blank slate,” the
newborn child has a large repertoire of built-in
abilities and protective reflexes. The “blank
slate” myth also ignores the child’s genetic
potential. (See Chapter 7, “Development
over the Lifespan.”) 7. False: Although many
details of our lives are remembered, there is no
evidence that memory records all the details
of our lives. In fact, we have good reason to
believe that most of the information around
us never reaches memory and that what does
reach memory often becomes distorted. (See
Chapter 5, “Memory.”) 8. False: Contrary to
what scientists thought just a few years ago,
some parts of the brain continue to create
new cells throughout life. (See Chapter 2,
“Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human
Nature.”) 9. False: Intelligence is the result
of both heredity and environment. Because it
depends, in part, on environment, your level
of intelligence (as measured by an IQ test) can
change throughout your life. (See Chapter 6,
“Thinking and Intelligence.”) 10. False: Even
the most expert polygrapher can incorrectly
classify a truth-teller as a liar or fail to identify
someone who is lying. Objective evidence
supporting the accuracy of lie detectors is
meager. (See Chapter 9, “Motivation and
Emotion.”)
Map the Concepts at
MyPsychLab

What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives? 11
Think of Core Concepts as brief answers to the Key Questions. (In fact, each one is
numbered to match its Key Question.) In other words, a Core Concept highlights the
central idea in each section—much like a preview at the movies. Recognize, though,
that a Core Concept is not a complete answer but rather a capsule summary of ideas to
be fleshed out. For example, the Core Concept for this section says:
Psychology is a broad field with many specialties, but fundamentally,
psychology is the science of behavior and mental processes.
This alerts you to the two important ideas in this section: (1) psychology studies both
the mind and behavior, and (2) there is a variety of specialties within psychology.
Knowing these overarching themes will help you find the important ideas and organize
them in your mind.
After you have constructed the foundation of your mental map with the overarch-
ing themes, fill in the details using the boldfaced terms in that section so your map
shows how each term fits into the theme. For example, can you explain the differ-
ence between applied, experimental, and teaching psychologists? Between psychology,
psychiatry, and pseudo-psychology?
In summary, then, Key Questions and Core Concepts lead you to the big ideas in
the chapter and provide a framework for the various concepts in that chapter. They
will help you step back from the details to see meaningful patterns—as the saying
goes—to distinguish the forest from the trees (and consequently, to understand how all
the trees fit into the forest).
1.2 KEY QUESTION
What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives?
The shape of modern psychology has been molded by its history, which dates back
some 25 centuries to the Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. These
sages not only speculated about consciousness and madness; they also knew that emo-
tions could distort thinking and that our perceptions are merely interpretations of the
external world. Even today, people would probably agree with many of these ancient
conjectures—and so would modern psychology.
The Greeks, however, get only partial credit for laying the foundations of psychol-
ogy. At roughly the same time, Asian and African societies were developing their own
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: In what way is modern psychology’s scope broader than
the Greek concept of psyche?
2. RECALL: Name two types of applied psychologists.
3. TRUE OR FALSE: Most psychologists are therapists.
4. APPLICATION: Which critical thinking questions discussed
in this section would be most applicable to the argument
that harsher sentences are the best way of dealing with crime
because “punishment is the only language that criminals
understand”?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: How is psychology
different from psychiatry and other disciplines that deal with
people?
Answers 1. Modern psychology studies behavior as well as the mind. 2. There are many sorts of applied psychologists. The ones mentioned in
this chapter are I/O psychologists, sports psychologists, school psychologists, clinical and counseling psychologists, forensic psychologists, and
environmental psychologists. 3. False. 4. Probably the most applicable for this claim would be these: “What is the evidence?” and “Could bias
contaminate the conclusion?” But we wouldn’t disagree with any other questions you may have listed because, just as with the “scared straight”
issue, they could all apply to a critical analysis of the claim. 5. Psychology is a broader field, covering all aspects of behavior and mental processes.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

12 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
psychological ideas. In Asia, followers of yoga and Buddhism were exploring conscious-
ness, which they attempted to control with meditation. Meanwhile, in Africa, other ex-
planations for personality and mental disorders were emerging from traditional spiritual
beliefs (Berry et al., 1992). Based on these folk psychologies, shamans (healers) devel-
oped therapies rivaling the effectiveness of treatments used in psychology and psychiatry
today (Lambo, 1978). It was, however, the Greek tradition and, later, the Church that
most influenced the winding developmental path of Western psychology as a science.
What role did the Church play in shaping the study of psychology? During medieval
centuries, for example, clerics actively suppressed inquiry into human nature, partly in
an attempt to discourage interest in the “world of the flesh.” For medieval Christians,
the human mind and soul were inseparable and—like the mind of God—presented a
mystery that mortals should never try to solve.
Change of this entrenched viewpoint did not come easily. It took a series of radi-
cal new ideas, spaced over several hundred years, to break the medieval mindset and
lay the intellectual foundation for modern psychology—which brings us to our Core
Concept for this section:
Core Concept 1.2
Six main viewpoints dominate modern psychology—the biological,
cognitive, behavioral, whole-person, developmental, and sociocultural
perspectives—each of which grew out of radical new concepts about
mind and behavior.
As we examine these perspectives, you will see that each viewpoint offers its own
unique explanation for human behavior. Taken together, they comprise psychology’s
multiple perspectives, each of which will become an important tool in your “psychol-
ogy toolbox” for understanding human behavior. To help you see for yourself how
useful these perspectives can be, we will apply each one to a problem with which many
students struggle: procrastination. Let’s begin with the biological perspective.
Separation of Mind and Body and the Modern Biological Perspective
The 17th-century philosopher René Descartes (Day-CART) proposed the first radi-
cal new concept that eventually led to modern psychology: a distinction between
the spiritual mind and the physical body. The genius of Descartes’ insight was that it
allowed the Church to keep the mind off limits for scientific inquiry, while simultane-
ously permitting the study of human sensations and behaviors because they were based
on physical activity in the nervous system. His proposal fit well with exciting new
discoveries about biology, in which scientists had just learned how the sense organs
of animals convert stimulation into nerve impulses and muscular responses. Such dis-
coveries, when combined with Descartes’ separation of mind and body, allowed scien-
tists to demonstrate that biological processes, rather than mysterious spiritual forces,
caused sensations and simple reflexive behaviors.
The Modern Biological Perspective Four hundred years later, Descartes’ revolu-
tionary perspective provides the basis for the modern biological perspective. No lon-
ger constrained by the dictates of the medieval Church, however, modern biological
psychologists have rejoined mind and body (although they leave issues of the soul to
religion), and now view the mind as a product of the brain.
In this current view, our personalities, preferences, behavior patterns, and abilities
all stem from our physical makeup. Accordingly, biological psychologists search for
the causes of our behavior in the brain, the nervous system, the endocrine (hormone)
system, and the genes. Procrastination, from this perspective, may result from a certain
type of brain chemistry (Liu, 2004), which could be inherited. While they don’t deny
the value of other perspectives on mind and behavior, biological psychologists aim to
learn as much as possible about the physical underpinnings of psychological processes.
biological perspective The psychological
perspective that searches for the causes of behavior in
the functioning of genes, the brain and nervous system,
and the endocrine (hormone) system.

What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives? 13
Two Variations on the Biological Theme As you might imagine, the biological
view has strong roots in medicine and biological science. In fact, the emerging field of
neuroscience combines biological psychology with biology, neurology, and other disci-
plines interested in brain processes. Thanks to spectacular advances in computers and
brain-imaging techniques, neuroscience is a hot area of research. Among their achieve-
ments, neuroscientists have learned how damage to certain parts of the brain can destroy
specific abilities, such as speech, social skills, or memory. And, as we will see in Chapter 8,
they now use brain wave patterns to open up the hidden world of sleep and dreams.
Another important variant of biological psychology sprouted recently from ideas
proposed by Charles Darwin some 150 years ago. This new evolutionary psychology
holds that much human behavior arises from inherited tendencies, and it has gained a
substantial boost from the recent surge of genetics research. In the evolutionary view,
our genetic makeup—underlying our most deeply ingrained behaviors—was shaped by
conditions our remote ancestors faced thousands of years ago.
According to evolutionary psychology, environmental forces have pruned the
human family tree, favoring the survival and reproduction of individuals with the most
adaptive mental and physical characteristics. Darwin called this process natural selec-
tion. Through it, the physical characteristics of our species have evolved (changed) in
the direction of characteristics that gave the fittest organisms a competitive advantage.
Some proponents of evolutionary psychology have made highly controversial
claims. In their view, even the most undesirable human behaviors, such as warfare,
rape, and infanticide, may have grown out of biological tendencies that once helped
humans adapt and survive (Buss, 2008). This approach also proposes controversial
biological explanations for certain gender differences—why, for instance, men typically
have more sexual partners than do women. Stay tuned for more of this controversy in
our discussion of sexuality in Chapter 9.
The Founding of Scientific Psychology
and the Modern Cognitive Perspective
Another radical idea that shaped the early
science of psychology came from chem-
istry, where scientists had developed the
famous periodic table after noticing pat-
terns in properties of the chemical elements.
At one stroke, the periodic table made the
relationships among the elements clear. Wil-
helm Wundt, a German scientist (who, incidentally,
became the first person to call himself a “psychologist”) wondered if he could sim-
plify the human psyche in the same way the periodic table had simplified chemistry.
Perhaps he could discover “the elements of conscious experience”! Although Wundt
never realized his dream of a periodic table for the mind, he did have this break-
through insight: The methods of science used to objectively measure and study the
natural world, such as in chemistry or physics, could be used to study the mind and
body as well.
Introspecting for the Elements of Conscious Experience “Please press the button
as soon as you see the light,” Professor Wundt might have said, as he readied to record
the reaction time between the light stimulus and a student’s response. Such simple
yet concrete experiments were common fare in 1879 in the world’s first psychology
laboratory at the University of Leipzig. There, Wundt and his students also performed
studies in which trained volunteers described their sensory and emotional responses
to various stimuli, using a technique called introspection. These were history’s first
psychology experiments: studies of what Wundt and his students proposed to be
the basic “elements” of consciousness, including sensation and perception, memory,
attention, emotion, thinking, learning, and language. All our mental activity, they
asserted, consists of different combinations of these basic processes.
neuroscience The field devoted to understanding
how the brain creates thoughts, feelings, motives, con-
sciousness, memories, and other mental processes.
evolutionary psychology A relatively new
specialty in psychology that sees behavior and mental
processes in terms of their genetic adaptations for
survival and reproduction.
introspection The process of reporting on one’s
own conscious mental experiences.
The periodic table of the chemical
elements inspired Wilhelm Wundt to
consider how the human mind might be
broken down into a similar framework of
common elements.
Table of
ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIEN
Attention Perception Memory
Emotion Sensation Thinking

14 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
Wundt’s Legacy: Structuralism Wundt’s pupil, Edward Bradford Titchener,
brought the quest for the elements of consciousness to America, where Titchener be-
gan calling it structuralism. Titchener’s term was fitting, because his goal—like that
of Wundt—was to reveal the most basic “structures” or components of the mind
(Fancher, 1979). So, even though Wundt never used the term, he is considered the
father of structuralism.
From the outset, both Wundt and Titchener became magnets for critics. Objections
especially targeted the introspective method as being too subjective. After all, said the
critics, how can we judge the accuracy of people’s descriptions of their thoughts and
feelings?
But Wundt and Titchener have had the last laugh. Even though psychologists some-
times view their ideas as quaint, they still rely on updated versions of the old structur-
alist methods. For example, you will see introspection at work when we study sleep
and dreaming, and you can experience it firsthand in the upcoming Do It Yourself!
box. Further, we can guess that Wundt and Titchener, if they were alive
today, would still be laughing for one more reason: The topics they first
identified and explored can be found as chapter headings in every intro-
ductory psychology text—including this one.
James and the Function of Mind and Behavior One of Wundt’s
most vocal critics, the American psychologist William James, argued
that the German’s approach was far too narrow. (James also said
it was boring—which didn’t help his already strained relationship
with Wundt.) Psychology should include the function of conscious-
ness, not just its structure, James argued. Appropriately, his brand
of psychology led to a “school”2 that became known as functionalism
(Fancher, 1979).
James and his followers found Charles Darwin’s ideas far more
interesting than Wundt’s. Like Darwin, James had a deep interest in
emotion that included its relation to the body and behavior (not just
as an element of consciousness, as in Wundt’s system). He also liked
structuralism A historical school of psychology
devoted to uncovering the basic structures that make
up mind and thought. Structuralists sought the
“elements” of conscious experience.
2The term school refers to a group of thinkers who share the same core beliefs.
functionalism A historical school of psychology
that believed mental processes could best be under-
stood in terms of their adaptive purpose and function.
For such demonstrations, the Gestalt
psychologists borrowed Wundt’s method
of introspection, but they objected to his
emphasis on the parts, or “elements,”
of consciousness. Instead, the Gestalt
psychologists sought to understand how
we construct “perceptual wholes,” or
Gestalts. How do we, for example, form
the perception of a face from its compo-
nent lines, shapes, colors, and textures?
Their ultimate goal was even grander:
They believed that understanding percep-
tion would lead them to an understanding
of how the brain creates perceptions. You
will get to know the Gestalt psychologists
better in Chapter 3, when we take an
in-depth look at sensation and perception.
A DEMONSTRATION FROM GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
Without reading further, decide quickly which
one of the two figures above (see Figure 1.2)
you would name “Takete” and which you
would call “Maluma.” You might want to see
if your friends give the same answer.
According to an
early 20th-century group
of German psychologists,
known as the Gestalt
psychologists, the names
you give to these figures
may reflect the asso-
ciations wired into your
brain. Indeed, most peo-
ple think that the soft-
sounding term Maluma is more appropriate
for the rounded left-hand figure, while the
sharp-sounding term Takete better fits the
pointy figure on the right (Köhler, 1947).
This was just one of many simple tests they
developed in their quest to understand how
we perceive our world.
FIGURE 1.2
Takete or Maluma?
Cognitive psychologist Elizabeth Loftus has done
pioneering studies showing the fallibility of memory
and eyewitness testimony.

What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives? 15
Darwin’s emphasis on organisms adapting to their environments. James therefore
proposed that psychology should explain how people adapt—or fail to adapt—to
the real world outside the laboratory.
The functionalists, then, became the first applied psychologists— examining how
psychology could be used to improve human life. James himself wrote extensively on
the development of learned “habits,” the psychology of religion, and teaching. He is
also thought to be the first American professor ever to ask for student evaluations
(Fancher, 1979). His follower, John Dewey, founded the “progressive education” move-
ment, which emphasized learning by doing rather than by merely listening to lectures
and memorizing facts.
Introspection was the point on which structuralism and functionalism agreed.
Ironically, their point of agreement was also their greatest point of vulnerability: The
introspective method was subjective, leaving them vulnerable to criticism that their
versions of psychology were not really scientific. Overcoming this problem took more
than half a century and the cooperation of experts from several disciplines who came
together to form the cognitive perspective.
The Modern Cognitive Perspective The development of the computer—which
became the new metaphor for the mind—gave psychology an irresistible push to-
ward a new synthesis: the modern cognitive perspective. Following in the tradition
of its structuralist, functionalist, and Gestalt ancestors, this perspective emphasizes
cognition, or mental activity, such as perceptions, interpretations, expectations,
beliefs, and memories. From this viewpoint, a person’s thoughts and actions are
the result of the unique cognitive pattern of perceptions and interpretations of her
experiences.
Today, however, the cognitive perspective boasts more objective methods of
observation than its forebears, thanks to stunning advancements in brain-imaging
techniques that allow scientists to view the brain as it engages in various mental
processes.
cognitive perspective Another of the main
psychological viewpoints distinguished by an empha-
sis on mental processes, such as learning, memory,
perception, and thinking, as forms of information
processing.
AN INTROSPECTIVE LOOK AT THE NECKER CUBE
The cube in Figure 1.3A will trick your
eye—or, more accurately, it will trick your
brain. Look at the cube for a few moments,
and suddenly it will seem to change per-
spectives. For a time it may seem as if you
were viewing the cube from the upper right
(see Figure 1.3B). Then, abruptly, it will
shift and appear as though you were seeing
it from the lower left (see Figure 1.3C).
It may take a little time for the cube
to shift the first time. But once you see
it change, you won’t be able to prevent
it from alternating back and forth, seem-
ingly at random. Try showing the cube to
a few friends and asking them what they
see. Do they see it shifting perspectives,
as you do?
This phenomenon was not discovered
by a psychologist. Rather, Louis Necker, a
Swiss geologist, first noticed it nearly 200
years ago while looking at cube-shaped
crystals under a microscope. Necker’s
amazing cube illustrates two important
points.
First, it illustrates the much-
maligned process of introspection,
pioneered by Wundt and his students.
You will note that the only way we can
demonstrate that the Necker cube
changes perspectives in our minds is
by introspection: having people look at
the cube and report what they see. And
why is this important to psychology?
Only the most hard-core behaviorists
would deny that something happens
mentally within a person looking at
the cube. In fact, the Necker cube
demonstrates that we add meaning to
our sensations—a process called per-
ception, which will be a main focus of
Chapter 3.
The second important point is this:
The Necker cube can serve as a metaphor
for the multiple perspectives in psychol-
ogy. Just as there is no single right way
to see the cube, there is no single per-
spective in psychology that gives us the
whole “truth” about behavior and mental
processes. Put another way, if we are to
understand psychology fully, we must alter-
nately shift our viewpoints among multiple
perspectives.
A
B C
FIGURE 1.3
Different Perspectives of the Necker Cube
Necker cube An ambiguous two-dimensional
figure of a cube that can be seen from different per-
spectives: The Necker cube is used here to illustrate
the notion that there is no single “right way” to view
psychological processes.

16 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
How would cognitive psychologists explain procrastination? First, they might
point out that procrastinators often underestimate how long a project might take—
illustrating the role of cognitive expectations in our behavior patterns. Also, procrastina-
tors may be victims of confirmation bias if they remember the times they previously pro-
crastinated yet completed a project on time, while forgetting the deadlines they missed.
Finally, people who put things off until the last minute may not interpret their behav-
ior as a problem—perhaps they tell themselves they do their best work under pressure.
In all these ways, cognitive psychology sheds light on the internal thinking processes
that influence procrastination and other human behaviors.
The Behavioral Perspective: Focusing on Observable Behavior
Early in the 1900s, a particularly radical and feisty group, known as the behavior-
ists, made a name for themselves by disagreeing with nearly everyone. Most famously,
they proposed the idea that the mind should not be part of psychology at all! John B.
Watson, an early leader of the behaviorist movement, argued that a truly objective sci-
ence of psychology should deal solely with observable events: physical stimuli from the
environment and the organism’s overt responses. Behaviorism, said Watson, is the sci-
ence of behavior and the measurable environmental conditions that influence it (refer
to Table 1.1).
Why did behaviorists reject mental processes—such as introspection—as a viable
area of scientific study? B. F. Skinner, another influential behaviorist, may have best
summarized this perspective when he suggested that the seductive concept of “mind”
behaviorism A historical school (as well as a
modern perspective) that has sought to make psychol-
ogy an objective science by focusing only on
behavior—to the exclusion of mental processes.
TABLE 1.1 Psychology’s Six Perspectives
Perspective What Determines Behavior? Sources
Biological perspective The brain, nervous system,
endocrine system (hormones),
and genes.
Rene Descartes
Cognitive perspective A person’s unique pattern of
perceptions, interpretations,
expectations, beliefs, and
memories.
Wilhelm Wundt and William
James
Behavioral perspective The stimuli in our environment,
and the previous consequences
of our behaviors.
John Watson and B.F. Skinner
Whole-person perspective Psychodynamic: Processes in
our unconscious mind.
Humanistic: Our innate needs
to grow, and to fulfill our best
possible potential.
Trait and temperament: Unique
personality characteristics
that are consistent over time
and across situations.
Sigmund Freud
Carl Rogers and Abraham
Maslow
Ancient Greeks
Developmental perspective The interaction of heredity and
environment, which unfolds in
predictable patterns through
the lifespan.
Mary Ainsworth, Jean Piaget
Sociocultural perspective The power of the situation.
Social and cultural influences
can overpower the influence of
all other factors in determining
behavior.
Stanley Milgram, Philip
Zimbardo
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Brain scanning methods such
as CT, PET, MRI, and fMRI use
advanced computer technology
to see into the brain without
opening the skull (p. 64).

What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives? 17
has led psychology in circles. The mind, he said, is something so
subjective that it cannot even be proved to exist (Skinner, 1990).
(Think about it: Can you prove you have a mind?) As Skinner
noted wryly, “The crucial age-old mistake is the belief that . . . what
we feel as we behave is the cause of our behaving” (Skinner, 1989,
p. 17). Thus, for the behaviorists, a person’s thoughts or emotions
became irrelevant—it was only behavior that could be reliably
observed and measured. So, for example, behaviorists examined
whether a young child would learn to avoid a harmless white rat
if the rat was paired with a sudden loud sound. Importantly, the
behaviorists refrained from making any subjective assumptions
about what the outward behavior (avoidance) represented inter-
nally (such as fear).
We can summarize the radical new idea that drove behavior-
ism this way: Psychology should be limited to the study of observ-
able behavior and the environmental stimuli that shape behavior.
This behavioral perspective called attention especially to the way
our actions are modified by their consequences, as when a child is
praised for saying “Thank you” or an adult is rewarded for good job
performance with a pay raise. The behaviorists contributed greatly
to our detailed understanding of environmental forces that impact
all kinds of human learning, and have also given us powerful strat-
egies for changing behavior by altering the environment (Alferink,
2005; Roediger, 2004). We will examine these ideas more closely in
Chapter 4.
How do you think behaviorists, with their emphasis on reward and punishment,
might explain procrastination? Consider the rewards reaped from putting off some-
thing you don’t want to do: Instead of the dreaded work, you likely spend the time
doing something you enjoy, which is instantly gratifying. Then, when you tackle the
problem at the last minute, you get rewarded by the feeling of success when you man-
age to pull it off and get it done just in the nick of time! Is it any wonder why pro-
crastination is a difficult behavior to change? Fortunately, in Chapter 4, you will learn
some effective strategies offered by these same behaviorists for overcoming this trou-
blesome pattern.
The Whole-Person Perspectives: Psychodynamic, Humanistic,
and Trait and Temperament Psychology
As the 20th century dawned, a new challenge to Wundt and structuralism came
from the Viennese physician Sigmund Freud and his disciples, who were developing
a method of treating mental disorders based on yet another radical idea: Personality
and mental disorders arise mainly from processes in the unconscious mind, outside of
our awareness (refer to Table 1.1). Although Freud was not the first to suggest that we
are unaware of some mental processes, neither structuralism nor functionalism had
imagined that unconscious processes could dominate the personality and cause mental
disorders. Moreover, Freud’s psychoanalytic theory aimed to explain the whole person,
not just certain components (such as attention, perception, memory, behavior, or emo-
tion), as other schools of psychology had done. His goal was to explain every aspect of
mind and behavior in a single, grand theory.
Psychodynamic Psychology Freud could be a difficult mentor, provoking many
of his followers to break ranks and develop their own theories. We use the term
psychodynamic to refer both to Freud’s ideas and to all these other neo-Freudian
formulations that arose from Freud’s notion that the mind (psyche), especially the
unconscious mind, is a reservoir of energy (dynamics) for the personality. This en-
ergy, says psychodynamic psychology, is what motivates us.
behavioral perspective A psychological view-
point that finds the source of our actions in environ-
mental stimuli, rather than in inner mental processes.
psychodynamic psychology A clinical
approach emphasizing the understanding of mental
disorders in terms of unconscious needs, desires,
memories, and conflicts.
S R
Strict behaviorists, such as B. F. Skinner, believe that psy-
chology should focus on the laws that govern behavior—that
is, on the relations between stimuli (S) and responses (R)—
rather than on the subjective processes of the mind.

18 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
The first and best-known representative of the psychodynamic approach is, of
course, Sigmund Freud, whose system is called psychoanalysis. Originally conceived as
a medical technique for treating mental disorders, psychoanalysts emphasize the analy-
sis of dreams, slips of the tongue (the so-called Freudian slip), and a technique called
free association to gather clues to the unconscious conflicts and “unacceptable” desires
thought to be censored by consciousness. For example, psychoanalysts might interpret
a person’s pattern of self-defeating behavior—such as procrastination—as motivated
by an unconscious fear of failure.
Like Freud, most psychoanalysts today are physicians with a specialty in psychiatry
and advanced training in Freudian methods. (And now, as promised, you know the dif-
ference between a psychologist and a psychoanalyst.) But these practitioners are not the
only ones aspiring to explain the whole person. Two other groups share an interest in a
global understanding of the personality, humanistic psychology and trait and tempera-
ment psychology. Here, we group all three under the heading whole-person perspectives.
Humanistic Psychology Reacting to the psychoanalytic emphasis on sinister forces
in the unconscious, humanistic psychology took a different tack. Their radical new
idea was an emphasis on the positive side of our nature that included human ability,
growth, and potential (refer to Table 1.1). Led by the likes of Abraham Maslow and
Carl Rogers, they offered a model of human nature that proposed innate needs for
growth and goodness, and also emphasized the free will people can exercise to make
choices affecting their lives and growth (Kendler, 2005).
In the humanistic view, your self-concept and self-esteem have a huge influence
on your thoughts, emotions, and actions, all of which ultimately impact development
of your potential. Like psychodynamic psychology, humanistic psychology has had a
major impact on the practice of counseling and psychotherapy.
Trait and Temperament Psychology The ancient Greeks, who anticipated so
many modern ideas, proclaimed that personality is ruled by four body humors (flu-
ids): blood, phlegm, melancholer, and yellow bile. Depending on which humor was
dominant, an individual’s personality might be sanguine (dominated by blood),
slow and deliberate (phlegm), melancholy (melancholer), or angry and aggressive
(yellow bile).
We no longer buy into the ancient Greek typology, of course. But their notion of
personality traits lives on in modern times as trait and temperament psychology. The fun-
damental idea distinguishing this group says: Differences among people arise from
differences in persistent characteristics and internal dispositions called traits and
temperaments (refer to Table 1.1).
psychoanalysis An approach to psychology
based on Sigmund Freud’s assertions, which empha-
size unconscious processes. The term is used to refer
broadly both to Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and to his
psychoanalytic treatment method.
whole-person perspectives A group of
psychological perspectives that take a global view of
the person: Included are psychodynamic psychology,
humanistic psychology, and trait and temperament
psychology.
humanistic psychology A clinical approach
emphasizing human ability, growth, potential, and
free will.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
People’s personalities differ on five
major trait dimensions, cleverly
called the Big Five (p. 423).
trait and temperament psychology A
psychological perspective that views behavior and
personality as the products of enduring psychological
characteristics.
This cartoon illustrates the Freudian slip, which suggests that thoughts or feelings we try to hide
from others will sometimes accidentally find their way into our speech.

What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives? 19
You have probably heard of such traits as introversion and extraversion, which
seem to be fundamental characteristics of human nature. Other traits psycholo-
gists have identified in people all over the world include a sense of anxiety or
well-being, openness to new experiences, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.
We will examine these “Big Five” personality traits (as well as the other whole-
person theories) more closely in Chapter 10. Some psychologists also propose that
we differ on an even more fundamental level called temperament, thought to ac-
count for the different dispositions observed among newborn babies (and among
adults as well).
Trait and temperament psychologists might explain procrastination in terms of
the extent to which a person possesses the trait of conscientiousness. So, for exam-
ple, a person who is high in conscientiousness—in other words, takes commitments
very seriously—would be less likely to procrastinate. The individual who habitually
puts things off, yet doesn’t get stressed at missed deadlines, would be labeled low on
conscientiousness and in possession of an easy temperament (thus explaining the low
stress). All these individual characteristics would be presumed to be at least partly
biological in nature and would be expected to be fairly consistent over time and
across situations.
The Developmental Perspective: Changes Arising
from Nature and Nurture
Change may be the only constant in our lives. According to the developmental perspec-
tive, psychological change results from the interaction between the heredity written
in our genes and the influence of our environment (see Table 1.1). But which counts
most heavily: nature (heredity) or nurture (environment)? As we have seen, biological
psychologists emphasize nature, while behaviorists emphasize nurture. Developmental
psychology is where the two forces meet.
The big idea that defines the developmental perspective is this: People change in
predictable ways as the influences of heredity and environment unfold over time. In
other words, humans think and act differently at different times of their lives. Physi-
cally, development can be seen in such predictable processes as growth, puberty,
and menopause. Psychologically, development includes the acquisition of language,
logical thinking, and the assumption of different roles at different times of life. De-
velopmental psychologists, then, might not be surprised by the teen who procrasti-
nates. On the contrary, they may see it as normal behavior at that age, given that
teens are still learning how to juggle multiple responsibilities and accurately esti-
mate how long things take to complete—all while simultaneously coping with their
changing bodies and social worlds.
In the past, much of the research in developmental psychology has focused on
children—in part because they change so rapidly and in rather predictable ways. De-
velopmental psychologists are increasing their scrutiny of teens and adults, however, as
we discover how developmental processes continue throughout our lives. In Chapter 7,
we will explore some common patterns of psychological change seen across the entire
lifespan, from conception to old age. The developmental theme will appear elsewhere
throughout this text, too, because development affects all our psychological processes,
from biology to social interaction.
The Sociocultural Perspective: The Individual in Context
Who could deny that people exert powerful influences on each other? The sociocultural
perspective places the idea of social influence center stage. From this viewpoint, social
psychologists probe the mysteries of liking, loving, prejudice, aggression, obedience,
and conformity. In addition, many have become interested in how these social pro-
cesses vary from one culture to another (refer to Table 1.1).
developmental perspective One of the six
main psychological viewpoints, distinguished by its
emphasis on nature and nurture and on predictable
changes that occur across the lifespan.
sociocultural perspective A main psychologi-
cal viewpoint emphasizing the importance of social
interaction, social learning, and culture in explaining
human behavior.

20 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
Culture, a complex blend of human language, beliefs, customs, values, and traditions,
exerts profound influences on all of us. We can see culture in action not only as we com-
pare people of one continent to those of another but also by comparing people, for exam-
ple, in the California–Mexican culture of San Diego and the Scandinavian-based culture
of Minnesota. Psychology’s earlier blindness to culture was due, in part, to the beginnings
of scientific psychology in Europe and North America, where most psychologists lived
and worked under similar cultural conditions (Lonner & Malpass, 1994; Segall et al.,
1998). Today the perspective has broadened: Less than half of the world’s half-million
psychologists live and work in the United States, and interest in psychology is growing in
countries outside of Europe and North America (Pawlik & d’Ydewalle, 1996; Rosenz-
weig, 1992, 1999). Still, much of our psychological knowledge has a North American/Eu-
ropean flavor. Recognizing this bias, cross-cultural psychologists have begun the long task of
reexamining the “laws” of psychology across cultural and ethnic boundaries (Cole, 2006).
Proponents of the sociocultural view do not, of course, deny the effects of heredity
or learning or even of unconscious processes. Rather, they bring to psychology a pow-
erful additional concept: the power of the situation. From this viewpoint, then, the so-
cial and cultural situation in which the person is embedded can sometimes overpower
all other factors that influence behavior. For example, certain cultures place greater
emphasis on meeting deadlines, which would in turn influence the behavior (such as
procrastination) of an individual in that culture. What situational or cultural forces
have, in your own past, interfered with your timely attention to a project?
Together, then, these six perspectives all play key roles in developing a holistic
understanding of human behavior. As we have seen with our example of procrastina-
tion, many perspectives can reasonably applied to any single behavior—and rarely is
just one perspective sufficient to adequately explain the behavior. (We hasten to add,
however, that explanations for a behavior are not intended as justifications for it.
Instead, they function well as clues for overcoming a behavior when it is problematic,
or for understanding behaviors in others.)
To summarize the perspectives we have just covered, please have a look at Figure 1.4.
There you will find a thumbnail overview of the main viewpoints that make up the spec-
trum of modern psychology.
The Changing Face of Psychology
Modern psychology is a field in flux. In recent decades, the biological, cognitive, and
developmental perspectives have become dominant. And increasingly, adherents of once-
conflicting perspectives are making connections and joining forces: We now see such
new and strange hybrid psychologists as “cognitive behaviorists”
or “evolutionary developmentalists.” At the same time, nearly all
specialties within psychology seem eager to make a connection
with neuroscience, which is rapidly becoming one of the pillars
of the field.
We also call your attention to a noteworthy shift in the propor-
tion of psychologists who are women and members of minority
groups. Ethnic minorities—especially Asians, African Americans,
and Latinos—are becoming psychologists in increasing numbers
(Kohout, 2001). Even more striking is the new majority status
of women in psychology. In 1906, only 12 percent of Ameri-
can psychologists listed were women, according to a listing in
American Men of Science (named with no irony intended). By
1921, the proportion had risen above 20 percent. And now,
women receive more than two-thirds of the new doctorates
awarded in the field each year (Cynkar, 2007; Kohout, 2001).
Although psychology has always included a higher pro-
portion of women than any of the other sciences, women
have often found gender biases blocking their career paths
culture A complex blend of language, beliefs,
customs, values, and traditions developed by a
group of people and shared with others in the same
environment.
cross-cultural psychologists Those who
work in this specialty are interested in how psychologi-
cal processes may differ among people of different
cultures.
Dr. Phil Zimbardo, one of your authors,
is a social psychologist who studies the
“power of the situation” in controlling
our behavior. You will see how strongly
social situations affect our behavior when
you read about his Stanford Prison
Experiment in Chapter 11.
Cross-cultural psychologists, such as this researcher in Kenya,
furnish important data for checking the validity of psychological
knowledge.

What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives? 21
FIGURE 1.4
Summary of Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives
The Biological Perspective
focuses on:
• nervous system
• endocrine system
• genetics
• physical characteristics
The Behavioral Perspective
focuses on:
• learning
• control of behavior by the
environment
• stimuli and responses—but
not mental processes
The Developmental Perspective
focuses on:
• changes in psychological
functioning across the life span
• heredity and environment
The Cognitive Perspective
focuses on:
• mental processes, such as
thought, learning, memory,
and perception
• the mind as a computer-like
”machine”
• how emotion and motivation
influence thought and
perception (”hot cognition”)
The Whole-Person Perspective
includes:
• the Psychodynamic View, which
emphasizes unconscious
motivation and mental disorder
• the Humanistic View, which
emphasizes mental health and
human potential
• the Trait and Temperament View,
which emphasizes personality
characteristics and individual
differences
The Sociocultural Perspective
focuses on:
• social influences on behavior and
mental processes
• how individuals function in
groups
• cultural differences
questions, or create one of your own. Can
you explain how at least four of psychol-
ogy’s perspectives might explain that be-
havior? If so, you are well on your way to
understanding the importance of multiple
perspectives in the field of psychology.
APPLYING PSYCHOLOGY’S PERSPECTIVES
The six perspectives in psychology can be
one of the most useful tools you take away
from this class. How? By applying them
to behaviors of interest in your own life,
you can become more sophisticated and
more accurate in your interpretations of
why people do what they do. Why do some
people commit acts of terror or violence?
What causes infidelity in romantic relation-
ships? What makes a person feel anxious
when speaking in public? Why do people
smoke cigarettes? Consider one of these

22 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
(Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986). For example, G. Stanley Hall, one of the pioneers of
American psychology, notoriously asserted that academic work would ruin a woman’s
health and cause deterioration of her reproductive organs. Nevertheless, as early as
1905, the American Psychological Association elected its first female president, Mary
Whiton Calkins. See Table 1.2 for a sampling of other important contributions made
by women to the field of psychology.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Psychology as a Major
Becoming a fully fledged psychologist requires substantial training beyond the bach-
elor’s degree. In graduate school, the psychology student takes advanced classes in one
or more specialized areas while developing general skills as a scholar and researcher.
On completion of the program, the student receives a master’s or doctor’s degree,
typically a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy), a PsyD (Doctor of Psychology), or an EdD
(Doctor of Education).
Satisfying careers are available, however, at various levels of education in psychology,
although the widest range of choices is available to holders of a doctorate (Smith, 2002b).
In most states, a license to practice psychology requires a doctorate plus a supervised intern-
ship. Most college and university teaching or research jobs in psychology also require a
doctorate.
A master’s degree, typically requiring two years of study beyond the bache-
lor’s level, may qualify you for employment as a psychology instructor at the high
school level or as an applied psychologist in certain specialties, such as counseling.
Master’s-level psychologists are common in human service agencies, as well as in
private practice (although many states do not allow them to advertise themselves as
“psychologists”).
Holders of associate’s degrees and bachelor’s degrees in psychology or related
human services fields may find jobs as psychological aides and technicians in agencies,
TABLE 1.2 A Sampling of Women’s Contributions to Psychology
Research Area Institutional Affiliation
Mary Ainsworth Infant attachment University of Toronto
Mary Calkins Memory, psychology of the self Wellesley College
Christine Ladd Franklin Logic and color vision Johns Hopkins University
Carol Gilligan Gender studies, moral development Harvard University
Julia Gulliver Dreams and the subconscious self Rockford University
Diane Halpern Critical thinking, gender differences University of Cincinnati
Elizabeth Loftus False memory Stanford University
Eleanor Maccoby Developmental psychology, effects
of divorce on children
University of Michigan
Lillien Martin Psychophysics Wellesley College
Christina Maslach Burnout and job stress Stanford University
Anna McKeag Pain Bardwell School
Sandra Scarr Intelligence Harvard University
Margaret Washburn Perception Vassar College

How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 23
hospitals, nursing homes, and rehabilitation centers. A bachelor’s degree in psychology,
coupled with training in business or education, can also lead to interesting careers in
personnel management or education.
Further information about job prospects and salary levels for psychologists is
available online in the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Outlook Handbook
(2011–2012 edition) at www.bls.gov/oco/home.htm. You might also check out the
American Psychological Association’s career pages at www.apa.org/careers/resources/
index.aspx.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: René Descartes made a science of psychology possible
when he suggested that __________.
2. APPLICATION: “The differences between men and women are
mainly the result of different survival and reproduction issues faced
by the two sexes.” Which of the main viewpoints in psychology
would this statement represent?
3. APPLICATION: If you were a teacher trying to understand how
students learn, which of the following perspectives would be most
helpful?
a. the cognitive view
b. the psychodynamic view
c. structuralism
d. the trait and temperament view
4. RECALL: To which of the structuralists’ and functionalists’ ideas
did the behaviorists object?
5. RECALL: Which of the whole-person views focuses on
understanding the unconscious mind?
6. APPLICATION: “Soldiers may sometimes perform heroic
acts, not so much because they have heroic personality traits
but because they are in a situation that encourages heroic
behavior.” Which perspective is this observation most consistent
with?
7. APPLICATION: If you wanted to tell whether a friend had
experienced a perceptual shift while viewing the Necker cube, you
would have to use the method of __________, which was pioneered
by Wundt and the structuralists.
8. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Which of the
following sets of factors are all associated with the perspective
indicated?
a. memory, personality, environment: the behavioral perspective
b. mental health, mental disorder, mental imagery: the trait and
temperament perspective
c. heredity, environment, predictable changes throughout the
lifespan: the developmental perspective
d. neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, genetics: the cognitive
perspective
Answers 1. sensations and behaviors are the result of activity in the nervous system. 2. The biological perspective—in particular the viewpoint
of evolutionary psychology 3. a 4. They particularly objected to the concept of the mind as an object of scientific study. They also objected to
introspection as a subjective and therefore unscientific method. 5. The psychodynamic view, especially psychoanalysis 6. The sociocultural
perspective 7. introspection 8. c.
1.3 KEY QUESTION
How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge?
Earlier in this chapter, we saw how Descartes’ radical new idea separating the spiritual
mind from the physical body enabled scientists to start identifying biological bases for
behaviors, thus challenging the pseudoscientific “common sense” that attributed cer-
tain behaviors to mysterious spiritual forces. Today, psychology continues to dispute
the unfounded claims of pseudoscience, which range from palm reading to psychic
predictions to use of crystals to heal physical ailments.
What makes psychology different from these pseudopsychological approaches to
understanding people? Not one of them has survived trial by the scientific method,
which is a way of testing ideas against observations. Instead, pseudo-psychology is
based on hope, confirmation bias, anecdote—and human gullibility.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

www.bls.gov/oco/home.htm

www.apa.org/careers/resources/index.aspx

www.apa.org/careers/resources/index.aspx

24 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
You might think this an arrogant view for psychologists to take. Why can’t we make
room for many different ways of understanding people? In fact, we do. Psychologists
welcome sociologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists, and other scientists as partners in
the enterprise of understanding people. We reject only those approaches that mislead
people by claiming to have “evidence” that is, in truth, only anecdotes and testimonials.
What makes psychology a real science, then, is the method. As our Core Concept
for this section says:
Core Concept 1.3
Psychologists, like all other scientists, use the scientific method to
test their ideas empirically.
What is this marvelous method? Simply put, the scientific method is a way of putting ideas
to an objective pass–fail test. The essential feature of this test is empirical investigation,
the collection of objective information by means of careful measurements based on di-
rect experience. From empirical investigations, psychological science ultimately seeks to
develop comprehensive explanations for behavior and mental processes. In science, we
call these explanations theories—a commonly misunderstood word.
“It’s only a theory,” people may say. But to a scientist, theory means something
special. In brief, a scientific theory is a testable explanation for a broad set of facts or
observations (Allen, 1995; Kukla, 1989). Obviously, this definition differs from the
way people customarily use the term. In everyday language, theory can mean wild
speculation or a mere hunch—an idea that has no evidence to support it. But to a sci-
entist, a good theory has two attractive attributes: (a) the power to explain the facts
and (b) the ability to be tested. Examples of well-supported theories include Einstein’s
theory of relativity, the germ theory of disease, and Darwin’s theory of natural selec-
tion. And as you will see throughout this text, psychology has many well-supported
theories too. But what are the essential steps involved in testing a theory?
Four Steps in the Scientific Method
Testing any idea scientifically requires four basic steps that we can illustrate by apply-
ing them to our problem examining the effects of sugar on children’s activity (see
Figure 1.5). All scientists follow essentially the same steps, no matter whether their
field is psychology, biology, chemistry, astronomy, or any other scientific pursuit. Thus,
it is the method that makes these fields scientific, not their subject matter.
Develop a Hypothesis The scientific method first requires a specific testable
idea or prediction, called a hypothesis. The term literally means “little theory”
because it often represents only one piece of a larger theoretical explanation. For
example, a hypothesis predicting that introverted people are attracted to extra-
verted people might be part of a theory tying together all the components of
romantic attraction. Alternatively, a hypothesis can just be an interesting idea that
piques our curiosity—as in our study of the effects of sugar on children.
To be testable, a hypothesis must be potentially falsifiable—that is, stated in such a
way that it can be shown to be either correct or incorrect. Let’s illustrate how this works
with the following hypothesis: Sugar causes children to become hyperactive. We could test
it by having children consume sugar and then observing their activity level. If we find no
increase, the hypothesis is falsified. The hypothesis would not be falsifiable if we merely
stated a value judgment—for example, that sugar is “bad” for children. Science does not
aim to make value judgments and cannot answer questions that can’t be tested empiri-
cally. See Table 1.3 for examples of other questions science cannot answer.
Next, the scientist must consider precisely how the hypothesis will be tested. This
means defining all aspects of the study in concrete terms called operational definitions.
The following examples could serve as operational definitions for our study.
scientific method A four-step process for em-
pirical investigation of a hypothesis under conditions
designed to control biases and subjective judgments.
empirical investigation An approach to
research that relies on sensory experience and observa-
tion as research data.
theory A testable explanation for a set of facts or
observations. In science, a theory is not just specula-
tion or a guess.
hypothesis A statement predicting the outcome of
a scientific study; a statement predicting the relation-
ship among variables in a study.
operational definitions Objective descriptions
of concepts involved in a scientific study. Operational
definitions may restate concepts to be studied in be-
havioral terms (e.g., fear may be operationally defined
as moving away from a stimulus). Operational defini-
tions also specify the procedures used to produce and
measure important variables under investigation (e.g.,
“attraction” may be measured by the amount of time
one person spends looking at another).

How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 25
• Operational definition of “children.” We can’t test all the children in the world, of
course. So, our operational definition of “children” might be all the third graders
in one class at a nearby elementary school.
• Operational definition of “sugar.” Likewise, we could define what we mean by
“sugar” as the amount of sugar in a commercial soft drink. If we decide, for example,
to use 7Up as our sugar source, we could operationally define “sugar” as the 38
grams available in one can of 7Up. (Using a noncaffeinated beverage, such as 7Up,
avoids the possibly confounding effects of caffeine on the children’s behavior.)
FIGURE 1.5
Four Steps in the Scientific Method
1. Developing a hypothesis
2. Gathering objective data
3. Analyzing the results
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
ch
ild
re
n
Activity level
Low High
4. Publishing, criticizing, and
replicating the results
TABLE 1.3 What Questions Can the Scientific Method Not Answer?
The scientific method is not appropriate for answering questions that cannot be put to an objective,
empirical test. Here are some examples of such issues:
Topic Question
Ethics Should scientists do research with animals?
Values Which culture has the best attitude toward work
and leisure?
Morality Is abortion morally right or wrong?
Preferences Is rap music better than blues?
Aesthetics Was Picasso more creative than Van Gogh?
Existential issues What is the meaning of life?
Religion Does God exist?
Law What should be the speed limit on interstate
highways?
Although science can help us understand such issues, the answers ultimately must be settled by logic, faith,
legislation, consensus, or other means that lie beyond the scope of the scientific method.

26 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
• Operational definition of hyperactive. This will be a bit more complicated. Sup-
pose we have specially trained observers who will rate each child’s behavior on the
following 5-point scale:
passive moderately active very active
1 2 3 4 5
So, if our study specifies giving some children a sugar-sweetened drink and others the
same drink containing artificial sweetener, we can operationally define “hyperactive”
as a significantly higher average activity rating for the group getting the sugared drink.
With our hypothesis and operational definitions in hand, we have taken the first step in
our scientific study. Next, we test our hypothesis. (The great failing of pseudosciences like
astrology or fortunetelling is they never actually take this step of testing their assertions.)
Collect Objective Data This is where we begin our empirical investigation. Literally,
empirical means “experience based”—as contrasted with speculation based solely on
hope, authority, faith, or “common sense.” This literal definition can be misleading,
however, if we mistakenly classify one person’s experience as “empirical.” Regardless
of how powerful one person’s experience might be, it remains merely a testimonial
or an anecdote that needs to be verified under the controlled conditions of scientific
research. As we discussed in the Critical Thinking section earlier in this chapter, it
would be risky to assume one person’s experiences would be true for others.
Investigating a question empirically means collecting evidence carefully and sys-
tematically, using one of several tried-and-true methods we will examine in depth in
the next section. Such methods are designed to avoid false conclusions caused by our
expectations, biases, and prejudices. Having done so, the data we obtain can be applied,
or generalized, to a larger group of people with more confidence.
Analyze the Results and Accept or Reject the Hypothesis Once we have collected
our data, we then analyze it using some type of mathematical or statistical formula. If you
hate math, though, fear not: Detailed explanations of statistical procedures are beyond
the scope of this book—in fact, advanced psychology students take entire courses on
statistical methods! In our experiment, however, the statistical analysis will be relatively
straightforward, because we merely want to know whether scores for the children receiv-
ing sugar are higher than those taking the sugar-free drink. If so, we can declare that our
hypothesis has been supported. If not, we will reject it. Either way, we have learned some-
thing. You can find a statistical appendix for this text online at www.mypsychlab.com.
Publish, Criticize, and Replicate the Results The final step in the scientific
method exposes a completed study to the scrutiny and criticism of the scientific com-
munity by publishing it in a professional journal, making a presentation at a profes-
sional meeting, or—occasionally—writing a book. Then the researchers wait for the
critics to respond.
If colleagues find the study interesting and important—and especially if it challenges
other research or a widely held theory—critics may look for flaws in the research de-
sign: Did the experimenters choose the participants properly? Were the statistical anal-
yses done correctly? Could other factors account for the results? Alternatively, they
may decide to check the study by replicating it. To replicate the experiment, they would
redo it themselves to see if they get the same results.
In fact, our study of the effects of sugar on children is a simplified replication of
research done previously by Mark Wolraich and his colleagues (1995). Their study lasted
three weeks and compared one group of children who ate a high-sugar diet with another
group given a low-sugar diet with artificial sweeteners. Contrary to folk wisdom, the
researchers found no differences between the groups in behavior or cognitive (mental)
function. So, if our study were to find a “sugar high” effect, it would contradict the
Wolraich findings, and you can be sure it would receive careful scrutiny and criticism.
Criticism also occurs behind the scientific scenes to filter out poorly conceived or
executed research prior to publication. Journal editors and book publishers (including
data Pieces of information, especially informa-
tion gathered by a researcher to be used in testing a
hypothesis. (Singular: datum.)
replicate In research, this refers to doing a study
over to see whether the same results are obtained. As
a control for bias, replication is often done by someone
other than the researcher who performed the original
study.

www.mypsychlab.com

How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 27
the publishers of this book) routinely seek opinions of expert reviewers. As a result,
authors usually receive helpful, if sometimes painful, suggestions for revision. Only
when a hypothesis has cleared all these hurdles will editors put it in print and scholars
tentatively accept it as scientific “truth.”
We should emphasize, however, that scientific findings are always tentative. As long
as they stand, they stand in jeopardy from a new study that requires a new interpreta-
tion or sends earlier work to the academic scrap heap. Consequently, the results of the
Wolraich sugar study could be eventually replaced by better, more definitive knowl-
edge. Obviously, then, the scientific method is an imperfect system, but it is the best
method ever developed for testing ideas about the natural world. As such, it represents
one of humankind’s greatest intellectual achievements.
Five Types of Psychological Research
The scientific method, then, provides much greater credibility for ideas than does mere
anecdote or pseudoscience. Within this method, there are several specific ways a re-
searcher can collect objective data. Each has unique advantages, as well as limitations.
One key step in conducting good research, then, is choosing the method best suited to
your particular hypothesis and resources.
Experiments Like the word theory, the term experiment also has a very specific mean-
ing in science. Contrary to everyday usage of the term to refer to any type of formal
or informal test, the scientific use of the word applies to a particular set of procedures
for collecting information under highly controlled conditions. As a result of its careful
design, an experiment is the only type of research method we will discuss here that can
reliably determine a cause–effect relationship. Thus, if a hypothesis is worded in a man-
ner that suggests cause and effect—as ours does in stating that sugar causes hyperactivity
in children—then the experiment is the best option. Let’s see how our sugar study can
determine cause and effect.
In the most basic experimental design, the researcher varies only one factor, known
as a variable, and keeps all other conditions of the experiment under constant control—
the same for all participants. Scientists call that one variable the independent variable
because it operates independently of everything else in the study. In our sugar study,
we hypothesized that sugar causes hyperactivity, so sugar/no sugar is our independent
variable. By giving some children sugar and others a sugar substitute, and keeping all
other conditions constant, we are manipulating the independent variable. Because
all other aspects of the experiment are held constant, we can say that the indepen-
dent variable is the cause of any experimental effects we observe.
Likewise, the dependent variable is the outcome variable, or what we hypothesize
to be the effect. In other words, any experimental effects we observe depend on the
independent variable that we have introduced. In our sugar experiment, then, the de-
pendent variable is the children’s activity level. If the group receiving the sugar is later
observed to be more active, we can be sure it was the sugar that caused the hyperactiv-
ity, because it was the only difference between the two groups.
Before going any further, we should clarify two other important terms used to identify
our participants. Those receiving the treatment of interest (in our study, the high-sugar
drink) are said to be in the experimental condition. Individuals exposed to the experi-
mental condition, then, make up the experimental group. Meanwhile, those in the control
group enter the control condition, where they do not receive the special treatment. (In our
study, the control group will get the artificially sweetened drink.) Thus, the control group
serves as a standard against which to compare those in the experimental group.
How do we decide which participants will be placed into each group? The easy way to
divide them up would be to let the children (or their parents) decide, based on their own
preferences. The problem with that, however, is there could be some difference between
children whose parents let them drink sugared drinks and those whose parents do not.
Perhaps, for example, parents who allow their children to drink sugared drinks are more
relaxed about rules in general, which could result in those same kids being rowdier in
their play—which would confound our results. Similarly, it wouldn’t do to put all the girls
experiment A kind of research in which the
researcher controls all the conditions and directly
manipulates the conditions, including the independent
variable.
independent variable A stimulus condition so
named because the experimenter changes it indepen-
dently of all the other carefully controlled experimental
conditions.
dependent variable The measured outcome of a
study; the responses of the subjects in a study.
experimental group Participants in an experi-
ment who are exposed to the treatment of interest.
control group Participants who are used as a
comparison for the experimental group. The control
group is not given the special treatment of interest.
Distinguishing Independent and
Dependent Variables at
Simulate the Experiment
MyPsychLab

28 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
in one group and all the boys in the other. Why not? There could be gender differences
in their physical reactions to sugar. In addition, one sex might be better than the other at
controlling their reactions. These pre-existing differences could impact our outcome.
The best solution is to use random assignment, by which participants are assigned to
each group purely by chance. One way to do this would be to list the children alpha-
betically and then assign alternating names to the experimental and control groups. In
this way, random assignment minimizes any pre-existing differences between the two
groups. This, in turn, assures that any differences in activity level are truly due to sugar
rather than to some other factor such as sex or parenting style.
In summary, the experimental method is the gold standard for finding cause-and-
effect relationships. It does so by isolating the variable of interest (the independent
variable) and holding all other conditions of the experiment constant. Random assign-
ment to experimental and control groups is used to minimize pre-existing differences
between the groups so we can be more confident that differences in the outcome (the
dependent variable) are due to the effects of the independent variable and nothing else.
Given the power of the experiment to find cause and effect, why do we need other
methods? For one reason, not all hypotheses aim to find cause and effect—some merely
wish to describe certain populations, such as determining what personality traits are
common among psychology students. For another, ethical considerations prevent us from
conducting certain kinds of experimental studies, notably those which might potentially
harm participants. In such instances, then, one of the following research methods is a
better or more practical choice.
Correlational Studies In addition to the considerations described above, there is yet
another factor that influences a researcher’s choice of method: Due to practical or ethi-
cal considerations, sometimes scientists cannot gain enough control over the situation
to allow them to conduct a true experiment. Suppose, for example, you wanted to test
the hypothesis that children who ingest lead-based paint run an increased risk of learn-
ing disabilities. (Lead-based paint is common in older homes, especially in low-income
urban housing.) You couldn’t do an experiment, because an experiment would require
you to manipulate the independent variable—which in this case would mean giving toxic
material (lead) to a group of children. Obviously, this would be harmful and unethical.
Fortunately, you can find a way around the problem—but at the expense of some
control over the research conditions. The solution takes the form of a correlational
study. In correlational research you, in effect, look for a “natural experiment” that has
already occurred by chance in the real world. So, in a correlational study on the ef-
fects of ingesting lead-based paint, you might look for a group of children who had
already been exposed to lead paint. Then you would compare them to another group
who had not been exposed. As a further control, you should try to match the groups
so they are comparable in every conceivable respect (such as age, family income, and
gender)—except in their exposure to lead-based paint.
The big drawback of a correlational study is that you can never be sure the groups
are completely comparable, because you did not randomly assign people to experimen-
tal groups or manipulate the independent variable. In fact, the groups may differ on
some important variables (such as access to health care or nutrition) that you could
have overlooked. Thus, even if you observe more learning disabilities among children
who were exposed to lead-based paint, you cannot conclude with certainty that expo-
sure to the paint caused the disabilities. The most you can say is that lead-based paint
is correlated (associated) with learning disabilities. This is, however, still useful, as it
narrows the search for links to learning disabilities. In addition, a series of solid corre-
lational findings sometimes pave the road to an experimental study, as we will discuss
in the following text. Many research findings reported in the media are likely to be
from correlational studies, rather than experimental ones, so let’s take a closer look at
what these findings mean and how we can accurately interpret them.
Three Types of Correlations If two variables show a pattern in which they vary in
the same direction (as one variable increases, so does the other), we say they have a
positive correlation. For example, we predicted a positive correlation in our hypothesis
random assignment A process used to assign
individuals to various experimental conditions
by chance alone.
correlational study A form of research in which
the relationship between variables is studied, but with-
out the experimental manipulation of an independent
variable. Correlational studies cannot determine cause-
and-effect relationships.
positive correlation A correlation indicating
that the variables change simultaneously in the same
direction: As one grows larger or smaller, the other
grows or shrinks in a parallel way.

How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 29
that children exposed to lead-based paint are at higher risk for learning disabili-
ties. But when one variable decreases as the other increases, this is called a negative
correlation. You would probably find a negative correlation between the amount of al-
cohol consumed by college students and their grade-point averages (as college students
increase their consumption of alcohol, their grade-point averages decrease). Finally, if
the variables have no relationship at all, there is a zero correlation, which is what you
might expect between height and GPA, for example (see Figure 1.6).
Researchers usually express the degree of correlation as a number that can range
from as low as –1.0 (reflecting a strong negative correlation) to a positive number as
high as +1.0 (indicating a strong positive correlation). It is important to note that a
correlation can show a strong relationship even when it is negative. (Note: Professors
often ask test questions about this!) Suppose we find a correlation of –0.7 between
anxiety and time spent studying. In other words, this is a negative correlation indicat-
ing more anxiety is correlated with less studying. Even though this is a negative cor-
relation, it shows a stronger relationship than the positive correlation of +0.4 that is
found, for example, between SAT scores and grades.
Interpreting Correlational Findings One of the most common errors in critical thinking
occurs when correlational findings are misinterpreted as cause-and-effect findings. For
example, some years ago, research identified a positive correlation between children’s
self-esteem and their performance in school. Did that mean high self-esteem caused kids
to do better in school? Not necessarily—and to conclude otherwise is a critical thinking
error! While that notion certainly fits our “common sense” ideas about the benefits of
self-esteem, without conducting an experiment, manipulating the independent variable
(self-esteem), and randomly assigning students to experimental and control conditions,
we cannot be sure what the causal factor is. Scientists often put the general principle
this way: Correlation does not necessarily mean causation.
In fact, any time you see a correlational finding, you must consider three possible
interpretations for the finding:
• A causes B. If “A” refers to the first variable mentioned—in this case, self-esteem—
and “B” refers to the second variable (grades), this interpretation recognizes that
self-esteem may indeed influence a student’s grades in school. That is, however,
only one possibility.
• B causes A. It could also be the case that grades in school influence self-esteem—in
other words, that our initial assumption about causality was backwards. If you
think about it, couldn’t it also be possible that students who do well in school feel
negative correlation A correlation indicating
that the variables change simultaneously in opposite
directions: As one becomes larger, the other gets
smaller.
zero correlation When two variables have no
relationship to each other.
FIGURE 1.6
Three Types of Correlation
The graphs illustrate the three main types of correlation, with data points for 27 individuals. (A) shows a positive correlation between SAT scores
and GPA; (B) shows a negative correlation between alcohol consumption and GPA; and (C) shows no correlation between height and GPA.
G
PA
Number of Drinks per Week
G
PA
SAT Scores
G
PA
Height
(B) Negative Correlation(A) Positive Correlation (C) No Correlation
200 400 600 800 2 4 6 7 9 10 12 4’6” 5”0” 5”6” 6’0” 6’6”
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Explore the Concept Correlations
Do Not Show Causation at
MyPsychLab

30 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
better about themselves as a result? If that were true, grades in school (rather than
self-esteem) would be the driving force of the correlation.
• C causes both A and B. Yet a third possibility must also be recognized in contem-
plating correlational findings: What if a different variable (C)—something not
measured in the study—was actually the driving force behind the observed rela-
tionship? In this example, what might influence a student’s school performance
and his or her self-esteem? Perhaps more time spent with parents helps a child
succeed in school and also improves the child’s self-esteem. In that case, we would
be mistaken to assume that grades and self-esteem were related causally—instead,
they just appeared that way due to lack of attention to the true source of both.
The important thing to remember is that without a true experiment, speculation about
cause is just that: speculation—and potentially dangerous speculation at that. This dan-
ger was powerfully illustrated by the very findings we have discussed here: In the wake of
correlational studies showing a relationship between self-esteem and grades, millions of
dollars were spent nationwide on programs training teachers to help improve students’
self-esteem, with the mistaken assumption that higher self-esteem would in turn raise
students’ grades. Did it work? No. On the contrary, follow-up experimental research
discovered that getting good grades is one causal component in high self-esteem, provid-
ing support for the B causes A explanation given previously. Moreover, it turns out that
self-control (in this case, an example of a C variable) promotes both self-esteem and
school performance (Baumeister, 2003). Even trained researchers and lawmakers can
make mistakes when “common sense” biases their accurate interpretations of research.
Surveys Which type of learning do students prefer: listening to lectures, reading material
on their own, or participating in hands-on activities? If you want to know the answer to
this question, you don’t need to perform an experiment or a correlational study. Instead,
you can simply ask students what they like using a survey, which is a popular and effec-
tive method of determining people’s attitudes, preferences, or other characteristics.
Widely used by political pollsters and marketing consultants (as well as by many
researchers in psychology and sociology), surveys typically ask people for their re-
sponses to a prepared set of questions. The biggest advantage of the survey method
is its ability to gather data from large numbers of respondents relatively quickly and
inexpensively, such as through Internet surveys. This easy access to many people is also
the source of the survey’s biggest disadvantage: its vulnerability to a variety of biases.
What are some common biases in conducting or interpreting results of a survey?
Social desirability bias refers to respondents’ tendency to answer questions in ways
that are socially or politically correct (Schwarz, 1999). Other biases can stem from
wording of the questions (Are they clear? Do they use emotionally charged words to
elicit a particular type of response?), the sample (How well do the respondents repre-
sent the general population?), and the survey conditions (Is the survey anonymous?
Are people completing it in a setting that might bias their responses?)
If care is taken to avoid these biases, surveys can be very useful—but only when the
hypothesis can be legitimately studied with a survey. Examining the effects of sugar on
children’s activity level by asking parents if they’ve noticed their children behaving more
actively after consuming sugar, for example, would reveal parents’ opinions about sugar
and hyperactivity—but opinions do not empirically test the relationship in which we are
interested. Thus, it would not be an appropriate choice for solving our chapter problem.
Naturalistic Observations In her classic studies showing that chimpanzees have a
complex, tool-making culture, Jane Goodall observed chimps in their natural jungle
environment. Likewise, when psychological researchers want to know how people act
in their natural surroundings (as contrasted with the artificial conditions of a labora-
tory), they use the same method of naturalistic observation. This approach is a good
choice for studying child-rearing practices, shopping habits, or how people flirt in pub-
lic. Thus, the setting for a naturalistic observation could be as varied as a home, a
shopping mall, a restaurant, or a remote wilderness.
survey A technique used in descriptive research,
typically involving seeking people’s responses to a
prepared set of verbal or written items.
naturalistic observation A form of descriptive
research involving behavioral assessment of people or
animals in their natural surroundings.

How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 31
As you might guess, naturalistic observations are made under far
less controlled conditions than are experiments because the researcher
merely observes and records behaviors, rather than manipulating the en-
vironment. The best naturalistic observations, however, follow a care-
fully thought-out plan. Thus, such concerns as expectancy bias can be
minimized by use of systematic procedures for observation and data
collection and by careful training of observers.
The advantage of naturalistic observation is that you see the behav-
iors as they naturally occur, which often reveals insights not found in a
laboratory setting. In some situations, it is also more cost effective to
use the natural environment rather than try to reconstruct one in the
lab. The disadvantages include the lack of control over the environment,
which prohibits causal conclusions, as well as the time-consuming and
expensive nature of a well-designed naturalistic study.
Case Studies How might you study what shaped comedian Stephen Colbert’s sense
of humor? You can’t conduct any type of empirical research, because (for better or
worse) you have only one Stephen Colbert. In situations such as this, researchers must
rely on the case study, a unique type of research method that focuses in depth on only
one or a few individuals, usually with rare problems or unusual talents. For example,
in his book, Creating Minds, Howard Gardner (1993) used the case study method to
explore the thought processes of several highly creative individuals, including Einstein,
Picasso, and Freud. Therapists who use case studies to develop theories about mental
disorder sometimes call this the clinical method. By either name, the disadvantages of
this approach lie in its subjectivity, its small sample size, and the lack of control over
variables that could affect the individuals under study. These limitations severely restrict
the researcher’s ability to draw conclusions that can be generalized or applied with con-
fidence to other individuals. Nevertheless, the case study can sometimes give us valuable
information that could be obtained in no other way.
Controlling Biases in Psychological Research
Assisted suicide. Abortion. Capital punishment. Do you have strong feelings and opin-
ions on any of these issues? Emotion-laden topics can bring out biases that make criti-
cal thinking difficult, as we have seen. The possibility of bias, then, poses problems for
psychologists interested in studying such issues as child abuse, gender differences, or the
effects of racial prejudice—topics that may interest them precisely because of their own
strong opinions. Left uncontrolled, researcher biases can affect the ways they design a
study, collect the data, and interpret the results. Let’s take a look at two forms of bias
that require special vigilance in research.
Emotional bias, which we discussed earlier in connection with critical thinking,
involves an individual’s cherished beliefs, strong preferences, unquestioned assump-
tions, or personal prejudices. Often these are not obvious to the individual who has
such biases. For example, in his book Even the Rat Was White, psychologist Robert
Guthrie (1998) points out the bias in the long psychological tradition of research on
college students—who were most often White—without realizing they were introduc-
ing bias with their sample-selection procedures. This practice limited the applicabil-
ity of the research results to people of color. Fortunately, the scientific method, with
its openness to peer criticism and replication, provides a powerful counterbalance to
an experimenter’s emotional bias. Still, scientists would prefer to identify and control
their biases before potentially erroneous conclusions hit print.
Expectancy bias can also affect scientists’ conclusions when they observe only what
they expect to observe. (You can see a close kinship here with confirmation bias, also
discussed earlier.) Expectancy bias revealed itself in, for example, a notable study in
which psychology students trained rats to perform behaviors such as pressing a lever to
obtain food (Rosenthal & Lawson, 1964). The experimenters told some students their
rats were especially bright; other students heard their rats were slow learners. (In fact,
case study Research involving a single individual
(or, at most, a few individuals).
expectancy bias The researcher allowing his or
her expectations to affect the outcome of a study.
Jane Goodall used the method of naturalistic observation
to study chimpanzee behavior.
In his book Even the Rat Was White,
Robert Guthrie called attention to the
neglect of contributions by African
Americans in psychology.

32 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
the experimenters had randomly selected both groups of rats from the same litters.)
Sure enough, the students’ data showed that rats believed to be bright outperformed
their supposedly duller littermates—in accord with the students’ expectations. How
could this be? Apparently, rats perform better for an enthusiastic audience! Follow-up
questionnaires showed that students with the “bright” rats were “more enthusiastic,
encouraging, pleasant, and interested in their rat’s performance.”
Not only can these sources of bias lead to erroneous conclusions, they can also pro-
duce expensive or even dangerous consequences. Imagine that you are a psychologist
working for a pharmaceutical company that wants you to test a new drug. With mil-
lions of dollars riding on the outcome, you may not be thinking with complete objectivity—
despite your most sincere efforts. And what about the doctors who will prescribe the
drug to patients in your study? Surely they will have high hopes for the drug, as will their
patients. And so the stage is set for expectancy bias to creep covertly into the study.
Fortunately, scientists have developed a strategy for controlling expectancy bias
by keeping participants in the research experimentally “blind,” or uninformed, about
whether they are getting the real treatment or a placebo (a sham “drug” or fake treat-
ment with no medical value). Even better is the double-blind study, which keeps both
participants and experimenters unaware of which group is receiving which treatment.
In a double-blind drug study, then, neither researchers nor participants would know
(until the end of the study) who was getting the new drug and who was getting the
placebo. This scientific trick controls for experimenters’ expectations by assuring that
experimenters will not inadvertently treat the experimental group differently from the
control group. And it controls for expectations of those receiving the experimental
treatment, because they are also “blind” to which group they have been assigned.
As you can imagine, expectancy bias could affect the response of the children in
our sugar study. Similarly, expectations of the observers could color their judgments.
To prevent this, we should ensure that neither the children nor the observers nor the
teachers know which children received each condition.
Ethical Issues in Psychological Research
Research also can involve serious ethical issues, such as the possibility of people being
hurt or unduly distressed. No researcher would want this to happen, yet the issues are
not always clear. Is it ethical, for example, in an experiment on aggression, to deliberately
provoke people by insulting them? What degree of stress is too high a price to pay for the
knowledge gained from the experiment? Such ethical issues raise difficult but important
questions, and not all psychologists would answer them in exactly the same way.
To provide some guidelines for researchers, the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) publishes Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (2002a).
This document not only deals with the ethical obligation to shield research participants
from potentially harmful procedures, but it also warns researchers that information
acquired about people during a study must be held confidential (Knapp & VandeCreek,
2003; Smith, 2003a, b).
Informed Consent One important ethical guideline involves gaining informed consent,
which ensures that our participants are willingly engaging in our research. In our sugar
study, for example, we might explain to parents and the teacher the broad outline of
the experiment like this:
We propose to examine the supposed effect of sugar on children’s activity level.
To do so, we have planned a simple study of the children in your child’s third-
grade classroom—subject to the permission of their parents. The procedure
calls for dividing the children into two groups: At lunchtime, one group will
be given a commercial soft drink (7Up) sweetened with sugar, while the other
group will be given the same drink sweetened with artificial sweetener (Diet
7Up). The children will not be told to which groups they have been assigned.
For the rest of the school day, specially trained observers will rate the children’s
activity level. Once averaged, ratings will show whether the group receiving
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 3
For many people, the brain
responds to placebos in much the
same way that it responds to
pain-relieving drugs (p. 110).
placebo (pla-SEE-bo) Substance that appears to
be a drug but is not. Placebos are often referred to as
“sugar pills” because they might contain only sugar,
rather than a real drug.
double-blind study An experimental procedure
in which both researchers and participants are unin-
formed about the nature of the independent variable
being administered.
informed consent Insures that research partici-
pants are informed of the procedures of the research,
as well as any potential dangers involved, so they may
opt out if desired.

How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 33
the sugar-sweetened drink was more active than the other group. We will
share the results with you at the end of the study.
Deception The use of deception poses an especially knotty problem for re-
searchers in psychology. As discussed above, the Ethical Principles document
states that, under most circumstances, participation in research should be volun-
tary and informed, so volunteers are told what challenges they will face and have
a real opportunity to opt out of the study. But the issue can be more complicated
than it first appears. What if you are interested in the “good Samaritan” prob-
lem: the conditions under which people will help a stranger in distress? If you tell
people you have contrived a phony emergency situation and ask them whether
they are willing to help, you will spoil the very effect you are trying to study.
Consequently, the guidelines do allow for deception under some conditions, pro-
vided no substantial risks are likely to accrue to the participants.
You might well ask, “Who judges the risks?” Most places where research is
done now have watchdog committees, called institutional review boards (IRBs),
that examine all studies proposed to be carried out within an institution, such as
a college, university, or clinic. Further, when a researcher uses deception, the APA
guidelines require that participants be informed of the deception as soon as pos-
sible without compromising the study’s research goals. Thus, participants are de-
briefed after the study to make sure they suffer no lasting ill effects. Despite these
precautions, some psychologists stand opposed to the use of deception in any form
of psychological research (Baumrind, 1985; Ortmann & Hertwig, 1997).
Animal Studies Another long-standing ethical issue surrounds the use of lab-
oratory animals, such as rats, pigeons, and monkeys. Animals make attractive
research subjects because of the relative simplicity of their nervous systems and the ease
with which large numbers of individuals can be maintained under controlled conditions.
Animals also have served as alternatives to humans when a procedure was deemed risky
or outright harmful, such as implanting electrodes in the brain to study its parts.
With such concerns in mind nearly 100 years ago, officers of the American Psycho-
logical Association established a Committee on Precautions in Animal Experimentation,
which wrote guidelines for animal research (Dewsbury, 1990). More recently, the APA’s
Ethical Principles document reiterated the experimenter’s obligation to provide decent liv-
ing conditions for research animals and to weigh any discomfort caused them against the
value of the information sought in the research. Additional safeguards appear in a 1985
federal law that regulates animal research (Novak & Suomi, 1988).
Recent years have seen a renewal of concern about the use of animals as research sub-
jects. When the research involves painful or damaging procedures, such as brain surgery,
electrode implants, or pain studies, people become especially uneasy. Some feel that limita-
tions should be more stringent, especially on studies using chimpanzees or other human-
like animals. Others believe that limitations or outright bans should apply to all animal
research, including studies of simple animals such as sea slugs (often used in neurological
studies). While many psychologists support animal research under the APA guidelines, the
issue remains a contested one (Bird, 2005; Plous, 1996).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
The Perils of Pseudo-Psychology
Now that we understand the importance of the scientific method in determining the
credibility of claims we hear in the news, let’s look at a few serious problems that have
resulted from failures to follow this reliable system carefully.
In 1949, the Nobel Prize in medicine went to the inventor of the “lobotomy,” which
at the time was a crude brain operation that disconnected the frontal lobes from the
rest of the brain. Originally intended as a treatment for severe mental disorders, the
operation led instead to thousands of permanently brain-injured patients. The procedure
had no careful scientific basis, yet it became popular because people who wanted it to

34 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
work didn’t ask critical questions. Emotional bias (in this case, the desire to cure people
with severe mental illnesses) promoted blind faith instead of clear-eyed scrutiny. As a
result, people failed to examine the evidence objectively.
For a modern example of pseudo-psychology’s harmful effects, we offer the widespread
belief that positive thoughts can cure dire diseases such as cancer. What could possibly be
wrong with that idea? For one thing, the evidence doesn’t support the notion that a per-
son’s state of mind significantly impacts the chances of recovery from a serious physical
illness (Cassileth et al., 1985; Coyne et al., 2007). For another, the attitude-can-make-you-
well belief can lead to “blaming the victim,” or assuming a patient didn’t get well because
his or her attitude was not sufficiently optimistic (Angell, 1985). And finally, for patients
suffering from severe illness, the lure of positive thinking certainly presents a less pain-
ful and traumatic solution than does surgery, chemotherapy, or other medical procedures.
Thus, their fear of the pain and suffering of proven medical treatment may bias them to put
their faith in positive thinking instead of the more scientifically valid course of treatment.
Throughout this text, we aim to help you improve your own scientific thinking by iden-
tifying and countering your own critical thinking errors. We will emphasize critical thinking
in three ways. One involves the problem presented at the beginning of each chapter: By ap-
plying the new knowledge you develop as you work your way through the chapter, you can
solve the problem. The second is through the way we have integrated our six critical think-
ing guidelines, introduced in the first section of this chapter, into discussions of controversial
issues in each chapter. In so doing, we hope you will become more accustomed to routinely
using these guidelines to think through other controversial issues you encounter in your life.
And, third, we have highlighted a special section at the end of each chapter, entitled “Critical
Thinking Applied.” In these features, we model the critical thinking process as we consider
a current issue related to the chapter topic—for instance, in this chapter we explore a popu-
lar treatment for autism. After reading each of these special sections, we challenge you to
follow our lead in critically thinking about some issue of particular interest to you in that
area. You can maximize your gain from this class by choosing topics especially relevant to
yourself, whether it be improving your memory, getting better sleep, or eliminating problem
behaviors such as procrastination. As you will see, Psychology Matters!
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: What is the difference between a scientific theory and a
mere opinion?
2. APPLICATION: Which of the following could be an operational
definition of “fear”?
a. an intense feeling of terror and dread when thinking about some
threatening situation
b. panic
c. a desire to avoid something
d. moving away from a stimulus
3. ANALYSIS: Identify the only form of research that can determine
cause and effect. Why is this so?
4. ANALYSIS: Why would an experimenter randomly assign
participants to different experimental conditions?
5. ANALYSIS: Which one of the following correlations shows the
strongest relationship between two variables?
a. +0.4
b. +0.38
c. −0.7
d. 0.05
6. ANALYSIS: What would be a good method for controlling
expectancy bias in research on a new drug for depression?
7. RECALL: Why does research using deception pose an ethical
problem?
8. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What do scientists
mean by empirical observation?
Answers 1. A scientific theory is a testable explanation for available facts or observations. An opinion is not necessarily testable, nor can it generally
explain all the relevant information. 2. d. (because it is the only one phrased in terms of behaviors that can be observed objectively) 3. Only the
experiment can determine cause and effect, because it is the only method that manipulates the independent variable. 4. Random assignment helps
ensure that the experimental and control groups are comparable. 5. c. 6. A double-blind study, because it controls for the expectations of both the
experimenters and the participants who receive the drug. 7. Deception involves a conflict with the principle that participants in research should give
their informed consent. (Deception is, however, permitted under certain circumstances specified in the Ethical Principles document.) 8. Empirical
observation requires making careful measurements based on direct experience.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge? 35
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Facilitated Communication
A utism is a developmental disorder that can cause severe impairments in attention, cognition, communication,
and social functioning. In the most extreme forms, persons
with autism often seem encapsulated in their own worlds,
disconnected from people around them. Consequently,
working with them can sometimes be quite discouraging for
parents and teachers alike. It is no wonder, then, that a tech-
nique known as facilitated communication was heralded as
a dramatic breakthrough in the treatment of autism.
Facilitated communication rests on the belief that untapped
language abilities lie hidden by the mask of autism. Propo-
nents of this technique use a trained facilitator to see through
the mask by helping the person with autism answer questions
by pointing to letters on a letter board or keyboard. (You can
see how this is done in the accompanying photo.) Parents and
teachers welcomed the initial enthusiastic reports on facilitated
communication. But would those reports withstand the scru-
tiny of science?
What Are the Critical Issues?
On its face, the claim that a person with autism is, somehow,
ready but unable to communicate is quite appealing to anyone
personally involved in the issue—after all, communication is a
basic element of human relationships. But many psychologists re-
mained skeptical. What critical thinking questions did they ask?
Is the Claim Reasonable or Extreme? The notion that a
simple pointing technique could break through the barrier of
autism sounded too good to be true, said critics. Indeed, such
extreme claims are typically a cue for critical thinkers to exam-
ine the claim and the evidence more closely. Testimonials, no
matter how powerful, are no substitute for empirical evidence.
What Is the Evidence? Sure enough, evidence from scientific
studies showed that, when the facilitator knew the questions, the
child with autism would appear to give sensible answers. But
when “blinders” were applied—by hiding the questions from
the facilitator—the responses were inaccurate or nonsensical
(American Psychological Association, 2003d; Lilienfeld, 2007).
Could Bias Contaminate the Conclusion? The evidence
above reveals one form of bias you may have already suspected:
The helper was—consciously or unconsciously—guiding the
child’s hand to produce the messages. This expectancy bias
became apparent when erroneous responses emerged under
conditions where the facilitator didn’t know the question. Con-
firmation bias and emotional biases were undoubtedly at work,
Autism A developmental disorder marked by disabilities in language, social interaction,
and the ability to understand another person’s state of mind.
too: Parents and teachers, desperate for an effective treatment,
uncritically accepted the anecdotal reports of success.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Sadly, although facilitated communication had extended hope to
beleaguered parents and teachers, a scientific look presented a pic-
ture showing how uncritical belief could create consequences far
worse than false hopes. More effective treatments were delayed,
and moreover, parents blamed themselves when their children did
not respond to the treatment as expected (Levine et al., 1994).
Worst of all were the false accusations of sexual abuse based on
messages thought to have come from children with autism (Bick-
len, 1990; Heckler, 1994). The research left little doubt, however,
that these messages had originated wholly in the minds of the
facilitators. In light of such findings, the American Psychological
Association (2003b) denounced facilitated communication as a
failure and relegated it to the junk pile of ineffective therapies.
What lessons about critical thinking can you, as a student
of psychology, take away from the facilitated communica-
tion fiasco? We hope you will develop a skeptical attitude
about reports of extraordinary new treatments, dramatic
psychological breakthroughs, and products that claim to help
you develop untapped potential. And we hope you will al-
ways pause to ask: What is the evidence? Could the claims
be merely the result of people’s expectations? Perhaps the big
lesson to be learned is this: No matter how much you want to
believe, and no matter how many anecdotes and testimonials
you have, there is no substitute for empirical evidence.
When skeptical psychologists tested the claims for facilitated com-
munication, they found that it wasn’t the autistic children who were
responsible for the messages.

36 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
CHALLENGING YOUR OWN PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC BELIEFS
By now, you probably recognize that
everyone—even well-trained scientists—
risks falling prey to biases and pseudosci-
ence. Thus, we hope you will accept that
you, too, are vulnerable to these errors in
logic. Here, we list several popular beliefs
that—yes, you guessed it—do not hold up
to scientific scrutiny. Choose one that you
tend to believe and use the Internet to find
reports of scientific studies of the belief.
Then identify at least two of the critical
thinking guidelines that you violated when
you believed that myth to be true. Then,
share your findings with your classmates.
Popular Pseudoscientific Myths
Crime rates increase when the moon
is full.
Venting anger is healthy.
Abused children become abusive adults.
Most people repress traumatic memories.
If you believe in yourself, you can do
anything (or, Visualize success and
you’ll achieve it).
People who join cults are weak-
minded or lack intelligence.
If you’re depressed, think happy
thoughts and you’ll feel better.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
PROBLEM: How would psychology test the claim that sugar
makes children hyperactive?
• Psychologists would use the scientific method to test this claim.
• In a controlled experiment—designed to show cause-
and-effect—children would be assigned randomly to an
experimental group or a control group and given a drink with
sugar or a sugar substitute.
• Using a double-blind procedure to control for experimenter
bias and the placebo effect, observers would rate each child’s
activity level.
• Analyzing the resulting data would show whether or not the
hypothesis had been supported. If children who received the
sugared drink were more active, we could conclude that sugar
does make children hyperactive.
1.1 What Is Psychology—and What Is It Not?
Core Concept 1.1 Psychology is a broad field with many
specialties, but fundamentally, psychology is the science of
behavior and mental processes.
All psychologists are concerned with some aspect of behavior
and mental processes. Unlike the pseudosciences, scientific psy-
chology demands solid evidence to back up its claims. Within
psychology, there are many specialties that fall within three
broad areas. Experimental psychologists primarily do research
but often teach as well. Those who are primarily teachers of
psychology work in a variety of settings, including colleges, uni-
versities, and high schools. Applied psychologists practice many
specialties, such as industrial/organizational, sports, school,
rehabilitation, clinical and counseling, forensic, and environ-
mental psychology. In contrast with psychology, psychiatry is a
medical specialty that deals exclusively with mental disorders.
In the media, much of what appears to be psychology is
actually pseudo-psychology. Noticing the difference requires
development of critical thinking skills—which this book
organizes around six questions to ask when confronting
new claims that purport to be scientifically based:
• What is the source?
• Is the claim reasonable or extreme?
• What is the evidence?
• Could bias contaminate the conclusion?
• Does the reasoning avoid common fallacies?
• Does the issue require multiple perspectives?
anecdotal evidence (p. 8)
applied psychologists (p. 5)
confirmation bias (p. 8)
critical thinking skills (p. 7)
emotional bias (p. 8)
experimental psychologists (p. 5)
pseudo-psychology (p. 7)
psychiatry (p. 6)
psychology (p. 4)
teachers of psychology (p. 5)
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

Chapter Summary 37
1.2 What Are Psychology’s Six Main
Perspectives?
Core Concept 1.2 Six main viewpoints dominate modern
psychology—the biological, cognitive, behavioral, whole-
person, developmental, and sociocultural perspectives—each
of which grew out of radical new concepts about mind and
behavior.
Psychology’s roots stretch back to the ancient Greeks. Several
hundred years ago, René Descartes helped the study of the
mind to become scientific, based on his assertion that sen-
sations and behaviors are linked to activity in the nervous
system—a step that ultimately led to the modern biological
perspective, which looks for the causes of behavior in physi-
cal processes such as brain function and genetics. Biological
psychology itself has developed in two directions: the fields of
neuroscience and evolutionary psychology.
The formal beginning of psychology as a science, how-
ever, is traced to the establishment by Wundt of the first psy-
chological laboratory in 1879. Wundt’s psychology, which
American psychologists morphed into structuralism, advo-
cated understanding mental processes such as consciousness
by investigating their contents and structure. Another early
school of psychology, known as functionalism, argued that
mental processes are best understood in terms of their adap-
tive purposes and functions. Both were criticized for the use
of introspection, which some psychologists found too subjec-
tive. Nevertheless, elements of these schools can be found in
the modern cognitive perspective, with its interest in learning,
memory, sensation, perception, language, and thinking and
its emphasis on information processing.
The behavioral perspective emerged around 1900, reject-
ing the introspective method and mentalistic explanations,
choosing instead to analyze behavior in terms of observable
stimuli and responses. Proponents of behaviorism, such as
John Watson and B. F. Skinner, have exerted a powerful influ-
ence on modern psychology with their demands for objective
methods, insights into the nature of learning, and effective
techniques for management of undesirable behavior.
Three rather different viewpoints make up the whole-person
perspective, which takes a global view of the individual. Sigmund
Freud’s psychoanalytic approach, with its focus on mental
disorder and unconscious processes, led to psychoanalysis and
modern psychodynamic psychology. In contrast, humanistic psychol-
ogy, led by Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, emphasizes the
positive side of human nature. Meanwhile, trait and temperament
psychology sees people in terms of their persistent characteristics
and dispositions.
The developmental perspective calls attention to mental and
behavioral changes that occur predictably throughout the
lifespan. Such changes result from the interaction of hered-
ity and environment. Alternatively, the sociocultural perspective
argues that each individual is influenced by other people and
by the culture in which they are all embedded.
Modern psychology has changed rapidly over the past
decades as the biological, cognitive, and developmental
perspectives have become dominant. At the same time,
adherents of different perspectives are joining forces. Another
major change involves the increasing number of women and
minority-group members entering the field.
While careers in psychology are available at various edu-
cational levels, becoming a fully fledged psychologist requires
a doctorate. Those with less than a doctorate work in various
applied specialties as aides, teachers, and counselors.
behavioral perspective (p. 17)
behaviorism (p. 16)
biological perspective (p. 12)
cognitive perspective (p. 15)
cross-cultural psychologists (p. 20)
culture (p. 20)
developmental perspective (p. 19)
evolutionary psychology (p. 13)
functionalism (p. 14)
humanistic psychology (p. 18)
introspection (p. 13)
Necker cube (p. 15)
neuroscience (p. 13)
psychoanalysis (p. 18)
psychodynamic psychology (p. 17)
sociocultural perspective (p. 19)
structuralism (p. 14)
trait and temperament psychology (p. 18)
whole-person perspectives (p. 18)
Research utilizing this scientific method can employ experi-
ments, correlational studies, surveys, naturalistic observations, and
case studies. Each method differs in the amount of control
the researcher has over the conditions being investigated. Re-
searchers can fall prey to expectancy bias. One way scientists
control for bias in their studies is the double-blind method.
Using the experimental method in large and well-controlled
double-blind studies, researchers have failed to find evidence
that links sugar to hyperactivity in children.
1.3 How Do Psychologists Develop New
Knowledge?
Core Concept 1.3 Psychologists, like all other scientists,
use the scientific method to test their ideas empirically.
Psychology differs from the pseudosciences in that it employs
the scientific method to test its ideas empirically. The scientific
method relies on testable theories and falsifiable hypotheses.

38 C H A P T E R 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
however, experimental studies revealed that reports of success
were skewed by expectancy bias. As a result, facilitated com-
munication was denounced by the American Psychological
Association.
Facilitated Communication
A form of therapy known as facilitated communication was
originally touted as a revolutionary new method of commu-
nicating with persons with autism. Upon closer inspection,
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following videos by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the videos, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 1: PAST, PRESENT,
AND PROMISE
PROGRAM 2: UNDERSTANDING
RESEARCH
c. the scientific study of the behavior of individuals and of their
mental processes
d. the knowledge used to predict how virtually any organism will
behave under specified conditions
Program Review
1. What is the best definition of psychology?
a. the scientific study of how people interact in social groups
b. the philosophy explaining the relation between brain
and mind
Psychologists follow a code of ethics, established by the
American Psychological Association, for the humane treat-
ment of subjects. Still, some areas of disagreement remain.
These especially involve the use of deception and the use of
animals as experimental subjects.
Despite widespread acceptance of the scientific method,
pseudo-psychological claims abound. Unchecked, pseudo-
psychology can have harmful effects, as seen in the use of the
lobotomy.
case study (p. 31)
control group (p. 27)
correlational study (p. 28)
data (p. 26)
dependent variable (p. 27)
double-blind study (p. 32)
empirical investigation (p. 24)
expectancy bias (p. 31)
experiment (p. 27)
experimental group (p. 27)
hypothesis (p. 24)
independent variable (p. 27)
informed consent (p. 32)
naturalistic observation (p. 30)
negative correlation (p. 29)
operational definitions (p. 24)
placebo (p. 32)
positive correlation (p. 28)
random assignment (p. 28)
replicate (p. 26)
scientific method (p. 24)
survey (p. 30)
theory (p. 24)
zero correlation (p. 29)

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 39
2. What is the main goal of psychological research?
a. to cure mental illness
b. to find the biological bases of the behavior of organisms
c. to predict and, in some cases, control behavior
d. to provide valid legal testimony
3. Who founded the first psychology laboratory in the
United States?
a. Wilhelm Wundt
b. William James
c. G. Stanley Hall
d. Sigmund Freud
4. Which of the following is desirable in research?
a. having the control and experimental conditions differ on
several variables
b. interpreting correlation as implying causality
c. systematic manipulation of the variable(s) of interest
d. using samples of participants who are more capable than the
population you want to draw conclusions about
5. What is the main reason the results of research studies are published?
a. so researchers can prove they earned their money
b. so other researchers can try to replicate the work
c. so the general public can understand the importance of
spending money on research
d. so attempts at fraud and trickery are detected
6. Why does the placebo effect work?
a. because researchers believe it does
b. because participants believe in the power of the placebo
c. because human beings prefer feeling they are in control
d. because it is part of the scientific method
7. What is the purpose of a double-blind procedure?
a. to test more than one variable at a time
b. to repeat the results of previously published work
c. to define a hypothesis clearly before it is tested
d. to eliminate experimenter bias
8. A prediction of how two or more variables are likely to be related
is called a
a. theory.
b. conclusion.
c. hypothesis.
d. correlation.
9. Why would other scientists want to replicate an experiment that
has already been done?
a. to have their names associated with a well-known
phenomenon
b. to gain a high-odds, low-risk publication
c. to ensure that the phenomenon under study is real and
reliable
d. to calibrate their equipment with that of another laboratory
10. The reactions of the boys and the girls to the teacher in the
Candid Camera episode were essentially similar. Professor
Zimbardo attributes this reaction to
a. how easily adolescents become embarrassed.
b. how an attractive teacher violates expectations.
c. the way sexual titillation makes people act.
d. the need people have to hide their real reactions.
11. The amygdala is an area of the brain that processes
a. sound.
b. social status.
c. faces.
d. emotion.
12. What assumption underlies the use of reaction times to study
prejudice indirectly?
a. People of different ethnic backgrounds are quicker intellectu-
ally than people of other ethnicities.
b. Concepts that are associated more strongly in memory are veri-
fied more quickly.
c. Prejudice can’t be studied in any other way.
d. People respond to emotional memories more slowly than
emotionless memories.

2.2 How Does the Body Communicate
Internally?
The Neuron: Building Block of the
Nervous System
The Nervous System
The Endocrine System
2.1 How Are Genes and Behavior
Linked?
Evolution and Natural Selection
Genetics and Inheritance
Biopsychology, Neuroscience,
and Human Nature2
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
Evolution has fundamentally shaped
psychological processes because it
favors genetic variations that produce
adaptive behavior.
Choosing Your Children’s Genes
Within your lifetime, parents may be
able to select genetic traits for their
children. What price will we pay for
these choices?
The brain coordinates the body’s
two communications systems, the
nervous system and the endocrine
system, which use similar chemical
processes to communicate with targets
throughout the body.
How Psychoactive Drugs Affect
the Nervous System
Chemicals used to alter thoughts and
feelings usually affect the actions
of hormones or neurotransmitters.
In so doing, they may also stimulate
unintended targets, producing
unwanted side effects.
The brain is composed of many
specialized modules that work together
to create mind and behavior.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
The fact that we employ many
different regions of the cerebral
cortex in learning and memory may be
among neuroscience’s most practical
discoveries.
CHAPTER PROBLEM What does Jill Bolte Taylor’s experience teach us about how our brain is
organized and about its amazing ability to adapt?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Left Brain versus Right Brain
2.3 How Does the Brain Produce
Behavior and Mental Processes?
Windows on the Brain
Three Layers of the Brain
Lobes of the Cerebral Cortex
Cerebral Dominance

41
I WAS LIVING LARGE,” SAYS DR. JILL BOLTE TAYLOR, ALSO KNOWN AS THE Singing Scientist (Taylor, 2009, p. xiv). At age 37, the Harvard Medical School brain anatomist had won prestigious awards and was recognized nationwide for her breakthrough research on the brain’s involvement in mental illness. Then, on a cold
December morning, her life abruptly changed.
When Jill first awoke that fateful day, she noticed a painful pounding in her head that felt
like a severe headache. As she tried to go about her normal morning routine, however, she
began to notice odd changes in her body and her mind. Stepping into the shower became a fo-
cused effort in coordination. Her body felt strange; the sound of the water was a deafening roar,
and the overhead light seared her eyes. As she tried to think rationally and figure out what was
happening, she couldn’t keep her thoughts on track. Instead, she found herself irresistibly dis-
tracted by a newfound fascination with the movement of her body parts. “As I held my hands
up in front of my face and wiggled my fingers, I was simultaneously perplexed and intrigued.
Wow, what a strange and amazing thing I am . . . I was both fascinated and humbled by how
hard my little cells worked, moment by moment . . . I felt ethereal” (pp. 42–43). Then, her right
arm became paralyzed, and suddenly she knew: “Oh my gosh, I’m having a stroke!”—followed
immediately by something perhaps only a brain scientist would consider at a time like that,
“Wow, this is so cool!” (p. 44).
Over the next few hours, Jill struggled with figuring out how to get help. She was no longer
aware that calling 911 would bring emergency treatment, nor could she recognize the numbers
on a telephone keypad. When—after spending a full hour figuring out how to call for help—she
finally reached a coworker, she discovered that not only did she not understand his words,
“

he could not understand hers: She had lost her ability to speak and to understand language.
Fortunately, her coworker recognized her voice, but the several hours it took for Jill to get to a
hospital took a profound toll on her brain. She could not sit up or walk without assistance. She
could hear, but sounds were merely noise; she could not make sense out of them. She could
see but could not distinguish color or determine whether a crack in the sidewalk was danger-
ous. She could not communicate with others. She didn’t even recognize her own mother. The
massive stroke she had suffered spilled blood throughout the left side of her brain, creating a
toxic environment for millions of brain cells.
Remarkably, though, Jill recovered. Despite the extensive damage to her brain, she has
returned to her career as a neuroanatomist, teaching at Indiana University School of Medicine
and traveling as a national spokesperson for the Harvard Brain Bank. She water skis, plays
guitar, and creates works of art that are uniquely representative of her experiences: anatomi-
cally correct stained glass brains. On the outside, observers see no signs of the traumatic brain
injury she survived. On the inside, however, Jill is not the same person. Her injury and recovery
rewired her brain, and with the rewiring came a different perspective on life and different per-
sonality traits. “I may look like me, and I may sound like me, but I’m different now, and I had
to accept that,” she states with grace and conviction. “I believe [Einstein] got it right when he
said, ‘I must be willing to give up what I am in order to become what I will be’” (p. 185).
PROBLEM: What does Jill’s experience teach us about how our brain is organized and
about its amazing ability to adapt?
What do we know about the human brain? In simplest terms, it is about the size of a grapefruit,
it weighs about 3 pounds, and it has a pinkish-gray and wrinkled surface. But such bald facts
offer no hint of the brain’s amazing structure and capabilities. Some 100 billion neurons (nerve
cells), each connecting with up to 10,000 other neurons, make the human brain the most com-
plex structure known. Our largest computers seem primitive by comparison.
At birth, you actually had far more neurons than you do now. Many of them have been
pruned away, probably from disuse in the first few years of your life. (Don’t worry. It
happens to everyone!) In adolescence, the number stabilizes and then remains essen-
tially the same throughout adulthood as some cells die and others develop on a daily
basis (Gage, 2003).
As for its capabilities, the human brain uses its vast nerve circuitry to regulate all
our body functions, control our behavior, generate our emotions and desires, and pro-
cess the experiences of a lifetime. Most of this activity operates unconsciously behind
the scenes—much like the electronics in your TV. Yet when disease, drugs, or accidents
destroy brain cells, the biological basis of the human mind becomes starkly apparent.
Then we realize the critical role of biology in human sensation and perception, learn-
ing and memory, passion and pain, reason—and even madness.
Most remarkable of all, perhaps, the human brain has the ability to think about
itself. This fact fascinates specialists in biopsychology, who work in a rapidly growing
field that lies at the intersection of biology, behavior, and mental processes. Biopsy-
chologists often collaborate with cognitive psychologists, biologists, computer scien-
tists, chemists, neurologists, linguists, and others interested in the connection between
brain and mind. The result is a vibrant interdisciplinary field known as neuroscience
(Kandel & Squire, 2000).
Looking at mind and behavior from this biological perspective has produced many
practical applications. For example, we now know that certain parts of the brain
control sleep patterns—with the result that we now have effective treatments for a
number of formerly untreatable sleep disorders. Likewise, the effects of certain psycho-
active drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, make sense now that we
biopsychology The specialty in psychology that
studies the interaction of biology, behavior, and mental
processes.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Neuroscience grew out of
the biological perspective in
psychology, which looks for
physiological explanations for
human behavior and mental
processes (p. 13).
42 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature

How Are Genes and Behavior Linked? 43
understand how these drugs interact with chemicals produced by the brain. And, as we
will see, recent discoveries involving mirror neurons, the genetic code for human life,
brain implants, and the biological basis of memory promise many more benefits for
people who live with brain disease.
We begin our exploration of biopsychology and neuroscience at the most basic
level—by considering the twin domains of genetics and evolution, both of which have
shaped our bodies and minds. Then we will examine the endocrine system and the
nervous system, the two communication channels carrying messages throughout the
body. Finally, we will focus on the brain itself. By reading this chapter, you will come to
understand how Jill Bolte Taylor recovered from the massive damage to her brain, yet
became an essentially different person. More importantly, you will learn how biologi-
cal processes shape your every thought, feeling, and action.
2.1 KEY QUESTION
How Are Genes and Behavior Linked?
Just as fish have an inborn knack for swimming and most birds are built for flight, we
humans also have innate (inborn) abilities. At birth, the human brain emerges already
“programmed” for language, social interaction, self-preservation, and many other
functions—as we can readily see in the interaction between babies and their caregivers.
Babies “know,” for example, how to search for the breast, how to communicate rather
effectively through coos and cries and, surprisingly, how to imitate a person sticking
out her tongue. We’ll look more closely at the menu of innate human behaviors in our
discussion of human development (Chapter 7), but for now, this is the question: How
did such potential come to be woven into the brain’s fabric?
The scientific answer rests on the concept of evolution, the process by which suc-
ceeding generations of organisms change as they adapt to changing environments. We
can observe evolution in action on a microscopic level, when an antibiotic fails to
work on a strain of bacteria that has evolved a resistance. When it comes to larger and
more complex organisms, change occurs over much longer periods of time as these
organisms adapt to changing climates, predators, diseases, and food supplies. In our
own species, for example, change has favored large brains suited to language, complex
problem solving, and social interaction.
Our Core Concept for this section makes this evolutionary process the link between
genetics and behavior.
Core Concept 2.1
Evolution has fundamentally shaped psychological processes because
it favors genetic variations that produce adaptive behavior.
Our explanation of evolution begins in this section with the story of Charles Darwin,
who gave the idea of evolutionary change to the world. Following that, we will build
on Darwin’s insight with a look at genetics, which involves the molecular machinery
that makes evolution work—and ultimately influences all our thoughts and behaviors.
Evolution and Natural Selection
Although he trained for careers in both medicine and the ministry, Charles Darwin’s
greatest love was nature. He was thrilled, then, when in 1831 (with help from his
botany professor) he landed a job as a “gentleman companion” aboard the Beagle
(Phelan, 2009), a British research vessel surveying the coastline of South America.
Darwin quickly became seasick, however, which made being on the ship unbearable,
so he spent as much time as possible on land. Following his passion, he began studying
the native species, collecting numerous specimens and keeping detailed records of the
evolution The gradual process of biological
change that occurs in a species as it adapts to its
environment.

44 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
unusual life-forms he found. Struck by the similarities among the various animals and
plants he studied, Darwin wondered if they could possibly be related to each other, and
furthermore, if all creatures, including humans, might share a common ancestry.
He knew this notion flew in the face of accepted scholarship, as well as the reli-
gious doctrine of creationism. So, in his famous book, On the Origin of Species (1859),
Darwin carefully made the case for the evolution of life. And controversial it was. The
essential features of his argument, however, withstood withering attacks, and eventu-
ally his theory of evolution created a fundamental change in the way people saw their
relationship to other living things (Keynes, 2002; Mayr, 2000).
The Evidence That Convinced Darwin What was the evidence that led Darwin to his
radical conclusion about the evolution of organisms? Again and again on the voyage,
he observed organisms exquisitely adapted to their environments: flowers that attracted
certain insects, birds with beaks perfectly suited to cracking certain types of seeds. But
he also observed variation among individuals within a species—just as some humans
are taller than others or have better eyesight (Weiner, 1994). It occurred to Darwin that
such variations could give one individual an advantage over others in the struggle for
survival and reproduction. This, then, suggested a mechanism for evolution: a “weeding
out” process he called natural selection. By means of natural selection, those individuals
best adapted to their environment are more likely to flourish and reproduce; the poorly
adapted tend to leave fewer offspring, and their line may die out. (You may have heard
this described as survival of the fittest, a term Darwin disliked.) Through natural selec-
tion, then, a species gradually changes as it adapts to the demands of its environment.
Application to Psychology This process of adaptation and evolution helps us make
sense of many observations we make in psychology. For example, human phobias
(extreme and incapacitating fears) most often involve stimuli that signaled danger to
our ancestors, such as snakes, heights, and lightning (Hersen & Thomas, 2005). In
the same way, the fact that we spend about a third of our lives asleep makes sense
in evolutionary terms: Sleep kept our ancestors out of trouble in the dark. Evolution
also explains our innate preferences and distastes, such as the attractiveness of sweets
and fatty foods (good sources of valuable calories for our ancestors) and a dislike for
bitter-tasting substances (often signaling poisons).
Evolution is, of course, an emotionally loaded term and, as a result, many people
have a distorted understanding of its real meaning. For example, some believe that
Darwin’s theory says humans “come from monkeys.” But neither Darwin nor any
other evolutionary scientist has ever said that. Rather, they say people and monkeys
had a common ancestor millions of years ago—a big difference. Evolutionary theory
says that, over time, the two species have diverged, each developing different sets of
adaptive traits. For humans, this meant developing a big brain adapted for language
(Buss et al., 1998).
We should be clear that the basic principles of evolution, while still controversial
in some quarters, have been accepted by virtually all scientists for more than a century.
That said, we should also note that evolutionary theory is a controversial newcomer
to psychology. It is not that psychologists dispute Darwin—most do not. To its credit,
evolutionary psychology may provide an elegant solution to the nature–nurture de-
bate, which we learned about in Chapter 1, by its premise that behavior evolves from
the interaction of heredity and environmental demands (Yee, 1995). Some worry, how-
ever, that recognition of a prominent genetic role in behavior may raise the question of
whether genetics absolves us of our responsibility for troublesome behaviors such as
aggression or addiction—a question to which evolutionary psychologists resoundingly
reply, “No!” (Hagen, 2004).
In later chapters, we will discuss specific evolutionary theories that have been
advanced to explain aggression, jealousy, sexual orientation, physical attraction
and mate selection, parenting, cooperation, temperament, morality, and (always a
psychological hot potato) gender differences. But for now, let us turn our attention to
genetics and the biological underpinnings of heredity and evolutionary change.
natural selection The driving force behind
evolution by which the environment “selects” the fittest
organisms.

How Are Genes and Behavior Linked? 45
Genetics and Inheritance
In principle, the genetic code is quite simple. Much as the microscopic pits in a CD encode
information that can become pictures or music, your genes encode molecular informa-
tion that can become inherited traits. Consider your own unique combination of physical
characteristics. Your height, facial features, and hair color, for example, all stem from the
encoded genetic “blueprint” inherited from your parents and inscribed in every cell
in your body. Likewise, genetics influences psychological characteristics, including your
basic temperament, tendency to fears, and certain behavior patterns (Pinker, 2002).
Yet, even under the influence of heredity, you are a unique individual, different from
either of your parents. One source of your uniqueness lies in your experience: the envi-
ronment in which you grew up—distinct in time and, perhaps, in place from that of your
parents. Another source of difference between you and either of your parents arises from
the random combination of traits, both physical and psychological, each parent passed
on to you from past generations in their own family lines. (It is important to note you
do not inherit copies of all your father’s and mother’s genes. Rather, you get half of each,
randomly shuffled.) This hybrid inheritance produced your unique genotype, the genetic
pattern that makes you different from anyone else on earth. Still, as different as people
may seem, 99.9 percent of human genetic material is the same (Marks, 2004).
If the genotype is the “blueprint,” then the resulting structure is the phenotype. All
your physical characteristics make up your phenotype, including not only your visible
traits (for instance, the shape of your nose or the number of freckles you have) but
also “hidden” biological traits, such as the chemistry and “wiring” of your brain. In
fact, any observable characteristic is part of the phenotype—so the phenotype includes
behavior. We should quickly point out that, while the phenotype is based in biology, it
is not completely determined by heredity. Heredity never acts alone but always in part-
nership with the environment, which includes such biological influences as nutrition,
disease, stress, and experiences that leave a lasting mark in the form of learning. The
environment even plays a role before our birth, such as when poor medical care results
in a birth defect.
Now, with these ideas about heredity, environment, genotypes, and phenotypes
fresh in mind, let’s turn to the details of heredity and individual variation that were yet
to be discovered in Darwin’s time.
Chromosomes, Genes, and DNA The blockbuster film Jurassic Park and its sequels
relied on a clever twist of plot in which scientists recovered the genetic code for dino-
saurs and created an island full of reptilian horrors. The stories, of course, are science
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Infants differ in their tendency
to be shy or outgoing, which
is believed to be an aspect of
temperament with a strong
biological basis (p. 421).
genotype An organism’s genetic makeup.
phenotype An organism’s observable physical and
behavioral characteristics.
More than 98 percent of our genetic
material is also found in chimpanzees
(Pennisi, 2007). This supports Darwin’s
idea that humans and apes had a
common ancestor.

46 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
fiction, yet the films rest on an important scientific fact: Every cell in the body carries a
complete set of biological instructions, known as a genome, for building the organism.
For humans, these instructions are spelled out in 23 pairs of chromosomes, which, un-
der a high-powered microscope, look like tiny twisted threads. Zooming in for an even
closer look, we find that each chromosome consists of a long and tightly coiled chain
of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), a molecule especially well suited for storing biological
information (see Figure 2.1).
Genes are the “words” that make up each organism’s instruction manual. Encoded
in short segments of DNA, each gene contributes to the operation of an organism by
specifying a single protein. Thousands of such proteins, in turn, serve as the build-
ing blocks for the organism’s physical characteristics (part of the phenotype) and the
regulation of the body’s internal operations. Genes, because they differ slightly from
one individual to another, provide the biological source for the variation that caught
Darwin’s attention.
Like the string of words in this paragraph, genes occur in sequence on the chromo-
somes. But chromosomes are much more than strings of genes. Like paragraphs, they
also contain “punctuation” that indicates where each gene begins and ends, along with
commands specifying how and when the genes will be expressed (Gibbs, 2003). Some-
times, however, these commands are wrong, or the genes themselves have defects. The
resulting errors in gene expression can cause physical and developmental problems,
such as cerebral palsy and mental retardation.
On a still smaller scale, genes are composed of even tinier molecular units called nu-
cleotides that serve as individual “letters” in the genetic “words.” Instead of a 26-letter
alphabet, the genetic code uses just four nucleotides. Consequently, a particular gene
may require hundreds of nucleotides strung together in a unique pattern to specify a
particular protein. You can see why, then, the Human Genome Project is so exciting
to scientists: It mapped the complete nucleotide pattern for all of the approximately
30,000 genes in the human organism, including multiple variations of patterns on each
gene to account for individual differences! Results offer great hope for better under-
standing and treatment of physical and psychological disorders.
Of the 46 chromosomes (23 pairs), two warrant special mention: the sex chromosomes.
Named X and Y for their shapes, these chromosomes carry genetic encoding for a male
or female phenotype. We all inherit one X chromosome from our biological mothers.
genome The complete set of genetic information
contained within a cell.
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) A long, com-
plex molecule that encodes genetic characteristics.
gene Segment of a chromosome that encodes the
directions for the inherited physical and mental char-
acteristics of an organism. Genes are the functional
units of a chromosome.
chromosome Tightly coiled threadlike structure
along which the genes are organized, like beads on a
necklace. Chromosomes consist primarily of DNA.
sex chromosomes The X and Y chromosomes
that determine our physical sex characteristics.
Genes contain
instructions
for making
proteins.G
C
C
C
G
C
G
T
A G A
T
A
T
A
T
T
A
Cell
Genome
DNA
Chromosome
Genes
FIGURE 2.1
DNA, Genes, and Chromosomes
A chromosome is composed mainly of a tightly coiled strand of DNA, an incredibly long molecule.
Each chromosome contains thousands of genes, along with instructions for the “when” and “how”
of gene expression, which together represent the organism’s genome. Genes themselves are seg-
ments of DNA. Each gene contains instructions, coded in the four-nucleotide alphabet, for making
a protein. The Human Genome Project has identified the sequence of nucleotides in all 23 pairs of
our chromosomes.
Read
MyPsychLab
about How DNA Works at

How Are Genes and Behavior Linked? 47
In addition, we receive either an X or a Y from our biological fathers. When they pair up,
two X chromosomes (XX) contain the code for femaleness, while an XY pair codes for
maleness. In this sense, then, the chromosome we get from our fathers—either an X or
a Y—determines our biological sex.
Genetic Explanations for Psychological Processes Most of our discussion of he-
redity and genetics could apply equally to fruit flies and butterflies, hollyhocks and
humans. All organisms follow the same basic laws of heredity. The differences among
species arise, then, from different genetic “words”—the genes themselves—“spelled”
with the same four letters (nucleotides) of life’s universal four-letter alphabet.
And what does all this have to do with psychology? Simply put, genes influence our
psychological characteristics just as they do our physical traits. In later chapters, we
will explore how genes affect such diverse human attributes as intelligence, personality,
mental disorders, reading and language disabilities, and (perhaps) sexual orientation.
Even our fears can have some genetic basis (Hariri et al., 2002). But, because genetic
psychology is still a field in its infancy, we don’t yet know exactly how or to what ex-
tent specific genes are involved in most psychological processes (Rutter, 2006).
It is also important to note that multiple genes, rather than just one, are thought to
be involved in most disorders (Plomin, 2000). In only a few cases can we hold a single
gene responsible for a specific psychological disorder. For example, just one abnormal
gene has been linked to a rare pattern of impulsive violence found in several members
of a Dutch family (Brunner et al., 1993). Experts expect that multiple genes contrib-
ute to most other conditions such as schizophrenia, a severe mental disorder, and
Alzheimer’s disease, a form of dementia. (St. George-Hyslop, 2000).
So, does this mean that heredity determines our psychological destiny? Will you grow
up to be like your Uncle Henry? Not to worry. Although you may share many of his
genes, your heredity never acts alone. Heredity and environment always work together
to influence our behavior and mental processes (Pinker, 2002). Jill Bolte Taylor’s intel-
ligence, for example, has a genetic component (her mother went to Harvard and her
father has a doctoral degree) but was further nurtured in her childhood environment and
educational opportunities. Her ability to overcome the challenges of her severe medical
condition, construct a new life, and go on to become one of Time Magazine’s 100 Most
Influential People in the World (2008) illustrates her creativity, a trait she attributes to
her father—but also undoubtedly enhanced by her training as a scientist.
Even identical twins, who share the same genotype, display individual differences
in appearance and personality that result from their distinct experiences, such as expo-
sure to different people, places, chemicals, and diseases. Moreover, studies show that
when one identical twin acquires a psychological disorder known to have a genetic
basis (schizophrenia, for example), the other does not necessarily develop the same
disorder. The takeaway message is this: Never attribute psychological characteristics to
genetics alone (Ehrlich, 2000a, b; Mauron, 2001).
A final example of the interaction between heredity and environment—and one
of the rays of hope from biopsychology—can be seen in a condition called Down
syndrome. Associated with an extra chromosome 21, this disorder includes impaired
physical development as well as mental retardation. Only a few years ago, people with
Down syndrome faced bleak and unproductive lives, shut away in institutions where
they depended almost wholly on others to fulfill their basic needs. Now, a better under-
standing of the disorder, along with a deeper appreciation for the interaction between
genetics and environment, has changed that outlook. Although no cure has been found,
today we know that people with Down syndrome are capable of considerable learning
despite their genetic impairment. With special life skills training, those with Down syn-
drome learn to care for themselves, work, and establish some personal independence.
In this way, environmental factors can powerfully shape genetic dispositions.
“Race” and Human Variation Certain features of skin color and other physical
characteristics are more (or less) common among people who trace their ancestry to
the same part of the world. Tropical ancestry is often associated with darker skin,
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
The evidence suggests that sexual
orientation is determined—at least
in part—by heredity (p. 385).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
Schizophrenia is a psychotic
disorder that affects about 1 out
of 100 persons (p. 537).

48 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
which affords some protection from the sun, and lighter skin frequently identifies peo-
ple from high latitudes, which receive less sun. While we commonly speak of “race” in
terms of these superficial characteristics, biologists tell us there are no physical charac-
teristics that divide people cleanly into distinct “racial” groups. We are all one species.
In reality, physical characteristics of the so-called “races” blend seamlessly one into
another. There is no physical characteristic that reliably distinguishes the brain of a
person of one geographic region, skin color, or ethnic origin from that of another. Inside
the skull are many physical differences—even some gender differences—but no race-
based differences. We should think of “race,” therefore, as a socially defined term rather
than a biological one. Alternatively, the concept of culture is a far better explanation for
most—perhaps all—of the group differences important to psychologists (Cohen, 1998).
Just because race is not a precise biological concept, however, doesn’t mean its
social meaning is unimportant. On the contrary, race as a socially defined category can
exert powerful influences on behavior. We will see, for example, that social conceptions
of race influence expectations and prejudices. Please keep this notion in mind when
we look at studies in which people who identify with different racial or ethnic groups
are compared, for example, on intelligence and academic achievement (Eberhardt &
Randall, 1997; Hirschfeld, 1996).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Choosing Your Children’s Genes
Scientists already have the ability to control and alter the genetics of animals, like
Dolly, the late and famous fatherless sheep, cloned from one of her mother’s cells in
1996. Since that time, a variety of animals from cats to cattle have been cloned, though
the success rate is just 1 to 2 percent of attempts (American Medical Association,
2010). But what about the prospects for genetic manipulation in people? Thanks to
scientists working on the Human Genome Project, we are getting a glimpse of the
genetic instructions that make us human. We now know the sequence of nucleotides
on all the human chromosomes (Pennisi, 2001).
Psychologists expect this information to teach us something about the genetic basis
for human differences in abilities, emotions, and resistance to stress (Kosslyn et al.,
2002). High on the list will be disorders that affect millions: cancer, heart disease, au-
tism, and depression. But not all the promise of human genetics lies in the future. We
can already sample fetal cells and search for certain genetic problems, such as Down
syndrome, Tay-Sachs disease, and sickle-cell anemia. And while many people support
genetic testing, others wonder if technology is advancing faster than our ability to
address the ethical issues it presents.
One such technique, known as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), was
developed to help couples decrease the risk of passing on a serious genetic disorder to an
unborn child. By testing the fetus or embryo at a very early stage, reproductive scientists
can ensure a genetically healthy fetus. Since its introduction in 1990, however, use of PGD
has broadened. The United States and some other countries now allow use of PGD for sex
selection: Almost half the clinics that offer PGD also offer parents the option to choose
whether they will have a boy or a girl (Adams, 2010). Moreover, “savior siblings” are be-
ing engineered, so parents who have a child with a life-threatening disease (such as leuke-
mia) can birth a sibling with the right bone marrow to save the ill child (Marcotty, 2010).
And, most recently, a fertility clinic in Los Angeles announced its plans to offer genetic
selection for physical traits such as height, hair color, and skin color (Naik, 2009). (Inter-
estingly, the clinic retracted its offer after receiving a letter of objection from the Vatican.)
But what will be the price of this technology?
Undoubtedly, parents in this brave new genetic world will want their children to be
smart and good looking—but by what standards will intelligence and looks be judged?
And will everyone be able to place an order for their children’s genes—or only the very
wealthy? You can be certain the problems we face will be simultaneously biological,
psychological, political, and ethical (Patenaude et al., 2002).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
While intelligence is influenced by
heredity, the relative contributions
of nature and nurture are hotly
debated (p. 251).
Read about Choosing Your Own
Children’s Genes at MyPsychLab

How Does the Body Communicate Internally? 49
Already, psychologists provide guidance about how genetic knowledge can best be
applied (Bronheim, 2000), particularly in helping people assess genetic risks in connec-
tion with family planning. We invite you to grapple with these issues by answering the
following questions:
• If you could select three genetic traits for your children, which ones would you
select?
• If a biological child of yours had a life-threatening illness, would you attempt to
conceive a “savior sibling?” Why or why not? What circumstances or conditions
would affect your decision?
• If you knew you might carry a gene responsible for a serious medical or
behavioral disorder, would you want to be tested before having children?
And would it be fair for a prospective partner to require you to be tested
before conceiving children? Would it be fair for the state to make such a
requirement?
These questions, of course, have no “right” answers; but your answers will help you
define your stand on some of the most important issues we will face in this century. In
considering them, think about how the critical thinking guidelines from Chapter 1
might affect your responses. For instance, to what degree might your own emotional
bias color your reaction to these questions?
2.2 KEY QUESTION
How Does the Body Communicate Internally?
Imagine this: You are driving on a winding mountain road, and suddenly a car comes
directly at you. At the last instant, you and the other driver swerve in opposite direc-
tions. Your heart pounds—and keeps pounding for several minutes after the danger has
passed. Externally, you have avoided a potentially fatal accident. Internally, your body
has responded to two kinds of messages from its two communication systems.
One is the fast-acting nervous system, with its extensive network of nerve cells
carrying messages in pulses of electrical and chemical energy throughout the body.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Explain how natural selection increases certain genetic
characteristics within a population of organisms.
2. APPLICATION: Name one of your own characteristics that is part
of your phenotype.
3. RECALL: Which of the following statements expresses the correct
relationship?
a. Genes are made of chromosomes.
b. DNA is made of chromosomes.
c. Nucleotides are made of genes.
d. Genes are made of DNA.
4. ANALYSIS: In purely evolutionary terms, which would be a
measure of your success as an organism?
a. your intellectual accomplishments
b. the length of your life
c. the number of children you have
d. the contributions you make to the happiness of humanity
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Behavior
consistently found in a species is likely to have a genetic basis
that evolved because the behavior was adaptive. Name a common
human behavior that illustrates this concept.
Answers 1. Natural selection relies on genetic variation among individuals within a population (or group) of organisms. Those best adapted to the
environment have a survival and reproduction advantage, leaving more offspring than others. Over generations, these adaptive characteristics
increase within the population. 2. Your observable physical and behavioral characteristics, such as height and weight or the way you speak, make
up your phenotype. 3. d 4. c 5. Language, social interaction, self-preservation, basic parenting “instincts,” feeding in newborns—all have been
influenced by evolution.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

50 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
This first-responder network comes quickly to your rescue in an emergency, carrying
orders that accelerate your heart and tense your muscles for action. The other com-
munication network, the slower-acting endocrine system, sends follow-up messages
that support and sustain the response initiated by the nervous system. To do this, the
endocrine glands, including the pituitary, thyroid, adrenals, and gonads, use chemical
messengers we call hormones.
The two internal message systems cooperate not only in stressful situations but
also in happier circumstances of high arousal, as when you receive an unexpected
“A” on a test or meet someone especially attractive. The endocrine system and ner-
vous system also work together during states of low arousal to keep vital body func-
tions operating smoothly. Managing this cooperation between the endocrine system
and the nervous system is the body’s chief executive, the brain—which brings us to
our Core Concept:
Core Concept 2.2
The brain coordinates the body’s two communications systems, the
nervous system and the endocrine system, which use similar chemi-
cal processes to communicate with targets throughout the body.
Why is this notion important for your understanding of psychology? For one thing,
these two communication systems are the biological bedrock for all our thoughts,
emotions, and behaviors. Another reason for studying the biology behind the
body’s internal communications is that it can help us understand how drugs, such
as caffeine, alcohol, ecstasy, and Prozac, can change the chemistry of the mind.
Finally, it will help you understand many common brain-based conditions, such as
stroke, multiple sclerosis, and depression.
Our overview of the body’s dual communication systems first spotlights the build-
ing block of the nervous system: the neuron. Next, we will see how networks of neu-
rons work together as modular components of the greater network of the nervous
system that extends throughout the body. Then we will shift our attention to the endo-
crine system, a group of glands that operates together and in parallel with the nervous
system—also throughout the body.
The Neuron: Building Block of the Nervous System
Like transistors in a computer, neurons or nerve cells are the fundamental process-
ing units in the brain. In simplest terms, a neuron is merely a cell specialized to
receive, process, and transmit information to other cells. And neurons do that very
efficiently: A typical nerve cell may receive messages from a thousand others and,
within a fraction of a second, decide to “fire,” passing the message along at speeds
up to 300 feet per second to another thousand neurons—or sometimes as many as
10,000 (Pinel, 2005).
Types of Neurons While neurons vary in shape and size, all have essentially the same
structure, and all send messages in essentially the same way. Nevertheless, biopsycholo-
gists distinguish three major classes of neurons according to their location and function:
sensory neurons, motor neurons, and interneurons (see Figure 2.2). Sensory neurons, or
afferent neurons, act like one-way streets that carry traffic from the sense organs toward
the brain. Accordingly, afferent neurons treat the brain to all your sensory experience,
including vision, hearing, taste, touch, smell, pain, and balance. For example, when you
test the water temperature in the shower with your hand, afferent neurons carry the
message toward the brain.
In contrast, motor neurons, or efferent neurons, form the one-way routes that
transport messages away from the brain and spinal cord to the muscles, organs, and
glands. Motor neurons, therefore, carry the instructions for all our actions. So, in
neuron Cell specialized to receive and transmit
information to other cells in the body—also called a
nerve cell. Bundles of many neurons are called nerves.
sensory neuron A nerve cell that carries mes-
sages toward the central nervous system from sense
receptors; also called afferent neurons.
motor neuron A nerve cell that carries messages
away from the central nervous system toward the
muscles and glands; also called efferent neurons.

How Does the Body Communicate Internally? 51
our shower example, the motor neurons deliver the message that tells your hand
just how much to move the shower control knob.
Sensory and motor neurons rarely communicate directly with each other, except in
the simplest of reflexive circuits. Instead, they usually rely on the go-between interneurons
(also shown in Figure 2.2), which make up most of the billions of cells in the brain and
spinal cord. Interneurons relay messages from sensory neurons to other interneurons
or to motor neurons, sometimes in complex pathways. In fact, the brain itself is largely
a network of intricately connected interneurons. To see how fast these neural circuits
work, try the demonstration in the accompanying Do It Yourself! box.
How Neurons Work A look at Figure 2.3 will help you visualize the neuron’s main
components. The “receiver” parts, which accept most incoming messages, consist of
finely branched fibers called dendrites. These dendritic fibers extend outward from the
cell body, where they act like a net, collecting messages received from other neurons or
by direct stimulation of the sense organs (e.g., the eyes, ears, or skin).
interneuron A nerve cell that relays messages
between nerve cells, especially in the brain and
spinal cord.
dendrite Branched fiber that extends outward from
the cell body and carries information into the neuron.
Sensory cortex
Pain message to brain
Spinal cord
Interneuron
Sensory neuron
Skin receptors
Muscle
Motor neuron
FIGURE 2.2
Sensory Neurons, Motor Neurons,
and Interneurons
Information about the water temperature
in the shower is carried by thousands
of sensory neurons (afferent neurons)
from the sense organs to the central
nervous system. In this case, the mes-
sage enters the spinal cord and is relayed
by interneurons to the brain. There, the
information is assessed and a response
is initiated (“Turn the water temperature
down!”). These instructions are sent to
the muscles by means of motor neurons
(efferent neurons). Large bundles of the
message-carrying fibers from these
neurons are called nerves.
NEURAL MESSAGES AND REACTION TIME
For only a dollar, you can find out how long
it takes for the brain to process information
and initiate a response.
Hold a crisp dollar bill by the middle
of the short side so that it dangles down-
ward. Have a friend put his or her thumb
and index fingers on opposite sides and
about an inch away from the center of
the bill. Instruct your friend to pinch the
thumb and fingers together, and attempt to
catch the bill when you drop it.
If you drop the bill without warning
(being careful not to signal your inten-
tions), your friend’s brain will not be able
to process the information rapidly enough
to get a response to the hand before the
dollar bill has dropped safely away.
What does this demonstrate? The time
it takes to respond reflects the time it takes
for the sensory nervous system to take in
the information, for the brain to process
it, and for the motor system to produce
a response. All this involves millions of
neurons; and, even though they respond
quickly, their responses do take time.
Simulate the Experiment
at MyPsychLab
Nerve
Impulse and Afferent and Efferent
Neurons

52 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
Dendrites then pass their messages on to the central part of the neuron, called the
cell body or soma. Not only does the soma house the cell’s chromosomes, it also con-
ducts on-the-spot evaluation of the hundreds (or sometimes thousands) of messages
received by the cell, often simultaneously. Making the assessment even more complex,
some of these messages received by the neuron are excitatory (saying, in effect, “Fire!”)
and some are inhibitory (“Don’t fire!”). The “decision” made by the soma depends
on its overall level of arousal—which depends, in turn, on the sum of the incoming
messages.
When excitation triumphs over inhibition, the neuron initiates a message of its
own and sends it along a single “transmitter” fiber known as the axon. These axons
vary tremendously in length. In a college basketball player, axons connecting the spinal
cord with the toes can be more than 3 feet long, while at the other extreme, axons of
interneurons in the brain may span only a tiny fraction of an inch.
The Action Potential When arousal in the cell body reaches a critical level, it triggers an
electrical impulse in the axon—like the electronic flash of a camera—and, as we said,
the cell “fires.” Much like a battery, the axon gets the electrical energy it needs to fire
from charged chemicals called ions. In its normal, resting state—appropriately called
the resting potential—the ions inside the axon have a negative electrical charge. But this
negative state is easily upset. When the cell body becomes excited, it triggers a cascade
of events, known as the action potential, that temporarily reverses the charge and causes
an electrical signal to race along the axon (see Figure 2.3).
soma The part of a cell (such as a neuron) contain-
ing the nucleus, which includes the chromosomes; also
called the cell body.
axon In a nerve cell, an extended fiber that con-
ducts information from the soma to the terminal but-
tons. Information travels along the axon in the form of
an electric charge called the action potential.
resting potential The electrical charge of the axon
in its inactive state, when the neuron is ready to “fire.”
action potential The nerve impulse caused by a
change in the electrical charge across the cell mem-
brane of the axon. When the neuron “fires,” this charge
travels down the axon and causes neurotransmitters to
be released by the terminal buttons.
Action
potential
(neural impluse)
Neurotransmitter
molecule
Axon
Vesicles
Presynaptic
membrane
Some neurotransmitters
do not “fit the lock”
Receptor
sitesSome neurotransmitters
“fit the lock”
Dendrite
Postsynaptic
membrane
Synaptic
cleft
Axon Soma
Dendrites
Nucleus
Cytoplasm
Myelin sheath
(covering the
axon)
Synapses
Terminal
buttons
FIGURE 2.3
Structure and Function of the Neuron
A typical neuron receives thousands of messages at a time through its dendrites and soma (cell body). When the soma becomes sufficiently
aroused, its own message is then passed to the axon, which transmits it by means of an action potential to the cell’s terminal buttons. There, tiny
vesicles containing neurotransmitters rupture and release their contents into the synapse (synaptic cleft). Appropriately shaped transmitter mol-
ecules arriving at the postsynaptic membrane can dock at receptors, where they stimulate the receiving cell. Excessive transmitters are taken back
into the “sending” neuron by means of reuptake.

How Does the Body Communicate Internally? 53
How does the electrical charge reverse itself? During the action potential, tiny pores
open in a small area of the axon’s membrane adjacent to the soma, allowing a rapid
influx of positive ions. Almost immediately, the internal charge in that part of the axon
changes from negative to positive. (We’re talking 1/1000 of a second here.) Then, like a
row of falling dominoes, these changes in the cell membrane progress down the axon.
The result is an electrical signal that races from the soma toward the axon ending.
There’s no halfway about this action potential: Either the axon “fires” or it doesn’t.
Neuroscientists call this the all-or-none principle. Incidentally, when this process careens
out of control, with very large numbers of neurons becoming hypersensitive and firing
too easily, the result can be an epileptic seizure.
Then, almost immediately after firing, the cell’s “ion pump” flushes out the posi-
tively charged ions and restores the neuron to its resting potential, ready to fire
again. Incredibly, the whole complex cycle may take less than a hundredth of a sec-
ond. It is an amazing performance—and that is not the end of the process. Informa-
tion carried by the action potential must still traverse a tiny gap before reaching
another cell.
Synaptic Transmission Despite their close proximity to each other, nerve cells do not
actually meet. A microscopic gap, called a synapse, lies between them, acting as an
electrical insulator (see Figure 2.3). This synaptic gap (or synaptic cleft) prevents the
charge from jumping directly from the axon to the next cell in the circuit (Dermietzel,
2006). Instead, the neuron must first stimulate tiny bulblike structures called terminal
buttons located at the ends of the axon. Then, in a remarkable sequence of events
known as synaptic transmission, the electrical message morphs into a chemical message
that flows across the synaptic cleft and on to the next neuron. Let’s examine that pro-
cess more closely.
Neurotransmitters When the electrical impulse arrives at the terminal buttons, tiny
bubblelike vesicles (sacs) inside them burst and release their chemical contents, known
as neurotransmitters, into the synapse. These neurotransmitters then attempt to ferry the
neural message across the gap to the next neuron in the chain (again, see Figure 2.3).
What do we mean by “attempt”? This is where the process gets a bit more complicated—
partly because there are dozens of different neurotransmitters, each of which has a dif-
ferent chemical structure, and partly because each ruptured vesicle releases about 5,000
neurotransmitter molecules into the synapse (Kandel & Squire, 2000)! So, in order for
the neural message to be passed along, there must be a receptor site on a nearby neuron
that is an exact match to the shape of one of the neurotransmitters. (Remember learning
in your basic science class what different molecules look like?) When there is a match,
the neurotransmitter fits into the receptor site, much as a key fits into a lock. This lock-
and-key process then stimulates the receiving neuron, which passes the message onward.
What happens to neurotransmitters that don’t find a matching receptor site?
Through a process called reuptake, many of them are drawn back into vesicles. Others
are broken down by specially matched enzymes, rather like a chemical cleanser that
removes unwanted substances from your clothing or carpet. Learning about these dual
processes has proven useful in research aimed at developing treatments for a variety
of disorders. For example, certain drugs—such as the well-known Prozac and its nu-
merous chemical cousins—interfere with the reuptake process for a neurotransmitter
called serotonin, which you may have heard is related to depression. By inhibiting the
reuptake process for serotonin, the chemical remains available in the synapse longer,
which increases the odds it will be picked up by a matching receptor site and utilized.
Other drugs, such as Aricept, used to treat Alzheimer’s disease, interfere with the work
of the cleanup enzyme for acetylcholine (another neurotransmitter), which has the
same result as reuptake inhibitors: It ultimately leaves more of the chemical available
for use (National Institute on Aging, 2010). Table 2.1 describes several neurotrans-
mitters found especially relevant to psychological functioning. We will also talk more
about neurotransmitters and their relation to drug action in the upcoming Psychology
Matters at the end of this section.
all-or-none principle Refers to the fact that the
action potential in the axon occurs either completely or
not at all.
synapse The microscopic gap that serves as a com-
munications link between neurons. Synapses also occur
between neurons and the muscles or glands they serve.
terminal buttons Tiny bulblike structures at the
end of the axon that contain neurotransmitters that
carry the neuron’s message into the synapse.
synaptic transmission The relaying of
information across the synapse by means of
chemical neurotransmitters.
neurotransmitter Chemical messenger that
relays neural messages across the synapse. Many
neurotransmitters are also hormones.
reuptake The process by which unused
neurotransmitters are drawn back into the vesicles
of their originating neuron
Explore the Concept The Action
Potential at MyPsychLab

54 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
Synchronous Firing Over the past decade, neuroscientists have discovered that some
neurons—a small minority—don’t play by the customary rules of synaptic transmis-
sion. That is, instead of using neurotransmitters to send messages across the synapse,
they forego the chemical messages and communicate directly through electrical con-
nections (Bullock et al., 2005; Dermietzel, 2006). Scientists have found these excep-
tional neurons with electrical synapses concentrated in special parts of the brain that
orchestrate synchronized activity in a large number of other neurons, such as those
TABLE 2.1 Seven Important Neurotransmitters
Neurotransmitter Normal Function
Problems Associated
with Imbalance
Substances
That Affect the
Action of This
Neurotransmitter
Dopamine A transmitter used
in brain circuits that
produces sensations
of pleasure and
reward
Used by CNS neurons
involved in voluntary
movement
Schizophrenia
Parkinson’s disease
Cocaine
Amphetamine
Methylphenidate
(Ritalin)
Alcohol
Serotonin Regulates sleep and
dreaming, mood, pain,
aggression, appetite,
and sexual behavior
Depression
Certain anxiety
disorders
Obsessive–compulsive
disorder
Fluoxetine (Prozac)
Hallucinogenics
(e.g., LSD)
Norepinephrine Used by neurons in
autonomic nervous
system and by
neurons in almost
every region of the
brain
Controls heart rate,
sleep, stress, sexual
responsiveness,
vigilance, and
appetite
High blood pressure
Depression
Tricyclic
antidepressants
Beta-blockers
Acetylcholine The primary
neurotransmitter used
by efferent neurons
carrying messages
from the CNS
Also involved in some
kinds of learning and
memory
Certain muscular
disorders
Alzheimer’s disease
Nicotine
Black widow spider
venom
Botulism toxin
Curare
Atropine
Barbiturates
GABA The most prevalent
inhibitory
neurotransmitter in
neurons of the CNS
Anxiety
Epilepsy
“Minor” tranquilizers
(e.g., Valium, Librium)
Alcohol
Glutamate The primary excitatory
neurotransmitter in
the CNS
Involved in learning
and memory
Release of excessive
glutamate apparently
causes brain damage
after stroke
PCP (“angel dust”)
Endorphins Pleasurable sensations
and control of pain
Lowered levels
resulting from opiate
addiction
Opiates: opium,
heroin, morphine,
methadone

How Does the Body Communicate Internally? 55
involved in the coordinated beating of the heart. These synchronized bursts may also
underlie the greatest mystery of all in the brain: how the brain combines input from
many different modules into a single sensation, idea, or action.
Plasticity Regardless of the communication method—electrical or chemical—neurons
have the ability to change. One of our most extraordinary capabilities, plasticity, al-
lows our brain to adapt or modify itself as the result of experience (Holloway, 2003;
Kandel & Squire, 2000). For example, when we learn something new, dendrites can
actually grow, and new synapses can be formed, both of which help create new con-
nections with different neurons. And although earlier research focused on the brain’s
plasticity in our early years of life, newer studies find plasticity in the adult brain as
well (Chklovskii et al., 2004).
Thus, plasticity helps account for the brain’s ability to compensate for injury, such
as when Jill Bolte Taylor’s massive stroke wiped out a significant portion of one side
of her brain, taking with it her language abilities, mathematical reasoning, and analyti-
cal skills. With the help of her mother and a team of rehabilitation experts, she slowly
re-learned those skills—thanks to her brain’s ability to create brand new connections
to compensate for what was lost. Plasticity, then, enables the brain to continually be
restructured and “reprogrammed,” both in function and in physical structure, by expe-
rience (LeDoux, 2002).
Plasticity accounts for much of our human ability to adapt to our experiences—for
better or for worse. For example, as a violin player gains expertise, the motor area of
the brain linked to the fingers of the left hand becomes larger (Juliano, 1998). Like-
wise, the brain dedicates more neural real estate to the index finger used by a blind
Braille reader (Elbert et al., 1995; LeDoux, 1996). On the other hand, plasticity also
allows traumatic experiences to alter the brain’s emotional responsiveness in ways that
can interfere with everyday functioning (Arnsten, 1998). Thus, brain cells of soldiers
who experience combat or of people who have been sexually assaulted can become
rewired to be more sensitive to cues that could, in a similar situation, help protect them
from harm. In everyday, nonthreatening circumstances, however, this same hair-trigger
responsiveness can cause them to overreact to mild stressors—or even to simple unex-
pected surprises.
Brain Implants Plasticity, of course, cannot compensate for injuries that are too
extensive. Driven by this problem, neuroscientists are experimenting with computer
chips implanted in the brain, hoping to restore some motor control in paralyzed pa-
tients. In one remarkable case, a 26-year-old paralyzed male received such a chip as
an implant in his motor cortex. By merely thinking about movement, he learned to
send signals from his brain to a computer, controlling a cursor by thought, much as he
might have used a computer’s mouse by hand. In this cerebral way, he could play video
games, draw circles, operate a TV set, and even move a robotic hand—all of which his
paralysis would have made impossible without the implant (Dunn, 2006; Hochberg
et al., 2006).
Glial Cells: A Support Group for Neurons Interwoven among the brain’s vast net-
work of neurons is an even greater number of glial cells, once thought to “glue” the
neurons together. (In fact, the name comes from the Greek word for “glue.”) Now,
however, we know that glial cells provide structural support for neurons and also help
form new synapses during learning (Fields, 2004; Gallo & Chittajallu, 2001). In addi-
tion, glial cells form the myelin sheath, a fatty insulation covering many axons in the
brain and spinal cord. Like the casing on an electrical cable, the myelin sheath on a
neuron insulates and protects the cell. It also helps speed the conduction of impulses
along the axon (refer to Figure 2.3). Certain diseases, such as multiple sclerosis (MS),
attack the myelin sheath, resulting in poor conduction of nerve impulses. That defi-
ciency accounts for the variety of symptoms faced by persons with MS, ranging from
difficulty with motor movement to sensory deficit to impairments in cognitive func-
tioning (National Institutes of Health, 2010).
plasticity The nervous system’s ability to adapt or
change as the result of experience. Plasticity may also
help the nervous system adapt to physical damage.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 14
Extremely traumatic
experiences can cause
posttraumatic stress disorder,
which can produce physical
changes in the brain (p. 605).
glial cell One of the cells that provide structural
support for neurons. Glial cells also provide an insulat-
ing covering (the myelin sheath) of the axon for some
neurons, which facilitates the electrical impulse.

56 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
So there you have the two main building blocks of the nervous system: neurons,
with their amazing plasticity, and the supportive glial cells, which protect the neurons
and help propagate neural messages. But, wondrous as these individual components
are, in the big picture of behavior and mental processes, a single cell doesn’t do very
much. It takes millions of neurons flashing their electrochemical signals in synchro-
nized waves back and forth through the incredibly complex neural networks in your
brain to produce thoughts, sensations, and feelings. Similarly, all your actions arise
from waves of nerve impulses delivered to your muscles, glands, and organs through
the nervous system. It is to this larger picture—the nervous system—that we now turn
our attention.
The Nervous System
If you could observe a neural message as it moves from stimulus to response, you
would see it flow seamlessly from one part of the nervous system to another. The signal
might begin, for example, in the eyes, then travel to the brain for extensive processing,
and finally reemerge from the brain as a message instructing the muscles to respond.
In fact, the nervous system, consisting of all the nerve cells in the body, functions as a
single, complex, and interconnected unit. Nevertheless, we find it convenient to dis-
tinguish among divisions of the nervous system based on their location and the type
of processing they do. The most basic distinction recognizes two major divisions: the
central nervous system and the peripheral nervous system (see Figure 2.4).
The Central Nervous System Composed of the brain and spinal cord, the central
nervous system (CNS) serves as the body’s “command central.” The brain, filling roughly
a third of the skull, makes complex decisions, coordinates our body functions, and
initiates most of our behaviors. The spinal cord, playing a supportive role, serves as
a sort of neural cable, connecting the brain with parts of the peripheral sensory and
motor systems.
Reflexes The spinal cord has another job too. It takes charge of simple, swift reflexes—
responses that do not require brain power, such as the reflex your physician elicits with
nervous system The entire network of neurons
in the body, including the central nervous system, the
peripheral nervous system, and their subdivisions.
central nervous system (CNS) The brain
and the spinal cord.
reflex Simple unlearned response triggered by
stimuli—such as the knee-jerk reflex set off by tapping
the tendon just below your kneecap.
Nervous system
Peripheral nervous system
Autonomic nervous system
(communicates with internal
organs and glands)
Somatic nervous system
(communicates with sense organs
and voluntary muscles)
Sympathetic
division
(arousing)
Parasympathetic
division
(calming)
Sensory (afferent)
nervous system
(sensory input)
Motor (efferent)
nervous system
(motor output)
Central nervous system
(brain and spinal cord)
FIGURE 2.4
Organization of the Nervous System
This figure shows the major divisions of the nervous system. The figure on the left shows the central nervous system, while the figure on the right
shows the peripheral nervous system.

How Does the Body Communicate Internally? 57
a tap on the knee. We know that the brain is not involved in these simple re-
flexes, because a person whose spinal cord has been severed doesn’t sense the
pain—but may still be able to withdraw a limb reflexively from a painful stim-
ulus. Voluntary movements, however, do require the brain. That’s why damage
to nerves in the spinal cord can produce paralysis of the limbs or trunk. The
extent of paralysis depends on the location of the damage: The higher the site
of damage, the greater the extent of the paralysis.
Contralateral Pathways Significantly, most sensory and motor pathways carry-
ing messages between the brain and the rest of the body are contralateral—that
is, they cross over to the opposite side in the spinal cord or the brain stem. The
result is that each side of the brain communicates primarily with the opposite
side of the body or the environment. This fact is important in understanding
how damage to one side of the brain often results in disabilities on the opposite
side of the body (see Figure 2.5). Jill Bolte Taylor’s stroke, for example, was in
the left side of her brain, but it was her right arm that became paralyzed during
the event.
The Peripheral Nervous System Also playing a supportive role, the peripheral nervous
system (PNS) connects the central nervous system with the rest of the body through
bundles of sensory and motor axons called nerves. The many branches of the PNS
carry messages between the brain and the sense organs, the internal organs, and the
muscles. In this role, the peripheral nervous system carries incoming messages telling
your brain about the sights, sounds, tastes, smells, and textures of the world. Likewise,
it carries outgoing signals telling your body’s muscles and glands how to respond.
You might think of the PNS as a pick-up-and-delivery service for the central ner-
vous system. If, for example, an aggressive dog approaches you, your PNS picks up
the auditory information (barking, growling, snarling) and visual information (bared
teeth, hair standing up on the neck) for delivery to the brain. Quickly, perceptual and
emotional circuits in the brain assess the situation (Danger!) and communicate with
other circuits, dispatching orders for a hasty retreat. The PNS then delivers those or-
ders to mobilize your heart, lungs, legs, and other body parts needed to respond to the
emergency. It does this through its two major divisions, the somatic nervous system
and the autonomic nervous system. One deals primarily with our external world, the
other with our internal responses. (A few moments spent studying Figure 2.4 will help
you understand these divisions and subdivisions.)
The Somatic Division of the PNS Think of the somatic nervous system as the brain’s com-
munications link with the outside world. Its sensory component connects the sense
organs to the brain, and its motor component links the CNS with the skeletal muscles
that control voluntary movements. So, for example, when you see a slice of pizza, the
visual image is carried to the brain by the somatic division’s afferent (sensory) system.
Then, if all goes well, the efferent (motor) system sends instructions to muscles that
propel the pizza on just the right trajectory into your open mouth.
The Autonomic Division of the PNS The other major division of the PNS takes over once
the pizza starts down your throat and into the province of the autonomic nervous system
(autonomic means self-regulating or independent). This network carries signals that
regulate our internal organs as they perform such jobs as digestion, respiration, heart
rate, and arousal. And it does so unconsciously—without our having to think about it.
The autonomic nervous system also works when you are asleep. Even during anesthe-
sia, autonomic activity sustains our most basic vital functions.
And—wouldn’t you know?—biopsychologists further divide the autonomic
nervous system into two subparts: the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions
(as shown in Figure 2.6). The sympathetic division arouses the heart, lungs, and other
organs in stressful or emergency situations, when our responses must be quick and
powerfully energized. Often called the “fight-or-flight” system, the sympathetic
division carries messages that help us respond quickly to a threat either by attacking
contralateral pathways Sensory and motor
pathways between the brain and the rest of the body
cross over to the opposite side en route, so messages
from the right side of the body are processed by the left
side of the brain and vice versa.
peripheral nervous system (PNS) All parts
of the nervous system lying outside the central nervous
system. The peripheral nervous system includes the
autonomic and somatic nervous systems.
somatic nervous system A division of the
peripheral nervous system that carries sensory infor-
mation to the central nervous system and also sends
voluntary messages to the body’s skeletal muscles.
autonomic nervous system The portion of the
peripheral nervous system that sends communications
between the central nervous system and the internal
organs and glands.
sympathetic division The part of the auto-
nomic nervous system that sends messages to internal
organs and glands that help us respond to stressful
and emergency situations.
Right brain
hemisphere
Left brain
hemisphere
• Communicates
with left
side of
the body
• Receives
input from
the left
visual field
• Communicates
with right
side of the
body
• Receives input
from the right
visual field
FIGURE 2.5
Contralateral Connections
For most sensory and motor functions,
each side of the brain communicates with
the opposite side of the body. (This is
known as contralateral communication.)

58 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
or fleeing. The sympathetic system also creates the tension and arousal you feel during
an exciting movie or first date. Perhaps you can recall how the sympathetic division of
your autonomic nervous system made you feel during your last oral presentation. Was
it hard to breathe? Were your palms sweaty? Did your stomach feel queasy? All these
are sympathetic division functions.
The parasympathetic division does just the opposite: It applies the neural brakes,
returning the body to a calm and collected state. But even though it has an opposing
action, the parasympathetic division works cooperatively with the sympathetic system,
like two children on a teeter-totter. Figure 2.6 shows the most important connections
made by these two autonomic divisions.
Now, having completed our whirlwind tour of the nervous system, we return our
attention briefly to its partner in internal communication, the endocrine system.
The Endocrine System
Perhaps you never thought of the bloodstream as a carrier of information, along with
oxygen, nutrients, and wastes. Yet blood-borne information, in the form of hormones,
serves as the communication channel among the glands of the endocrine system, shown
in Figure 2.7. (Endocrine comes from the Greek endo for “within” and krinein for
“secrete.”)
parasympathetic division The part of the
autonomic nervous system that monitors the routine
operations of the internal organs and returns the body
to calmer functioning after arousal by the sympathetic
division.
endocrine system The hormone system—the
body’s chemical messenger system, including the
endocrine glands: pituitary, thyroid, parathyroid,
adrenals, pancreas, ovaries, and testes.
PARASYMPATHETICSYMPATHETIC
Constricts pupil
Inhibits tear
glands
Increases
salivation
Slows heart
Constricts bronchi
Increases
digestive
functions of
stomach
Increases
digestive
functions of
intestine
Contracts bladder
Spinal
cord
Chain of
sympathetic
ganglia
Inhibits bladder
constriction
Decreases
digestive
functions of
intestine
Secretes
adrenalin
Decreases
digestive
functions of
stomach
Dilates bronchi
Accelerates heart
Dilates pupil
Inhibits salivation
Increases sweating
Stimulates
tear glands
FIGURE 2.6
Divisions of the Autonomic Nervous System
The sympathetic nervous system (at left) regulates internal processes and behavior in stressful situations. On their way to and from the spinal cord,
sympathetic nerve fibers make connections with specialized neural clusters called ganglia. The parasympathetic nervous system (at right) regulates
day-to-day internal processes and behavior.

How Does the Body Communicate Internally? 59
Playing much the same role as neurotransmitters in the nervous system, hormones
carry messages that influence not only body functions but also behaviors and emotions
(Damasio, 2003; LeDoux, 2002). For example, hormones from the pituitary stimulate
body growth. Hormones from the ovaries and testes influence sexual development and
sexual responses. Hormones from the adrenals produce the arousal accompanying fear.
And hormones from the thyroid control metabolism (rate of energy use). Once secreted
into the blood by an endocrine gland, hormones circulate throughout the body until
delivered to their targets, which may include not only other endocrine glands but also
muscles and organs. Table 2.2 outlines the major endocrine glands and the body systems
they regulate.
How Does the Endocrine System Respond in a Crisis? Under normal (un-
aroused) conditions, the endocrine system works in parallel with the parasympathetic
nervous system to sustain our basic body processes. But in a crisis, it shifts into a dif-
ferent mode, in support of the sympathetic nervous system. So, when you encounter a
stressor or an emergency (such as the speeding car headed toward you), the hormone
epinephrine (sometimes called adrenalin) is released into the bloodstream, sustaining
the body’s “fight or flight” reaction. In this way, the endocrine system finishes what
your sympathetic nervous system started by keeping your heart pounding and your
muscles tense, ready for action.
Later in the text, we will see what happens when this stressful state gets out of control.
For example, people who have stressful jobs or unhappy relationships may develop a
chronically elevated level of stress hormones in their blood, keeping them in a prolonged
state of arousal. The price your mind and body pay for this extended arousal can be dear.
hormones Chemical messengers used by the en-
docrine system. Many hormones also serve as
neurotransmitters in the nervous system.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 14
Prolonged stress messages can
produce physical and mental
disorders by means of the general
adaptation syndrome (p. 615).
Hypothalamus
Pituitary gland
Thyroid and
Parathyroid
Adrenal
glands
Pancreas
Testes
(male)
Ovaries
(female)
FIGURE 2.7
Endocrine Glands
The pituitary gland is the “master gland”
regulating the endocrine glands, whose
locations are shown here. The pituitary
gland is itself under control of the hy-
pothalamus, an important structure that
regulates many basic functions of the
body.

60 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
What Controls the Endocrine System? At the base of your brain, a “master gland,”
called the pituitary gland, oversees all these endocrine responses (see Figure 2.7). It does
so by sending out hormone signals of its own through the blood to other endocrine
glands throughout the body. But the pituitary itself is really only a midlevel manager.
It takes orders, in turn, from the brain—in particular from a small region to which it is
attached: the hypothalamus, a brain component about which we will have more to say
in a moment.
For now, we want to emphasize the notion that the peripheral nervous system and
the endocrine system provide parallel means of communication, coordinated by their
link in the brain. Ultimately, the brain decides which messages will be sent through
both networks. We will next turn our attention to the master “nerve center” that makes
these decisions—the brain—right after exploring how the concepts we just covered can
explain the effects of psychoactive drugs.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
How Psychoactive Drugs Affect the Nervous System
The mind-altering effects of marijuana, LSD, cocaine, methamphetamines, and
sedatives attract millions of users. Millions more jolt their brains awake with the
caffeine of their morning coffee, tea, or energy drink and the nicotine in an ac-
companying cigarette; at night they may attempt to reverse their arousal with the
depressant effects of alcohol and sleeping pills. How do these seductive substances
pituitary gland The “master gland” that
produces hormones influencing the secretions of all
other endocrine glands, as well as a hormone that
influences growth. The pituitary is attached to the
brain’s hypothalamus, from which it takes its orders.
TABLE 2.2 Hormonal Functions of Major Endocrine Glands
These Endocrine Glands . . . Produce Hormones That Regulate. . .
Anterior pituitary Ovaries and testes
Breast milk production
Metabolism
Reactions to stress
Posterior pituitary Conservation of water in the body
Breast milk secretion
Uterus contractions
Thyroid Metabolism
Physical growth and development
Parathyroid Calcium levels in the body
Pancreas Glucose (sugar) metabolism
Adrenal glands Fight-or-flight response
Metabolism
Sexual desire (especially in women)
Ovaries Development of female sexual characteristics
Production of ova (eggs)
Testes Development of male sexual characteristics
Sperm production
Sexual desire (in men)

How Does the Body Communicate Internally? 61
achieve their effects? The answer involves the ability of psychoactive drugs to en-
hance or inhibit natural chemical processes in our brains.
Agonists and Antagonists
The ecstasy and the agony of psychoactive drugs come mainly from their interactions with
neurotransmitters. Some impersonate neurotransmitters by mimicking their effects in the
brain. Other drugs act less directly by enhancing or dampening the effects of neurotrans-
mitters. Those that enhance or mimic neurotransmitters are called agonists. Nicotine, for
example, is an agonist because it acts like the neurotransmitter acetylcholine (refer to Table
2.1). This has the effect of “turning up the volume” in the acetylcholine pathways (the ace-
tylcholine-using bundles of nerve cells controlling the muscles and connecting certain parts
of the brain). Similarly, the well-known antidepressant Prozac (fluoxetine) acts as an agonist
in the brain’s serotonin pathways, where it makes more serotonin available (see Figure 2.8).
In contrast, antagonists are chemicals that dampen or inhibit the effects of
neurotransmitters. Some drugs used to treat schizophrenia are antagonists because
they interfere with the neurotransmitter dopamine—effectively “turning the volume
down” and thus reducing the stimulation contributing to symptoms of delusions and
hallucinations (Nairne, 2009). So-called beta blockers, often used to manage heart
conditions, act as antagonists against both epinephrine and norepinephrine, thereby
counteracting the effects of stress. In general, agonists facilitate and antagonists inhibit
messages in parts of the nervous system using that transmitter.
Why Side Effects?
What causes drugs’ unwanted side effects? The answer to that question involves an im-
portant principle about the brain’s design. The brain contains many bundles of neurons—
neural pathways—that interconnect its components, much as rail lines connect major
cities. Moreover, each pathway employs only certain neurotransmitters—like rail lines
allowing only certain companies to use their tracks. This fact allows a drug affecting a
particular transmitter to target specific parts of the brain. Unfortunately for the drug
takers, different pathways may employ the same neurotransmitter for widely different
functions. Thus, the brain’s multiple serotonin pathways connect with brain structures
that affect not only mood but also sleep, appetite, and cognition, much as a railroad
has lines that connect with different many cities. Because of these multiple serotonin
pathways, taking Prozac (or one of its chemical cousins with other brand names) may
treat depression but, at the same time, affect sleep patterns, appetite, and thinking.
In fact, no psychoactive drug exists that acts like a “magic bullet,” only striking one
precise target in the brain without causing collateral effects.
agonists Drugs or other chemicals that enhance or
mimic the effects of neurotransmitters.
antagonists Drugs or other chemicals that inhibit
the effects of neurotransmitters.
neural pathways Bundles of nerve cells that
follow generally the same route and employ the same
neurotransmitter.
Cerebellum
Hypothalamus
Hippocampus
Projection to
spinal cord
Cerebral cortex
Serotonin pathways
(dark brown)
Thalamus
FIGURE 2.8
Serotonin Pathways in the Brain
Each neurotransmitter is associated with
certain neural pathways in the brain. In
this cross-section of the brain, you see
the main pathways for serotonin. Drugs
that stimulate or inhibit serotonin will
selectively affect the brain regions shown
in this diagram.

62 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
2.3 KEY QUESTION
How Does the Brain Produce Behavior
and Mental Processes?
In September 1848, a 25-year-old American railroad worker named Phineas Gage
sustained a serious head injury when a charge of blasting powder drove an iron rod
into his face, up through the front of his brain, and out through the top of his
head. (See accompanying photo.) Amazingly, Gage recovered from this injury and
lived another 12 years—but as a psychologically changed man (Fleischman, 2002;
Macmillan, 2000). Those who knew him remarked that Gage, once a dependable
and likeable crew boss, had become an irresponsible and rowdy ruffian. “Gage
was no longer Gage,” remarked his former companions (Damasio, 1994, p. 8). We
cannot help but wonder: Had the site of his injury—the front of his brain—been
the home of Phineas Gage’s “old self”? Further, the story of Gage’s transformation
sounds rather similar to Jill Bolte Taylor’s assertion that, since her stroke, she is no
longer “the same person.” What could explain these changes?
These stories raise a larger question: What is the connection between mind
and body? Humans have, of course, long recognized the existence of such a link—
although they didn’t always know the brain to be the organ of the mind. Even
today we might speak, as they did in Shakespeare’s time, of “giving one’s heart” to
another or of “not having the stomach” for something when describing revulsion—
even though we now know that love doesn’t really flow from the heart, nor disgust
from the digestive system, but that all emotions, desires, and thoughts originate in the
brain. (Apparently, this news hasn’t reached songwriters, who have yet to pen a lyric
proclaiming, “I love you with all of my brain.”)
At last, neuroscientists have begun unraveling the deep mysteries of this complex
organ of the mind. We now see the brain as a collection of distinct modules that work
together like the components of a computer. This new understanding of the brain
becomes the Core Concept for this final section of the chapter:
Core Concept 2.3
The brain is composed of many specialized modules that work
together to create mind and behavior.
Answers 1. nervous system/endocrine system 2. sympathetic/parasympathetic 3. When the electrical impulse arrives at the axon ending,
neurotransmitters are released into the synapse. Some lodge in receptor sites on the opposite side of the synapse, where they stimulate the receiving
neuron. 4. The pituitary gland 5. Your diagram should be similar to the one on the left side in Figure 2.3. The burst of electric energy (the action
potential) occurs in the axon. 6. neurotransmitters/hormones.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Of the body’s two main communication systems, the
is faster, while the sends longer-lasting
messages.
2. APPLICATION: You are touring a haunted house at Halloween,
when suddenly you hear a blood-curdling scream right behind you.
The division of your autonomic nervous system quickly
increases your heart rate. As you recover, the division
slows your heart rate to normal.
3. RECALL: Explain how a neural message is carried across the
synapse.
4. RECALL: Which gland takes orders from the brain but exerts
control over the rest of the endocrine system?
5. RECALL: Make a sketch of two connecting neurons, indicating
the locations of the dendrites, soma, axon, myelin sheath, terminal
buttons, and synapse. Which part of the neuron sends messages by
means of a brief electric charge?
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: The chemical
messengers in the brain are called , while in the
endocrine system they are called .
Author Phil Zimbardo with the skull of
Phineas Gage.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 63
As you study the brain, you will find that each of its modular components has its
own responsibilities (Cohen & Tong, 2001). Some process sensations, such as vision
and hearing. Some regulate our emotional lives. Some contribute to memory. Some
generate speech and other behaviors. What’s the point? The specialized parts of the
brain act like members of a championship team: each doing a particular job yet work-
ing smoothly together. Happily, many of these modules perform their tasks automati-
cally and without conscious direction—as when you simultaneously walk, digest your
breakfast, breathe, and carry on a conversation. But, when something goes awry with
one or more of the brain’s components, as it does in a stroke or as happened to Phineas
Gage, the biological basis of thought or behavior comes to the fore.
Let’s begin the story of the brain by exploring how neuroscientists go about open-
ing the windows on its inner workings.
Windows on the Brain
Isolated within the protective skull, the brain can never actually touch velvet, taste
chocolate, have sex, or see the blue of the sky. It only knows the outside world second-
hand, through changing patterns of electrochemical activity in the peripheral nervous
system, the brain’s link with the world outside. To communicate within the body, the
brain must rely on the neural and endocrine pathways that carry its messages to and
from the muscles, organs, and glands throughout the body.
But what would you see if you could peer beneath the bony skull and behold the
brain? Its wrinkled surface, rather like a giant walnut, tells us little about the brain’s
internal structure or function. For that, technology—such as EEG, electrical stimula-
tion, and various types of brain scans—has opened new windows on the brain.
Sensing Brain Waves with the EEG For nearly one hundred years, neuroscientists
have used the electroencephalograph (or EEG) to record weak voltage patterns called
brain waves, sensed by electrodes pasted on the scalp. Much as city lights indicate
which parts of town are most “alive” at night, the EEG senses which parts of the brain
are most active. The EEG can identify, for example, regions involved in moving the
hand or processing a visual image. It can also reveal abnormal waves caused by brain
malfunctions, such as epilepsy (a seizure disorder that arises from an electrical “storm”
in the brain). You can see the sort of information provided by the EEG in Figure 2.9A.
Useful as it is, however, the EEG is not very precise, indiscriminately recording the
brain’s electrical activity in a large region near the electrode. Because there may be
electroencephalograph (EEG) A device for
recording brain waves, typically by electrodes placed on
the scalp. The record produced is known as an electro-
encephalogram (also called an EEG).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 8
Sleep researchers use brain waves,
recorded by the EEG, to identify
REM sleep, which is characterized
by dreaming (p. 335).
(A)
(B)
(D)(C) (E)
FIGURE 2.9
Windows on the Mind
Images from brain-scanning devices. (A) EEG; (B) CT scan; (C) PET; (D) MRI; and (E) fMRI. Each scanning and recording device has strengths
and weaknesses.

64 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
fewer than a dozen electrodes used, the EEG does not paint a detailed electrical picture
of the brain. Rather, it produces a coarse, moment-to-moment summary of electrical
activity in millions of neurons—making it all the more amazing that we can sometimes
read the traces of mental processes in an EEG record.
Mapping the Brain with Electric Probes The next step forward in understanding
the brain came about half a century ago, when the great Canadian neurologist Wilder
Penfield opened another window on the brain by “mapping” its pinkish-gray surface.
During brain surgery, using a pen-shaped electric probe, Penfield stimulated patients’
exposed brains with a gentle electric current and recorded the responses. (His patients
were kept awake, but under local anesthesia, so they felt no pain.)
This was not just an experiment born out of curiosity. As a surgeon, Penfield needed to
identify the exact boundaries of diseased brain areas to avoid removing healthy tissue. In
the process, he found the brain’s surface had distinct regions with distinct functions. Stimu-
lating a certain spot might cause the left hand to move; another site might produce a sensa-
tion, such as a flash of light. Stimulating still other sites occasionally provoked a memory
from childhood (Penfield, 1959; Penfield & Baldwin, 1952). Later, other scientists followed
his lead and probed structures deeper in the brain. There they found that electrical stimu-
lation could set off elaborate sequences of behavior or emotions. The overall conclusion
from such work is unmistakable: Each region of the brain has its own specific functions.
Computerized Brain Scans During the past few decades, increasingly detailed
views of the brain have emerged through sophisticated procedures collectively known
as brain scans. Some types of scans make images with X-rays, others use radioactive
tracers, and still others use magnetic fields. As a result, scientists can now make vivid
pictures of brain structures without opening the skull. In medicine, brain scans help
neurosurgeons locate brain abnormalities such as tumors or stroke-related damage.
And in psychology, images obtained from brain scans can reveal where our thoughts
and feelings are processed. How? Depending on the scanning method used, specific
regions of the brain may “light up” when, for example, a person reads, speaks, solves
problems, or feels certain emotions (Raichle, 1994).
The most common brain-scanning methods currently employed are CT, PET, MRI,
and fMRI:
CT scanning, or computerized tomography, creates digital images of the brain from
X-rays passed through the brain at various angles, as though it were being sliced like a
tomato. By means of sophisticated computer analysis, this form of tomography (from
the Greek tomos, “section”) reveals soft-tissue structures of the brain that X-rays alone
cannot show (see Figure 2.9B). CT scans produce good three-dimensional images and
are relatively inexpensive; the downside is they employ X-rays, which can be harmful in
high doses. CT scans are often used in hospitals for assessing traumatic brain injuries.
PET scanning, or positron emission tomography, shows brain activity (rather than just brain
structure). One common PET technique does this by sensing low-level radioactive glucose
(sugar), which concentrates in the brain’s most active circuits. Areas of high metabolic ac-
tivity show up brightly colored on the image (see Figure 2.9C). Thus, researchers can use
PET scans to show which parts are more active or less active during a particular task.
MRI, or magnetic resonance imaging, uses brief, powerful pulses of magnetic energy to
create highly detailed pictures of the structure of the brain (see Figure 2.9D). The MRI
technique makes exceptionally clear, three-dimensional images, without the use of
X-rays, which favors its use in research despite its higher cost.
fMRI, or functional magnetic resonance imaging, is a newer technique that records both
brain activity and structure, thus offering the advantages of both PET and MRI (Alper,
1993; Collins, 2001). By monitoring the blood and oxygen flow in the brain, it distin-
guishes more active brain cells from less active ones. Thus, fMRI lets neuroscientists
determine which parts of the brain are at work during various mental activities, much
the same as PET, only with the more detailed images of MRI (see Figure 2.9E).
Which Scanning Method Is Best? Each type of brain scan has its particular
strengths and weaknesses. For example, both PET and fMRI show which parts of the
CT scanning, or computerized
tomography A computerized imaging technique
that uses X-rays passed through the brain at various
angles and then combined into an image.
PET scanning, or positron emission
tomography An imaging technique that relies on
the detection of radioactive sugar consumed by active
brain cells.
MRI, or magnetic resonance imaging An
imaging technique that relies on cells’ responses in a
high-intensity magnetic field.
fMRI, or functional magnetic resonance
imaging A newer form of magnetic resonance
imaging that records both brain structure and brain
activity.

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 65
brain are active during a particular task, such as talking, looking at a picture, or solv-
ing a problem. Standard MRI excels at distinguishing the fine details of brain structure.
But none of these methods can detect processes that occur only briefly, such as a shift
in attention or a startle response. To capture such short-lived “conversations” among
brain cells requires the EEG—which, unfortunately, is limited in its detail (Raichle,
1994). Currently, no single scanning technique gives biopsychologists a perfectly clear
“window” on all the brain’s activity.
Three Layers of the Brain
What we see through these windows also depends on the brain we are examining.
Birds and reptiles manage to make a living with a brain that consists of little more than
a stalk that regulates the most basic life processes and instinctual responses. Our own
more complex brains arise from essentially the same stalk, called the brain stem. From
an evolutionary perspective, then, this is the part of the brain with the longest ancestry
and most basic functions. On top of that stalk, we and our mammalian cousins have
evolved two more layers, known as the limbic system and the cerebrum, that give us
greatly expanded brain powers (see Figure 2.10).
brain stem The most primitive of the brain’s three
major layers. It includes the medulla, pons, and the
reticular formation.
Limbic system:
regulates emotions
and motivated
behavior
Cerebrum:
the thick, outer
layer of the brain,
divided into two
hemispheres Hypothalamus:
manages the body’s
internal state
Cerebral cortex:
(outer layer of cerebrum)
involved in complex
mental processes
Pons:
involved in regulation
of sleep
Reticular formation:
controls alertness
Hippocampus:
involved in
memory
Amygdala:
involved in emotion
and memory
Pituitary gland:
regulates glands
all over body
Thalamus:
relays sensory
information
Spinal cord:
pathway for neural
fibers traveling to
and from brain
Cerebellum:
regulates
coordinated
movement Brain stem:
sets brain’s general
alertness level and
warning system Medulla:
regulates autonomic
body functions such
as breathing and heart
rate.
FIGURE 2.10
Major Structures of the Brain
From an evolutionary perspective, the brain stem and cerebellum represent the oldest part of the brain; the limbic system
evolved next; and the cerebral cortex is the most recent achievement in brain evolution.

66 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
The Brain Stem and Its Neighbors If you have ever fought to stay awake in class,
you have struggled with your brain stem. Most of the time, however, it does its life-
sustaining jobs less obviously and less obnoxiously. We can infer one of the brain
stem’s tasks from its location, linking the spinal cord with the rest of the brain. In this
position, it serves as a conduit for nerve pathways carrying messages up and down the
spinal corridor between the body and the brain. This is also where many sensory and
motor pathways between the brain and our sense organs and skeletal muscles cross
over to the opposite side, thus connecting each side of the brain to the opposite side of
the body.
More than just a conduit, the brain stem also links together several important
information-processing regions, three of which are contained in the brain stem itself
(the medulla, the pons, and the reticular formation) and two that are adjacent (the
thalamus and the cerebellum) (Pinel, 2005). From an evolutionary standpoint, all these
are ancient structures found in the brains of creatures as diverse as penguins, pandas,
pythons, porcupines, and people. You can see their specific locations in Figure 2.10.
The medulla, appearing as a bulge in the brain stem, regulates basic body functions,
which include breathing, blood pressure, and heart rate. It operates on “automatic
pilot”—without conscious awareness—to keep our internal organs operating. An even
bigger bulge called the pons (meaning bridge) appears just above the medulla, where it
houses nerve circuits that regulate the sleep and dreaming cycle. True to its name, the
pons also acts as a “bridge” that connects the brain stem to the cerebellum, a structure
involved in making coordinated movements.
The reticular formation, running through the center of everything, is a pencil-shaped
bundle of nerve cells that forms the brain stem’s core. One of the reticular formation’s
jobs is keeping the brain awake and alert. Others include monitoring the incoming
stream of sensory information and directing attention to novel or important messages.
And—don’t blame your professor—it is the reticular formation you struggle with when
you become drowsy in class.
The thalamus, a pair of football-shaped bodies perched atop the brain stem, receives
nerve fibers from the reticular formation. Technically part of the cerebral hemispheres,
not the brain stem, the thalamus acts like the central processing chip in a computer,
directing the brain’s incoming and outgoing sensory and motor traffic. Accordingly, it
receives information from all the senses (except smell) and distributes this information
to appropriate processing circuits throughout the brain.
The cerebellum, tucked under the back of the cerebral hemispheres and behind the
brain stem, looks very much like a mini-brain—in fact, its name comes from the Latin
for “little brain.” Although not counted as part of the brain stem by many anatomists,
the cerebellum enables our motor coordination and balance (Spencer et al., 2003;
Wickelgren, 1998b). It is your cerebellum that allows you to run down a flight of stairs
without being conscious of the precise movements of your feet. The cerebellum also
helps us keep a series of events in order, as we do when listening to the sequence of
notes in a melody (Bower & Parsons, 2003). Finally, the cerebellum gets involved in a
basic form of learning that involves habitual responses we perform on cue—as when
you learn to wince at the sound of the dentist’s drill (Hazeltine & Ivry, 2002).
Taken together, these modules associated with the brain stem control the most
basic functions of movement and of life itself. Note, again, that much of their work is
automatic, functioning largely outside our awareness. The next two layers, however,
assert themselves more obviously in consciousness.
The Limbic System: Emotions, Memories, and More We’re sorry to report that
your pet canary or goldfish doesn’t have the emotional equipment that we mammals
possess. You see, only mammals have a fully developed limbic system, a diverse col-
lection of structures that wraps around the thalamus deep inside the cerebral hemi-
spheres (see Figure 2.11). Together, these ram’s-horn-shaped structures give us greatly
enhanced capacity for emotions and memory, faculties that offer the huge advantage
of mental flexibility. Because we have limbic systems, we don’t have to rely solely on
instincts and reflexes that dominate the behavior of simpler creatures.
medulla A brain-stem structure that controls breath-
ing and heart rate. The sensory and motor pathways
connecting the brain to the body cross in the medulla.
pons A brain-stem structure that regulates brain
activity during sleep and dreaming. The name pons
derives from the Latin word for “bridge.”
reticular formation A pencil-shaped structure
forming the core of the brain stem. The reticular for-
mation arouses the cortex to keep the brain alert and
attentive to new stimulation.
thalamus The brain’s central “relay station,” situ-
ated just atop the brain stem. Nearly all the messages
going into or out of the brain pass through the thalamus.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 3
The sense of smell has a unique
ability to evoke memories (p. 106).
cerebellum The “little brain” attached to the
brain stem. The cerebellum is responsible for coordi-
nated movements.
limbic system The middle layer of the brain,
involved in emotion and memory. The limbic system
includes the hippocampus, amygdala, hypothalamus,
and other structures.

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 67
The limbic system houses other modules as well, regulating such important pro-
cesses as hunger, thirst, and body temperature. Overall, the limbic system is the brain’s
command post for emotions, motives, memory, and maintenance of a balanced condi-
tion within the body. Let’s examine each of its modules and their corresponding func-
tions in detail.
The Hippocampus and Memory The hippocampus enables our memory system. (Actually,
the brain has one hippocampus on each side, giving us two hippocampi [see Figure
2.10]). One of its jobs is to help us remember the location of objects, such as where
you left your car in a large parking lot (Squire, 2007). And it appears to actually grow
with experience, as suggested by a study of London cab drivers that found them to
have larger hippocampi than people who didn’t drive taxis, with more experienced
cabbies having the largest hippocampi of all (Maguire et al., 2003).
In addition to its role in spatial memory, the hippocampus plays a key role in mem-
ory storage, as evidenced by the tragic story of H. M. (referred to by his initials to pro-
tect his privacy). In 1953, when he was in his early 20s, H. M. underwent a radical and
experimental brain operation intended to treat frequent seizures that threatened his life
(Hilts, 1995). The surgery removed most of the hippocampus on both sides of his brain
and succeeded in reducing the frequency of his seizures. Unfortunately, the surgery also
produced an unforeseen and disastrous side effect: After the operation, new experi-
ences disappeared from H. M.’s memory almost as soon as they occurred, although his
memory for details of his life prior to the surgery remained intact. For the rest of his
life, when he tried to remember the years since 1953, H. M. drew a blank and was even
unable to recognize his daily caregivers. In fact, he continued to believe he was living
in 1953 right up until his death in 2008. This story, along with corroborating research,
indicates that—although the hippocampus is not the storage location for memory—it
is critically involved in creating new memories as we experience life.
hippocampus A component of the limbic system,
involved in establishing long-term memories.
Hunger and eating:
Hypothalamus
Fear and apprehension:
Amygdala
Learning and memory:
Hippocampus
FIGURE 2.11
The Limbic System
The structures of the limbic system are involved with motivation, emotion, and certain memory processes.

68 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
corpus callosum The band of nerve cells con-
necting and enabling communication between the two
cerebral hemispheres.
The Amygdala and Emotion Another limbic structure, the amygdala, takes its name from
its shape: amygdala means “almond” in Greek. Like many other brain structures, there
are actually two amygdalas, one extending in front of the hippocampus on each side
(see Figure 2.10).
In a classic experiment designed to find out what the amygdala does, Heinrich
Klüver and Paul Bucy (1939) surgically snipped the connections to the amygdala on
both sides of the brain in normally foul-tempered rhesus monkeys. Postsurgically, the
beasts became so docile and easy to handle that even Klüver and Bucy were surprised,
demonstrating the amygdala’s role in fear and aggression. More recent studies also
note that the amygdala—perhaps aided by its close proximity to the hippocampus—
uses memories to aid in emotional responses (Roozendaal et al., 2009), as when a per-
son who was previously in a serious car accident overreacts to a minor threat (such as
brief tailgating) from another driver. And this tiny structure has been found to activate
in both men and women (although to a greater degree in men) when they view sexually
arousing images (Hamann, 2005), illustrating its role in positive emotions as well as
negative ones.
Pleasure and the Limbic System In addition to the amygdala and hippocampus, the
limbic system contains several so-called pleasure centers that create good feelings when
aroused by electrical stimulation or by addictive drugs like cocaine, methamphetamine,
and heroin (Olds & Fobes, 1981; Pinel, 2005). But you don’t have to take drugs to
stimulate these limbic pleasure circuits. Sex will do it too. So will eating, drinking, or
exciting activities, such as riding a roller coaster. Even rich chocolate can arouse these
rewarding brain circuits (Small et al., 2001).
Reward circuits also participate in our response to humor. For most people, having
a brain scan is not a pleasant experience—largely because of the cramped spaces and
strange, loud noises made by the machine. But by telling jokes during the fMRI scan,
researchers got a few laughs from volunteers with their heads in the scanner. And,
sure enough, for those who thought the jokes were funny, parts of the brain’s reward
circuitry “lit up” (Goel & Dolan, 2001; Watson et al., 2007).
The Hypothalamus and Control over Motivation In passing, we have already met the
hypothalamus, the limbic structure responsible for maintaining the body in a stable, bal-
anced condition, partly by initiating endocrine system messages (refer to Figure 2.10).
Rich with blood vessels as well as neurons, the hypothalamus serves as your brain’s
blood-analysis laboratory. By constantly monitoring the blood, it detects small changes
in body temperature, fluid levels, and nutrients. When it detects an imbalance (too
much or too little water, for example), the hypothalamus immediately responds with
orders aimed at restoring balance.
The hypothalamus makes its influence felt in other ways as well. Although much
of its work occurs outside of consciousness, the hypothalamus sends neural messages
to “higher” processing areas in the brain, making us aware of its needs (hunger, for
example). It also controls our internal organs through its influence on the pituitary
gland, attached to the underside of the hypothalamus at the base of the brain. Thus,
the hypothalamus serves as the link between the nervous system and the endocrine
system, through which it regulates emotional arousal and stress. Finally, the hypothala-
mus plays a role in our emotions by hosting some of the brain’s reward circuits, espe-
cially those that generate the feel-good emotions associated with gratifying the hunger,
thirst, and sex drives.
The Cerebral Cortex: The Brain’s Thinking Cap When you look at a whole human
brain, you mostly see the bulging cerebral hemispheres—a little bigger than your two
fists held together. You may also notice they are connected by a band of fibers, known
as the corpus callosum, through which the two hemispheres communicate with each
other. The nearly symmetrical hemispheres form a thick cap (known as the cerebrum)
that accounts for two-thirds of the brain’s total mass and protects most of the limbic
amygdala A limbic system structure involved in
memory and emotion, particularly fear and aggression.
Pronounced a-MIG-da-la.
hypothalamus A limbic structure that serves as
the brain’s blood-testing laboratory, constantly moni-
toring the blood to determine the condition of the body.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
The hypothalamus contains
important control circuits for
several basic motives and drives,
such as hunger and thirst (p. 377).
cerebral hemispheres The large symmetrical
halves of the brain located atop the brain stem.

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 69
system. The hemispheres’ thin outer layer, the cerebral cortex, with its distinctive folded
and wrinkled surface, allows billions of cells to squeeze into the tight quarters inside
your skull. Flattened out, the cortical surface would cover an area roughly the size of a
newspaper page. But because of its convoluted surface, only about a third of the cortex
is visible when the brain is exposed. For what it’s worth: Women’s brains have more
folding and wrinkling than do men’s, while, as we have seen, men’s brains are slightly
larger than women’s, on the average (Luders et al., 2004). And what does this cerebral
cortex do? The locus of our most awesome mental powers, it processes all our sensa-
tions, stores memories, and makes decisions—among many other functions, which we
will consider in our discussion of its lobes in the following text.
Although we humans take pride in our big brains, it turns out ours are not the biggest
on the planet. All large animals have large brains—a fact more closely related to body
size than to intelligence. Nor is the wrinkled cortex a distinctively human trait. Again, all
large animals have highly convoluted cortexes. If this bothers your self-esteem, take com-
fort in the fact that we do have more massive cortexes for our body weight than do other
big-brained creatures. Although no one is sure exactly how or why the brain became so
large in our species (Buss, 2008; Pennisi, 2006), comparisons with other animals show
that human uniqueness lies more in the way our brains function than in size.
Lobes of the Cerebral Cortex
In the late 1700s, the famous Austrian physician Franz Joseph Gall threw his considerable
scientific weight behind the idea that specific regions of the brain control specific mental
faculties, such as hearing, speech, movement, vision, and memory. Unfortunately, he car-
ried this sensible idea to extremes: In his theory of phrenology, Gall claimed that the brain
also had regions devoted to such traits as spirituality, hope, benevolence, friendship, de-
structiveness, and cautiousness. Moreover, he asserted that these traits could be detected
as bumps on the skull, the “reading” of which became a minor scam industry.
Gall’s ideas captured the public’s attention and became enormously popular, even
though his theory was mostly wrong. But he was absolutely right on one important
point: his doctrine of localization of function, the notion that different parts of the
brain perform different tasks. Discoveries in modern neuroscience have helped us cor-
rect Gall’s picture of the cerebral cortex. As we discuss the geography of the cortex,
please keep in mind that, while the lobes are convenient features, the functions we will
ascribe to each do not always respect their precise boundaries.
The Frontal Lobes Your choice of major, your plans for the summer, and your ability
to juggle your classes, your job, and your personal life all depend heavily on the corti-
cal regions at the front of your brain, aptly named the frontal lobes (you have one in
each hemisphere) (see Figure 2.12). Here, especially in the foremost region, known as
the prefrontal cortex, we find circuitry for our most advanced mental functions, such
as decision making, goal setting and follow-through, and anticipating future events
(Miller, 2006a). The biological underpinnings of personality, temperament, and our
sense of “self” seem to have important components here, too, as the case of Phineas
Gage first suggested (Bower, 2006c).
At the back of the frontal lobe lies a special strip of cortex capable of taking action
on our thoughts. Known as the motor cortex, this patch of brain takes its name from its
main function: controlling the body’s motor movement by sending messages to motor
nerves and on to voluntary muscles. As you can see in Figure 2.13, the motor cortex
contains an upside-down map of the body, represented by the homunculus (the dis-
torted “little man” in the figure). A closer look at the motor homunculus shows that it
exaggerates certain parts of the body, indicating that the brain allots a larger amount
of cortex to body parts requiring more fine-tuned motor control such as the lips,
tongue, and hands. Perhaps the most exaggerated areas represent the fingers (especially
the thumb), reflecting the importance of manipulating objects. Another large area con-
nects to facial muscles, used in expressions of emotion. Please remember, however, that
cerebral cortex The thin gray matter covering
the cerebral hemispheres, consisting of a ¼-inch layer
dense with cell bodies of neurons. The cerebral cortex
carries on the major portion of our “higher” mental
processing, including thinking and perceiving.
frontal lobes Cortical regions at the front of the
brain that are especially involved in movement and in
thinking.
motor cortex A narrow vertical strip of cortex in
the frontal lobes lying just in front of the central
fissure; controls voluntary movement.
The cerebral hemispheres of the human
brain.

70 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
commands from the motor cortex on one side of the brain control muscles on the op-
posite side of the body. So a wink of your left eye originates in your right motor cortex,
while the left motor cortex can wink your right eye.
Mirror Neurons Discovered in the Frontal Lobes Recently, neuroscientists discovered
a new class of neurons, called mirror neurons, scattered throughout the brain but
especially in motor areas of the frontal lobes. These mirror neurons appear to fire when
we observe another person performing some action, such as waving, drinking from a
cup, or wincing in pain—just as if we had performed the same act ourselves. In effect,
we may do and feel what we see in others—but in the privacy of our own minds
(Dobbs, 2006a).
What could be their purpose? For one thing, mirror neurons may help children
mimic—and therefore learn—language. What’s more, these specialized cells may form
part of a brain network enabling us to anticipate other people’s intentions, says Italian
neuroscientist Giacomo Rizzolatti, one of the discoverers of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti
et al., 2006). Because they connect with the brain’s emotional circuitry, mirror neurons
may allow us to “mirror” other people’s emotions in our minds. From an evolutionary
perspective, observing and imitating others is a fundamental human characteristic, so
mirror neurons could even turn out to be a biological basis of culture. Finally, some
researchers believe deficits in the mirror system may underlie disorders, such as autism,
that involve difficulties in imitation and in understanding others’ feelings and inten-
tions (Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006).
Although the discovery of mirror neurons has ignited great excitement in the
field of brain science, let’s take a moment to think critically about what research
has actually found, versus what may—at this point, at least—be mere speculation.
One caution centers around a common fallacy we discussed in Chapter 1: the as-
sumption of causation when only correlational data exist. Just because our own
motor cortex, for example, activates when we see another person engaging in a
motor activity, we cannot conclude that our observation caused our corresponding
mirror neuron A recently discovered class of neu-
ron that fires in response to (“mirroring”) observation
of another person’s actions or emotions.
Primary
somatosensory
cortex
Receives data about
sensations in skin,
muscles, and joints
Visual association
cortex
Analyzes visual data
to form images
Parietal Lobe
Occipital Lobe
Primary
visual cortex
Receives nerve
impulses from
the visual
thalamus
Wernicke’s area
Interprets spoken
and written language
Temporal Lobe
Auditory association cortex
Analyzes data about sound,
so that we can recognize
words or melodies
Primary auditory
cortex
Detects discrete
qualities of sound,
such as pitch
and volume
Broca’s area
Vital for the
formation of
speech
Prefrontal cortex
Associated with
various aspects of
behavior and
personality
Frontal Lobe
Motor cortex
Generates signals
responsible for
voluntary
movements
FIGURE 2.12
The Four Lobes of the Cerebral Cortex
Each of the two hemispheres of the
cerebral cortex has four lobes. Different
sensory and motor functions have been
associated with specific parts of each
lobe, as shown here.

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 71
neural activity (Hickok, 2009). Thus, it would be premature—and dangerous—to
assume that the lack of imitation sometimes found in autism, for example, was
caused by mirror neuron deficit or dysfunction.
Second, and perhaps even more important, is the notion that mirror neuron activity
implies the observer understands the meaning and intent of the action. For example, if
you see Mary grasp a cup, you might infer from the way she grasps it that she intends
to drink from it (rather than, say, give it to someone else). Mirror neuron enthusi-
asts have assumed this type of action-understanding comes with the mirror neuron
package, so to speak—in other words, that mirror neuron activity promotes deeper
understanding of the person’s motives and actions, leading to conclusions that mirror
neurons underlie empathy and social understanding. But research outside the area of
mirror neurons clearly shows that understanding others’ motivations can occur out-
side a mirror neuron system, in part as the result of analytical thinking skills (Hickok,
2010; Keysers, 2010).
In summary, then, while the discovery of mirror neuron circuitry is definitely excit-
ing and may indeed prove to be a promising advance in understanding human thought,
emotion, and behavior, we must remind ourselves that extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence—and curb our enthusiasm a little in the meantime.
A. Primary motor
Primary
somatosensory
B. Primary somatosensoryPrimary visual
(buried deep in
rear of brain)
Primary
auditory
and auditory
association areas
swallowing
chewing
leg
toes
sh
ou
ld
er
w
ris
t
sh
ou
lde
r
wr
ist
ha
nd
fin
ge
rs
th
um
b
fa
ce
lip
s
ind
ex
fin
ge
rha
nd
th
um
b
jaw
knee
toes
Primary
motor
FIGURE 2.13
The Motor Cortex and the Somatosensory Cortex
Actions of the body’s voluntary muscles are controlled by the motor cortex in the frontal lobe. The somatosensory cortex
in the parietal lobe processes information about temperature, touch, body position, and pain. This diagram shows the
proportion of tissue devoted to various activities or sensitivities in each cortex.

72 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
The Left Frontal Lobe’s Role in Speech In most people, the left frontal lobe has another
important function: the production of speech (see Figure 2.12). First discovered in
the mid-1800s by French neurologist Paul Broca, damage to this specialized region—
aptly named Broca’s area—can leave a person without the ability to talk. Surprisingly,
though, the ability to understand speech lies elsewhere in the brain. As you might have
guessed, Jill Bolte Taylor’s stroke damaged Broca’s area in her brain, which explains
why she lost her ability to construct language.
The Parietal Lobes To the rear of each frontal lobe lie two large patches of cortex
that specialize in sensation (see Figure 2.12). These parietal lobes allow us to sense the
warmth of a hot bath, the smoothness of silk, the poke of a rude elbow, and the gentle-
ness of a caress. A special parietal strip, known as the somatosensory cortex, mirrors the
adjacent strip of motor cortex we found in the frontal lobe. This somatosensory cortex
has two main functions. First, it serves as the primary processing area for the sensa-
tions of touch, temperature, pain, and pressure from all over the body (Graziano et al.,
2000; Helmuth, 2000). Second, it relates this information to a mental map of the body
to help us locate the source of these sensations (refer to Figure 2.13).
Other maps in the parietal lobes keep track of the position of body parts, so they
prevent you from biting your tongue or stepping on your own toes. And, when your
leg “goes to sleep” and you can’t feel anything but a tingling sensation, you have tem-
porarily interrupted messages from the nerve cells that carry sensory information to
body maps in the parietal lobe.
Besides processing sensation and keeping track of body parts, the right parietal
lobes help us locate, in three-dimensional space, the positions of external objects de-
tected by our senses. This helps us navigate through our day, from getting out of bed
and finding our way into the shower to dressing ourselves, getting ourselves to school
or work, and so on. Meanwhile, the left hemisphere’s parietal lobe has its own spe-
cial talents. It specializes in mathematical reasoning and locating the source of speech
sounds, as when someone calls your name. It also works with the temporal lobe to
extract meaning from speech and writing.
The Temporal Lobes When the phone rings or a horn honks, the sound registers in
your temporal lobes, on the lower side of each cerebral hemisphere (see Figure 2.12).
There, the auditory cortex helps you make sense of sounds.
But the temporal lobes take responsibility for more than just hearing. In most peo-
ple, a specialized section in the left auditory cortex (where it merges into the lower
parietal lobe), known as Wernicke’s area, helps process the meaning of language. When
Jill Bolte Taylor phoned her coworker for help during her stroke, she could hear his
words, but they sounded like gibberish to her. “Oh my gosh, he sounds like a golden
retriever!” she thought (Taylor, 2009, p. 56). This was due to the damage underway in
Wernicke’s area of her brain. And it doesn’t seem to matter if the language is spoken
or signed: Research with hearing-impaired individuals finds that they recruit this same
area in understanding sign language (Neville et al., 1998).
And that’s not all. Portions of the temporal lobes “subcontract” from the visual cor-
tex the work of recognizing faces. Other temporal regions work with the hippocampus
on the important task of storing long-term memories. There is even a distinct patch of
temporal cortex dedicated to perception of the human body (Kanwisher, 2006; Tsao,
2006). Finally, the right temporal lobe plays a significant role in interpreting the emo-
tional tone of language—which explains why the gentle tone of her coworker’s voice
reassured Jill that he would bring help, despite her inability to understand his words
(Taylor, 2009).
The Occipital Lobes Have you ever “seen stars” after a hard bump to your head? If
so, that visual sensation likely resulted from stimulation to your occipital lobes at the
back of your brain (see Figure 2.12). Under more normal circumstances, the occipital
lobes receive messages relayed from the eyes. There, the visual cortex constructs ongoing
images of the world around us.
parietal lobes Cortical areas lying toward the
back and top of the brain; involved in touch sensation
and in perceiving spatial relationships (the relation-
ships of objects in space).
somatosensory cortex A strip of the parietal
lobe lying just behind the central fissure. The somato-
sensory cortex is involved with sensations of touch.
temporal lobes Cortical lobes that process
sounds, including speech. The temporal lobes are
probably involved in storing long-term memories.
occipital lobes The cortical regions at the back
of the brain that house the visual cortex.
visual cortex The visual processing areas of
cortex in the occipital and temporal lobes.

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 73
To create pictures of the outside world, the brain divides up the incoming visual
input and sends it to separate cortical areas for the processing of color, movement,
shape, and shading—as we will see in more detail in Chapter 3. But the occipital lobes
don’t do all this work alone. As we noted previously, they coordinate with adjacent
areas in the parietal lobes to locate objects in space. They also work with temporal
regions to produce visual memories (Ishai & Sagi, 1995; Miyashita, 1995). To complete
the picture, we should note that congenitally blind people recruit the visual cortex to
help them read Braille (Amedi et al., 2005; Barach, 2003).
The Association Cortex In accomplishing its magnificent feats of multitasking,
our brain relies both on the “primary processing areas” of the cortex as well as
the “association areas” of the cortex. The association cortex, named for the belief that
complex thinking relies upon associating ideas with each other, actually constitutes
more than half of the cerebral cortex. But before these associations are made, specific
areas of the cortex must process the raw data streaming in from the sense organs: For
example, the primary visual cortex processes raw visual stimulation, such as the let-
ters in a word and whether any are capitalized. Then the association area takes over
to interpret the meaning of the message, such as perceiving the whole of the word or
sentence. Thus, diverse parts of the association cortex, throughout our lobes, interpret
sensations, lay plans, make decisions, and prepare us for action— precisely the mental
powers in which we humans excel and that distinguish us from other animals.
The Cooperative Brain No single part of the brain, however, takes sole responsi-
bility for emotion, memory, personality, or any other complex psychological char-
acteristic: There are no single “brain centers” for any of our major faculties. Rather,
every mental and behavioral process involves the coordination and cooperation of
many brain networks, each an expert at some highly specialized task (Damasio,
2003; LeDoux, 2002). For example, when you do something as simple as answer
a ringing telephone, you hear it in your temporal lobes, interpret its meaning with
the help of the frontal lobes, visually locate it with your occipital and parietal lobes,
initiate grasping the phone on the orders of your frontal and parietal lobes, and
engage in thoughtful conversation, again using frontal and temporal lobe circuitry.
And the cortex cannot do its work without communicating with circuits lying deep
beneath the surface: the limbic system, thalamus, brain stem, cerebellum, and other
structures.
Clearly, the brain usually manages to “put it all together” in a coordinated effort
to understand and respond to the world. Exactly how it does so is not clear to neuro-
scientists—and, in fact, constitutes one of the biggest mysteries of modern psychology.
Some clues have appeared in recent work, however. Constantly active, even when we
are asleep, our brains produce pulses of coordinated waves sweeping over the cortex
that are thought, somehow, to coordinate activity in far-flung brain regions (Buzsáki,
2006). All these busy neural networks work in elegant coordination with each other
in work and in play, in waking and sleeping, from conception to death—and mostly
without our awareness.
Cerebral Dominance
Throughout our discussion of various brain structures and their associated
functions, we have made some distinctions between functions in the left and right
hemispheres. We know, for example, that a person with injury to the right hemi-
sphere would probably not experience language difficulties but could have trouble
with spatial orientation—for example, feeling lost in a familiar place or unable to
complete a simple jigsaw puzzle. This tendency for each hemisphere to take the lead
in different tasks is called cerebral dominance, an often-exaggerated concept. While
it is true that some processes are more under the control of the left hemisphere
and others are predominantly right-hemisphere tasks, both hemispheres continu-
ally work together to produce our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors—courtesy of
association cortex Cortical regions throughout
the brain that combine information from various other
parts of the brain.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 3
The puzzle of how the brain “puts
it all together” is known as the
binding problem (p. 113).
cerebral dominance The tendency of each
brain hemisphere to exert control over different func-
tions, such as language or perception of spatial
relationships.

74 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
the corpus callosum and its role in communication between the hemispheres. With
that in mind, what differences are there between the hemispheres?
Language and Communication As we have seen, the left hemisphere usually domi-
nates language functions, although both sides of the brain get involved to some extent.
Typically, the left side is more active in manufacturing and processing the “what,” or
content, of speech. The right hemisphere, by contrast, interprets the emotional tone
of speech (Vingerhoets et al., 2003), as we noted in the case of Jill’s stroke. The right
hemisphere also takes the lead in interpreting others’ emotional responses and their
nonverbal communication signals. As for our own emotions, the control of negative
emotions, such as fear and anger, usually stems from the right frontal lobe, while the
left frontal lobe typically regulates positive emotions such as joy (Davidson, 2000b).
Different Processing Styles Thus, the two hemispheres don’t generally compete
with each other. Rather, they make different contributions to the same task. In the
lingo of neuroscience, the two hemispheres have different but complimentary pro-
cessing styles. For example, the left hemisphere groups objects analytically and ver-
bally—as by similarity in function (knife with spoon)—while the right hemisphere
might match things by form or visual pattern—as in matching coin to clock, which are
both round objects (Gazzaniga, 1970; Sperry, 1968, 1982). In general, we can describe
the left hemisphere’s processing style as more analytic and sequential, while the right
hemisphere interprets experience more holistically, emotionally, and spatially (Reuter-
Lorenz & Miller, 1998). In a normally functioning brain, the two styles complement
each other, combining to produce a multifaceted perspective of the world.
In the wake of damage to the brain, though—such as Jill’s stroke—the different
processing styles may become starkly apparent. In Jill’s case, she relied more on linear
thinking during the first part of her life: “I spent a lifetime of thirty-seven years being
enthusiastically committed to do-do-doing lots of stuff at a very fast pace” (Taylor,
2009, p. 70). The radical shift in her perception caused by the damage to her left hemi-
sphere was noticeable right away, when she found herself incapable of keeping her
thoughts on track while trying to plan how to get help. The step-by-step, time-oriented
thinking she had taken for granted had vanished, and in its place a completely different
perspective of herself and the world emerged. “I felt no rush to do anything (p. 71),”
she marvels, as she remembers her joy in feeling connected to everything around her, in
being exquisitely tuned to others’ emotions, in taking time to ponder things, and in the
deep inner peace that came with her new view of the world that emphasized the right
brain’s perspective.
If that description sounds like words a person might use to describe a religious or
spiritual experience, neurological studies from the University of Pennsylvania may tell
us why. Researchers conducted sophisticated brain scans on people who were meditat-
ing and found that in peak meditative states, activity in the left association cortex—the
area that makes us aware of our body’s physical boundaries—declined sharply. Thus,
the self-transcendence reported by expert meditators, as well as Jill Taylor’s similar
feeling of being “one with the universe,” appear to have a biological basis: When blood
flow to that region of the left hemisphere slows down, our awareness of ourselves as
separate and distinct organisms fades (Newberg et al., 2001a). In addition, decreased
activity in the left parietal lobe, also noted in studies of meditators, correlates with an
altered awareness of one’s body in relation to space (Newberg et al., 2001b).
Some People Are Different—But That’s Normal Just to complicate your picture
of cerebral dominance, dominance patterns are not always the same from one person
to another. Research demonstrating this fact uses a technique called transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) to deliver powerful magnetic pulses through the skull and into
the brain. There, the magnetic fields interfere with the brain’s electrical activity, tempo-
rarily disabling the targeted region without causing permanent damage. Surprisingly,
when the left-side language areas receive TMS, language abilities in some people—
mostly left-handers—remain unaffected. In general, these studies show that about one
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Emotional intelligence includes the
ability to perceive and understand
others’ emotions (p. 396).

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 75
in ten individuals process language primarily on the right side of the brain. Another
one in ten—again, mostly left-handers—have language functions distributed equally
on both sides of the brain (Knecht et al., 2002).
Male and Female Brains In a culture where bigger is often seen as better, the unde-
niable fact that men (on average) have slightly larger brains than do women has caused
heated debate. The real question, of course, is: What is the meaning of the size differen-
tial? Most neuroscientists think it is simply related to the male’s larger body size—and
not of much other importance (Brannon, 2008).
Within the brain, certain structures exhibit sex differences too. A part of the
hypothalamus commonly believed to be associated with sexual behavior and, perhaps,
gender identity, is larger in males than in females. Some studies have suggested that
male brains are more lateralized, while females tend to distribute abilities, such as
language, across both hemispheres, although findings in this area are mixed (Sommer
et al., 2004). If true, however, the difference in lateralization may explain why women
are more likely than men to recover speech after a stroke. Other than that, what
advantage the difference in lateralization may have is unclear.
At present, no one has nailed down any psychological difference that can be
attributed with certainty to physical differences between the brains of males and
females. The research continues, but we suggest interpreting new claims with a liberal
dose of critical thinking, being especially wary of bias that may influence the way
results are interpreted. In fact, we will help you do just that in the Critical Thinking:
Applied section at the end of this chapter.
The Strange and Fascinating Case of the Split Brain Imagine what your world
might be like if your two hemispheres could not communicate—if your brain were,
somehow, “split” in two. Would you be, literally, “of two minds”? (See Figure 2.14.)
This is not an idle question, because there are people with “split brains,” the result of a
last-resort surgical procedure used to treat a rare condition of almost continuous epi-
leptic seizures. Before their surgery, these patients produced abnormal electrical bursts
of brain waves that seemed to “echo” back and forth between the hemispheres, quickly
building into a seizure—much as feedback through a microphone generates a loud
screeching noise. So the idea was to cut the corpus callosum—severing the connection
between the hemispheres—and thereby prevent the seizure from raging out of control.
But was there a psychological price? Curiously, split-brain patients appear mentally
and behaviorally unaffected by this extreme procedure under all but the most unusual
conditions.
Those unusual conditions involve clever tests contrived by Nobel Prize winner
Roger Sperry (1968) and his colleague Michael Gazzaniga (2005). For example,
when holding a ball in the left hand (without being able to see it), as shown in
Corpus callosum
FIGURE 2.14
The Corpus Callosum
Only the corpus callosum is severed when
the brain is “split.” This medical proce-
dure prevents communication between
the cerebral hemispheres. Surprisingly,
split-brain patients act like people with
normal brains under most conditions.
Special laboratory tests, however, reveal
a duality of consciousness in the split
brain.

76 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
Figure 2.15, their split-brain patients could not identify it by touch, yet they had no
trouble doing so when the ball was transferred to the right hand. In another test,
split-brain patients said they saw nothing when an image of a spoon flashed briefly
on the left side of the visual field. Yet, they could reach around a visual barrier with
the right hand and easily pick the spoon out of an array of other objects.
How can we explain these odd findings? Let’s see if we can use what we have
learned in this chapter to solve this peculiar puzzle.
• First, remember that the corpus callosum enables communication between the
hemispheres—so, when it is severed, each hemisphere must process information
on its own. This explains, also, why split-brain patients can simultaneously draw a
circle with one hand and a square with the other (a near-impossible task for those
with intact brains. If you don’t believe us, just try it!)
• Because the sensory pathways cross over to the opposite side as they ascend to the
cortex, each side of the body communicates with the opposite side of the brain. So,
each hemisphere perceives touch sensation from the hand on the opposite side of
the body.
• Language is usually a left-hemisphere function. This, when combined with the
contralateral sensory pathways, explains why these patients could name ob-
jects when they were processed in the left hemisphere. When sensory messages
came in from the right visual field or the right hand (such as holding the ball
in the right hand), the message crossed over to the left hemisphere, which—
thanks to its language abilities—could name the object. Conversely, objects
seen in the left visual field or felt in the left hand crossed over to the right
hemisphere for processing, where—because the right hemisphere cannot pro-
duce speech—patients could not name the object. They could, however, identify
it by touch.
In another study with a similar patient, Gazzaniga found something else remark-
able. He began with images of paintings by an artist named Giuseppe Arcimboldo,
famous for painting faces made entirely of figures, such as fruit, books, fish, and other
objects (see the accompanying photo). Would the patient’s left hemisphere’s perception
of the painting differ from his right hemisphere’s view of it? (If you enjoy a challenge,
try to remember something we discussed a few pages back that may help you figure
out the answer before reading on.)
could not identify verbally could identify verbally
? “ball”
FIGURE 2.15
Testing a Split-Brain Patient
Split-brain patients can name unseen
objects placed in the right hand, but
when an object is placed in the left hand,
they cannot name it. Why?
FIGURE 2.16
The Neural Pathways from the Eyes to
the Visual Cortex
There are two things to notice in this
illustration in which the person is look-
ing at the center of the pizza. First, the
information from the left side of the retina
in each eye (which is the left visual field)
corresponds to the right side of the pizza.
Conversely, the right visual field senses
the left side of the pizza. (This happens
because the lens of the eye reverses the
image.) Second, please notice that the
optic nerves of both eyes join together at
the optic chiasm, where information
from the left sides of both retinas are
routed to the left visual cortex, while
images from the right sides of both reti-
nas are routed to the right visual cortex.
As a result, everything a person sees on
the right gets processed in the left hemi-
sphere’s visual cortex, while the right visual
cortex processes everything to the left of
the point on which the eyes are fixed.

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 77
When the images were flashed briefly to his right visual
field (and thus processed in his left hemisphere), he recognized
only the objects in the image (such as fruit or books)—he did
not “see” a face. When shown to his left visual field, however,
the processing style of his right hemisphere enabled his recog-
nition of a human face. This finding supports other research
indicating a special ability for facial recognition in the right
hemisphere (The Man with Two Brains, 1997). Clearly, both
hemispheres play important roles in human abilities.
Two Consciousnesses Such cerebral antics point to the most
interesting finding in Sperry and Gazzaniga’s work: the duality
of consciousness observed in split-brain patients. When the two
hemispheres received different information, it was as if the pa-
tient were two separate individuals. One patient told how his
left hand would unzip his pants or unbutton his shirt at most
inappropriate times, especially when he felt stressed. Another
reported his misbehaving left hand turning off the television in
the middle of a program he had been watching (Joseph, 1988).
Why? Sperry theorized that the right hemisphere—which has
little language ability, but which controls the left hand—was
merely trying to find a way to communicate by getting attention
any way it could (Sperry, 1964).
We must, however, be cautious about generalizing such
findings from split-brain patients to individuals with normal
brains. Gazzaniga (1998a, b) suggests we think of the human
mind as neither a single nor a dual entity but rather as a con-
federation of minds, each specialized to process a specific kind
of information. For most people, then, the corpus callosum
serves as a connecting pathway that helps our confederation
of minds share information. And so we come full circle to the Core Concept we en-
countered at the beginning of this section: The brain is composed of many special-
ized modules that work together to create mind and behavior (Baynes et al., 1998;
Strauss, 1998).
What’s It to You? Nearly everybody knows someone who has suffered brain damage
from an accident, a stroke, or a tumor. Your new knowledge of the brain and behavior
will help you understand the problems such people face. And if you know what
abilities have been lost or altered, you can usually make a good guess as to which
part of the brain sustained the damage—especially if you bear in mind three simple
principles:
1. Each side of the brain communicates with the opposite side of the body. Thus,
if symptoms appear on one side of the body, it is likely that the other side of the
brain was damaged (see Figure 2.17).
2. For most people, speech is mainly a left-hemisphere function.
3. Each lobe has special functions:
• The occipital lobe specializes in vision;
• The temporal lobe specializes in hearing, memory, and face recognition;
• The parietal lobe specializes in locating sensations in space, including the
surface of the body;
• The frontal lobe specializes in motor movement, the production of speech,
and certain higher mental functions that we often call “thinking” or
“intelligence.”
Right brain
damage
Paralyzed
left side
Spatial
perceptual
defects
Behavioral
style—quick,
impulsive
Memory
deficits—
performance
Left brain
damage
Paralyzed
right side
Speech,
language
deficits
Behavioral
style—slow,
cautious
Memory
deficits—
language
FIGURE 2.17
Contralateral Effects of Damage to the
Cerebral Hemispheres
A painting by Arcimboldo, who painted
faces made of fruits, flowers, and books,
and other figures. Gazzaniga used
Arcimboldo’s paintings to show how the
two hemispheres process facial images
differently.

78 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
Here’s how one of your authors (Bob) applied his knowledge of the brain:
I hadn’t noticed Dad dragging the toe of his right foot ever so slightly as he
walked. But my Mom noticed it on their nightly tour of the neighborhood,
when he wasn’t keeping up with her brisk pace. I just figured he was slowing
down a bit in his later years.
Dad, too, casually dismissed his symptom, but Mom was persistent. She
scheduled an appointment with the doctor. In turn, the doctor scheduled a brain
scan that showed a remarkably large mass—a tumor—on the left side of Dad’s
brain. You can see what the neurologist saw in Figure 2.18—an image taken
ear-to-ear through the head.
When I saw the pictures, I knew immediately what was happening. The tu-
mor was located in an area that would interfere with tracking the position of
the foot. I knew that each side of the brain communicates with the opposite side
of the body—so it made sense that the tumor showing so clearly on the left side
of Dad’s brain (right side of the image) was affecting communications with his
right foot.
The neurologist also told us that the diseased tissue was not in the brain
itself. Rather, it was in the saclike layers surrounding the brain and spinal cord.
That was good news, in an otherwise bleak report. Still, the mass was growing
and putting pressure on the brain. The recommendation was surgery—which
occurred after an anxious wait of a few weeks.
During this difficult time, I remember feeling grateful for my professional
training. As a psychologist, I knew something about the brain, its disorders,
and treatments. This allowed me to shift perspectives—from son to psycholo-
gist and back again. It helped me deal with the emotions that rose to the surface
when I thought about the struggle for the organ of my father’s mind.
Sadly, the operation did not produce the miraculous cure for which we had
hoped. Although brain surgery is performed safely on thousands of patients
each year—many of whom receive immense benefits in the quality and lengths
of their lives—one has to remember that it is a procedure usually done on very
FIGURE 2.18
MRI Image of a Brain Tumor
This image, showing a side-to-side sec-
tion toward the back of the head, reveals
a large mass on the left side of the brain
in a region involved with tracking the po-
sition of the right foot. Visible at the bot-
tom is a cross-section of the cerebellum.
Also visible are the folds in the cerebral
cortex covering the brain. Near the center,
you can see two of the brain’s ventricles
(hollow spaces filled with cerebrospinal
fluid), which are often enlarged, as they
are here, in Alzheimer’s disease. The scan
is of the father of one of your authors.

How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes? 79
sick people. In fact, the operation did give Dad some time with us that he may
otherwise not have had.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
The old idea that we use only 10 percent of our brains is nonsense that probably came
from a time when neuroscientists hadn’t figured out the functions of many cortical ar-
eas. Now we know that every part of the brain has a specific function, and they all get
used every day. Therefore, simply finding a way to engage more of the brain is not the
royal road to increased brainpower.
Have neuroscientists found anything you can use to improve your memory, espe-
cially for concepts you are learning in your classes? The fact that we employ many dif-
ferent regions of the cerebral cortex in learning and memory may be among their most
practical discoveries (Kandel & Squire, 2000). Accordingly, if you can bring more of
this cerebral circuitry to bear on your studies (about biopsychology, for example), your
brain will develop a wider web of memories.
Reading the material in this book will help you form verbal (language) memories, parts
of which involve circuits in the temporal cortex. Taking notes brings the motor cortex of
the frontal lobes into play, adding a “motor memory” component to your study. Studying
the accompanying photos, charts, and drawings adds visual and spatial memory compo-
nents in the occipital and parietal lobes. Listening actively to your professor’s lectures and
discussing the material with a study partner will engage the auditory regions of the tem-
poral cortex and create still more memory traces. Finally, anticipating questions that may
appear on the exam will involve regions of the frontal lobes in your learning process.
In general, the more ways you can engage with the material—the more sensory
and motor channels you can employ—the more memory components you will build in
your brain’s circuitry. As a result, you will have more ways of accessing what you have
learned when you need to remember the material.
Answers 1. fMRI would be best, because it not only gives detailed three-dimensional images but also shows different activity levels in different
parts of the brain. The driving task, however, would have to be modified so it could be performed while in the fMRI machine. 2. The brain stem and
cerebellum, the limbic system, the cerebrum 3. limbic system 4. See the location of the four lobes in Figure 2.12. The left hemisphere controls
language, and the right hemisphere controls your left hand. 5. right 6. Examples include the interaction of regions in the four lobes of the cerebral
cortex when answering the phone. There are many other examples mentioned in this section.
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: Suppose you are a neuroscientist interested in
comparing what parts of the brain are most active when people
are driving and talking on a cell phone. Which imaging technique
would be best for your research?
2. RECALL: Name the three main layers of the human brain
discussed in the text: , , and .
3. APPLICATION: An fMRI or a PET scan would show activity in a
person’s during an emotional response.
4. RECALL: Make a sketch showing the four lobes of the cerebral
cortex. Indicate the main functions of each lobe and which
hemisphere controls language in most people. Which hemisphere
controls the left hand?
5. ANALYSIS: A split-brain patient would have trouble using his
hand to select the object flashed on the left side of
the screen. (Hints: Which hemisphere controls each hand? Which
hemisphere processes information from the left side of the visual
field?)
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: The brain is
composed of many specialized and interconnected modules that
work together to create mind and behavior. Can you name at
least two specialized parts of the brain that are known to work
together?
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80 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Left Brain versus Right Brain
Would you rather solve a math problem or create a paint-ing? Write an essay on an academic topic or invent a
fictional story? According to pop science, the way you answer
questions like this reveals whether you are a “left-brain” per-
son or a “right-brain” person. Furthermore, the same sources
often then encourage you to use that information to choose a
career. Is there any truth to these claims?
The split-brain studies and discovery that the two sides
of the brain process information differently have certainly
captured public interest. Press reports claiming the left
hemisphere is logical and the right hemisphere is emotional
might easily lead to the mistaken conclusion that your friend
Jamal, a guy with an analytic bent, lives mostly in his left
hemisphere, while his wife Barb, more sensitive to people’s
emotions, filters her experience mainly through the right side
of her brain.
Knowing a fad when they see it, pseudoscientists have
developed workshops to help plodding analytical types get
into their “right minds.” Before you jump on this particular
bandwagon, though, let’s dig a little deeper.
What Are the Critical Issues?
The idea that people fall neatly into one category or another
has popular appeal, but do the facts bear this out? Recent
findings in neuroscience should be able to tell us how the left
and right brain interact and whether people really are right-
or left-brained.
Is the Claim Reasonable or Extreme? As we have seen
in this chapter, the notion that we rely on one side of the
brain, largely to the exclusion of the other, is an exaggera-
tion. Rather, we use both sides, in coordination with each
other, all the time. As we often find in extreme claims, the
“left brain vs. right brain” issue has oversimplified the sci-
entific findings of hemispheric differences: People rarely fit
neatly into one of two dichotomous categories. This serves
as a good example of how honest findings (such as the
work reported in this chapter on the differences between
the hemispheres) often become wildly exaggerated by the
time they reach the popular news media. We should always
digest these reports with a healthy dose of skepticism and
look closely at the evidence.
What Is the Evidence? As we have seen, the two hemi-
spheres have somewhat different processing styles, but the
actual differences between the two hemispheres do not out-
weigh their similarities (Banich, 1998; Trope et al., 1992).
Most important—and what the right-brain/left-brain faddists
overlook—is that the two hemispheres of the intact brain co-
operate with each other, each making its own complementary
contribution to our mental lives (see Figure 2.17).
Could Bias Contaminate the Conclusion? Two biases
come easily to mind as we consider this issue. First—as we
mentioned earlier—some businesses have made fortunes
“selling” this idea, which creates an obvious bias if these
same businesses are trying to convince you of its veracity.
Emotional bias is likely present as well. After all, we humans
like to classify things and people into categories: It appeals to
our sense of order and soothes our need to resolve complex
issues. Small wonder, then, that we often latch on to typolo-
gies that purport to explain human nature, characteristics,
and behavior.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Unless you have a split brain, you bring the abilities of
both sides of your brain to bear on everything you do.
Why, then, do people have such obvious differences in the
way they approach the same tasks? Some people do seem
to approach things in a more analytical, logical fashion;
others operate from a more intuitive and emotional per-
spective. But now that you know something of how the
brain works, you understand that we cannot account for
these differences simply by suggesting people employ one
side of their brain or the other. Even split-brain patients use
both sides of their brains! A better explanation involves
different combinations of experience and brain physiology.
People are different because of different combinations of
nature and nurture—not because they use opposite sides
of the brain.

Chapter Summary 81
USING BOTH SIDES OF YOUR BRAIN
Think of something you enjoy doing—it
might be playing a particular sport or
making music, cooking or having dinner
with friends, studying or shopping, or
whatever strikes your fancy. Now, imagine
doing it for a couple of hours and all the
minute details of what would likely oc-
cur in that period of time. Make a note
of some of them and then try to identify
which parts of the activity might be led
by your left hemisphere and which parts
of the activity are more likely coordinated
by your right hemisphere. (Hint: Besides
all the examples included earlier in the
chapter, we have listed some in
Figure 2.19.)
Chances are, in any pursuit, you’ll
see how involved both hemispheres need
to be in order for you to fully engage in
the experience. And because of that, you
stand as living proof that you are neither
“left-brained” nor “right-brained,” but
a beautifully coordinated example of
“whole-brained!”
• Regulation of positive
emotions
• Control of muscles used
in speech
• Control of sequence of
movements
• Spontaneous speaking
and writing
• Memory for words and
numbers
• Understanding speech
and writing
• Regulation of
negative emotions
• Responses to simple
commands
• Memory for shapes
and music
• Interpreting spatial
relationships and
visual images
• Recognition of faces
Left hemisphere Right hemisphere
FIGURE 2.19
Specialization of the Cerebral Hemispheres
While each hemisphere communicates with the opposite side of the body, the hemispheres
each specialize in controlling different functions. For most people, the left hemisphere spe-
cializes in speech and other functions performed in sequence (such as walking, throwing,
and reading). The right hemisphere specializes in synthesis: gathering many pieces of
information and synthesizing it as a unified whole (as in recognizing faces or shapes).
CHAPTER PROBLEM: What does Jill Bolte Taylor’s
experience teach us about how our brain is organized and about its
amazing ability to adapt?
• Our brain communicates through contralateral pathways, so
that sensory information from one side of the body is processed
by the opposite cerebral hemisphere.
• Brain plasticity allows us to regain or rewire functions lost due
to damage or trauma.
• Our brain is composed of a group of specialized structures,
each of which performs certain tasks, but which all work
together to produce thought, behavior, and emotion.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
2.1 How Are Genes and Behavior Linked?
Core Concept 2.1 Evolution has fundamentally shaped
psychological processes because it favors genetic variations
that produce adaptive behavior.
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution explains behavior as
the result of natural selection. Variation among individuals and
competition for resources lead to survival of the most adap-
tive behavior as well as the fittest physical features. This prin-
ciple underlies human behavior as well as that of other animals.
Genetics has clarified the biological basis for natural selection
and inheritance. Our chromosomes contain thousands of genes,
carrying traits inherited from our parents. Each gene consists
of a DNA segment that encodes for a protein. Proteins, in turn,
serve as the building blocks for the organism’s structure and
function, including the functioning of the brain. While a draft
of the human genome has been completed, we do not yet know
precisely how specific genes influence behavior and mental
processes. Genetic research is nearing the point at which we
may alter our genetic makeup or select certain genetic traits for
our children. This new knowledge brings with it ethical choices
that humans have never had to face before.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

82 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
biopsychology (p. 42)
chromosome (p. 46)
corpus callosum (p. 68)
DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid) (p. 46)
evolution (p. 43)
gene (p. 46)
genotype (p. 45)
genome (p. 46)
natural selection (p. 44)
phenotype (p. 45)
sex chromosomes (p. 46)
2.2 How Does the Body Communicate
Internally?
Core Concept 2.2 The brain coordinates the body’s
two communications systems, the nervous system and the
endocrine system, which use similar chemical messengers to
communicate with targets throughout the body.
The body’s two communication systems are the nervous system
and the endocrine system. Neurons receive messages by means
of stimulation of the dendrites and soma. When sufficiently
aroused, a neuron generates an action potential along the axon.
Neurotransmitter chemicals relay the message to receptors on
cells across the synapse. The nervous system has two main
divisions: the central nervous system and the peripheral nervous
system. The peripheral nervous system, in turn, comprises the
somatic nervous system (further divided into sensory and motor
pathways) and the autonomic nervous system, which communi-
cates with internal organs and glands. The sympathetic division
of the autonomic nervous system is most active under stress,
while the parasympathetic division attempts to maintain the body
in a calmer state. The glands of the slower endocrine system
also communicate with cells around the body by secreting
hormones into the bloodstream. Endocrine system activity is
controlled by the pituitary gland, attached to the base of the
brain, where it receives orders from the hypothalamus. Psycho-
active drugs affect the nervous system by influencing the effects
of neurotransmitters by acting as agonists or antagonists. Un-
fortunately for people taking psychoactive drugs, many neural
pathways in the brain may employ the same neurotransmitter,
causing unwanted side effects.
action potential (p. 52)
agonists (p. 61)
all-or-none principle (p. 53)
antagonists (p. 61)
autonomic nervous system (p. 57)
axon (p. 52)
central nervous system (CNS) (p. 56)
contralateral pathways (p. 57)
dendrite (p. 51)
endocrine system (p. 58)
glial cell (p. 55)
hormones (p. 59)
interneuron (p. 51)
motor neuron (p. 50)
nervous system (p. 56)
neural pathways (p. 61)
neuron (p. 50)
neurotransmitter (p. 53)
parasympathetic division (p. 58)
peripheral nervous system (PNS) (p. 57)
pituitary gland (p. 60)
plasticity (p. 55)
reflex (p. 56)
resting potential (p. 52)
reuptake (p. 53)
sensory neuron (p. 50)
soma (p. 52)
somatic nervous system (p. 57)
sympathetic division (p. 57)
synapse (p. 53)
synaptic transmission (p. 53)
terminal buttons (p. 53)
2.3 How Does the Brain Produce Behavior
and Mental Processes?
Core Concept 2.3 The brain is composed of many
specialized modules that work together to create mind and
behavior.
In modern times, researchers have opened windows on the
brain, using the EEG to sense the brain’s electrical activity. In
recent years, computer technology has led to brain-scanning
techniques, such as CT, PET, MRI, and fMRI—each having its
advantages and disadvantages. We can conceive of the brain as
being organized in three integrated layers. The brain stem and
associated structures (including the medulla, reticular forma-
tion, pons, thalamus, and cerebellum) control many vital body
functions, along with influencing alertness and motor move-
ment. The limbic system (including the hippocampus, amygdala,
and hypothalamus) plays a vital role in motivation, emotion, and
memory. The cerebral cortex contains highly specialized modules.
Its frontal lobes control motor functions, including speech, and
higher mental functions. The parietal lobes specialize in sensation,
especially the senses of touch and body position, as well as the
understanding of speech. The occipital lobes deal exclusively with
vision, while the temporal lobes have multiple roles involved in
face recognition, hearing, and smell. Even though the functions
of the brain are highly localized within specific modules, they
normally work seamlessly together: Every mental and behav-
ioral process involves the coordination and cooperation of many
brain networks. The association cortex integrates the multitude of
raw data into a coherent perception. While the two hemispheres
are more similar than different, they are each equipped with

specialties. Language, analytical thinking, and positive emotions
are regulated primarily by circuits in the left hemisphere. The
right hemisphere specializes in spatial interpretation, visual and
musical memory, and negative emotions. The two hemispheres
communicate across the corpus callosum. If the hemispheres are
surgically severed, as when the corpus callosum is cut in split-
brain patients, a duality of consciousness emerges. Because each
side of the body has sensory and motor links to the opposite
side of the brain, a split-brain patient who “sees” an object in
only one hemisphere of the brain will only be able to locate that
object by touch using the hand linked to the same hemisphere.
amygdala (p. 68)
association cortex (p. 73)
brain stem (p. 65)
cerebellum (p. 66)
cerebral cortex (p. 69)
cerebral dominance (p. 73)
cerebral hemispheres (p. 68)
corpus callosum (p. 68)
CT scanning or computerized tomography (p. 64)
electroencephalograph (EEG) (p. 63)
fMRI or functional magnetic resonance imaging (p. 64)
frontal lobes (p. 69)
hippocampus (p. 67)
hypothalamus (p. 68)
limbic system (p. 66)
medulla (p. 66)
mirror neuron (p. 70)
motor cortex (p. 69)
MRI or magnetic resonance imaging (p. 64)
occipital lobes (p. 72)
parietal lobes (p. 72)
PET scanning or positron emission tomography (p. 64)
pons (p. 66)
reticular formation (p. 66)
somatosensory cortex (p. 72)
temporal lobes (p. 72)
thalamus (p. 66)
visual cortex (p. 72)
analytical or intuitive. A closer look at the evidence for hemi-
spheric specialization, however, reveals that this dichotomy is
wildly oversimplied.
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Left Brain versus Right Brain
Pop science dichotomizes people into left-brained and right-
brained people, based on whether they tend to be more
Chapter Summary 83

84 C H A P T E R 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
Program Review
6. Research related to acetylcholine may someday help people who
a. have Alzheimer’s disease.
b. have Parkinson’s disease.
c. suffer spinal cord trauma.
d. suffer from depression.
7. When we say the relationship between the brain and behavior is
reciprocal, we mean that
a. the brain controls behavior, but behavior can modify the
brain.
b. behavior determines what the brain will think about.
c. the brain and behavior operate as separate systems with no
interconnection.
d. the brain alters behavior as it learns more about the world.
8. Which of the following is true about how neurons communicate
with each other?
a. All neuronal communication is excitatory.
b. Neurons communicate with each other by sending electrical
discharges across the connecting synapse.
c. Neurons of any given type can communicate only with other
neurons of the same type.
d. The sum of excitatory and inhibitory signals to a neuron deter-
mines whether and how strongly it will respond.
9. Which part of the brain controls breathing?
a. cerebellum c. hypothalamus
b. brain stem d. limbic system
1. What section of a nerve cell receives incoming information?
a. axon
b. terminal button
c. synapse
d. dendrite
2. In general, neuroscientists are interested in the
a. brain mechanisms underlying normal and abnormal behavior.
b. biological consequences of stress on the body.
c. comparison of neurons with other types of cells.
d. computer simulation of intelligence.
3. Which section of the brain coordinates body movement and main-
tains equilibrium?
a. brain stem
b. cerebellum
c. hippocampus
d. cerebrum
4. Which brain structure is most closely involved with emotion?
a. cortex c. limbic system
b. brain stem d. cerebellum
5. Which method of probing the brain produces actual pictures of
the brain’s inner workings?
a. autopsies c. brain imaging
b. lesioning d. electroencephalograms
FPO
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following videos by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com). After you have
watched the videos, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 3: THE BEHAVING BRAIN

PROGRAM 4: THE RESPONSIVE BRAIN

PROGRAM 25: COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 85
10. The cerebrum
a. consists of two hemispheres connected by the corpus
callosum.
b. relays sensory impulses to the higher perceptual
centers.
c. releases seven different hormones to the pituitary gland.
d. controls temperature and blood pressure.
11. After a rod was shot through Phineas Gage’s skull, what psycho-
logical system was most strongly disrupted?
a. his emotional responses
b. his ability to sleep and wake
c. his language comprehension
d. his ability to count
12. Which of the following does not provide information about the
structure of the brain?
a. CAT c. MRI
b. EEG d. fMRI
13. Which of the following provides the highest temporal and spatial
resolution in brain imaging?
a. ERP c. PET
b. MRI d. fMRI
14. Stimuli that pass through the right eye are processed by
a. the left side of the brain.
b. the front of the brain.
c. the right side of the brain.
d. the brain stem.
15. The process of learning how to read shows that the brain is plas-
tic. What does this mean?
a. The brain is rigid in what it is designed to do.
b. Learning how to read reorganizes the brain.
c. The brain cannot be damaged simply by attempting new men-
tal feats.
d. The brain can be damaged when it attempts new mental feats.
16. If a scientist was studying the effects of endorphins on the body,
the scientist would be likely to look at a participant’s
a. memory.
b. mood.
c. ability to learn new material.
d. motivation to compete in sports.
17. What is the relationship between the results of Saul Schanberg’s
research and that of Tiffany Field?
a. Their results are contradictory.
b. The results of Schanberg’s research led to Field’s research.
c. Their results show similar phenomena in different species.
d. Their results are essentially unrelated.
18. What physical change did Mark Rosenzweig’s team note when it
studied rats raised in an enriched environment?
a. a thicker cortex
b. more neurons
c. fewer neurotransmitters
d. no physical changes were noted, only functional changes
19. A scientist who uses the methodologies of brain science to exam-
ine animal behavior in natural habitats is a
a. naturalist.
b. bioecologist.
c. neuroethologist.
d. cerebroetymologist.
20. With respect to the neurochemistry of the brain, all of these are
true, except that
a. scopolamine blocks the establishment of long-term
memories.
b. opioid peptides are naturally occurring chemicals in
the brain.
c. physostigmine is responsible for information transmission in
the perceptual pathways.
d. endorphins play a major role in pleasure and pain
experiences.

Sensation and Perception3
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
3.1 How Does Stimulation Become
Sensation?
Transduction: Changing Stimulation to
Sensation
Thresholds: The Boundaries of Sensation
Signal Detection Theory
The brain senses the world indirectly
because the sense organs convert
stimulation into the language of the
nervous system: neural messages.
Sensory Adaptation
We get used to all but the most
extreme or obnoxious stimuli because
our senses are built to tell us about
change.
3.2 How Are the Senses Alike?
How Are They Different?
Vision: How the Nervous System Processes
Light
Hearing: If a Tree Falls in the Forest . . .
How the Other Senses Are Like Vision and
Hearing
Synesthesia: Sensations across the Senses
The senses all operate in much the
same way, but each extracts different
information and sends it to its own
specialized processing region in the
brain.
The Experience of Pain
Pain is more than just a stimulus;
it is an experience that varies from
person to person. Pain control methods
include drugs, hypnosis, and—for
some—placebos.
Perception brings meaning to
sensation, so perception produces
an interpretation of the world, not a
perfect representation of it.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
Don’t set aside a certain amount of
time for studying. Instead, study for
the Gestalt.
CHAPTER PROBLEM Is there any way to tell whether the world we “see” in our minds is the same
as the external world—and whether we see things as most others do?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Subliminal Perception and Subliminal Persuasion
3.3 What Is the Relationship between
Sensation and Perception?
Perceptual Processing: Finding Meaning
in Sensation
Perceptual Ambiguity and Distortion
Theoretical Explanations for Perception
Seeing and Believing

87
C AN YOU IMAGINE WHAT YOUR WORLD WOULD BE LIKE IF YOU COULD NO LONGER see colors—but merely black, white, and gray? Such a bizarre sensory loss befell Jonathan I., a 65-year-old New Yorker, following an automobile accident. Details of his case appear in neurologist Oliver Sacks’s 1995 book, An Anthropologist on Mars.
The accident caused damage to a region in Jonathan’s brain that processes color in-
formation. At first, he also experienced amnesia for reading letters of the alphabet, which
all seemed like a jumble of nonsensical markings. But, after five days, his inability to read
disappeared. His loss of color vision, however, persisted as a permanent condition, known
as cerebral achromatopsia (pronounced ay-kroma-TOP-see-a). Curiously, Jonathan also lost
his memory for colors: He could no longer imagine, for instance, what “red” once looked like.
As you might expect, Jonathan became depressed by this turn in his life. And the prob-
lem was aggravated by his occupation. You see, Jonathan was a painter who had based his
livelihood on representing his visual images of the world in vivid colors. Now this whole world
of color was gone. Everything was drab—all “molded in lead.” When he looked at his own
paintings now, paintings that had seemed bursting with special meaning and emotional as-
sociations, all he could see were unfamiliar and meaningless objects on canvas.
Still, Jonathan’s story has a more or less happy ending, one that reveals much about the
resilience of the human spirit. Jonathan became a “night person,” traveling and working at
night and socializing with other night people. (As we will see in this chapter, good color vision
depends on bright illumination such as daylight; most people’s color vision is not as acute in
the dark of night.) He also became aware that what remained of his vision was remarkably

88 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
good, enabling him to read license plates from four blocks away at night. Jonathan began to
reinterpret his “loss” as a “gift” in which he was no longer distracted by color so that he could
now focus his work more intensely on shape, form, and content. Finally, he switched to painting
only in black and white. Critics acclaimed his “new phase” as a success. He has also become a
skilled sculptor, which he had never attempted before his accident. So, as Jonathan’s world of
color died, a new world of “pure forms” was born in his perception of the people, objects, and
events in his environment.
What lessons can we learn from Jonathan’s experience? His unusual sensory loss tells
us that our picture of the world around us depends on an elaborate sensory system that
processes incoming information. In other words, we don’t experience the world directly, but
instead through a series of “filters” that we call our senses. By examining such cases of sen-
sory loss, psychologists have learned much about how the sensory processing system works.
And, on a more personal level, case studies like Jonathan’s allow us momentarily to slip
outside our own experience to see more clearly how resilient humans can be in the face of
catastrophic loss.
But Jonathan’s case also raises some deeper issues. Many conditions can produce the
inability to see colors: abnormalities in the eyes, the optic nerve, or the brain can interfere
with vision and, specifically, with the ability to see colors, as Jonathan’s case illustrates. But
do colors exist in the world outside us—or is it possible that color is a creation of our brains?
At first, such a question may seem absurd. But let’s look a little deeper. Yes, we will argue
that color—and, in fact, all sensation—is a creation of the brain. But perhaps the more profound
issue is this:
PROBLEM: Is there any way to tell whether the world we “see” in our minds is the same
as the external world—and whether we see things as most others do?
This chapter will show you how psychologists have addressed such questions. The chapter
also takes us the next logical step beyond our introduction to the brain to a consideration
of how information from the outside world gets into the brain and how the brain makes
sense of it.
Although the very private processes that connect us with the outside world extend
deep into the brain, we will begin our chapter at the surface—at the sense organs. This
is the territory of sensory psychology. We will define sensation simply as the process
by which a stimulated receptor (such as the eyes or ears) creates a pattern of neural
messages that represent the stimulus in the brain, giving rise to our initial experience
of the stimulus. An important idea to remember is that sensation involves converting
stimulation (such as a pinprick, a sound, or a flash of light) into a form the brain can
understand (neural signals)—much as a cell phone converts an electronic signal into
sound waves you can hear.
Psychologists who study sensation do so primarily from a biological perspective.
As you will see, they have found that all our sense organs are, in some very basic
ways, much alike. All the sense organs transform physical stimulation (such as light
waves or sound waves) into the neural impulses that give us sensations (such as the
experience of light or sound). In this chapter, you will also learn about the biological
and psychological bases for color, odor, sound, texture, and taste. By the end of our
excursion, you will know why tomatoes and limes have different hues, why a pinprick
feels different from a caress, and why seeing doesn’t always give us an accurate basis
for believing.
Happily, under most conditions, our sensory experience is highly reliable. So
when you catch sight of a friend, the sensation usually registers clearly, immediately,
sensation The process by which stimulation of
a sensory receptor produces neural impulses that the
brain interprets as a sound, a visual image, an odor, a
taste, a pain, or other sensory image. Sensation repre-
sents the first series of steps in processing of incoming
information.
Psychologists study sensation primarily
from a biological perspective.

How Does Stimulation Become Sensation? 89
and accurately. Yet, we humans do have our sensory limitations—just as
other creatures do. In fact, we lack the acute senses so remarkable in many
other species: the vision of hawks, the hearing of bats, the sense of smell of
rodents, or the sensitivity to magnetic fields found in migratory birds. So
do we humans excel at anything? Yes. Our species has evolved the sensory
equipment that enables us to process a wider range and variety of sensory
input than any other.
But sensation is only half the story. Our ultimate destination in this chap-
ter lies, beyond mere sensation, in the amazing realm of perception. There
we will uncover the psychological processes that attach meaning and per-
sonal significance to the sensory messages entering our brains. Perceptual
psychology will help you understand how we assemble a series of tones into
a familiar melody or a collage of shapes and shadings into a familiar face.
More generally, we will define perception as a mental process that elaborates
and assigns meaning to the incoming sensory patterns. Thus, perception cre-
ates an interpretation of sensation. Perception gives answers to such ques-
tions as: What do I see—a tomato? Is the sound I hear a church bell or a doorbell?
Does the face belong to someone I know? Until quite recently, the study of per-
ception was primarily the province of psychologists using the cognitive perspective.
Now that brain scans have opened new “windows” on perceptual processes in the
brain, neuroscientists have joined them in the quest to find biological explanations
for perception.
As you can see, the boundary of sensation blurs into that of perception. Percep-
tion is essentially an interpretation and elaboration of sensation. Seen in these terms,
sensation refers just to the initial steps in the processing of a stimulus. It is to these
first sensory steps that we now turn our attention.
3.1 KEY QUESTION
How Does Stimulation Become Sensation?
A thunderstorm is approaching, and you feel the electric charge in the air make the
hair stand up on your neck. Lightning flashes, and a split second later, you hear the
thunderclap. It was close by, and you smell the ozone left in the wake of the bolt as it
sizzled through the air. Your senses are warning you of danger.
Our senses have other adaptive functions, too. They aid our survival by direct-
ing us toward certain stimuli, such as tasty foods, which provide nourishment. Our
senses also help us locate mates, seek shelter, and recognize our friends. Incidentally,
our senses also give us the opportunity to find pleasure in music, art, athletics, food,
and sex.
How do our senses accomplish all this? The complete answer is complex, but it
involves one elegantly simple idea that applies across the sensory landscape: Our sen-
sory impressions of the world involve neural representations of stimuli—not the actual
stimuli themselves. The Core Concept puts it this way:
Core Concept 3.1
The brain senses the world indirectly because the sense organs
convert stimulation into the language of the nervous system: neural
messages.
The brain never receives stimulation directly from the outside world. Its experience
of a tomato is not the same as the tomato itself—although we usually assume that
the two are identical. Neither can the brain receive light from a sunset, reach out and
touch velvet, or inhale the fragrance of a rose. It must always rely on secondhand
perception A process that makes sensory patterns
meaningful. It is perception that makes these words
meaningful, rather than just a string of visual patterns.
To make this happen, perception draws heavily on
memory, motivation, emotion, and other psychological
processes.
Human senses do not detect the earth’s magnetic
fields that migratory birds use for navigation.
Until recently, psychologists studied
perception primarily from a cognitive
perspective.

90 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
information from the go-between sensory system, which delivers only a coded neural
message, out of which the brain must create its own experience (see Figure 3.1). Just
as you cannot receive phone messages without a telephone receiver to convert the
electronic energy into sound you can hear, your brain also needs its sensory system to
convert the stimuli from the outside world into neural signals that it can comprehend.
To understand more deeply how the world’s stimulation becomes the brain’s sensa-
tion, we need to think about three attributes common to all the senses: transduction,
sensory adaptation, and thresholds. They determine which stimuli will actually be-
come sensation, what the quality and impact of that sensation will be, and whether it
grabs our interest. These attributes determine, for example, whether a tomato actually
registers in the sensory system strongly enough to enter our awareness, what its color
and form appear to be, and how strongly it bids for our attention.
Transduction: Changing Stimulation to Sensation
It may seem incredible that basic sensations, such as the redness and flavor of our
tomato—or the colors Jonathan could see before his accident—are entirely creations
of the sense organs and brain. But remember that all sensory communication with the
brain flows through neurons in the form of neural signals: Neurons cannot transmit
light or sound waves or any other external stimulus. Accordingly, none of the light
bouncing off the tomato ever actually reaches the brain. In fact, incoming light only
travels as far as the back of the eyes. There the information it contains is converted to
neural messages. Likewise, the chemicals that signal taste make their way only as far as
the tongue, not all the way to the brain.
In all the sense organs, it is the job of the sensory receptors, such as the eyes and
ears, to convert incoming stimulus information into electrochemical signals—neural
activity—the only language the brain understands. As Jonathan I.’s case suggests,
sensations, such as “red” or “sweet” or “cold,” occur only when the neural signal
reaches the cerebral cortex. The whole process seems so immediate and direct that
it fools us into assuming that the sensation of redness is characteristic of a tomato
or the sensation of cold is a characteristic of ice cream. But they are not! (You can
discover how light is not necessary for sensations of light with the demonstration in
the Do It Yourself! box, “Phosphenes Show That Your Brain Creates Sensations.”)
Psychologists use the term transduction for the sensory process that converts the
information carried by a physical stimulus, such as light or sound waves, into the form
of neural messages. Transduction begins when a sensory neuron detects a physical
stimulus (such as the sound wave made by a vibrating guitar string). When the appro-
priate stimulus reaches a sense organ, it activates specialized neurons, called receptors,
that respond by converting their excitation into a nerve signal. This happens in much
the same way that a bar-code reader (which is, after all, merely an electronic receptor)
converts the series of lines on a frozen pizza box into an electronic signal that a com-
puter can match with a price.
In our own sensory system, neural impulses carry the codes of sensory events in a
form that can be further processed by the brain. To get to its destination, this information-
carrying signal travels from the receptor cells along a sensory pathway—usually by way
transduction Transformation of one form of in-
formation into another—especially the transformation
of stimulus information into nerve signals by the sense
organs. As a result of transduction, the brain interprets
the incoming light waves from a ripe tomato as red.
FIGURE 3.1
Stimulation Becomes Perception
For visual stimulation to become mean-
ingful perception, it must undergo several
transformations. First, physical stimula-
tion (light waves from the butterfly) is
transduced by the eye, where informa-
tion about the wavelength and intensity
of the light is coded into neural signals.
Second, the neural messages travel to the
sensory cortex of the brain, where they
become sensations of color, brightness,
form, and movement. Finally, the process
of perception interprets these sensations
by making connections with memories,
expectations, emotions, and motives in
other parts of the brain. Similar processes
operate on the information taken in by
the other senses.
Stimulation Transduction Sensation
Neural signalsLight waves
Perception

How Does Stimulation Become Sensation? 91
of the thalamus and on to specialized sensory processing areas in the brain. From the
coded neural impulses arriving from these pathways, the brain then extracts information
about the basic qualities of the stimulus, such as its intensity and direction. Please keep
in mind, however, that the stimulus itself terminates in the receptor: The only thing that
flows into the nervous system is information carried by the neural impulse.
Let’s return now to the problem we set out at the beginning of the chapter: How
could we tell whether the world we “see” in our minds is the same as the external
world—and whether we see the world as others do? The idea of transduction gives us
part of the answer. Because we do not see (or hear, or smell . . .) the external world di-
rectly, what we sense is an electrochemical rendition of the world created by the sen-
sory receptors and the brain. To give an analogy: Just as digital photography changes
a scene first into electronic signals and then into drops of ink on a piece of paper, so
the process of sensation changes the world into a pattern of neural impulses realized
in the brain.
Thresholds: The Boundaries of Sensation
What is the weakest stimulus an organism can detect? How dim can a light be and still
be visible? How soft can music be and still be heard? These questions refer to the absolute
threshold for different types of stimulation, which is the minimum amount of physical
energy needed to produce a sensory experience. In the laboratory, a psychologist would
define this operationally as the intensity at which the stimulus is detected accurately half
of the time over many trials. This threshold will also vary from one person to another. So
if you point out a faint star to a friend who says he cannot see it, the star’s light is above
your absolute threshold (you can see it) but below that of your friend (who cannot).
A faint stimulus does not abruptly become detectable as its intensity increases. Be-
cause of the fuzzy boundary between detection and nondetection, a person’s absolute
threshold is not absolute! In fact, it varies continually with our mental alertness and
physical condition. Experiments designed to determine thresholds for various types of
stimulation were among the earliest studies done by psychologists—who called this
line of inquiry psychophysics. Table 3.1 shows some typical absolute threshold levels
for several familiar natural stimuli.
We can illustrate another kind of threshold with the following imaginary experi-
ment. Suppose you are relaxing by watching television on the one night you don’t need
absolute threshold The amount of stimulation
necessary for a stimulus to be detected. In practice,
this means that the presence or absence of a stimulus
is detected correctly half the time over many trials.
PHOSPHENES SHOW THAT YOUR BRAIN CREATES SENSATIONS
One of the simplest concepts in perceptual
psychology is among the most difficult for
most people to grasp: The brain and its
sensory systems create the colors, sounds,
tastes, odors, textures, and pains that you
sense. You can demonstrate this to yourself
in the following way.
Close your eyes and press gently with
your finger on the inside corner of one eye.
On the opposite side of your visual field, you
will “see” a pattern caused by the pressure of
your finger—not by light. These light sensa-
tions are phosphenes, visual images caused
by fooling your visual system with pressure,
which stimulates the optic nerve in much
the same way light does. Direct electrical
stimulation of the occipital lobe, sometimes
done during brain surgery, can have the same
effect. This shows that light waves are not
absolutely necessary for the sensation of light.
The sensory experience of light, therefore,
must be a creation of the brain rather than a
property of objects in the external world.
Phosphenes may have some practical
value, too. Several laboratories are work-
ing on ways to use phosphenes, created by
stimulation sent from a TV camera to the
occipital cortex to create visual sensations for
people who have lost their sight (Wickelgren,
2006). Another promising approach under
development involves replacing a section
of the retina with an electronic microchip
(Boahen, 2005; Liu et al., 2000). We hasten
to add, however, that this technology is in its
infancy (Cohen, 2002; U.S. Department of
Energy Office of Science, 2011).
sensation of light
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
An operational definition describes
a concept in terms of the
operations required to produce,
observe, or measure it (p. 24).

92 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
to study, while a roommate busily prepares for an early morning exam. Your room-
mate asks you to “turn it down a little” to eliminate the distraction. You feel that you
should make some effort to comply but really wish to leave the volume as it is. What
is the least amount you can lower the volume to prove your good intentions to your
roommate while still keeping the sound clearly audible? Your ability to make judg-
ments like this one depends on your difference threshold (also called the just noticeable
difference or JND), the smallest physical difference between two stimuli that a person
can reliably detect 50 percent of the time.
If you turn down the volume as little as possible, your roommate might complain,
“I don’t hear any difference.” By this, your roommate probably means that the change
in volume does not match his or her difference threshold. By gradually lowering the
volume until your roommate says “when,” you will be able to find the difference
threshold that keeps the peace in your relationship.
Investigation of the difference thresholds across the senses has yielded some inter-
esting insights into how human stimulus detection works. It turns out that the JND is
always large when the stimulus intensity is high and small when the stimulus intensity
is low. Psychologists refer to this idea—that the size of the JND is proportional to the
intensity of the stimulus—as Weber’s law. And what does Weber’s law tell us about ad-
justing the TV volume? If you have the volume turned up very high, you will have to
turn it down a lot to make the difference noticeable. On the other hand, if you already
have the volume set to a very low level, a small adjustment will probably be noticeable
enough for your roommate. The same principle operates across all our senses. Know-
ing this, you might guess that a weight lifter would notice the difference when small
amounts are added to light weights, but it would take a much larger addition to be
noticeable with heavy weights.
What does all this mean for our understanding of human sensation? The general
principle is this: We are built to detect changes in stimulation and relationships among
stimuli. You can see how this works in the box, Do It Yourself! An Enlightening Dem-
onstration of Sensory Relationships.
difference threshold The smallest amount by
which a stimulus can be changed and the difference be
detected half the time.
Weber’s law The concept that the size of a JND
is proportional to the intensity of the stimulus; the JND
is large when the stimulus intensity is high and small
when the stimulus intensity is low.
AN ENLIGHTENING DEMONSTRATION OF SENSORY RELATIONSHIPS
In this simple demonstration, you will see
how detection of change in brightness is
relative, not absolute. Find a three-way
lamp equipped with a bulb having equal
wattage increments, such as a 50-100-
150-watt bulb. (Wattage is closely related
to brightness.) Then, in a dark room, switch
the light on to 50 watts, which will seem
like a huge increase in brightness relative
to the dark. Next, turn the switch to change
from 50 to 100 watts: This will also seem
like a large increase—but not so much as it
did when you originally turned on the light
in the dark. Finally, switch from 100 to
150 watts. Why does this last 50-watt in-
crease, from 100 to 150 watts, appear only
slightly brighter?
Your visual system does not give you
an absolute sensation of brightness; rather,
it provides information about the relative
change. That is, it compares the stimulus
change to the background stimulation,
translating the jump from 100 to 150
watts as a mere 50 percent increase (50
watts added to 100) compared to the ear-
lier 100 percent increase (50 watts added
to 50). This illustrates how your visual
system computes sensory relationships
rather than absolutes—and it is essentially
the same with your other senses.
TABLE 3.1 Approximate Sensory Thresholds of Five Senses
Sense Detection Threshold
Sight A candle flame at 30 miles on a clear, dark night
Hearing The tick of a watch 20 feet away in a quiet room
Smell One drop of perfume diffused throughout a three-room apartment
Taste One teaspoon of sugar in 2 gallons of water
Touch A bee’s wing falling on the cheek from 1 centimeter above

How Does Stimulation Become Sensation? 93
Signal Detection Theory
A deeper understanding of absolute and difference thresholds comes from signal detec-
tion theory (Green & Swets, 1966). Originally developed for engineering electronic
sensors, signal detection theory uses the same concepts to explain both the electronic
sensing of stimuli by devices, such as your TV set, and by the human senses, such as
vision and hearing.
According to signal detection theory, sensation depends on the characteristics of the
stimulus, the background stimulation, and the detector. Thus, how well you receive a
stimulus, such as a professor’s lecture, depends on the presence of competing stimuli
in the background—the clacking keys of a nearby laptop or intrusive fantasies about a
classmate. It will also depend on the condition of your “detector”—your brain—and,
perhaps, whether it has been aroused by a strong cup of coffee or dulled by drugs or
lack of sleep.
Signal detection theory also helps us understand why thresholds vary—why, for
example, you might notice a certain sound one time and not the next. The clas-
sical theory of thresholds ignored the effects of the perceiver’s physical condition,
judgments, or biases. Thus, in classical psychophysics (as the study of stimulation,
thresholds, and sensory experience was called before signal-detection theory
came along), if a signal were intense enough to exceed one’s absolute thresh-
old, it would be sensed; if below the threshold, it would be missed. In the
view of modern signal detection theory, sensation is not a simple yes-or-no
experience but a probability that the signal will be detected and processed
accurately.
So, what does signal detection theory offer psychology that was missing
in classical psychophysics? One factor is the variability in human judgment.
Another involves the conditions in which the signal occurs. Signal detec-
tion theory recognizes that the observer, whose physical and mental status
is always in flux, must compare a sensory experience with ever-changing
expectations and biological conditions. When something “goes bump in the
night” after you have gone to bed, you must decide whether it is the cat,
an intruder, or just your imagination. But what you decide it is depends on
factors such as the keenness of your hearing and what you expect to hear, as well
as other noises in the background. By taking into account the variable conditions
that affect detection of a stimulus, signal detection theory provides a more accurate
portrayal of sensation than did classical psychophysics.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Sensory Adaptation
If you have ever jumped into a cool pool on a hot day, you know that sensation is criti-
cally influenced by change. In fact, a main role of our stimulus detectors is to announce
changes in the external world—a flash of light, a splash of water, a clap of thunder,
the approach of a lion, the prick of a pin, or the burst of flavor from a dollop of salsa.
Thus, our sense organs are change detectors. Their receptors specialize in gathering
information about new and changing events.
The great quantity of incoming sensation would quickly overwhelm us, if not for
the ability of our sensory systems to adapt. Sensory adaptation is the diminishing re-
sponsiveness of sensory systems to prolonged stimulation, as when you adapt to the
feel of swimming in cool water. In fact, any unchanging stimulation usually shifts into
the background of our awareness unless it is quite intense or painful. On the other
hand, any change in stimulation (as when a doorbell rings) will immediately draw
your attention.
Incidentally, sensory adaptation accounts for the background music often played
in stores being so forgettable: It has been deliberately selected and filtered to remove
signal detection theory Explains how we de-
tect “signals,” consisting of stimulation affecting our
eyes, ears, nose, skin, and other sense organs. Signal
detection theory says that sensation is a judgment the
sensory system makes about incoming stimulation.
Often, it occurs outside of consciousness. In contrast
to older theories from psychophysics, signal detection
theory takes observer characteristics into account.
sensory adaptation Loss of responsiveness
in receptor cells after stimulation has remained
unchanged for a while, as when a swimmer becomes
adapted to the temperature of the water.
Signal detection theory says that the
background stimulation would make it
less likely for you to hear someone call-
ing your name on a busy downtown street
than in a quiet park.

94 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
3.2 KEY QUESTION
How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different?
Vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch, pain, body position: In certain ways, all these
senses are the same. We have seen that they all transduce stimulus energy into neural
impulses. They are all more sensitive to change than to constant stimulation. And they
all provide us information about the world—information that has survival value. But
how are they different? With the exception of pain, each sense taps a different form of
stimulus energy, and each sends the information it extracts to a different part of the
brain. These contrasting ideas lead us to the Core Concept of this section:
Core Concept 3.2
The senses all operate in much the same way, but each extracts
different information and sends it to its own specialized processing
region in the brain.
As a result, different sensations occur because different areas of the brain become
activated. Whether you hear a bell or see a bell depends ultimately on which part of the brain
receives stimulation. We will explore how this all works by looking at each of the senses
in turn. First, we will explore the visual system—the best understood of the senses—to
discover how it transduces light waves into visual sensations of color and brightness.
Vision: How the Nervous System Processes Light
Animals with good vision have an enormous biological advantage. This fact has
exerted evolutionary pressure to make vision the most complex, best-developed, and
important sense for humans and most other highly mobile creatures. Good vision helps
us detect desired targets, threats, and changes in our physical environment and to
adapt our behavior accordingly. So, how does the visual system accomplish this?
any large changes in volume or pitch that might distract attention from the mer-
chandise. (On the other hand, do you see why it’s not a good idea to listen to your
favorite music while studying?)
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: The sensory pathways carry information from
to .
2. RECALL: Why do sensory psychologists use the standard of the
amount of stimulation that your sensory system can detect about
half the time for identifying the absolute threshold?
3. APPLICATION: Which one would involve sensory adaptation?
a. The odor of food cooking is more noticeable when you enter the
house than after you have been there a while.
b. The flavor of a spicy salsa on your taco seems hot by comparison
with the blandness of the sour cream.
c. You are unaware of a stimulus flashed on the screen at 1/100 of
a second.
d. You prefer the feel of silk to the feel of velvet.
4. RECALL: What is the psychological process that adds meaning to
information obtained by the sensory system?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Use the concept
of transduction to explain why the brain never directly senses the
outside world.
Answers 1. The sense organs; the brain. 2. The amount of stimulation that we can detect is not fixed. Rather, it varies depending on ever-changing
factors such as our level of arousal, distractions, fatigue, and motivation. 3. a 4. Perception 5. The senses transduce stimulation from the external
world into the form of neural impulses, which is the only form of information that the brain can use. Therefore, the brain does not deal directly with
light, sound, odors, and other stimuli but only with information that has been changed (transduced) into neural messages.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 95
The Anatomy of Visual Sensation You might think of the eye as a sort of “video
camera” that the brain uses to make motion pictures of the world (see Figure 3.2). Like
a camera, the eye gathers light through a lens, focuses it, and forms an image in the ret-
ina at the back of the eye. The lens, incidentally, turns the image left to right and upside
down. (Because vision is so important, this visual reversal may have influenced the very
structure of the brain, which, you will remember, tends to maintain this reversal in its
sensory processing regions. Thus, most information from the sense organs crosses over
to the opposite side of the brain. Likewise, “maps” of the body in the brain’s sensory
areas are typically reversed and inverted.)
But while a digital camera simply forms an electronic image, the eye forms an image
that gets extensive further processing in the brain. The unique characteristic of the
eye—what makes the eye different from other sense organs—lies in its ability to extract
the information from light waves, which are simply a form of electromagnetic energy.
The eye, then, transduces the characteristics of light into neural signals that the brain
can process. This transduction happens in the retina, the light-sensitive layer of cells at
the back of the eye that acts much like the light-sensitive chip in a digital camera.
And, as with a camera, things can go wrong. For example, the lenses of those who
are “nearsighted” focus images short of (in front of) the retina; in those who are “far-
sighted,” the focal point extends behind the retina. Either way, images are not sharp
without corrective lenses.
The real work in the retina is performed by light-sensitive cells known as photo-
receptors, which operate much like the tiny pixel receptors in a digital camera. These
photoreceptors consist of two different types of specialized neurons—the rods and
cones that absorb light energy and respond by creating neural impulses (see Figure 3.3).
But why are there two sorts of photoreceptors?
Because we function sometimes in near darkness and sometimes in bright light, we
have evolved two types of processors involving two distinct receptor cell types named
for their shapes. The 125 million tiny rods “see in the dark”—that is, they detect low
retina The thin light-sensitive layer at the back of
the eyeball. The retina contains millions of photorecep-
tors and other nerve cells.
photoreceptors Light-sensitive cells (neurons) in
the retina that convert light energy to neural impulses.
The photoreceptors are as far as light gets into the
visual system.
rods Photoreceptors in the retina that are especially
sensitive to dim light but not to colors. Strange as it
may seem, they are rod-shaped.
Fluid (aqueous humor)
Muscle
(for focusing lens) Optic nerve
Blood vessels
Blind spot
Fovea
Retina
Fluid (vitreous humor)
Muscle (for turning eye)
Iris
Lens
Pupil
Cornea
FIGURE 3.2
Structures of the Human Eye

96 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
intensities of light at night, though they cannot make the fine distinctions that give
rise to our sensations of color. Rod cells enable you to find a seat in a darkened movie
theater.
Making the fine distinctions necessary for color vision is the job of the seven mil-
lion cones that come into play in brighter light. Each cone is specialized to detect the
light waves we sense either as blue, red, or green. In good light, then, we can use these
cones to distinguish ripe tomatoes (sensed as red) from unripe ones (sensed as green).
The cones concentrate in the very center of the retina, in a small region called the fovea,
which gives us our sharpest vision. With movements of our eyeballs, we use the fovea
to scan whatever interests us visually—the features of a face or, perhaps, a flower.
There are other types of cells in the retina that do not respond directly to light. The
bipolar cells handle the job of collecting impulses from many photoreceptors (rods and
cones) and shuttling them on to the ganglion cells, much as an airline hub collects pas-
sengers from many regional airports and shuttles them on to other destinations. The
retina also contains receptor cells sensitive to edges and boundaries of objects; other
cells respond to light and shadow and motion (Werblin & Roska, 2007).
Bundled together, the axons of the ganglion cells make up the optic nerve, which
transports visual information from the eye to the brain (refer to Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
Again, it is important to understand that the optic nerve carries no light—only patterns
of nerve impulses conveying information derived from the incoming light.
Just as strangely, there is a small area of the retina in each eye where everyone is
blind, because that part of the retina has no photoreceptors. This blind spot is located
at the point where the optic nerve exits each eye, and the result is a gap in the visual
field. You do not experience blindness there because what one eye misses is registered
by the other eye, and the brain “fills in” the spot with information that matches the
background. You can find your own blind spot by following the instructions in the Do
It Yourself! box.
We should clarify that the visual impairment we call blindness can have many
causes, which are usually unrelated to the blind spot. Blindness can result, for example,
from damage to the retina, cataracts that make the lens opaque, damage to the optic
nerve, or from damage to the visual processing areas in the brain.
cones Photoreceptors in the retina that are
especially sensitive to colors but not to dim light. You
may have guessed that the cones are cone-shaped.
fovea The tiny area of sharpest vision in the retina.
optic nerve The bundle of neurons that carries
visual information from the retina to the brain.
blind spot The point where the optic nerve exits
the eye and where there are no photoreceptors. Any
stimulus that falls on this area cannot be seen.
FIGURE 3.3
Transduction of Light in the Retina
This simplified diagram shows the path-
ways that connect three layers of nerve
cells in the retina. Incoming light passes
through the ganglion cells and bipolar
cells first before striking the photorecep-
tors at the back of the eyeball. Once stim-
ulated, the rods and cones then transmit
information to the bipolar cells (note that
one bipolar cell combines information
from several receptor cells). The bipolar
cells then transmit neural impulses to the
ganglion cells. Impulses travel from the
ganglia to the brain via axons that make
up the optic nerve.
Ba
ck
o
f r
et
in
a
Eyeball
Area enlarged
Optic nerve
Outgoing nerve
impulse to cortex
Rod and cone cells
Gan
glio
n
cell
s
Bip
ola
r
cell
s
Incoming
light stimulus

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 97
Processing Visual Sensation in the Brain We look with our eyes, but we see with
the brain. That is, a special brain area called the visual cortex creates visual images
from the information imported from the eyes through the optic nerve (see Figure
3.4). There in the visual cortex, the brain begins working its magic by transforming
the incoming neural impulses into visual sensations of color, form, boundary, and
FIND YOUR BLIND SPOT
The “blind spot” occurs at the place on the
retina where the neurons from the retina
bunch together to exit the eyeball and form
the optic nerve. There are no light-sensitive
cells at this point on the retina. Conse-
quently, you are “blind” in this small region
of your visual field. The following demon-
strations will help you determine where this
blind spot occurs in your visual field.
Demonstration 1
Hold the text at arm’s length, close your
right eye, and fix your left eye on the
“bank” figure. Keep your right eye closed
and bring the book slowly closer. When
it is about 10 to 12 inches away and the
dollar sign is in your blind spot, the dollar
sign will disappear—but you will not see a
“hole” in your visual field. Instead, your vi-
sual system “fills in” the missing area with
information from the white background. You
have “lost” your money!
Demonstration 2
To convince yourself that the brain fills in
the missing part of the visual field with ap-
propriate background, close your right eye
again and focus on the cross in the lower
part of the figure. Once again, keeping the
right eye closed, bring the book closer to you
as you focus your left eye on the cross. This
time, the gap in the line will disappear and
will be filled in with a continuation of the
line on either side. This shows that what you
see in your blind spot may not really exist!
Bank
$
FIGURE 3.4
How Visual Stimulation Goes
from the Eyes to the Brain
Light from objects in the visual field
projects images on the retinas of the
eyes. Please note two important things.
First, the lens of the eye reverses the
image on the retina—so the image of the
man falls on the right side of the retina,
and the image of the woman falls on the
left. Second, the visual system splits the
retinal image coming from each eye so
that part of the image coming from each
eye crosses over to the opposite side of
the brain. (Note how branches of the op-
tic pathway cross at the optic chiasma.)
As a result, objects appearing in the left
part of the visual field of both eyes (the
man, in this diagram) are sent to the right
hemisphere’s visual cortex for process-
ing, while objects in the right side of the
visual field of both eyes (the woman, in
this diagram) are sent to the left visual
cortex. In general, the right hemisphere
“sees” the left visual field, while the left
hemisphere “sees” the right visual field.
Source: Frisby, J. P. (1980). Seeing: Illusion, brain
and mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Copyright © 1979. Reprinted by permission of
J. P. Frisby.
Retinal image
Left eye Right eye
Optic nerve
(from eye to brain)
Optic chiasma
Lateral geniculate
nucleus (left)
Visual
association
cortex
Primary visual cortex
Optic tract

98 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
movement. Amazingly, the visual cortex also manages to take the two-dimensional
patterns from each eye and assemble them into our three- dimensional world of depth
(Barinaga, 1998; Dobbins et al., 1998). With further processing, the cortex ultimately
combines these visual sensations with memories, motives, emotions, and sensations
of body position and touch to create a representation of the visual world that fits our
current concerns and interests (de Gelder, 2000; Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009). These
associations explain why, for example, you feel so strongly attracted by displays of
appetizing foods if you go grocery shopping when you are hungry.
Let’s return for a moment to the chapter problem and to the question, Do we
“see” the world as others do? As far as sensation is concerned, we will find that
the answer is a qualified “yes.” That is, different people have essentially the same
sensory apparatus (with the exceptions of a few individuals who, like Jonathan,
cannot distinguish colors or who have other sensory deficits). Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to assume that most people sense colors, sounds, textures, odors, and tastes
in much the same way—although, as we will see, they do not necessarily perceive
them in the same way. To see what we mean, let’s start with the visual sensation of
brightness.
How the Visual System Creates Brightness Sensations of brightness come from the intensity
or amplitude of light, determined by how much light reaches the retina (see Table 3.2).
Bright light, as from the sun, involves a more intense light wave, which creates much
neural activity in the retina, while relatively dim light, as from the moon, produces rela-
tively little retinal activity. Ultimately, the brain senses brightness by the volume of neural
activity it receives from the eyes.
How the Visual System Creates Color You may have been surprised to learn that a flower
or a ripe tomato, itself, has no color, or hue. Physical objects seen in bright light seem
to have the marvelous property of being awash with color; but, as we have noted, the
red tomatoes, yellow flowers, green trees, blue oceans, and multihued rainbows are, in
themselves, actually quite colorless. Nor does the light reflected from these objects have
color. Despite the way the world appears to us, color does not exist outside the brain
because color is a sensation that the brain creates based on the wavelength of light
striking our eyes. Thus, color exists only in the mind of the viewer—a psychological
property of our sensory experience. To understand more fully how this happens, you
must first know something of the nature of light.
The eyes detect the special form of energy that we call visible light. Physicists tell us
that this light is pure energy—fundamentally the same as radio waves, microwaves, infra-
red light, ultraviolet light, X-rays, and cosmic rays. All are forms of electromagnetic energy.
These waves differ in their wavelength (the distance they travel in making one wave cycle)
as they vibrate in space, like ripples on a pond (see Figure 3.5). The light we see occupies
but a tiny segment somewhere near the middle of the vast electromagnetic spectrum. Our
only access to this electromagnetic spectrum lies through a small visual “window” called
the visible spectrum. Because we have no biological receptors sensitive to the other portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum, we must detect these waves through devices, such as ra-
dios and TVs, that convert the energy into signals we can use.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Note that part of the visual
pathway of each eye crosses over
to the cortex on the opposite side
of the brain. This produced some
of the bizarre responses that we
saw in the tests of split-brain
patients (p. 75).
brightness A psychological sensation caused by
the intensity (amplitude) of light waves.
color Also called hue. Color is not a property of
things in the external world. Rather, it is a psychologi-
cal sensation created in the brain from information ob-
tained by the eyes from the wavelengths of visible light.
electromagnetic spectrum The entire range
of electromagnetic energy, including radio waves,
X-rays, microwaves, and visible light.
visible spectrum The tiny part of the electro-
magnetic spectrum to which our eyes are sensitive.
The visible spectrum of other creatures may be slightly
different from our own.
TABLE 3.2 Visual Stimulation Becomes Sensation
Color and brightness are the psychological counterparts of the
wavelength and intensity of a light wave. Wavelength and intensity
are physical characteristics of light waves, while color and brightness
are psychological characteristics that exist only in the brain.
Physical Stimulation Psychological Sensation
Wavelength Color
Intensity (amplitude) Brightness

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 99
Within the narrow visible spectrum, light waves of different wavelengths give rise
to our sensations of different colors. Longer waves make us see a tomato as red, and
medium-length waves give rise to the sensations of yellow and green we see in lem-
ons and limes. The shorter waves from a clear sky stimulate sensations of blue. Thus,
the eye extracts information from the wavelength of light, and the brain uses that
information to construct the sensations we see as colors (see Table 3.2).
Remarkably, our visual experiences of color, form, position, and depth are based
on processing the stream of visual sensory information in different parts of the cor-
tex. Colors themselves are realized in a specialized area, where humans are capable
of discriminating among about five million different hues. It was damage in this
part of the cortex that shut down Jonathan’s ability to see colors. Other nearby cor-
tical areas take responsibility for processing information about boundaries, shapes,
and movements.
Two Ways of Sensing Colors Even though color is realized in the cortex, color
processing begins in the retina. There, three different types of cones sense dif-
ferent parts of the visible spectrum—light waves that we sense as red, green,
and blue. This three-receptor explanation for color vision is known as the
trichromatic theory, and for a time it was considered to account for color vision
completely. We now know that the trichromatic theory best explains the initial
stages of color vision in the cone cells.
Another explanation, called the opponent-process theory, better explains
negative afterimages (see the Do It Yourself! box), phenomena that involve
opponent, or complementary, colors. According to the opponent-process the-
ory, the visual system processes colors, from the bipolar cells onward, in com-
plementary pairs: red-green or yellow-blue. Thus, the sensation of a certain
color, such as red, inhibits, or interferes with, the sensation of its complement,
green. Taken together, the two theories explain two different aspects of color
vision involving the retina and visual pathways. While all that may sound
complicated, here is the take-home message: The trichromatic theory explains
color processing in the cones of the retina, while the opponent-process theory
explains what happens in the bipolar cells and beyond.
Color Blindness Not everyone sees colors in the same way, because some people
are born with a deficiency in distinguishing colors. The incidence varies among
trichromatic theory The idea that colors are
sensed by three different types of cones sensitive to
light in the red, blue, and green wavelengths. The
trichromatic (three-color) theory explains the earliest
stage of color sensation. In honor of its originators, this
is sometimes called the Young-Helmholtz theory.
opponent-process theory The idea that cells
in the visual system process colors in complementary
pairs, such as red or green or as yellow or blue. The
opponent-process theory explains color sensation from
the bipolar cells onward in the visual system.
afterimages Sensations that linger after the stim-
ulus is removed. Most visual afterimages are negative
afterimages, which appear in reversed colors.
The combination of any two primary colors of light
yields the complement of a third color. The com-
bination of all three wavelengths produces white
light. (The mixture of pigments, as in print, works
differently, because pigments are made to absorb
some wavelengths of light falling on them.)
FIGURE 3.5
The Electromagnetic Spectrum
The only difference between visible light
and other forms of electromagnetic en-
ergy is wavelength. The receptors in our
eyes are sensitive to only a tiny portion of
the electromagnetic spectrum.
Source: Sekuler, R., & Blake, R. (1994). Perception,
3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. Copyright © 1994.
Reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill.
Gamma
rays
Visible
light
X rays
Violet
400 500 600 700
Blue Green
Wavelength in nanometers
shorter
wavelengths
short long
longer
wavelengths
Yellow Red
Ultra-
violet
rays
Infra-
red
rays
Radar FM
radio
AM
radio
AC
circuits
Micro-
waves
TV
10-3 10-1 101 103 105 107 109 1011 1013 1015

100 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
racial groups (highest in Whites and lowest in Blacks). Overall about 8 percent of males
in the United States are affected. Women rarely have the condition.
At the extreme, complete color blindness is the total inability to distinguish col-
ors. More commonly, people merely have a color weakness that causes minor prob-
lems in distinguishing colors, especially under low-light conditions. People with one
form of color weakness can’t distinguish pale colors, such as pink or tan. Most
color weakness or blindness, however, involves a problem in distinguishing red
from green, especially at weak saturations. Those who confuse yellows and blues
are rare, about one or two people per thousand. Rarest of all are those who see no
color at all but see only variations in brightness. In fact, only about 500 cases of
this total color blindness have ever been reported—including Jonathan I., whom we
met at the beginning of this chapter. To find out whether you have a deficiency in
color vision, look at Figure 3.6. If you see the number 29 in the dot pattern, your
color vision is probably normal. If you see something else, you are probably at least
partially color blind.
Hearing: If a Tree Falls in the Forest . . .
Imagine how your world would change if your ability to hear were suddenly dimin-
ished. You would quickly realize that hearing, like vision, provides you with the abil-
ity to locate objects in space, such as the source of a voice calling your name. In fact,
hearing may be even more important than vision in orienting us toward distant events.
We often hear things, such as footsteps coming up behind us, before we see the source
of the sounds. Hearing may also tell us of events that we cannot see, including speech,
music, or an approaching car.
But there is more to hearing than its function. Accordingly, we will look a little
deeper to learn how we hear. In the next few pages, we will review what sensory psy-
chologists have discovered about how sound waves are produced, how they are sensed,
and how these sensations of sound are interpreted.
The Physics of Sound: How Sound Waves Are Produced If Hollywood gave us
an honest portrayal of exploding spaceships or planets, there would be absolutely no
sound! In space, there is no air or other medium to carry sound waves, so if you were a
witness to an exploding star, the experience would be eerily silent. On Earth, the energy
of exploding objects, such as firecrackers, transfers to the surrounding medium—usually
color blindness Typically a genetic disorder
(although sometimes the result of trauma, as in the
case of Jonathan) that prevents an individual from
discriminating certain colors. The most common form is
red–green color blindness.
THE AMAZING AFTERIMAGE
After you stare at a colored object for a
while, ganglion cells in your retina will
become fatigued, causing an interesting
visual effect. When you shift your gaze to a
blank, white surface, you can “see” the ob-
ject in complementary colors—as a visual
afterimage. The “phantom flag” demonstra-
tion will show you how this works.
Stare at the dot in the center of the
green, black, and orange flag for at least
30 seconds. Take care to hold your eyes
steady and not to let them scan over the
image during this time. Then quickly shift
your gaze to the center of a sheet of white
paper or to a light-colored blank wall. What
do you see? Have your friends try this,
too. Do they see the same afterimage?
(The effect may not be the same for
people who are color blind.)
Afterimages may be negative
or positive. Positive afterimages
are caused by a continuation of the
receptor and neural processes fol-
lowing stimulation. They are brief.
An example of positive afterimages
occurs when you see the trail of a
sparkler twirled by a Fourth of July
reveler. Negative afterimages are the
opposite or the reverse of the origi-
nal experience, as in the flag exam-
ple. They last longer. Negative afterimages
operate according to the opponent-process
theory of color vision, which involves
ganglion cells in the retina and the optic
nerve. Apparently, in a negative afterim-
age, the fatigue in these cells produces
sensations of a complementary color when
they are exposed to white light.
FIGURE 3.6
The Ishihara Color Blindness Test
Someone who cannot discriminate be-
tween red and green hues will not be
able to identify the number hidden in the
figure. What do you see? If you see the
number 29 in the dot pattern, your color
vision is probably normal.

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 101
air—in the form of sound waves. Essentially the same thing happens with rapidly vi-
brating objects, such as guitar strings, bells, and vocal cords, as the vibrations push the
molecules of air back and forth. The resulting changes in pressure spread outward in
the form of sound waves that can travel 1,100 feet per second.
The purest tones are made by a tuning fork (see Figure 3.7). When struck with
a mallet, a tuning fork produces an extremely clean sound wave that has only two
characteristics, frequency and amplitude. These are the two physical properties of any
sound wave that determine how it will be sensed by the brain. Frequency refers to the
number of vibrations or cycles the wave completes in a given amount of time, which
in turn determines the highness or lowness of a sound (the pitch). Frequency is usually
expressed in cycles per second (cps) or hertz (Hz). Amplitude measures the physical
strength of the sound wave (shown in graphs as the height of the wave); it is defined
in units of sound pressure or energy. When you turn down the volume on your music
system, you are decreasing the amplitude of the sound waves emerging from the speak-
ers or ear buds.
Sensing Sounds: How We Hear Sound Waves Much like vision, the psychological
sensation of sound requires that waves be transduced into neural impulses and sent to
the brain. This happens in four steps:
1. Airborne sound waves are relayed to the inner ear. In this initial transformation,
vibrating waves of air enter the outer ear (also called the pinna) and move
through the ear canal to the eardrum, or tympanic membrane (see Figure 3.8). This
tightly stretched sheet of tissue transmits the vibrations to three tiny bones in the
frequency The number of cycles completed by a
wave in a second.
amplitude The physical strength of a wave. This is
shown on graphs as the height of the wave.
tympanic membrane The eardrum.
FIGURE 3.7
Sound Waves
Sound waves produced by the vibration of
a tuning fork create waves of compressed
and expanded air. The pitch that we hear
depends on the frequency of the wave
(the number of cycles per second). High
pitches are the result of high-frequency
waves. The amplitude or strength of a
sound wave depends on how strongly the
air is affected by the vibrations. In this
diagram, amplitude is represented by the
height of the graph.
One cycle
Time
A
m
pl
it
ud
e
ExpansionAir: Compression
FIGURE 3.8
Structures of the Human Ear
Sound waves are channeled by the outer
ear (pinna) through the external canal,
causing the tympanic membrane to vibrate.
The vibration activates the tiny bones in
the middle ear (hammer, anvil, and stir-
rup). These mechanical vibrations pass
from the oval window to the cochlea, where
they set an internal fluid in motion. The
fluid movement stimulates tiny hair cells
along the basilar membrane, inside the co-
chlea, to transmit neural impulses from the
ear to the brain along the auditory nerve.
Hammer
Stirrup
Oval windowAnvil
Semicircular
canals
Bones of the
middle ear
Cochlea
Basilar membrane
with vibration-
sensitive hair cells
Eardrum
Auditory
nerve

102 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
middle ear: the hammer, anvil, and stirrup, named for their shapes. These bones
pass the vibrations on to the primary organ of hearing, the cochlea, located in the
inner ear.
2. The cochlea focuses the vibrations on the basilar membrane. Here in the cochlea, the
formerly airborne sound wave becomes “seaborne,” because the coiled tube of the
cochlea is filled with fluid. As the bony stirrup vibrates against the oval window
at the base of the cochlea, the vibrations set the fluid into wave motion, much as
a submarine sends a sonar “ping” through the water. As the fluid wave spreads
through the cochlea, it causes vibration in the basilar membrane, a thin strip of
hairy tissue running through the cochlea.
3. The basilar membrane converts the vibrations into neural messages. The swaying of tiny
hair cells on the vibrating basilar membrane stimulates sensory nerve endings con-
nected to the hair cells. The excited neurons, then, transform the mechanical vibra-
tions of the basilar membrane into neural activity.
4. Finally, the neural messages travel to the auditory cortex in the brain. Neural signals
leave the cochlea in a bundle of neurons called the auditory nerve. The neurons
from the two ears meet in the brain stem, which passes the auditory information
to both sides of the brain. Ultimately, the signals arrive in the auditory cortex for
higher-order processing.
If the auditory system seems complicated, you might think of it as a sensory “relay team.”
Sound waves are first funneled in by the outer ear, then handed off from the eardrum to
bones in the middle ear. These bones then hand off their mechanical vibrations to the
cochlea and basilar membrane in the inner ear, where they finally become neural signals,
which are, in turn, passed along to the brain. This series of steps transforms common-
place vibrations into experiences as exquisite and varied as music, doorbells, whispers,
and shouts—and psychology lectures.
Psychological Qualities of Sound: How We Distinguish One Sound from
Another No matter where they come from, sound waves—like light waves—have
only two physical characteristics: frequency and amplitude. In the following discus-
sion, we will show you how the brain converts these two characteristics into three
psychological sensations: pitch, loudness, and timbre.
Sensations of Pitch A sound wave’s frequency determines the highness or lowness of a
sound—a quality known as pitch. High frequencies produce high-pitched sounds, and
low frequencies produce low-pitched sounds, as you see in Table 3.3. As with light, our
sensitivity to sound spans only a limited range of the sound waves that occur in na-
ture. The range of human auditory sensitivity extends from frequencies as low as about
20 cps (the lowest range of a subwoofer in a good sound system) to frequencies as high
cochlea The primary organ of hearing; a coiled
tube in the inner ear, where sound waves are
transduced into nerve messages.
basilar membrane A thin strip of tissue sensi-
tive to vibrations in the cochlea. The basilar membrane
contains hair cells connected to neurons. When a sound
wave causes the hair cells to vibrate, the associated
neurons become excited. As a result, the sound waves
are converted (transduced) into nerve activity.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
The brain’s primary auditory
cortex lies in the temporal lobes
(p. 72).
pitch A sensory characteristic of sound produced by
the frequency of the sound wave.
TABLE 3.3 Auditory Stimulation
Becomes Sensation
Pitch and loudness are the psychological
counterparts of the frequency and
amplitude (intensity) of a sound
wave. Frequency and amplitude are
characteristics of the physical sound
wave, while sensations of pitch and
loudness exist only in the brain. In
addition, sound waves can be complex
combinations of simpler waves.
Psychologically, we experience this
complexity as timbre. Compare this table
with Table 3.2 for vision.
Loud
Low
Pure
Soft
High
Complex
Physical stimulation Waveform Psychological sensation
Amplitude (intensity) Loudness
Frequency (wavelength) Pitch
Complexity Timbre

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 103
as 20,000 cps (produced by the high-frequency tweeter in a high-quality audio system).
Other creatures can hear sounds both higher (dogs, for example) and lower (elephants).
How does the auditory apparatus produce sensations of pitch? Two distinct audi-
tory processes share the task, affording us much greater sensory precision than either
could provide alone. Here’s what happens:
• When sound waves pass through the inner ear, the basilar membrane vibrates (see
Figure 3.8). Different frequencies activate different locations on the membrane.
Thus, the pitch one hears depends, in part, on which region of the basilar mem-
brane is receiving the greatest stimulation. This place theory explanation of pitch
perception says that different places on the basilar membrane send neural codes
for different pitches to the auditory cortex of the brain—much as keys in different
places on a piano keyboard can produce different notes. It turns out that the place
theory accounts for our ability to hear high tones—above about 1,000 Hz (cycles
per second).
• Neurons on the basilar membrane respond with different firing rates to different
sound wave frequencies, much as guitar strings vibrating at different frequencies
produce different notes. And so, the rate of firing provides another code for pitch
perception in the brain. This frequency theory explains how the basilar membrane
deals with frequencies below about 5,000 Hz.
• Between 1,000 and 5,000 Hz, hearing relies on both place and frequency.
What is so special about the range of 1,000 to 5,000 Hz? This interval spans the
upper frequency range of human speech, which is crucial for discriminating the high-
pitched sounds that distinguish consonants, such as p, s, and t. These are the subtle
sounds that allow us to distinguish among many common words, such as pie, sigh, and
tie. Coincidentally, the auditory canal is specially shaped to amplify sounds within this
speech range.
Sensations of Loudness Much as the intensity of light determines brightness, the physi-
cal strength or amplitude of a sound wave determines loudness, as shown in Table 3.3.
More intense sound waves (a shout) produce louder sounds, while we experience sound
waves with small amplitudes (a whisper) as soft. Amplitude, then, refers to the physical
characteristics of a sound wave, while loudness is a psychological sensation.
Because we can hear sound waves across a great range of intensity, the loudness of
a sound is usually expressed as a ratio rather than an absolute amount. More specifi-
cally, sound intensity is expressed in units called decibels (dB). Figure 3.9 shows the
levels of some representative natural sounds in decibel units.
Sensations of Timbre The bark of a dog, a toot of a train whistle, the wail of an oboe,
the clink of a spoon in a cup—all sound distinctively different, not just because they
have different pitches or loudness but because they are peculiar mixtures of tones.
In fact, most natural sound waves are mixtures rather than pure tones, as shown in
Figure 3.10. This complex quality of a sound wave is known as timbre (pronounced
TAM—b’r). Timbre is the property that enables you to recognize a friend’s voice on the
phone or distinguish between the same song sung by different artists.
Hearing Loss Aging commonly involves loss of hearing acuity, especially for high-
frequency sounds so crucial for understanding speech. If you think about the tiny dif-
ference between the sounds b and p, you can see why speech perception depends so
heavily on high frequency sounds. But hearing loss is not always the result of aging. It
can come from diseases, such as mumps, that may attack the auditory nerves. And it
can result from exposure to loud noises (see Figure 3.9), such as gunshots, jet engines,
or loud music, that damage the hair cells in the cochlea.
How Are Auditory and Visual Sensations Alike? Earlier, we discussed how visual
information is carried to the brain by the optic nerve in the form of neural impulses.
Now we find that, in a similar fashion, auditory information is also conveyed to the
loudness A sensory characteristic of sound pro-
duced by the amplitude (intensity) of the sound wave.
timbre The quality of a sound wave that derives
from the wave’s complexity (combination of pure tones).
Timbre comes from the Greek word for “drum,” as does
the term tympanic membrane, or eardrum.
dB
Decibel
level
180
140
130
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Rocket launch
(from 150 ft)
Jet plane take off
(from 80 ft)
Threshold of pain
Loud thunder; rock band
Twin-engine airplane
take off
Inside subway train
Hearing loss with
prolonged exposure
Inside noisy car
Inside quiet car
Normal conversation
Normal office
Quiet office
Quiet room
Soft whisper (5 ft)
Absolute hearing
threshold
(for 1000-Hz tone)
FIGURE 3.9
Intensities of Familiar Sounds
Cochlear ImplantsWatch the Video
at MyPsychLab

104 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
brain as neural signals—but by a different pathway and to a different location in
the brain. Please note the similarity in the ways vision and hearing make use of fre-
quency and amplitude information found in light and sound waves.
But why do we “see” visual information and “hear” auditory information? As our
Core Concept suggested, the answer lies in the region of the cortex receiving the neural
message—not on some unique quality of the message itself. In brief, different regions
of the brain, when activated, produce different sensations.
How the Other Senses Are Like Vision and Hearing
Of all our senses, vision and hearing have been studied the most. However, our sur-
vival and well-being depend on other senses, too. So, to conclude this discussion of
sensation, we will briefly review the processes involved in our sense of body position
and movement, smell, taste, the skin senses, and pain (see Table 3.4). You will note
that each gives us information about a different aspect of our internal or external en-
vironment. Yet each operates on similar principles. Each transduces physical stimuli
into neural activity, and each is more sensitive to change than to constant stimulation.
And, as was the case with vision and hearing, each of these senses is distinguished by
the type of information it extracts and by the specialized regions of the brain devoted
to it. Finally, the senses often act in concert, as when we see a lightning strike and hear
the ensuing clap of thunder or when the sensation we call “taste” really encompasses
a combination of flavor, odor, sight, and texture of food. Other common sensory com-
binations occur in sizzling steaks, fizzing colas, and bowls of Rice Krispies®.
Position and Movement To act purposefully and gracefully, we need constant infor-
mation about the position of our limbs and other body parts in relation to each other
and to objects in the environment. Without this information, even our simplest actions
Flute
Clarinet
Human voice
Explosion
Middle C on the piano
FIGURE 3.10
Waveforms of Familiar Sounds
Each sound is a distinctive combination
of several pure tones.
Source: Miller, D. C. (1916/1922). The Science
of musical sounds. New York: W. H. Freeman.
Reprinted by permission of Case Western Reserve
University.
TABLE 3.4 Fundamental Features of the Human Senses
Sense Stimulus Sense Organ Receptor Sensation
Vision Light waves Eye Rods and cones of
retina
Colors, brightness,
patterns, motion,
textures
Hearing Sound waves Ear Hair cells of the
basilar membrane
Pitch, loudness,
timbre
Skin senses External contact Skin Nerve endings in
skin
Touch, warmth,
cold
Smell Volatile
substances
Nose Hair cells of
olfactory epithelium
Odors
Taste Soluble
substances
Tongue Taste buds of
tongue
Flavors
Pain Many intense or
extreme stimuli:
temperature,
chemicals,
mechanical
stimuli, etc.
Net of pain
fibers all over
the body
Specialized
pain receptors,
overactive or
abnormal neurons
Acute pain,
chronic pain
Kinesthetic
and vestibular
senses
Body position,
movement, and
balance
Semicircular
canals, skeletal
muscles,
joints, tendons
Hair cells in
semicircular
canals; neurons
connected to
skeletal muscles,
joints, and tendons
Position of body
parts in space

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 105
would be hopelessly uncoordinated. (You have probably had just this experience when
you tried to walk on a leg that had “gone to sleep.”) The physical mechanisms that
keep track of body position, movement, and balance actually consist of two different
systems, the vestibular sense and the kinesthetic sense.
The vestibular sense is the body position sense that orients us with respect to gravity.
It tells us the posture of our bodies—whether straight, leaning, reclining, or upside
down. The vestibular sense also tells us when we are moving or how our motion is
changing. The receptors for this information are tiny hairs (much like those we found
in the basilar membrane) in the semicircular canals of the inner ear (refer to Figure 3.8).
These hairs respond to our movements by detecting corresponding movements in the
fluid of the semicircular canals. Disorders of this sense can cause extreme dizziness and
disorientation.
The kinesthetic sense, the other sense of body position and movement, keeps track
of body parts relative to each other. Your kinesthetic sense makes you aware of cross-
ing your legs, for example, and tells you which hand is closer to your cell phone when
it rings. Kinesthesis provides constant sensory feedback about what the muscles in
your body are doing during motor activities, such as whether to continue reaching for
your cup of coffee or to stop before you knock it over (Turvey, 1996).
Receptors for kinesthesis reside in the joints, muscles, and tendons. These recep-
tors, as well as those for the vestibular sense, connect to processing regions in the
brain’s parietal lobes—which help us make a sensory “map” of the spatial relation-
ship among objects and events. This processing usually happens automatically and
effortlessly, outside of conscious awareness, except when we are deliberately learning
the movements for a new physical skill, such as swinging a golf club or playing a
musical instrument.
Smell Smell serves a protective function by sensing the odor of possibly dangerous
food or, for some animals, the scent of a predator. We humans seem to use the sense
of smell primarily in conjunction with taste to locate and identify calorie-dense foods,
avoid tainted foods, and, it seems, to identify potential mates—a fact capitalized on
by the perfume and cologne industry (Benson, 2002; Martins et al., 2005; Miller &
Maner, 2010).
Many animals take the sense of smell a step farther by exploiting it for communica-
tion. For example, insects such as ants and termites and vertebrates such as dogs and
cats communicate with each other by secreting and detecting odorous signals called
pheromones—especially to signal not only sexual receptivity but also danger, territorial
boundaries, food sources, and family members. It appears that the human use of the
sense of smell is much more limited.
The Biology of Olfaction Biologically, the sense of smell, or olfaction, begins with chemi-
cal events in the nose. There, odors (in the form of airborne chemical molecules) inter-
act with receptor proteins associated with specialized nerve cells (Axel, 1995; Turin,
2006). These cells, incidentally, are the body’s only nerve cells that come in direct con-
tact with the outside environment.
Odor molecules can be complex and varied. For example, freshly brewed coffee
owes its aroma to as many as 600 volatile compounds (Wilson & Stevenson, 2006).
More broadly, scientists have cataloged at least 1,500 different odor-producing mol-
ecules (Zimmer, 2010). Exactly how the nose makes sense of this cacophony of odors
is not completely understood, but we do know that nasal receptors sense the shape of
odor molecules (Foley & Matlin, 2010).
We also know that the nose’s receptor cells transduce information about the stimu-
lus and convey it to the brain’s olfactory bulbs, located on the underside of the brain
just below the frontal lobes (see Figure 3.11). There, our sensations of smell are ini-
tially processed and then passed on to many other parts of the brain (Mori et al.,
1999). Unlike all the other senses, smell signals are not relayed through the thalamus,
suggesting that smell has very ancient evolutionary roots.
vestibular sense The sense of body orientation
with respect to gravity. The vestibular sense is closely
associated with the inner ear and, in fact, is carried to
the brain on a branch of the auditory nerve.
kinesthetic sense The sense of body position
and movement of body parts relative to each other (also
called kinesthesis)
pheromones Chemical signals released by organ-
isms to communicate with other members of their spe-
cies. Pheromones are often used by animals as sexual
attractants. It is unclear whether or not humans employ
pheromones.
olfaction The sense of smell.
Gymnasts and dancers rely on their
vestibular and kinesthetic senses to
give them information about the position
and movement of their bodies.

106 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
The Psychology of Smell Olfaction has an intimate connection with both emotion and
memory. This may explain why the olfactory bulbs lie very close to, and communicate
directly with, structures in the limbic system and temporal lobes that are associated
with emotion and memory. Therefore, it is not surprising that both psychologists and
writers have noticed that certain smells can evoke emotion-laden memories, sometimes
of otherwise-forgotten events (Dingfelder, 2004a). If you think about it for a moment,
you can probably recall a vivid memory “image” of the aroma associated with a favor-
ite food—perhaps fresh bread or a spicy dish—from your childhood.
Taste Like smell, taste is a sense based on chemistry. But the similarity doesn’t end
there: The senses of taste and smell have a close and cooperative working relationship—
so many of the subtle distinctions you may think of as flavors really come from odors.
(Much of the “taste” of an onion is odor, not flavor. And when you have a cold, you’ll
notice that food seems tasteless because your nasal passages are blocked.)
Most people know that our sense of taste, or gustation, involves four primary quali-
ties or dimensions: sweet, sour, bitter, and salty. Less well known, however, is a fifth taste
called umami (Chaudhari et al., 2000). Umami is the savory flavor found in protein-rich
foods, such as meat, seafood, and cheese. It is also associated with monosodium gluta-
mate (MSG), often used in Asian cuisine.
The taste receptor cells, located in the taste buds on the top and side of the tongue,
sample flavors from food and drink as they pass by on the way to the stomach. These
taste receptors cluster in small mucous-membrane projections called papillae, shown
in Figure 3.12. Each is especially sensitive to molecules of a particular shape.
Moving beyond the receptors on the tongue, a specialized nerve “hotline” carries
nothing but taste messages to specialized regions of the cortex. There, tastes are realized
in the parietal lobe’s somatosensory area. Conveniently, this region lies next to the patch
of cortex that receives touch stimulation from the face (Gadsby, 2000).
Developmental Changes in Taste Infants have heightened taste sensitivity, which is why
babies universally cringe at the bitter taste of lemon. This supersensitivity, however,
decreases with age. As a result, many elderly people complain that food has lost its
gustation The sense of taste, from the same word
root as “gusto;” also called the gustatory sense.
Frontal lobe of
cerebrum
Olfactory tract
Olfactory bulb
Olfactory nerves
Olfactory
epithelium
Olfactory bulb
Olfactory (l) nerves
Olfactory receptor cell
Olfactory hair (cilium)
Mucus layer
Substance being smelled
Dendrite
Connective tissue
Axon
A. Section through head, showing
the nasal cavity and the location of
olfactory receptors
B. Enlarged aspect of olfactory receptors
FIGURE 3.11
Receptors for Smell
Source: Zimbardo, P. G., & Gerrig, R. J. (1999). Psychology and life, 15th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. © 1999 by Pearson Education. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 107
taste—which really means that they have lost much of their sensory ability to detect
differences in the taste and smell of food. Compounding this effect, taste receptors can
be easily damaged by alcohol, smoke, acids, or hot foods. Fortunately, we frequently
replace our gustatory receptors—as we do our smell receptors. Because of this constant
renewal, the taste system boasts the most resistance to permanent damage of all our
senses, and a total loss of taste is extremely rare (Bartoshuk, 1990).
Supertasters Individuals of any age vary in their sensitivity to taste sensations, a function
of the density of papillae on the tongue (Bartoshuk, 2000, 2009; Bartoshuk et al., 1994).
Those with the most taste buds are supertasters who live in a “neon” taste world relative
to the rest of us—which accounts for their distaste for certain foods, such as broccoli or
“diet” drinks, in which they detect a disturbingly bitter flavor (Duenwald, 2005). Is there
any advantage to being a supertaster? Taste expert Linda Bartoshuk (1993) speculates
that, because most poisons are bitter, supertasters have a survival advantage.
Such differences also speak to the problem with which we began the chapter—in
particular, the question of whether different people sense the world in the same way.
Bartoshuk’s research suggests that, to the extent that the sense receptors exhibit some
variation from one person to another, so does our sensory experience of the world. This
variability is not so bizarre as to make one person’s sensation of sweet the same as another
person’s sensation of sour. Rather, the variations observed involve simply the intensity of
taste sensations, such as the bitter detected by supertasters. One big unknown, according
to Bartoshuk, is whether people differ in their sensitivities to different taste sensations:
for example, whether a person could be a supertaster for bitter while having only normal
sensations for sweet or salt (personal communication, January 4, 2011).
On the other hand, taste researchers have detected differences in taste preferences
between supertasters and those with normal taste sensations. In particular, supertasters
more often report disliking foods that they find too sweet or too fatty. Although the sig-
nificance of this remains to be determined, researchers have observed that supertasters,
on the average, weigh less than their nonsupertasting counterparts (Bartoshuk, 2000).
The Skin Senses Consider the skin’s remarkable versatility: It protects us against
surface injury, holds in body fluids, and helps regulate body temperature. The skin
also contains nerve endings that, when stimulated, produce sensations of touch, pain,
A. Top view of tongue B. Enlarged side view of papillae C. Enlarged view of taste bud
Papillae
Taste bud
Gustatory cell
FIGURE 3.12
Receptors for Taste
(A) Taste buds are clustered in papillae on the upper side of the tongue; (B) an enlarged view with individual papillae and taste buds
visible; (C) one of the taste buds enlarged.

108 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
warmth, and cold. Like several other senses, these skin senses are connected to the so-
matosensory cortex located in the brain’s parietal lobes.
The skin’s sensitivity to stimulation varies tremendously over the body, depending
in part on the number of receptors in each area. For example, we are ten times more
accurate in sensing stimulation on our fingertips than stimulation on our backs. In
general, our sensitivity is greatest where we need it most—on our face, tongue, and
hands. Precise sensory feedback from these parts of the body permits effective eating,
speaking, and grasping.
One important aspect of skin sensitivity—touch—plays a central role in human
relationships. Through touch, we communicate our desire to give or receive comfort,
support, and love (Fisher, 1992; Harlow, 1965). Touch also serves as a primary stimu-
lus for sexual arousal in humans. And it is essential for healthy mental and physical
development; the lack of touch stimulation can stunt mental and motor development
(Anand & Scalzo, 2000).
Synesthesia: Sensations across the Senses
A small minority of otherwise “normal” people have a condition called synesthesia, which
allows them to sense their worlds across sensory domains. Some actually taste shapes—
so that pears may taste “round” and grapefruit “pointy” (Cytowic, 1993). Other synes-
thetes associate days of the week with colors—so that Wednesday may be “green” and
Thursday may be “red.” Their defining characteristic involves sensory experience that
links one sense with another.
Through clever experiments, V. S. Ramachandran and his colleagues have shown
that the cross-sensory sensations reported in synesthesia are real, not just metaphors
(Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). You can take one of their tests in the accompa-
nying Do It Yourself! box. Research also shows that this ability runs in families, so it
probably has a genetic component.
What causes synesthesia? Apparently it can involve communication between differ-
ent brain areas that process different sensations—often regions that lie close to each
other in the cortex. Brain imaging studies implicate a cortical area called the TPO,
lying at the junction of the temporal, parietal, and occipital lobes (Ramachandran &
Hubbard, 2003). This region simultaneously processes information coming from many
pathways. We all have some neural connections among these areas, theorizes Ramach-
andran, but synesthetes seem to have more than most.
The condition occurs slightly more often in highly creative people, Ramachandran
notes. And it may account for the “auras” purportedly seen around people by some mys-
tics (Holden, 2004). But perhaps we all have some cross-sensory abilities in us, which
may be why we resonate with Shakespeare’s famous metaphor in Romeo and Juliet,
“It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.” We know that he was not speaking literally, of
course. Rather we understand that, for Romeo—and so for us—Juliet is linked, across
our senses, with light, warmth, and sensory pleasure (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999).
skin senses Sensory systems for processing
touch, warmth, cold, texture, and pain.
synesthesia The mixing of sensations across
sensory modalities, as in tasting shapes or seeing
colors associated with numbers.
A SYNESTHESIA TEST
Most people will not have any trouble see-
ing the 5 while staring at the cross (left),
although the 5 becomes indistinct when
surrounded by other numbers (right). If
you are a synesthete who associates colors
with numbers, however, you may be able to
identify the 5 in the figure on the right be-
cause it appears as a blotch of the color as-
sociated with that number. (Adapted from
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2003.)
3
+ 353+ 5
3

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 109
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
The Sense and Experience of Pain
If you have severe pain, nothing else matters. A wound or a toothache can dominate
all other sensations. And if you are among the one-third of Americans who suffer from
persistent or recurring pain, the experience can be debilitating and can sometimes even
lead to suicide. Yet, pain is also part of your body’s adaptive mechanism that makes
you respond to conditions that threaten damage to your body.
Unlike other sensations, pain can arise from intense stimulation of various kinds, such
as a very loud sound, heavy pressure, a pinprick, or an extremely bright light. But pain is
not merely the result of stimulation. It is also affected by our moods and expectations, as
you know if you were ever anxious about going to the dentist (Koyama et al., 2005).
Pain Receptors
In the skin, several types of specialized nerve cells, called nociceptors, sense painful
stimuli and send their unpleasant messages to the central nervous system. Some noci-
ceptors are most sensitive to heat, while others respond mainly to pressure, chemical
trauma, or other tissue injury (Foley & Matlin, 2010). There are even specialized noci-
ceptors for the sensation of itching—itself a type of pain (Gieler & Walter, 2008).
A Pain in the Brain
Even though they may seem to emanate from far-flung parts of the body, we actually
feel painful sensations in the brain. There are two distinct regions that have primary
roles in processing incoming pain messages (Foley & Matlin, 2010; Porreca & Price,
2009). One, involving a pathway terminating in the parietal lobe, registers the loca-
tion, intensity, and the sharpness or dullness of pain. The other, a group of structures
deep in the frontal cortex and in the limbic system, registers just how unpleasant the
painful sensation is. People with damage to this second region may notice a painful
stimulus but report that it does not feel unpleasant.
Phantom Limbs
One intriguing puzzle about pain concerns the mysterious sensations often experienced
by people who have lost an arm or leg—a condition known as a phantom limb. In
such cases, the amputee feels sensations—sometimes quite painful ones—that seem to
come from the missing body part (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). Neurological
studies show that the phantom limb sensations do not originate in damaged nerves in
the sensory pathways. Nor are they purely imaginary. Rather, they arise in the brain
itself—perhaps the result of the brain generating sensation when none comes from the
missing limb (Dingfelder, 2007). The odd phenomenon of phantom limbs teaches us
that understanding pain requires understanding not only painful sensations but also
mechanisms in the brain that both process and inhibit pain.
The Gate-Control Theory
No one has yet developed a theory that explains everything about pain, but Melzack
and Wall’s (1965, 1983) gate-control theory explains a lot. In particular, it explains why
pain can sometimes be blocked or facilitated “top-down” by our mental state. The
“gate” itself involves special interneurons that can open or close the pain pathway run-
ning up the spinal cord toward the brain. Closing the gate interferes with the transmis-
sion of pain messages in the spinal pathway.
What can close the gate? Messages from nonpain nerve fibers, such as those involved
in touch, can inhibit pain transmission. This explains why you vigorously shake your
hand when you hit your finger with a hammer. Just as important, messages from the brain
can also close the gate. This is how opiate drugs, such as morphine, work—by initiating
a cascade of inhibitory messages that travel downward to block incoming pain messages.
gate-control theory An explanation for pain
control that proposes we have a neural “gate” that
can, under some circumstances, block incoming pain
signals.

110 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
The gate on the pain pathway can also be opened and closed, such as hypnosis
or the distraction of important events. (See Fields, 2009.) We have long known that
people’s interpretations of events affect whether or not stimuli are perceived as painful
(Turk, 1994). For example, soldiers and athletes may suffer severe injuries that cause
little pain until the excitement of the battle or contest is over. And as we will see in a
moment, this mind–body effect on pain is evident in the action of placebos or other
sham treatments.
Dealing with Pain
Wouldn’t it be nice to banish the experience of pain altogether? In reality, such a con-
dition can be deadly. People with congenital insensitivity to pain do not feel what is
hurting them, and their bodies often become scarred and their limbs deformed from
injuries they could have avoided if their brains were able to warn them of danger.
Because of their failure to notice and respond to tissue-damaging stimuli, these people
tend to die young (Manfredi et al., 1981).
In general, pain serves as an essential defense signal: It warns us of potential harm,
and it helps us to survive in hostile environments and to get treatment for sickness and in-
jury. Sometimes, however, chronic pain seems to be a disease in itself, with neurons in the
pain pathways becoming hypersensitive, amplifying normal sensory stimulation into pain
messages (Watkins & Maier, 2003). Research also suggests that chronic pain may, at least
sometimes, arise from genes that get “turned on” in nerve-damaged tissue (Marx, 2004).
Analgesics
What can you do if you are in pain? Analgesic drugs, ranging from over-the-counter
remedies such as aspirin and ibuprofen to prescription narcotics such as morphine, are
widely used and effective. These act in a variety of ways. Morphine suppresses pain
messages in the spinal cord and the brain; aspirin interferes with a chemical signal pro-
duced by damaged tissue (Basbaum & Julius, 2006; Carlson, 2007). Those using pain-
killing drugs should be aware of unwanted side effects, such as digestive tract or liver
damage and even addiction. But studies have shown that if you must use narcotics to
control severe pain, the possibility of your becoming addicted is far less than it would
be if you were using narcotics recreationally (Melzack, 1990).
Psychological Techniques for Pain Control
Many people can also learn to control pain by psychological techniques, such as hyp-
nosis, relaxation, and thought-distraction procedures (Brown, 1998). For instance, a
child receiving a shot at the doctor’s office might be asked to take a series of deep
breaths and look away. You also may be among those for whom pain can also be
modified by placebos, mock drugs made to appear as real drugs. For example, a pla-
cebo may be an injection of mild saline solution (salt water) or a pill made of sugar.
Such fake drugs are routinely given to a control group in tests of new pain drugs. Their
effectiveness, of course, involves the people’s belief that they are getting real medicine
(Niemi, 2009; Wager, 2005; Wager et al., 2004). It is important to note, however, that
the brain’s response to a placebo is much the same as that of pain-relieving drugs: clos-
ing the spinal gate. Because this placebo effect is common, any drug deemed effective
must prove itself stronger than a placebo.
How do placebos produce their effects? Apparently, the expectation of pain relief
is enough to cause the brain to release painkilling endorphins. We believe this is so
because brain scans show that essentially the same pain-suppression areas “light up”
when patients take placebos or analgesic drugs (Petrovic et al., 2002). Further, we find
that individuals who respond to placebos report that their pain increases when they
take the endorphin-blocking drug naltrexone (Fields, 1978; Fields & Levine, 1984).
Surprisingly, the placebo effect doesn’t necessarily require a placebo! In a con-
trolled experiment, Dr. Fabrizio Benedetti and his colleagues (2005) showed that the
physician’s bedside manner, even without a painkilling drug, can suppress pain. For
psychologists, this is an important discovery, demonstrating that the psychosocial con-
text itself can have a therapeutic effect (Guterman, 2005).
placebo Substance that appears to be a drug but
is not. Placebos are often referred to as “sugar pills”
because they might contain only sugar rather than a
real drug.
placebo effect A response to a placebo (a fake
drug) caused by the belief that it is a real drug.

How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different? 111
Controlling Psychological Pain with Analgesics
In another surprising development, psychologist C. Nathan DeWall and his colleagues
(2010) have found that acetaminophen (the pain reliever in Tylenol) can lessen the psy-
chological pain of social rejection. Volunteers who took acetaminophen, as compared
with those taking placebos, reported far fewer feelings of social rejection in everyday
life. And in a follow-up experimental study involving a computer game rigged to make
players feel social rejection, fMRI scans showed that acetaminophen reduced activity
in brain areas associated with social rejection and also with physical pain. What makes
this research interesting is the suggestion that both physical and psychological hurts
involve some of the same pain mechanisms in the brain.
Pain Tolerance
The threshold of pain varies enormously from person to person. Some people always
demand Novocain from their dentist, while others may prefer dental work without the
added hassle of an injection. And in the laboratory, one study found that electric shocks
had to be eight times more powerful to produce painful sensations in their least-sensitive
subjects as compared with their most-sensitive subjects (Rollman & Harris, 1987). An-
other experiment found that brain scans of people who are highly sensitive to pain show
greater activation of the thalamus and the anterior cingulate cortex than in scans of
those with greater pain tolerance (Coghill et al., 2003). At least part of this variation has
a genetic basis (Couzin, 2006).
We should be clear on this point: There is no evidence of genetic differences in
sensitivity to pain among different ethnic or racial groups, although many reports suggest
that culture does affect how people interpret pain and respond to painful stimulation. For
example, Western women often report that childbirth is an excruciatingly painful experi-
ence, while women in some cultures routinely give birth with little indication of distress.
Severely wounded soldiers, too, typically need less pain medication than do civilians with
comparable injuries—perhaps because of the “culture of bravery” instilled in soldiers or
because a soldier knows that a wound represents a ticket out of the combat zone.
Readers should be cautioned, however, that much of the literature on cultural
differences in response to pain relies far more on anecdotes than on controlled studies.
Further, the scientific work that does exist in this area has frequently come to conflict-
ing conclusions (Foster, 2006). Perhaps one of the most important influences to emerge
from this work involves poverty and access to health care: Poor people are much less
likely to seek medical attention until pain becomes severe.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Name the two types of photoreceptors and indicate what
sort of stimulation they detect.
2. RECALL: The wavelength of light causes sensations of ,
while the intensity of light causes sensations of .
a. motion/shape
b. color/brightness
c. primary colors/secondary colors
d. depth/color
3. RECALL: The frequency theory best explains how we hear
sounds, while the place theory best explains how we
hear sounds.
4. SYNTHESIS: What do all of the following senses have in common:
vision, hearing, taste, smell, hearing, pain, equilibrium, and body
position?
5. RECALL: Studies of painful phantom limbs show that the phantom
pain originates in
a. the brain.
b. nerve cells damaged from the amputation.
c. the imagination.
d. ascending pathways in the spinal cord.
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Explain why
different senses give us different sensations.
Answers 1. The rods are better than the cones for detecting objects in dim light. The cones give us high-resolution color vision in relatively bright
light. 2. b (color/brightness) 3. low-pitched/high-pitched 4. Each of these senses transduces physical stimulation into neural activity, and each
responds more to change than to constant stimulation. 5. a (the brain) 6. The different sensations occur because the sensory information is
processed by different parts of the brain.
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112 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
3.3 KEY QUESTION
What Is the Relationship between Sensation
and Perception?
We have described how sensory signals are transduced and transmitted to specific
regions of your brain for further processing as visual images, pain, odors, and other
sensations. Then what? You enlist your brain’s perceptual machinery to attach meaning
to the incoming sensory information. Does a bitter taste mean poison? Does a red
flag mean danger? Does a smile signify a friendly overture? The Core Concept of this
section emphasizes this perceptual elaboration of sensory information:
Core Concept 3.3
Perception brings meaning to sensation, so perception produces an
interpretation of the world, not a perfect representation of it.
In brief, we might say that the task of perception is to organize sensation into stable,
meaningful percepts. A percept, then, is not just a sensation but the associated mean-
ing as well. As we describe this complex perceptual process, we will first consider how
our perceptual apparatus usually manages to give us a reasonably accurate and useful
image of the world. Then we will look at some illusions and other instances in which
perception apparently fails spectacularly. Finally, we will examine two theories that
attempt to capture the most fundamental principles at work behind these perceptual
successes and failures.
Perceptual Processing: Finding Meaning in Sensation
How does the sensory image of a person (such as the individual pictured in Figure
3.13) become the percept of someone you recognize? That is, how does mere sensa-
tion become an elaborate and meaningful perception? Let’s begin with two visual
pathways that help us identify objects and locate them in space: the what pathway
and the where pathway.
The What and Where Pathways in the Brain The primary visual cortex, at the
back of the brain, splits visual information into two interconnected streams (Fariva,
2009; Goodale & Milner, 1992). One stream, which flows mainly to the temporal
lobe, extracts information about an object’s color and shape. This what pathway al-
lows us to determine what objects are. The other stream, the where pathway, projects to
the parietal lobe, which determines an object’s location. Evidence suggests that other
senses, such as touch and hearing, also have what and where streams that interact with
those in the visual system (Rauschecker & Tian, 2000).
Curiously, we are conscious of information in the what pathway but not necessarily
in the where pathway. This fact explains a curious phenomenon known as blindsight, a
condition that occurs in some people with damage to the what pathway—damage that
makes them visually unaware of objects around them. Yet if the where pathway is in-
tact, blindsight patients may be able to step over objects in their path or reach out and
touch objects that they claim not to see (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran,
2008). In this way, persons with blindsight are much like a sophisticated robot that can
sense and react to objects around it even though it lacks the ability to represent them
in consciousness.
Feature Detectors The deeper information travels into the brain along the what
and where pathways, the more specialized processing becomes. Ultimately, specialized
groups of cells in the visual pathways extract very specific stimulus features, such as
an object’s length, slant, color, boundary, location, and movement (Kandel & Squire,
2000). Perceptual psychologists call these cells feature detectors.
percept The meaningful product of perception—
often an image that has been associated with con-
cepts, memories of events, emotions, and motives.
what pathway A neural pathway, projecting from
the primary visual cortex to the temporal lobe, which
involves identifying objects.
where pathway A neural pathway that projects
visual information to the parietal lobe; responsible for
locating objects in space.
blindsight The ability to locate objects despite
damage to the visual system making it impossible for
a person consciously to see and identify objects. Blind-
sight is thought to involve unconscious visual process-
ing in the where pathway.
feature detectors Cells in the cortex that spe-
cialize in extracting certain features of a stimulus.
FIGURE 3.13
Who Is This?
Perceptual processes help us recognize
people and objects by matching the
stimulus to images in memory.

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 113
We know about feature detectors from animal experiments and also from
cases like Jonathan’s, in which brain injury or disease selectively robs an
individual of the ability to detect certain features, such as colors or shapes.
There is even a part of the temporal lobe—near the occipital cortex—with
feature detectors that are especially sensitive to features of the human face
(Carpenter, 1999).
Despite our extensive knowledge of feature detectors, we still don’t know
exactly how the brain manages to combine (or “bind”) the multiple features
it detects into a single percept of, say, a face. Psychologists call this puzzle the
binding problem, and it may be the deepest mystery of perceptual psychology
(Kandel & Squire, 2000).
We do have one tantalizing piece of this perceptual puzzle: Neuroscien-
tists have discovered that the brain synchronizes the firing patterns in differ-
ent groups of neurons that have each detected different features of the same
object—much as an orchestra conductor determines the tempo at which all
members of the ensemble will play a musical piece (Buzsáki, 2006). But just
how this synchronization is involved in “binding” these features together
remains a mystery.
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processing Forming a percept also seems to
involve imposing a pattern on sensation. This involves two complementary
processes that psychologists call top-down processing and bottom-up pro-
cessing. In top-down processing, our goals, past experience, knowledge, expectations,
memory, motivations, or cultural background guide our perceptions of objects—or
events (see Nelson, 1993). Trying to find your car keys in a cluttered room requires
top-down processing. So does searching for Waldo in the popular children’s series
Where’s Waldo? And if you skip lunch to go grocery shopping, top-down hunger sig-
nals will probably make you notice all the snack foods in the store.
In bottom-up processing, the characteristics of the stimulus (rather than a concept
in our minds) exert a strong influence on our perceptions. Bottom-up processing relies
heavily on the brain’s feature detectors to sense these stimulus characteristics: Is it
moving? What color is it? Is it loud, sweet, painful, pleasant smelling, wet, hot…? You
are doing bottom-up processing when you notice a moving fish in an aquarium, a hot
pepper in a stir-fry, or a loud noise in the middle of the night.
Thus, bottom-up processing involves sending sensory data into the system through
receptors and sending it “upward” to the cortex, where a basic analysis, involving the
feature detectors, is first performed to determine the characteristics of the stimulus.
Psychologists also refer to this as stimulus-driven processing because the resulting per-
cept is determined, or “driven,” by stimulus features. By contrast, top-down processing
flows in the opposite direction, with the percept being driven by some concept in the
cortex—at the “top” of the brain. Because this sort of thinking relies heavily on con-
cepts in the perceiver’s own mind, it is also known as conceptually driven processing.
Perceptual Constancies We can illustrate another aspect of perception with yet
another example of top-down processing. Suppose that you are looking at a door, such
as the one pictured in Figure 3.14A. You “know” that the door is rectangular, even
though your sensory image of it is distorted when you are not looking at it straight-on.
Your brain automatically corrects the sensory distortion so that you perceive the door
as being rectangular, as in Figure 3.14B.
This ability to see an object as being the same shape from different angles or
distances is just one example of a perceptual constancy. In fact, there are many kinds of
perceptual constancies. These include color constancy, which allows us to see a flower
as being the same color in the reddish light of sunset as in the white glare of midday.
Size constancy allows us to perceive a person as the same size at different distances
and also serves as a strong cue for depth perception. And it was shape constancy that
allowed us to see the door as remaining rectangular from different angles. Together,
these constancies help us identify and track objects in a changing world.
binding problem Refers to the process used by
the brain to combine (or “bind”) the results of many
sensory operations into a single percept. This occurs,
for example, when sensations of color, shape, bound-
ary, and texture are combined to produce the percept
of a person’s face. No one knows exactly how the brain
does this. Thus, the binding problem is one of the major
unsolved mysteries in psychology.
top-down processing Perceptual analysis
that emphasizes the perceiver’s expectations, concept
memories, and other cognitive factors, rather than be-
ing driven by the characteristics of the stimulus. “Top”
refers to a mental set in the brain—which stands at
the “top” of the perceptual processing system.
bottom-up processing Perceptual analysis
that emphasizes characteristics of the stimulus, rather
than our concepts and expectations. “Bottom” refers
to the stimulus, which occurs at step one of perceptual
processing.
perceptual constancy The ability to recognize
the same object as remaining “constant” under dif-
ferent conditions, such as changes in illumination,
distance, or location.
Many viewers report that the flowers in Claude
Monet’s floral paintings, such as Coquelicots,
produce a shimmering or moving sensation. Neu-
roscientists believe this occurs because the colors
of the flowers have the same level of brightness as
the colors in the surrounding field—and so are dif-
ficult for the colorblind “where” pathway to locate
precisely in space (Dingfelder, 2010).

114 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
Inattentional Blindness and Change Blindness Some-
times we don’t notice things that occur right in front of our
noses—particularly if they are unexpected and we haven’t
focused our attention on them. While driving, you may not
notice a car unexpectedly shifting lanes. Psychologists call
this inattentional blindness (Beck et al., 2004; Greer, 2004a).
Magicians rely on it for many of their tricks (Sanders,
2009). They also rely on change blindness, a related phe-
nomenon in which we fail to notice that something is dif-
ferent now than it was before, as when a friend changes
hair color or shaves a mustache (Martinez-Conde &
Macknik, 2008).
We do notice changes that we anticipate, such as a red
light turning to green. But laboratory studies show that
many people don’t notice when, in a series of photographs
of the same scene, a red light is replaced by a stop sign.
One way this may cause trouble in the world outside the
laboratory is that people underestimate the extent to which
they can be affected by change blindness. This probably
occurs because our perceptual systems and our attention
have limits on the amount of information they can process,
so our expectations coming from the “top down” cause us
to overlook the unexpected.
Perceptual Ambiguity and Distortion
A primary goal of perception is to get an accurate “fix” on the world—to recognize
friends, foes, opportunities, and dangers. Survival sometimes depends on accurately
perceiving the environment, but the environment is not always easy to “read.” We
can illustrate this difficulty with the photo of black and white splotches in Figure
3.15. What is it? When you eventually extract the stimulus figure from the back-
ground, you will see it as a Dalmatian dog walking toward the upper left with its
head down. The dog is hard to find because it blends so easily with the background.
The same problem occurs when you try to single out a voice against the background
of a noisy party.
But it is not just the inability to find an image that causes
perceptual problems. Sometimes our perceptions can be wildly
inaccurate because we misinterpret an image—as happens with
sensory and perceptual illusions.
What Illusions Tell Us about Sensation and Perception When
your mind deceives you by interpreting a stimulus pattern incor-
rectly, you are experiencing an illusion. Such illusions can help
us understand some fundamental properties of sensation and
perception—particularly the discrepancy between our percepts and
external reality (Cohen & Girgus, 1973).
Let’s first examine a remarkable bottom-up illusion that
works at the level of sensation: the black-and-white Hermann
grid (see Figure 3.16). As you stare at the center of the grid, note
how dark, fuzzy spots appear at the intersections of the white
bars. But when you focus on an intersection, the spot vanishes.
Why? The answer lies in the way receptor cells in your visual
pathways interact with each other. The firing of certain cells that
are sensitive to light–dark boundaries inhibits the activity of
adjacent cells that would otherwise detect the white grid lines.
This inhibiting process makes you sense darker regions—the
inattentional blindness A failure to notice
changes occurring in one’s visual field, apparently
caused by narrowing the focus of one’s attention.
change blindness A perceptual failure to notice
that a visual scene has changed from the way it had
appeared previously. Unlike inattentional blindness,
change blindness requires comparing a current scene
to one from the past, stored in memory.
illusion You have experienced an illusion when you
have a demonstrably incorrect perception of a stimulus
pattern, especially one that also fools others who are
observing the same stimulus. (If no one else sees it the
way you do, you could be having a hallucination. We’ll
take that term up in a later chapter on mental disorder.)
FIGURE 3.15
An Ambiguous Picture
What is depicted here? The difficulty in seeing the figure lies in
its similarity to the background.
FIGURE 3.14
A Door by Any Other Shape Is Still a Door
(A) A door seen from an angle presents the eye with a distorted rect-
angle image. (B) The brain perceives the door as rectangular.

(A) (B)

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 115
grayish areas—at the white intersections just outside your focus. Even though you
know (top-down) that the squares in the Hermann grid are black and the lines are
white, this knowledge cannot overcome the illusion, which operates at a more basic,
sensory level.
To study illusions at the level of perception, psychologists often employ ambiguous
figures—stimulus patterns that can be interpreted (top-down) in two or more distinct
ways, as in Figures 3.17A and 3.17B. There you see that both the vase/faces figure and
the Necker cube are designed to confound your interpretations, not just your sensa-
tions. Each suggests two conflicting meanings: Once you have seen both, your percep-
tion will cycle back and forth between them as you look at the figure. Studies suggest
that these alternating interpretations may involve the shifting of perceptual control
between the left and right hemispheres of the brain (Gibbs, 2001).
Another dramatic illusion, recently discovered, appears in Figure 3.18. Although
it is hard to believe, the squares marked A and B are the same shade of gray. Proof
appears in the right-hand image, where the vertical bars are also the same gray shade.
Why are we fooled by this illusion? Perceptual psychologists respond that the effect
derives from color and brightness constancy: our ability to see an object as essentially
unchanged under different lighting conditions, from the bright noon sun to near dark-
ness (Gilchrist, 2006). Under normal conditions, this prevents us from being misled
by shadows.
Figure 3.19 shows several other illusions that operate primarily at the level of
perceptual interpretation. All are compelling, and all are controversial—particu-
larly the Müller–Lyer illusion, which has intrigued psychologists for more than 100
years. Disregarding the arrowheads, which of the two horizontal lines in this fig-
ure appears longer? If you measure them, you will see that the horizontal lines are
exactly the same length. What is the explanation? Answers to that question have
ambiguous figures Images that can be inter-
preted in more than one way. There is no “right” way to
see an ambiguous figure.
FIGURE 3.16
The Hermann Grid
Why do faint gray dots appear at the intersections of
the grid? The illusion, which operates at the sensory
level, is explained in the text.
Source: Levine, M. W., & Shefner, J. (2000). Fundamentals
of sensation & perception. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reprinted by permission of Michael W. Levine.
FIGURE 3.18
The Checkerboard Illusion
Appearances are deceiving: Squares A
and B are actually the same shade of
gray, as you can see on the right by com-
paring the squares with the vertical bars.
The text explains why this occurs.
Source: Adelson, E. H. (2010). Checkershadow
illusion. Retrieved from http://persci.mit.edu/gallery/
checkershadow. © 1995, Edward H. Adelson.
Vase or faces?
A.
B.
The Necker cube:
above or below?
FIGURE 3.17
Perceptual Illusions
These ambiguous figures
are illusions of perceptual
interpretation.

Checker Shadow Illusion

Checker Shadow Illusion

116 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
been offered in well over a thousand published studies, and psychologists still don’t
know for sure.
One popular theory, combining both top-down and bottom-up factors, has gath-
ered some support. It suggests that we unconsciously interpret the Müller–Lyer figures
as three-dimensional objects. So instead of arrowheads, we see the ends as angles that
project toward or away from us like the inside and outside corners of a building or a
room, as in Figure 3.20 The inside corner seems to recede in the distance, while the
outside corner appears to extend toward us. Therefore, we judge the outside corner to
be closer—and shorter. Why? When two objects make the same-size image on the retina
and we judge one to be farther away than the other, we assume that the more distant
one is larger.
Illusions in the Context of Culture But what if you had grown up in a culture
with no square-cornered buildings? Would you still see one line as longer than the
other in the Müller–Lyer? In other words, do you have to learn to see the illusion,
or is it “hard wired” into your brain? One way to answer such questions is through
cross-cultural research. With this in mind, Richard Gregory (1977) went to South
Africa to study a group of people known as the Zulus, who live in what he called
a “circular culture.” Aesthetically, people in that culture prefer curves to straight
lines and square corners: Their round huts have round doors and windows; they till
Is the hat taller than the
brim is wide?
Is the diagonal line
straight or broken?
Turning the tables: Could the table tops be the same size?
Top hat illusion Poggendorf illusion
Which central circle is bigger?
a b
Ebbinghaus illusion
Are the vertical lines parallel?Which horizontal line is longer?
a b
c d
Müller–Lyer illusion Zöllner illusion
FIGURE 3.19
Six Illusions to Tease Your Brain
Each of these illusions involves a bad “bet” made by your brain. What explanations can you give for the distortion of reality that each of these illu-
sions produces? Are they caused by nature or nurture? The table illusion was originally developed by Roger N. Shepard and presented in his 1990
book Mind Sights (Freeman).

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 117
their fields along sweeping curved lines, using curved plows; the children’s toys lack
straight lines.
So what happened when Gregory showed them the Müller–Lyer? Most saw the
lines as nearly the same length. This suggests that the Müller–Lyer illusion is learned.
A number of other studies support Gregory’s conclusion that people who live in “car-
pentered” environments—where buildings are built with straight sides and 90-degree
angles—are more susceptible to the illusion than those who (like the Zulus) live in
“noncarpentered” worlds (Segall et al., 1999).
Applying the Lessons of Illusions Several prominent modern artists, fascinated
with the visual experiences created by ambiguity, have used perceptual illusion as a
central artistic feature of their work. Consider the two examples of art shown here.
Gestalt-Rugo by Victor Vasarely (see Figure 3.21) produces depth reversals like those
in the Necker cube, with corners that alternately project and recede. In Sky and Water
by M. C. Escher (see Figure 3.22), you can see birds and fishes only through the
process of figure–ground reversal, much like the vase/faces illusion we encountered
earlier (see Figure 3.17). The effect of these paintings on us underscores the function
of human perception to make sense of the world and to fix on the best interpretation
we can make.
To interpret such illusions, we draw on our personal experiences, learning, and
motivation. Knowing this, those who understand the principles of perception often can
control illusions to achieve desired effects far beyond the world of painting. Architects
and interior designers, for example, create illusions that make spaces seem larger or
smaller than they really are. They may, for example, make a small apartment appear
more spacious when it is painted in light colors and sparsely furnished. Similarly, set
and lighting designers in movies and theatrical productions purposely create visual
illusions on film and on stage. So, too, do many of us make everyday use of illusion in
our choices of cosmetics and clothing (Dackman, 1986). Light-colored clothing and
horizontal stripes can make our bodies seem larger, while dark-colored clothing and
vertical stripes can make our bodies seem slimmer. In such ways, we use illusions to
distort “reality” and make our lives more pleasant.
Theoretical Explanations for Perception
The fact that most people perceive most illusions and ambiguous figures in essen-
tially the same way suggests that fundamental perceptual principles are at work. But
what are these principles? To find some answers, we will examine two influential the-
ories that explain how we form our perceptions: Gestalt theory and learning-based
inference.
Although these two approaches may seem contradictory at first, they really empha-
size complementary influences on perception. The Gestalt theory emphasizes how we
organize incoming stimulation into meaningful perceptual patterns—because of the
FIGURE 3.20
The Müller-Lyer Illusion
One explanation for the Müller-Lyer il-
lusion says that your brain thinks it is
seeing the inside and outside corners of a
building in perspective.
BA
FIGURE 3.21
Victor Vasarely’s Gestalt-Rugo
FIGURE 3.22
M. C. Escher’s Sky and Water

118 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
way our brains are innately ”wired.” On the other hand, learning-based inference em-
phasizes learned influences on perception, including the power of expectations, con-
text, and culture. In other words, Gestalt theory emphasizes nature, and learning-based
inference emphasizes nurture.
Perceptual Organization: The Gestalt Theory You may have noticed that a series of
blinking lights, perhaps on a theater marquee, can create the illusion of motion where
there really is no motion. Similarly, there appears to be a white triangle in the Do It
Yourself! box on this page—but there really is no white triangle. And, as we have seen,
the Necker cube seems to flip back and forth between two alternative perspectives—
but, of course, the flipping is all in your mind.
About 100 years ago, such perceptual tricks captured the interest of a group of
German psychologists, who argued that the brain is innately wired to perceive not just
stimuli but also patterns in stimulation (Sharps &Wertheimer, 2000). They called such a
pattern a Gestalt, the German word for “perceptual pattern” or “configuration.” Thus,
from the raw material of stimulation, the brain forms a perceptual whole that is more
than the mere sum of its sensory parts (Prinzmetal, 1995; Rock & Palmer, 1990). This
perspective became known as Gestalt psychology.
The Gestaltists liked to point out that we perceive a square as a single figure rather
than merely as four individual lines. Similarly, when you hear a familiar song, you do
not focus on the individual notes. Rather, your brain extracts the melody, which is
your perception of the overall pattern of notes. Such examples, the Gestalt psycholo-
gists argued, show that we always attempt to organize sensory information into mean-
ingful patterns, the most basic elements of which are already present in our brains
at birth. Because this approach has been so influential, we will examine some of the
Gestalt discoveries in more detail.
Figure and Ground One of the most basic of perceptual processes identified by Gestalt
psychology divides our perceptual experience into figure and ground. A figure is simply
a pattern or image that grabs our attention. As we noted, psychologists sometimes call
this a Gestalt. Everything else becomes ground, the backdrop against which we perceive
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
The nature–nurture issue centers
on the relative importance of
heredity and environment (p. 44).
Gestalt psychology From a German word (pro-
nounced gush-TAWLT) that means “whole” or “form”
or “configuration.” (A Gestalt is also a percept.) The
Gestalt psychologists believed that much of perception
is shaped by innate factors built into the brain.
figure The part of a pattern that commands atten-
tion. The figure stands out against the ground.
ground The part of a pattern that does not
command attention; the background.
object that obscures the ground behind
it. (That’s why we often call the ground a
“background.”)
FIGURE OBSCURES GROUND
The tendency to perceive a figure as be-
ing in front of a ground is strong. It is so
strong, in fact, that you can even get this
effect when the perceived figure doesn’t
actually exist! You can demonstrate this
with an examination of the accompany-
ing figure. (See also Ramachandran &
Rogers-Ramachandran, 2010.) You prob-
ably perceive a fir-tree shape against a
ground of red circles on a white surface.
But, of course, there is no fir-tree figure
printed on the page; the figure consists
only of three solid red shapes and a
black-line base. You perceive the illusory
white triangle in front because the wedge-
shaped cuts in the red circles seem to
be the corners of a solid white triangle.
To see an illusory six-pointed star, look
at part B. Here, the nonexistent “top”
triangle appears to blot out parts of red
circles and a black-lined triangle, when
in fact none of these is depicted as com-
plete figures. Again, this demonstrates
that we prefer to see the figure as an
A B
Subjective Contours
(A) A subjective fir tree; (B) a subjective six-pointed star.
Listen to the Podcast
MyPsychLab
Gestalt
Principles at Work at

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 119
the figure. A melody becomes a figure heard against a background of complex harmo-
nies, and a spicy chunk of pepperoni becomes the figure against the ground of cheese,
sauce, and bread that makes up a pizza. Visually, a figure could be a bright flashing
sign or a word on the background of a page. And in the ambiguous faces/vase seen in
Figure 3.17A, figure and ground reverse when the faces and vase alternately “pop out”
as figure.
Closure: Filling in the Blanks Our minds seem built to abhor a gap, as you saw in the
Do It Yourself! above. Note especially the illusory white triangle—superimposed on
red circles and black lines. Moreover, you will note that you have mentally divided
the white area into two regions, the triangle and the background. Where this division
occurs, you perceive subjective contours: boundaries that exist not in the stimulus but
only in the subjective experience of your mind.
Your perception of these illusory triangles demonstrates a second powerful orga-
nizing process identified by the Gestalt psychologists. Closure makes you see incomplete
figures as wholes by supplying the missing segments, filling in gaps, and making infer-
ences about potentially hidden objects. So when you see a face peeking around a cor-
ner, your mind automatically fills in the hidden parts of the face and body. In general,
humans have a natural tendency to perceive stimuli as complete and balanced even
when pieces are missing. (Does this ring a with you?) Closure is also respon-
sible for filling in your “blind spot,” as you saw on page 97.
In the foregoing demonstrations, we have seen how the perception of subjective
contours and closure derives from the brain’s ability to create percepts out of incom-
plete stimulation. Now let us turn to the perceptual laws that explain how we group
the stimulus elements that are actually present in Gestalts.
The Gestalt Laws of Perceptual Grouping It’s easy to see a school of fish as a single unit—
as a Gestalt. But why? And how do we mentally combine hundreds of notes together
and perceive them as a single melody? How do we combine the elements of color,
shadow, form, texture, and boundary into the percept of a friend’s face? And why have
thousands of people reported seeing “flying saucers” or the face of Jesus in the scorch
marks on a tortilla? That is, how do we pull together in our minds the separate stimu-
lus elements that seem to “belong” together? This is the binding problem again: one of
the most fundamental problems in psychology. As we will see, the Gestalt psycholo-
gists made great strides in this area, even though the processes by which perceptual
organization works are still debated today (Palmer, 2002).
In the heyday of Gestalt psychology, of course, there were no MRIs or PET scans.
Modern neuroscience didn’t exist. Hence, Gestalt psychologists like Max Wertheimer
(1923) had to focus on the problem of perceptual organization in a different way—with
closure The Gestalt principle that identifies the
tendency to fill in gaps in figures and to see incomplete
figures as complete.
FIGURE 3.23
Gestalt Laws of Perceptual Grouping
Because of similarity, in (A), you most
easily see the Xs grouped together, while
Os form a separate Gestalt. So columns
group together more easily than rows.
The rows, made up of dissimilar ele-
ments, do not form patterns so easily. In
(B), proximity makes dissimilar elements
easily group together when they are near
each other. In (C), even though the lines
cut each other into many discontinuous
segments, continuity makes it easier to
see just two lines—each of which appears
to be continuous as a single line cutting
through the figure.
A. Similarity B. Proximity
C. Continuity
X O X O X
X O X O X
X O X O X O X O X O X O X OX
X O X O X
X O X O X

120 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
arrays of simple figures, such as you see in Figure 3.23. By varying a single factor and
observing how it affected the way people perceived the structure of the array, Wert-
heimer was able to formulate a set of laws of perceptual grouping, which he inferred were
built into the neural fabric of the brain.
According to Wertheimer’s law of similarity, we group things together that have a
similar look (or sound, or feel, and so on). So in Figure 3.23A, you see that the Xs and
Os form distinct columns, rather than rows, because of similarity. Likewise, when you
watch a football game, you use the colors of the uniforms to group the players into
two teams because of similarity, even when they are mixed together during a play. You
can also hear the law of similarity echoed in the old proverb “Birds of a feather flock
together,” which is a commentary not only on avian behavior but also on the assump-
tions we make about perceptual grouping. Any such tendency to perceive things as
belonging together because they share common features reflects the law of similarity.
Now, suppose that, on one drowsy morning, you mistakenly put on two different-
colored socks because they were together in the drawer and you assumed that they
were a pair. Your mistake was merely Wertheimer’s law of proximity (nearness) at work.
The proximity principle says that we tend to group things together that are near each
other, as you can see in the pairings of the Xs with the Os in Figure 3.23B. On the level
of social perception, your parents were invoking the law of proximity when they cau-
tioned you, “You’re known by the company you keep.”
We can see the Gestalt law of continuity in Figure 3.23C, where the straight line
appears as a single, continuous line, even though the curved line repeatedly cuts
through it. In general, the law of continuity says that we prefer smoothly con-
nected and continuous figures to disjointed ones. Continuity also operates in the
realm of social perception, where we commonly make the assumption of continuity
in the personality of an individual whom we haven’t seen for some
time. So, despite interruptions in our contact with that person, we
will expect to find continuity—to find him or her to be essentially
the same person we knew earlier.
There is yet another form of perceptual grouping—one that we
cannot illustrate in the pages of a book because it involves motion.
But you can easily conjure up your own image that exemplifies the
law of common fate: Imagine a school of fish, a gaggle of geese, or a
uniformed marching band. When visual elements (the individual fish,
geese, or band members) are moving together, you perceive them as a
single Gestalt.
According to the Gestalt perspective, then, each of these exam-
ples of perceptual grouping illustrates the profound idea that our
perceptions reflect innate patterns in the brain. These inborn mental
processes, in a top-down fashion, determine the organization of the
individual parts of the percept, just as mountains and valleys deter-
mine the course of a river. Moreover, the Gestalt psychologists sug-
gested, the laws of perceptual grouping exemplify a more general
principle known as the law of Prägnanz (“meaningfulness”). This prin-
ciple states that we perceive the simplest pattern possible—the percept
requiring the least mental effort. The most general of all the Gestalt
principles, Prägnanz (pronounced PRAYG-nonce) has also been called
the minimum principle of perception. The law of Prägnanz is what
makes proofreading so hard to do, as you will find when you examine
Figure 3.24.
Learning-Based Inference: The Nurture of Perception In 1866,
Hermann von Helmholtz pointed out the important role of learning (or
nurture) in perception. His theory of learning-based inference emphasized
how people use prior learning to interpret new sensory information.
Based on experience, then, the observer makes inferences—guesses or
predictions—about what the sensations mean. This theory explains, for
laws of perceptual grouping The Gestalt
principles of similarity, proximity, continuity, and common
fate. These “laws” suggest how our brains prefer to group
stimulus elements together to form a percept (Gestalt).
law of similarity The Gestalt principle that we
tend to group similar objects together in our perceptions.
law of proximity The Gestalt principle that we
tend to group objects together when they are near each
other. Proximity means “nearness.”
A
BIRD
IN THE
THE HAND
FIGURE 3.24
A Bird in the . . .
We usually see what we expect to
see—not what is really there. Look
again.
Quickly scan this photo. Then look away and describe as
much as you recall. Next, turn to page 124 to learn what
you may or may not have seen.

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 121
example, why you assume a birthday party is in progress when you see lighted candles
on a cake: You have learned to associate cakes, candles, and birthdays.
Ordinarily, such perceptual inferences are fairly accurate. On the other hand, we
have seen that confusing sensations and ambiguous arrangements can create perceptual
illusions and erroneous conclusions. Our perceptual interpretations are, in effect,
hypotheses about our sensations. For example, even babies come to expect that faces
will have certain features in fixed arrangements (pair of eyes above nose, mouth below
nose, etc.). In fact, our expectations about faces in their usual configuration are so
thoroughly ingrained that we fail to “see” facial patterns that violate our expectations,
particularly when they appear in an unfamiliar orientation. When you look at the two
inverted portraits of Beyoncé (Figure 3.25), do you detect any important differences
between them? Turn the book upside down for a surprise.
What, according to the theory of learning-based inference, determines how suc-
cessful we will be in forming an accurate percept? The most important factors in-
clude the context, our expectations, and our perceptual set. We will see that each of
these involves a way of narrowing our search of the vast store of concepts in long-
term memory.
Context and Expectations Once you identify a context, you form expectations about
what persons, objects, and events you are likely to experience (Biederman, 1989). To
see what we mean, take a look at the following:
It says THE CAT, right? Now look again at the middle letter of each word. Physically,
these two letters are exactly the same, yet you perceived the first as an H and the sec-
ond as an A. Why? Clearly, your perception was affected by what you know about
words in English. The context provided by T__E makes an H highly likely and an A
unlikely, whereas the reverse is true of the context of C__T (Selfridge, 1955).
Here’s a more real-world example: You have probably had difficulty recogniz-
ing people you know in situations where you didn’t expect to see them, such as
in a different city or a new social group. The problem, of course, is not that they
looked different but that the context was unusual: You didn’t expect them to be
there. Thus, perceptual identification depends on context and expectations as well as
on an object’s physical properties.
Perceptual Set Another way learning serves as a platform from which context and
expectation exert an influence on perception involves perceptual set—which is closely
related to expectation. Under the influence of perceptual set, we have a readiness to
notice and respond to certain stimulus cues—like a sprinter anticipating the starter’s
pistol. In general, perceptual set involves a focused alertness for a particular stimulus
in a given context. For example, a new mother is set to hear the cries of her child.
Likewise, if you drive a sporty red car, you probably know how the highway patrol
has a perceptual set to notice speeding sporty red cars.
Often, a perceptual set leads you to transform an ambiguous stimulus into the one
you were expecting. To experience this yourself, read quickly through the series of
words that follow in both rows:
FOX; OWL; SNAKE; TURKEY; SWAN; D?CK
BOB; RAY; DAVE; BILL; TOM; D?CK
Notice how the words in the two rows lead you to read D?CK differently in each row.
The meanings of the words read prior to the ambiguous stimulus create a perceptual
law of common fate The Gestalt principle that
we tend to group similar objects together that share a
common motion or destination.
law of Prägnanz The most general Gestalt prin-
ciple, which states that the simplest organization, requir-
ing the least cognitive effort, will emerge as the figure.
Prägnanz shares a common root with pregnant, and so it
carries the idea of a “fully developed figure.” That is, our
perceptual system prefers to see a fully developed Gestalt,
such as a complete circle—as opposed to a broken circle.
learning-based inference The view that per-
ception is primarily shaped by learning (or experience),
rather than by innate factors.
perceptual set Readiness to detect a particular
stimulus in a given context—as when a person who is
afraid interprets an unfamiliar sound as a threat.
law of continuity The Gestalt principle that we
prefer perceptions of connected and continuous figures
to disconnected and disjointed ones.
FIGURE 3.25
Two Perspectives on Beyoncé
Although one of these photos clearly
has been altered, they look similar
when viewed this way. However, turn
the book upside down and look again.

122 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
set. Words that refer to animals create a perceptual set that influences you to read
D?CK as “DUCK.” Names create a perceptual set leading you to see D?CK as DICK.
Yet another illustration of perceptual set appears in the Do It Yourself! box “You See
What You’re Set to See.”
Cultural Influences on Perception Which of the following three items go together:
chicken, cow, grass? If you are American, you are likely to group chicken and cow,
because they are both animals. But if you are Chinese, you are more likely to put the
latter two together, because cows eat grass. In general, says cross-cultural psychologist
Richard Nisbett, Americans tend to put items in categories by abstract type
rather than by relationship or function (Winerman, 2006d).
Nisbett and his colleagues have also found that East Asians typically per-
ceive in a more holistic fashion than do Americans (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett &
Norenzayan, 2002). That is, the Asians pay more attention to, and can later
recall more detail about, the context than do Americans. (This is true, inciden-
tally, even if the American is of Chinese ancestry.) Specifically, when looking at
a scene, people raised in America tend to spend more time scanning the “fig-
ure,” while those raised in China usually focus more on details of the “ground”
(Chua et al., 2005). “The Americans are more zoom and the East Asians are
more panoramic,” says neuroscientist Denise Park (Goldberg, 2008). Such dis-
tinctions are now even showing up as subtle differences on scans comparing
brain activity of Asians and Americans on simple perceptual judgment tasks
(Hedden et al., 2008).
Cross-cultural psychologists have pointed to still other cultural differ-
ences in perception (Segall et al., 1999). Consider, for example, the famous
Ponzo illusion, based on linear perspective depth cues (see Figure 3.26). In
your opinion, which bar is longer: the one on top (marked A) or the one
on the bottom (marked B)? In actuality, both bars are the same length. (If
you’ve developed a skeptical scientific attitude, you’ll measure them!) Re-
search shows, however, that responses to these figures depend strongly on
culture-related experiences. Most readers of this book will report that the
top bar appears longer than the bottom bar, yet people from some cultural
backgrounds are not so easily fooled.
Why the difference? The world you have grown up in probably included
many structures featuring parallel lines that seemed to converge in the dis-
tance: railroad tracks, long buildings, highways, and tunnels. Such experi-
ences leave you vulnerable to images, such as the Ponzo illusion, in which
cues for size and distance are unreliable.
But what about people from cultures where individuals have had far less
experience with this cue for distance? Research on this issue has been carried
YOU SEE WHAT YOU’RE SET TO SEE
Labels create a context that can impose a
perceptual set for an ambiguous figure. Have
a friend look carefully at the picture of the
“young woman” in image (A) of the accompa-
nying figure, and have another friend exam-
ine the “old woman” in image (B). (Cover the
other pictures while they do this.) Then have
them look together at image (C). What do
they see? Each will probably see something
different, even though it’s the same stimulus
pattern. Prior exposure to the picture with a
specific label will usually affect a person’s
perception of the ambiguous figure.
(A) A Young Woman (B) An Old Woman (C) Now what do you see?
A
B
FIGURE 3.26
The Ponzo Illusion
The two white bars superimposed on the railroad
track are actually identical in length. Because A ap-
pears farther away than B, we perceive it as longer.

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 123
out on the Pacific island of Guam, where there are no Ponzolike railroad tracks (Bris-
lin, 1974, 1993). There, too, the roads are so winding that people have few opportu-
nities to see roadsides “converge” in the distance. People who have spent their entire
lives on Guam, then, presumably have fewer opportunities to learn the strong percep-
tual cue that converging lines indicate distance.
And, sure enough—just as researchers had predicted—people who had lived all their
lives on Guam were less influenced by the Ponzo illusion than were respondents from
the mainland United States. That is, they were less likely to report that the top line in the
figure was longer. These results strongly support the argument that people’s experiences
affect their perceptions—as Helmholz had theorized.
Depth Perception: Nature or Nurture? Now that we have looked at two contrast-
ing approaches to perception—Gestalt theory, which emphasizes nature, and learning-
based inference, which emphasizes nurture—let’s see how each explains a
classic problem in psychology: depth perception. Are we born with the ability
to perceive depth, or must we learn it? Let’s look at the evidence.
Bower (1971) found evidence of depth perception in infants only 2 weeks
old. By fitting his subjects with 3-D goggles, Bower produced powerful virtual
reality images of a ball moving about in space. When the ball image suddenly
appeared to move directly toward the infant’s face, the reaction was increased
heart rate and obvious anxiety. This suggests that some ability for depth per-
ception is probably inborn or heavily influenced by genetic programming that
unfolds in the course of early development.
Although depth perception appears early in human development, the
idea of being cautious when there is danger of falling seems to  develop later
in infancy. In a famous demonstration, psychologists Eleanor Gibson and
Richard Walk placed infants on a Plexiglas-topped table that appeared to drop
off sharply on one end. (See the accompanying photo.) Reactions to the visual
cliff occurred mainly in infants older than 6 months—old enough to crawl.
Most readily crawled across the “shallow” side of the table, but they were
reluctant to go over the “edge” of the visual cliff—indicating not only that they
could perceive depth but also that they associated the drop-off with danger
(Gibson & Walk, 1960). Developmental psychologists believe that crawling and depth
perception are linked in that crawling helps infants develop their understanding of the
three-dimensional world.
Digging deeper into the problem of depth perception, we find that our sense of
depth or distance relies on multiple cues. We can group these depth cues in two catego-
ries, either binocular cues or monocular cues.
Binocular Cues Certain depth cues, the binocular cues, depend on the use of two eyes.
You can demonstrate this to yourself: Hold one finger about 6 inches from your eyes
and look at it. Now move it about a foot farther away. Do you feel the change in your
eye muscles as you focus at different distances? This feeling serves as one of the main
cues for depth perception when looking at objects that are relatively close. The term
for this, binocular convergence, suggests how the lines of vision from each eye con-
verge at different angles on objects at different distances.
A related binocular depth cue, retinal disparity, arises from the difference in
perspectives of the two eyes. To see how this works, again hold a finger about 12
inches from your face and look at it alternately with one eye and then with the
other. Notice how you see a different view of your finger with each eye. Because
we see greater disparity when looking at nearby objects than we do when viewing
distant objects, these image differences coming from each eye provide us with depth
information.
We can’t say for sure whether the binocular cues are innate or learned. What we
can say is that they rely heavily on our biology: a sense of eye muscle movement and
the physically different images on the two retinas. The monocular cues, however, pres-
ent a very different picture.
binocular cues Information taken in by both
eyes that aids in depth perception, including binocular
convergence and retinal disparity.
Apprehension about the “visual cliff” shows that
infants make use of distance clues. This ability de-
velops at about the same time an infant is learning
to crawl.
Read t
at MyPsychLab
about Cultural Differences in
Interpretation of Symbols

124 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
Monocular Cues for Depth Perception Not all cues for depth perception require both
eyes. A one-eyed pilot we know, who manages to perceive depth well enough to ma-
neuver the airplane safely during takeoffs and landings, is proof that one-eye cues con-
vey a great deal of depth information. Here are some of the monocular cues that a
one-eyed pilot (or a two-eyed pilot, for that matter) could learn to use while flying:
• If two objects that are assumed to be the same size cast different-sized images on
the retina, observers usually judge them to lie at different distances. So a pilot fly-
ing low can learn to use the relative size of familiar objects on the ground as a cue
for depth and distance. Because of this cue, automakers who install wide-angle
rear-view mirrors always inscribe the warning on them, “Objects in the mirror are
closer than they appear.”
• If you have ever looked down a long, straight railroad track, you know that the
parallel rails seem to come together in the distance—as we saw in the Ponzo illusion
(p. 122). Likewise, a pilot approaching a runway for landing sees the runway as being
much wider at the near end than at the far end. Both examples illustrate how linear
perspective, the apparent convergence of parallel lines, can serve as a depth cue.
• Lighter-colored objects seem closer to us, and darker objects seem farther away.
Thus, light and shadow work together as a distance cue. You will notice this the
next time you drive your car at night with the headlights on: Objects that reflect
the most light appear to be nearer than more dimly lit objects in the distance.
• We assume that closer objects will cut off our vision of more distant objects
behind them, a distance cue known as interposition. So we know that partially
hidden objects are more distant than the objects that hide them. You can see this
effect right in front of you now, as your book partially obscures the background,
which you judge to be farther away.
• As you move, objects at different distances appear to move through your field
of vision at a different rate or with a different relative motion. Look for this one
from your car window. Notice how the power poles or fence posts along the road-
side appear to move by at great speed, while more distant objects stay in your field
of view longer, appearing to move by more slowly. With this cue, student pilots
learn to set up a glide path to landing by adjusting their descent so that the end of
the runway appears to stay at a fixed spot on the windshield while more distant
points appear to move upward and nearer objects seem to move downward.
• Haze or fog makes objects in the distance look fuzzy, less distinct, or invisible, creat-
ing another learned distance cue called atmospheric perspective. In the accompanying
photo, you can see that more distant buildings lack clarity through the Los Angeles
smog. At familiar airports, most pilots have identified a landmark three miles away. If
they cannot see the landmark, they know that they must fly by relying on instruments.
So which of the two theories about perception that we have been discussing—
Helmholtz’s learning theory or the Gestaltists’ innate theory—best accounts for depth
perception? Both of them! That is, depth and distance perception—indeed, all our
perceptual processes—show the influence of both nature and nurture.
Seeing and Believing
If you assume, as most people do, that your senses give you an accurate and undis-
torted picture of the outside world, you are mistaken (Segall et al., 1990). We hope
that the illusions presented in this chapter will help make the point. We also hope that
the chapter has helped you realize that people see the world through the filter of their
own perceptions—and that marketing and politics depend on manipulating our per-
ceptions (think iPhones, Droids, and Blackberries).
Magicians are also experts in manipulating perceptions—and so perceptual scien-
tists are making them partners in perceptual research (Hyman, 1989; Martinez-Conde &
Macknik, 2008; Sanders, 2009). The results include discoveries about change blindness,
inattentional blindness, and brain modules involved in both attention and perception.
monocular cues Information about depth that
relies on the input of just one eye—includes relative
size, light and shadow, interposition, relative motion,
and atmospheric perspective.
Haze, fog, or air pollution makes distant
objects less distinct, creating atmo-
spheric perspective, which acts as a
distance cue. Even the air itself provides
a cue for distance by giving far-away
objects a bluish cast.
Did you see a woman committing suicide
in the photo on page 120? Most people
have difficulty identifying the falling
woman in the center of the photo because
of the confusing background and because
they have no perceptual schema that
makes them expect to see a person posi-
tioned horizontally in midair.

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 125
Unlike magicians, however, perceptual scientists are happy to reveal how sensation and
perception play tricks on us all. (Incidentally, a magician friend of ours warns that smart
people are the easiest ones to fool. So watch out!)
We hope that this chapter has shaken your faith in your senses and perceptions . . .
just a bit. To drive the point home, consider this statement (which, unfortunately, was
printed backward):
.rat eht saw tac ehT
Please turn it around in your mind: What does it say? At first most people see a sen-
sible sentence that says, “The cat saw the rat.” But take another look. The difficulty lies
in the power of expectations to shape your interpretation of stimulation.
This demonstration illustrates once again that we don’t merely sense the world as it
is; we perceive it. The goal of the process by which stimulation becomes sensation and,
finally, perception is to find meaning in our experience. But it is well to remember that
we impose our own meanings on sensory experience.
Differences in the ways we interpret our experiences explain why two people can
look at the same sunset, the same presidential candidates, or the same religions and
perceive them so differently. Perceptual differences make us unique individuals. An old
Spanish proverb makes the point elegantly:
En este mundo traidor In this treacherous world
No hay verdad ni mentira; There is neither truth nor lie;
Todo es según el color All is according to the color
Del cristál con que se mira. Of the lens through which we spy.
With this proverb in mind, let’s return one more time to the problem with which
we began the chapter—and in particular to the question of whether the world looks
(feels, tastes, smells . . .) the same to different people. We have every reason to suspect
that we all (with some variation) sense the world in roughly the same way. But be-
cause we attach different meanings to our sensations, it is clear that people perceive
the world in many different ways—with, perhaps, as many differences as there are
people.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
One of the most mistaken notions about studying and learning is that students should
set aside a certain amount of time for study every day. This is not to suggest that you
shouldn’t study regularly. Rather, it is to say that you shouldn’t focus on merely put-
ting in your time. So where should you place your emphasis? (And what does this have
to do with perceptual psychology?)
Recall the concept of Gestalt, the idea of the meaningful pattern, discussed earlier in
this chapter. The Gestalt psychologists taught that we have an innate tendency to under-
stand our world in terms of meaningful patterns. Applied to your studying, this means that
your emphasis should be on finding meaningful patterns—Gestalts—in your course work.
In this chapter, for example, you will find that your authors have helped you by divid-
ing the material into three major sections. You can think of each section as a conceptual
Gestalt built around a Core Concept that ties it together and gives it meaning. We suggest
that you organize your study of psychology around one of these meaningful units of ma-
terial. That is, identify a major section of your book and study that until it makes sense.
To be more specific, you might spend an hour or two working on the first section of this
chapter, where you would not only read the material but also connect each boldfaced term
to the Core Concept. For example, what does the difference threshold have to do with the
idea that the brain senses the world through neural messages? (Sample brief answer: The
brain is geared to detect changes or differences that are conveyed to it in the form of neural
Most of us assume that our senses
give us an accurate picture of the
world. This helps magicians like
Lance Burton fool us with perceptual
illusions.
about Extrasensory Perception atRead
MyPsychLab

126 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
impulses.) We suggest that you do the same thing with each of the other boldfaced terms in
the chapter. The result will be a deeper understanding of the material. In perceptual terms,
you will be constructing a meaningful pattern—a Gestalt—around the Core Concept.
You can do that only by focusing on meaningful units of material rather than on
the clock.
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Subliminal Perception and Subliminal Persuasion
Could extremely weak stimulation—stimulation that you don’t even notice—affect your attitudes, opinions, or be-
havior? We know that the brain does a lot of information
processing outside of awareness. So the notion that your
sensory system can operate below the level of awareness is
the basis for the industry that sells “subliminal” recordings
touted as remedies for obesity, shoplifting, smoking, and low
self-esteem. The same notion also feeds the fear that certain
musical groups imbed hidden messages in their recordings or
that advertisers may be using subliminal messages to influ-
ence our buying habits and, perhaps, our votes (Vokey, 2002).
What Are the Critical Issues?
People are always hoping for a bit of magic. But before you put
your money in the mail for that subliminal weight-loss CD, let’s
identify what exactly we’re talking about—and what we’re not
talking about. If subliminal persuasion works as claimed, then
it must work on groups of people—a mass audience—rather
 
than just on individuals. It also means that a persuasive mes-
sage can change the behavior of large numbers of people, even
though no one is aware of the message. The issue is not whether
sensory and perceptual processing can occur outside of aware-
ness. The issue is whether subliminal messages can effect a sub-
stantial change in people’s attitudes, opinions, and behaviors.
Fame, Fortune, Fraud, and Subliminal Perception There
is always a possibility of fraud when fortune or fame is
involved, which is certainly the case with claims of amazing
powers—such as persuasion through subliminal perception. This
should cue us to ask: What is the source of claims that sublimi-
nal persuasion techniques work? That question leads us to an
advertising executive, one James Vicary, who dramatically an-
nounced to the press some years ago that he had discovered an
irresistible sales technique, now known as “subliminal advertis-
ing.” Vicary said that his method consisted of projecting very
brief messages on the screen of a movie theater, urging the audi-
ence to “Drink Coke” and “Buy popcorn.” He claimed that the
subliminal perception The process by which a
stimulus that is below the awareness threshold can be
sensed and interpreted outside of consciousness.
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: Give an example, from your own experience, of
top-down processing.
2. RECALL: Our brains have specialized cells, known as
, dedicated to identifying stimulus properties such as
length, slant, color, and boundary.
3. RECALL: What do perceptual constancies do for us?
4. RECALL: What two basic perceptual properties seem to reverse or
alternate in the faces/vase image (in Figure 3.17A)?
5. APPLICATION: When two close friends are talking, other people
may not be able to follow their conversation because it has
many gaps that the friends can mentally fill in from their shared
experience. Which Gestalt principle is illustrated by the friends’
ability to fill in these conversational gaps?
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Which of the
following best illustrates the idea that perception is not an exact
internal copy of the world?
a. the sound of a familiar tune
b. the Ponzo illusion
c. a bright light
d. jumping in response to a pinprick
Answers 1. Your example should involve perception based on expectations, motives, emotions, or mental images—such as seeing a friend’s face
in a crowd or making sense of an unexpected sound in the house at night. 2. feature detectors 3. Perceptual constancies allow us to identify and
track objects under a variety of conditions, such as changes in illumination or perspective. 4. Figure and ground 5. Closure 6. b—because, of all the
choices listed, the Ponzo illusion involves the most extensive perceptual interpretation.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception? 127
ads presented ideas so fleetingly that the conscious mind could
not perceive them—yet, he said, the messages would still lodge
in the unconscious mind, where they would work on the view-
ers’ desires unnoticed. Vicary also boasted that sales of Coca-
Cola and popcorn had soared at a New Jersey theater where he
tested the technique.
The public was both fascinated and outraged. Subliminal
advertising became the subject of intense debate. People wor-
ried that they were being manipulated by powerful psycho-
logical forces without their consent. As a result, laws were
proposed to quash the practice. But aside from the hysteria,
was there any real cause for concern? To answer that ques-
tion, we must ask: What is the evidence?
Examining the Evidence Let’s first see what the psycholog-
ical science of perceptual thresholds can tell us. As you will re-
call, a threshold refers to the minimum amount of stimulation
necessary to trigger a response. The word subliminal means
“below the threshold” (limen = threshold). In the language of
perceptual psychology, subliminal more specifically refers to
stimuli lying near the absolute threshold. Such stimuli may, in
fact, be strong enough to affect the sense organs and to enter
the sensory system without causing conscious awareness of the
stimulus. But the real question is this: Can subliminal stimuli in
this range influence our thoughts and behavior?
Several studies have found that subliminal words flashed
briefly on a screen (for less than 1/100 second) can “prime”
a person’s later responses (Merikle & Reingold, 1990). For
example, can you fill in the following blanks to make a word?
S N _ _ _ E L
If you had been subliminally primed by a brief presenta-
tion of the appropriate word or picture, it would be more
likely that you would have found the right answer, even
though you were not aware of the priming stimulus. So does
the fact that subliminal stimulation can affect our responses
on such tasks mean that subliminal persuasion really works?
Of course, priming doesn’t always work: It merely in-
creases the chances of getting the “right” answer. The answer
to the problem, by the way, is “snorkel.” And were you aware
that we were priming you with the photo, to the right, of a
snorkeler? If you were, it just goes to show that sometimes
people do realize when they are being primed.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Apparently people do perceive stimuli below the absolute
threshold, under circumstances such as the demonstration
above (Greenwald et al., 1996; Reber, 1993). Under very
carefully controlled conditions, subliminal perception is a
fact. But here is the problem for would-be subliminal adver-
tisers who would attempt to influence us in the uncontrolled
world outside the laboratory: Different people have thresh-
olds at different levels. So what might be subliminal for me
could well be supraliminal (above the threshold) for you.
Consequently, the would-be subliminal advertiser runs the
risk that some in the audience will notice—and perhaps be
angry about—a stimulus aimed slightly below the average
person’s threshold. In fact, no controlled research has ever
shown that subliminal messages delivered to a mass audience
can influence people’s buying habits or voting patterns.
And what about those subliminal recordings that some
stores play to prevent shoplifting? Again, no reputable study
has ever demonstrated their effectiveness. A more likely expla-
nation for any decrease in shoplifting attributed to these mes-
sages lies in increased vigilance from employees who know
that management is worried about shoplifting. The same goes
for the tapes that claim to help you quit smoking, lose weight,
become wildly creative, or achieve other dozens of elusive
dreams. In a comprehensive study of subliminal self-help
techniques, the U.S. Army found all to be without foundation
(Druckman & Bjork, 1991). The simplest explanation for re-
ports of success lies in the purchasers’ expectations and in the
need to prove that they did not spend their money foolishly.
And finally, to take the rest of the worry out of subliminal
persuasion, you should know one more bit of evidence. James
Vicary eventually admitted that his claims for subliminal ad-
vertising were a hoax (Druckman & Bjork, 1991).
So, using our previous SNORKEL example, could you use
what you know about the Gestalt principle of closure to get
theatergoers to think about popcorn?
This photo carries a subliminal message, explained in the text.

• The brain does not sense the external world directly. The sense
organs transduce stimulation and deliver stimulus information
to the brain in the form of neural impulses. Our sensory
experiences are, therefore, what the brain creates from the
information delivered in these neural impulses.
CHAPTER PROBLEM: Is there any way to tell whether the
world we “see” in our minds is the same as the external world—and
whether we see things as most others do?
• Different people probably have similar sensations in response
to a stimulus because their sense organs and parts of the brain
they use in sensation are similar.
• People differ, however, in their perceptions, because they draw
on different experiences to interpret their sensations.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
3.1 How Does Stimulation Become
Sensation?
Core Concept 3.1 The brain senses the world indirectly
because the sense organs convert stimulation into the
language of the nervous system: neural messages.
The most fundamental step in sensation involves the trans-
duction by the sense organs of physical stimuli into neural
messages, which are sent onward in the sensory pathways
to the appropriate part of the brain for further process-
ing. Not all stimuli become sensations, because some fall
below the absolute threshold. Further, changes in stimula-
tion are noticed only if they exceed the difference threshold.
Classical psychophysics focused on identifying thresholds
for sensations and for just-noticeable differences, but a
newer approach, called signal detection theory, explains sen-
sation as a process involving context, physical sensitivity,
and judgment. We should consider our senses to be change
detectors. But because they accommodate to unchanging
stimulation, we become less and less aware of constant
stimulation.
absolute threshold (p. 91)
difference threshold (p. 92)
perception (p. 89)
sensation (p. 88)
sensory adaptation (p. 93)
signal detection theory (p. 93)
transduction (p. 90)
Weber’s law (p. 92)
3.2 How Are the Senses Alike?
How Are They Different?
Core Concept 3.2 The senses all operate in much the
same way, but each extracts different information and sends it
to its own specialized sensory processing region in the brain.
All the senses involve transduction of physical stimuli into
nerve impulses. Thus, our sensations are not properties of
the original stimulus, but rather are creations of the brain.
In vision, photoreceptors in the retina transduce light waves
into neural codes, which retain frequency and amplitude
information. This visual information is then transmitted by
the optic nerve to the brain’s occipital lobe, which converts
the neural signals into sensations of color and brightness.
Both the trichromatic theory and the opponent process theory
are required to explain how visual sensations are extracted.
Vision makes use of only a tiny “window” in the electromag-
netic spectrum.
In the ear, sound waves in the air are transduced into neural
energy in the cochlea and then sent on to the brain’s temporal
lobes, where frequency and amplitude information are con-
verted to sensations of pitch, loudness, and timbre.
Other senses include position and movement (the
vestibular and kinesthetic senses), smell, taste, the skin senses
(touch, pressure, and temperature), and pain. Like vision
and hearing, these other senses are especially attuned to
detect changes in stimulation. Further, all sensations are
carried to the brain by neural impulses, but we experience
different sensations because the impulses are processed
by different sensory regions of the brain. In some people,
sensations cross sensory domains. Studies suggest that
synesthesia involves communication between sensory areas
of the brain that lie close together. This seems to occur more
often in highly creative people.
The experience of pain can be the result of intense stimu-
lation in any of several sensory pathways. While we don’t
completely understand pain, the gate-control theory explains
how pain can be suppressed by competing sensations or
other mental processes. Similarly, the ideal analgesic—one
without unwanted side effects—has not been discovered, al-
though the placebo effect works exceptionally well for some
people.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter
128 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception

Chapter Summary 129
afterimages (p. 99)
amplitude (p. 101)
basilar membrane (p. 102)
blind spot (p. 96)
brightness (p. 98)
cochlea (p. 102)
color (p. 98)
color blindness (p. 100)
cones (p. 96)
electromagnetic spectrum (p. 98)
fovea (p. 96)
frequency (p. 101)
gate-control theory (p. 109)
gustation (p. 106)
kinesthetic sense (p. 105)
loudness (p. 103)
olfaction (p. 105)
opponent-process theory (p. 99)
optic nerve (p. 96)
percept (p. 112)
pheromones (p. 105)
photoreceptors (p. 95)
pitch (p. 102)
placebo (p. 110)
placebo effect (p. 110)
retina (p. 95)
rods (p. 95)
skin senses (p. 108)
synesthesia (p. 108)
timbre (p. 103)
trichromatic theory (p. 99)
tympanic membrane (p. 101)
vestibular sense (p. 105)
visible spectrum (p. 98)
3.3 What Is the Relationship between
Sensation and Perception?
Core Concept 3.3 Perception brings meaning to
sensation, so perception produces an interpretation of the
world, not a perfect representation of it.
Psychologists define perception as the stage at which mean-
ing is attached to sensation. Visual identification of objects
involves feature detectors in the what pathway that projects to
the temporal lobe. The where pathway, projecting to the parietal
lobe, involves the location of objects in space. The disorder
known as blindsight occurs because the where pathway can
operate outside of consciousness. We also derive meaning from
bottom-up stimulus cues picked up by feature detectors and
from top-down processes, especially those involving expecta-
tions. What remains unclear is how the brain manages to com-
bine the output of many sensory circuits into a single percept:
This is called the binding problem. By studying such perceptual
phenomena as illusions, perceptual constancies, change blindness,
and inattentional blindness, researchers can learn about the fac-
tors that influence and distort the construction of perceptions.
Illusions demonstrate that perception does not necessarily
form an accurate representation of the outside world.
Perception has been explained by theories that differ in their
emphasis on the role of innate brain processes versus learning—
nature versus nurture. Gestalt psychology emphasizes innate fac-
tors that help us organize stimulation into meaningful patterns.
In particular, the Gestaltists have described the processes that
help us distinguish figure from ground, to identify contours and
apply closure, and to group stimuli according to similarity, prox-
imity, continuity, and common fate. Some aspects of depth percep-
tion, such as retinal disparity and convergence, may be innate
as well. The theory of learning-based inference also correctly
points out that perception is influenced by experience, such as
context, perceptual set, and culture. Many aspects of depth per-
ception, such as relative motion, linear perspective, and atmo-
spheric perspective, seem to be learned.
Despite all we know about sensation and perception,
many people uncritically accept the evidence of their senses
(and perceptions) at face value. This allows magicians, politi-
cians, and marketers an opening through which they can ma-
nipulate our perceptions and, ultimately, our behavior.
ambiguous figures (p. 115)
binding problem (p. 113)
binocular cues (p. 123)
blindsight (p. 112)
bottom-up processing (p. 113)
change blindness (p. 114)
closure (p. 119)
feature detectors (p. 112)
figure (p. 118)
Gestalt psychology (p. 118)
ground (p. 118)
illusion (p. 114)
inattentional blindness (p. 114)
law of common fate (p. 121)
law of continuity (p. 121)
law of Prägnanz (p. 121)
law of proximity (p. 120)
law of similarity (p. 120)
laws of perceptual grouping (p. 120)
learning-based inference (p. 121)
monocular cues (p. 124)
percept (p. 112)
perceptual constancy (p. 113)
perceptual set (p. 121)
top-down processing (p. 113)
what pathway (p. 112)
where pathway (p. 112)
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that techniques of
subliminal persuasion are effective in persuading a mass audi-
ence to change their attitudes or behaviors.
Subliminal Perception and Subliminal Persuasion
Subliminal messages, in the form of priming, have been
shown to affect an individual’s responses on simple tasks un-
der carefully controlled conditions. Yet, despite advertising

130 C H A P T E R 3 Sensation and Perception
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the video, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 7: SENSATION AND PERCEPTION
Program Review
c. He will accurately perceive the ball’s position.
d. It is impossible to predict an individual’s reaction in this
situation.
8. Imagine that a small dog is walking toward you. As the dog gets
closer, the image it casts on your retina
a. gets larger. c. gets smaller.
b. gets darker. d. stays exactly the same size.
9. Imagine the same small dog walking toward you. You know that
the dog’s size is unchanged as it draws nearer. A psychologist
would attribute this to
a. perceptual constancy. c. contrast effects.
b. visual paradoxes. d. threshold differences.
10. Which of the following best illustrates that perception is an active
process?
a. bottom-up processing c. top-down processing
b. motion parallax d. parietal senses
11. The program shows a drawing that can be seen as a rat or as a
man. People were more likely to identify the drawing as a man
if they
a. were men themselves.
b. had just seen pictures of people.
c. were afraid of rats.
d. looked at the picture holistically rather than analytically.
12. Where is the proximal stimulus found?
a. in the outside world c. in the occipital lobe
b. on the retina d. in the thalamus
13. How is visual information processed by the brain?
a. It’s processed by the parietal lobe, which relays the informa-
tion to the temporal lobe.
b. It’s processed entirely within the frontal lobe.
c. It’s processed by the occipital lobe, which projects to the
thalamus, which projects to a succession of areas in the
cortex.
d. If the information is abstract, it’s processed by the cortex; if
it’s concrete, it’s processed by the thalamus.
1. Imagine that a teaspoon of sugar is dissolved in 2 gallons of water.
Rita can detect this level of sweetness at least half the time. This
level is called the
a. distal stimulus. c. response bias.
b. perceptual constant. d. absolute threshold.
2. What is the job of a receptor?
a. to transmit a neural impulse
b. to connect new information with old information
c. to detect a type of physical energy
d. to receive an impulse from the brain
3. In what area of the brain is the visual cortex located?
a. in the front c. in the back
b. in the middle d. under the brain stem
4. What is the function of the thalamus in visual processing?
a. It relays information to the cortex.
b. It rotates the retinal image.
c. It converts light energy to a neural impulse.
d. It makes sense of the proximal stimulus.
5. David Hubel discusses the visual pathway and the response to a
line. The program shows an experiment in which the response to a
moving line changed dramatically with changes in the line’s
a. thickness. c. speed.
b. color. d. orientation.
6. Misha Pavel used computer graphics to study how
a. we process visual information.
b. rods differ from cones in function.
c. we combine information from different senses.
d. physical energy is transduced in the visual system.
7. Imagine that a baseball player puts on special glasses that shift
his visual field up 10 degrees. When he wears these glasses,
the player sees everything higher than it actually is. After some
practice, the player can hit with the glasses on. What will happen
when the player first tries to hit with the glasses off?
a. He will think that the ball is lower than it is.
b. He will think that the ball is higher than it is.

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 131
14. Which of the following is true about the proximal stimulus in
visual perception?
a. It’s identical to the distal stimulus because the retina pro-
duces a faithful reproduction of the perceptual world.
b. It’s upside-down, flat, distorted, and obscured by blood vessels.
c. It’s black and white and consists of very sparse information
about horizontal and vertical edges.
d. It contains information about the degree of convergence of the
two eyes.
15. Which of the following is an example of pure top-down processing
(i.e., requires no bottom-up processing)?
a. hallucinating
b. understanding someone else’s speech when honking horns are
obscuring individual sounds
c. perceiving a circular color patch that has been painted onto a
canvas
d. enjoying a melody
16. Which sensory information is not paired with the cortical lobe that
is primarily responsible for processing it?
a. visual information, occipital lobe
b. speech, frontal lobe
c. body senses, parietal lobe
d. hearing, central sulcus lobe
17. When your eyes are shut, you cannot
a. hallucinate.
b. use contextual information from other senses to make infer-
ences about what’s there.
c. transform a distal visual stimulus into a proximal stimulus.
d. experience perceptual constancy.
18. The researcher David Hubel is best known for
a. mapping visual receptor cells.
b. discovering subjective contours.
c. identifying the neural pathways by which body sensations occur.
d. realizing that hearing and smell originate from the same brain
area.
19. The primary reason why psychologists study illusions is because
a. they help in identifying areas of the cortex that have been
damaged.
b. they serve as good “public relations” material for curious novices.
c. they help in categorizing people into good and bad perceivers.
d. they help in understanding how perception normally works.
20. The shrinking-square illusion demonstrated by Misha Pavel relies
on processing of which kinds of feature?
a. edges and corners
b. color and texture
c. torque and angular momentum
d. density gradients and motion

Learning and Human Nurture4
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
4.1 What Sort of Learning Does
Classical Conditioning Explain?
The Essentials of Classical Conditioning
Applications of Classical Conditioning
Classical conditioning is a basic form
of learning in which a stimulus that
produces an innate reflex becomes
associated with a previously neutral
stimulus, which then acquires the power
to elicit essentially the same response.
Taste Aversions and
Chemotherapy
Your friend risks developing a food
aversion when medicine makes her
feel sick.
4.2 How Do We Learn New Behaviors
by Operant Conditioning?
Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism
The Power of Reinforcement
The Problem of Punishment
A Checklist for Modifying Operant
Behavior
Operant and Classical Conditioning
Compared
In operant conditioning, the
consequences of behavior, such as
rewards and punishments, influence
the probability that the behavior will
occur again.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
If the Premack Principle doesn’t
work for you, try using behavioral
principles to make studying itself more
reinforcing.
According to cognitive psychology,
some forms of learning must be
explained as changes in mental
processes rather than as changes
in behavior alone.
Fear of Flying Revisited
A combination of classical
conditioning, operant conditioning,
and cognitive techniques makes fear
manageable.
CHAPTER PROBLEM Assuming Sabra’s fear of flying was a response she had learned, could it
also be treated by learning? If so, how?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Do Different People Have Different “Learning Styles”?
4.3 How Does Cognitive Psychology
Explain Learning?
Insight Learning: Köhler in the Canaries
with Chimps
Cognitive Maps: Tolman Finds Out What’s
on a Rat’s Mind
Observational Learning: Bandura’s
Challenge to Behaviorism
Brain Mechanisms and Learning
“Higher” Cognitive Learning

133
I N 1924, JOHN WATSON BOASTED, “GIVE ME A DOZEN HEALTHY INFANTS, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his tal-
ents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.” Decades later, the
assumption behind Watson’s lofty claim became the bedrock on which the community called
Walden Two was built: Nurture trumps nature. Or, to put it another way: Environment carries far
more weight than heredity in determining our behavior.
At Walden Two, residents can enter any sort of profession that interests them. In their
leisure time, they can do whatever they like: attend concerts, lie on the grass, read, or perhaps
drink coffee with friends. They have no crime, no drug problems, and no greedy politicians. In
exchange for this happy lifestyle, community members must earn four “labor credits” each day,
doing work needed by the community. (That’s about 4 hours’ work—fewer hours for unpleasant
tasks, such as cleaning sewers, but more for the easiest work, perhaps pruning the roses.) Fol-
lowing Watson’s vision, the founder of Walden Two, a psychologist named Frasier, believed peo-
ple could have happy, fulfilling lives in an environment psychologically engineered to reward
people for making socially beneficial choices. To reap these benefits, all a community must do
is change the way it deals out rewards.
Where was this community built? Only in the mind of behaviorist B. F. Skinner. You see,
Walden Two is a novel written by Skinner (1948) to promote his ideas on better living through
behavioral psychology. But so alluring was the picture he painted of this mythical miniature
society that many real-world communes sprang up, using Walden Two as the blueprint.

134 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
None of the real communities based on Walden Two ran so smoothly as the one in Skinner’s
mind. Yet at least one such group, Twin Oaks, located in Virginia, thrives after more than
40 years—but not without substantial modifications to Skinner’s vision (Kincade, 1973). In
fact, you can visit this group electronically through its website at www.twinoaks.org/index.html
(Twin Oaks, 2007).
Nor was behaviorism’s fate exactly as Skinner had envisioned it. Although the behaviorist
perspective dominated psychology during much of the 20th century, its fortunes fell as cog-
nitive psychology grew in prominence. But what remains is behaviorism’s substantial legacy,
including impressive theories of behavioral learning and a valuable set of therapeutic tools for
treating learned disorders—such as fears and phobias. To illustrate what behaviorism has given
us, consider the problem that confronted Sabra.
A newly minted college graduate, Sabra landed a dream job at an advertising firm in
San Francisco. The work was interesting and challenging, and she enjoyed her new colleagues.
The only problem was that her supervisor had asked her to attend an upcoming conference in
Hawaii—and take an extra few days of vacation there at the company’s expense. Why was that
a problem? Sabra had a fear of flying.
PROBLEM: Assuming Sabra’s fear of flying was a response she had learned, could it also
be treated by learning? If so, how?
A common stereotype of psychological treatment involves “reliving” traumatic experi-
ences that supposedly caused fear or some other symptom. Behavioral learning therapy,
however, works differently. It focuses on the here and now instead of the past: The
therapist acts like a coach, teaching the client new responses to replace old problem
behaviors. So, as you consider how Sabra’s fear might be treated, you might think along
the following lines:
• What problematic behaviors would we expect to see in people like Sabra who are
afraid of flying?
• What behaviors could Sabra learn to replace her fearful behavior?
• How could these new behaviors be taught?
While the solution to Sabra’s problem involves learning, it’s not the sort of hit-the-
books learning that usually comes to mind for college students. Psychologists define
the concept of learning broadly, as a process through which experience produces a last-
ing change in behavior or mental processes. According to this definition, then, Sabra’s
“flight training” would be learning—just as taking golf lessons or reading this text is a
learning experience.
To avoid confusion, two parts of our definition need elaboration. First, we underscore
the idea that learning involves a lasting change. Suppose you go to your doctor’s office
and get a particularly painful injection, during which the sight of the needle becomes as-
sociated with pain. The result: The next time you need a shot, and every time thereafter,
you wince when you first see the needle. This persistent change in responding involves
learning. In contrast, a simple, reflexive reaction, such as jumping when you hear an un-
expected loud noise, does not qualify as learning because it produces no lasting change—
nothing more than a fleeting reaction, even though it does entail a change in behavior.
Second, learning affects behavior or mental processes. In the doctor’s office exam-
ple above, it is easy to see how learning affects behavior. But mental processes are more
difficult to observe. How could you tell, for example, whether a laboratory rat had
simply learned the behaviors required to negotiate a maze (turn right, then left, then
right . . .) or whether it was following some sort of mental image of the maze, much as
you would follow a road map? (And why should we care what, if anything, was on a
rat’s mind?) Let’s venture a little deeper into our definition of learning by considering
the controversy surrounding mental processes.
learning A lasting change in behavior or mental
processes that results from experience.

www.twinoaks.org/index.html

C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture 135
Behavioral Learning versus Cognitive Learning The problem of observing mental
events, whether in rats or in people, underlies a long-running controversy between
behaviorists and cognitive psychologists that threads through this entire chapter. For
more than 100 years, behaviorists maintained that psychology could be a true sci-
ence only if it disregarded subjective mental processes and focused solely on observ-
able stimuli and responses. On the other side of the issue, cognitive psychologists
contend that the behavioral view is far too limiting and that understanding learning
requires us to make inferences about hidden mental processes. In the following pages,
we will see that both sides in this dispute have made important contributions to our
knowledge.
Learning versus Instincts So, what does learning—either behavioral or cognitive—
do for us? Nearly all human activity, from working to playing to interacting with fam-
ily and friends, involves some form of learning. Without learning, we would have no
human language. We wouldn’t know who our family or friends were. We would have
no memory of our past or goals for our future. And without learning, we would be
forced to rely on simple reflexes and a limited repertoire of innate behaviors, sometimes
known as “instincts.”
In contrast with learning, instinctive behavior is heavily influenced by genetic pro-
gramming, as we see in bird migrations or animal mating rituals. In humans, however,
behavior is much more influenced by learning than by instincts. For us, learning pro-
vides greater flexibility to adapt quickly to changing situations and new environments.
In this sense, then, learning represents an evolutionary advance over instincts.
Simple and Complex Forms of Learning Some forms of learning are quite simple.
For example, if you live near a busy street, you may learn to ignore the sound of the
traffic. This sort of learning, known as habituation, involves learning not to respond to
stimulation. Habituation occurs in all animals that have nervous systems, from insects
and worms to people. It helps you focus on important stimuli while ignoring stimuli
that need no attention, such as the feel of the chair you are sitting on or the sound of
the air conditioning in the background.
Another relatively simple form of learning is our general preference for familiar
stimuli as contrasted with novel stimuli. This mere exposure effxect occurs regardless
of whether the stimulus was associated with something pleasurable, or we were even
aware of the stimulus. The mere exposure effect probably accounts for the effective-
ness of much advertising (Zajonc, 1968, 2001). It also helps explain our attraction to
people we see often at work or school and for songs we have heard at least a few times.
Other kinds of learning can be more complex. One type involves learning a con-
nection between two stimuli—as when you associate a certain scent with a particular
person who wears that fragrance. Another occurs when we associate our actions with
rewarding or punishing consequences, such as a reprimand from the boss or an A
from a professor. The initial sections of the chapter will emphasize these two especially
important forms of behavioral learning, which we will call classical conditioning and
operant conditioning.
In the third section of the chapter, we shift our focus from external behavior to
internal mental processes. There, our look at cognitive learning will consider how
sudden “flashes of insight” and imitative behavior require theories that go beyond
behavioral learning to explain how we solve problems or why children imitate behav-
ior for which they see other people being rewarded. We will also discuss acquisition of
concepts, the most complex form of learning and, notably, the sort of learning you do
in your college classes. We will close the chapter on a practical note by considering how
to use the psychology of learning to help you study more effectively—and enjoy it.
Now, let’s begin—with a form of behavioral learning that accounts for many of
your own likes and dislikes: classical conditioning.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Instinct refers to motivated
behaviors that have a strong
innate basis (p. 369).
habituation Learning not to respond to the
repeated presentation of a stimulus.
mere exposure effect A learned preference for
stimuli to which we have been previously exposed.
behavioral learning Forms of learning, such as
classical conditioning and operant conditioning, that
can be described in terms of stimuli and responses.
This giant leatherback turtle “instinc-
tively” returns to its birthplace each year
to nest. Although this behavior is heavily
influenced by genetics, environmental
cues such as tidal patterns play a role
as well. Thus, scientists usually shun
the term instinct, preferring the term
species-typical behavior.
The behavioral perspective says that
many abnormal behaviors are learned.

136 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
4.1 KEY QUESTION
What Sort of Learning Does Classical Conditioning Explain?
Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) would have been insulted had you called him a psychologist.
In fact, this Russian physiologist had only contempt for the structuralist and function-
alist psychology of his time, which he saw as hopelessly mired in speculation about
subjective mental life (Todes, 1997). Pavlov and the hundreds of student researchers
who passed through his research “factory” were famous for their work on the digestive
system—for which Pavlov eventually snared a Nobel prize (Fancher, 1979; Kimble,
1991).
Unexpectedly, however, their experiments on salivation (the first step in digestion)
went awry, sending Pavlov and his crew on a detour into the psychology of learning—
a detour that occupied Pavlov for the rest of his life. The problem they encountered
was that their experimental animals began salivating even before food was put in their
mouths (Dewsbury, 1997), which—from a biological perspective—was inexplicable, as
salivation normally occurs only after food enters the mouth. Yet, in Pavlov’s animals,
saliva would start flowing when they merely saw the food or they heard the footsteps
of the lab assistant bringing the food.
This response was a puzzle. What could be the biological function of salivating
before receiving food? When Pavlov and his associates turned their attention to under-
standing these “psychic secretions,” they made a series of discoveries that would for-
ever change the course of psychology (Pavlov, 1928; Todes, 1997). Quite by accident,
they had stumbled upon an objective model of learning that could be manipulated in
the laboratory to tease out the connections among stimuli and responses. This discov-
ery, now known as classical conditioning, forms the Core Concept of this section:
Core Concept 4.1
Classical conditioning is a basic form of learning in which a stimulus
that produces an innate reflex becomes associated with a previously
neutral stimulus, which then acquires the power to elicit essentially
the same response.
In the following pages, we will see that classical conditioning accounts for some
important behavior patterns found not only in animals but also in people. By means of
classical conditioning, organisms learn about cues that help them anticipate and avoid
danger, as well as cues alerting them to food, sexual opportunity, and other conditions
that promote survival. First, however, let’s examine the fundamental features Pavlov
identified in classical conditioning.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Structuralism and functionalism
were two of the early “schools” of
psychology (p. 14).
classical conditioning A form of behavioral
learning in which a previously neutral stimulus
acquires the power to elicit the same innate reflex
produced by another stimulus.
To study classical conditioning, Pavlov (in
the center of the photo) placed his dogs
in a restraining apparatus. The dogs were
then presented with a neutral stimulus,
such as a tone. Through its association
with food, the neutral stimulus became a
conditioned stimulus eliciting salivation.

What Sort of Learning Does Classical Conditioning Explain? 137
The Essentials of Classical Conditioning
Pavlov’s work on learning focused on manipulating simple, automatic responses
known as reflexes (Windholz, 1997). Salivation and eye blinks are examples of such
reflexes, which commonly result from stimuli that have biological significance: The
blinking reflex, for example, protects the eyes; the salivation reflex aids digestion.
Pavlov’s great discovery was that his dogs could associate these reflexive responses
with new stimuli—neutral stimuli that had previously produced no response (such as
the sound of the lab assistant’s footsteps). Thus, they could learn the connection be-
tween a reflex and a new stimulus. For example, Pavlov found he could teach a dog to
salivate upon hearing a certain sound, such as the tone produced by striking a tuning
fork or a bell. You have experienced the same sort of learning if your mouth waters
when you read the menu in a restaurant.
To understand how these “conditioned reflexes” worked, Pavlov’s team employed
a simple experimental strategy. They first placed an untrained dog in a harness and set
up a vial to capture the animal’s saliva. Then, at intervals, they sounded a tone, after
which they gave the dog a bit of food. At first, the dog salivated only after receiving
the food—demonstrating a normal, biological reflex. But gradually, over a number of
trials pairing the tone with the food, the dog began to salivate in response to the tone
alone. Pavlov and his students had discovered that a neutral stimulus (one without any
reflex-provoking power, such as a tone or a light), when paired with a natural reflex-
producing stimulus (such as food), will by itself begin to elicit a learned response (sali-
vation) similar to the original reflex. In humans, classical conditioning is the learning
process that makes us associate romance with flowers or chocolate.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the main features of Pavlov’s classical conditioning proce-
dure. At first glance, the terms may seem a bit overwhelming. Nevertheless, you will
find it immensely helpful to study them carefully now so they will come to mind easily
later—when we analyze complicated, real-life learning situations, as in the acquisition
and treatment of fears, phobias, and food aversions.
Acquisition Classical conditioning always involves an unconditioned stimulus (UCS), a
stimulus that automatically—that is, without conditioning—provokes a reflexive re-
sponse. Pavlov used food as the UCS because it reliably produced the salivation reflex.
neutral stimulus Any stimulus that produces
no conditioned response prior to learning. When it is
brought into a conditioning experiment, the researcher
will call it a conditioned stimulus (CS). The assumption
is that some conditioning occurs after even one pairing
of the CS and UCS.
unconditioned stimulus (UCS) In classical
conditioning, UCS is the stimulus that elicits an
unconditioned response.
Unconditioned response (UCR)
Automatically
elicits
Before conditioning
During conditioning (acquisition)
Food
Unconditioned stimulus (UCS)
Neutral stimulus (NS)
Neutral stimulus (NS)
Tone
Unconditioned response (UCR)Unconditioned stimulus (UCS)
Conditioned response (CR)
No response or irrevelant response
Salivation
Salivation
Salivation
No salivation
Food
Followed by Elicits
Elicits
Tone
After conditioning
Conditioned stimulus (CS)
Tone
FIGURE 4.1
Basic Features of Classical
Conditioning
Before conditioning, the food (UCS) natu-
rally elicits salivation (UCR). A tone from
a tuning fork is a neutral stimulus (NS)
and has no effect. During conditioning
(the acquisition phase), the tone (NS)
is paired with the food (UCS), which
continues to elicit the salivation response
(UCR). Through its association with the
food, the previously neutral tone becomes
a conditioned stimulus (CS), gradually
producing a stronger and stronger
salivation response (CR).
Source: Zimbardo, P.G., & Gerrig, R. J.. (1999).
Psychology and Life, 15th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon. Copyright © 1999 by Pearson Education.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

138 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
In the language of classical conditioning, then, this is called an unconditioned reflex
or, more commonly, an unconditioned response (UCR). It is important to realize that the
UCS–UCR connection is “wired in” and so involves no learning. His dogs didn’t have
to learn to salivate when they received food, just as you don’t have to learn to cry out
when you feel pain: Both are unconditioned responses.
Acquisition, the initial learning stage in classical conditioning, pairs a new stimulus—a
neutral stimulus (NS)—with the unconditioned stimulus. Typically, after several trials, the
neutral stimulus (the tone produced by a tuning fork, for example) will elicit essentially the
same response as does the UCS. So, in Pavlov’s experiments, when the sound alone began
to produce salivation, this formerly neutral stimulus became a conditioned stimulus (CS).
Although this response to the conditioned stimulus is essentially the same as the response
originally produced by the unconditioned stimulus, we now refer to it as the conditioned
response (CR)—because it is occurring as a result of conditioning, or learning. The same
thing may have happened to you in grade school, when your mouth watered (a condi-
tioned response) at the sound of the lunch bell (a conditioned stimulus).
In conditioning, as in telling a joke, timing is critical. In most cases, the CS and
UCS must occur contiguously (close together in time) so the organism can make the
appropriate connection during acquisition. The range of time intervals between the CS
and UCS that produces the best conditioning depends on the type of response being
conditioned. For motor responses, such as eye blinks, a short interval of one second or
less is best. For visceral responses, such as heart rate and salivation, longer intervals of
five to 15 seconds work best. Conditioned fear optimally requires even longer intervals
of many seconds or even minutes between the CS and the UCS. Taste aversions, we will
see, can develop even after several hours’ delay. (These time differentials probably have
survival value. For example, in the case of taste aversions, rats seem to be genetically
programmed to eat small amounts of an unfamiliar food and, if they don’t get sick,
return to the food after a few hours.)
These, then, are the building blocks of classical conditioning: the UCS, UCR, NS
(which becomes the CS), CR, and the timing that connects them. Why did it take Pavlov
three decades and 532 experiments to study such a simple phenomenon? There was
more to classical conditioning than first met Pavlov’s eyes. Along with acquisition, he
also discovered extinction, spontaneous recovery, generalization, and discrimination—
which we will now explore.
Extinction and Spontaneous Recovery As a result of your grade-school experience
with lunch bells, would your mouth still water at the sound of a school bell in your
neighborhood today? In other words, do conditioned responses remain permanently in
your behavioral repertoire? The good news, based on experiments by Pavlov’s group,
suggests they do not. Conditioned salivation responses in Pavlov’s dogs were easily
eliminated by withholding the UCS (food) over several trials in which the CS (the tone)
was presented alone. In the language of classical conditioning, we call this extinction (in
classical conditioning). It occurs when a conditioned response disappears after repeated
presentations of the CS without the UCS. Figure 4.2 shows how the conditioned re-
sponse (salivation) becomes weaker and weaker during extinction trials. So, after years
of hearing bells that were not immediately followed by food, we would not expect your
mouth-watering response upon hearing a bell today. Extinction, then, is of considerable
importance in behavioral therapies for fears and phobias, such as Sabra’s fear of flying.
Now for the bad news: Imagine that, after many years, you are visiting your old
grade school to give a presentation to the first graders. While you are there, the lunch
bell rings—and, to your surprise, your mouth waters. Why? The conditioned response
has made a spontaneous recovery. Much the same thing happened with Pavlov’s dogs:
Some time after undergoing extinction training, they would salivate again when they
heard the tone. In technical terms, this spontaneous recovery occurs when the CR reap-
pears after extinction and after a period without exposure to the CS. Happily, when
spontaneous recovery happens, the conditioned response nearly always reappears at a
lower intensity, as you can see in Figure 4.2. In practice, then, the CR can gradually be
eliminated, although this may require several extinction sessions.
unconditioned response (UCR) In classical
conditioning, the response elicited by an unconditioned
stimulus without prior learning.
acquisition The initial learning stage in classical
conditioning, during which the conditioned response
comes to be elicited by the conditioned stimulus.
conditioned stimulus (CS) In classical
conditioning, a previously neutral stimulus that comes
to elicit the conditioned response. Customarily, in a
conditioning experiment, the neutral stimulus is called
a conditioned stimulus when it is first paired with an
unconditioned stimulus (UCS).
conditioned response (CR) In classical
conditioning, a response elicited by a previously
neutral stimulus that has become associated with
the unconditioned stimulus.
extinction (in classical conditioning) The
weakening of a conditioned response in the absence
of an unconditioned stimulus.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Behavioral therapies are based
on classical conditioning and
operant conditioning (p. 568).
spontaneous recovery The unexpected
reappearance of an extinguished conditioned response
after a time delay.

What Sort of Learning Does Classical Conditioning Explain? 139
Generalization Now, switching to a visual CS, suppose you have developed a fear of
spiders. Most likely, you will probably respond the same way to spiders of all sizes and
markings. We call this stimulus generalization: giving a conditioned response to stimuli
that are similar to the CS. Pavlov demonstrated stimulus generalization in his labo-
ratory by showing that a well-trained dog would salivate in response to a tone of a
slightly different pitch from the one used during conditioning. As you would expect,
the closer the new sound was to the original, the stronger the response.
In everyday life, we see stimulus generalization when people acquire fears as a
result of traumatic events. So a person who was bitten by a dog may develop a fear of
all dogs rather than fearing only the specific dog responsible for the attack. Likewise,
stimulus generalization accounts for an allergy sufferer’s sneeze upon seeing a paper
flower. In short, by means of stimulus generalization, we learn to give old responses in
new situations.
Discrimination Learning As a child, you may have learned to salivate at the sound
of the lunch bell, but—thanks to stimulus discrimination—your mouth probably didn’t
water when the doorbell rang. Much the opposite of stimulus generalization, stimulus
discrimination occurs when an organism learns to respond to one stimulus but not to
stimuli that are similar. Pavlov and his students demonstrated this when they taught
dogs to distinguish between two tones of different frequencies. Once again, their pro-
cedure was simple: One tone was followed by food while another was not. Over a
series of trials, the dogs gradually learned to discriminate between the tones, evidenced
in salivation elicited by one tone and not the other. Beyond the laboratory, stimulus
discrimination is the concept that underlies advertising campaigns aimed at condition-
ing us to discriminate between particular brands, as in the perennial battle between
Pepsi and Coke.
Applications of Classical Conditioning
The beauty of classical conditioning is that it offers a simple explanation for many
behaviors, from cravings to aversions. Moreover, it gives us the tools for eliminating
unwanted human behaviors—although Pavlov himself never attempted any therapeu-
tic applications. Instead, it fell to the American behaviorist, John Watson, to apply
classical conditioning techniques to human problems.
The Notorious Case of Little Albert More than 90 years ago, John Watson and
Rosalie Rayner first demonstrated conditioned fear in a human (Brewer, 1991;
Fancher, 1979). In an experiment that would be considered unethical today, Watson
and Rayner (1920/2000) conditioned an infant named Albert to react fearfully to
stimulus generalization The extension of a
learned response to stimuli that are similar to the
conditioned stimulus.
stimulus discrimination Learning to respond
to a particular stimulus but not to stimuli that are
similar.
Trials
St
re
n
g
th
o
f
th
e
C
R
(W
ea
k)
(S
tr
o
n
g
) (1)
Acquisition
(NS + UCS)
(2)
Extinction
(CS alone)
(3)
Spontaneous
recovery and
re-extinction
(CS alone)
N
o
e
xp
o
su
re
t
o
C
S
(Time )
FIGURE 4.2
Acquisition, Extinction, and
Spontaneous Recovery
(1) During acquisition (NS + UCS), the
strength of the CR increases rapidly,
after which the NS becomes the CS.
(2) During extinction, when the UCS no
longer follows the CS, the strength of the
CR drops to zero. (3) After extinction, the
CR may occasionally reappear, even when
the UCS is still not presented; only the
CS alone occurs. This reappearance of
the CR is called “spontaneous recovery.”
Source: Zimbardo, P.G., & Gerrig, R. J. (1999).
Psychology and Life, 15th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon. Copyright © 1999 by Pearson Education.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
Stimulus
Generalization and Stimulus Discrimination
Explore the Concept
at MyPsychLab

140 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
a white laboratory rat. They created the fear response by repeatedly presenting the
rat, paired with the loud sound of a steel bar struck with a mallet, which acted as an
aversive UCS. It took only seven trials for “Little Albert” to react with distress at the
appearance of the rat (CS) alone. After Albert’s response to the rat had become well
established, Watson and Rayner showed that his aversion readily generalized from the
rat to other furry objects, such as a Santa Claus mask and a fur coat worn by Watson
(Harris, 1979).
Most likely, the experiment caused Albert only temporary distress, because his
fear response extinguished rapidly, making it necessary for Watson and Raynor to
renew the fear conditioning periodically. In fact, the need to recondition Albert
nearly ended the whole experiment when Watson and Rayner were attempting to
generalize the child’s fear to a dog, a rabbit, and a sealskin coat. Watson decided to
“freshen the reaction to the rat” by again striking the steel bar. The noise startled the
dog, which began to bark, frightening not only Little Albert but both experimenters
(Harris, 1979).
Unlike Little Albert’s short-lived aversion to furry objects, some fears learned under
highly stressful conditions can persist for years (LeDoux, 1996). During World War
II, the Navy used a gong sounding at the rate of 100 rings a minute as a call to battle
stations. For combat personnel aboard ship, this sound became strongly associated
with danger—a CS for emotional arousal. The persistent effect of this association was
shown in a study conducted 15 years after the war, when Navy combat veterans still
gave a strong autonomic reaction to the old “call to battle stations” (Edwards & Acker,
1962).
Like those veterans, any of us can retain a readiness to respond to old emotional
cues. Fortunately, however, classical conditioning also provides tools for eliminating
troublesome conditioned fears (Wolpe & Plaud, 1997). One strategy combines extinc-
tion of the conditioned fear response with counterconditioning, a therapy that teaches
a relaxation response to the CS. This approach has been particularly effective in deal-
ing with phobias. As you may be thinking, we ought to consider counterconditioning
as part of the treatment plan to help Sabra conquer her fear of flying.
Conditioned Food Aversions All three of your authors have had bad experiences
with specific foods. Phil got sick after eating pork and beans in the grade school lunch-
room, Bob became ill after a childhood overdose of olives, and Vivian became queasy
after eating chicken salad (formerly one of her favorite meals). In all three cases, we
associated our distress with the distinctive sight, smell, and taste of the food—which,
for years afterward, was enough to cause feelings of nausea.
Unpleasant as it is, learning to avoid a food associated with illness has survival
value. That’s why humans and other animals readily form an association between ill-
ness and food—much more readily than between illness and a nonfood stimulus, such
as a light or a tone. For example, nothing else present in your authors’ environments
during their bad food experiences became associated with nausea. Phil didn’t become
wary of the trays his school lunches were served on, Bob didn’t develop a reaction to
the highchair in which he developed his olive antipathy, and Vivian didn’t avoid the
friends who were dining with her when she ate the treacherous meal. It was solely the
foods that became effective conditioned stimuli.
John Garcia and Robert Koelling (1966) first recognized this highly selective
CS–UCS connection when they noticed rats wouldn’t drink from water bottles in the
chambers where they had previously been made nauseous by radiation. Could the rats
be associating the taste of the water in those bottles with being sick? Subsequent ex-
periments confirmed their suspicions and led to yet another important discovery. Rats
readily learned an association between flavored water and illness, yet the rats could
not be conditioned to associate flavored water with the pain of an electric shock de-
livered through a grid on the floor of the test chamber. This makes good sense from
an evolutionary perspective, because illness can easily result from drinking (or eat-
ing) poisonous substances but rarely occurs following a sharp pain to the feet. Simi-
larly, rats easily learned to fear bright lights and noise when they preceded an electric
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
The autonomic nervous system
regulates the internal organs
(p. 57).
John Watson and Rosalie Rayner
conditioned Little Albert to fear
furry objects like this Santa Claus
mask (Discovering Psychology,
1990). For years, no one knew
what had become of Little Albert
after the research. Archival records
recently revealed that, sadly,
Douglass Merritte—the boy known
as Little Albert—died just a few
years later from acquired hydro-
cephalus (Beck, et al., 2009).

What Sort of Learning Does Classical Conditioning Explain? 141
shock—but could not learn to connect those light and sound cues with subsequent
illness. Such observations suggest that organisms have an inborn preparedness to
associate certain stimuli with certain consequences, while other CS–UCS combinations
are highly resistant to learning.
Biological Predispositions: A Challenge to Pavlov A major insight resulting from
the Garcia and Koelling experiments is that conditioned aversions involve both nature
and nurture. That is, the tendency to develop taste aversions appears to be “wired in”
as part of our biological nature rather than purely learned. It is this biological basis for
taste aversions that prompts psychologists to question some aspects of Pavlov’s origi-
nal theory of classical conditioning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
Biological predispositions may also impact the timing involved in acquiring a
conditioned aversion. For example, food aversions can develop even when the time
interval between eating and illness extends over several hours—as compared with
just a few seconds in Pavlov’s experiments. Again, this suggests that in food aversions,
we are not dealing with a simple classically conditioned response as Pavlov under-
stood it but, instead, with a response based as much in nature (biology) as in nurture
(learning).
And such biological predispositions go far beyond taste and food aversions.
Psychologists now believe that many common fears and phobias arise from genetic
preparedness, built into us from our ancestral past, disposing us to learn fears of harm-
ful objects: snakes, spiders, blood, lightning, heights, and closed spaces. Likewise, anxi-
ety about mutilation or other bodily harm can contribute to fears of seemingly modern
objects or situations, such as injections, dentistry, or flying.
Real-World Applications of Classical Conditioning Examples of the impact of
classical conditioning on human and on animal behavior abound. One clever experi-
ment by John Garcia and his colleagues demonstrated how aversive conditioning can
dissuade wild coyotes from attacking sheep. They did so by wrapping toxic lamb burg-
ers in sheepskins and stashing them on sheep ranches: When roaming coyotes found
and ate these meaty morsels, they became sick and—as predicted—developed a dis-
taste for lamb meat. The result was a whopping 30 to 50 percent reduction in sheep
attacks! So powerful was this aversion that, when captured and placed in a cage with a
sheep, the coyotes would not get close to it. Some even vomited at the sight of a sheep
(Garcia, 1990). Unfortunately, this type of conditioning does not appear to extend to
sheep ranchers’ behavior: Despite the success of these experiments in natural predator
control, scientists have been unable to get the ranchers to use this method. Apparently,
sheep ranchers have a strong aversion to feeding lamb to coyotes!
Need help getting to sleep, studying, or getting yourself to the gym? A little clas-
sical conditioning might help: Try finding positive stimuli to associate with each of
those activities. For example, experts recommend keeping your sleeping area quiet
and peaceful at all times of the day and night so you learn to associate it with relax-
ation. Similarly, creating for yourself a specific study space that offers a comfortable
chair, pleasant aromas or tastes, or other sensations that positively stimulate you
will help you associate those positive stimuli with studying—especially if you allow
yourself exposure to these particular stimuli only when you study. And the same
principles apply to your efforts to exercise more: If you listen to your favorite music
only while working out, chances are you’ll start getting that pumped-up, “feels good
to exercise” feeling when you hear it—and then you can use it as a stimulus to get
yourself to the gym!
What is the big lesson coming out of all this work on classical conditioning? Con-
ditioning involves both nature and nurture. That is, conditioning depends not only on
the learned relationship among stimuli and responses but also on the way an organ-
ism is genetically attuned to certain stimuli in its environment (Barker et al., 1978;
Dickinson, 2001). What any organism can—and cannot—learn in a given setting is
to some extent a product of its evolutionary history (Garcia, 1993). And that is a
concept that Pavlov never understood.
A conditioned taste aversion can make
a coyote stop killing sheep.

142 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
4.2 KEY QUESTION
How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning?
With classical conditioning, you can teach a dog to salivate, but you can’t teach it to
sit up or roll over. Why? Salivation is a passive, involuntary reflex, while sitting up
and rolling over are much more complex responses that we usually think of as vol-
untary. To a behavioral psychologist, however, such “voluntary” behaviors are really
controlled by rewards and punishments. And because rewards and punishments play
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Taste Aversions and Chemotherapy
Imagine that your friend Jena is about to undergo her first round of chemotherapy, just
to make sure any stray cells from the tumor found in her breast will be destroyed. To her
surprise, the nurse enters the lab, not with the expected syringe, but with a dish of licorice-
flavored ice cream. “Is this a new kind of therapy?” she asks. The nurse replies that it
is, indeed, explaining that most patients who undergo chemotherapy experience nausea,
which can make them “go off their feed” and quit eating, just when their body needs
nourishment to fight the disease. “But,” says the nurse, “We have found a way around the
problem. If we give patients an unusual food before their chemotherapy, they usually de-
velop an aversion only to that food.” She continues, “Did you ever hear of Pavlov’s dogs?”
Conditioned food aversions make evolutionary sense, as we have seen, because
they helped our ancestors avoid poisonous foods. As is the case with some of our other
evolutionary baggage, such ancient aversions can cause modern problems. People un-
dergoing chemotherapy often develop aversions to normal foods in their diets to such
an extent that they become malnourished. The aversions are nothing more than con-
ditioned responses in which food (the CS) becomes associated with nausea. Chemo-
therapy personnel trained in classical conditioning use their knowledge to prevent the
development of aversions to nutritive foods by arranging for meals to be withheld just
before chemotherapy. And, as in Jena’s case, they also present a “scapegoat” stimulus.
By consuming candies or ice cream with unusual flavors before treatment, patients
develop taste aversions only to those special flavors. For some patients, this practical
solution to problems with chemotherapy may make the difference between life and
death (Bernstein, 1988, 1991).
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Which one of the
following could be an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) involved in
classical conditioning?
a. food
b. a flashing light
c. music
d. money
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: Give an example of classical conditioning from
your everyday life and identify the UCS, UCR, NS (which becomes
the CS), and CR.
2. RECALL: Before a response, such as salivation, becomes a
conditioned response, it is a(n) .
3. APPLICATION: If you learned to fear electrical outlets after
getting a painful shock, what would be the CS?
Answers 1. Everyday examples of classical conditioning involve learning taste aversions (such as a dislike for olives) or fears (such as a fear of going to
the dentist), as well as responses developed through association with positive stimuli. For example, if you develop feelings of contentment from the
smell of your grandmother’s house, the UCS is your grandmother’s house, the UCR the contentment you feel when you are with her, the NS the smell
of her house, which becomes the CS when you learn to associate it with her (after visiting her at her house several times). 2. innate reflex or UCR 3.
The electrical outlet 4. a—because it is the only one that produces an innate reflexive response (UCR).
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning? 143
no role in classical conditioning, another important form of learning must be at work.
Psychologists call it operant conditioning. (An operant, incidentally, is an observable
behavior that an organism uses to “operate” in, or have an effect on, the environment.
Thus, if you are reading this book to get a good grade on the next test, reading is
an operant behavior.) You might also think of operant conditioning as a form of learning
in which the consequences of behavior can encourage behavior change. The Core Concept
of this section puts the idea this way:
Core Concept 4.2
In operant conditioning, the consequences of behavior, such as
rewards and punishments, influence the probability that the behavior
will occur again.
Common rewarding consequences include money, praise, food, or high grades—all
of which can encourage the behavior they follow. By contrast, punishments such as
pain, loss of privileges, or low grades can discourage the behavior they follow.
As you will see, the theory of operant conditioning is an important one for at
least two reasons. First, operant conditioning accounts for a much wider spectrum of
behavior than does classical conditioning. And second, it explains new and voluntary
behaviors—not just reflexive behaviors.
Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism
The founding father of operant conditioning, American psychologist
B. F. Skinner (1904–1990), based his whole career on the idea that
the most powerful influences on behavior are its consequences: what
happens immediately after the behavior. Actually, it wasn’t Skinner’s
idea originally. He borrowed the notion of behavior being controlled
by rewards and punishments from another American psychologist,
Edward Thorndike, who demonstrated how hungry animals would
work diligently to solve a problem by trial and error to obtain a food
reward. Gradually, on succeeding trials, erroneous responses were
eliminated and effective responses were “stamped in.” Thorndike
called this the law of effect (see Figure 4.3). The idea was that an ani-
mal’s behavior leads to pleasant or unpleasant results that influence
whether the animal will try those behaviors again.
The first thing Skinner did with Thorndike’s psychology, however,
was to rid it of subjective and unscientific speculation about the or-
ganism’s feelings, intentions, or goals. What an animal “wanted” or
the “pleasure” it felt was not important for an objective understand-
ing of the animal’s behavior. As a radical behaviorist, Skinner refused
to consider what happens in an organism’s mind, because such specu-
lation cannot be verified by observation—and studying anything not
directly observable threatened the scientific credibility of the fledgling
field of psychology. For example, eating can be observed, but we can-
not observe the inner experiences of hunger, the desire for food, or
pleasure at eating.
The Power of Reinforcement
Skinner’s passionate commitment to the establishment of behaviorism
as a legitimate science permeated his work. For example, while we
often speak of “reward” in casual conversation, Skinner preferred the
more objective term reinforcer. Why so concerned over terminology?
Skinner objected to the term reward on the grounds that rewards
operant conditioning A form of behavioral
learning in which the probability of a response is
changed by its consequences—that is, by the stimuli
that follow the response.
reinforcer A condition (involving either the
presentation or removal of a stimulus) that occurs
after a response and strengthens that response.
law of effect The idea that responses that pro-
duced desirable results would be learned or “stamped”
into the organism.
FIGURE 4.3
A Thorndike Puzzle Box
Unlike Pavlov’s dogs, Thorndike’s cats faced a problem requir-
ing some kind of voluntary action on their part: how to open the
door in the puzzle box to get a food reward lying just outside.
To solve this problem, the animals used trial-and-error learning,
rather than simple reflexive responses. At first, their responses
seemed random, but gradually they eliminated ineffective be-
haviors. And when the effects of their behavior were desirable
(that is, when the door finally opened and the animals got the
food), they used this strategy on subsequent trials. This change
in behavior based on consequences of previous trials is called
the law of effect. Much the same trial-and-error learning occurs
when you learn a skill, such as shooting a basketball.

144 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
imply pleasure on the part of the recipient, which in turn assumes knowledge of the
organism’s inner experience—which was forbidden territory. Reinforcers, on the other
hand, act on the behavior (rather than the organism’s mind), which is directly observ-
able (Winn, 2001). So Skinner defined a reinforcer as any stimulus that follows and
strengthens a response. Food, money, and sex serve this function for most peoples; so
do attention, praise, or a smile. All these are examples of positive reinforcement, which
strengthens a response by occurring after the response and making the behavior more
likely to occur again.
Most people know about positive reinforcement, of course, but fewer people under-
stand the other main way to strengthen operant responses: the reinforcement of behav-
ior by the removal of an unpleasant or aversive stimulus. Psychologists call this negative
reinforcement. (The word negative here is used in the mathematical sense of subtract or
remove, while positive means add or apply. Please be careful not to make the common
mistake of confusing negative reinforcement with punishment: Instead, remember that
reinforcement always strengthens behavior, whereas punishment—which we’ll discuss
shortly—weakens it.) So using an umbrella to avoid getting wet during a downpour
is a behavior learned and maintained by negative reinforcement. That is, you use the
umbrella to avoid or remove an unpleasant stimulus (getting wet). Likewise, when you
buckle your seat belt to stop the annoying sound of the seat-belt buzzer in your car, you
are receiving negative reinforcement. And taking a few minutes right now to highlight
the distinction between negative reinforcement and punishment in your notes will help
you avoid the unpleasant consequence of missing that question on the exam—providing
yet another example of the power of negative reinforcement to strengthen behavior!
Reinforcing Technology: The “Skinner Box” One of B. F. Skinner’s (1956) innova-
tions was a simple device for studying the effects of reinforcers on laboratory animals:
a box with a lever an animal could press to obtain food. He called this device an
operant chamber. (Nearly everyone else called it a “Skinner box,” a term he detested.)
Over the years, thousands of psychologists have used the apparatus to study operant
conditioning.
The virtue of the operant chamber lay in its capacity to control the timing and
frequency of reinforcement, factors that exert important influences on behavior, as you
will soon see. Moreover, the Skinner box could be programmed to conduct experi-
ments at any time of day—even when the researcher was home in bed.
Contingencies of Reinforcement The timing and frequency of reinforcement deter-
mines its effect on behavior. So while grade reports delivered two or three times a year
may reinforce college and university students for their studying, such a schedule has
little effect on their day-to-day study habits. Many professors realize this, of course,
positive reinforcement A stimulus presented
after a response and increasing the probability of that
response happening again.
negative reinforcement The removal of an
unpleasant or aversive stimulus, contingent on a
particular behavior. Contrast with punishment.
operant chamber A boxlike apparatus that
can be programmed to deliver reinforcers and
punishers contingent on an animal’s behavior. The
operant chamber is often called a “Skinner box.”
In this cartoon, the child was positively reinforced for crying by being allowed to sleep with mom and dad. Ironically, this is
negative reinforcement for the parents, as they are letting the child sleep in their bed in order to avoid being disturbed by a
crying baby.
Source: Hi & Lois © King Features Syndicate.

How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning? 145
and schedule exams and assignments to award grades periodically throughout their
courses. In this way, they encourage continual studying rather than one big push at the
end of the semester. But that’s not always enough.
Whether we’re talking about college students, Fortune 500 CEOs, or laboratory
rats, any plan to influence operant learning requires careful consideration of the tim-
ing and frequency of rewards. How often will they receive reinforcement? How much
work must they do to earn a reinforcer? Will they be reinforced for every response or
only after a certain number of responses? We will consider these questions below in
our discussion of reinforcement contingencies, involving the many possible ways of as-
sociating responses and reinforcers. And stay alert for the Psychology Matters at the
end of this section, where we will give you some tips for applying these principles to
your own studying.
Continuous versus Intermittent Reinforcement Suppose you want to teach your
dog a trick—say, sitting on command. It would be a good idea to begin the training
program with a reward for every correct response. Psychologists call this continuous
reinforcement. It’s a useful tactic early in the learning process, because rewarding ev-
ery correct response and ignoring the incorrect ones provide quick and clear feedback
about which responses are desired. In addition, continuous reinforcement is useful for
shaping complex new behaviors. Shaping, often used in animal training, involves the
deliberate use of rewards (and sometimes punishments) to encourage better and better
approximations of the desired behavior. (You have experienced shaping in school, as
a teacher taught you to read, write, or play a musical instrument by gradually setting
reinforcement contingencies Relationships
between a response and the changes in stimulation
that follow the response.
continuous reinforcement A type of rein-
forcement schedule by which all correct responses are
reinforced.
shaping An operant learning technique in which a
new behavior is produced by reinforcing responses that
are similar to the desired response.
B. F. Skinner is shown reinforcing the
animal’s behavior in an operant chamber
or “Skinner box.” The apparatus allows the
experimenter to control all the stimuli in the
animal’s environment.
Just to set the record straight, we’d like to mention a bit of trivia about the “baby tender” crib that
Skinner devised for his daughter, Deborah (Benjamin & Nielsen-Gammon, 1999). It consisted of an
enclosed, temperature-controlled box that unfortunately bore a superficial resemblance to the oper-
ant chambers used in his experiments. The public learned about the “baby tender” from an article
by Skinner in the magazine Ladies’ Home Journal. The story took on a life of its own, and, years
later, stories arose about Deborah Skinner’s supposed psychotic breakdown, lawsuits against
her father, and eventual suicide—none of which were true. In fact, Deborah grew up to be a
well-adjusted individual who loved her parents.

146 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
higher standards.) By means of shaping, the teacher can continually
“raise the bar” or increase the performance level required for earn-
ing a reward. This tells the learner when performance has improved.
In general, then, we can say that continuous reinforcement is a good
strategy for shaping new behaviors.
Continuous reinforcement does have some drawbacks. For one
thing, failure to reward a correct response on one trial could easily
be misinterpreted as a signal that the response was not correct. Con-
sistency, then, is key to its success. Another drawback of continuous
reinforcement occurs after the reinforcer has been earned many times:
once the learner becomes satiated, the reinforcer loses its power to
motivate. For example, if someone were training you to shoot free
throws by rewarding you with a big candy bar after each successful
attempt, the first candy bar might be highly rewarding, but after you
have had several, the reward value dissipates.
Happily, once the desired behavior becomes well established (for
example, when your dog has learned to sit), the demands of the situ-
ation change. The learner no longer needs rewards to discriminate a correct response
from an incorrect one. It’s time to shift to intermittent reinforcement (also called partial
reinforcement), the rewarding of some, but not all, correct responses. A less frequent
schedule of reinforcement—perhaps, after every third correct response—still serves as
an incentive for your dog to sit on command, while helping to avoid satiation. In gen-
eral, whether we’re dealing with people or animals, intermittent reinforcement is the
most efficient way to maintain behaviors that have already been learned (Robbins,
1971; Terry, 2000). As a practical matter, the transition to intermittent reinforcement
can be made easier by mixing in social reinforcement (“Good dog!”) with more tan-
gible rewards (food, for example).
A big advantage of intermittent reinforcement is its resistance to extinction. The
operant version of extinction (in operant conditioning) occurs when reinforcement is with-
held, as when a gambler stops playing a slot machine that never pays off. Why do
responses strengthened by intermittent reinforcement resist extinction better than do
continuously rewarded responses? Imagine two gamblers and two slot machines. One
machine inexplicably pays off on every trial, and another, more typical, machine pays
on an unpredictable, intermittent schedule. Now, suppose both devices suddenly stop
paying. Which gambler will catch on first? The one who has been rewarded for each
push of the button (continuous reinforcement) will quickly notice the change, while
the gambler who has won only occasionally (on partial reinforcement) may continue
playing unrewarded for a long while.
Schedules of Reinforcement Now that we have convinced you of the power of
intermittent reinforcement, you should know it occurs in two main forms or schedules
of reinforcement. One, the ratio schedule, rewards after a certain number of responses.
The other, known as an interval schedule, reinforces after a certain time interval. Let’s
look at the advantages and disadvantages of each. As you read this section, refer fre-
quently to Figure 4.4, which provides a visual summary of the results of each type of
reinforcement.
Ratio Schedules Suppose you own a business and pay your employees based on the
amount of work they perform: You are maintaining them on a ratio schedule of rein-
forcement. That is, ratio schedules occur when rewards depend on the number of cor-
rect responses (see Figure 4.4). Psychologists make a further distinction between two
subtypes of ratio schedules, fixed ratio and variable ratio schedules.
Fixed ratio (FR) schedules commonly occur in industry, when workers are paid on
a piecework basis—a certain amount of pay for a certain amount of production. So
if you own a tire factory and pay each worker a dollar for every five tires produced,
you are using a fixed ratio schedule. Under this scheme, the amount of work (the num-
ber of responses) needed for a reward remains constant, but the faster people work,
the more money they get. Not surprisingly, management likes FR schedules because
intermittent reinforcement A type of
reinforcement schedule by which some, but not all,
correct responses are reinforced; also called partial
reinforcement.
extinction (in operant conditioning) A
process by which a response that has been learned is
weakened by the absence or removal of reinforcement.
(Compare with extinction in classical conditioning.)
schedule of reinforcement A program speci-
fying the frequency and timing of reinforcements.
ratio schedule A program by which reinforce-
ment depends on the number of correct responses.
interval schedule A program by which reinforce-
ment depends on the time interval elapsed since the
last reinforcement.
fixed ratio (FR) schedule A program by which
reinforcement is contingent on a certain, unvarying
number of responses.
Shaping was undoubtedly used to get the
dolphins to jump this high: They were
likely reinforced gradually for higher and
higher jumps until they eventually only
received reinforcement for the highest
jump.

How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning? 147
the rate of responding is usually high (Terry, 2000; Whyte, 1972), or, in other words,
it keeps people working quickly. Retail establishments also use fixed ratio schedules
when, for example, you receive a free pizza after buying ten pizzas from your local
pizza shop—which keeps you coming back to the same place for your next pizza.
Variable ratio (VR) schedules are less predictable. Telemarketers work on a VR sched-
ule, because they never know how many calls they must make before they get the next
sale, which acts as a reinforcer for the caller. Slot machine players also respond on a
variable ratio schedule, never knowing when the machine will pay off. In both cases,
continually changing the requirements for reinforcement keeps responses coming at
a high rate—so high, in fact, that the VR schedule usually produces more responding
than any other reinforcement schedule. In a demonstration of just how powerful a VR
schedule could be, Skinner showed that a hungry pigeon would peck a disk 12,000
times an hour for rewards given, on the average, for every 110 pecks (Skinner, 1953)!
Interval Schedules Time is of the essence on an interval schedule. That is, with
an interval schedule, reinforcement depends on responses made within a certain
time period (rather than on the total number of responses given) (see Figure 4.4).
Psychologists distinguish the same two kinds of interval schedules as ratio schedules:
fixed interval and variable interval schedules.
Fixed interval (FI) schedules commonly occur in the work world, where they may
appear as a periodic paycheck or praise from the boss at a monthly staff meeting. A
student who studies for a weekly quiz is also on a fixed interval schedule. In all such cases,
the interval does not vary, so the time period between rewards remains constant. You may
have already guessed that fixed interval reinforcement usually results in a comparatively
low response rate. Ironically, this is the schedule most widely adopted by business. Even a
rat in a Skinner box programmed for a fixed interval schedule soon learns it must produce
only a limited amount of work during the interval to get its reward. Pressing the lever
more often than required to get the food reward is just wasted energy. Thus, both rats and
humans on fixed interval schedules may display only modest productivity until near the
end of the interval, when the response rate increases rapidly. (Think of college students
facing a term paper deadline.) Graphically, in Figure 4.4, you can see the “scalloped” pat-
tern of behavior that results from this flurry of activity near the end of each interval.
Variable interval (VI) schedules are, perhaps, the most unpredictable of all. On a VI sched-
ule, the time interval between rewards (or punishments) varies. The resulting rate of re-
sponding can be high, although not usually as high as for the VR schedule. (Think about
it this way: You control the frequency of reward on the ratio schedule, because the faster
you work, the sooner you reach the magic number required for the reward. On interval
schedules, though, no matter how slowly or quickly you work, you cannot make time
pass any faster: Until the specified amount of time has passed, you will not receive your
reward.) For a pigeon or a rat in a Skinner box, the variable interval schedule may be a
30-second interval now, three minutes next, and a one-minute wait later. In the classroom,
pop quizzes exemplify a VI schedule, as do random visits by the boss or drug tests on the
job. And watch for responses typical of a VI schedule while waiting for an elevator: Be-
cause the delay between pressing the call button and the arrival of the elevator varies each
time, some of your companions will press the button multiple times—much like pigeons in
a Skinner box—as if more responses within an unpredictable time interval could control
the elevator’s arrival.
Primary and Secondary Reinforcers You can easily see why stimuli that fulfill basic
biological needs or desires provide reinforcement: Food reinforces a hungry animal, and
water reinforces a thirsty one. Similarly, the opportunity for sex becomes a reinforcer
for a sexually aroused organism. Psychologists call such stimuli primary reinforcers.
But money or grades provide a different sort of reinforcement: You can’t eat them
or drink them. Nor do they directly satisfy any physical need. So why do such things
reinforce behavior so powerfully? Neutral stimuli, such as money or grades, acquire a
reinforcing effect by association with primary reinforcers and so become conditioned
reinforcers or secondary reinforcers for operant responses. The same thing happens with
praise, smiles of approval, gold stars, “reward cards” used by merchants, and various
variable ratio (VR) schedule A reinforcement
program by which the number of responses required for
a reinforcement varies from trial to trial.
fixed interval (FI) schedule A program by
which reinforcement is contingent upon a certain, fixed
time period.
variable interval (VI) schedule A program
by which the time period between reinforcements varies
from trial to trial.
primary reinforcer A reinforcer, such as food or
sex, that has an innate basis because of its biological
value to an organism.
conditioned reinforcer or secondary
reinforcer A stimulus, such as money or tokens,
that acquires its reinforcing power by a learned
association with primary reinforcers.
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
f
re
q
u
en
cy
o
f
re
sp
o
n
d
in
g
FR
Brief pauses
after each
reinforcer is
delivered.
VI
Responding
occurs at
a fairly
constant
rate.
FI
Few
responses
immediately
after each
reinforcer is
delivered.
VR
No pauses
after each
reinforcer is
delivered.
Fixed ratio
Variable ratio
Fixed interval
Variable interval
R
es
p
o
n
se
s
Time
FIGURE 4.4
Reinforcement Schedules
The graphs show typical patterns of
responding produced by four different
schedules of reinforcement. (The hash
marks indicate when reinforcement is
delivered.) Notice that the steeper angle
of the top two graphs shows how the ratio
schedules usually produce more
responses over a given period of time
than do the interval schedules.

148 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
kinds of status symbols. In fact, virtually any stimulus can become a secondary or
conditioned reinforcer by being associated with a primary reinforcer. With strong con-
ditioning, secondary reinforcers such as money, status, or awards can even become
ends in themselves.
Piggy Banks and Token Economies The distinction between primary and second-
ary reinforcers brings up a more subtle point: Just as we saw in classical conditioning,
operant conditioning is not pure learning, but it is built on a biological base; hence our
“wired-in” preferences for certain reinforcers—to which “junk” food manufacturers
pander with their sweet and fatty treats.
To illustrate the power of biology in operant conditioning, we offer the story of
Keller and Marian Breland, two students of Skinner’s who went into the animal train-
ing business, but encountered some unexpected trouble with their trained pigs. As you
may know, pigs are very smart animals. Thus, the Brelands had no difficulty teaching
them to pick up round wooden tokens and deposit them in a “piggy bank.” The prob-
lem was that, over a period of weeks, these porcine subjects reverted to piggish behav-
ior: They would repeatedly drop the token, root at it, pick it up and toss it in the air,
and root it some more. This happened in pig after trained pig. Why? Because rooting is
instinctive behavior for pigs. The Brelands (1961) found similar patterns in critters as
diverse as raccoons, chickens, whales, and cows, and coined the term instinctive drift to
describe this tendency for innate response tendencies to interfere with learned behavior.
No wonder, then, people can’t make their cats stop scratching the furniture—or can’t
altogether avoid the temptation of junk food.
Happily, psychologists have had better luck using tokens with people than with
pigs. Mental institutions, for example, have tapped the power of conditioned reinforc-
ers by setting up so-called token economies to encourage desirable and healthy patient
behaviors. Under a token economy, staff may reinforce grooming or taking medication
with plastic tokens. Patients soon learn they can exchange the tokens for highly desired
rewards and privileges (Ayllon & Azrin, 1965; Holden, 1978). Alongside other forms
of therapy, token economies help mental patients learn strategies for acting effectively
in the world (Kazdin, 1994).
Preferred Activities as Reinforcers: The Premack Principle The opportunity to
perform desirable activities can reinforce behavior just as effectively as food or drink
or other primary reinforcers. For example, people who exercise regularly might use a
daily run or fitness class as a reward for getting other tasks done. Likewise, teachers
have found that young children will learn to sit still if such behavior is reinforced with
the opportunity to run around and make noise later (Homme et al., 1963).
The principle at work here says the opportunity to engage in a preferred activity
(active, noisy play) can be used to reinforce a less-preferred behavior (sitting still and
listening to the teacher). Psychologists call this the Premack principle, after its discoverer.
David Premack (1965) first demonstrated this concept in thirsty rats, which would spend
more time running in an exercise wheel if the running were followed by an opportunity
to drink. Conversely, another group of rats that were exercise deprived, but not thirsty,
would increase the amount they drank if drinking were followed by a chance to run in
the wheel. In exactly the same way, then, parents can use the Premack principle to get
children to make the bed or do the dishes if the task is followed by the opportunity to
play with friends. What preferred activity can you use to reinforce yourself for studying?
Reinforcement Across Cultures The laws of operant learning apply to all creatures
with a brain. The biological mechanism underlying reinforcement is, apparently, much
the same across species. On the other hand, exactly what serves as a reinforcer varies
widely. Experience suggests that food for a hungry organism and water for a thirsty
one will act as reinforcers because they satisfy basic needs related to survival. But what
any particular individual will choose to satisfy those needs may depend as much on
learning as on survival instincts—especially in humans, where secondary reinforcement
is so important. For us, culture plays an especially powerful role in determining what
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
The brain’s reward system
provides greater rewards for sweet
and fatty foods, a preference that
evolved from our ancestors’ need
for calorie-dense food to sustain
them through times when food
was scarce (p. 377).
instinctive drift The tendency of an organism’s
innate (instinctive) responses to interfere with learned
behavior.
token economy A therapeutic method, based
on operant conditioning, by which individuals are
rewarded with tokens, which act as secondary rein-
forcers. The tokens can be redeemed for a variety of
rewards and privileges.
Premack principle The concept, developed by
David Premack, that a more-preferred activity can be
used to reinforce a less-preferred activity.

How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning? 149
will act as reinforcers. So while people in some cultures would find eating a cricket
reinforcing, most people of Euro-American ancestry would not. Similarly, disposing of
a noisy cricket might seem both sensible and rewarding to a Baptist, yet aversive to a
Buddhist. And, just to underscore our point, we note that watching a game of cricket
would most likely be rewarding to a British cricket fan—although punishingly dull to
most Americans.
So culture shapes preferences in reinforcement, but reinforcement also shapes cul-
ture. When you first walk down a street in a foreign city, all the differences that catch
your eye are merely different ways people have found to seek reinforcement or avoid
punishment. A temple houses cultural attempts to seek rewards from a deity. Clothing
may reflect attempts to seek a reinforcing mate or to feel comfortable in the climate.
And a culture’s cuisine evolves from learning to survive on the native plant and animal
resources. In this sense, then, culture is a set of behaviors originally learned by operant
conditioning and shared by a group of people.
The Problem of Punishment
Punishment as a means of influencing behavior poses several difficulties, as
schoolteachers and prison wardens will attest. Ideally, we might think of punishment
as the opposite of reinforcement: an aversive consequence used to weaken the behavior
it follows. And like reinforcement, punishment comes in two main forms. Positive
punishment requires application of an aversive stimulus—as, when you touch a hot
plate, the painful consequence reduces the likelihood of you repeating that behavior.
The other main form of punishment, negative punishment, results from the removal
of a reinforcer—as when parents take away a misbehaving teen’s car keys. (You can
see, then, that the terms positive and negative, when applied to punishment, operate
the same way they do when applied to reinforcement: Positive punishment adds
something, and negative punishment takes something away.) Technically, however—
and this is one of the problems of punishment—an aversive stimulus is punishing only
if it actually weakens the behavior it follows. In this sense, then, spankings or speeding
tickets may or may not be punishment, depending on the results.
Punishment versus Negative Reinforcement You have probably noted that
punishment and negative reinforcement both involve unpleasant stimuli. How can
you distinguish between the two? Let’s see how punishment and negative reinforce-
ment differ, using the following examples (see Figure 4.5). Suppose an animal in a
punishment An aversive consequence which,
occurring after a response, diminishes the strength of
that response. (Contrast with negative reinforcement.)
positive punishment The application of an
aversive stimulus after a response.
negative punishment The removal of an
attractive stimulus after a response.
loud noise
no noise
press lever
Consequence
loud noise removed
(negative reinforcement)
loud noise applied
(punishment)press lever
Response
FIGURE 4.5
Negative Reinforcement and Punishment Compared
Entomophagy is the practice of eating
insects as food, which people in some
cultures find reinforcing.

150 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
Skinner box can turn off a loud, unpleasant noise by pressing a lever. This response pro-
duces negative reinforcement. Now compare that with the other animal in Figure 4.5
for which the loud noise serves as a punishment for pressing the lever.
The main point is this: Punishment and negative reinforcement lead to opposite effects
on behavior (Baum, 1994). Punishment decreases a behavior or reduces its probability
of recurring. In contrast, negative reinforcement—like positive reinforcement—always
increases a response’s probability of occurring again. And don’t forget the descriptors
positive and negative mean “add” and “remove.” Thus, both positive reinforcement and
positive punishment involve administering or “adding” a stimulus. On the other hand,
negative reinforcement and negative punishment always involve withholding or remov-
ing a stimulus. For a concise summary of the distinctions between positive and negative
reinforcement and punishment, please see Table 4.1.
Uses and Abuses of Punishment Many societies rely heavily on punishment and the
threat of punishment to keep people “in line.” We fine people, spank them, and give them
bad grades, parking tickets, and disapproving looks. Around the world and throughout
history, cultures have ritually engaged in shunning, stoning, flogging, imprisonment, and
a veritable smorgasbord of creative methods of execution in attempts to deter unaccept-
able behavior. Currently, American jails and prisons contain more than 2 million people,
while the United States currently maintains one in every 32 of its citizens in jail or prison
or on probation or parole (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009).
Why do we use punishment so often? For one, it can sometimes produce an
immediate change in behavior—which, incidentally, reinforces the punisher. For another,
punishers may feel satisfaction by delivering the punishment, sensing they are “settling
a score,” “getting even,” or making the other person “pay.” This is why we speak of
revenge as being “sweet,” a sentiment that seems to underlie public attitudes toward the
punishment of lawbreakers (Carlsmith, 2006).
But punishment—especially the sort of punishment involving pain, humiliation, or
imprisonment—usually doesn’t work as well in the long run (American Psychological
Association, 2002b). Punished children may continue to misbehave; reprimanded em-
ployees may sabotage efforts to meet production goals. And people still commit crimes
around the world, despite a variety of harsh punishment tactics. So why is punishment
so difficult to use effectively? There are several reasons.
First, punishment—unlike reinforcement—must be administered consistently. Driv-
ers will observe the speed limit when they know the highway patrol is watching; Andre
will refrain from hitting his little brother when a parent is within earshot; and you will
probably give up your wallet to a mugger who points a gun at you. But the power of
punishment to suppress behavior usually disappears when the threat of punishment is
removed (Skinner, 1953). If punishment is unlikely, it does not act as a deterrent—and in
most cases, it is impossible to administer punishment consistently. Intermittent punishment
is far less effective than punishment delivered after every undesired response: In fact, not
Apply (add) Stimulus (positive) Remove (subtract) Stimulus (negative)
What is the effect
of the stimulus
(consequence) on
behavior?
The probability of the
behavior increases.
Positive reinforcement
Example: An employee gets a bonus for good
work (and continues to work hard).
Negative reinforcement
Example: You take aspirin for your headache, and
the headache vanishes (so you take aspirin the
next time you have a headache).
The probability of the
behavior decreases.
Positive punishment
Example: A speeder gets a traffic ticket (and
drives away more slowly).
Negative punishment
Example: A child who has stayed out late misses
dinner (and comes home early next time).
Three important points to keep in mind as you study this table:
1. “Positive” and “negative” mean that a stimulus (consequence) has been added (presented) or subtracted (removed). These terms have nothing to do with “good”
or “bad, pleasurable or painful.”
2. We can often predict what effect a particular consequence will have, but the only way to know for sure whether it will be a reinforcer or a punisher is to observe its effect on
behavior. For example, although we might guess that a spanking would punish a child, the attention might actually serve as a reinforcer to strengthen the unwanted behavior.
3. From a cognitive viewpoint, we can see that reinforcement consists of the presentation of a pleasant stimulus or the removal of an unpleasant one. Similarly,
punishment entails the presentation of an unpleasant stimulus or the removal of a pleasant one.
TABLE 4.1 Four Kinds of Consequences
�

How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning? 151
punishing an occurrence of unwanted behavior can have
the effect of rewarding it—as when a supervisor over-
looks the late arrival of an employee. In general, you can
be certain of controlling someone’s behavior through
punishment or threat of punishment only if you can
control the environment all the time. Such total control
is rarely feasible.
Second, the lure of rewards may make the possi-
bility of punishment seem worth the price. This may
be one factor impacting drug dealing—when the pos-
sibility of making a large amount of money outweighs
the possibility of prison time (Levitt & Dubner, 2005).
And, in a different way, the push-pull of punishment
and rewards also affects dieters, when the short-term
attraction of food may overpower the unwanted long-
term consequences of weight gain. So if you attempt to
control someone’s behavior through punishment, you
may fail if you do not control the rewards as well.
Third, punishment triggers escape or aggression. When punished, an organism’s
survival instinct prompts it to flee from or otherwise avoid further punishment. And
if escape is blocked, aggression can result. Corner a wounded animal, and it may sav-
agely attack you. Put two rats in a Skinner box with an electrified floor grid, and the
rats will attack each other (Ulrich & Azrin, 1962). Put humans in a harsh prison envi-
ronment, and they may riot—or, if they are prison guards, they may abuse the prisoners
(Zimbardo, 2004b, 2007).
Further, in a punitive environment, whether it be a prison, a school, or a home,
people learn that punishment and aggression are legitimate means of influencing oth-
ers. The punishment–aggression link also explains why abusing parents so often come
from abusive families, and why aggressive delinquents frequently come from homes
where aggressive behavior is commonplace (Golden, 2000). Unfortunately, the well-
documented relationship between punishment and aggression remains widely unknown
to the general public.
Here’s a fourth reason why punishment is so often ineffective: Punishment makes
the learner fearful or apprehensive, which inhibits learning new and more desirable
responses. Unable to escape punishment, an organism may eventually give up its
attempts at flight or fight and surrender to an overwhelming feeling of hopelessness.
This passive acceptance of a punitive fate produces a behavior pattern called learned
helplessness (Overmier & Seligman, 1967). In people, this reaction can produce the
mental disorder known as depression (Terry, 2000).
If you want to produce a constructive change in attitudes and behavior, learned
helplessness and depression are undesirable outcomes. The same goes for aggression
and escape. And, perhaps most importantly, punishment fails to teach learners what
to do differently, because it focuses attention on what not to do. All of these outcomes
interfere with new learning. By contrast, individuals who have not been punished feel
much freer to experiment with new behaviors.
Yet a fifth reason why punitive measures may fail: Punishment is often applied
unequally, even though that violates our standards of fair and equal treatment. For
example, parents and teachers punish boys more often than girls (Lytton & Romney,
1991). Then, too, children (especially grade school children) receive more physical pun-
ishment than do adults. And, to give one more example, our schools—and probably
our society at large—more often punish members of minority groups than members of
the majority (Hyman, 1996).
Does Punishment Ever Work? In limited circumstances, punishment can work
remarkably well. For example, punishment can halt the self-destructive behavior of
children with autism, who may injure themselves severely in some cases by banging
their heads or chewing the flesh off their fingers. A mild electric shock or a splash of
cold water in the face can quickly stop such unwanted behavior, although effects may be
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 11
In the Stanford Prison
Experiment, the behavior of
normal, healthy college men
changed drastically after just a
few days in a simulated prison
environment (p. 500).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 14
Learned helplessness was
originally found in dogs that,
when repeatedly unable to escape
shocks in their cages, eventually
gave up and stopped trying.
Learned helplessness has been
documented widely in humans,
including abused and discouraged
children, battered wives, and
prisoners of war (p. 624).
Prison riots and other aggressive
behavior may result from highly punitive
conditions.

152 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
temporary (Holmes, 2001). It can also be combined effectively with reinforcement—as when
students receive good grades for studying and failing grades for neglecting their work.
Punishment is also more likely to be successful if it involves a logical consequence:
a consequence closely related to the undesirable behavior—as contrasted with an
unrelated punishment, such as spanking or grounding. So, if a child leaves a toy truck
on the stairs, a logical consequence might be to lose the toy for a week. To give another
example, a logical consequence of coming home late for dinner is getting a cold dinner.
Rather than a purely punitive approach to misbehavior, research supports the com-
bination of logical consequences, extinction, and the rewarding of desirable alternative
responses. When you do decide to use punishment, it should meet the following conditions:
• Punishment should be swift—that is, immediate. Any delay will impair its effec-
tiveness, so “You’ll get spanked when your father gets home” is a poor punish-
ment strategy.
• Punishment should be consistent—administered every time the unwanted response
occurs. When bad behavior goes unpunished, the effect can actually be rewarding.
• Punishment should be limited in duration and intensity—meaningful enough to
stop the behavior but appropriate enough to “make the punishment fit the crime.”
• Punishment should clearly target the behavior and be a logical consequence of the
behavior rather than an attack on character of the person (humiliation, sarcasm,
or verbal abuse) or physical pain.
• Punishment should be limited to the situation in which the response occurred.
• Punishment should not give mixed messages to the punished person (such as, “You
are not permitted to hit others, but I am allowed to hit you”).
• The most effective punishment is usually negative punishment, such as loss of
privileges, rather than the application of unpleasant stimuli such as a spanking.
A Checklist for Modifying Operant Behavior
Think of someone whose behavior you would like to change. For the sake of illustra-
tion, let’s consider your niece Maddy’s temper tantrums, which seem to be occurring
with greater frequency—sometimes even when you take her out in public. Operant
conditioning offers a selection of tools that can help: positive reinforcement on a vari-
ety of schedules, plus negative reinforcement, extinction, and punishment.
• Since positive reinforcement is always good bet, identify and encourage a desir-
able behavior in place of the unwanted behavior. The most effective parents and
teachers often do this by shifting the child’s attention to some other reinforcing
activity. When taking her to the grocery store, for example, involve her in simple
choices between, say, the green apples or the red ones. This keeps her interested,
which will help prevent a temper tantrum, and also gives you an opportunity to
provide positive reinforcement for her help (“Good idea, Maddy—I like the red
ones, too!”) And don’t overlook the Premack principle, which lets Maddy do
something she enjoys if she behaves for a certain period of time. (Incidentally, this
is where shaping comes into play: To be effective, you must set goals for Maddy
that are within her reach, so she can achieve them and reap the benefits of posi-
tive reinforcement. So, you might aim for just 20 minutes of good behavior at first,
then—after she has achieved it and been rewarded—gradually work up to longer
and longer periods of time.) Use continuous reinforcement at first, then scale back
to a combination of intermittent reinforcement schedules to keep her tantrum free.
• Negative reinforcement can be useful too. If, for example, one of Maddy’s house-
hold chores is taking out the trash, tell her you’ll do it for her if she can play nicely
with her sister (with no temper tantrums) that afternoon. That way, she avoids
something she’d rather not do, which reinforces her for good behavior. You may
have enjoyed negative reinforcement yourself if you’ve had a professor who let
you opt out of the final exam if your other exam scores were high enough or skip
a homework assignment if you’d achieved some other important goal in the class.

How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning? 153
There are less effective applications of negative reinforcement, however. For
example, parents commonly use nagging to try to get their children to, say, clean
their rooms. In this scenario, parents nag until the room gets cleaned—thus, the
child cleans the room to stop or to avoid the nagging. While this may get the job
done, it’s generally not pleasant for anyone. Instead, behaviorists recommend
parents create positive reinforcers to provide incentives for the kids to clean their
rooms. By offering meaningful rewards or using the Premack principle to encour-
age desired behaviors, you accomplish the same behavioral change without the
tension that typically accompanies nagging or other aversive stimuli.
• Extinction guarantees a solution, but only if you control all the reinforcers. In
Maddy’s case, extinction comes from not giving in to the temper tantrum and not
giving her what she wants. Instead, you simply allow the tantrum to burn itself
out. This can be a challenge, since it means you must suffer through the tantrum,
maybe even feeling embarrassed if she’s throwing the tantrum in public. (Have you
ever wondered why children seem intuitively to pick the most public places for
such displays? Perhaps because they quickly learn they will be “rewarded” with
candy or attention from an exasperated parent who just wants them to stop—
which is another misuse of negative reinforcement!) Another problem with extinc-
tion, however, is that it may take a while, so extinction is not a good option if the
subject is engaging in dangerous behavior, such as playing in a busy street.
• Punishment may be tempting, but we have seen that it usually produces unwanted
effects, such as aggression or escape. In addition, punishment often damages the
relationship between the punisher and the person being punished and is difficult
to employ with unfailing consistency. If you do decide to punish Maddy for her
tantrums, make it a logical consequence, such as a “time out” in her room if she is
acting up at home—and doing so swiftly, but without undue harshness.
The best approach—often recommended by child psychologists—combines several tactics.
In Maddy’s case, this might involve both reinforcing her desirable behaviors and using
extinction or logical consequences on her undesirable ones. We encourage you to try these
strategies for yourself the next time you are dealing with someone whose behavior is
undesirable. And remember: The behavior you may want to change could be your own!
Operant and Classical Conditioning Compared
Now that we have examined the main features of operant and classical condition-
ing, let’s compare them side by side. As you can see in Table 4.2, the consequences
of behavior—especially rewards and punishments—distinguish operant conditioning
different from classical conditioning. But note this point of potential confusion: As the
example in Figure 4.6 shows, food acts as a reward in operant conditioning, but in
TABLE 4.2 Classical and Operant Conditioning Compared
Classical Conditioning Operant Conditioning
Behavior is controlled by stimuli that precede
the response (by the CS and UCS).
Behavior is controlled by consequences
(rewards, punishments, and the like) that
follow the response.
No reward or punishment is involved (although
pleasant and aversive stimuli may be used).
Often involves reward (reinforcement)
or punishment.
Through conditioning, a new stimulus (the CS)
comes to produce “old” (reflexive) behavior.
Through conditioning, a new stimulus
(a reinforcer) produces new behavior.
Extinction is produced by withholding the UCS. Extinction is produced by withholding
reinforcement.
Learner is passive (responds reflexively):
Responses are involuntary. That is, behavior is
elicited by stimulation.
Learner is active (operant behavior): Responses
are voluntary. That is, behavior is emitted by the
organism.

154 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
classical conditioning, food is an unconditioned stimulus. The important thing to note
is that in classical conditioning the food comes before the response—and therefore it
cannot serve as a reward.
Because classical conditioning and operant conditioning differ in the order in which
the stimulus and response occur, classically conditioned behavior is largely a response
to past stimulation. (Think of Pavlov’s dogs salivating after hearing a bell.) Operant
behavior aims to attain some future reinforcement or avoid a punishment. (Think of a
dog sitting to get a food reward.) To say it another way, operant conditioning requires
a stimulus that follows the response, whereas classical conditioning ends with the
response (see Figure 4.7).
Unconditioned stimulus
(food)
Unconditioned response
(salivation to food)
Conditioned response
(salivation to tone previously paired
with food)
Classical Conditioning
Operant behavior
(sitting up)
Reinforcing stimulus
(food)
Operant Conditioning
Conditioned stimulus
(tone)
FIGURE 4.6
The Same Stimulus Plays Different
Roles in Classical Conditioning and
Operant Conditioning
The same stimulus (food) can play vastly
different roles, depending on which type
of conditioning is involved. In classical
conditioning, it can be the UCS, while
in operant conditioning it can serve as
a reinforcer for operant behavior. Note
also that classical conditioning involves
the association of two stimuli that occur
before the response. Operant condition-
ing involves a reinforcing (rewarding) or
punishing stimulus that occurs after the
response.
Classical Conditioning Operant Conditioning
UCS
“Look out!”
CS
snake
UCR
fear
behavior
CR
Consequence:
attentionFIGURE 4.7
Classical and Operant Conditioning
Can Work Together
A response originally learned through
classical conditioning can be main-
tained and strengthened by operant
reinforcement.

How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning? 155
Another difference between the two types of conditioning is the kinds of behaviors
they target. Operant conditioning encourages new behaviors—whether they be making
beds, going to work, developing healthy eating habits, or studying for an exam. Classi-
cal conditioning, on the other hand, emphasizes eliciting old responses to new stimuli—
such as salivating at the sound of a bell or flinching at the sound of a dentist’s drill.
You may have also noticed that extinction works in slightly different ways in the
two forms of learning. In classical conditioning, extinction requires withholding the
unconditioned stimulus. In operant conditioning, extinction results from withholding
the reinforcer.
Operant conditioning and classical conditioning differ in several other important
ways, as you saw in Table 4.2 (page 153). For one, operant behavior is not based on an
automatic reflex action, as was the dog’s salivation or Little Albert’s crying. Accordingly,
operant behavior seems more “voluntary”—more under the control of the responder.
To paraphrase a proverb: You can stimulate a dog to salivation (a reflex), but you can’t
make it eat (an operant behavior).
But don’t make the mistake of thinking that classical and operant conditioning are
competing explanations for learning. They can be complementary. In fact, responses
originally learned by classical conditioning will often be maintained later by operant
conditioning. How? Consider a snake phobia. Suppose the fear of snakes was origi-
nally learned by classical conditioning when a snake (CS) was paired with a frighten-
ing UCS (someone yelling, “Look out!”). Once the phobic response is established, it
could be maintained and strengthened by operant conditioning, as when bystanders
give attention (positive reinforcement) to the fearful person (see Figure 4.7).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
You may have tried the Premack principle to encourage yourself to study more, per-
haps by saving TV time or a trip to the refrigerator until your homework was done. It
works for some people, but if it doesn’t work for you, try making the studying itself
more enjoyable and more reinforcing.
For most of us, getting together with people we like is reinforcing, regardless of the
activity. So, make some (not all) of your studying a social activity. That is, schedule a
time when you and another classmate or two can get together to identify and discuss
important concepts, and try to predict what will be on the next test.
In this cartoon, Pavlov’s dog is illustrating
voluntary behavior (operant conditioning)
by drooling in order to make Pavlov write
in his little book.

156 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
And don’t focus just on vocabulary. Rather, try to discover the big picture—the
overall meaning of each section of the chapter. The Core Concepts are a good place to
start. Then you can discuss with your friends how the details fit in with the Core Con-
cepts. You will most likely find that the social pressure of an upcoming study group
(serving as an intermittent reinforcer) will help motivate you to get your reading done
and identify murky points. When you get together for your group study session, you
will discover that explaining what you have learned strengthens your own understand-
ing. In this way, you reap the benefits of a series of reinforcements: time with friends,
enhanced learning, and better performance on the exam.
4.3 KEY QUESTION
How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning?
According to biologist J. D. Watson’s (1968) account in The Double Helix, he and
Francis Crick cracked the genetic code one day in a flash of insight following months
of trial and error. You may have had a similarly sudden, if less famous, insight when
solving a problem of your own. Such events present difficulties for strict behaviorists,
because they obviously involve learning but are hard to explain in terms of Pavlovian
or Skinnerian conditioning.
Many psychologists believe that an entirely different process, called cognitive learn-
ing, is responsible for such flashes of insight. From a cognitive perspective, learning
does not always show itself immediately in behavior. Instead, learning can be reflected
in mental activity alone—as the Core Concept for this section says:
Core Concept 4.3
According to cognitive psychology, some forms of learning must be
explained as changes in mental processes rather than as changes in
behavior alone.
The cognitive perspective says that our
cognitions can affect our mental health—
or our mental disorders.
4. RECALL: Give an example of something that serves as a
conditioned reinforcer for most people.
5. APPLICATION & ANALYSIS: Suppose you are trying to
teach Stevie not to hit his sister. What operant techniques
would you use? Also, explain why extinction would not be wise
in this case.
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What is a feature
of operant conditioning that distinguishes it from classical
conditioning?
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: Give an example of a response a pet dog or cat
might learn that could be explained by Thorndike’s law of effect.
2. APPLICATION: Give an example of negative reinforcement from
your own life.
3. APPLICATION: Suppose you have taught your dog to roll over for
the reward of a dog biscuit. Which schedule of reinforcement would
keep your dog responding the longest time?
a. continuous reinforcement
b. intermittent reinforcement
c. negative reinforcement
d. noncontingent reinforcement
Answers 1. Any response that was learned by being rewarded—such as sitting up for a food reward or scratching at the door to be let into the house—
involves Thorndike’s law of effect. 2. Negative reinforcement occurs any time your behavior causes an unpleasant stimulus to stop bothering you.
Examples include taking aspirin to stop a pain, going to the dentist for a toothache, or doing your chores to stop a roommate from nagging you. 3. b
4. Money is probably the most common example. 5. The best approach is probably some combination of reinforcing alternative responses and “time
out” for hitting behavior. Under extinction alone, Stevie would still continue to hit his sister for a period of time until the behavior is extinguished,
which might inflict hardship on the sister. 6. In operant conditioning, learning depends on stimuli that occur after the response. These stimuli
include rewards and punishments. By contrast, classical conditioning focuses on stimuli that occur before the response.
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How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning? 157
Let’s see how cognitive psychologists have approached this
task of examining the covert mental processes behind learning.
To do so, we first take you on a trip to the Canary Islands, off the
coast of northern Africa.
Insight Learning: Köhler in the Canaries with Chimps
Isolated on the island of Tenerife during World War I, Gestalt psy-
chologist Wolfgang Köhler (KER-ler) had time to think long and
hard about learning. Disenchanted with the behaviorists’ explana-
tion for learning, Köhler sought to develop his own theories. To
his way of thinking, psychology had to recognize mental processes
as an essential component of learning, even though mental events
had been spurned as subjective speculation by the behaviorists. To
press his point, Köhler took advantage of a primate research fa-
cility constructed by the German government on Tenerife. There,
he contrived experiments designed to reveal cognitive learning in
observable behavior (Sharps & Wertheimer, 2000; Sherrill, 1991).
In a series of famous studies, Köhler showed that chimps could learn to solve com-
plex problems, not just by trial and error (an explanation favored by behaviorists) but
by “flashes of insight” that combined simpler responses learned previously. One such
experiment involved Sultan, a chimp that had learned to pile up boxes and scramble on
top of them to reach fruit suspended high in his cage, and to use sticks to obtain fruit
that was just out of reach. When Köhler presented Sultan with a novel situation that
combined the two problems—with fruit suspended even higher in the air—the chimp
first attacked it unsuccessfully with sticks in trial-and-error fashion. Then, in apparent
frustration, Sultan threw the sticks away, kicked the wall, and sat down. According to
Köhler’s report, the animal then scratched his head and began to stare at some boxes
nearby. After a time of apparent “thinking,” he suddenly jumped up and dragged a box
and a stick underneath the fruit, climbed on the box, and knocked down his prize with
the stick.
Remarkably, Sultan had never before seen or used such a combination of responses.
This behavior, Köhler argued, was evidence that animals were not just mindlessly using
conditioned responses but were learning by insight: by reorganizing their perceptions
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 3
Gestalt psychology is best
known for its work on
perception (p. 118).
The ruins of Köhler’s old laboratory,
known as La Casa Amarilla (the Yellow
House), can still be seen near the town
of Puerto de La Cruz. You can see a
satellite view of it using the following
coordinates in Google Earth: latitude
28° 24952.230 N and longitude
16° 31947.930 W. If you enjoy historical
mysteries, you might read A Whisper of
Expionage, a book exploring the
possibility that Köhler was not only
studying chimpanzee behavior but also
spying on Allied shipping from his
laboratory’s vantage point on the coast of
Tenerife during World War I (Ley, 1990).
The sort of learning displayed by Köhler’s chimps defied explanation by the behaviorists—in terms of classical conditioning and operant condition-
ing. Here, you see Sultan, Köhler’s smartest animal, solving the problem of getting the bananas suspended out of reach by stacking the boxes and
climbing on top of them. Köhler claimed that Sultan’s behavior demonstrated insight learning.

158 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
of problems. He ventured that such behavior shows how apes, like humans, learn to
solve problems by suddenly perceiving familiar objects in new forms or relationships—
a decidedly mental process rather than a merely behavioral one. He called this insight
learning (Köhler, 1925). Insight learning, said Köhler, results from an abrupt reorgani-
zation of the way a situation is perceived.
Behaviorism had no convincing explanation for Köhler’s demonstration. Neither
classical nor operant conditioning could account for Sultan’s behavior in stimulus–
response terms. Thus, the feats of Köhler’s chimps demanded the cognitive explanation
of perceptual reorganization.
Cognitive Maps: Tolman Finds Out What’s on a Rat’s Mind
Not long after Köhler’s experiments with chimpanzees, the rats in Edward Tolman’s
lab at Berkeley also began behaving in ways that flew in the face of accepted behavioral
doctrine. They would run through laboratory mazes as if following a mental “map” of
the maze, rather than mindlessly executing a series of learned behaviors. Let’s see how
Tolman managed to demonstrate these “mindful” responses.
Mental Images—Not Behaviors If you have ever walked through your house in
the dark, you have some idea what Tolman meant by “cognitive map.” Technically, a
cognitive map is a mental image an organism uses to navigate through a familiar en-
vironment. But could a simple-minded creature like a rat have such complex mental
imagery? And, if so, how could the existence of these cognitive maps be demonstrated?
A cognitive map, Tolman argued, was the only way to account for a rat quickly select-
ing an alternative route in a maze when the preferred path to the goal is blocked. In
fact, rats will often select the shortest detour around a barrier, even though taking that
particular route was never previously reinforced. Rather than blindly exploring dif-
ferent parts of the maze through trial and error (as behavioral theory would predict),
Tolman’s rats behaved as if they had a mental representation of the maze. (Figure 4.8
shows the arrangement of such a maze.)
In further support of his claim that learning was mental, not purely behavioral,
Tolman offered another experiment: After his rats had learned to run a maze, he
flooded it with water and showed that the rats were quite capable of swimming through
insight learning A form of cognitive learning,
originally described by the Gestalt psychologists, in
which problem solving occurs by means of a sudden
reorganization of perceptions.
cognitive map In Tolman’s work, a cognitive map
was a mental representation of a maze or other physi-
cal space. Psychologists often use the term cognitive
map more broadly to include an understanding of con-
nections among concepts. Thus, a cognitive map can
represent either a physical or a mental “space.”
Path 2
A
Path 3
Path 1
Food
boxStart
B
FIGURE 4.8
Using Cognitive Maps in Maze
Learning
Rats used in this experiment preferred
the direct path (Path 1) when it was
open. When it was blocked at A, they pre-
ferred Path 2. When Path 2 was blocked
at B, the rats usually chose Path 3. Their
behavior indicated that they had a cogni-
tive map of the best route to the food box.
Source: Tolman, E. C. & Honzik, C. H. (December
1930). Degrees of hunger, reward and nonreward,
and maze learning in rats. University of California
Publication of Psychology, 4(16).

How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning? 159
the maze. Again, this demonstrated what the animals had learned was a concept, not
just behaviors. Instead of learning merely a sequence of right and left turns, Tolman
argued, they had acquired a more abstract mental representation of the maze’s spatial
layout (Tolman & Honzik, 1930; Tolman et al., 1946).
Learning without Reinforcement In yet another study that attacked the very foun-
dations of behaviorism, Tolman (1948) allowed his rats to wander freely about a maze
for several hours. During this time, the rats received no rewards at all—they simply ex-
plored the maze. Yet, despite the lack of reinforcement, which behaviorists supposed to
be essential for maze learning, the rats later learned to run the maze for a food reward
more quickly than did other rats that had never seen the maze. Obviously, they had
learned the maze during the exploratory period, even though no hint of learning could
be seen in their behavior at the time. Tolman called this latent learning.
The Significance of Tolman’s Work As with Köhler’s experiments, what made
Tolman’s work both significant and provocative was its challenge to the prevailing
views of Pavlov, Watson, and other behaviorists. While Tolman accepted the idea that
psychologists must study observable behavior, he showed that simple associations
between stimuli and responses could not explain the behavior observed in his experi-
ments. Tolman’s cognitive explanations, therefore, presented a provocative challenge
to behaviorism (Gleitman, 1991).
Subsequent experiments on cognitive maps in rats, chimpanzees, and humans have
broadly supported Tolman’s work (Olton, 1992). More recently, brain imaging has pointed
to the hippocampus as a structure involved in “drawing” the cognitive map in the brain
(Jacobs & Schenk, 2003). So it seems clear that Tolman was on target: Organisms learn
the spatial layout of their environments by exploration and do so even if they are not rein-
forced for exploring. From an evolutionary perspective, the ability to make cognitive maps
would be highly adaptive in animals that must forage for food (Kamil et al., 1987).
In the following section, we shall see that Albert Bandura followed in Tolman’s
footsteps by toppling yet another pillar of behaviorism: the idea that rewards and pun-
ishments act only on the individual receiving them. Bandura proposed that rewards
and punishments can be effective even if we merely see someone else get them. (This
is why casinos make such a fuss over jackpot winners.) Bandura’s work, then, sug-
gests the consequences of behavior can operate indirectly, through observation. Let’s
see how he demonstrated this idea.
Observational Learning: Bandura’s Challenge to Behaviorism
Does observing violent behavior make viewers more likely to become violent? A clas-
sic study by Albert Bandura suggests that it does—at least in the children he invited to
his lab for a simple experiment. All it took to bring out aggressive behavior in these
children was watching adults appearing to enjoy punching, hitting, and kicking an
inflated plastic clown (a BoBo doll). When later given the opportunity, children who
had seen the adult models showed far more aggressive behavior toward the doll than
did children in a control condition who had not observed the aggressive models
(Bandura et al., 1963). Subsequent studies have shown similar results: Children will
imitate aggressive behaviors they have seen on television or in video games, exhibiting
up to seven times more aggressive acts than children in a control condition—even when
the models are merely cartoon characters (Anderson et al., 2007; Boyatzis et al., 1995).
Learning by Observation and Imitation An important implication of Bandura’s
BoBo doll study is that learning by observation and imitation can affect our behavior
in new situations—when we have no personal experience. Thus, learning can occur
not only by direct experience but also by watching the behavior of another person or
model. If the model’s actions appear successful—that is, if the model seems to find it
reinforcing—we may behave in the same way. In this way, learning by observation and
imitation is an extension of operant conditioning, by which we observe someone else
getting rewards but act as though we had also received a reward.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
A concept is a mental category
we use to organize our thinking.
In Tolman’s experiments, his rats
demonstrated learning of the
concept of a maze (p. 216).
In the BoBo doll experiment, a boy and
girl imitate the aggressive behavior that
they have seen from an adult.
Bandura’s BoBo Doll
Experiment
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160 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
Psychologists call this social learning or observational learning. It accounts for
children learning aggressive behavior by imitating aggressive role models who are
perceived as successful or admirable or who seem to be enjoying themselves. Obser-
vational learning also explains how people learn athletic skills, how to drive a car, and
how to behave with friends and then shift roles in a job interview. And it illuminates
changes in clothing fashions and the rapid spread of slang expressions.
Observational learning occurs in nonhuman species, too, as when a mother cat
teaches her kittens how to hunt. One study demonstrated that even a creature as
simple-brained as the octopus can learn from watching the behavior of other octopi
(Fiorito & Scotto, 1992). Not to be outdone, a clever bowerbird in an Australian na-
tional park achieved notoriety through observational learning by fooling tourists with
its imitation of a cell phone ringing (Winters, 2002).
Effects of Media Violence As you might have guessed, much of the research on
observational learning has focused on the impact of violence in film and video (Huesmann
et al., 2003). Predictably, the issue is a controversial one, because much of the evidence is
correlational (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). That evidence makes a credible case,
based on more than 50 studies showing that observing violence is associated with vio-
lent behavior. But does observing violence cause violent behavior? Or is it the other way
around: Could it be that violent people are drawn to violent films and videos?
Thanks to more than 100 experimental studies, experts now know that observing
violence truly does increase the likelihood of violent behavior (Huesmann & Moise,
1996; Primavera & Heron, 1996). In fact, the link between viewing violent media
and subsequent behavior aggression is stronger than the link between lead-based paint
and children’s IQ, and is nearly as strong as the link between cigarette smoking and
cancer (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). Viewers of media violence also show less emo-
tional arousal and distress when they subsequently observe violent acts—a habituation-
like condition known as psychic numbing (Murray & Kippax, 1979). Psychologist Elliot
Aronson argues that extensive media violence is one factor contributing to violent trag-
edies, such as the Columbine High School shootings (Aronson, 2000).
Not all imitation is harmful, of course. Thanks to imitation, we also learn about
charitable behavior, comforting others in distress, and driving on the legal side of the
road. In general, people learn much—both prosocial (helping) and antisocial (hurt-
ing) behaviors—through observation of others. This capacity to learn from watching
enables us to acquire behaviors efficiently, without going through tedious trial and er-
ror. So while observational learning is a factor in violent behavior, it also enables us to
learn socially useful behaviors by profiting from the mistakes and successes of others.
Observational Learning Applied to Social Problems Around the Globe Television is
one of the most powerful sources of observational learning—and not only of the undesir-
able sort we have just noted. Here at home, the long-running children’s program, Sesame
Street, uses such well-loved characters as Big Bird and Cookie Monster to teach language,
arithmetic, and courtesy through observational learning. And in Mexico, TV executive
Miguel Sabido has deliberately drawn on Bandura’s work in creating the popular soap
opera Ven Conmigo (Come with Me), which focuses on a group of people who connect
through a literacy class. After the initial season, enrollment in adult literacy classes in the
broadcast area shot up to nine times the level in the previous year (Smith, 2002b).
The idea was taken up by a nonprofit group, Populations Communications Interna-
tional, which has promoted it worldwide. As a result, television dramas are now aimed
not only at literacy but at promoting women’s rights, safe sex, and preventing HIV and
unwanted pregnancies. Such programs are wildly popular, reaching large numbers of de-
voted fans in dozens of countries and regions around the world, including Latin American,
Africa, South and East Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the Philippines. In China,
observers learn about the value of girls; in Tanzania, they learn that AIDS is transmitted by
people, not by mosquitoes; and in India, the programs question the practice of child mar-
riages. In the Caribbean, soap operas now promote responsible environmental practices.
Does it work? Very well, say professors Arvind Singhal and Everett Rogers (2002),
who are currently gathering data on such projects. Because of a soap opera broadcast in
observational learning A form of cognitive
learning in which new responses are acquired after
watching others’ behavior and the consequences of
their behavior.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Only an experimental study can
determine cause and effect
(p. 27).

How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning? 161
India, a whole village signed a letter promising to stop the practice of child marriages.
Similarly, Tanzanians now increasingly approve of family planning. And in rural villages
in India, the enrollment of girls in school has risen between ten and 38 percent. Overall,
it appears that television can be a means of producing positive social change and act as
a conduit for psychological research to make a significant difference in people’s lives.
Brain Mechanisms and Learning
What do we know about the biology behind learning? On the level of neurons, learning
apparently involves physical changes that strengthen the synapses in groups of nerve
cells—a process called long-term potentiation (Antonova et al., 2001; Kandel, 2000).
Initially, neurons in various brain areas involved in a learning task work very hard—
for example, as a person learns the location of various objects, cells in the visual and
parietal cortex may fire rapidly. But as learning progresses, the connections among the
different cortical regions become stronger and the firing pattern becomes less intense
(Büchel et al., 1999).
In operant conditioning, the brain’s reward circuitry comes into play, especially
in parts of the frontal cortex and the limbic system, rich in dopamine receptors
(O’Doherty et al., 2004; Roesch & Olson, 2004). Many experts now believe the brain
uses this circuitry to identify the rewards that are the essence of positive reinforcement
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Shizgal & Avanitogiannis, 2003). The limbic system also helps us
remember strong emotions, such as fear, so often associated with classical conditioning
(Miller, 2004). And in the next chapter, when we talk about memory, you will learn
about other parts of the brain involved in learning.
The Brain on Extinction While it is important for our survival to remember
emotion-laden events, it’s also important to forget associations that turn out to be
irrelevant. So just as wild animals need to forget about a water hole that has run dry,
you must learn to deal with changes in school schedules or traffic laws. These examples
involve extinction of responses learned previously. Neuroscientists have found that
extinction occurs when certain neurotransmitters, including glutamate and norepi-
nephrine, block memories (Miller, 2004; Travis, 2004).
Discoveries such as these have stimulated the search for drugs that could accom-
plish something previously only seen in futuristic movies: blocking the emotional
trauma associated with certain events, such as combat experiences, violent crimes, and
horrific accidents. And recent research boasts early success (Brunet et al., 2007; Kindt
et al., 2009). In both animals and humans, experimenters have successfully eliminated
the emotional arousal associated with typical memories of such traumatic events. And
while this remarkable discovery holds great potential for survivors of violent crime,
war, accidents, and natural disasters, ethical questions remain about future directions
in this rapidly advancing field.
Linking Behavioral Learning with Cognitive Learning Neuroscience has found
evidence in the brain to support both the behaviorist and the cognitive explanations
for learning. Specifically, there may be two separate brain circuits for learning: one
for simple stimulus–response learning and one for more complex tasks (Kandel &
Hawkins, 1992). The simpler circuit seems responsible for the sort of “mindless” learn-
ing that occurs when a dog drools at the sound of a bell or when a person acquires a
motor skill, such as riding a bike or kicking a soccer ball. This kind of learning occurs
relatively slowly and improves with repetition over many trials. Significantly, classical
conditioning and much of operant learning fit this description. By contrast, the second
type of learning circuit seems responsible for more complex forms of learning requir-
ing conscious processing: concept formation, insight learning, observational learning,
and memory for specific events. If further research verifies that this division reflects a
fundamental distinction in the nervous system, we will be able to say that those on the
behavioral and cognitive extremes were both (partly) right. They were talking about
fundamentally different ways the brain learns (see Figure 4.3) (Clark & Squire, 1998;
Jog et al., 1999).
long-term potentiation A biological process
involving physical changes that strengthen the syn-
apses in groups of nerve cells that is believed to be the
neural basis of learning.
Although scientists have discovered
experimental methods of blocking the
emotional trauma associated with memo-
ries of a traumatic event, the notion of a
machine that can selectively delete mem-
ories (as in the film Eternal Sunshine
of the Spotless Mind) will likely remain
farfetched.
Billboards, television programs, and other
media campaigns can be effective tools
for promoting social change.

162 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
Observational Learning and Mirror Neurons People obviously learn from their
observations of others, as we saw in Bandura’s BoBo doll studies. Similarly, if you see
someone at the dinner table take a bite and grimace with disgust, you will be reluctant
to taste the same dish. But the mystery has always been to understand how our brains
respond to somebody else’s rewards or punishments. The recent discovery of mirror
neurons suggests a neurological basis for observational learning. It may be that the
“mirror cells” in our brains are finely tuned to help us mirror other people’s sense of
being rewarded or punished by activating the same circuits in our own brains (Jaffe,
2007). Watch the news for further developments.
“Higher” Cognitive Learning
It now seems clear that much of the complex and abstract learning required in college
classes is fundamentally different from the learning that Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner
studied. Acquiring knowledge about the field of psychology, for example, involves
building mental images, assimilating concepts, and pondering ways they can be related.
It’s not that behavioral conditioning isn’t involved in human learning—after all,
students do work for grades and salivate when they see a pizza—but principles of be-
havioral learning don’t tell the whole story of “higher” cognitive learning.
The following chapters will take us deeper into this realm of cognitive learning,
where we will discuss memory, thinking, concept formation, problem solving, and intel-
ligence. There, you will learn more about mental structures that underlie cognition. The
challenge we will face is exactly the one behaviorists were hoping to avoid: In studying
cognition, we must make inferences about processes we cannot measure directly. We will
find, however, that cognitive psychologists have developed very clever methods for ob-
taining objective data on which to base their inferences. The newest of these—coming
fully online in the last decade or so—is brain imaging, which, as we will see, has brought
psychologists very close to an objective glimpse at private mental processes.
But before we move on to these topics in the next chapter, let’s return to the prob-
lem with which we began the chapter: Sabra’s fear of flying.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Fear of Flying Revisited
Which kind of learning—operant conditioning or classical conditioning—do you
suppose lay behind Sabra’s aversion to flying? Although we may never know exactly
what caused her fear in the first place, we can guess that both forms of conditioning
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Mirror neurons help us imitate
other people’s behavior (p. 70).
TABLE 4.3 Behavioral Learning and Cognitive Learning Compared
Behavioral Learning Cognitive Learning
Focus is on observable events (stimuli and
responses) only.
Inferences are made about mental processes that
are not directly observable.
Learning consists of associations among
stimuli and responses.
Learning as information processing: The learner
seeks useful information from stimuli.
Main forms of learning are habituation, classical
conditioning, and operant (instrumental)
conditioning.
Learning also involves insight, observational
learning, cognitive maps, and other more
complex forms of learning.
Developed as a rebellion against the subjective
methods of structuralism and functionalism:
Behaviorism became the dominant perspective
for much of the 20th century.
Developed as a rebellion against the narrow
perspective of behaviorism: Cognitive psychology
became the dominant perspective at the end of
the 20th century.
Big names include Pavlov, Thorndike, Watson,
and Skinner.
Big names include Köhler, Tolman, and Bandura.

How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning? 163
were involved. Fears commonly arise through direct experience involving classical
conditioning. Alternatively, fears can be learned through observational learning,
perhaps from a fearful parent or peer. And once the fear has been learned, operant
conditioning can maintain it, because people are rewarded by avoiding the feared
object.
These assumptions have led some airlines to experiment with a hybrid treatment
known as cognitive-behavioral therapy, aimed at helping people overcome their fear of
flying. Happily, Sabra located one of these programs a few weeks before the conference
started. She contacted the airline and signed up for three weekend sessions to be held
at a nearby airport.
She arrived at the appointed time, full of expectations and apprehensions. Would
the therapist probe her childhood experiences and fantasies? Would she have to take
tranquilizers? Or would she have to undergo some sort of terrifying treatment, such as
flying upside down in a small airplane?
Her worst expectations turned out to be unfounded. The treatment sessions were
organized by a behavioral psychologist who gathered the nine participants in a small
conference room. He began by saying that such fears are learned—much as you might
learn to cringe when you hear a dentist’s drill. But because it is not important how
such fears originated, this fear-of-flying program would focus on the present, not the
past, he said. Sabra began to feel more relaxed.
The conditioning-based therapy program combined several learning strategies.
A classical conditioning component would involve extinction of her fear through
gradual exposure to the experience of flying. Operant conditioning would play a role
through social reinforcement from the therapist and other members of the group. In
addition, a cognitive component would involve learning more about how airplanes
work.
After a brief overview of the process they would experience over the next three
weeks, the group took a tour of the airport, including the cabin of a passenger jet
parked on the Tarmac. Then they went back to the conference room to learn about
how a pilot controls an airplane and about the physical forces that keep it in the air.
The group also watched some videos involving routine flights in a commercial jet. All
in all, this first session went smoothly, and everyone seemed much more at ease than
when they started.
The second weekend began with more classroom discussion. Then, the class
went back into the airliner, where they took seats and went through a series of re-
laxation exercises designed to extinguish the participants’ fears and to learn a new
and more relaxed response to the experience of being in an airplane. This training
included deep breathing and progressive relaxation of specific muscle groups all
over the body. When everyone in the group reported feeling relaxed, they again
watched videos of flight on the plane’s TV monitors. This was followed by more
relaxation exercises. The final activity for the second weekend involved starting the
engines and going through the preflight routine—all the way up to takeoff . . . and
more relaxation exercises.
The final weekend session was almost identical to the previous one. The only
difference was that “graduation” involved an actual flight—a 20-minute trip out
over the local countryside and back to the airport. It was, of course, voluntary, but
only one of the nine people in the class chose not to go. Sabra went, but not without
some anxiety. The therapist, however, encouraged the group to focus on the relax-
ation exercises they had learned rather than on their feelings of fear. To the amaze-
ment of all who participated, these learning-based techniques helped them through
the flight exercise without losing control of their emotional responses. Although no
one’s fear had vanished completely, everyone on board was able to bring it under
control.
The happiest result was that Sabra was able to go to her meeting in Hawaii—
where, by the way, she had a productive conference and a wonderful time. For our
purposes we should also note that she has flown several times since then. Each trip gets
a little easier, she says—just as the psychology of learning would predict.
Through cognitive-behavioral therapy,
Sabra learned new ways of thinking about
the experience of flying. Gradual exposure
to flying, called desensitization (a form
of extinction), also helped to banish her
fearful responses.

164 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Do Different People Have Different “Learning Styles”?
Without a doubt, people differ in the ways they approach learning. As you can see by observing your classmates, ev-
eryone brings a different set of interests, abilities, temperamental
factors, developmental levels, social experiences, and emotions
to bear on learning tasks. But can we say these differences con-
stitute distinct “learning styles”? For example, are some people
“visual learners” who need to see the material rather than hear-
ing it, as, perhaps, an “auditory learner” must do?
Educators have been drawn to the concept of learning
styles in the hope of encouraging learning by tailoring in-
struction to a student’s learning style. The excitement about
learning styles has, in turn, led to a proliferation of learning-
style inventories, each aiming to diagnose how a student
learns best, with implications for how to tailor a teaching
environment to fit each learner. Perhaps you have taken one
such test. But is all this buzz based on fact or fantasy?
What Are the Critical Issues?
From a critical perspective, the principal issue centers on the
meaning of “learning styles.” The term may seem intuitively
clear—but does it mean the same thing to everyone? And
are learning styles really requirements or mere preferences
for learning? In other words, if you are a “visual learner,” to
what extent does this truly impact your ability to learn when
visuals are not available? And are learning styles unchange-
able (like eye color), or can people adjust their approach to
learning to fit the demands of the subject matter (say, litera-
ture, psychology, dentistry, or music)?
What Is the Source? Unfortunately, most of the publications
on learning styles come from sources that have not performed the
controlled studies needed to support their claims (Stahl, 1999).
Rather, the “research” they say supports their claims is largely
unpublished and thus has not be scrutinized by other scientists.
As we learned in Chapter 1, publishing and critiquing studies
and their results is a key step in the scientific method. Avoiding
this requirement may be a warning sign that the claimant has
fallen prey to one or more types of bias and thus lacks credibility.
What Is the Evidence? One problem we encounter in ex-
amining the evidence for learning styles is that, even among
learning-style enthusiasts, we find no agreed-upon list of distinct
learning styles. Although educators commonly talk about “verbal
learners,” “visual learners,” and “kinesthetic (movement) learn-
ers,” some inventories also claim to assess some combination of
the following styles: tactile (touch), logical, social, solitary, active/
reflective, sensing/intuitive, thinking/feeling, judging/perceiving,
c. have children punch a BoBo doll to “get the aggression out of
their system.”
d. punish children for aggressive acts performed at school.
4. APPLICATION: Mirror neurons seem to explain how observational
learning works. So, looking at your answer to the previous question:
What would the observers’ mirror neurons be responding to?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Pick one
experiment described in this section of the chapter, and discuss
why it is difficult to explain in purely behavioral terms.
Check Your Understanding
1. ANALYSIS: Why was insight rather than trial and error the best
explanation for Sultan’s solution to the problem of reaching the
food reward?
2. RECALL: What evidence did Tolman have that his rats had
developed cognitive maps of a maze?
3. APPLICATION: If you were going to use Bandura’s findings in
developing a program to prevent violence among middle school
children, you might
a. have children watch videos of children who are responding
constructively to aggressive acts on the playground.
b. punish children who are aggressive and reward those who are
not aggressive.
Answers 1. Sultan had apparently given up on active trial-and-error attempts to solve the problem. Yet, after a period of inactivity, he abruptly found
the solution, which involved piling the boxes so he could climb on them and reach the fruit. Köhler argued that Sultan had achieved the solution
mentally, through insight. 2. When their usual path was blocked, Tolman’s rats would usually take the shortest alternative path to the goal. 3. a 4. The
mirror neurons in the observers would be responding to the behavior of the children who are responding constructively to aggressive acts. 5. All of the
following are difficult to explain behaviorally because each challenges a basic principle of operant or classical conditioning: Köhler’s experiments on
insight learning (learning = a reorganization of perceptions), Tolman’s “cognitive map” experiments (evidence that animals learn concepts rather than
specific behaviors), and Bandura’s studies of observational learning (children learn behaviors for which other people are rewarded).
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning? 165
sequential/global. This widespread disagreement regarding even
the basic categories of “learning styles” should be a clue to the
critical thinker that claims may be based on mere speculation
and common sense rather than true scientific findings.
A second red flag we see when we examine the evidence
is the scarcity of findings to support any relationship between
a person’s learning style and his or her actual learning. In
fact, most advocates of learning styles have little support-
ing data for their claim that people with different scores learn
the same material in different ways. In fact, the research we
have shows that matching a teaching environment to a per-
son’s purported learning style has little to no effect on his
or her achievement. Thus, a more accurate interpretation
of learning styles may be that they reflect preferences in
learning rather than requirements for learning (Krätzig &
Arbuthnott, 2006).
There is, however, one scientific study that does show
evidence for impact of certain learning styles on achievement.
An ambitious program developed by cognitive psychologists
Robert Sternberg and Elena Grigorenko first measured stu-
dents’ abilities for logical, creative, and practical thinking—
arguably, three distinct forms of “intelligence” (Sternberg,
1994; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997). Then students in an
introductory psychology course were divided into groups that
received instruction emphasizing the form of intelligence on
which they had scored highest. (A control group of students
was deliberately mismatched.) Tests at the end of the course
indicated that students did best when the teaching emphasis
matched their intellectual style.
What was different about the Sternberg and Grigorenko
study? In addition to the fact that their results did show bet-
ter student achievement when the teaching style matched
their intellectual profile—in terms of logical, creative, and
practical thinking—they used a randomized, double-blind
experimental method to test their hypothesis. Notably, most
other “learning style assessments” fail to employ such rigor-
ous and reliable scientific procedures.
Does the Issue Require Multiple Perspectives? If learning
styles do exist, could a cross-cultural perspective help us under-
stand them (Winerman, 2006b)? Studies by Nisbett et al. (2003)
have shown that Asians and Americans often perceive the world
quite differently, with Americans focusing on central objects and
Asians taking in a scene more globally. (The difference is cul-
tural, not physiological: Americans of Asian ancestry perceive in
essentially the same way as do other Americans.) To illustrate the
difference in these two styles of “seeing,” look at the image of the
tiger against a jungle background on this page. Nisbett’s group
found that the typical American spends more mental energy on
putting prominent elements of the scene—the tiger—into logi-
cal categories, while Asians usually pay more attention to the
context and background—the jungle.
Culture can also influence the way people approach class-
room learning. For example, Americans generally believe that
academic success is the result of innate intelligence, while
East Asians emphasize discipline and hard work (Li, 2005).
Which belief system would you guess might encourage most
children to do well in school?
Other cultural differences can play a role in academic
achievement as well, says Korean-born psychologist Heejung
Kim. After struggling with classes that required group
discussion, which was rare in her Korean educational expe-
rience, Kim (2002) decided to look for differences between
the ways Asians and Americans approach academic tasks.
As she predicted, when Asian and American college students
were given problems to solve, the Americans usually bene-
fited from talking over the problems with each other, while
such discussion often inhibited problem solving by Asian
students.
We note, however, that these cultural differences are not
part of the current debate regarding “learning styles” and
thus have not been included in any of the learning styles in-
ventories marketed by a variety of organizations. We men-
tion them here, however, to show that ideas currently based
on popular opinion (such as the impact of learning styles on
performance) stand to gain credibility by accepting criticism
from the scientific community and using it to seek improve-
ments in their theories. In this case, advocates of learning
styles might do well to conduct controlled tests to investigate
whether some of these cultural differences might result in ac-
tual performance differences and, if so, create categories of
learning styles that truly reflect empirical differences.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
In general, while we best be cautious about most claims
regarding learning styles, we should remain open to new
developments that may emerge from cross-cultural research
and from work on Sternberg’s three-intelligences theory.
Beyond that, we should acknowledge that interest in learn-
ing styles has encouraged teachers and professors to pres-
ent material in a variety of ways in their classes—including
media, demonstrations, and various “active learning” tech-
niques. Further, available research suggests everyone learns
better when the same material can be approached in more
than one way—both visual and verbal, as well as through
hands-on learning (McKeachie, 1990, 1997, 1999).
The lines on this image, used by Nisbett’s team, show one individual’s
eye movements when scanning the scene. Americans spent more time
looking at the tiger and other prominent objects in the picture, whereas
Asians spent more time scanning details of the context and background.

166 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
the way we learn to the type of material to be learned: You
wouldn’t learn about music in exactly the same way you would
learn about math. Learning involves an interaction of many fac-
tors: the learner, the material, the medium in which the material
is presented, the organization of the presentation, the person-
alities of the teacher and learner, and the environment in which
learning takes place, to name a few. And your college experience
presents a wonderful opportunity to learn to think in new and
unaccustomed ways.
ADAPTING YOURSELF TO BETTER LEARNING
Most students would like to improve their
performance in one or more classes. Rather
than wasting time with the pseudoscience
of learning styles, try applying the bona fide
principles of classical and operant condition-
ing to a plan designed specifically to help
you achieve your goal. Using the various prin-
ciples you have learned so far in this chapter,
design your own behavior change program.
First, identify a specific behavior.
Instead of setting a broad goal, such as
getting a better grade, make your goal
specific—reading eight textbook pages per
day, completing the “As You Read Practice
Activities” in MyPsychLab, or reviewing your
class notes each day. Then identify at least
five ways you can encourage the new behav-
ior based on the principles of classical and
operant conditioning. For starters, you might
identify one feeling or biological stimulus
you want to associate with the desired be-
havior and figure out a way to achieve that
with classical conditioning. Then, you’ll def-
initely want to identify one or two reinforcers
you can use—continuously at first. Next,
decide what schedules of reinforcement
you will implement once you have begun
to shape the behavior successfully, and—
based on that—write down how often you
will receive a reinforcer and what it will be.
For best results, use a variety of reinforcers
on a variety of schedules to keep yourself re-
sponding well. Then get started! Keep track
of your progress, and make adjustments as
needed.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER PROBLEM: Assuming Sabra’s fear of flying was a
response she had learned, could it also be treated by learning? If
so, how?
• Classical conditioning played one role in Sabra overcoming
her fear of flying. By creating positive associations with the
experience of flying, Sabra underwent a combination of
extinction and counter-conditioning.
• Operant conditioning helped Sabra overcome her fear of flying
through shaping—providing positive reinforcement for each
successive step toward flying in an airplane. The effectiveness
of the treatment provided negative reinforcement by removing
the anxiety and fear she had previously associated with flying.
• Cognitive learning added instruction about some of the
aeronautical aspects of flying, thus helping Sabra develop
a mental understanding of how airplanes work, as well as
observational learning during which Sabra observed calm
passengers takng a flight.
But back to our main point: We recommend caution when
interpreting results of tests that purport to identify your learn-
ing style. Beware of people who tell you that you are a visual
learner, a reflective learner, or some other type: Just because you
prefer images to words, for example, does not mean that you
should avoid reading and just look at the pictures. This sort of
thinking erroneously suggests that each person learns in only
one way. It also erroneously suggests that the way we learn is
fixed and unchanging. Instead, we need to learn how to adapt
4.1 What Sort of Learning Does Classical
Conditioning Explain?
Core Concept 4.1 Classical conditioning is a basic form
of learning in which a stimulus that produces an innate reflex
becomes associated with a previously neutral stimulus, which
then acquires the power to elicit essentially the same response.
Learning produces lasting changes in behavior or mental pro-
cesses, giving us an advantage over organisms that rely more
heavily on reflexes and instincts. Some forms of learning, such
as habituation, are quite simple, while others, such as classical
conditioning, operant conditioning, and cognitive learning,
are more complex.
The earliest learning research focused on classical condi-
tioning, beginning with Ivan Pavlov’s discovery that condi-
tioned stimuli (after being paired with unconditioned stimuli)
could elicit reflexive responses. His experiments on dogs
showed how conditioned responses could be acquired and
extinguished and undergo spontaneous recovery in laboratory
animals. He also demonstrated stimulus generalization and dis-
crimination learning. John Watson extended Pavlov’s work to
people, notably in his famous experiment on the conditioning
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

of fear in Little Albert. More recent work, particularly studies
of taste aversions, suggests, however, that classical condition-
ing is not a simple stimulus–response learning process but also
has a biological component. In general, classical conditioning
affects basic, survival-oriented responses. Therapeutic applica-
tions of Pavlovian learning include the prevention of harmful
food aversions in chemotherapy patients.
acquisition (p. 138)
behavioral learning (p. 135)
classical conditioning (p. 136)
conditioned response (CR) (p. 138)
conditioned stimulus (CS) (p. 138)
extinction (in classical conditioning) (p. 138)
habituation (p. 135)
learning (p. 134)
mere exposure effect (p. 135)
neutral stimulus (p. 137)
spontaneous recovery (p. 138)
stimulus discrimination (p. 139)
stimulus generalization (p. 139)
unconditioned response (UCR) (p. 138)
unconditioned stimulus (UCS) (p. 137)
4.2 How Do We Learn New Behaviors
By Operant Conditioning?
Core Concept 4.2 In operant conditioning, the
consequences of behavior, such as rewards and punishments,
influence the probability that the behavior will occur again.
A more active form of learning, called instrumental condition-
ing, was first explored by Edward Thorndike, who established
the law of effect based on his study of trial-and-error learning.
B. F. Skinner expanded Thorndike’s work, now called operant
conditioning, to explain how responses are influenced by
their environmental consequences. His work identified and
assessed various consequences, including positive and nega-
tive reinforcement, punishment, and an operant form of extinc-
tion. The power of operant conditioning involves producing
new responses. To learn how this works, Skinner and others
examined continuous reinforcement as well as several kinds of
intermittent reinforcement contingencies, including FR, VR, FI,
and VI schedules. As for punishment, research has shown it is
more difficult to use than reinforcement because it has sev-
eral undesirable side effects. There are, however, alternatives,
including operant extinction and rewarding of alternative
responses, application of the Premack principle, and prompt-
ing and shaping new behaviors. These techniques have found
practical use in controlling behavior in schools and other
institutions, as well as in behavioral therapy for controlling
fears and phobias.
conditioned reinforcer or secondary
reinforcer (p. 147)
continuous reinforcement (p. 145)
extinction (in operant conditioning)
(p. 146)
fixed interval (FI) schedules (p. 147)
fixed ratio (FR) schedules (p. 146)
instinctive drift (p. 148)
intermittent reinforcement (p. 146)
interval schedule (p. 146)
law of effect (p. 143)
negative punishment (p. 149)
negative reinforcement (p. 144)
operant chamber (p. 144)
operant conditioning (p. 143)
positive punishment (p. 149)
positive reinforcement (p. 144)
Premack principle (p. 148)
primary reinforcer (p. 147)
punishment (p. 149)
ratio schedule (p. 146)
reinforcement contingencies
(p. 145)
reinforcer (p. 143)
schedule of reinforcement (p. 146)
shaping (p. 145)
token economy (p. 148)
variable interval (VI) schedule
(p. 147)
variable ratio (VR) schedule
(p. 147)
4.3 How Does Cognitive Psychology
Explain Learning?
Core Concept 4.3 According to cognitive psychology,
some forms of learning must be explained as changes in
mental processes rather than as changes in behavior alone.
Much research now suggests that learning is not just a process
that links stimuli and responses: Learning is also cognitive. This
was shown in Köhler’s work on insight learning in chimpanzees,
in Tolman’s studies of cognitive maps in rats, and in Bandura’s
research on observational learning and imitation in humans—
particularly the effect of observing aggressive models, which
spawned many studies on media violence and, recently, applica-
tions dealing with social problems, such as the spread of AIDS.
All this cognitive research demonstrates that learning does not
necessarily involve changes in behavior, nor does it require re-
inforcement. In the past three decades, cognitive scientists have
reinterpreted behavioral learning, especially operant and classi-
cal conditioning, in cognitive terms, as well as searched for the
neural basis of learning.
cognitive map (p. 158)
insight learning (p. 158)
long-term potentiation (p. 161)
observational learning (p. 160)
Chapter Summary 167

168 C H A P T E R 4 Learning and Human Nurture
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
however, is sparse. Nor is there general agreement on a specific
set of learning styles. A critical thinking approach suggests
that people have learning preferences, but they can learn to
adapt their approach to different kinds of material.
Do Different People Have Different “Learning Styles”?
Media attention on so-called learning styles continues to
encourage learners to focus on learning in ways that match
their learning style. Empirical evidence to support this notion,
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the video, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 8: LEARNING
Program Review
6. What point is Professor Zimbardo making when he says “Relax”
while firing a pistol?
a. There are fixed reactions to verbal stimuli.
b. The acquisition process is reversed during extinction.
c. Any stimulus can come to elicit any reaction.
d. Unconditioned stimuli are frequently negative.
7. What point does Ader and Cohen’s research on taste aversion in
rats make about classical conditioning?
a. It can be extinguished easily.
b. It takes many conditioning trials to be effective.
c. It is powerful enough to suppress the immune system.
d. It tends to be more effective than instrumental conditioning.
8. What is Thorndike’s law of effect?
a. Learning is controlled by its consequences.
b. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction.
c. Effects are more easily changed than causes.
d. A conditioned stimulus comes to have the same effect as an
unconditioned stimulus.
9. According to John B. Watson, any behavior, even strong emotion,
could be explained by the power of
a. instinct.
b. inherited traits.
1. Which of the following is an example of a fixed-action
pattern?
a. a fish leaping at bait that looks like a fly
b. a flock of birds migrating in winter
c. a person blinking when something gets in her eye
d. a chimpanzee solving a problem using insight
2. What is the basic purpose of learning?
a. to improve one’s genes
b. to understand the world one lives in
c. to find food more successfully
d. to adapt to changing circumstances
3. How have psychologists traditionally studied learning?
a. in classrooms with children as participants
b. in classrooms with college students as participants
c. in laboratories with humans as participants
d. in laboratories with nonhuman animals as participants
4. In his work, Pavlov found that a metronome could produce
salivation in dogs because
a. it signaled that food would arrive.
b. it was the dogs’ normal reaction to a metronome.
c. it was on while the dogs ate.
d. it extinguished the dogs’ original response.
5. What is learned in classical conditioning?
a. a relationship between an action and its consequence
b. a relationship between two stimulus events
c. a relationship between two response events
d. classical conditioning does not involve learning
c. innate ideas.
d. conditioning.
10. In Watson’s work with Little Albert, why was Albert afraid of the
Santa Claus mask?
a. He had been classically conditioned with the mask.
b. The mask was an unconditioned stimulus creating fear.
c. He generalized his learned fear of the rat.
d. Instrumental conditioning created a fear of strangers.

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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 169
11. What was the point of the Skinner box?
a. It kept animals safe.
b. It provided a simple, highly controlled environment.
c. It set up a classical conditioning situation.
d. It allowed psychologists to use computers for research.
12. Skinner found that the rate at which a pigeon pecked at a target
varied directly with
a. the conditioned stimulus.
b. the conditioned response.
c. the operant antecedents.
d. the reinforcing consequences.
13. Imagine a behavior therapist is treating a person who fears going
out into public places. What would the therapist be likely to
focus on?
a. the conditioning experience that created the fear
b. the deeper problems that the fear is a symptom of
c. providing positive consequences for going out
d. reinforcing the patient’s desire to overcome the fear
14. When should the conditioned stimulus be presented in order to
optimally produce classical conditioning?
a. just before the unconditioned stimulus
b. simultaneously with the unconditioned response
c. just after the unconditioned stimulus
d. just after the conditioned response
15. Operant conditioning can be used to achieve all of the following,
except
a. teaching dogs to assist the handicapped.
b. teaching English grammar to infants.
c. teaching self-control to someone who is trying to quit
smoking.
d. increasing productivity among factory workers.
16. Which psychologist has argued that in order to understand and
control behavior, one has to consider both the reinforcements act-
ing on the selected behavior and the reinforcements acting on the
alternatives?
a. E. Thorndike
b. J. Watson
c. B. F. Skinner
d. H. Rachlin
17. If given a choice between an immediate small reinforcer and a
delayed larger reinforcer, an untrained pigeon will
a. select the immediate small one.
b. select the delayed larger one.
c. experiment and alternate across trials.
d. not show any signs of perceiving the difference.
18. In order to produce extinction of a classically conditioned behav-
ior, an experimenter would
a. reward the behavior.
b. pair the behavior with negative reinforcement.
c. present the conditioned stimulus in the absence of the uncon-
ditioned stimulus.
d. model the behavior for the organism.
19. In Pavlov’s early work, bell is to food as
a. unconditioned response is to conditioned response.
b. conditioned stimulus is to unconditioned stimulus.
c. unconditioned response is to conditioned stimulus.
d. conditioned stimulus is to conditioned response.
20. Howard Rachlin has discovered that animals can be taught
self-control through
a. reinforcement.
b. operant conditioning.
c. instrumental conditioning.
d. all of the above.

Memory5
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
5.1 What Is Memory?
Metaphors for Memory
Memory’s Three Basic Tasks
Human memory is an information
processing system that works
constructively to encode, store, and
retrieve information.
Would You Want a
“Photographic” Memory?
This ability is rare, and those who
have it say that the images sometimes
interfere with their thinking.
5.2 How Do We Form Memories?
The First Stage: Sensory Memory
The Second Stage: Working Memory
The Third Stage: Long-Term Memory
Each of the three memory stages encodes
and stores memories in a different way,
but they work together to transform
sensory experience into a lasting record
that has a pattern or meaning.
“Flashbulb” Memories: Where
Were You When . . . ?
These especially vivid memories usually
involve emotionally charged events.
Surprisingly, they aren’t always accurate.
Whether memories are implicit or
explicit, successful retrieval depends
on how they were encoded and how
they are cued.
On the Tip of Your Tongue
It is frustrating when you know the
word but can’t quite find it. But you’re
not alone. Most people experience this
about once a week.
CHAPTER PROBLEM How can our knowledge about memory help us
evaluate claims of recovered memories?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED The Recovered Memory Controversy
5.3 How Do We Retrieve Memories?
Implicit and Explicit Memory
Retrieval Cues
Other Factors Affecting Retrieval
5.4 Why Does Memory Sometimes
Fail Us?
Transience: Fading Memories Cause
Forgetting
Absent-Mindedness: Lapses of Attention
Cause Forgetting
Blocking: Access Problems
Misattribution: Memories in the Wrong
Context
Suggestibility: External Cues Distort or
Create Memories
Bias: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Opinions
Distort Memories
Persistence: When We Can’t Forget
The Advantages of the “Seven Sins” of
Memory
Improving Your Memory with Mnemonics
Most of our memory problems arise
from memory’s “seven sins”—which
are really by-products of otherwise
adaptive features of human memory.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
In studying psychology, there isn’t
much you need to memorize. Instead,
elaborative rehearsal and distributed
learning will help you learn and
remember concepts.

171
DOES MEMORY MAKE AN ACCURATE AND INDELIBLE RECORD OF OUR PAST? OR IS it like a footprint in the sand, shifting with time and circumstance? In fact, the truth about memory encompasses both of those extremes. Memory can be highly malleable—yet many of our memories are quite accurate. The challenge lies in
knowing when to rely on memory and when to question it, as the following cases will illustrate.
CASE 1 Twelve-year-old Donna began to suffer severe migraine headaches that left her
sleepless and depressed. Concerned, her parents, Judee and Dan, sought help for her. Over
the next year, Donna was passed from one therapist to another, ending up with a psychiatric
social worker who specialized in treatment of child abuse. It was to that therapist that Donna
disclosed—for the first time—having been sexually molested at the age of 3 by a neighbor. The
therapist concluded that memories of the assault, buried in her mind for so long, were probably
responsible for some of Donna’s current problems, so she continued to probe for details and
other possible instances of sexual abuse.
Eventually, the therapist asked her to bring in a family photo album, which included a photo
of Donna, taken at age 2 or 3, wearing only underpants. The therapist suggested this might be
evidence that Donna’s father had a sexual interest in her and, possibly, had molested her. More-
over, the therapist contacted the authorities, who began an investigation (ABC News, 1995).
For two years, Donna felt intense pressure to blame her father, but consistently denied he
had molested her. Finally, amid increasing confusion about her childhood memories, she began
to believe she suffered from “repressed memory syndrome” and that her father had abused her
repeatedly during her childhood. Eventually, Donna was hospitalized. While in the hospital,
she was placed on medication, hypnotized repeatedly, and diagnosed with multiple personality
disorder (now called dissociative identity disorder).

172 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
As for her father, Dan was arrested and tried on charges of abuse based solely on his daugh-
ter’s recovered memory. When his two-week trial ended in a hung jury, Dan went free. Shortly
after the trial, Donna moved to another state with a foster family. In new surroundings and far
away from the system that had supported her story, she began to believe her memories were
false. Eventually, her doctor recommended she be sent back to her family, where they began
the slow process of rebuilding broken relationships and trust.
CASE 2 Ross is a college professor who entered therapy because he was unhappy with his
life. Describing his condition, he said, “I felt somehow adrift, as if some anchor in my life had
been raised. I had doubts about my marriage, my job, everything” (Schacter, 1996, p. 249).
Then, some months after entering therapy, he had a dream that left him with a strong sense of
unease about a certain camp counselor he had known as a youth. Over the next few hours, that
sense of unease gradually became a vivid recollection of the counselor molesting him. From
that point on, Ross became obsessed with the memory, finally hiring a private detective, who
helped him track down the counselor in a small Oregon town. After numerous attempts to talk
with the counselor by telephone, Ross at last made contact and taped the phone conversation.
The counselor admitted molesting Ross, as well as several other boys at the camp. Strangely,
Ross claimed he had simply not thought about the abuse for years—until he entered therapy.
PROBLEM: How can our knowledge about memory help us evaluate claims of
recovered memories?
Keep in mind there is no sure way to “prove a negative.” That is, without some independent
evidence, no one could ever prove conclusively that abuse or some other apparently long-
forgotten event did not occur. Instead, we must weigh claims against our understanding of
memory. In particular, we need answers to the following questions:
• Does memory make an accurate record of everything we experience?
• Are traumatic experiences, such as those of sexual abuse, likely to be repressed (blocked
from consciousness), as Sigmund Freud taught? Or are we more likely to remember our
most emotional experiences, both good and bad?
• How reliable are memories of experiences from early childhood?
• How easily can memories be changed by suggestion, as when a therapist or police officer
might suggest that sexual abuse occurred?
• Are vivid memories more accurate than ordinary, less-distinct memories?
You will find answers to these questions, and many more, in this chapter. Let’s begin with
the most fundamental question of all.
5.1 KEY QUESTION
What Is Memory?
Undoubtedly, memory does play tricks on us. Our best defense against those tricks
is an understanding of how memory works. So let’s begin building that understand-
ing with a definition: Cognitive psychologists view memory as a system that encodes,
stores, and retrieves information—a definition, by the way, that applies equally to
an organism or a computer. Unlike a computer’s memory, however, we humans have
a cognitive memory system that selectively takes information from the senses and
converts it into meaningful patterns that we store and access later as needed. These
memory patterns, then, form the raw material for thought and behavior, which
in turn enables you to recognize a friend’s face, ride a bicycle, recollect a trip to
memory Any system—human, animal, or machine—
that encodes, stores, and retrieves information.

What Is Memory? 173
Disneyland, and (if all goes well) recall the concepts you need during a test. More
generally, our Core Concept characterizes memory this way:
Core Concept 5.1
Human memory is an information processing system that works
constructively to encode, store, and retrieve information.
And how is memory related to learning, the topic of the last chapter? Learning
and memory are different sides of the same coin. You might think of memory as the
cognitive system that processes, encodes, and stores the information we learn, then
later allows us to retrieve it. In other words, memory enables learning. So this chapter
is really an extension of our discussion of cognitive learning in the last section of
Chapter 4. The focus here, however, will be on more complex human learning and
memory, as contrasted with the simpler forms of animal learning and conditioning we
emphasized earlier.
Metaphors for Memory
We often use metaphors to help us understand complicated things. One such
metaphor compares human memory to a library or a storehouse, emphasizing the
ability of memory to hold large amounts of information (Haberlandt, 1999).
Another, compares memory to a computer. Some metaphors for memory, however,
are misleading. That’s certainly the case with the “video recorder” metaphor for
memory, which implies that human memory makes a complete and accurate record
of everything we experience.
Experiments clearly show this video-recorder metaphor is wrong. And, especially
in some cases of “recovered memories,” believing in the unfailing accuracy of mem-
ory can be dangerously wrong. Instead, human memory is an interpretive system that
takes in information and, much like an artist, discards certain details and organizes the
rest into meaningful patterns. As a result, our memories represent our unique percep-
tions of events rather than being accurate or objective representations of the events
themselves.
Simply put, then, we don’t technically retrieve memories—in truth, we reconstruct
them. We start with fragments of memory—like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Then, from
these fragments, we reconstruct the incident (or idea, emotion, or image) by filling
in the blanks as we remember it, rather than the way it actually was. Most of the
time this works well enough that you don’t realize just how much of remembrance is
actually reconstruction.
A look at Figure 5.1 should convince you of this reconstructive process. Which
image is the most accurate portrayal of a penny? Unless you are a coin collector, you
probably pay little attention to the details of these familiar objects. So, when retrieving
the image of a penny, you automatically fill in the gaps and missing details—without
realizing how much of the memory image you are actually creating.
Some memories are sketchier than others. In general, psychologists have found we
make the most complete and accurate memory records for:
• Information on which we have focused our attention, such as a friend’s words
against a background of other conversations
• Information in which we are interested, such as the plot of a favorite movie
• Information that arouses us emotionally, such as an especially enjoyable or painful
experience (unless the material also brings our biases into play, as when we are in
a heated discussion with a loved one)
• Information that connects with previous experience, such as a news item about the
musician whose concert you attended last week
• Information that we rehearse, such as material reviewed before an exam
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Cognitive psychology is one of
the six main perspectives in
psychology (p. 16).
The cognitive perspective says that
our cognitions can affect our mental
health—or our mental disorders.

174 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
The rest of the chapter will unfold this cognitive approach to memory, known as
the information-processing model. It emphasizes the systematic changes information un-
dergoes on its way to becoming a permanent memory—quite different from the naïve
video recorder model. The information-processing model also emphasizes that mem-
ory is functional—that is, it performs useful functions for us. The most basic of these,
we will see below, are the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information.
Memory’s Three Basic Tasks
In simplest terms, human memory takes essentially meaningless sensory information
(such as the sounds of your professor’s voice) and changes it into meaningful patterns
(words, sentences, and concepts) you can store and use later. To do so, memory must
first encode the incoming sensory information in a useful format.
Encoding first requires that you select some stimulus event from the vast array of
inputs assaulting your senses and make a preliminary classification of that stimulus. Is it a
sound, visual image, odor, taste, or pain? Next you identify the distinctive features of that
input. If it’s a sound, is it loud, soft, or harsh? Does it fit some pattern, such as a car horn,
a melody, a voice? Is it a sound you have heard before? Finally, you mentally tag, or label,
an experience to make it meaningful. (“It’s Dr. Johnson. He’s my psychology professor!”)
Often, encoding is so automatic and rapid that we have no awareness of the
process. For example, you can probably recall what you had for breakfast this morning,
even though you didn’t deliberately try to make the experience “stick” in your mind.
Emotionally charged experiences, such as an angry exchange with a colleague, are even
more likely to lodge in memory without any effort to encode them (Dolan, 2002).
On the other hand, memories for concepts, such as the basic principles of psychol-
ogy, usually require a deliberate encoding effort to establish a usable memory. In a
process called elaboration, you attempt to connect a new concept with existing infor-
mation in memory. One way to do this is to link the new material to personal, concrete
examples, as when you associated the term negative reinforcement with the removal of
pain when you take an aspirin. (As an aid to elaboration, this text deliberately provides
many such examples that, we hope, will help you connect new concepts with your own
experiences.) In fact, failure to elaborate is a common cause of memory errors: If you
didn’t know the answer to the Penny Test, for example, you probably never paid close
attention to the configuration of a penny, and thus never really encoded it to begin
with. (The correct answer, by the way, is A.)
information-processing model A cognitive
understanding of memory, emphasizing how infor-
mation is changed when it is encoded, stored, and
retrieved.
encoding The first of the three basic tasks of
memory, involving the modification of information to
fit the preferred format for the memory system.
FIGURE 5.1
The Penny Test
Which of these images is an accurate
portrayal of a penny?
Source: Nickerson, R., & Adams, M. (1979).
Long-term memory for a common object. Cognitive
Psychology, 11(1), 287–307. Copyright © 1979.
Reprinted by permission of Elsevier.
A B C D E
K L M N O
F G H I J

What Is Memory? 175
Storage, the second essential memory task, involves the retention of encoded
material over time. But it’s not a simple process. As we get deeper into the workings of
memory, you will learn that memory consists of three parts, or stages, each of which
stores memories for different lengths of time and in different forms. The trick of get-
ting difficult-to-remember material into long-term storage, then, is to recode the in-
formation in the way long-term memory “likes” it before the time clock runs out. For
example, while listening to a lecture, you may have just a few seconds to encode a
pattern or meaning in the sound of your professor’s voice before new information
comes along and the old information is lost.
Retrieval, the third basic memory task, is the payoff for your earlier efforts in
encoding and storage. When you have a properly encoded memory, it takes only a split
second for a good cue to access the information, bring it to consciousness, or, in some
cases, to influence your behavior at an unconscious level. (Let’s test the ability of your
conscious retrieval machinery: Can you remember which of the three memory tasks
occurs just before storage?)
Alas, retrieval doesn’t always go well, because the human memory system—marvelous
as it is—sometimes makes errors, distorts information, or even fails us completely. In
the last section of the chapter, we will take a close look at these problems, which memory
expert Daniel Schacter (1996) calls the “seven sins of memory.”1 The good news is you
can combat memory’s “sins” with a few simple techniques that you will also learn about
in the following pages.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Would You Want a “Photographic” Memory?
Suppose your memory were so vivid and accurate you could “read” paragraphs of
this book from memory during your next exam. Such was the power of a 23-year-old
woman tested by Charles Stromeyer and Joseph Psotka (1970). One of the amazing
things she could do was to look at the meaningless configuration of dots in the left-
hand pattern in the Do It Yourself! box and combine it mentally with the right-hand
image. The result was the combined pattern shown in Figure 5.2. (Did you see the
number “63” before you looked at the solution?) Wouldn’t it be great to have such a
“photographic” memory? Not entirely, it turns out.
The technical term for “photographic memory” is eidetic imagery. Psychologists
prefer this term because eidetic images differ in many important respects from im-
ages made by a camera (Haber, 1969, 1980; Searleman, 2007). For example, a pho-
tographic image renders everything in minute detail, while an eidetic image portrays
the most interesting and meaningful parts of the scene most accurately and is subject
to the same kind of distortions found in “normal” memories.
Eidetic memories also differ in several respects from typical human memory
images. For one thing, eidetikers describe their memory images as having the viv-
idness of the original experience (Neisser, 1967). For another, eidetic images are
visualized as being “outside the head” rather than inside—in the “mind’s eye.” (Yet,
unlike a person who is hallucinating, eidetikers recognize these images as mental
images.) Further, an eidetic image can last for several minutes—even for days, in
some cases. For example, the woman tested by Stromeyer and Psotka could pass
the dot-combining test even when she saw the two patterns 24 hours apart. But,
remarkable as this is, the persistence of eidetic images can be a curse. Eidetikers
report that their vivid imagery sometimes clutters their minds and interferes with
other things they want to think about (Hunter, 1964).
storage The second of the three basic tasks of
memory, involving the retention of encoded material
over time.
retrieval The third basic task of memory, involving
the location and recovery of information from memory.
eidetic imagery An especially clear and per-
sistent form of memory that is quite rare; sometimes
known as “photographic memory.”
1 Schacter’s “seven sins” of memory are a pun on the famous seven sins of medieval times. You can remember them
by the acronym WASPLEG, which refers to Wrath, Avarice, Sloth, Pride, Lust, Envy, and Gluttony.

176 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
Eidetic imagery appears most commonly in children and only rarely in adults.
One estimate suggests that up to five percent of children show some eidetic
ability—although in most instances it’s not good enough to pass the dot-combining
test (Gray & Gummerman, 1975). And, in case you were wondering, there are no
gender differences in eidetic memory: Boys and girls alike seem to have similar
likelihoods of possessing the ability (Searleman, 2007). While no one knows why
eidetic imagery tends to disappear in adults, it may follow some sort of develop-
mental sequence—like losing one’s baby teeth. Possibly its disappearance is related
to the emphasis placed on logical thought that typically comes with the beginning
of formal education, and dovetails with a change in children’s thinking styles.
Case studies also suggest a connection between the decline of eidetic imagery
and the development of language skills: Eidetikers report that eidetic images are
strongest when they remain mere images; describing an eidetic image in words
makes it fade from memory, and eidetikers learn to exploit this fact to control
their intrusive imagery (Haber, 1969, 1970). Research in forensic psychology has
found that, for ordinary people (noneidetikers) as well, giving verbal descriptions
of suspects’ faces interferes with later memories for those faces. Likewise, trying
to describe other hard-to-verbalize perceptions, such as a voice or the taste of a
wine, impairs most people’s abilities to recall those perceptions later (Bower, 2003;
Dodson et al., 1997).
A study from Nigeria further supports the idea that loss of eidetic ability may result
from conflict between language skills and visual imagery: Eidetic imagery was found to
be common not only among Ibo children but also among illiterate adults of the tribe
who were living in rural villages. Although many of these adults could correctly draw
details of images seen earlier, members of the same tribe who had moved to the city
and learned to read showed little eidetic ability (Doob, 1964).
Whatever eidetic memory may be, it is clearly rare—so rare, in fact, that some
psychologists have questioned its existence (Crowder, 1992). The few existing studies
of “photographic memory” have portrayed it as different from everyday memory, as
we have seen. Truthfully, however, we know relatively little about the phenomenon,
and few psychologists are currently studying it.
Eidetic imagery presents not only a practical problem for those rare individuals
who possess it but also a theoretical problem for cognitive psychologists. If eidetic
imagery exists, is a known component of memory responsible? On the other hand, if it
proves to be a unique form of memory, how does it fit with the widely accepted three-
stage model of memory—which we will discuss next?
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
In Piaget’s theory, the concrete
operational stage, typically
beginning around age 6 to 7,
marks the transition from
magical thinking to logical
thinking (p. 285).
A TEST OF EIDETIC IMAGERY
Look at the dot pattern on the left in the
figure for a few moments and try to fix it
in your memory. With that image in mind,
look at the dot pattern on the right. Try
to put the two sets of dots together by
recalling the first pattern while looking
at the second one. If you are the rare
individual who can mentally combine the
two patterns, you will see something not
apparent in either image alone. Difficult?
No problem if you have eidetic imagery—
but impossible for the rest of us. If you
want to see the combined images, but
can’t combine them in your memory, look
at Figure 5.2.
A Test of Eidetic Imagery
People with good eidetic imagery can mentally combine these two images to see some-
thing that appears in neither one alone.

How Do We Form Memories? 177
5.2 KEY QUESTION
How Do We Form Memories?
If information in a lecture is to become part of your permanent memory, it must be
processed in three sequential stages: first in sensory memory, then in working mem-
ory, and finally in long-term memory. The three stages work like an assembly line to
convert a flow of incoming stimuli into meaningful patterns you can store and later
reconstruct. This three-stage model, originally developed by Richard Atkinson and
Richard Shiffrin (1968), is now widely accepted—with some elaborations and modi-
fications. Figure 5.3 shows how information flows through the three stages. (Caution:
Don’t get these three stages confused with the three basic tasks of memory we covered
earlier.)
Sensory memory, the most fleeting of the three stages, typically holds sights, sounds,
smells, textures, and other sensory impressions for a maximum of a few seconds.
Although sensory memory usually operates on an unconscious level, you can see its
effects in the fading luminous trail made by a moving flashlight or a twirling Fourth-
of-July sparkler. You can also hear the effects of fading sensory memories in the blend-
ing of one note into another as you listen to a melody. In general, these short-lived
images allow us to maintain incoming sensory information just long enough for it to
be screened for importance by working memory.
Working memory, the second stage of processing, selectively takes information from
the sensory registers and makes connections with items already in long-term storage.
(It is this connection we mean when we say, “That rings a bell!”) Working memory
holds information for up to 20 to 30 seconds (Nairne, 2003), making it a useful buf-
fer for temporarily holding a name you have just heard or following directions some-
one has just given you. Originally, psychologists called this stage short-term memory
(STM), reflecting the notion that this was merely a short-term, passive storage bin.
Research has discovered, however, there are multiple active mental processes working
at lightning speed to process information in this stage—hence the newer term working
memory.
Long-term memory (LTM), the final stage of processing, receives information from work-
ing memory and can store it for long periods—sometimes for a lifetime. Information in
sensory memory The first of three memory
stages, preserving brief sensory impressions of stimuli.
working memory The second of three memory
stages, and the one most limited in capacity. It
preserves recently perceived events or experiences
for less than a minute without rehearsal.
long-term memory (LTM) The third of three
memory stages, with the largest capacity and longest
duration; LTM stores material organized according to
meaning.
FIGURE 5.3
The Three Stages of Memory
(simplified)
Memory is generally thought to be divided
into three stages of processing. Every-
thing that eventually goes into long-term
storage must first be processed by
sensory memory and working memory.
Sensory
memory Long-term memory
Working
memory
FIGURE 5.2
What an Eidetiker Sees
The combined images from the Do It
Yourself! box form a number pattern.
Source: Klatzky, R. (1980). Human Memory:
Structures and Processes. San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman and Company. Copyright © 1975,
1980 by W. H. Freeman and Company. Used with
permission.
Check Your Understanding
1. ANALYSIS: What is a major objection to the “video recorder”
model of human memory?
2. RECALL: What are the three essential tasks of memory?
3. ANALYSIS: Suppose you have just adopted a new cat. You note
her unique markings so you can recognize her among other cats
in the neighborhood. What would a cognitive psychologist call this
process of identifying the distinctive features of your cat?
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Which of the
following memory systems reconstructs material during retrieval?
a. computer memory
b. human memory
c. video recorder memory
d. information recorded in a book
Answers 1. Unlike a video recorder, which makes an accurate and detailed record, memory stores an interpretation of experience. 2. Encoding,
storage, and retrieval 3. Encoding 4. b
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

178 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
long-term memory includes all our knowledge about the world, from an image of your
mother’s face to the lyrics to your favorite song and the year that Wilhelm Wundt estab-
lished the first psychology laboratory. (Do you remember the year from Chapter 1?)
Our Core Concept captures the three stages in brief:
Core Concept 5.2
Each of the three memory stages encodes and stores memories in a
different way, but they work together to transform sensory experience
into a lasting record that has a pattern or meaning.
Our focus in this section will be on the unique contributions each stage makes to
the final memory product (see Table 5.1). More specifically, we will look at each stage
in terms of its storage capacity, its duration (how long it retains information), its struc-
ture and function, and its biological basis.
The First Stage: Sensory Memory
Your senses take in far more information than you can possibly use. While reading
this book, they serve up all the words on the page, sounds in the room, the feel of your
clothes on your skin, the temperature of the air, the slightly hungry feeling in your
stomach. . . . How does the brain deal with this multitude of sensory input?
It’s the job of sensory memory to hold the barrage of incoming sensation just long
enough for your brain to scan it and decide which stream of information needs atten-
tion. But just how much information can sensory memory hold? Cognitive psycholo-
gist George Sperling answered this question by devising one of psychology’s simplest
and most clever experiments.
TABLE 5.1 The Three Stages of Memory Compared
Sensory Memory Working Memory Long-Term Memory
Function Briefly holds information
awaiting entry into
working memory
Involved in control of
attention
Attaches meaning to
stimulation
Makes associations
among ideas and
events
Long-term storage of
information
Encoding Sensory images: no
meaningful encoding
Encodes information
(especially by meaning)
to make it acceptable
for long-term storage
Stores information in
meaningful mental
categories
Storage capacity 12–16 items 7 ± 2 chunks Unlimited
Duration From 1/4 second to a few
seconds
About 20 seconds
unless repeatedly
rehearsed
Unlimited
Structure A separate sensory
register for each sense
Central executive
Phonological loop
Sketchpad
Episodic buffer
Procedural memory
and declarative
memory (further
subdivided into
semantic and episodic
memory)
Biological basis Sensory pathways Involves the
hippocampus and
frontal lobes
Involves various parts
of the cerebral cortex
Like the trail of light from these spar-
klers, sensory memory holds incoming
sensory information for just a brief
moment.

How Do We Form Memories? 179
The Capacity and Duration of Sensory Memory Sperling demonstrated that sen-
sory memory can hold far more information than ever reaches consciousness. He first
asked people to remember, as best they could, an array of letters flashed on a screen
for a fraction of a second. (You might try glancing briefly at the array below and then
trying to recall as many as you can.)
D J B W
X H G N
C L Y K
Not surprisingly, most people could remember only three or four items from a
fraction-of-a-second exposure.
But, Sperling wondered, could it be possible that far more information than these
three or four items entered a temporary memory buffer but vanished before it could be
reported? To test this conjecture, he modified the experimental task as follows. Imme-
diately after the array of letters flashed on the screen, an auditory cue signaled which
row of letters to report: A high-pitched tone indicated the top row, a medium tone the
middle row, and a low tone meant the bottom row. Thus, immediately after seeing the
brief image and hearing a beep, respondents were to report items from only one row,
rather than items from the whole array.
Under this partial report condition, most people achieved almost perfect accuracy—
no matter which row was signaled. That is, Sperling’s volunteers could accurately re-
port any single row, but not all rows. This result suggested that the actual storage
capacity of sensory memory can be 12 or more items—even though all but three or
four items usually disappear from sensory memory before they can enter consciousness
(Sperling, 1960, 1963).
Would it be better if our sensory memories lasted longer so we would have more
time to scan them? Probably not. With new information constantly flowing in, old in-
formation needs to disappear quickly, lest the system become overloaded. We are built
so that sensory memories last just long enough to dissolve into one another and give us
a sense of flow and continuity in our experience. Fortunately, they do not usually last
long enough to interfere with new sensory impressions.
The Structure and Function of Sensory Memory You might think of sensory
memory as a sort of mental movie screen, where images are projected fleetingly
and then disappear. In fact, this blending of images in sensory memory gives us the
impression of motion in a “motion picture”—which is really just a rapid series of still
images.
But not all sensory memory consists of visual images. We have a separate sensory
register for each sense, with each register holding a different kind of sensory informa-
tion, as shown in Figure 5.4. The register for vision, called iconic memory, stores the
encoded light patterns experienced as visual images. Similarly, the sensory memory for
hearing, known as echoic memory, holds encoded auditory stimuli.
FIGURE 5.4
Multiple Sensory Stores
We have a separate sensory memory for
each of our sensory pathways. All feed
into working memory.
Visual stimulation
Auditory stimulation
Tactile stimulation
(touch)
Olfactory stimulation
(smell)
Gustatory stimulation
(taste)
Iconic memory
Echoic memory
Working
memory
Long-term
memory
Tactile sensory memory
Olfactory sensory memory
Gustatory sensory memory

180 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
Please note that images in sensory memory have no meaning attached to them—
just as digital images have no meaning to a camera. It’s the job of sensory memory
simply to store the images briefly. It’s in the next stage, working memory, where we
add meaning to sensation.
The Biological Basis of Sensory Memory The biology of sensory memory appears
to be relatively simple. In this initial stage, memory images take the form of neural
activity in the sense organs and their pathways to the brain. Thus, sensory memory
consists of the rapidly fading trace of stimulation in our sensory systems (Bower,
2000b; Glanz, 1998). Working memory then “reads” these fading sensory traces and
decides which ones will gain admittance into the spotlight of attention and which will
be ignored and disappear.
The Second Stage: Working Memory
In the second stage of processing, working memory serves as the temporary storage
site for a new name you just heard or for the first part of this sentence while you read
the remainder. More broadly, working memory is the processor of conscious expe-
rience, including information coming from sensory memory, as well as information
being retrieved from long-term memory (Jonides et al., 2005). Everything entering
consciousness does so through working memory.
Moreover, working memory provides a mental “work space” where we sort and
encode information before adding it to more permanent storage (Shiffrin, 1993). In
doing so, it makes experiences meaningful by blending them with information from
long-term memory. To give a concrete example: Working memory is the register into
which you retrieve the information you learned in yesterday’s class as you review for
tomorrow’s test.
You might think of working memory, then, as the “central processing chip” for
the entire memory system. In this role, it typically holds information for 20–30
seconds—far longer than sensory memory. If you make a special effort to rehearse
the material, information can remain active even longer, as when you repeat a new
phone number to yourself before putting it into your phone’s contact list. It is also
the mental work space in which we consciously mull over ideas and images pulled
from long-term storage in the process we call thinking. In all these roles, then, working
memory is not only the center of mental action but also the liaison among other
components of memory.
The Capacity and Duration of Working Memory Psychologist George Miller
(1956) famously suggested that the “magic number” of this second stage of mem-
ory was 7±2. What he meant was that the storage component of working memory
holds about seven items—a fact that caused lots of distress when phone companies
began requiring callers to add an area code to the old seven-digit phone number.
Working memory’s storage capacity does vary slightly from person to person, so
you may want to assess how much yours can hold by trying the test in the Do It
Yourself! box.
When we overload working memory, earlier items usually drop away to accommo-
date more recent ones. Yet, when working memory fills up with information demand-
ing attention, we can fail to notice new information streaming into our senses. That’s
why, in the opinion of many experts, this limited capacity of working memory makes it
unsafe to use your cell phone while driving (Wickelgren, 2001). In fact, research finds
we only process about 50 percent of incoming sensory information when we are con-
currently driving and talking on a cell phone—even when the driver is using a hands-
free set. And one in four auto accidents result from driving while using a cell phone
(National Safety Council, 2010).

How Do We Form Memories? 181
Note that working memory’s meager storage capacity is
significantly smaller than that of sensory memory. In fact, working
memory has the smallest capacity of the three memory stages. This
constraint, combined with its limited duration, makes working
memory the information “bottleneck” of the memory system (see
Figure 5.5). These twin problems of limited capacity and short
duration present special obstacles for students trying to pro-
cess and remember large amounts of information from a lecture
or textbook. Fortunately, there are ways to work around these
difficulties, as we will see.
Chunks and Chunking In memory, a chunk is any pattern or meaningful unit of informa-
tion. It might be a single letter or number, a name, or even a concept. For example, the let-
ters P-H-I-L could constitute four chunks. However, you probably recognize this sequence
as a name (in fact, the name of one of your authors), so you can combine the four letters
into a single chunk. Thus, chunking helps you get more material into the seven slots of
working memory.
The phone companies capitalized on chunking years ago. When they originally
grouped the seven digits of a phone number (e.g., 6735201) into two shorter strings of
numbers (673-5201), they helped us collapse seven separate items into two chunks—
and now, with the addition of the area code conveniently chunked as well, we have
only one additional thing to remember. The government uses the same chunking prin-
ciple to help us remember our nine-digit Social Security numbers.
The Role of Rehearsal Imagine you are ordering pizza, and you ask your room-
mates what toppings they want. To keep their list in your working memory while
you call the pizza place, you might repeat it to yourself over and over. This tech-
nique is called maintenance rehearsal, and it serves us well for maintaining informa-
tion temporarily in consciousness by preventing competing inputs from crowding
it out. But repetition is not an efficient way to transfer information to long-term
memory, even though people often attempt to do so. So using this strategy to try to
learn material for a test won’t work very well.
A better strategy is elaborative rehearsal. With this method, information is not
merely repeated but is actively connected to knowledge already stored. One way to
do this is to associate a new idea with something it logically brings to mind for you.
When you read about echoic memory, for example, did you think “that makes sense,
since echoes have to do with sound?” Another way is to think of personal examples
of concepts. In the last chapter, perhaps you came up with examples of positive rein-
forcement, negative reinforcement, and classical conditioning from your own life; if
you did, we’ll bet those concepts were easier to remember when you were tested on
them.
chunking Organizing pieces of information into
a smaller number of meaningful units (or chunks)—a
process that frees up space in working memory.
maintenance rehearsal A working-memory
process in which information is merely repeated or re-
viewed to keep it from fading while in working memory.
Maintenance rehearsal involves no active elaboration.
elaborative rehearsal A working-memory
process in which information is consciously reviewed
and actively related to information already in LTM.
FINDING YOUR WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY
Look at the following list of numbers and
scan the four-digit number, the first number
on the list. Don’t try to memorize it. Just read
it quickly; then look away from the page and
try to recall the number. If you remember it
correctly, go on to the next longer number,
continuing down the list until you begin to
make mistakes. How many digits are in the
longest number that you can squeeze into
your working memory?
7 4 8 5
3 6 2 1 8
4 7 9 1 0 3
2 3 8 4 9 7 1
3 6 8 9 1 7 5 6
7 4 7 2 1 0 3 2 4
8 2 3 0 1 3 8 4 7 6
The result is your digit span, or your
working (short-term) memory capacity for
digits. Studies show that, under ideal test-
ing conditions, most people can remember
five to nine digits. If you remembered
more, you may have been using special
“chunking” techniques.
FIGURE 5.5
The Working Memory Bottleneck
Caught in the middle, with a much
smaller capacity than sensory and long-
term memories, working memory becomes
an information bottleneck in the
memory system. As a result, much
incoming information from sensory
memory is lost.
Sensory
memory
Long-term
memory
Working memory
5 to 9 ”chunks”

182 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
One caution about elaborative rehearsal: Make sure you have your facts straight
before creating a web of connections for them! If, for example, you erroneously believe
that memory is like a video recorder and think for a moment about how that makes
sense, you are reinforcing a false memory. Likewise, if the therapist treating Donna (at
the beginning of this chapter) told her to imagine situations where her Dad may have
had opportunities to molest her, merely imagining those events could help create false
memories (Loftus, 1997a; Zaragoza et al., 2011).
The Structure and Function of Working Memory When we introduced you to the
concept of working memory at the beginning of this section, we said its name reflected
the active nature of this stage of the memory process. So what are the activities work-
ing memory engages in? Currently, researchers Allen Baddeley and his colleagues be-
lieve there are four: the central executive, the phonological loop, the sketchpad, and an
episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Let’s take a closer look at
each one (see Figure 5.6).
The Central Executive The information clearinghouse for working memory, the central
executive, directs your attention to important input from both sensory memory and
long-term memory and interfaces with the brain’s voluntary (conscious) response sys-
tem. Even now, as you sit reading this text, the central executive in your working mem-
ory is helping you decide whether to attend to these words or to other stimuli flowing
in from your other senses, along with thoughts from long-term memory.
Acoustic Encoding: The Phonological Loop When you read words like “whirr,” “pop,”
“cuckoo,” and “splash,” you can hear in your mind the sounds they describe. This acoustic
encoding also happens with words that don’t have imitative sounds. That is, working
memory converts all the words we encounter into the sounds of our spoken language and
shuttles them into its phonological loop—whether the words come through our eyes, as
acoustic encoding The conversion of informa-
tion, especially semantic information, to sound
patterns in working memory.
FIGURE 5.6
A Model of Working Memory
Atkinson and Shiffrin’s original model divided memory into three stages. Events must first be processed by sensory memory and short-term mem-
ory (now called working memory) before they finally go into long-term memory storage—from which they can later be retrieved back into working
memory. Baddeley’s (2003) updated version of working memory includes a central executive that directs attention, a sketchpad for visual and
spatial information, a phonological loop for sounds, and an episodic buffer that can combine many kinds of information into memories of events.
This drawing includes all of these refinements to the original model of working memory.
Source: Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417–423.
Working Memory
Long-Term Memory
Central
Executive
Sensory
Memory
Episodic Buffer
(events)
Visual LTM
for words
Sketchpad
(visual image)
Episodic
LTM
LTM for sounds
(e.g. of language)
Stimulation Behavior
Phonological
Loop
(sounds)

How Do We Form Memories? 183
in reading, or our ears, as in listening to speech (Baddeley, 2001). There, working memory
maintains the verbal patterns in an acoustic (sound) form as they are processed.
Acoustic encoding can create its own brand of memory errors. When people recall lists
of letters they have just seen, their mistakes often involve confusions of letters that have
similar sounds—such as D and T—rather than letters with a similar appearance—such as
E and F (Conrad, 1964). Mistakes aside, however, acoustic encoding has its advantages,
particularly in learning and using language (Baddeley et al., 1998; Schacter, 1999).
Visual and Spatial Encoding: The Sketchpad Serving much the same function for visual
and spatial information, working memory’s sketchpad encodes visual images and men-
tal representations of objects in space. It holds the visual images you mentally rummage
through when you’re trying to remember where you left your car keys. It also holds the
mental map you follow from home to class. Neurological evidence suggests that the
sketchpad requires coordination among several brain systems, including the frontal and
occipital lobes.
Binding Information Together: The Episodic Buffer The most recent addition to Baddeley’s
model of working memory, the episodic buffer appears to bind the various pieces of
information in working memory into a coherent episode. When planning a series of er-
rands, for instance, we have to first identify all the places we need to go, then organize
them into a logical route based on location, and finally calculate about how long the
entire trip will take. So we have all the locations swimming around in our working
memory as we mentally map them out, and various amounts of time associated with
each one as we consider what we need to accomplish at each place. The episodic buffer
acts as the temporary storage facility for these various pieces of our puzzle as we work
it out. It also enables us to remember story lines of movies and other events, as it pro-
vides a place to organize the visual, spatial, phonological, and chronological aspects
into a single memorable episode (Baddeley, 2003).
Levels of Processing in Working Memory Here’s an important tip: The more
connections you can make in working memory between new information and
knowledge you already have, the more likely you are to remember it later. Obviously
this requires interaction between working memory and long-term memory. According
to the levels-of-processing theory proposed by Fergus Craik and Robert Lockhart
(1972), “deeper” processing—establishing more connections with long-term
memories—makes new information more meaningful and more memorable.
A famous experiment will illustrate this point.
Craik and Tulving (1975) had volunteers examine a list of 60 common
words presented on a screen one at a time. As each word appeared, experi-
menters asked questions designed to influence how deeply each word was
processed. For example, when BEAR appeared on the screen, the experiment-
ers would ask one of three questions: “Is it in capital letters?” “Does it rhyme
with chair?” “Is it an animal?” Craik and Tulving theorized that merely think-
ing about capital letters would not require processing the word as deeply as
would comparing its sound with that of another word. But the deepest level
of processing, they predicted, would occur when some aspect of the word’s
meaning was analyzed, as when they asked whether BEAR was an animal.
Thus, they predicted that items processed more deeply would leave more ro-
bust traces in memory. And, sure enough, when participants were later asked
to pick the original 60 words out of a larger list of 180, they remembered the
deeply processed words the best, as the graph in Figure 5.7 shows. You can
apply this strategy to your studying: Deeper processing of new information
will help you develop stronger memories of the material.
The Biological Basis of Working Memory Although some details remain
unclear, working memory probably holds information in the form of messages
flashed repeatedly in nerve circuits. Brain imaging implicates brain regions in
levels-of-processing theory The explanation
for the fact that information that is more thoroughly
connected to meaningful items in long-term memory
(more “deeply” processed) will be remembered better.
FIGURE 5.7
Results of Levels-of-Processing Experiment
In the Craik and Tulving (1975) experiment, words
that were processed more deeply (for meaning) were
remembered better than words examined for rhymes
or for target letters.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
letters
Co
rr
ec
t
Re
sp
on
se
s
Levels of Processing
rhymes meaning

184 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
the frontal cortex (Beardsley, 1997b; Smith, 2000), which in turn project to all sensory
parts of the brain and areas known to be involved in long-term storage. Brain imaging
also suggests the frontal lobes house some anatomically distinct “executive processes”
that focus attention on information in short-term storage (Smith & Jonides, 1999).
Together, these brain modules direct attention, set priorities, make plans, update the
contents of working memory, and monitor the time sequence of events.
The Third Stage: Long-Term Memory
Can you remember who discovered classical conditioning? Can you ride a bicycle?
How many birthdays have you had? Such information, along with everything else you
know, is stored in your long-term memory (LTM), the last of the three memory stages.
Given the vast amount of data stored in LTM, it is a marvel that we can so easily
gain access to so much of it. Remarkably, if someone asks your name, you don’t have
to rummage through a lifetime of information to find the answer. The method behind
the marvel involves a special feature of long-term memory: Words and concepts are en-
coded by their meanings. This connects them, in turn, with other items that have simi-
lar meanings. Accordingly, you might picture LTM as a huge web of interconnected
associations. As a result, good retrieval cues (stimuli that prompt the activation of a
long-term memory) can navigate though the web and help you quickly locate the item
you want amid all the data stored there.
The Capacity and Duration of Long-Term Memory How much information can
long-term memory hold? As far as we know, it has unlimited storage capacity. (No
one has yet maxed it out, so you don’t have to conserve memory by cutting back on
your studying.) LTM can store the information of a lifetime: all the experiences, events,
information, emotions, skills, words, categories, rules, and judgments that have been
transferred from working memory. Thus, your LTM contains your total knowledge
of the world and of yourself. This makes long-term memory the clear champion in
both duration and storage capacity among the three stages of memory. But how does
LTM manage to have unlimited capacity? That’s another unsolved mystery of memory.
Perhaps we might conceive of LTM as a sort of mental “scaffold,” so the more associa-
tions you make, the more information it can hold.
The Structure and Function of Long-Term Memory With a broad overview of
LTM in mind, let’s look at some of the details of its two main components. One, a
register for the things we know how to do, is called procedural memory. The other,
which stores information we can describe—facts we know and experiences we
remember—is called declarative memory. We know that procedural and declarative
memory are distinct because brain-damaged patients may lose one but not the other
(as we will see).
Procedural Memory We call on procedural memory when riding a bicycle, tying shoe-
laces, or playing a musical instrument. Indeed, we use procedural memory to store the
mental directions, or “procedures,” for all our well-practiced skills (Schacter, 1996).
Much of procedural memory operates outside of awareness: Only during the early
phases of training, when we must concentrate on every move we make, must we think
consciously about the details of our performance. Later, after the skill is thoroughly
learned, it operates largely beyond the fringes of awareness, as when a concert pia-
nist performs a piece without consciously recalling the individual notes. (Figure 5.8
should help you clarify the relationship between the two major components of long-
term memory.)
Declarative Memory We use declarative memory to store facts, impressions, and events.
Recalling the major perspectives in psychology or your most memorable vacation de-
pends on declarative memory. In contrast with procedural memory, using declarative
procedural memory A division of LTM that
stores memories for how things are done.
declarative memory A division of LTM that
stores explicit information; also known as fact memory.
Declarative memory has two subdivisions, episodic
memory and semantic memory.
Procedural memory allows experts like
Oregon quarterback Darron Thomas to per-
form complex tasks automatically, without
consciously recalling all the details.

How Do We Form Memories? 185
Semantic memory
Includes memory for:
language
facts
general knowledge
concepts
Episodic memory
Declarative memory
(knowing what)
Long-term memory
Procedural memory
(knowing how)
Includes memory for:
events
personal experiences
Includes memory for:
motor skills
operant conditioning
classical conditioning
FIGURE 5.8
Components of Long-Term Memory
Declarative memory involves knowing
specific information—knowing “what.”
It stores facts, personal experiences,
language, concepts—things about which
we might say, “I remember!” Procedural
memory involves knowing “how”—
particularly motor skills and behavioral
learning.
memory typically requires conscious mental effort, as you see when people roll their
eyes or make facial gestures while trying to recall facts or experiences.
To complicate matters, declarative memory itself has two major subdivisions,
episodic memory and semantic memory. One deals with the rich detail of personal
experiences (your first kiss), while the other simply stores information, without an
“I-remember-when” context—information like the multiplication tables or the capital
of your state.
Episodic memory stores your memories of events, or “episodes,” in your life. It
also stores temporal coding (or time tags) to identify when the event occurred and
context coding that indicates where it took place. For example, you store memories
of your recent vacation or of an unhappy love affair in episodic memory, along with
codes for where and when these episodes occurred. In this way, episodic memory
acts as your internal diary or autobiographical memory. You consult it when some-
one says, “Where were you on New Year’s Eve?” or “What did you do in class last
Tuesday?”
Semantic memory is the other division of declarative memory. (Refer to Figure 5.8 if
this is becoming confusing.) It stores the basic meanings of words and concepts. Usu-
ally, semantic memory retains no information about the time and place in which its
contents were acquired. Thus, you keep the meaning of cat in semantic memory—but
probably not a recollection of the occasion on which you first learned the meaning
of cat. In this respect, semantic memory more closely resembles an encyclopedia or a
database than an autobiography. It stores a vast quantity of facts about names, faces,
grammar, history, music, manners, scientific principles, and religious beliefs. All the
facts and concepts you know are stored there, and you consult its registry when some-
one asks you, “Who was the third president?” or “What are the two major divisions of
declarative memory?”
Schemas When you attend a class, have dinner at a restaurant, make a phone call, or
go to a birthday party, you know what to expect, because each of these events involves
familiar scenarios. Cognitive psychologists call them schemas: clusters of knowledge in
semantic memory that give us a context for understanding events (Squire, 2007). The
exact contents of our schemas depend, of course, on culture and personal experience,
but the point is that we invoke schemas to make new experiences meaningful.
episodic memory A subdivision of declarative
memory that stores personal events or “episodes.”
semantic memory A subdivision of declarative
memory that stores general knowledge, including the
meanings of words and concepts.
schema Cluster of related information that repre-
sents ideas or concepts in semantic memory. Schemas
provide a context for understanding objects and events.
On the TV show Are You Smarter Than a
5th Grader?, host Jeff Foxworthy’s
questions call for facts stored in semantic
memory.

186 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
Schemas allow us quick access to information. So if someone says “birthday party,”
you can immediately draw on information that tells you what you might expect to be
associated with a birthday party, such as eating cake and ice cream, singing “Happy
Birthday,” and opening presents. Just as important, when you invoke your “birthday
party” schema, you don’t have to sort through irrelevant knowledge in your memory—
such as information contained in your “attending class” schema or your “dinner at a
restaurant” schema. See for yourself how helpful schemas can be in the Do It Yourself
box on this page.
Schemas, then, can be an aid to declarative long-term memory when they help us
make sense out of new information by giving us a ready-made framework for it. On
the other hand, they frequently lead us astray when it comes to details—as you may
have realized in the Do It Yourself box. The problem is that we aren’t usually aware
of those memory errors when we make them. We will have a closer look at problems
resulting from schema bias in the last part of this chapter.
Early Memories Most people have difficulty remembering events that happened before
their third birthday, a phenomenon called childhood amnesia. This suggests that younger
children have limited episodic memory ability. Learning clearly occurs, however, long
before age 3, probably from the moment of birth. We see this in a baby who learns to
recognize a parent’s face or in a toddler learning language. Thus, we know that very
young children have, at least, a semantic memory and a procedural memory.
Until recently, psychologists thought childhood amnesia occurs because young chil-
dren’s brains have not yet formed neural connections required for episodic memory.
Now, however, we know that the brain has begun to create necessary circuits by the
end of the first year of life. For example, cognitive scientists have found children as
young as 9 months showing some signs of episodic memory in the ability to imitate
behaviors they have observed after a delay (Bauer et al., 2003). So why can’t you re-
member your first birthday party? Part of the answer probably involves rudimentary
language skills (for verbal encoding of memories), the lack of a sense of self (necessary
as a reference point, but which doesn’t develop until about age 2), and the lack of the
complex schemas older children and adults use to help them remember.
Culture also influences people’s early memories. For example, the earliest memories
of Maori New Zealanders go back to 2.5 years, while Korean adults rarely remember
anything before the age of 4. The difference seems to depend on how much the culture
encourages children to tell detailed stories about their lives. “High elaborative” parents
childhood amnesia The inability to remember
events during the first two or three years of life.
HOW SCHEMAS IMPACT MEMORY
Read the following passage carefully:
Chief Resident Jones adjusted his
face mask while anxiously surveying
a pale figure secured to the long
gleaming table before him. One swift
stroke of his small, sharp instrument
and a thin red line appeared. Then
the eager young assistant carefully
extended the opening as another aide
pushed aside glistening surface fat
so that the vital parts were laid bare.
Everyone stared in horror at the ugly
growth too large for removal. He now
knew it was pointless to continue.
Now, without looking back, please
complete the following exercise. Circle
below the words that appeared in the
passage:
patient scalpel blood tumor
cancer nurse disease surgery
In the original study, most of the
subjects who read this passage circled the
words patient, scalpel, and tumor. Did you?
However, none of the words were there!
Interpreting the story as a medical story
made it more understandable, but also
resulted in inaccurate recall (Lachman
et al., 1979). Once the subjects had
related the story to their schema for
hospital surgery, they “remembered” labels
from their schema that were not present
in what they had read. So while schemas
help us organize information, they also
create ample opportunity for errors in
encoding and retrieval—which may create
false memories, as we unconsciously
modify information to make it more consis-
tent with our schema-based expectations.

How Do We Form Memories? 187
spend a lot of time encouraging children to talk about their daily experiences. This seems
to strengthen early memories, enabling them to persist into adulthood (Leichtman, 2006;
Winerman, 2005a).
The Biological Basis of Long-Term Memory Scientists have searched for the
engram, the biological basis of long-term memory, for more than a century. One of their
tactics involves looking for neural circuitry the brain uses to forge memories. Another
approach goes to the level of synapses, looking for biochemical changes that might
represent the physical memory trace within nerve cells. A tragic figure known as H. M.,
whom we met in Chapter 2, represents the first of these two approaches.
Clues from the Case of H. M. As a young man in 1953, H. M. lost most of his ability
to form new memories—the result of an experimental brain operation performed as
a last-ditch effort to treat his frequent epileptic seizures (Corkin, 2002; Hilts, 1995).
From that point on, he was almost completely unable to create new memories of
events in his life. So profound was his memory impairment that he never even learned
to recognize the people who cared for him in the decades after his surgery.
Remarkably, H. M.’s memory for events prior to the operation remained normal,
even as new experiences slipped away before he could store them in LTM. He knew
nothing of the 9/11 attacks, the moon landings, or the computer revolution. He
couldn’t remember what he had for breakfast or the name of a visitor who left two
minutes before. Ironically, one of the few things he was able to retain was that he had
a memory problem. Even so, he was mildly surprised to see an aging face in the mir-
ror, expecting the younger man he had been in 1953 (Milner et al., 1968; Rosenzweig,
1992). Yet, throughout his long ordeal, he maintained generally good spirits and worked
willingly with psychologist Brenda Milner, whom he never could recognize, even after
working with her for years.
H. M.’s medical record listed his condition as anterograde amnesia—which means
a disability in forming new memories. To put the problem in cognitive terms, H. M.
had a severe impairment in his ability to transfer new concepts and experiences from
working memory to long-term memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957). From a biological
perspective, the cause was removal of the hippocampus and amygdala on both sides of
his brain (see Figure 5.9).
What did we learn from H. M.? Again speaking biologically, he taught us that
the hippocampus and amygdala are crucial to laying down new declarative memo-
ries, although they seem to have no role in retrieving old (well-remembered) memories
(Bechara et al., 1995; Wirth et al., 2003). Further, as we will see in a moment, H. M.’s
case helped us understand the distinction between procedural memories and declara-
tive memories. Remarkably, H. M. remained upbeat about his condition—even joking
engram The physical changes in the brain associ-
ated with a memory. It is also known as the memory trace.
New Zealand Maoris often remember
events from when they were 21/2 years
old—probably because their culture en-
courages children to tell stories about
their lives.
anterograde amnesia The inability to form
new memories (as opposed to retrograde amnesia,
which involves the inability to remember information
previously stored in memory).
FIGURE 5.9
The Hippocampus and Amygdala
The hippocampus and amygdala were
surgically removed from both sides of
H. M.’s brain. To help yourself visualize
where these structures lie, compare the
drawing with the MRI image. The MRI
shows the brain in cross section, with a
slice through the hippocampus visible
on each side.
Amygdala
Hippocampus
Hippocampus
Imagine if you looked into a mirror
expecting to see a young version of yourself
but instead saw yourself aged 30 or
40 years. This is what happened with H.M.

188 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
about his inability to remember—although, ironically, the removal of his amygdalas
may have contributed to his positive disposition (Corkin, 2002).
Parts of the Brain Associated with Long-Term Memory In the last two decades, neurosci-
entists have added much to the picture H. M. gave us of human memory. We now
know the hippocampus (see Figure 5.9) is implicated in Alzheimer’s disease, which also
involves loss of ability to make new declarative memories. Neuroscientists have also
discovered that the hippocampus’s neural neighbor, the amygdala, processes memo-
ries that have strong emotional associations (Bechara et al., 1995). These emotional
associations, it seems, act as an aid for quick access and retrieval (Dolan, 2002). The
amygdala, then, plays a role in the persistent and troubling memories reported by sol-
diers and others who have experienced violent assaults. In some cases, these memories
can be so disturbing that they constitute a condition known as posttraumatic stress
disorder. Importantly, this same biological basis of emotional memories contributes to
the lasting quality of most traumatic memories.
Are memories, then, stored in the hippocampus and the amygdala? No. Memories
for events and information (declarative memories) are actually stored throughout the
cerebral cortex, with various pieces of a memory each stored in the part of the cortex
that initially processed that particular sensory signal. So, for example, the memory of
the great vacation you had at the beach last summer would have the visual compo-
nents of the memory in your visual cortex, the sounds in the auditory cortex, the smells
in the olfactory bulb, the sequence of events in the frontal lobes, and so forth. And, if
you learned how to surf while you were there, that memory would be linked to the cer-
ebellum and the motor cortex—just like other procedural memories that involve body
movements and muscle memory.
How, you might wonder, do all these memory fragments get put back together
properly? (In other words, how does the surfing memory end up with the other beach
memories, rather than being misfiled with memories of your last visit to the dentist?)
While the technical details of this fantastic feat remain a mystery to neuroscientists,
we do know one part of the brain that plays a starring role. In the process known as
memory consolidation, memories gradually become more permanent with the help of the
hippocampus. Essentially, each time we retrieve a new declarative memory, pieces of that
memory from all over the brain come together in the hippocampus, which somehow
sorts through them and re-assembles the relevant ones into a coherent memory. Each
time, the neural pathway for that particular memory becomes stronger, so eventually the
memory doesn’t need the hippocampus to bind it together. At that point, any single piece of
the memory (for example, the smell of the ocean) is enough to produce the entire memory.
Understanding more about memory storage and consolidation reveals why H. M.
could not form new declarative memories—without hippocampi, his brain was missing
the hardware needed for these projects. It also explains why his ability to form new
procedural memories remained intact—as these memories do not involve the hippo-
campus. And, for those of us with intact hippocampi, researchers report that new ex-
periences consolidate much more rapidly if they are associated with existing memory
schemas (Squire, 2007; Tse et al., 2007). For you, that might mean connecting what
you learned about the hippocampus in Chapter 2 with the new information about its
role in consolidation that you are learning here.
Memories, Neurons, and Synapses A standard plot in soap operas and movies depicts
a person who develops amnesia (loss of memory) after a blow or injury to the head.
But does research support this soap-opera neuroscience? At the level of individual
neurons, memories form initially as fragile chemical traces at the synapse and con-
solidate into more permanent synaptic changes over time. During this consolidation
process, memories are especially vulnerable to interference by new experience, cer-
tain drugs, or a blow to the head (Doyère et al., 2007). The diagnosis, in the event of
significant memory loss, would be retrograde amnesia or loss of prior memory. (Note
that retrograde amnesia is the opposite of H. M.’s problem, anterograde amnesia,
which was the inability to form new memories.)
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 14
Lasting biological changes may
occur in the brains of individuals
with posttraumatic stress disorder
(p. 605).
consolidation The process by which short-term
memories become long-term memories over a period
of time.
retrograde amnesia The inability to remember
information previously stored in memory. (Contrast with
anterograde amnesia.)
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab
What Happens with
Alzheimer’s

How Do We Form Memories? 189
Memories can be strengthened, as well as weakened, during consolidation—
especially by a person’s emotional state. Research shows, however, that positive and
negative emotions have vastly different effects on attention and therefore on mem-
ory. If you are happy, you tend to look at situations broadly and remember the “big
picture.” But if you are being robbed at gunpoint, you will most likely attend to the
gun while paying less attention to details of the robber’s appearance. In general, we can
say that emotional arousal accounts for our most vivid memories, but not our most
precise ones: The scope of happy memories tends to be larger, as negative emotions
tend to restrict the focus of our memories (Dingfelder, 2005; Levine & Bluck, 2004).
Before leaving this section, we should note that from an evolutionary perspective, emo-
tion plays a highly adaptive role in memory. If you survive a frightening encounter with a
bear, for example, you are likely to remember to avoid bears in the future. For this, we can
thank the amygdala, as well as emotion-related chemicals such as epinephrine (adrenalin)
and certain stress hormones. Together, they enhance memory for emotion-laden experi-
ences via the “supercharged” emotional associations they create (McGaugh, 2000).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
“Flashbulb” Memories: Where Were You When . . . ?
The closest most people will come to having a “photographic memory” is a flashbulb
memory, an exceptionally clear recollection of an important and emotion-packed event
(Brown & Kulik, 1977). You probably harbor several such memories: a graduation,
a tragic accident, a death, a big victory. It feels as though you made a flash picture in
your mind of the striking scene. (The term was coined in the days when flash pho-
tography required a “flashbulb” for each picture.) The defining feature of a flashbulb
memory is the source of the memory (Davidson et al., 2005): vivid images of where
the individuals were at the time they received the news, what they were doing, and the
emotions they felt.
Many people form flashbulb memories of emotionally charged events in the news,
such as the death of Michael Jackson, the September 11 attacks, or the election of
Barack Obama as president (Pillemer, 1984; Schmolck et al., 2000). Cognitive psychol-
ogists take advantage of these naturally occurring opportunities for research, and in
this case, use them to find the answer to this important question: Does the emotionally
charged nature of flashbulb memories affect their accuracy?
One study at Duke University collected students’ memories of the September 11
attacks the day after the event (Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Researchers also gathered
memories of a normal, everyday event from the same participants. Thirty-two weeks
later, participants’ memories were tested for accuracy. The result? On average, flash-
bulb memories were no more accurate than everyday memories—both types of memo-
ries declined in accuracy over time. Importantly, however, participants’ confidence in
the flashbulb memories was quite high: Students were more confident about the ac-
curacy of their flashbulb memories than their everyday memories, but it was false con-
fidence. Significantly, confidence level for the flashbulb memories correlated with the
initial level of emotional arousal during the flashbulb event. Other studies have corrob-
orated the notion that emotional arousal increases the vividness of the memory—but
not necessarily the accuracy of the memory.
How do we make sense of these findings, given the strong evidence that exists
for enhanced recollection of personal emotional events? First, we must note that
flashbulb memories are rarely the same as a memory of personal involvement in
a traumatic event. Flashbulb memories are often of publicly known, widely shared
events—on an individual level, we may not have personal involvement in the situa-
tion. Thus, the public event is likely to be all over the news, discussed widely, and
retold frequently. And in these frequent tellings, by many different people, details are
likely to become distorted.
flashbulb memory A clear and vivid long-term
memory of an especially meaningful and emotional
event.
Do you remember where you were and
how you felt when Barack Obama won the
2008 Presidential Election? Chances are,
your flashbulb memory is not as accurate
as you think it is.

190 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
As the saying goes, then, the devil may be in the details. Flashbulb memory studies
reveal that certain vivid details are often remembered with great accuracy, but also—
especially over time—other, equally vivid details fail the accuracy test. One study
of Israeli students, in the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin,
found that only about two-thirds of vividly reported memories were still accurate
after 11 months (Nachson & Zelig, 2003)—although confidence in the erroneous
memories remained high. As we noted earlier, traumatic events narrow the scope of
our attention; thus, we encode only certain details and later fill in that sketch—quite
unconsciously—with details we have heard from others or details that fit our schema
for the event.
Even though this creates the potential for memory errors, the mistaking of confi-
dence for accuracy may serve an adaptive purpose. Evolutionary psychologists suggest
that, in times of stress, the ability to make a quick and confident decision might make
the difference between life and death (Poldrack et al., 2008). In that way as well, the
devil may truly be in the details.
5.3 KEY QUESTION
How Do We Retrieve Memories?
Memory can play several surprising tricks during retrieval. One involves the possibility
of retrieving a memory you didn’t know you had—which tells us some memories can
be successfully encoded and stored without full awareness. Another quirk involves our
confidence in recollections—as we saw in flashbulb memories. Our Core Concept
summarizes the retrieval process this way:
Core Concept 5.3
Whether memories are implicit or explicit, successful retrieval
depends on how they were encoded and how they are cued.
Implicit and Explicit Memory
We begin our exploration of retrieval with another lesson from H. M. You may recall
that he retained the ability to learn new motor skills, even though he lost most of his
ability to remember facts and events. For example, H. M. learned the difficult skill of
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Which part of memory has the smallest capacity? (That
is, which part of memory is considered the “bottleneck” in the
memory system?)
2. RECALL: Which part of long-term memory stores autobiographical
information?
3. RECALL: To get material into permanent storage, it must be made
meaningful while it is in .
4. APPLICATION: As you study vocabulary in this text, which of the
following methods would result in the deepest level of processing?
a. learning the definition given in the marginal glossary
b. marking each term with a highlighter each time it occurs in a
sentence in the text
c. thinking of an example of each term
d. having a friend read a definition, with you having to identify the
term in question form, as on the TV show Jeopardy
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: As the information
in this book passes from one stage of your memory to the next, the
information becomes more .
Answers 1. Working memory 2. Episodic memory 3. working memory 4. c 5. meaningful and associated with other information in LTM
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Do We Retrieve Memories? 191
mirror writing—writing while looking at his hands in a mirror (Milner et al., 1968;
Raymond, 1989). In fact, his procedural memory for motor tasks was quite normal, even
though he couldn’t remember learning these skills and didn’t even know he knew them.
But you don’t have to have brain damage like H. M. to have memories of which you
are unaware. A normal memory has disconnected islands of information too. For more
than 100 years, psychologists have realized that people with no memory defects can
know something without knowing they know it. Psychologist Daniel Schacter (1992,
1996) calls this implicit memory: memory that can affect your behavior without coming
into full awareness. By contrast, explicit memory requires conscious awareness.
Procedural memories are often implicit, as when golfers remember how to swing
a club without thinking about how to move their bodies. Likewise, H. M.’s mirror
writing was an implicit memory. But implicit memories are not limited to procedural
memory—nor is explicit memory the same as declarative memory. Information in your
semantic store can be either explicit (such as in remembering the material you have
studied for a test) or implicit (such as knowing the color of the building in which your
psychology class is held). The general rule is this: A memory is implicit if it can affect
behavior or mental processes without becoming conscious. Explicit memories, on the
other hand, always involve consciousness during storage and retrieval.
In striking new studies, Skotko et al. (2004) found that H. M. could learn some
new semantic material through implicit channels—that is, even though he didn’t know
he learned it. To do this, Skotko’s group exploited H. M.’s favorite pastime of doing
crossword puzzles. They devised crosswords that linked new information with knowl-
edge H. M. had at the time of his operation: For example, H. M. knew that polio was a
dreaded disease, but the polio vaccine was not discovered until after his surgery, so he
had no knowledge of it. Yet by working on a specially designed crossword puzzle over
a five-day period, H. M. learned to respond correctly to the item, “childhood disease
successfully treated by Salk vaccine.” Similarly, he was able to learn that Jacqueline
Kennedy, wife of assassinated President John Kennedy, subsequently became Jacque-
line Onassis. This technique, then, showed that H. M.’s problem was primarily one of
explicit memory.
Retrieval Cues
For accurate retrieval, both implicit and explicit memories require good cues. You have
some understanding of such cues if you’ve ever used search terms in Google or an-
other Internet search engine: Make a poor choice of terms, and you come up either
with nothing or with Internet garbage. Long-term memory works much the same way,
where a successful search requires good mental retrieval cues (the “search terms” used
to recover a memory). Sometimes the only retrieval cue required to reactivate a long-
dormant experience is a certain odor, such as the smell of fresh-baked cookies you
associated with visiting Grandma’s house. Other times, the retrieval cue might be an
emotion, as when a person struggling with depression gets caught in a maelstrom
of depressing memories. In our story of Ross at the beginning of the chapter, some-
thing in his dream may have served as a retrieval cue for the memory he had long
forgotten.
On the other hand, some memories—especially semantic ones—are not so easily
cued. During a test, for example, you may draw a blank if the wording of a question
doesn’t match the way you framed the material in your mind as you were studying. In
other words, your memory may fail if the question isn’t a good retrieval cue. In gen-
eral, whether a retrieval cue is effective depends on the type of memory being sought
and the web of associations in which the memory is embedded. The take-home lesson
here? The more extensive your web of associations, the greater the chance of retrieving
the information. Let’s examine ways you can use this information to your advantage.
Retrieving Implicit Memories by Priming A quirk of implicit memory landed for-
mer Beatle George Harrison in court (Schacter, 1996). Lawyers for a singing group
known as the Chiffons claimed the melody in Harrison’s song “My Sweet Lord” was
implicit memory A memory that was not
deliberately learned or of which you have no conscious
awareness.
explicit memory Memory that has been
processed with attention and can be consciously
recalled.
retrieval cue Stimulus used to bring a memory to
consciousness or to cue a behavior.
H.M.’s Obituary from The New York
Times
Read
at MyPsychLab

192 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
nearly identical to that of the Chiffon classic “He’s So Fine.” Harrison denied that
he deliberately borrowed the melody, but conceded he had heard the Chiffons’s tune
prior to writing his own. The court agreed, stating that Harrison’s borrowing was a
product of “subconscious memory.” Everyday life abounds with similar experiences,
says Daniel Schacter (1996). You may have proposed an idea to a friend and had it
rejected, but weeks later your friend excitedly proposed the same idea to you, as if it
were entirely new.
In such real-life situations it can be hard to say what prompts an implicit memory
to surface. Psychologists have, however, developed ways to “prime” implicit memories
in the lab (Schacter, 1996). To illustrate, imagine you have volunteered for a memory
experiment. First, you are shown a list of words for several seconds:
assassin, octopus, avocado, mystery, sheriff, climate
Then, an hour later, the experimenter asks you to examine another list and indicate
which items you recognize from the earlier list: twilight, assassin, dinosaur, and mys-
tery. That task is easy for you. But then the experimenter shows you some words with
missing letters and asks you to fill in the blanks:
c h _ _ _ _ n k, o _ t _ _ u s, _ o g _ y _ _ _ , _ l _ m _ t e
It is likely that answers for two of these pop readily into mind, octopus and climate.
But chances are that you will be less successful with the other two words, chipmunk
and bogeyman. This difference is due to priming, the procedure of providing cues that
stimulate memories without awareness. Because you had been primed with the words
octopus and climate, they more easily “popped out” in your consciousness than did
words that had not been primed.
Retrieving Explicit Memories Anything stored in LTM must be “filed” according
to its pattern or meaning. Consequently, the best way to add material to long-term
memory is to associate it, while in working memory, with material already stored in
LTM. We have called that process elaborative rehearsal. Encoding many such connec-
tions by elaborative rehearsal gives you more ways of accessing the information, much
as a town with many access roads can be approached from many directions.
Meaningful Organization One way of retrieving information from explicit memory
involves getting the general idea or gist of an event, rather than a memory of the event
as it actually occurred. Suppose you hear the sentence, “The book was returned to
the library by Mary.” Later, when asked if you heard the sentence, “Mary returned
the book to the library,” you may indeed mistakenly remember having heard the sec-
ond sentence. This happens because we tend to remember the meaning or sense of the
words—the gist—rather than the exact words themselves.
If you’ll forgive us for repeating ourselves, we want to underscore the practical
consequences of LTM being organized by meaning. Storing new information in
LTM usually requires that you make the information meaningful while it is in work-
ing memory. This means that you must associate new information with things you
already know. Sometimes it is important to remember all the details accurately (as
in memorizing a mathematical formula), while at other times the important thing is
to remember the gist (as when you read the case study of H. M.). In attempting to
remember the gist, it is especially important to think of personal examples of the con-
cepts and ideas you want to remember. (Are you getting into the habit of identifying
personal examples of chapter concepts yet?)
Recall and Recognition Explicit memories can be cued in two primary ways. One
involves the kinds of retrieval cues used on essay tests; the other involves cues found
on multiple choice tests. Essay tests require recall or retrieving a memory with minimal
retrieval cues. That is, on an essay test, you must create an answer almost entirely from
memory, with the help of only minimal cues from a question such as, “What are the
two ways to cue explicit memories?”
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 8
Priming is also a technique for
studying nonconscious processes
(p. 329).
priming A technique for cuing implicit memories
by providing cues that stimulate a memory without
awareness of the connection between the cue and the
retrieved memory.
gist (pronounced JIST ) The sense or meaning, as
contrasted with the exact details.
recall A retrieval method in which one must
reproduce previously presented information.

How Do We Retrieve Memories? 193
Recognition, on another hand, is the method required by multiple-choice tests. In a
recognition task, you merely identify whether a stimulus has been previously experi-
enced. Normally, recognition is less demanding than recall because the cues are much
more complete. Incidentally, the reason people say, “I’m terrible with names, but I never
forget a face,” is because recall (names) is usually tougher than recognition (faces).
The police use recognition when they ask an eyewitness to identify a suspect in
a lineup. The witness is required only to match an image from memory (the crime)
against a present stimulus (a suspect in the lineup). And what would be a comparable
recall task? A witness working with a police artist to make a drawing of a suspect must
recall, entirely from memory, the suspect’s facial characteristics.
Of course, recognizing a previously recognized stimulus doesn’t necessarily mean
that stimulus matches the current context. We run into this problem on multiple-choice
exams when several options offer concepts we have learned, but only one of them is a
match to the particular question. Similarly, suspects have been falsely identified in po-
lice lineups by eyewitnesses if, for example, police have shown the eyewitness books of
mug shots that include one or more of the suspects in the lineup. In these cases, eyewit-
nesses can mistakenly identify a suspect because they recognize him from the mug shot
book rather than the actual crime (Weiner et al., 2003). Thus, although recognition
generally produces more memories than recall, it also is more likely to produce false
positives—or, in this case, false memories.
Other Factors Affecting Retrieval
We have seen that the ability to retrieve information from explicit declarative memory
depends on whether the information was encoded and elaborated to make it mean-
ingful. You won’t be surprised to learn that alertness, stress level, drugs, and general
knowledge also affect retrieval. Less well known, however, are the following, which
relate to the context in which you encoded a memory and also the context in which
you are remembering.
Encoding Specificity The more closely retrieval cues match the form in which the
information was encoded, the better they will cue the appropriate memory. For ex-
ample, perhaps you saw your psychology professor at the grocery store, but needed a
moment to recognize who she or he was because the context didn’t cue you to think
“psychology professor.” On the other hand, talking to a childhood friend may have
cued a flood of memories you hadn’t thought about for years. These two experiences
illustrate the encoding specificity principle, which says successful recall depends on how
well retrieval cues match cues present when the memory was encoded.
So, one important thing you can do in studying for exams is to anticipate what
retrieval cues are likely to be on the test and organize your learning around those
probable cues. Students who merely read the material and hope for the best may have
trouble. In fact, this is such a common problem that psychologist Robert Bjork (2000)
has suggested teachers introduce “desirable difficulties” into their courses to encour-
age students to encode the material in multiple ways. What are desirable difficulties?
Bjork argues that by giving students assignments that require them to interact with
the material in many different ways—projects, papers, problems, and presentations—
professors help students build a greater web of associations into which a memory is
embedded—and the more connections there are, the easier it becomes to cue a memory.
If your own professor doesn’t do this, what can you do to create more associations with
the concepts you are learning?
Mood and Memory Information processing isn’t just about facts and events; it’s also
about emotions and moods. We use the expressions “feeling blue” and “looking at
the world through rose-colored glasses” to acknowledge that moods bias our percep-
tions. Likewise, our moods can also affect what we remember, a phenomenon called
mood-congruent memory. If you have ever had an episode of uncontrollable giggling,
you know how a euphoric mood can trigger one silly thought after another. And at
recognition A retrieval method in which one must
identify present stimuli as having been previously
presented.
encoding specificity principle The doctrine
that memory is encoded and stored with specific cues
related to the context in which it was formed. The more
closely the retrieval cues match the form in which
the information was encoded, the better it will be
remembered.
mood-congruent memory A memory process
that selectively retrieves memories that match (are
congruent with) one’s mood.

194 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
the other end of the mood spectrum, people with depression often report that all their
thoughts have a melancholy aspect. In this way, depression can perpetuate itself through
retrieval of depressing memories (Sakaki, 2007).
Not just a laboratory curiosity, mood-congruent memory can also have important
health implications. Says memory researcher Gordon Bower, “Doctors assess what
to do with you based on your complaints and how much you complain” (McCarthy,
1991). Because people with depression are likely to emphasize their medical symp-
toms, they may receive different treatment from that dispensed to more upbeat indi-
viduals with the same disease. This, says Bower, means physicians must learn to take
a person’s psychological state into consideration when deciding on a diagnosis and a
course of therapy.
Prospective Memory One of the most common memory tasks involves remembering
to perform some action at a future time—such as keeping a doctor’s appointment,
going to lunch with a friend, or setting out the garbage cans on the appointed day.
Psychologists call this prospective memory. Surprisingly, this important process of
remembering to remember has received relatively little study. We do know a failure
in prospective memory can have consequences that range from merely inconvenient
and embarrassing to horrific:
After a change in his usual routine, an adoring father forgot to turn toward
the day care center and instead drove his usual route to work at the university.
Several hours later, his infant son, who had been quietly asleep in the back seat,
was dead (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005, p. 286).
How could such a terrible thing happen? The father probably became distracted from
his intended task and fell into his customary routine. In situations like this, when peo-
ple have to remember to deviate from their usual routine, they typically rely on contin-
uous monitoring, which means trying to keep the intended action in mind. Continuous
monitoring, however, can be easily derailed by distraction or habit. So if you find your-
self in that situation, your best bet is to use a reliable prompt—which for the father
may have meant placing his briefcase in the backseat with his child. Another good
technique involves thinking of a specific cue you expect to encounter just before the
required task. The father, for example, might have visualized a prominent landmark he
would see just before the turn off his usual route and then focused on that landmark
as a memory cue.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
On the Tip of Your Tongue
Answer as many of the following questions as you can:
• What is the North American equivalent of the reindeer?
• What do artists call the board on which they mix paints?
• What is the name for a tall, four-sided stone monument with a point at the top
of its shaft?
• What instrument do navigators use to determine latitude by sighting on the stars?
• What is the name of a sheath used to contain a sword or dagger?
• What is the name of a small Chinese boat usually propelled with a single
oar or pole?
If this demonstration works as expected, you couldn’t remember all the answers,
but you had a strong sense you had them somewhere in memory. You might say that
the answer was “on the tip of your tongue.” Appropriately enough, psychologists refer
to this near-miss memory as the TOT phenomenon (Brown, 1991). Surveys show that
prospective memory The aspect of memory
that enables one to remember to take some action in
the future—as remembering a doctor’s appointment.
TOT phenomenon The inability to recall a
word, while knowing that it is in memory. People often
describe this frustrating experience as having the word
“on the tip of the tongue.”
The Washington Monument is an example
of a tapered stone object that is topped
by a pyramid-shaped point. Can you recall
the name for such objects? Or is it “on
the tip of your tongue”?
Because mood affects memory, people
with depression may remember and report
more negative symptoms to a physician.
As a result, their treatment may differ
from that given to patients with the same
condition who do not have depression.

Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us? 195
most people have a “tip-of-the-tongue” (TOT) experience about once a week. Among
those who watch Jeopardy, it may occur even more frequently. And, according to a
recent study, deaf persons who use sign language sometimes have a “tip of the fingers”
(TOF) experience in which they are sure they know a word but cannot quite retrieve
the sign (Thompson et al., 2005). Obviously, then, some fundamental memory process
underlies both the TOT and the TOF phenomena.
The most common TOT experiences center on names of personal acquaintances,
names of famous persons, and familiar objects (Brown, 1991). About half the time, target
words finally do pop into mind, usually within about one agonizing minute (Brown &
McNeill, 1966).
What accounts for the TOT phenomenon? One possibility—often exploited in
laboratory studies—involves inadequate context cues. This is probably what made you
stumble on some of the items above: We did not give you enough context to activate
the schema associated with the correct answer.
Another possibility involves interference: when another memory blocks access or
retrieval, as when you were thinking of Jan when you unexpectedly meet Jill (Schacter,
1999). And, even though you were unable to recall some of the correct words in our
demonstration of TOT (caribou, palette, obelisk, sextant, scabbard, sampan), you may
have spotted the right answer in a recognition format. It’s also likely that some features
of the sought-for words abruptly popped to mind (“I know it begins with an s!”), even
though the words themselves eluded you. So the TOT phenomenon occurs during a
recall attempt when there is a weak match between retrieval cues and the encoding of
the word in long-term memory.
And we’ll bet you can’t name all seven dwarfs.
5. RECALL: A person experiencing the TOT phenomenon is unable
to _____ a specific word.
a. recognize c. recall
b. encode d. process
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: An implicit memory
may be activated by priming, and an explicit memory may be
activated by a recognizable stimulus. In either case, a psychologist
would say that these memories are being
a. cued. c. encoded.
b. recognized. d. chunked.
Study and Review at MyPsychLabCheck Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: Remembering names is usually harder than
remembering faces because names require , while faces
merely require .
2. APPLICATION: At a high school class reunion, you are likely
to experience a flood of memories that would be unlikely to come to
mind under other circumstances. What memory process
explains this?
3. APPLICATION: Give an example of mood-congruent memory.
4. APPLICATION: Give an example of a situation that would require
prospective memory.
Answers 1. recall/recognition 2. Encoding specificity 3. Good examples involve situations in which people who are feeling a strong emotion or mood
selectively remember experiences associated with that mood. Thus, during a physical exam, a depressed person might report more unpleasant
physical symptoms than would a happy person. 4. Prospective memory involves having to remember to perform some action at a time in the future,
such as taking medicine tonight, stopping at the grocery store on the way home, or calling one’s parents next Friday evening. 5. c 6. a
5.4 KEY QUESTION
Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us?
We forget appointments and anniversaries. During a test you can’t remember the terms
you studied the night before. Or a familiar name seems just out of your mental reach.
Yet, ironically, we sometimes cannot rid memory of an unhappy event. Why does
memory play these tricks on us—making us remember what we would rather forget
and forget what we want to remember?

196 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
According to memory expert Daniel Schacter, the culprit is what he terms the
“seven sins” of memory: transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, sug-
gestibility, bias, and unwanted persistence (Schacter, 1999, 2001). Further, he claims
these seven problems are really consequences of some very useful features of human
memory. From an evolutionary perspective, these features stood our ancestors in good
stead, so they are preserved in our own memory systems. Our Core Concept puts this
notion more succinctly:
Core Concept 5.4
Most of our memory problems arise from memory’s “seven sins”—
which are really by-products of otherwise adaptive features of human
memory.
While examining the “seven sins,” we will consider such everyday memory prob-
lems as forgetting where you left your keys or the inability to forget an unpleasant
experience. We will also explore strategies for improving memory by overcoming some
of Schacter’s “seven sins”—with special emphasis on how certain memory techniques
can improve your studying. We begin with the frustration of fading memories.
Transience: Fading Memories Cause Forgetting
How would you do on a rigorous test of the course work you took a year
ago? We thought so—because unused memories seem to weaken with time.
Although no one has directly observed a human memory trace fade and
disappear, much circumstantial evidence points to this transience, or imper-
manence, of long-term memory—the first of Schacter’s “sins.”
Ebbinghaus and the Forgetting Curve In a classic study of transience,
pioneering psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus (1908/1973) first learned
lists of nonsense syllables (such as POV, KEB, FIC, and RUZ) and tried to
recall them over varying time intervals. This worked well over short peri-
ods, up to a few days. But to measure memory after long delays of weeks
or months, when recall had failed completely, Ebbinghaus had to invent
another method: He measured the number of trials required to relearn the
original list. Because it generally took fewer trials to relearn a list than to
learn it originally, the difference indicated a “savings” that could serve as a
measure of memory. (If the original learning required ten trials and relearn-
ing required seven trials, the savings was 30 percent.) By using the savings
method, Ebbinghaus could trace memory over long periods of time. The
curve obtained from combining data from many experiments appears in
Figure 5.10 and represents one of Ebbinghaus’s most important discov-
eries: For relatively meaningless material, we have a rapid initial loss of memory
followed by a declining rate of loss. Subsequent research shows that this forgetting
curve captures the pattern of transience by which we forget much of the verbal
material we learn.
Modern psychologists have built on Ebbinghaus’s work but now have more inter-
est in how we remember meaningful material, such as information you read in this
book. Meaningful memories seem to fade too—though, fortunately, not as rapidly as
Ebbinghaus’s nonsense syllables. Current research sometimes uses brain scanning tech-
niques, such as fMRI and PET, to visualize the diminishing brain activity that charac-
terizes forgetting (Schacter, 1996, 1999).
Not all memories, however, follow the classic forgetting curve. We often retain well-
used motor skills, for example, substantially intact in procedural memory for many
years, even without practice—“just like riding a bicycle.” Memory for foreign lan-
guages learned, but not used for a long period of time, also seems to remain relatively
intact (subject to less forgetting than Ebbinghaus predicted) for as long as 50 years
transience The impermanence of a long-term
memory. Transience is based on the idea that long-term
memories gradually fade in strength over time.
forgetting curve A graph plotting the amount of
retention and forgetting over time for a certain batch of
material, such as a list of nonsense syllables. The typi-
cal forgetting curve is steep at first, becoming flatter
as time goes on.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
fMRI and PET are brain scanning
techniques that form images of
especially active regions in the
brain (p. 64).
FIGURE 5.10
Ebbinghaus’s Forgetting Curve
Ebbinghaus’s forgetting curve shows that the savings
demonstrated by relearning drops rapidly and reaches
a plateau, below which little more is forgotten.
Source: Zimbardo, P. G., & Gerrig, R. J. (1999). Psychology and
Life, 15th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Copyright © 1999 by
Pearson Education. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
Pe
rc
en
t
sa
vi
ng
s
Days
10
10
20
30
40
50
60
2345 10 15 20 25 30

Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us? 197
(Bahrick, 1984). Similarly, recognition of high-school classmates’ names and faces re-
mains about 90 percent accurate even up to 45 years (although recall-based memory
tasks show much lower retention; Bahrick, Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975). What ac-
counts for less transience in these areas? We’ll reveal the answer to that question near
the end of the chapter in our discussion of study tips.
Interference One common cause of transience comes from interference—when one
item prevents us from forming a robust memory for another item. This often occurs
when you attempt to learn two conflicting things in succession, such as if you had a
French class followed by a Spanish class.
What causes interference? Three main factors top the list:
1. The more similar the two sets of material to be learned, the greater the likelihood of
interference. So French and Spanish classes are more likely to interfere with each
other than are, say, psychology and accounting.
2. Meaningless material is more vulnerable to interference than meaningful material.
Because LTM is organized by meaning, you will have more trouble remembering
two locker combinations than you will two news bulletins. (The exception occurs
when you experience a direct conflict in meaning, as when two news bulletins
seem to be telling you conflicting things.)
3. Emotional material can be an especially powerful cause of interference. So if you broke
up with your true love last night, you will probably forget what your literature
professor says in class today.
Interference commonly arises when an old habit gets in the way of learning a new
response, as we saw in the case of the father who forgot to stop at the day care center.
Interference can also happen when people switch from one word-processing program
to another. And, of course, interference accounts for the legendary problem old dogs
have in learning new tricks. Everyday life offers many more examples, but interfer-
ence theory groups them in two main categories, proactive interference and retroactive
interference.
Proactive Interference When an old memory disrupts the learning and remembering of
new information, proactive interference is the culprit. An example of proactive interfer-
ence occurs every January when we have trouble remembering to write the correct date
on our checks. Pro- means “forward,” so in proactive interference, old memories act
forward in time to block your attempts at new learning.
Retroactive Interference When the opposite happens—when new information prevents
your remembering older information—we can blame forgetting on retroactive interference.
Retro- means “backward”; the newer material reaches back into your memory to push
old material out of memory (see Figure 5.11). In a computer, retroactive interference
occurs when you save a new document in place of an old one. Much the same thing
happens in your own memory when you meet two new people in succession, and the
second name causes you to forget the first one.
The Serial Position Effect Have you ever noticed that the first and last parts of a poem
or vocabulary list are usually easier to learn and remember than the middle portion? In
general, the primacy effect refers to the relative ease of remembering the first items in
a series, while the recency effect refers to the strength of memory for the most recent
items. Together, with diminished memory for the middle portion, we term this the
serial position effect. So when you are introduced to several people in succession, you
are more likely to remember the names of those you met first and last than those you
met in between. (That’s assuming other factors are equal, such as the commonness of
their names, distinctiveness of their appearance, and their personalities.)
How does interference theory explain the serial position effect? Unlike the material
at the ends of the poem or list, the part in the middle is exposed to a double dose of
interference—both retroactively and proactively. That is, the middle receives interference
proactive interference A cause of forgetting by
which previously stored information prevents learning
and remembering new information.
retroactive interference A cause of forgetting
by which newly learned information prevents retrieval
of previously stored material.
serial position effect A form of interference
related to the sequence in which information is pre-
sented. Generally, items in the middle of the sequence
are less well remembered than items presented first
or last.

198 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
from both directions, while material at either end gets interference from only one side.
So, in view of the serial position effect, perhaps it would be helpful to pay special
attention to the material in the middle of this chapter.
Absent-Mindedness: Lapses of Attention Cause Forgetting
When you misplace your car keys or forget an anniversary, you have had an episode
of absent-mindedness, the second “sin” of memory. It’s not that the memory has disap-
peared from your brain circuits. Rather, you have suffered a retrieval failure caused by
shifting your attention elsewhere. In the case of a forgotten anniversary, the attention
problem occurred on the retrieval end—when you were concentrating on something
that took your attention away from the upcoming anniversary. As for the car keys,
your attentive shift probably occurred during the original encoding—when you weren’t
paying attention to where you laid them. This form of absent-mindedness often comes
from listening to music or watching TV while studying.
This kind of encoding error was also at work in the “depth of processing”
experiments we discussed earlier: People who encoded information shallowly (“Does
the word contain an e?”) were less able to recall the target word than those who
encoded it deeply (“Is it an animal?”). Yet another example can be found in demon-
strations of change blindness: In one study, participants viewed a movie clip in which
one actor who was asking directions was replaced by another actor while they were
briefly hidden by two men carrying a door in front of them. Amazingly, fewer than half
the viewers noticed the change (Simons & Levin, 1998). Much the same thing may
happen to you in the magic trick demonstration in Figure 5.12.
Blocking: Access Problems
Blocking, the third “sin” of memory, occurs when we lose access to information, such
as when you see familiar people in new surroundings and can’t remember their names.
The most thoroughly studied form of blocking, however, involves the maddening TOT
absent-mindedness Forgetting caused by
lapses in attention.
blocking Forgetting that occurs when an item in
memory cannot be accessed or retrieved. Blocking is
caused by interference.
Study French
papier
chien
livre plume
proactive interference
Study Spanish
papel
perro
libro pluma
French 101
Midterm
exam
papier
livre
plume
chien
Study French
papier
chien
livre plume
retroactive interference
Study Spanish
Recall French
Recall Spanish
papel
perro
libro pluma
Spanish 101
Midterm
exam
papel
libro
pluma
perro
FIGURE 5.11
Two Types of Interference
In proactive interference, earlier learning
(Spanish) interferes with memory for later
information (French). In retroactive inter-
ference, new information (French) inter-
feres with memory for information learned
earlier (Spanish).
Misplacing your car keys results from a
shift in attention. Which of the seven
“sins” does this represent?

Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us? 199
experience: when you know you know the name for something but can’t retrieve it. As
we saw earlier, the TOT phenomenon often results from poor context cues that fail to
activate the necessary memory schema.
Stress, too, can produce blocking, perhaps through failure to sustain one’s focus of
attention. Similarly, distraction can cause blocking on prospective memory tasks, such
as remembering to perform a certain action at a certain time. Age plays a role, too,
with blocking increasing as one grows older.
Misattribution: Memories in the Wrong Context
All three “sins” discussed so far make memories unavailable in one way or another.
But these are not the only kinds of memory problems we experience. For example, we
sometimes retrieve memories but associate them with the wrong time, place, or person.
Schacter (1999) calls this misattribution, a problem that stems from the reconstructive
nature of long-term memory. In the penny demonstration at the beginning of the chapter,
you learned that we commonly retrieve incomplete memories and fill in the blanks to
make them meaningful to us. This paves the way for mistakes that arise from connect-
ing information with the wrong, but oh-so-sensible, context.
Here’s an example of misattribution: Psychologist Donald Thompson was
accused of rape based on a victim’s detailed, but mistaken, description of her assail-
ant (Thompson, 1988). Fortunately for Thompson, his alibi was indisputable. When
the crime occurred, he was being interviewed live on television—about memory dis-
tortions. The victim, it turned out, had been watching the interview just before she
was raped and, in the stress of the experience, misattributed the assault to Thompson,
recalling his face instead of the face of her assailant.
Misattribution can also prompt people to mistakenly believe that other people’s
ideas are their own. This sort of misattribution occurs when a person hears an idea
and keeps it in memory, forgetting its source. Unintentional plagiarism comes from
this form of misattribution, as we saw earlier in the case of George Harrison of the
Beatles.
Yet another type of misattribution can cause people to remember something
they did not experience at all. Such was the case with volunteers who were asked
to remember a set of words associated with a particular theme: door, glass, pane,
shade, ledge, sill, house, open, curtain, frame, view, breeze, sash, screen, and
shutter. Under these conditions, many later remembered window, even though that
word was not on the list (Roediger & McDermott, 1995, 2000). This result again
shows the power of context cues in determining the content of memory. And it
demonstrates yet again how people tend to create and retrieve memories based on
meaning.
misattribution A memory fault that occurs when
memories are retrieved but are associated with the
wrong time, place, or person.
FIGURE 5.12A
The “Magic of Memory”
Pick one of the cards. Stare at it intently
for at least 15 seconds, being careful not
to shift your gaze to the other cards. Then
turn the page.

200 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
Suggestibility: External Cues Distort or Create Memories
Suggestion can also distort or even create memories, a possibility of particular con-
cern to the courts. Attorneys or law enforcement officers interviewing witnesses may
make suggestions about the facts of a case—either deliberately or unintentionally—
that could alter a witness’s memory. Such concerns about suggestibility prompted
Elizabeth Loftus and John Palmer to find out just how easily eyewitness memories
could be distorted.
Memory Distortion Participants in the Loftus and Palmer study first watched a film of
two cars colliding. Then the experimenters asked them to estimate how fast the cars had
been moving (Loftus, 1979, 1984; Loftus & Palmer, 1973). Half the witnesses were asked,
“How fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?” Their estimates, it
turned out, were about 25 percent higher than those given by respondents asked, “How
fast were the cars going when they hit each other?” This distortion of memory caused by
misinformation has been dubbed, appropriately, the misinformation effect.
Clearly, the Loftus and Palmer study showed that memories can be distorted and
embellished by even the most subtle cues and suggestions. But memories can also be
created by similar methods. And it can be done without an individual’s awareness.
Fabricated Memories The famed developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget (1962),
described a vivid memory of a traumatic event from his own early childhood:
One of my first memories would date, if it were true, from my second year. I can
still see, most clearly, the following scene in which I believed until I was about
fifteen. I was sitting in my pram, which my nurse was pushing in the Champs
Elysées [in Paris], when a man tried to kidnap me. I was held in by the strap fas-
tened round me while my nurse bravely tried to stand between me and the thief.
She received various scratches, and I can still see vaguely those on her face . . .
(pp. 187–188).
Piaget’s nurse described the alleged attack in vivid detail and was given an expen-
sive watch from his parents as a token of thanks for her bravery. However, years later,
the former nurse sent a letter to Piaget’s family confessing the story had been fabri-
cated and returning the watch. From this, Piaget (1962) concluded:
I, therefore, must have heard, as a child, the account of this story, which my
parents believed, and projected into the past in the form of a visual memory
(Piaget, 1962, p. 188).
suggestibility The process of memory distortion
as the result of deliberate or inadvertent suggestion.
misinformation effect The distortion of
memory by suggestion or misinformation.
FIGURE 5.12B
The “Magic of Memory”
Your card is gone! How did we do it? We
didn’t read your mind; it was your own
reconstructive memory and the “sin” of
absent-mindedness playing card tricks on
you. If you don’t immediately see how the
trick works, try it again with a different
card.
Memory:
Elizabeth Loftus
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us? 201
Are we all susceptible to creating false memories such as the one Piaget described? To
find out, Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues decided to do an experiment. They first
contacted parents of a group of college students, obtaining lists of childhood events,
which the students were then asked if they remembered. But embedded in those lists
were plausible events that never happened, such as being lost in a shopping mall, spill-
ing the punch bowl at a wedding, meeting Bugs Bunny at Disneyland (impossible be-
cause Bugs is not a Disney character), or experiencing a visit by a clown at a birthday
party (Loftus, 2003a). After repeated recall attempts over a period of several days,
about one-fourth of the students claimed to remember the bogus events. All that was
required were some credible suggestions. (This experiment may remind you of Donna’s
case, with which we began our chapter: Repeated suggestions by the therapist led to
Donna’s fabricated memory.)
New research suggests that doctored photographs can also create false memories,
perhaps even more powerfully than the stories used by Loftus and her colleagues. For
example, in a variation of the lost-in-the-mall technique, adults viewed altered photo-
graphs purporting to show them riding in a hot air balloon. After seeing the photos
several times over a period of two weeks, half the participants “remembered” details
about the fictitious balloon ride (Wade et al., 2002). Even in this age of digital cameras
and image-altering software, people don’t always stop to question whether a photo-
graph may have been modified (Garry & Gerrie, 2005).
Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitnesses So to what extent can we rely
on eyewitness testimony? Obviously, it is possible in laboratory experiments to dis-
tinguish false memories from true ones. But what about real-life situations in which
people claim to have recovered long-forgotten memories?
As we saw in our second case at the beginning of the chapter, Ross’s recollection
was independently verified by the confession of a camp counselor, but such objective
evidence doesn’t always materialize. In such cases, the best we can do is look for evi-
dence of suggestion that may have produced the memory—as we see in false-memory
experiments. If suggestion has occurred, a healthy dose of skepticism is warranted,
unless objective evidence appears. Specifically, we should beware of eyewitness reports
tainted by the following factors (Kassin, 2001):
• Leading questions (“How fast were the cars going when they smashed into each
other?”) can influence witnesses’ recollections. But such questions have less effect
if witnesses are forewarned that interrogations can create memory bias.
• The passage of substantial amounts of time, which allows the original memory to
fade, makes people more likely to misremember information.
• Repeated retrieval: Each time a memory is retrieved, it is reconstructed and then
restored (much like a computer document that is retrieved, modified, and saved),
increasing the chances of error.
• The age of the witness: Younger children and older adults may be especially
susceptible to influence by misinformation.
• Unwarranted confidence: Confidence in a memory is not a sign of an accurate
memory. In fact, misinformed individuals can actually come to believe the misin-
formation in which they feel confident.
Based on such concerns, the U.S. Department of Justice (1999) has published national
guidelines for gathering eyewitness testimony, available on its website.
Bias: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Opinions Distort Memories
The sixth memory “sin,” which Schacter calls bias, refers to the influence of personal
beliefs, attitudes, and experiences on memory. Lots of domestic arguments of the “Did
not! Did too!” variety owe their spirited exchanges to bias. While it’s easier to see an-
other person’s biases than our own, here are two common forms you should especially
guard against.
The way mug shots are presented can
bias the recollections of witnesses. Real-
izing this, the U.S. Department of Justice
has published guidelines for interrogating
eyewitnesses.

202 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
Expectancy Bias An unconscious tendency to remember events as being congruent
with our expectations produces expectancy bias. To illustrate, suppose you are among a
group of volunteers for an experiment in which you read a story about the relationship
between Bob and Margie, a couple who plan to get married. Part of the story reveals
that Bob doesn’t want children, and he is worried about how Margie will react to that.
When he does tell her, Margie is shocked, because she desperately wants children. To
your surprise, you are informed after reading the story that, contrary to your expecta-
tions, Bob and Margie did get married. Meanwhile, another group of volunteers reads
the same story but are told the couple ended their relationship. Other than the ending,
will people in those two groups remember the Bob and Margie story differently?
In a laboratory experiment using this same story, those who heard the unexpected
ending (the condition in which Bob and Margie decided to get married) gave the most
erroneous reports. Why? Because of their expectancy biases, they recalled distorted
information that made the outcome fit their initial expectations (Schacter, 1999; Spiro,
1980). One person, for example, “remembered” that Bob and Margie had separated
but decided their love could overcome their differences. Another related that the cou-
ple had decided on adoption as a compromise. When something happens that violates
our expectations, then, we may unconsciously skew the information so it better fits our
pre-existing notions.
Self-Consistency Bias People abhor the thought of being inconsistent, even
though research suggests that they are kidding themselves. This Schacter calls the
self-consistency bias. For example, studies have found people to be far less consistent
than they realized in their support for political candidates, as well as on political is-
sues such as the equality of women, aid to minority groups, and the legalization of
marijuana (Levine, 1997; Marcus, 1986).
Of particular interest for the study of memory, self-consistency bias can affect the
content of our memories (Levine & Safer, 2002). One study interviewed dating couples
twice, two months apart, and found memories about the relationship changed based
on how well the relationship had progressed over the two-month interval. Importantly,
though, participants generally did not recognize their inconsistencies. Those whose
relationships had improved remembered their initial evaluations of their partners as
more positive than they actually were, while those whose relationships had declined
had the opposite response (Scharfe & Bartholomew, 1998). In this study, as well as
many others involving attitudes, beliefs, opinions, or emotions, we see that our biases
act as a sort of distorted mirror in which our memories are reflected—but without our
awareness that our memories had been altered.
Persistence: When We Can’t Forget
The seventh “sin” of memory, persistence, reminds us that memory sometimes works
all too well. We all experience this occasionally, when a persistent thought, image, or
melody cycles over and over in our minds. Thankfully, such intrusive memories are
usually short lived. They can become a problem, though, when accompanied by intense
negative emotions. At the extreme, the persistence of memories for unpleasant events
creates a downward emotional spiral whereby people suffering from depression can’t
stop ruminating about unhappy events or traumas in their lives. Similarly, patients
with phobias may become obsessed by fearful memories about snakes, dogs, crowds,
spiders, or lightning. All of this underscores the powerful role that emotion plays in
memory.
The Advantages of the “Seven Sins” of Memory
Despite the grief they cause us, the “seven sins” arise from adaptive features of
memory, argues Daniel Schacter (1999). Thus, transience—maddening as it is to the
student taking a test—actually prevents the memory system from being overwhelmed
by information it no longer needs. Similarly, blocking is useful when it allows only the
self-consistency bias The commonly held idea
that we are more consistent in our attitudes, opinions,
and beliefs than we actually are.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
People with phobias have
extreme and unreasonable fears
of specific objects or situations
(p. 532).
persistence A memory problem in which
unwanted memories cannot be put out of mind.
expectancy bias The unconscious tendency
to remember events as being congruent with our
expectations.

Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us? 203
most relevant information—information most strongly associated with present cues—
to come to mind. These processes, then, help prevent us from a flood of unwanted and
distracting memories.
Absent-mindedness, too, is the by-product of the useful ability to shift our atten-
tion. Similarly, misattributions, biases, and suggestibility result from a memory system
built to focus on meaning and discard details: The alternative would be a computer-
like memory filled with information at the expense of understanding. And, finally, we
can see that the “sin” of persistence is really a feature of a memory system responsive
to emotional experiences, particularly those involving dangerous situations. In general,
then, the picture that emerges of memory’s “failures” is also a picture of a system well
adapted to conditions people have faced for thousands of years.
Improving Your Memory with Mnemonics
One way to improve your memory is to develop a tool kit of mental strategies known
as mnemonics (pronounced ni-MON-ix, from the Greek word meaning “remember”).
Mnemonic strategies help you encode new information by associating it with informa-
tion already in long-term memory. To illustrate, we will take a detailed look at two
mnemonic strategies, the method of loci and natural language mediators, both of
which are especially useful for remembering lists. Then we will offer tips to help with
the common problem of remembering names.
The Method of Loci Dating back to the ancient Greeks, the method of loci
(pronounced LOW-sye, from locus or “place”), is literally one of the oldest tricks in
this book. Greek orators originally devised the method of loci to help remember the
major points of their speeches.
To illustrate, imagine a familiar sequence of places, such as the bed, desk, and chairs
in your room. Then, using the method of loci, mentally move from place to place in the
room, and as you go imagine putting one item from your list in each place. To retrieve
the series, you merely take another mental tour, examining the places you used earlier.
There you will “see” the item you put in each place. To remember a grocery list, for ex-
ample, you might mentally picture a can of tuna on your bed, shampoo spilled on your
desktop, and a box of eggs open on a chair. Bizarre or unconventional image combina-
tions are usually easier to remember—so a can of tuna in your bedroom will make a
more memorable image than tuna in your kitchen (Bower, 1972).
It’s worth noting, by the way, that visual imagery is one of the most effective forms
of encoding: You can easily remember things by associating them with vivid, distinctive
mental pictures. In fact, you could remember your grocery list by using visual imagery
alone. Simply combine the mental images of tuna, shampoo, and eggs in a bizarre but
memorable way. So, you might picture a tuna floating on an enormous fried egg in a
sea of foamy shampoo. Or you might imagine a celebrity you dislike eating tuna from
the can, hair covered with shampoo suds, while you throw eggs at her.
Natural Language Mediators Memory aids called natural language mediators
associate meaningful word patterns with new information to be remembered. Using
this method to remember a grocery list, you would make up a story. Using the same
list as before (tuna, shampoo, and eggs), the story might link the items this way:
“The cat discovers I’m out of tuna so she interrupts me while I’m using the sham-
poo and meows to egg me on.” (OK, we know it’s hokey—but it works!) Similarly,
advertisers know that rhyming slogans and rhythmic musical jingles make it easier
for customers to remember their products and brand names (you may even have
one stuck in your head now!). The chances are that a teacher in your past used a
simple rhyme to help you remember a spelling rule (“I before E except after C”) or
the number of days in each month (“Thirty days has September . . . ”). In a physics
class, you may have used a natural language mediator in the form of an acronym—a
word made up of initials—to learn the colors of the visible spectrum in their correct
order: “Roy G. Biv” for red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet.
mnemonic strategy Technique for improving
memory, especially by making connections between new
material and information already present in
long-term memory.
method of loci A mnemonic technique that
involves associating items on a list with a sequence
of familiar physical locations.
natural language mediator Word associated
with new information to be remembered.

204 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
Remembering Names The inability to remember people’s names is one of the most
common complaints about memory. So how could you use the power of association
to remember names? In the first place, know that remembering names doesn’t hap-
pen automatically. People who do it well work at it by making deliberate associations
between a name and some characteristic of the person—the more unusual the associa-
tion, the better.
Suppose, for example, you have just met us, the authors of this text, at a psycho-
logical convention. You might visualize Bob’s face framed in a big O, taken from the
middle of his name. To remember Vivian, think of her as “Vivacious Vivian,” the liveli-
est person at the convention. And, as for Phil, you might visualize putting a hose in
Phil’s mouth and “fill”-ing him with water. (While unusual associations may be easier
to remember than mundane ones, it is best not to tell people about the mnemonic you
have devised to remember their names.)
In general, use of mnemonics teaches us that memory is flexible, personal, and
creative. It also teaches us that memory ultimately works by meaningful associations.
With this knowledge and a little experimentation, you can devise techniques for encod-
ing and retrieval that work well for you, based on your own personal associations and,
perhaps, on your own sense of humor.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Mnemonic strategies designed for learning names or memorizing lists of unrelated
items won’t help much with the material you need to learn in your psychology class.
There, the important material consists of concepts—often abstract concepts, such as
“operant conditioning” or “retroactive interference”—ideas you need to understand
rather than merely memorize. Such material calls for strategies geared both to concept
learning and to avoiding the two memory “sins” feared most by college students,
transience and blocking. Let’s see what advice cognitive psychologists have for students
trying to avoid these two quirks of memory.
Studying to Avoid Transience
• Make the material personally meaningful. Many studies have shown that memories
remain stronger when they are meaningful, rather than just a collection of facts and
definitions (Baddeley, 1998; Haberlandt, 1999). One good strategy for doing this
is the whole method, a technique often used by actors who must learn a script in a
short time. With this approach, begin by getting an overview of all the material—
the “big picture” into which details can be assimilated. Suppose, for example, you
have a test on this chapter next week. Using the whole method, you would read
through the chapter outline and summary, along with all the Key Questions and
Core Concepts on the chapter opening page, before beginning to read the details of
the chapter. This approach erects a mental framework on which you can hang the
details of encoding, interference, retrieval, and other memory topics.
• Spread your learning out over time. Next, use distributed learning to resist tran-
sience. In other words, study your psychology repeatedly and at frequent intervals
rather than trying to learn it all at once in a single “cram” session (called massed
learning). Distributed learning not only avoids the lowered efficiency of massed
learning, which causes fatigue, but also strengthens memories in the process of
consolidation. One study found that students who studied in two separate ses-
sions, rather than just one, doubled the amount of information they learned in
a given amount of time and also increased their understanding of the material
(Bahrick et al., 1993). Distributed learning also results in longer retention of mate-
rial (Schmidt & Bjork, 1992). And it helps us understand why we have enhanced
memory capabilities for names and faces of high school friends even decades
whole method The mnemonic strategy of first
approaching the material to be learned “as a whole,”
forming an impression of the overall meaning of the
material. The details are later associated with this
overall impression.
distributed learning A technique whereby the
learner spaces learning sessions over time rather than
trying to learn the material all in one study period.
Mnemonic strategies help us remember
things by making them meaningful. Here,
Wangari Maathai, the Nobel Peace Prize
laureate from Kenya, tries her hand at learn-
ing the Chinese character for “tree”—which
bears a resemblance to a stylized tree.
Many Chinese and Japanese characters
originally were drawings of the objects they
represented.

Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us? 205
later: We likely accessed that information frequently while in high school—the
equivalent of distributed learning.
• Take active steps to minimize interference. You can’t avoid interference altogether,
but you can avoid studying for another class after your review session for tomor-
row’s psychology test. And you can make sure you understand all the material and
have cleared up any confusing points well before you go to the test. If, for exam-
ple, you are not sure of the difference between declarative memory and semantic
memory, discuss this with your instructor—before the day of the test.
Studying to Avoid Blocking on the Test
The strategies above will help you get to the test with a strong memory for what you
need to know. To really do well on the test, though, you must also avoid blocking, the
inability to retrieve what you have in memory. To help you achieve this, we suggest
some techniques that apply two more ideas you learned in this chapter, elaborative
rehearsal and encoding specificity:
• Review and elaborate on the material. Students often think that, just because they
read the material once and understood it, they will remember it. With complex
concepts and ideas, though, you need to review what you have learned several
times. And your review should not be mindless and passive—merely looking at
the words in the book. Instead, use elaborative rehearsal. One of the best ways of
doing this when studying for a test is to create your own examples of the
concepts. So, as you study about proactive interference, think of an example from
your own experience. Also, review and rehearse mnemonics you may have created
for some of the material, such as acronyms or vivid mental images of concepts.
By adding associations to the material, you create more ways to access it when
you need it.
• Test yourself with retrieval cues you expect to see on the examination. By using
the principle of encoding specificity, you can learn the material in ways most likely
to be cued by the questions on the test. This is often easier to do with a friend
studying for the same test, ideally a few days before the exam, but after you have
already prepared and feel ready. Your purpose, at this point, will not be to learn
new material but to practice what you’ve learned as you anticipate the most likely
test items. Does your professor prefer essay questions? Short-answer questions?
Multiple choice? Try to think of and answer questions of the type most likely to
appear on the test.
All these study strategies are based on well-established principles of learning and
memory. Studying this way may sound like a lot of work—and it is. But the results will
be worth the mental effort.
Check Your Understanding
1. ANALYSIS: What happens to memory over time, as described by
Ebbinghaus’s forgetting curve?
2. APPLICATION: Which kind of forgetting is involved when the
sociology I studied yesterday makes it more difficult to learn and
remember the psychology I am studying today?
3. RECALL: Describe at least three ways you can apply what you
have learned in this chapter to improve your studying and memory.
4. RECALL: Which of the seven “sins” of memory was responsible for
Piaget’s fabricated memory of an attempted kidnapping?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Which of the “sins”
of memory probably helps us avoid dangerous situations we have
encountered before?
Answers 1. We forget rapidly at first and then more slowly as time goes on. 2. Proactive interference 3. Elaborative rehearsal, distributed learning, and
creating a variety of memory cues for each concept. 4. Suggestibility 5. Persistence
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

206 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
A series of studies has revealed striking evidence that children
with an avoidant attachment style—or a general lack of trust in
their environment and the principal people in it (see Chapter 7)—
are less likely to mentally process an abusive event when it oc-
curs, resulting in less likelihood of a memory being encoded and
stored in long-term memory. For these individuals, the end result
may indeed be what has historically been termed “repression.”
Could Bias Contaminate the Conclusion? We have seen
that memory does not make a complete record of our experi-
ences. Nor is it always accurate. Of special relevance to the
recovered memory controversy is research we discussed ear-
lier in the chapter, showing that memories can rather easily
be modified or even created by suggestion. As a result, par-
ticipants not only report false memories but begin to believe
them (Bruck & Ceci, 2004). Such experiments should make
us skeptical of memories recovered during therapy or inter-
rogation involving suggestive techniques. Memory expert
Elizabeth Loftus argues that therapists who assume that most
mental problems stem from childhood sexual abuse com-
monly use suggestive practices, although she does not say how
widespread the problem might be (Loftus, 2003a, b). And in
the book Making Monsters, social psychologist Richard Ofshe
and his coauthor describe how clients can unknowingly tailor
their recollections to fit their therapists’ expectations. He adds
that “therapists often encourage patients to redefine their life
histories based on the new pseudomemories and, by doing so,
redefine their most basic understanding of their families and
themselves” (Ofshe & Watters, 1994, p. 6).
We are not saying that all, or even most, therapists use
suggestive techniques to probe for memories of sexual abuse,
although some certainly do (Poole et al., 1995). Nevertheless,
patients should be wary of therapists who go “fishing” for
repressed memories of early sexual experiences using such
techniques as hypnosis, dream analysis, and suggestive ques-
tioning. No evidence exists in support of these methods for
the recovery of accurate memories.
Another source of suggestion that pops up in a surprisingly
large proportion of recovered memory cases is a book: The
Courage to Heal. This book argues that forgotten memories
of incest and abuse may lie behind people’s feelings of pow-
erlessness, inadequacy, vulnerability, and a long list of other
unpleasant thoughts and emotions (Bass & Davis, 1988). The
authors state, “If you . . . have a feeling that something abusive
happened to you, it probably did” (pp. 21–22). None of these
assertions, however, rests on anything more solid than specula-
tion. Thus, say memory experts Elizabeth Loftus and Kather-
ine Ketcham (1994), it seems likely that The Courage to Heal
has contributed to many false memories of sexual abuse.
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Recovered Memory Controversy
Let’s return now to the case studies with which we began the chapter. All involved claims of recovered memories: Ross’s
memory of molestation by a camp counselor was clearly ac-
curate, and Donna’s memory of abuse by her father was even-
tually repudiated. So where does that leave us when we hear
about other such claims?
What Are the Critical Issues?
The controversy centers on the accuracy of claims of recovered
memories—not on the reality of sexual abuse. Is it possible that
recovered memories could be false? If so, we must decide how
to judge their accuracy, especially memories of traumatic events.
Is the Claim Reasonable or Extreme? Let’s begin by
asking: Is the notion of recovered memories of sexual abuse
reasonable or outrageous? That is, does it fit with what we
know both about memory and about sexual abuse? Let’s see
what the evidence can tell us.
We need to emphasize that sexual abuse of children
does occur and poses a serious problem. How widespread
is it? While estimates vary considerably, it appears that 4 to
20 percent of children in the United States have experienced
at least one incident of sexual abuse (McAnulty & Burnette,
2004; Terry & Tallon, 2004). Accurate figures are difficult
to obtain, of course, because people can be reluctant to dis-
cuss these experiences. And if it is true that sexual abuse can
be blocked out of consciousness for long periods, the actual
numbers could be higher.
We should also note that most claims of sexual abuse do
not involve “recovered” memories. In general, we have no
reason to doubt people who say they have been molested and
have always remembered. The controversy centers on memo-
ries said to have been “recovered” after having been forgotten
for months or even years.
What Is the Evidence? The general public harbors a
strong but unfounded belief that the most common response
to trauma is repression, the blocking of memories in the un-
conscious, as first described by Sigmund Freud. But, in fact,
most people who have traumatic experiences remember them
vividly, rather than forgetting them (McNally et al., 2003).
Unwelcome remembering of disturbing experiences is pre-
cisely the problem in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
How, then, can we account for the fact that a portion of cases
in almost every research study in this area includes some re-
ports of repression (Greenhoot et al., 2008)?
Until recently, psychologists were at a loss to answer this
question. But now, University of California psychologist Gail
Goodwin and her colleagues (2010) may have found the answer.

Chapter Summary 207
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
So, where does this leave us? Weigh the evidence yourself on
a case-by-case basis, mindful of the possibility that emotional
biases can affect your thinking. Keep in mind the following
points as well:
• Sexual abuse of children does occur and is more preva-
lent than most professionals suspected just a generation
ago (McAnulty & Burnette, 2004).
• On the other hand, memories cued by suggestion, as from
therapists or police officers, are particularly vulnerable to
distortion and fabrication (Loftus, 2003a). So, without
independent evidence, there is no way to tell whether a
recovered memory is true or false.
• Remember that people can feel just as certain about false
memories as accurate ones.
• Although traumatic events can be forgotten and later re-
called, they are much more likely to form persistent and
intrusive memories that people cannot forget. Neverthe-
less, cases such as that of Ross show us that recovered
memories of abuse can be true.
• Early memories, especially those of incidents that may
have happened in infancy, are likely to be fantasies or
misattributions. As we have seen, episodic memories of
events before age 3 are rare (Schacter, 1996).
• One should be more suspicious of claims for memories
that have been “repressed” and then “recovered” years
later than for memories that have always been available
to consciousness.
We should also note that the issue of recovered memories
is both complex and charged with emotion—a situation ripe
for emotional bias. Not only does the issue of sexual abuse
strike many people close to home, but none of us wants to
turn our back on those who believe they have been victims
of sexual abuse. Yet what we know about memory tells us
that we should not accept long-forgotten traumatic memories
without corroborating evidence.
Does the Reasoning Avoid Common Fallacies? When
we observe associations between things, we have a natural
tendency to suspect that one might cause the other—as we
associate overeating with gaining weight or spending time in
the sun with a sunburn. Most of the time this logic serves us
well, but occasionally it leads us to the wrong conclusions—
as when we conclude that a chill causes a cold or that eating
sweets causes a “sugar high.” Experts call this the post hoc
fallacy: Post hoc literally means “after the fact,” and the idea
is that looking back at events occurring in succession (e.g.,
sugar followed by excitement), we may erroneously conclude
that the first event is the cause of the second.
How could the post hoc fallacy contribute to the “recov-
ered memory” controversy? When people “look back” in
their memories and find a memory (accurate or not) of abuse
that seems to be associated with their current unhappiness,
they assume the abusive event (again, whether real or errone-
ously remembered) is the cause of their current mental state.
But, as we have seen, this conclusion may be faulty. Ironi-
cally, this can reinforce one’s belief in the memory—through
confirmation bias.
FINDING OUT MORE ABOUT ISSUES IN REPORTS OF REPRESSED MEMORIES
In this discussion, you may have noticed
names of two researchers who are espe-
cially prominent in the area memory and
false memories: Elizabeth Loftus and Gail
Goodman. Find a recent article (published
in the past year) by one of these authors,
read it, and identify three main points the
article makes that add to what you learned
in this chapter.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER PROBLEM: How can our knowledge about mem-
ory help us evaluate claims of recovered memories?
• Evidence clearly shows that most people form powerful
memories of traumatic events, rather than repressing them.
• Up to one-third of the population has been demonstrated
by research to be susceptible to relatively easy formation of
false memories. Thus, suggestive questioning techniques by
therapists or other authority figures may inadvertently lead a
person to create false memories that are in accordance with a
therapist’s suggestion.
• People with an avoidant attachment style have been found by
researchers to be more likely to suppress traumatic memories
than people with other attachment styles.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

208 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
5.1 What Is Memory?
Core Concept 5.1 Human memory is an information
processing system that works constructively to encode, store,
and retrieve information.
Human memory, like any memory system, involves three im-
portant tasks: encoding, storage, and retrieval. Although many
people believe that memory makes a complete and accurate
record, cognitive psychologists see human memory as an in-
formation processing system that interprets, distorts, and
reconstructs information. Eidetic imagery, however, is a rare
and poorly understood form of memory that produces espe-
cially vivid and persistent memories that may interfere with
thought. It is not clear how eidetic memory fits with the
widely accepted three-stage model of memory.
eidetic imagery (p. 175)
encoding (p. 174)
information-processing model (p. 174)
memory (p. 172)
retrieval (p. 175)
storage (p. 175)
5.2 How Do We Form Memories?
Core Concept 5.2 Each of the three memory stages
encodes and stores memories in a different way, but they
work together to transform sensory experience into a lasting
record that has a pattern or meaning.
The memory system is composed of three distinct stages: sen-
sory memory, working memory, and long-term memory. The
three stages work together sequentially to convert incoming
sensory information into useful patterns or concepts that can
be stored and retrieved when needed later.
Sensory memory holds 12 to 16 visual items for up to just a
second or two, making use of the sensory pathways. A separate
sensory register for each sense holds material just long enough
for important information to be selected for further processing.
Working memory, which has the smallest storage capacity
of the three stages and a duration of 20 to 30 seconds, draws
information from sensory memory and long-term memory
and processes it consciously. Theorists have proposed at least
four components of working memory: a central executive, a
phonological loop, a sketchpad, and an episodic buffer. We
can cope with its limited duration and capacity by chunking
and rehearsal. The biological basis of working memory is not
clear, but it is believed to involve actively firing nerve circuits,
probably in the frontal cortex.
Long-term memory has apparently unlimited storage
capacity and duration. It has two main partitions, declarative
memory (for facts and events) and procedural memory (for per-
ceptual and motor skills). Declarative memory can be further
divided into episodic memory and semantic memory. Semantic
information is encoded, stored, and retrieved according to
the meaning and context of the material. The case of H. M.
showed that the hippocampus is involved in transferring in-
formation to long-term memory. Other research has found
long-term memories associated with relatively permanent
changes at the synaptic level.
Flashbulb memories are common in highly emotional
experiences. While most people have a great deal of confi-
dence in such vivid memories, studies have shown these
memories are no more accurate than everyday memories.
acoustic encoding (p. 182)
anterograde amnesia (p. 187)
childhood amnesia (p. 186)
chunking (p. 181)
consolidation (p. 188)
declarative memory (p. 184)
elaborative rehearsal (p. 181)
engram (p. 187)
episodic memory (p. 185)
flashbulb memory (p. 189)
levels-of-processing theory (p. 183)
long-term memory (LTM) (p. 177)
maintenance rehearsal (p. 181)
procedural memory (p. 184)
retrograde amnesia (p. 188)
schema (p. 185)
semantic memory (p. 185)
sensory memory (p. 177)
working memory (p. 177)
5.3 How Do We Retrieve Memories?
Core Concept 5.3 Whether memories are implicit or
explicit, successful retrieval depends on how they were
encoded and how they are cued.
H. M.’s case also demonstrated that information can be stored
as explicit or implicit memories. The success of a memory search
depends, in part, on the retrieval cues. Implicit memories can
be cued by priming. Explicit memories can be cued by vari-
ous recall or recognition tasks, although some tasks require
remembering the gist rather than exact details. The accuracy
of memory retrieval also depends on encoding specificity and
mood. Relatively little is known about the conditions required
for successful prospective memory. When there is a poor match
between retrieval cues and the encoding, we may experience
the TOT phenomenon.

encoding specificity principle (p. 193)
explicit memory (p. 191)
gist (p. 192)
implicit memory (p. 191)
mood-congruent memory (p. 193)
priming (p. 192)
prospective memory (p. 194)
recall (p. 192)
recognition (p. 193)
retrieval cue (p. 191)
TOT phenomenon (p. 194)
5.4 Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us?
Core Concept 5.4 Most of our memory problems arise
from memory’s “seven sins”—which are really by-products
of otherwise adaptive features of human memory.
Memory failures involve the “seven sins” of memory. These
include forgetting, resulting from weakening memory traces
(transience), lapses of attention (absent-mindedness), and inabil-
ity to retrieve a memory (blocking). Some forgetting can be at-
tributed to a cause of transience known as interference. Memory
can also fail when recollections are altered through misattribution,
suggestibility, and bias. An important example involves eyewitness
memories, which are subject to distortion. Suggestibility can also
produce false memories that seem believable to the rememberer.
The final “sin” of persistence occurs when unwanted memories
linger in memory even when we would like to forget them.
The “seven sins” of memory, however, are by-products
of a memory system that is well suited to solving problems
of day-to-day living. Some of these problems can be over-
come by mnemonic strategies, such as the method of loci, natural
language mediators, and other associative methods. The learn-
ing of concepts, however, requires special strategies geared
to learning the gist of the material and to avoiding the two
memory “sins” of transience and blocking.
absent-mindedness (p. 198)
blocking (p. 198)
distributed learning (p. 204)
expectancy bias (p. 202)
forgetting curve (p. 196)
method of loci (p. 203)
misattribution (p. 199)
misinformation effect (p. 200)
mnemonic strategy (p. 203)
natural language mediator (p. 203)
persistence (p. 202)
proactive interference (p. 197)
retroactive interference (p. 197)
self-consistency bias (p. 202)
serial position effect (p. 197)
suggestibility (p. 200)
transience (p. 196)
whole method (p. 204)
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Recovered Memory Controversy
not only do most people NOT repress traumatic memories,
suggestive techniques can actually enable creation of false
memories.
Most people mistakenly believe that traumatic memories are
subject to repression and can later be recovered accurately
through hypnosis or other techniques. Evidence indicates that
Chapter Summary 209

210 C H A P T E R 5 Memory
7. According to Sigmund Freud, what is the purpose of
repression?
a. to protect the memory from encoding too much material
b. to preserve the individual’s self-esteem
c. to activate networks of associations
d. to fit new information into existing schemas
8. In an experiment, people spent a few minutes in an office. They
were then asked to recall what they had seen. They were most
likely to recall objects that
a. fit into their existing schema of an office.
b. carried little emotional content.
c. were unusual within that particular context.
d. related to objects they owned themselves.
9. The paintings Franco Magnani made of an Italian town were
distorted mainly by
a. repression, causing some features to be left out.
b. a child’s perspective.
c. sensory gating, changing colors.
d. false memories of items that were not really there.
10. What was Karl Lashley’s goal in teaching rats how to negotiate
mazes and then removing part of their cortexes?
a. finding out how much tissue was necessary for learning
to occur
b. determining whether memory was localized in one area of
the brain
c. discovering how much tissue loss led to
memory loss
d. finding out whether conditioned responses could be
eradicated
11. What has Richard Thompson found in his work with rabbits
conditioned to a tone before an air puff?
a. Rabbits learn the response more slowly after
lesioning.
b. Eyelid conditioning involves several brain areas.
c. The memory of the response can be removed by lesioning.
d. Once the response is learned, the memory is permanent,
despite lesioning.
Program Review
1. What pattern of remembering emerged in Hermann Ebbinghaus’s
research?
a. Loss occurred at a steady rate.
b. A small initial loss was followed by no further loss.
c. There was no initial loss, but then there was a gradual decline.
d. A sharp initial loss was followed by a gradual decline.
2. The way psychologists thought about and studied memory was
changed by the invention of
a. television.
b. electroconvulsive shock therapy.
c. the computer.
d. the electron microscope.
3. What do we mean when we say that memories must be encoded?
a. They must be taken from storage to be used.
b. They must be put in a form the brain can register.
c. They must be transferred from one network to another.
d. They must be put in a passive storehouse.
4. About how many items can be held in short-term memory?
a. three
b. seven
c. 11
d. an unlimited number
5. Imagine you had a string of 20 one-digit numbers to remember.
The best way to accomplish the task, which requires increasing
the capacity of short-term memory, is through the technique of
a. selective attention.
b. peg words.
c. rehearsing.
d. chunking.
6. According to Gordon Bower, what is an important feature of good
mnemonic systems?
a. There is a dovetailing between storage and retrieval.
b. The acoustic element is more important than the visual.
c. The learner is strongly motivated to remember.
d. Short-term memory is bypassed in favor of long-term
memory.
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the video, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 9: REMEMBERING
AND FORGETTING
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 211
12. Patients with Alzheimer’s disease find it almost impossible to
produce
a. unconditioned responses.
b. conditioned stimuli.
c. conditioned responses.
d. unconditioned stimuli.
13. The best way to keep items in short-term memory for an indefinite
length of time is to
a. chunk.
b. create context dependence.
c. use the peg-word system.
d. rehearse.
14. Long-term memory is organized as a
a. complex network of associations.
b. serial list.
c. set of visual images.
d. jumble of individual memories with no clear organizational
scheme.
15. You remember a list of unrelated words by associating them, one
at a time, with images of a bun, a shoe, a tree, a door, a hive,
sticks, Heaven, a gate, a line, and a hen. What mnemonic
technique are you using?
a. method of loci
b. peg-word
c. link
d. digit conversion
16. What did Karl Lashley conclude about the engram?
a. It is localized in the brain stem.
b. It is localized in the right hemisphere only.
c. It is localized in the left hemisphere only.
d. Complex memories cannot be pinpointed within
the brain.
17. Long-term memories appear to be stored in the
a. cortex. c. hippocampus.
b. occipital lobe. d. parietal lobe.
18. How has Diana Woodruff-Pak utilized Richard Thompson’s work
on eyeblink conditioning?
a. as a precursor to early-onset dementia
b. as a predictor of musical genius
c. as a mechanism for growing brain cells in
intact animals
d. as a tool for training long-term visual memories
19. Which neurotransmitter(s) is/are disrupted in Alzheimer’s
patients?
a. scopolamine
b. acetylcholine
c. both of the above
d. none of the above
20. Alzheimer’s disease is associated with the loss of
a. memory. c. life itself.
b. personality. d. all of the above.

6.1 What Are the Components of
Thought?
Concepts
Imagery and Cognitive Maps
Thought and the Brain
Intuition

Key Questions/
Chapter Outline
Thinking and Intelligence6
Psychology Matters
Thinking is a cognitive process in
which the brain uses information from
the senses, emotions, and memory
to create and manipulate mental
representations, such as concepts,
images, schemas, and scripts.
Schemas and Scripts Help You
Know What to Expect
But sometimes they fill in the
blanks—without your realizing it.
6.2 What Abilities Do Good Thinkers
Possess?
Problem Solving
Judging and Making Decisions
Becoming a Creative Genius
Good thinkers not only have a
repertoire of effective strategies,
called algorithms and heuristics, they
also know how to avoid the common
impediments to problem solving and
decision making.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
Psychologists have learned the secrets
of developing expertise—in psychology
or any other subject.
Intelligence testing has a history of
controversy, but most psychologists
now view intelligence as normally
distributed and measurable by
performance on a variety of tasks.
What Can You Do for an
Exceptional Child?
In both mental retardation and
giftedness, children should be
encouraged to capitalize on their
abilities.
6.3 How Is Intelligence Measured?
Binet and Simon Invent a School Abilities Test
American Psychologists Borrow Binet and
Simon’s Idea
Problems with the IQ Formula
Calculating IQs “on the Curve”
IQ Testing Today
6.4 Is Intelligence One or Many
Abilities?
Psychometric Theories of Intelligence
Cognitive Theories of Intelligence
Cultural Definitions of Intelligence
The Question of Animal Intelligence
Some psychologists believe that
intelligence comprises one general
factor, g, while others believe that
intelligence is a collection of distinct
abilities.
Test Scores and the
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
An IQ score can create expectations
that develop a life of their own.
6.5 How Do Psychologists Explain IQ
Differences Among Groups?
Intelligence and the Politics of Immigration
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence Is
Influenced by Heredity?
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence Is
Influenced by Environment?
Heritability (not Heredity) and Group
Differences
While most psychologists agree that
both heredity and environment affect
intelligence, they disagree on the
source of IQ differences among racial
and social groups.
Stereotype Threat
A simple reminder that you belong to a
minority group may be enough to lower
your test scores.
CHAPTER PROBLEM What produces “genius,” and to what extent are the people we call
“geniuses” different from others?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED The Question of Gender Differences
Core Concepts

213
F OLLOW YOUR PASSIONS AND YOU, TOO, MAY BECOME A MULTIMILLIONAIRE. At least that’s what happened to Sergey Brin and Larry Page, graduate students in computer science at Stanford University. Both were deeply interested in finding a quicker way to search the Internet and extract specific information from its abun-
dance of informational riches.
It was January of 1996, and both Brin and Page had some creative ideas about how to
search the Web more efficiently than existing search engines could. After combining forces, the
first thing this duo did was to build a computer in Larry’s dorm room, equipping it with as much
memory as they could afford.
The first-generation search engine to come out of their collaboration was BackRub, so called
because it could identify and follow “back links” to discover which websites were listing a par-
ticular page—giving them an index of how valuable users had found a site to be. And, while their
search engine performed well, Brin and Page couldn’t get any of the big computer companies or
existing Internet entrepreneurs to buy their design. So they started their own business—with a little
financial help from their family and friends. One friend of a Stanford faculty member saw so much
promise in their enterprise that he wrote them a check for $100,000. The check sat in a drawer
in Page’s desk for two weeks because they hadn’t yet set up a company that could cash the check.
In most respects, Brin and Page’s search engine worked like any other Web-searching soft-
ware. It sent out electronic “spiders” that crawl across Web pages, looking for important terms
and listing them in an index, along with their Web addresses. It also followed links on the Web
pages it scanned (both forward and backward) and listed more terms. The secret ingredient
for their success remains as closely guarded as the formula for Coca-Cola. It involves the way
results are ranked for presentation to the user. More often than not, it manages to put the sites

214 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
computer metaphor The idea that the brain
is an information-processing organ that operates, in
some ways, like a computer.
users want most near the top of a list that can include millions of possible sources. Thus, the
software is designed to serve as the link between a concept in the user’s mind and billions of
words on the Web. In other words, Brin and Page had to organize their search engine to “think”
as much as possible like a person—which is what this chapter is about.
The public seemed to like their search engine. In fact, the public liked it far better than
did the big companies that had turned it down. And over the next decade, it became “the little
engine that could.” First, it outgrew Page’s dorm room and—in the great tradition of American
inventors and rock bands—into a garage. Today, it has offices spread throughout the United
States and 36 other countries, with more than 20,000 employees. It also has a reputation
as the most comprehensive of search engines, indexing key words from billions of Web pages.
Every day, it processes hundreds of millions of search requests. Things got so busy that Brin and
Page had to take a leave from graduate school to run the company—which they renamed after
the term mathematicians use for the number 1 followed by 100 zeros. They called it Google.
In some respects, Brin and Page are like other legendary pioneers in the computer field:
the two Steves, Jobs and Wozniak, who started Apple Computers in a garage, and Bill Gates
who, with his friend Paul Allen, launched Microsoft on a shoestring. All could be called
“geniuses,” a term that frames our initial problem for this chapter:
PROBLEM: What produces “genius,” and to what extent are the people we call
“geniuses” different from others?
As we consider this problem, here are some additional questions worth pondering:
• Thomas Edison once said that genius is 1 percent inspiration, 99 percent perspiration. If
so, does that mean genius is mainly a matter of high motivation rather than aptitude or
talent?
• Is genius a product mainly of nature or of nurture?
• Do geniuses think differently from the rest of us? Or do they just use the same thought
processes more effectively?
• Could Einstein (for example), whose specialty was physics, have been a genius in painting
or literature or medicine if he had chosen to do so? That is, are there different kinds of
genius? And is the potential for genius specific to a particular field?
We will address all these questions in the following pages. But first, let’s return to Google and
the computer metaphor for the human mind, as we begin our inquiry into thinking and intelligence.
Despite its phenomenal success, Google is only a pale imitation of the human mind.
Sure, it can scan its memory, amassed from up to one trillion Web pages, and return
over one billion links on, say, the term “search engine” in about a half second. But ask
it what food to serve at a birthday party, and it will merely serve up (at this writing)
49,800,000 links to the terms “birthday” and “party” and “food.” Unlike most human
minds, Google and its network of supportive hardware is clueless. So is the computer
on your desk. Computers just don’t index information by meaning.
Nevertheless, computers in the hands of cognitive scientists can be powerful tools
for studying how we think—for three reasons. First, these scientists use computers in brain
imaging studies, which have shown the brain to be a system of interrelated processing
modules, as we have seen. Second, researchers use computer simulations that attempt
to model human thought processes. And third, while they haven’t yet made a computer
function exactly like a brain, cognitive scientists have adopted the computer as a meta-
phor for the brain, as a processor of information.
This computer metaphor—the brain as an information processor—suggests that thinking
is nothing more, or less, than information processing. The information we use in thought
can come from raw data we receive from our senses, but it can also come from meaningful

What Are the Components of Thought? 215
concepts in long-term memory. As you can see, then, the
psychology of thinking deals with the same processes we
discussed in connection with learning and memory.
To be sure, the computer metaphor is not perfect. Com-
puters can’t deal with meaning. And, as we will see, they
are not very good at abstract thought or humor (although
they are very good at transmitting the millions of jokes
shared on e-mail each day). Consequently, some psycholo-
gists encourage moving beyond the computer metaphor to
talk about the sort of modular, parallel information pro-
cessing that we now know the brain really does when it
thinks. Evolutionary psychologists, for example, suggest
the brain is more like a Swiss Army knife—an all-purpose
tool that can adapt to many uses, with a variety of special-
ized components for particular functions. Nevertheless, the
computer metaphor is a good place to begin our thinking
about thought.
In the first two sections of this chapter, we will focus
on the processes underlying thought, especially in decision making and problem solving.
This discussion will examine the building blocks of thought: concepts, images, schemas,
and scripts. Our excursion into thinking will also give us the opportunity to return for a
closer look at that mysterious quality known as “genius.”
In the second half of the chapter, we will turn to the form of thinking we call intel-
ligence. There you will learn about IQ tests, conflicting perspectives on what intelligence
really is, and what it means to say that IQ is “heritable.” In the Using Psychology to
Learn Psychology feature, you will learn how to apply the knowledge in this chapter
to become an expert in psychology—or any other field you choose. Finally, our Critical
Thinking Application will look at the controversial issue of gender differences in thought.
6.1 KEY QUESTION
What Are the Components of Thought?
Solving a math problem, deciding what to do Friday night, and indulging a private
fantasy all require thinking. We can conceive of thinking as a complex act of cog-
nition—information processing in the brain—by which we deal with our world of
ideas, feelings, desires, and experience. Our Core Concept notes that this information
can come from within and from without, but it always involves some form of mental
representation:
Core Concept 6.1
Thinking is a cognitive process in which the brain uses information
from the senses, emotions, and memory to create and manipulate
mental representations such as concepts, images, schemas, and
scripts.
These mental representations, then, serve as the building blocks of cognition, while
thinking organizes them in meaningful ways. The ultimate results are the higher
thought processes we call reasoning, imagining, judging, deciding, problem solving,
expertise, creativity, and—sometimes—genius.
Concepts
Have you ever visited a new place only to feel like you had been there before? Or had
a conversation with someone and felt the experience was uncannily familiar? If so,
you have experienced a phenomenon known as déjà vu (from the French for “seen
The cognitive perspective focuses on
mental processes as the primary key to
human behavior.
Watson, an IBM computer capable of
responding to human language, bested
two top-winning Jeopardy contestants in
2011. While this technology is a great
leap forward in artificial intelligence, crit-
ics argue that rapid computational skills
should not be confused with a true under-
standing of meaning.

216 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
before”). The term refers to the strange sense that your present experience matches a
previous experience, even though you cannot retrieve the explicit memory. This feeling
reflects the brain’s ability to treat new stimuli as instances of familiar categories, even
if the stimuli are slightly different from anything it has encountered before. Why is
that important? Imagine what life would be like if, every time we started a new class in
school, for example, we couldn’t access any of our previous school experiences, so we
had to start from scratch to figure out what to do, how to study, and what the point
of school even was. This ability to assimilate experiences, objects, or ideas into famil-
iar mental categories—and take the same action toward them or give them the same
label—is one of the most basic attributes of thinking organisms (Mervis & Rosch,
1981).
The mental categories we form in this way are known as concepts. We use them as
the building blocks of thinking because they help us organize our knowledge (Goldman-
Rakic, 1992). Concepts can represent classes of objects such as “chair” or “food,” living
organisms such as “birds” or “buffaloes,” or events like “birthday parties.” They may
also represent properties (such as “red” or “large”), abstractions (such as “truth” or
“love”), relations (such as “smarter than”), procedures (such as how to tie your shoes),
or intentions (such as the intention to break into a conversation) (Smith & Medin,
1981). But because concepts are mental structures, we cannot observe them directly.
For the cognitive scientist, this means inferring concepts from their influence on behav-
ior or on brain activity. For example, you cannot be sure another person shares your
concept of “fun,” but you can observe whether he or she responds the same way you
do to stimuli you interpret as “fun.”
Two Kinds of Concepts Everyone conceptualizes the world in a unique way, so
our concepts define who we are. Yet, behind this individual uniqueness lie similarities
in the ways we all form concepts. In particular, we all distinguish between natural
concepts and artificial concepts (Medin et al., 2000).
Natural concepts are imprecise mental categories that develop out of our everyday
experiences in the world. You possess a natural concept of “bird” based on your ex-
periences with birds, which in turn invokes a mental prototype, a generic image rep-
resenting a typical bird from your experience (Hunt, 1989). To determine whether
an object is a bird or not, you mentally compare it to your bird prototype—and the
closer it matches, the quicker you can make your decision. Most people take less time
to recognize an eagle as a bird than a penguin, for example (Rips, 1997). Our personal
prototypes encompass all kinds of natural concepts, including friendship, intimacy,
and sex. And, for all these, one person’s prototype might differ from that of someone
else, which can create the basis for misunderstanding in our relationships. Natural
concepts are sometimes called “fuzzy concepts” because of their imprecision (Kosko &
Isaka, 1993).
By comparison, artificial concepts are defined by a set of rules or characteristics, such
as dictionary definitions or mathematical formulas. The definition of “rectangle” is an
example. Artificial concepts represent precisely defined ideas or abstractions rather
than actual objects in the world. So, if you are a zoology major, you may also have an
artificial concept of “bird,” which defines it as a “feathered biped.” In fact, most of the
concepts you learn in school are artificial concepts—such as “cognitive psychology,”
and even the concept of “concept”!
Concept Hierarchies We organize much of our declarative memory into concept
hierarchies, arranged from general to specific, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. For most
people, the broad category of “animal” has several subcategories, such as “bird” and
“fish,” which are divided, in turn, into specific forms, such as “canary,” “ostrich,”
“shark,” and “salmon.” The “animal” category may itself be a subcategory of the still
larger category of “living beings.” Also, we can often link each category to a variety of
other concepts: For example, some birds are edible, some are endangered, and some
are national symbols. In this way, our concept hierarchies are often intricate webs of
concepts and associations.
concepts Mental groupings of similar objects,
ideas, or experiences.
natural concepts Mental representations of
objects and events drawn from our direct experience.
prototype An ideal or most representative example
of a conceptual category.
artificial concepts Concepts defined by rules,
such as word definitions and mathematical formulas.
concept hierarchies Levels of concepts, from
most general to most specific, in which a more general
level includes more specific concepts—as the concept
of “animal” includes “dog,” “giraffe,” and “butterfly.”
Your natural concept of “bird” involves
a prototype that is probably more like an
eagle than a penguin. Hence, you would
likely classify an eagle as a bird faster than
you would a penguin. Biology majors, how-
ever, may also have an artificial concept of
“bird” that works equally well for both.

What Are the Components of Thought? 217
Culture, Concepts, and Thought Concepts can carry vastly different meanings in
different cultures. For example, the concepts of “democracy” and “freedom,” so dear
to Americans, may have the connotation of chaos, excess, and rudeness in parts of Asia
and the Middle East.
Americans also differ from many Asians in the ways they deal with conflicting ideas
and contradictions (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). We can see this in the way the Chinese
have dealt with the conflicting ideologies of capitalism and communism by allowing
elements of both to flourish in their economy, an approach many Americans find diffi-
cult to understand. The Chinese culture encourages thinkers to keep opposing perspec-
tives in mind and seek a “middle way,” while American culture tends toward thinking
in more polarized “either-or” terms—capitalism or communism.
Another big cultural difference involves the use of logic: Many cultures do not
value the use of logical reasoning as much as do Europeans and North Americans
(Bower, 2000a; Nisbett et al., 2001). Some seek “truth” by comparing new ideas with
the wisdom of sacred writings, such as the Koran, the Bible, or the Upanishads. Even
in the United States, many people place higher value on qualities variously known as
“common sense,” which refers to thinking based on experience rather than on logic.
What is the lesson to be learned from these cultural differences? While there are
some universal principles of thought that cut across cultures, they involve very basic
processes, such as the fact that everyone forms concepts. But when it comes to how
they form concepts or the meaning they attach to them, we should be cautious about
assuming that others think as we do.
Imagery and Cognitive Maps
We think in words, but we also think in pictures, spatial relationships, and other sen-
sory images. Taking a moment to think of a friend’s face, your favorite song, or the
smell of warm cookies makes this obvious. Visual imagery adds complexity and rich-
ness to our thinking, as do images that involve the other senses (sound, taste, smell,
and touch). Thinking with sensory imagery can be useful when solving problems in
which relationships can be conveyed more clearly in an image than in words. That is
why texts such as this one often encourage visual thinking by using pictures, diagrams,
and charts. In fact, in MyPsychLab, you will find a concept mapping tool you can use
to map the concepts in every chapter—thus illuminating your understanding of them
both individually and in relation to each other.
FIGURE 6.1
Hierarchically Organized Structure
of Concepts
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Animal
Has skin
Can move around
Eats
Breathes
Salmon
Is pink
Is edible
Swims upstream
to lay eggs
Shark
Can bite
Is dangerous
Ostrich
Has long thin legs
Is tall
Can‘t fly
Canary
Can sing
Is yellow
Bird
Has wings
Can fly
Has feathers
Fish
Has fins
Can swim
Has gills
Map the Concepts at MyPsychLab

218 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
A cognitive representation of physical space is a special form of visual concept
called a cognitive map. Cognitive maps help you get to your psychology class, and en-
able you to give a friend directions to a nearby theater or deli. By using cognitive maps,
people can move through their homes with their eyes closed or go to familiar destina-
tions even when their usual routes are blocked. As you can see in Figures 6.2 and 6.3,
though, people’s cognitive maps can be vastly different. Just like other elements of
thinking, they are based on our unique perceptions.
Thought and the Brain
Developments in brain imaging have allowed cognitive researchers to begin mapping
the mind itself (Ashby & Waldron, 2000). Scientists can now connect certain thoughts,
such as “dog” or “pencil,” with specific electrical wave patterns in the brain (Garnsey,
1993; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992). They do this by repeatedly presenting a stimulus
(such as the word dog flashed on a screen) to a volunteer “wired” to record the brain’s
electrical responses. While the brain waves on just one trial may show no clear pattern, a
computer can average many brain wave responses to a single, repeated stimulus (such as
a tone or a visual image), eliminating the random background “noise” of the brain and
isolating the unique brain wave pattern evoked by that stimulus (Kotchoubey, 2002).
Other methods tell us which parts of the brain switch on and off while we think.
With PET scans, MRI, and fMRI, neuroscientists have identified brain regions that be-
come active during various mental tasks. Two broad conclusions have come from this
work. First, thinking is an activity involving widely distributed areas of the brain—not
just a single “thinking center.” Second, neuroscientists now see the brain as a com-
munity of highly specialized modules, each of which deals with different components
of thought (Cree & McRae, 2003). Moreover, the brain generates many of the images
used in thought with the same circuitry it uses for sensation. Thus, visual imagery
drawn from memory activates the visual cortex, while auditory memories engage the
auditory cortex (Behrmann, 2000). And thinking with language may involve different
regions, depending on the topic. One brain-imaging study found that most jokes tickle
us mainly in the language-processing areas of the cortex, while sound-alike puns acti-
vate the brain’s sound-processing circuits as well (Goel & Dolan, 2001). In general, the
picture of thought coming out of this work reveals thinking as a process composed of
many modules acting in concert.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Learning theorist Edward C.
Tolman suggested that we form
cognitive maps of our environment,
which we use to guide our actions
toward desired goals (p. 158).
FIGURE 6.2
Chicagocentric View of the World
How does this student’s sketch compare
with your view of the world?
Source: Solso, R. L. (1998). Cognitive Psychology.
Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Copyright © 1998 by
Pearson Education. Reprinted by permission of the
publisher.
This MRI scan shows how many dif-
ferent parts of the brain can be active
simultaneously.

What Are the Components of Thought? 219
The frontal lobes of the brain play an especially important role in coordinating men-
tal activity as we make decisions and solve problems (Helmuth, 2003a; Koechlin et al.,
2003). To do so, the prefrontal cortex (in the frontal lobes, just above your eyes) per-
forms three different tasks: keeping track of the episode (the situation in which we find
ourselves), understanding the context (the meaning of the situation), and responding to a
specific stimulus in the situation. Here’s how it works. Suppose you are driving to school,
and you pass a dog on the side of the road that appears to have been hit by another car.
The dog is clearly still alive but can’t seem to walk (the stimulus). What do you do? If it
were your neighborhood, and you recognized the dog, you would most likely stop and
help, perhaps by finding the dog’s owner or taking the dog to a vet. But what if you didn’t
live in that neighborhood and you didn’t know the dog? Or what if you had an exam in
the class you were trying to get to, and stopping to help might make you late—or even
miss the exam? What if you were afraid of dogs? These different contexts would figure
into your decision, all in just a few seconds. From a neuroscience perspective, the interest-
ing thing is that all these tasks are performed by different combinations of brain modules
that work together in seamless synchronicity. It’s an impressive and sophisticated system.
Intuition
Psychologists have long known that when people make decisions—even about buy-
ing a house or selecting a spouse—they sometimes make quick judgments based on
FIGURE 6.3
Australiocentric View of the World
Now who’s “down under”? It probably would not occur to most Americans to draw a map “upside down” like this one drawn by an Australian
student, placing Australia near the center of the world.
The maps we carry in our minds mirror the view of the world that we have developed from the perspective of our own culture. The maps you
see here and in the previous figure came from a study aimed at understanding how nearly 4,000 students from 71 cities in 49 countries visualize
the world. The majority of maps had a Eurocentric world view: Europe was placed in the center of the map and the other countries were arranged
around it—probably due to the dominance for many centuries of Eurocentric maps in geography books. But the study also yielded many interesting
culture-biased maps, such as the one by a Chicago student in Figure 6.2 and this one by an Australian student. American students, incidentally,
performed especially poorly on this task, often misplacing countries. Students from the former Soviet Union and Hungary made the most accu-
rately detailed maps (Saarinen, 1987).
Source: Solso, R. L. (1998). Cognitive Psychology. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Copyright © 1998 by Pearson Education. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

220 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
feelings as well as reason (Gladwell, 2005; Myers, 2002). This emotional component
of thinking—like many other complex cognitive tasks—involves the prefrontal cortex,
which unconsciously factors emotional “hunches” into our decisions in the form of
information about past rewards and punishments. Individuals with severe damage to
this area of the brain may display little emotion or have impairments in intuition—the
ability to make judgments without consciously reasoning. As a result, they frequently
make unwise choices when faced with decisions (Damasio, 1994).
But intuition is not always right. Sometimes our intuitive snap judgments, which
may feel like truth, are merely our prejudices and biases (Myers, 2002). That has been
shown to be true of executives, for example, who commonly overestimate the power
of their intuition by believing they are especially good judges of other people’s abilities
and character. Accordingly, they often rely exclusively on in-person interviews for hir-
ing, even though studies show they usually make better judgments when factoring in
objective data, such as educational levels and test scores (Dawes, 2001).
Sometimes, however, quick intuitive judgments can be surprisingly on target.
Dr. Nalini Ambady found that people make remarkably accurate judgments of a per-
son’s personality traits after viewing only a six-second video clip. Similarly, students’
quick judgments about a professor’s teaching effectiveness correlate highly with end-
of-course ratings (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993; Greer, 2005). Princeton psychologist
Daniel Kahneman suggests that intuition is an evolutionary invention that helped our
ancestors make snap judgments in difficult and dangerous situations (2003).
So, where do the seemingly contradictory findings about intuition leave us? The
accuracy of our intuition may depend on, for one thing, the context in which we use it.
In general, our “instincts” about personality are often correct—but, notes psychologist
Frank Bernieri, the serial killer Ted Bundy made a good first impression, demonstrating
that we do make occasional mistakes (Winerman, 2005c). When we “intuitively” make
statistical or numerical judgments, however, we are much more likely to be wrong, says
Kahneman. (How many English words end with r? Or how likely is it that I will be
killed by a terrorist?) We will examine some reasons for these particular errors in the
next few pages.
In addition to context, our intuition may also be more reliable in complex situa-
tions when time is limited: In those situations, our conscious processing skills—located
in our working memory—simply may not be capable of handling the complexity or
the number of factors that need to be quickly weighed. (Do you remember the “magic
number” of working memory?) Here’s an example: Participants in an experiment were
asked to choose the best of four apartments after reading a list of a dozen factors
about each one. The descriptions were designed to be both numerous and complex,
including both positive features (“it’s in a nice area”) and negative ones (“the landlord
is troublesome”). There were three experimental conditions: Some participants had to
choose right away, some were given several minutes to think carefully before choos-
ing, and some, after reading the information, were distracted for several minutes by a
tedious task before choosing. (It was this third condition that aimed to assess pure in-
tuition, because there was no opportunity for analysis.) The results were provocative.
Participants in the distracted (intuitive) group were far better at choosing the most
desirable apartment than either of the other groups (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Thus, in com-
plex situations involving time pressures or distractions, our intuition may be a better
guide than an incomplete attempt at logical analysis.
When time is not short, however, expertise does make a difference, as shown in a
study that compared experienced college students to novices in dealing with typical
college problems (Pretz, 2008). Yale seniors solved problems more effectively when
they thought through a problem than when they simply followed their intuition. Con-
versely, freshmen had more success with intuition. Researchers theorize that, when a
person has the expertise necessary to analyze a situation, intuition may impede clear
thinking. In the absence of experience, though, intuition trumps a clumsy attempt at
analysis.
The bottom line is this: It is important to recognize when we are making intui-
tive judgments and to consider the context, the time available, and our expertise in
intuition The ability to make judgments without
consciously reasoning.

What Are the Components of Thought? 221
that area. We must also be mindful that intuition can be wrong: As we saw in our
discussion of memory, confidence is not a reliable indicator of accuracy. For psycholo-
gists, the task that lies ahead may be to help us learn to use intuition more accurately
(Haslam, 2007). As one researcher suggests, in many situations, the best solution may
be to assess the facts, then hand them over to our unconscious. In that way, we may
learn to balance our use of analysis and intuition (Dijksterhuis, 2004).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Schemas and Scripts Help You Know What to Expect
Much of your knowledge is stored in your brain as schemas (Oden, 1987): clusters of
related concepts that provide a framework for thinking about objects, events, ideas, or even
emotions. So you probably have schemas that represent “school,” “Internet,” “vacation,”
“music,” and “fear.” Let’s look at some important ways that these schemas are used.
Expectations
Schemas are one of the attributes that Google and other search engines lack, so they have
no real understanding of “birthday” or “psychology” or “nonfat mocha.” But for us,
schemas provide contexts and expectations about the features likely to be found when
you encounter familiar people, situations, images, and ideas (Baldwin, 1992). For ex-
ample, to an airline passenger, the word terminal probably conjures up a schema that
includes scenes of crowds, long corridors, and airplanes. For a heart attack victim, how-
ever, the schema for terminal might include feelings of anxiety and thoughts of death.
And for an auto mechanic, terminal might mean a connection for a battery cable.
Making Inferences
New information, which is often incomplete or ambiguous, makes more sense when
you can relate it to existing knowledge in your stored schemas. So schemas enable you
to make inferences about missing information. Consider this statement:
Tanya was upset to discover, on opening the basket, that she’d forgotten the salt.
With no further information, what can you infer about this event? Salt implies
that the basket is a picnic basket containing food. The fact that Tanya is upset that
the salt is missing suggests that the food in the basket is food that is usually salted,
such as hard-boiled eggs or vegetables. You automatically know what other foods
might be included and, equally important, what definitely is not: Everything in the
world that is larger than a picnic basket and anything that would be inappropri-
ate to take on a picnic—from a boa constrictor to bronze-plated baby shoes. Thus,
the body of information you now have has been organized around a “picnic-
basket” schema. So by relating the statement about Tanya to your schema, the state-
ment gains meaning.
In a practical application of schema theory, researchers taught low-achieving math
students to classify word problems into a few different types. For example, one type
involved a “change” schema. The students learned that all “change” problems involve
a story, such as this one: “Rudy had three pennies, and his mother gave him four
more. How many does he now have?” They also learned common strategies for solv-
ing “change” problems. After several months of schema-based instruction, test results
showed these students had made tremendous gains in their math scores—enough to
move into the “above average” ranks (Jitendra et al., 2007). Classifying problems by
schema helped them gain access to effective strategies for solutions.
Schemas and Humor
Schemas also serve as the foundation for much of our humor (Dingfelder, 2006). We
often find things funny when they invoke two or more incongruous or incompatible
schemas at once. Consider this joke:
A horse walks into a bar, and the bartender says, “Why the long face?”
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
Piaget said that cognitive
development involves changes in
schemas (p. 282).
University of Chicago social psychologist
Joshua Correll created a video game with
images like this one to test respondents’
stereotypes. In the game, participants
had less than a second to decide if the
person in the image was carrying a gun,
a wallet, or a cell-phone, and press a
button to shoot or not to shoot. Mistakes
followed a clear pattern: Unarmed blacks
were more likely than unarmed whites
to be shot, demonstrating the power of
schemas and expectations in our thought
processes. Follow-up research indicated
that police officers made fewer mistakes
than civilians, and—for all participants—
practicing the game improved accuracy,
indicating that schemas can be revised
with conscious effort.

222 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
This brief (and possibly lame) joke features multiple incongruous schemas, includ-
ing (a) our knowledge that horses don’t frequent bars and (b) the confusion over the
horse’s long nose and the “long face” as a metaphor for sadness.
Not everything we find incongruous is funny, however. A person being struck by a
car on the sidewalk is not humorous. Generally, if the conflicting frames of reference
involve threat or if the situation holds a cherished belief up to ridicule, we won’t find
it funny. If, however, schemas in a joke demean someone whom we consider threaten-
ing, we may well find it humorous. This accounts for much humor that we call racist,
sexist, or political.
Scripts as Event Schemas
We have schemas not only about objects and events but also about persons, roles, and
ourselves. These schemas help us decide what to expect or how people should behave
in specific circumstances. An event schema or script consists of knowledge about se-
quences of interrelated, specific events and actions expected to occur in a certain way
in particular settings (Baldwin, 1992). We have scripts for going to a restaurant, taking
a vacation, listening to a lecture, going on a first date, and even making love. Conflict
can arise, however, when your script differs from that of someone else in your world.
Cultural Influences on Scripts
Scripts in other cultures may differ substantially from ours. For example, American
women living in conservative Arab countries often report that many behaviors they
take for granted at home—such as walking unescorted in public, wearing clothing
showing their faces and legs, or driving a car—are considered scandalously inappro-
priate by citizens of their host country. To maintain good relations, many women
change their behaviors to accommodate local customs. Similarly, Americans expect
visitors from other countries to conform to their preferred ways, such as tipping
servers 15 to 20 percent at a restaurant—far more than is customary in many other
countries.
The cultural diversity of scripts around the world is the result of each culture’s
unique schema for viewing the world, which includes its values. We tend to feel
comfortable with others who share our scripts because we see things the same
way and know what to expect (Abelson, 1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Unfor-
tunately, our discomfort with unfamiliar scripts can sometimes create divides, as
when people say, “I tried to interact, but it was so awkward that I don’t want to
try again” (Brislin, 1993). In our increasingly multicultural world, understanding
the power of scripts and schemas can help us be more open to others’ scripts and
more resilient in trying new ways to bridge the gaps—after all, variety is, they say,
the spice of life.
script A cluster of knowledge about sequences
of events and actions expected to occur in particular
settings.
Answers 1. An artificial concept. 2. Our example is animal, mammal, dog, cocker spaniel. Any such series forms a concept hierarchy, provided each
category includes the one that follows. Another example would be food, Italian food, pasta, spaghetti. 3. Knowing how to check out a book at the
library is an example of a script. So is any other procedure, such as knowing how to study for a test or how to boil an egg. 4. d
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: All of the following
are components of thought, except
a. concepts. c. schemas.
b. images. d. stimuli.
Study and Review at MyPsychLabCheck Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: A dictionary definition would be an example of
which kind of concept?
2. APPLICATION: Give an example of a concept hierarchy.
3. APPLICATION: Give an example of a script.

What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess? 223
6.2 KEY QUESTION
What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess?
The popularity of lotteries and casino games, in which chances of winning are small,
shows us that human thought is not always logical. Instead, we might say thinking is
psychological—which has some advantages. Departures from logic allow us to fanta-
size, daydream, act creatively, react unconsciously, respond emotionally, and generate
new ideas.
We are, of course, capable of careful reasoning. After all, our species did invent
that most logical of devices, the computer. Still, the psychology of thinking teaches us
we should not always expect people to behave in a strictly logical manner. This ability
to think psychologically enhances our ability to solve problems. And, as we will see,
good thinkers also know how to use effective thinking strategies and how to avoid
ineffective or misleading strategies. We will also see that psychological thinking is more
useful than mere logic because it helps us make decisions rapidly in a changing world
that usually furnishes us incomplete information. Our Core Concept puts all this in
more technical language:
Core Concept 6.2
Good thinkers not only have a repertoire of effective strategies, called
algorithms and heuristics, they also know how to avoid common
impediments to problem solving and decision making.
Problem Solving
Sergey Brin and Larry Page can certainly be called effective problem solvers. Likewise,
artists, inventors, Nobel Prize winners, great presidents, successful business executives,
world-class athletes, and high-achieving college students must be effective problem
solvers. What strategies do they use? No matter what their field, most successful prob-
lem solvers share certain characteristics. They, of course, possess the requisite knowl-
edge for solving the problems they face. In addition, they are skilled at (a) identifying
the problem and (b) selecting a strategy to attack the problem. In the next few pages,
we will examine these two skills with the aid of some examples.
Identifying the Problem A good problem solver learns to consider all relevant possi-
bilities without leaping to conclusions prematurely. Suppose you are driving along the
freeway and your car suddenly begins sputtering and then quits. As you coast to the
shoulder, you notice the gas gauge says “empty.” What do you do? Your action in this
predicament depends on the problem you think you are solving. If you assume you are
out of fuel, you may hike to the nearest service station for a gallon of gas. But you may
be disappointed. By representing the problem as “out of gas,” you may fail to notice a
loose battery cable that interrupts the supply of electricity both to the spark plugs and
to the gas gauge. The good problem solver considers all possibilities before committing
to one solution.
Selecting a Strategy The second ingredient of successful problem solving requires
selecting a strategy that fits the problem at hand (Wickelgren, 1974). For simple prob-
lems, a trial-and-error approach will do—as when you search in the dark for the key
to your front door. More difficult problems require more efficient methods. Problems
in specialized fields, such as engineering or medicine, may require not only specialized
knowledge but also special procedures or formulas known as algorithms. In addition,
expert problem solvers have a repertoire of more intuitive, but less precise, strategies
called heuristics. Let’s look more closely at both of these methods.

224 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
Algorithms Whether you are a psychology student or a rocket scientist, selecting the
right algorithms will guarantee correct solutions for many of your problems. What are
these never-fail strategies? Algorithms are nothing more than formulas or procedures,
like those you learned in science and math classes. They can help you solve particular
kinds of problems for which you have all the necessary information. For example,
you can use algorithms to balance your checkbook, figure your gas mileage, calculate
your grade-point average, and make a call on your cell phone. If applied correctly, an
algorithm always works because you merely follow a step-by-step procedure that leads
directly from the problem to the solution.
Despite their usefulness, however, algorithms will not solve every problem you face.
Problems involving subjective values or having too many unknowns (Will you be hap-
pier with a red car or a white car? Which is the best airline to take to Denver?) and
problems that are just too complex for a formula (How can you get a promotion?
What will the fish bite on today?) do not lend themselves to the use of algorithms. That
is why we also need the more intuitive and flexible strategies called heuristics.
Heuristics Everyone makes a collection of heuristics while going through life. Examples:
“Don’t keep bananas in the refrigerator.” “If it doesn’t work, see if it’s plugged in.” “Feed
a cold and starve a fever” (or is it the other way around?). Heuristics are simple, basic
rules—so-called “rules of thumb” that help us cut through the confusion of complicated
situations. Unlike algorithms, heuristics do not guarantee a correct solution, but they often
start us off in the right direction. Some heuristics require special knowledge, such as train-
ing in medicine or physics or psychology. Other heuristics, such as those you will learn
in the following paragraphs, are more widely applicable—and well worth remembering.
Some Useful Heuristic Strategies Here are three essential heuristics that should be
in every problem solver’s tool kit. They require no specialized knowledge, yet they can
help in a wide variety of puzzling situations. The common element shared by all three
involves approaching the problem from a different perspective.
Working Backward Some problems, such as the maze seen in Figure 6.4, baffle us
because they present so many possibilities we don’t know where to start. A good way to
attack this sort of puzzle is by beginning at the end and working backward. (Who says
we must always begin at the beginning?) This strategy can eliminate some of the dead
ends we would otherwise encounter by trial and error. In general, working backward
offers an excellent strategy for problems in which the goal is clearly specified, such as
mazes or certain math problems. In the larger world, police officers and investigators
often work backward to solve crimes. By starting at the scene of the crime—where
the event “ended”—and gathering information based on evidence and witness state-
ments, the potential pool of suspects is narrowed down considerably. With fingerprints
and sketches of the assailant in hand, investigators can focus their efforts accordingly,
working backward as they follow clues to the origin (Lesgold, 1988).
Searching for Analogies If a new problem is similar to one you have faced before, you
may be able to employ a strategy you learned previously. The trick is to recognize
the similarity, or analogy, between the new problem and the old one (Medin & Ross,
1992). For example, if you are an experienced cold-weather driver, you use this strat-
egy to decide whether to install tire chains on a snowy day: “Is the snow as deep as it
algorithms Problem-solving procedures or
formulas that guarantee a correct outcome, if correctly
applied.
heuristics Cognitive strategies or “rules of
thumb” used as shortcuts to solve complex mental
tasks. Unlike algorithms, heuristics do not guarantee a
correct solution.
FIGURE 6.4
Working Backward
Mazes and math problems often lend
themselves to the heuristic of working
backward. Try solving this maze, as the
mouse must do, by starting at what would
normally be the finish (in the center) and
working backward to the start.

What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess? 225
was last time I needed chains?” Even very complex problems may yield to this strategy.
The cracking of the genetic code was assisted by the analogy of the DNA molecule
being shaped like a spiral staircase.
Breaking a Big Problem into Smaller Problems Are you facing a huge problem, such as
an extensive term paper or a messy house? The best strategy may be to break the big
problem into smaller, more manageable steps, often called subgoals. In writing a pa-
per, for example, you might break the problem into the steps of selecting a topic, do-
ing your library and Internet research, outlining the paper, writing the first draft, and
revising the paper. In this way, you begin to organize the work and develop a plan for
each part of the problem. Tackling the problem in a step-by-step fashion makes big
problems seem more manageable. In fact, the Wright brothers deliberately used this
heuristic to break down their problem of powered human flight into its components.
By using a series of kites, gliders, and models, they studied the component problems of
lift, stability, power, and directional control. Later, they put their discoveries together
to solve the larger problem of powered human flight (Bradshaw, 1992).
Obstacles to Problem Solving Having a good repertoire of strategies is essential to
successful problem solving, but people often get stuck when they latch onto an ineffec-
tive strategy and won’t let go. For this reason, problem solvers must learn to recognize
obstacles that demand a new approach. Here are some of the most troublesome
obstacles problem solvers face.
Mental Set Have you ever studied for a new class the same way you studied effectively
for a previous class—but in the new class, your old study methods didn’t work at all,
and as a result you did poorly on an exam? If so, psychologists would say you had an
inappropriate mental set—the tendency to respond to a new problem in the same way
you approached a similar problem previously. You “set” your mind on a strategy, but
chose the wrong analogy, schema, or algorithm. You can see for yourself another type
of mental set in the Do It Yourself! box on this page.
The rapid advance of technology offers us many opportunities to get stuck in men-
tal sets—and an equal number of opportunities to practice overcoming them. Most of
your professors, for example, probably delight in having broad Internet access to virtu-
ally unlimited sources of academic information: Their mental sets for preparing a new
lecture may no longer include trips to the library, since they can access almost anything
online. And if you’ve ever thought, “Oh, no, now I can’t turn in my paper on time!”
when your printer died the morning the paper was due, your obsolete mental set may
have interfered with your recognition of an alternate solution: that you could save the
paper on a flash drive and print it out at school instead.
mental set The tendency to respond to a new
problem in the manner used for a previous problem.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Kohler’s chimp, Sultan, demonstrated
the limitations of mental set when
he, at first, couldn’t figure out a way
to reach a banana high above him—
because previous strategies he
had used successfully didn’t work.
Sultan’s case also illustrates what
is often a solution to the mental set
barrier: insight, which often occurs
spontaneously when we mentally
step back from the problem in
hopes of seeing it from a novel
perspective (p. 157).
OVERCOMING MENTAL SETS
Each of the groups of letters in the col-
umns below is a common but scrambled
word. See if you can unscramble them:
nelin frsca raspe tnsai
ensce peshe klsta epslo
sdlen nitra nolem naoce
lecam macre dlsco tesle
slfal elwha hsfle maste
dlchi ytpar naorg egran
neque htmou egsta eltab
Check your answers against the key on
page 227.
Most people, whether they realize it
or not, eventually solve the scrambled word
problem with an algorithm by rearranging
the order of the letters in all the words in
the same way, using the formula 3-4-5-2-1.
Thus,
n e l i n becomes l i n e n
1 2 3 4 5 3 4 5 2 1
Notice, however, that by using that
algorithm, your answers for the last two col-
umns won’t agree with the “correct” ones
given on page 227. The mental set you
developed while working on the first two
columns prevented you from seeing there
is more than one answer for the last 14
items. The lesson of this demonstration is
that a mental set can make you limit your
options without realizing you have done so.
While a mental set may produce results,
you should occasionally stop to ask yourself
whether you have slipped into a rut that
prevents your seeing another answer. (Now,
can you find some other possible answers
to the scrambled words in the last two
columns?)

226 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
Functional Fixedness A special sort of mental set occurs when you think you need a
screwdriver but don’t realize you could tighten the bolt with a dime. Psychologists call
this functional fixedness. Under this condition, the function of a familiar object becomes
so set, or fixed, in your mind that you cannot see a new function for it. To illustrate,
consider this classic problem:
Your psychology professor has offered you $5 if you can tie together two
strings dangling from the ceiling without pulling them down (see Figure 6.5).
But when you grab the end of one string and pull it toward the other one, you
find that you cannot quite reach the other string. The only objects available to
you in the room are on the floor in the corner: a Ping-Pong ball, five screws, a
screwdriver, a glass of water, and a paper bag. How can you reach both strings
at once and tie them together?
If you want to figure this out for yourself, don’t read this paragraph
until you’ve tried to solve the problem. In this problem, you may have had
functional fixedness with regard to the screwdriver. Did you realize that you
could use the screwdriver as a pendulum weight to swing one of the strings
toward you?
Self-Imposed Limitations We can be our own worst enemies when we
impose unnecessary limitations on ourselves. The classic nine-dot prob-
lem in Figure 6.6 illustrates this neatly. To solve it, you must connect all
nine dots with no more than four connecting straight lines—and without
lifting your pencil from the paper. The instructions allow you to cross a
line, but you may not retrace a line.
Hint: Most people who confront this problem impose an unnecessary
restriction on themselves by assuming they cannot draw lines beyond
the square made by the dots. Literally, they don’t “think outside the box.”
Figure 6.7 gives two possible correct answers. Translating this into personal terms, we
find many instances in which people impose unnecessary restrictions on themselves.
Students may assume that they have no talent for math or science—thereby eliminating
the possibility of a technical career. Or because of gender stereotypes, a man may never
consider he could be a secretary or a grade school teacher, and a woman may assume
she must be a nurse rather than a doctor. What real-life problems are you working on in
which you have imposed unnecessary limitations on yourself?
Other Obstacles There are many other obstacles to problem solving that we will sim-
ply mention rather than discuss in detail. These include lack of specific knowledge
required by the problem, lack of interest, low self-esteem, fatigue, and drugs (even legal
drugs such as cold medicines or sleeping pills). Arousal and its accompanying stress
create another stumbling block for would-be problem solvers. When you study emo-
tion and motivation later in this book, you will see there is an optimum arousal level
for any task, be it basketball, brain surgery, or bartending. Beyond that critical point,
further arousal causes performance to deteriorate. Thus, moderate levels of arousal
actually facilitate everyday problem solving, but high stress levels can make problem
solving impossible.
In general, we humans are thinkers who readily jump to conclusions, based on
our knowledge but also biased by our knowledge—as well as our motives, emotions,
and perceptions. In view of this, it is surprising that our thinking so often serves us
well in day-to-day life. Yet, from another perspective it makes perfect sense; most of
our problem-solving efforts draw on past experience to make predictions about fu-
ture rewards or punishments. This, of course, is exactly what operant conditioning is
all about—which suggests this mode of thinking is a fundamental part of our nature.
Many of the “flaws” in our reasoning abilities, such as mental sets, are actually adap-
tive (but necessarily imperfect) strategies that help us apply previous experience to
solve new problems.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 5
Compare functional fixedness
with proactive interference
(p. 197).
FIGURE 6.5
The Two-String Problem
How could you tie the two strings together
using only the objects found in the room?
FIGURE 6.6
The Nine-Dot Problem
Can you connect all nine dots with four
connecting straight lines without lifting
your pencil from the paper?
Source: Adapted from Wickelgren, W. A. (1974).
Can you solve it? How to solve mathematical
problems: elements of a theory of problems and
problem solving. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Copyright © 1974 by W. H. Freeman and Company.
Reprinted by permission of Dover Publications.
functional fixedness The inability to perceive
a new use for an object associated with a different
purpose; a form of mental set.

What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess? 227
Judging and Making Decisions
Whether you are a student, professor, or corporate president, you make decisions every
day. “How much time do I need to study tonight?” “What grade does this paper de-
serve?” “How much should I invest?” Each decision is the solution to a problem—for
which there may not be a clear answer, but instead requires judgment. Unfortunately,
especially for those who have not studied the psychology of decision making, judgment
can be clouded by emotions and biases that interfere with critical thinking. Let’s exam-
ine the most common of these causes of poor judgment.
Confirmation Bias Suppose Tony has strong feelings about raising children: “Spare
the rod and spoil the child,” he says. How do you suppose Tony will deal with the
news that punishment can actually encourage aggressive behavior? Chances are
confirmation bias will cause him to ignore or find fault with information that doesn’t
fit his opinions while seeking and remembering information with which he agrees. He
may tell tales of spoiled children who didn’t get punishment for their transgressions
or of upstanding adults, like himself, who owe their fine character to harsh discipline.
A great deal of evidence shows the confirmation bias is a powerful and all-too-human
tendency (Aronson, 2004; Nickerson, 1998). In fact, we all act like Tony sometimes,
especially when we hold strong opinions.
Hindsight Bias A friend tells you he wrecked his car when he was texting while driv-
ing. ”I can’t believe it,” he says, “It was just for a few seconds!” Your reply? “You
should have known not to text when you’re driving—haven’t you read the studies that
show you’re almost guaranteed to get in an accident eventually?” Besides being an
insensitive friend, you are guilty of the hindsight bias, sometimes called the “I-knew-it-
all-along effect” (Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Just as guilty of hind-
sight bias are the Monday morning quarterbacks who know what play should have
been called at the crucial point in yesterday’s big game. This form of distorted think-
ing appears after an event has occurred and people overestimate their ability to have
predicted it. Examples in the news abounded after 9/11, after the Arizona shooting of
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, and after every election.
The problem with hindsight bias is that it impedes our ability to learn from our mis-
takes: After all, anytime we’re sure we “knew it all along,” we are ignoring an opportunity
to improve our judgment next time by recognizing our errors this time. A recent study
of international investment bankers found hindsight bias coloring bankers’ recollections
of their accuracy in predicting stock prices—and the bankers most guilty of the bias also
earned the fewest performance bonuses, indicating a correlation between a tendency for
hindsight bias and for poor performance (Biais & Weber, 2009). In other words, being
swayed by hindsight bias may increase our chances of repeating the same mistake.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Confirmation bias makes us pay
attention to events that confirm
our beliefs and ignore evidence
that contradicts them (p. 8).
hindsight bias The tendency, after learning
about an event, to “second guess” or believe that one
could have predicted the event in advance.
linen
scene
lends
camel
falls
child
queen
scarf
sheep
train
cream
whale
party
mouth
pears
talks
melon
colds
shelf
groan
gates
stain
poles
canoe
steel
meats
anger
bleat
Unscrambled Words (from page 225)
The words you found to solve the scrambled
word problem may not jibe with the ones
listed here—especially the third and fourth
columns. Most people, whether they are
aware of it or not, develop an algorithm as
they work on the first two columns. While the
formula will work on all the words, it becomes
a mental set that interferes with the problem
solver’s ability to see alternative solutions for
the words in the last two columns.

228 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
Anchoring Bias Ask a few of your friends, one at a time, to give a quick, off-the-top-
of-the-head guess at the answer to the following simple math problem:
1 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 5 3 6 3 7 3 8 5 ?
Make them give you an estimate without actually doing the calculation; give them
only about five seconds to think about it. Then, pose the problem in reverse to some
other friends:
8 3 7 3 6 3 5 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 1 5 ?
Are the results different for the two groups?
Nobody will give precisely the right answer, of course, but it’s likely that your
friends will respond as volunteers did in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s (2000)
experiment. It turns out the answers to such questions, where people usually don’t
have a good “ballpark” answer, depend on whether the problem begins with larger
or smaller numbers. Those who saw the first problem gave a lower estimate than did
those given the second problem. In Kahneman and Tversky’s study, the average answer
for the first group was 512, while the average for the second group was 2,250. Ap-
parently, their “first impression”—larger or smaller numbers at the beginning of the
problem—biased their responses. Incidentally, the correct answer (40,320) was larger
than either group had imagined.
Kahneman and Tversky have explained the difference between the two groups on
the basis of an anchoring bias. That is, people apparently use this flawed heuristic to
“anchor” their thinking to the higher or lower numbers that appear at the beginning of
the problem. The anchoring bias can affect our real-world decisions, as those who sell
automobiles and real estate know well: What we ultimately decide to pay for a car or a
house depends on the price and condition of the first item we are shown.
Representativeness Bias If you assume blondes are mentally challenged or
ministers are prudish or math professors are nerdish, your judgment is clouded by
representativeness bias. Why do people succumb to such prejudices? Mere convenience:
The representativeness bias simplifies the task of social judgment. Once something is “cat-
egorized,” it shares all the features of other members in that category. The fallacy in this
heuristic, of course, is that people, events, and objects do not “belong” to categories simply
because we find it mentally convenient to give them labels. By relying on category mem-
berships to organize our experiences, we risk ignoring or underestimating the tremendous
diversity of individual cases and complexity of people.
When estimating the likelihood that a specific individual belongs to a certain
category—“vegetarian,” for example—we look to see whether the person possesses
features found in a typical category member. For example, is your new acquaintance,
Holly, a vegetarian? Does she resemble your prototype of a “typical” vegetarian? Per-
haps you believe most vegetarians wear sandals, ride bicycles, and support liberal so-
cial causes. If so, you might judge that Holly represents enough of the characteristics of
your concept of “vegetarians” to belong to the same group.
anchoring bias A faulty heuristic caused by
basing (anchoring) an estimate on a completely
irrelevant quantity.
representativeness bias A faulty heuristic
strategy based on the presumption that, once people
or events are categorized, they share all the features of
other members in that category.
FIGURE 6.7
Two Solutions to the Nine-Dot Problem
Source: Adapted from Wickelgren, W. A. (1974).
Can you solve it? How to solve mathematical
problems: elements of a theory of problems and
problem solving. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Copyright © 1974 by W. H. Freeman and Company.
Reprinted by permission of Dover Publications.

What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess? 229
But such an analysis is not entirely reasonable. Although some—perhaps many—
vegetarians wear sandals, ride bicycles, and hold liberal views, the opposite may not be
true: Because vegetarians are a minority group in the general population, it is unlikely
that any particular individual who supports liberal social causes, wears sandals, and
rides a bicycle is also vegetarian. That is, by ignoring the base rate information—the
probability of a characteristic occurring in the general population—you have drawn
an erroneous conclusion. While your representativeness bias—judging Holly by what
seems to be her “type”—may not have dire consequences in this case, the same error
underlies the more serious stereotypes and prejudices that result when people classify
others solely on the basis of group membership.
Availability Bias Which is riskier: Traveling by car or by plane? Statistically, you are far
more likely to be killed in an auto accident than in a plane crash, and most of us know
this in our rational brains. Yet, why do we fear flying more than driving? The availability
bias reflects our tendency to judge probabilities of events by how readily examples come
to mind, and media coverage of plane crashes takes center stage with its vivid images—
even though you are far more likely to die crossing the street than in a plane crash (Bailey,
2006). The same bias makes some people more wary of a shark bite than a dog bite, and
more afraid of a terrorist attack than a heart attack. Similarly, people who watch a lot
of violent crime on television judge their chances of being murdered or mugged as being
much higher than do people who watch little television (Singer et al., 1984).
The Tyranny of Choice Not all decision problems stem from faulty heuristics; they can
also come from outside factors. To illustrate: Have you ever had trouble deciding among
a bewildering array of choices—perhaps in buying a car, a computer, or even a tube of
toothpaste? Too many choices can interfere with effective decision making, sometimes
to the point of immobilizing us. For example, when Sheena Sethi-Iyengar and her col-
leagues (2004) studied the choices employees made concerning matching contributions
to retirement funds, they found that too many alternatives could, in effect, make people
throw away free money. If employers offered to match employees’ contributions and
give them only two alternatives, 75 percent elected to participate. But when allowed to
select among 59 possibilities, the participation rate fell to 60 percent. Apparently, some
people just gave up. Psychologist Barry Schwartz (2004) calls this the tyranny of choice.
Schwartz says the tyranny of choice can create stress, especially for those who feel
compelled to make the “correct” decision or get the very “best buy.” The antidote, he
says, is “satisficing” rather than “maximizing.” Satisficers, says Schwartz, scan their op-
tions until they find one that is merely “good enough,” while maximizers stress them-
selves out by trying to make certain they have made the very best choice—perhaps
getting caught in “analysis paralysis” and not making a decision at all.
Decision Making and Critical Thinking Much of the foregoing discussion should
have a familiar ring, because it involves critical thinking. In fact, one of the critical
thinking questions we pose in this book concerns biases, such as confirmation bias,
anchoring bias, and availability bias. In other words, critical thinkers are alert to these
common obstacles to problem solving.
In addition, we can now add a few more items to the list of critical-thinking skills
we discussed in previous chapters. Specifically, the critical thinker should know how to
identify a problem, select a strategy, and apply the most common algorithms and heu-
ristic strategies. Critical thinkers also know about the various biases common in judg-
ment and decision-making, and work to overcome them. All these skills can help you
take your thinking to the next level: to become an expert—or even a creative genius.
Becoming a Creative Genius
Everyone would agree that Einstein was a creative genius. So were Aristotle and
Bach. And we can make a case that Brin and Page, the Google guys, are geniuses, too.
But what about your Aunt Elisa, who does watercolors? Such questions illustrate
base rate information The probability of a
characteristic occurring in the general population.
availability bias A faulty heuristic strategy that
estimates probabilities based on the availability of
vivid mental images of the event.
tyranny of choice The impairment of effective
decision making when confronted with an overwhelm-
ing number of choices.
Shoppers face the tyranny of choice
when they must decide among similar
products. Psychologist Barry Schwartz
suggests quickly settling on one that
is “good enough” rather than wasting
time on “maximizing” a choice of little
importance.

230 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
the big problem in creativity research: Experts cannot agree on an exact definition
of creativity. Most, however, would go along with the slightly fuzzy notion that cre-
ativity is a process that produces novel responses to the solutions of problems. Most
would also agree that a “genius” is someone whose insight and creativity are greater
than those of ordinary folk. As with the idea of creativity, the boundary for genius is
not well defined.
Let’s follow the lead of psychologist Robert Weisberg, whose view of “genius”
departs from the commonly held assumption that geniuses are completely different
from the rest of us. In brief, he argues that geniuses are merely good problem solvers
who also possess certain helpful—but entirely human—characteristics.
Creative Genius as Not So Superhuman Here’s how Weisberg (1986) character-
ized most people’s assumptions about the quality we call “genius”:
Our society holds a very romantic view about the origins of creative achieve-
ments. . . .This is the genius view, and at its core is the belief that creative
achievements come about through great leaps of imagination which occur
because creative individuals are capable of extraordinary thought processes.
In addition to their intellectual capacities, creative individuals are assumed
to possess extraordinary personality characteristics which also play a role in
bringing about creative leaps. These intellectual and personality characteristics
are what is called “genius,” and they are brought forth as the explanation for
great creative achievements (p. 1).
But, according to Weisberg and some other scholars in this area (Bink & Marsh,
2000), there is surprisingly little evidence supporting this view. In fact, the notion that
creative geniuses are a breed apart may actually discourage creativity by making peo-
ple feel that real creativity lies out of their reach. A more productive view, suggests
Weisberg, portrays the thinking of people we call geniuses as “ordinary thought pro-
cesses in ordinary individuals” (p. 11). What produces extraordinary creativity, he says,
is extensive knowledge, high motivation, and certain personality characteristics—not
superhuman talents.
Knowledge and Understanding Everyone agrees with Weisberg on one point: The
most highly creative individuals have expertise or highly developed knowledge in their
fields (Ericsson et al., 2006). In fact, you cannot become highly creative without first
becoming an expert: having extensive and organized knowledge of the field in which
you will make your creative contribution. But such mastery is not easily achieved, be-
cause it requires a high level of motivation to sustain years of intense training and
practice. Studies indicate that about ten years of work, or 10,000 hours, are required
to become fully competent in virtually any field, whether it be skiing, sculpture, sing-
ing, or psychology (Ericsson et al., 1993; Gladwell, 2008). Oh, yes, and this rule also
applies to the field of computing, as in the case of Google founders Brin and Page.
Meanwhile, such factors as time pressures or an overly critical supervisor, teacher, or
parent can suppress the creative flow (Amabile et al., 2002).
Aptitudes, Personality Characteristics, and Creativity In opposition to Weisberg,
psychologist Howard Gardner (1993) argues that the extraordinary creativity we see
in the work of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, and others results not only from expertise
and motivation but also from certain patterns of abilities and personality characteris-
tics. Highly creative individuals, he says, have aptitudes—largely innate potentialities—
specific to certain domains. (These potentialities, of course, must be developed by
intensive study and practice.) Freud, for example, had a special facility for creating
with words and understanding people; Einstein was remarkably good at logic and
spatial relationships; and Picasso’s creativity arose from a combination of aptitudes
comprising spatial relationships and interpersonal perceptiveness.
creativity A mental process that produces novel
responses that contribute to the solutions of problems.
aptitudes Innate potentialities (as contrasted with
abilities acquired by learning).
There was no question but that Albert
Einstein was bright. He also had an in-
dependent streak, a sense of humor, an
intense interest in the complex problem
of gravity, and a willingness to restructure
the problem. And he sought the stimula-
tion of other physicists. But he probably
did not use thought processes that were
altogether different from those used by
other thinkers.
experts Individuals who possess well-organized
funds of knowledge, including the effective problem-
solving strategies, in a field.

What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess? 231
In addition to aptitudes, creative people usually possess a common cluster of per-
sonality traits, including the following (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Csikszentmihalyi,
1996):
• Independence. Highly creative people can resist social pressures to conform to
conventional ways of thinking, at least in their area of creative interest (Amabile,
1983, 1987; Sternberg, 2001). That is, they have the confidence to strike out on
their own. Because of this, perhaps, some creative people describe themselves as
loners.
• Intense interest in a problem. Highly creative individuals must also have an all-
consuming interest in their creative subject matter (Amabile, 2001), always tinker-
ing, often just in their minds, with problems that fascinate them (Weisberg, 1986).
External motivators, such as money or a Nobel Prize, may be attractive, but their
main motivators are internal. Otherwise they could not sustain the long-term
interest necessary for an original contribution.
• Willingness to restructure the problem. Highly creative people not only grapple with
problems but often question the way a problem is presented (Sternberg, 2001).
(Recall our earlier discussion about identifying the problem.) For example, stu-
dents from the School of the Art Institute of Chicago who later became the most
successful artists among their class members had one striking characteristic in
common: They were always changing and redefining the assignments given by
their instructors (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976).
• Preference for complexity. Creative people seem drawn to complexity—to what may
appear messy or chaotic to others. Moreover, they revel in the challenge of look-
ing for simplicity in complexity. Thus, highly creative people may be attracted to
the largest, most difficult, and most complex problems in their fields (Sternberg &
Lubart, 1992).
• A need for stimulating interaction. Creativity of the highest order almost always
grows out of an interaction of highly creative individuals. Early in their careers,
creative people usually find a mentor—a teacher who brings them up to speed in
their chosen field. Highly creative individuals may surpass their mentors and then
seek additional stimulation from others like themselves. Often, this means leaving
behind family and former friends (Gardner, 1993).
What is the take-home message? Those who have looked closely at creativity
agree on two main points. First, creativity requires well-developed knowledge—
often growing out of aptitudes—in the field in which the creative contribution will
be made. Second, high-level creativity requires certain personal characteristics,
such as independence and motivation to sustain an interest over a very long period
of time. This combination of qualities, then, may be your formula for becoming a
creative genius.
The Role of Intelligence in Creativity Is a high IQ necessary for one’s creativity or
to be a genius? The answer is a bit complicated. Low intelligence inhibits creativity—
although we will see there are some special cases, known as savants, who may have
a highly developed skill despite their mental handicaps. On the other end of the IQ
spectrum, we find that having high intelligence does not necessarily produce creativ-
ity: There are lots of very bright people who never create anything that could be called
groundbreaking or highly original and insightful. Thus, intelligence and creativity are
distinct abilities. We can find plodding, unimaginative persons at all IQ levels, and we
can find highly creative persons with only average IQ scores.
Robert Sternberg (2001) argues that creativity lies a step beyond IQ. In his view,
creativity requires a decision to go against the expectations of the crowd. This makes
creativity potentially achievable for anyone who chooses to adopt a creative attitude.
Most people will not do so, he says, for a variety of reasons, including an unwilling-
ness to take the necessary risks.

232 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
But we are, again, getting ahead of ourselves. To understand more deeply how cre-
ativity and intelligence are different, it will be helpful to know what intelligence is and
how it is measured . . . coming up in a couple of pages.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Obviously, experts are people who know a lot about a particular subject. Unlike a nov-
ice, an expert confronting a problem does not have to start from scratch. Experts often
see a solution quickly because they have seen many similar problems before. That is,
they are especially good at finding analogies.
Their secret lies in the way their knowledge is organized (Ericsson et al., 2006;
Ross, 2006). Characteristically, the novice possesses knowledge that is both limited
and unorganized, while experts have extensive knowledge organized into elaborate
“chunks” and schemas. We can see this quite clearly in a famous study of world-class
chess players.
A Study of Chess Experts
Dutch psychologist Adriaan de Groot found some striking differences when he com-
pared how well a group of grand master chess players and another group of merely
“good” players could remember a chess problem. When allowed five seconds to view
a configuration of pieces as they might appear on a chessboard during a match, grand
masters could reproduce the pattern far more accurately than those with less profi-
ciency (de Groot, 1965). Does that mean the grand masters had better visual memo-
ries? No. When confronted with a random pattern of pieces on the chess board—a
pattern that would never happen in a match—grand masters did no better than the
others. This suggests the experts were better able to draw on familiar patterns in mem-
ory (schemas, really), rather than trying to recall individual pieces and positions.
Expertise as Organized Knowledge
How do experts organize their knowledge? There is no easy formula. Through study
and practice, they develop both a fund of knowledge to apply to a problem and a
familiarity with the field’s common problems and solutions. That is, they know not only
the facts but also how the facts are interrelated and used (Bédard & Chi, 1992). Aside
from facts and specific skills they must learn, would-be-experts must also acquire a
repertoire of heuristics, or “tricks of the trade,” unique to their field of expertise. These
heuristics help them find solutions more quickly, without having to follow so many
blind leads (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Simon, 1992).
Practice versus Talent
Are experts born, or is expertise learned? The highest levels of skilled performance
requiring speed and accuracy of movement, as in athletics or music, seems to depend, in
part, on native ability (Ackerman, 2007; Simonton, 2001). Expertise in a field requiring
the mastery of a body of knowledge (think psychology, medicine, or medieval literature)
requires considerable study. There is evidence that people have differing aptitudes
for performing at the highest levels in any given field, but it is impossible to predict
in advance who has the requisite ability for a particular endeavor. At this point, the
important variables seem to be motivation and practice—much as we saw with creativity
(Ericsson & Charness, 1994).
Eventually, perhaps, the theories of multiple intelligences we will study later in this
chapter can give us some practical assistance. But for now, especially if you are at the
beginning of your college career, the best advice is to explore as many fields as you can
to find out where your passions lie. You are much more likely to work long and hard
on something you love.
Master chess players are better able than
novices to remember common patterns of
pieces on a chess board, indicating that
they use chunking to remember familiar
patterns. Incidentally, can you remember
how many hours or years experience it
generally takes for a person to become a
master in chess—or any other area?

How Is Intelligence Measured? 233
So, How Do You Become an Expert?
A supportive environment, with good teachers and mentors, helps (Barab & Plucker,
2002). Beyond that, it’s study and practice! But don’t just focus on the details. Learn
the important schemas and problem-solving strategies in your chosen field too.
What does this suggest for your learning of psychology and other disciplines? You
can take the first steps in developing your expertise in any subject by attending to the
way your professor and your text organize the information they present (Gonzalvo
et al., 1994). Consider such questions as the following:
• What terms does your psychology professor mention over and over? These might
be such concepts as “cognitive science,” “behaviorism,” “developmental,” or “theo-
retical perspectives.” For you they may be, at first, unfamiliar and abstract, but
for the professor they may represent the core of the course. Make sure you know
what they mean and why they are important.
• What concepts does the course syllabus emphasize? What terms are associated
with the main topics?
• Around what concepts is the textbook organized? You may be able to discern this
quickly by looking at the table of contents. Alternatively, authors may lay out the
organizing points in the preface. (In this book, we have attempted to help you
identify the organizing principles of each chapter in the form of Core Concepts.)
Identifying the organizing principles for the course will simplify your studying. This
makes sense, of course, in light of what you learned earlier about memory. Long-term
memory (as you will remember!) is organized by meaningful associations. Accordingly,
when you have a simple and effective way of organizing material, you create a frame-
work to help you store and retain it in long-term memory.
Answers 1. The mathematical formula for finding the area of a triangle is an example of an algorithm—as is any formula or procedure that always
gives the correct answer. 2. heuristics 3. a 4. Any four of the following are correct: independence, intense interest in a problem (high motivational
level), willingness to restructure problems, preference for complexity, need for stimulating interaction. 5. b
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: From your own experience, give an example of an
algorithm.
2. RECALL: Good problem solvers often use “tricks of the trade” or
“rules of thumb” known as .
3. APPLICATION: Which one of the following would be an example
of the confirmation bias at work?
a. Mary ignores negative information about her favorite political
candidate.
b. Aaron agrees with Joel’s taste in music.
c. Natasha refuses to eat a food she dislikes.
d. Bill buys a new RV even though his wife was opposed to the
purchase.
4. RECALL: List four personality characteristics commonly found in
highly creative people.
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Heuristic strategies
show that our thinking is often based on
a. logic rather than emotion.
b. experience rather than logic.
c. trial and error rather than algorithms.
d. creativity rather than genius.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
6.3 KEY QUESTION
How Is Intelligence Measured?
Psychologists have long been fascinated by the ways in which people differ in their
abilities to reason, solve problems, and think creatively. The assessment of individual
differences, however, did not begin with modern psychology. Historical records show

234 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
that sophisticated mental testing methods were used in ancient China. More than
2,000 years ago, the Chinese employed a program of civil service testing that re-
quired government officials to demonstrate their competence every third year at an
oral examination. Later, applicants were required to pass written civil service tests to
assess their knowledge of law, the military, agriculture, and geography. British dip-
lomats and missionaries assigned to China in the early 1800s described the selection
procedures so admiringly that the British, and later the Americans, adopted modified
versions of China’s system for the selection of civil service personnel (Wiggins, 1973).
Unlike the historical Chinese, however, modern Americans seem to be more
interested in how “smart” people are, as opposed to how much they have learned.
It is interest in this sort of “native ability” that spurred development of intelligence
testing as we know it today. But, despite the long history of mental testing and the
widespread use of intelligence tests in our society, the exact meaning of the term
intelligence is still disputed (Neisser et al., 1996). Still, most psychologists would
probably agree with the general definition we provided at the beginning of the
chapter—that intelligence is the mental capacity to acquire knowledge, reason, and
solve problems effectively. They would also agree that a complete picture of an indi-
vidual’s intelligence must be obtained from measurements across a variety of tasks.
They disagree, however, on exactly what mental abilities constitute intelligence and
whether they are many or few in number.
Everyone does acknowledge that intelligence is a relative term. That is, an
individual’s level of intelligence must be defined in relation to the same abilities in
a comparison group, usually of the same age range. Everyone also agrees that intel-
ligence is a hypothetical construct: a characteristic that is not directly observable but
must be inferred from behavior. In practice, this means that intelligence is measured
from an individual’s responses on an intelligence test. The individual’s scores are then
compared to those of a reference group. Exactly what these tests should assess is the
source of much controversy—and the focus of this section of the chapter.
Core Concept 6.3
Intelligence testing has a history of controversy, but most psycholo-
gists now view intelligence as a normally distributed trait that can be
measured by performance on a variety of tasks.
We begin our survey of intelligence and intelligence testing
by introducing you to the founders of intelligence testing.
Binet and Simon Invent a School Abilities Test
Alfred Binet (Bi-NAY) and his colleague Théodore Simon stepped
into history in 1904. At that time, a new law required all French
children to attend school, and the government needed a means
of identifying those who needed remedial help. Binet and Simon
were asked to design a test for this purpose. They responded
with 30 problems sampling a variety of abilities necessary for
school (see Figure 6.8). The new approach was a success: It did,
indeed, predict which children could or could not handle nor-
mal schoolwork.
Four important features distinguish the Binet-Simon ap-
proach (Binet, 1911):
1. They interpreted scores on their test as an estimate of current
performance and not as a measure of innate intelligence.
intelligence The mental capacity to acquire
knowledge, reason, and solve problems effectively.
FIGURE 6.8
Sample Items from the First Binet-Simon Test
• Name various common objects (such as a clock or
a cat) shown in pictures.
• Repeat a 15-word sentence given by the examiner.
• Give a word that rhymes with one given by the
examiner.
• Imitate gestures (such as pointing to an object).
• Comply with simple commands (such as moving a
block from one location to another).
• Explain the differences between two common
objects.
• Use three words (given by the examiner) in a
sentence.
• Define abstract terms (such as “friendship”).
On the original Binet-Simon test, a child was asked
to perform tasks such as the following:

How Is Intelligence Measured? 235
2. They wanted test scores used to identify children who needed special help, not
merely to categorize or label them as bright or dull.
3. They emphasized that training and opportunity could affect intelligence and
wanted to pinpoint areas of performance in which special education could help
certain children identified by their test.
4. They constructed the test empirically—based on how children were observed to
perform—rather than tying the test to a particular theory of intelligence.
Binet and Simon assessed French children of various ages with this test and first
computed an average score for children at each age. Then, they compared each
child’s performance to the averages for children of various ages The result of that
comparison yielded a score for each individual child, expressed in terms of mental
age (MA): the average age at which individuals achieve a particular score. So, for
example, when a child’s score was the same as the average score for a group of
5-year-olds, the child was said to have a mental age of 5, regardless of his or her
chronological age (CA), the number of years since birth. Binet and Simon determined
that students most needing remedial help were those whose MA was two years
behind their CA.
American Psychologists Borrow Binet and Simon’s Idea
Less than a decade after the French began testing school children, American psycholo-
gists imported the Binet-Simon test of school abilities and changed it into the form
we now call the IQ test. They did this by modifying the scoring procedure, expanding
the test’s content, and obtaining scores from a large normative group of people, including
adults. Soon “intelligence testing” was widely accepted as a technique by which Americans
were defining themselves—and each other.
The Appeal of Intelligence Testing in America Why did intelligence tests
become so popular in the United States? Three forces changing the face of the coun-
try in the early 20th century conspired to make intelligence testing seem like an or-
derly way out of turmoil and uncertainty. First, the United States was experiencing
an unprecedented wave of immigration resulting from global economic, social, and
political crises. Second, new laws requiring universal education—schooling for all
children—were flooding schools with students. And third, when World War I be-
gan, the military needed a way of assessing and classifying new recruits. Together,
these events created a need to assess large numbers of people (Chapman, 1988).
Intelligence was seen not only as a means of bringing order to the turbulence of
rapid social change but also as an inexpensive and democratic way to separate
those who could benefit from education or military leadership training from those
who could not.
One consequence of the large-scale group-testing program in America was that
the public came to accept the idea that intelligence tests could accurately differenti-
ate people in terms of their mental abilities. This acceptance soon led to widespread
use of tests in schools and industry. Another, more unfortunate, consequence was that
the tests reinforced prevailing prejudices. Specifically, Army reports suggested that dif-
ferences in test scores were linked to race and country of origin (Yerkes, 1921). Of
course, the same statistics could have been used to demonstrate that environmental
disadvantages limit the full development of people’s intellectual abilities. Instead, im-
migrants with limited facility in English (the only language in which the tests were
given) or even little understanding of how to take such tests were labeled as “morons,”
“idiots,” and “imbeciles” (terms used at the time to specify different degrees of mental
retardation).
While these problems are obvious to us now (with the help of hindsight), at the time
they were obscured by the fact that the tests accomplished what most people wanted:
They were simple to administer and provided a means of assessing and classifying
mental age (MA) The average age at which nor-
mal (average) individuals achieve a particular score.
chronological age (CA) The number of years
since the individual’s birth.

236 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
people according to their scores. Any awareness of bias or unfair treatment was likely
suppressed by emotional bias. As a result, the public generally perceived the tests as
objective and democratic.
The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale The most respected of the new American
tests of intelligence came from the laboratory of Stanford University professor Lewis
Terman. He adapted the Binet-Simon test for U.S. school children by standardizing its
administration and its age-level norms. The result was the Stanford-Binet Intelligence
Scale (Terman, 1916), which soon became the standard by which other measures of
intelligence were judged. Because it had to be administered individually, Terman’s test
was less economical than the group tests. Nevertheless, it was better suited for spotting
learning problems. Even more importantly, the Stanford-Binet test was designed both
for children and adults.
With his new test, Terman introduced the concept of the intelligence quotient (IQ), a term
coined originally by German psychologist William Stern in 1914. The IQ was the ratio of
mental age (MA) to chronological age (CA), multiplied by 100 (to eliminate decimals):
Mental Age
IQ 5 3 100
Chronological Age
Please follow us through the IQ equation with these examples: Consider a
child with a chronological age of 8 years, whose test scores reveal a mental age of
10. Dividing the child’s mental age by chronological age (MA/CA 5 10/8) gives
1.25. Multiplying that result by 100, we obtain an IQ of 125. In contrast, another
8-year-old child who performs at the level of an average 6-year-old (MA 5 6) has
an IQ of 6/8 3 100 5 75, according to Terman’s formula. Those whose mental age
is the same as their chronological age have IQs of 100, which is considered to be
the average or “normal” IQ.
Within a short time, the new Stanford-Binet test became a popular instrument in
clinical psychology, psychiatry, and educational counseling. With the publication of
his test, Terman also promoted his belief that intelligence is largely innate and measur-
able. The message, then, was that an IQ score reflected something fundamental and
unchanging about people.
Although the Stanford-Binet became the “gold standard” of intelligence testing, it
had its critics. The loudest objection was that it employed an inconsistent concept of
intelligence because it measured different mental abilities at different ages. For example,
2- to 4-year-olds were tested on their ability to manipulate objects, whereas adults were
tested almost exclusively on verbal items. Test makers heeded these criticisms, and, as
the scientific understanding of intelligence increased, psychologists found it increasingly
important to measure multiple intellectual abilities at all age levels. A modern revision
of the Stanford-Binet now provides separate scores for several mental skills.
Problems with the IQ Formula
An inherent problem in calculating IQ scores became apparent as soon as psycholo-
gists began to use their formula with adults. Here’s what happens: By the mid- to late
teenage years, gains in mental age scores usually level off as people develop mentally
in many different directions. Consequently, mental growth, as measured by a test,
appears to slow down. As a result, Terman’s formula for computing IQs makes nor-
mal children appear to become adults with mental retardation—at least as far as
their test scores are concerned! Note what happens to the average 30-year-old’s score
if mental age, as measured by a test, stays at the same level as it was at age 15:
Mental Age 15
IQ 5 5 3 100 5 50
Chronological Age 30
Psychologists quickly realized this paints an erroneous picture of adult mental abilities.
People do not grow less intelligent as they become adults (although their children some-
times think so). Rather, adults develop in different directions, which IQ scores do not nec-
essarily reflect. Prudently, psychologists decided to abandon the original IQ formula and
intelligence quotient (IQ) A numerical score
on an intelligence test, originally computed by divid-
ing the person’s mental age by chronological age and
multiplying by 100.

How Is Intelligence Measured? 237
seek another means of calculating IQs. Their solution was similar to the familiar practice
of “grading on the curve.” This famous curve demands some explanation.
Calculating IQs “on the Curve”
Behind the new method for calculating IQ lay the assumption that intelligence is nor-
mally distributed. That is, intelligence is assumed to be spread through the population
in varying degrees so that only a few people fall into the high or low ranges, while
most cluster around a central average. In this respect, intelligence is presumed to be
like many physical traits, including height, weight, and shoe size. If you were to mea-
sure any of these variables in a large number of people, you would probably get a set
of scores that follow the same “curve” teachers use when they grade “on the curve.”
Let us take women’s heights as an example.
Imagine you have randomly selected a large number of adult women and arranged
them in single-file columns according to their heights (everybody 59 tall in one column,
5910 in the next, 5920 in the next, and so on). You would find most of the women stand-
ing in the columns near the group’s average height (see Figure 6.9). Only a few would be
in the columns containing extremely tall women or extremely short women. We could
easily describe the number of women at each height by a curve that follows the bound-
ary of each column. We call this bell-shaped curve a normal distribution (or normal curve).
Applying this same concept to intelligence, psychologists find that IQ scores (like
the women’s heights we considered above) fit a normal distribution (see Figure 6.10).
More precisely, when IQ tests are given to large numbers of individuals, the scores of
those at each age level are normally distributed. (Adults are placed in a group of their
normal distribution (or normal curve) A
bell-shaped curve describing the spread of a charac-
teristic throughout a population.
FIGURE 6.10
The Normal Distribution of IQ Scores
among a Large Sample
Intelligence tests are usually designed to
make the scores fit a normal distribution,
with an average of 100. Within that distri-
bution, the normal range of IQs typically
spans scores of about 90 to 110—or about
fifty percent of the population. The “gifted”
and the “mentally retarded” ranges at op-
posite ends together account for less than
five percent of the population.
55 70 85 100
Wechsler IQ score
115 130 145
Mental retardation
generally involves a
score below about
70 points.
0.1% 0.1%
2% 2%
The “gifted” range
generally involves
IQ scores above
about 130 points.
Approximately two-thirds
of all people will fall
within 15 IQ points of the
average score of 100.
The “normal range”
is usually considered
to be between 90
and 110 points.
95%
68%
FIGURE 6.9
An (Imaginary) Normal Distribution of
Women’s Heights
The level of the curve at any point reflects
the number of women with that height.
4’9” 5’1” 5’5”
Average
5’9” 6’1”
”Normal”
range

238 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
own, regardless of age, and the distribution of their scores also fits the bell-shaped
curve.) Instead of using the old IQ formula, IQs are now determined from tables that
indicate where test scores fall on the normal curve. The scores are statistically adjusted
so the average for each age group is set at 100. Scores near the middle of the distri-
bution (usually between 90 and 110) are considered to be in the normal range, which
includes approximately 50 percent of the population (see Figure 6.11). At the extreme
ends of the distribution, scores below 70 are often said to be in the mentally retarded
range, while those above 130 are sometimes said to indicate giftedness.
Thus, IQ scores are no longer calculated by dividing mental age by chronological
age. The concept of a ratio expressed as a multiple of 100 (a percentage-like number
that is easy to understand) is retained, however. This solves the problem of calculating
adult IQs by comparing adults with adults.
But one more problem has surfaced—and remains unsolved. Much to everyone’s
chagrin, James Flynn noticed the average IQ score has gradually increased, at the rate
of about three points per decade, ever since the tests were invented—a fact obscured by
“renorming” the tests every few years to keep the average IQ at 100 (Flynn, 1987). If
taken at face value, this Flynn effect would mean that a person in the average range in
your great-grandparents’ time might be considered to have mental retardation today!
Flynn, along with most other observers, believes such a conclusion is absurd. What,
then, explains the effect (Flynn, 2003; Neisser et al., 1996)?
The gradual increase probably results from a combination of factors, includ-
ing better test-taking skills, greater complexity and mental stimulation in society
(everything from movies to games to computers to cell phones), more schooling,
and better nutrition. Flynn (2007) himself points out that different components
of intelligence have accelerated at different rates (with vocabulary, for example,
hardly budging at all), so part of the IQ gain can be explained by societies valuing
and encouraging factors that contribute to intelligence. For example, one question
asks, “How are a dog and a rabbit alike?” A century ago, says Flynn, the answer
would have been culture-specific: “You use dogs to hunt rabbits.” Now, he notes,
the correct answer would be “They are both mammals,” reflecting better abstract
thinking skills.
The Flynn effect, however, may be slowing down, at least in developed countries.
Since the mid-1990s, test scores in European samples have stabilized and in some cases
even declined somewhat (Teasdale & Owen, 2008). In lesser-developed countries,
however, IQ scores continue to increase (Colom et al., 2007; Daley et al., 2003). At
the same time, close examination of the Flynn effect since its beginning indicates the
average rise in IQ score is generally a result of significant increases in the lower-end
scores—but little or no increase in the upper range of scores (Teasdale & Owen, 1987).
Putting all these findings together leads some theorists to suggest the Flynn effect may
really be a mark of better equality in access to education, nutrition, and cognitive stim-
ulation. If that is true, we may see a narrowing of the IQ gap between developed and
developing countries in the decades to come.
IQ Testing Today
The success of the Stanford-Binet test encouraged development of other IQ tests. As
a result, psychologists can now choose from a wide array of instruments for mea-
suring intelligence. The most prominent of these alternatives are the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), and
the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI). With these in-
struments, psychologist David Wechsler offers a family of tests that measures many
skills presumed to be components of intelligence, including vocabulary, verbal com-
prehension, arithmetic ability, similarities (the ability to state how two things are
alike), digit span (repeating a series of digits after the examiner), and block design
(the ability to reproduce designs by fitting together blocks with colored sides). As
our Core Concept noted, these tests measure intelligence by assessing performance
on a variety of tasks.
normal range Scores falling near the middle of
a normal distribution. The normal range of IQ scores
is about 90–110 and includes about 50 percent of the
population.

How Is Intelligence Measured? 239
Like the Stanford-Binet, the Wechsler tests are individual tests. That is, they are
given to one person at a time. Also available are group tests of intelligence that can
be administered to large numbers of students simultaneously. Unlike the Stanford-
Binet and Wechsler tests, group tests consist of paper-and-pencil measures, involving
booklets of questions and machine-scored answer sheets. The convenience of group
tests—although not as precise as individual tests—has made IQ testing, along with
other forms of academic assessment, widespread. It is quite likely you have taken such
tests several times as you passed through grades 1 to 12, perhaps without realizing
what they were. The items in the Do It Yourself! box are similar to items in many of
these commonly used group tests of mental abilities.
What are IQ tests used for today? An IQ score assumes almost overwhelming
importance in determining whether a child has “mental retardation” or is “gifted”—
concepts we will examine more closely in the next Psychology Matters feature. Aside
from those uses, IQ tests figure most prominently in the diagnosis of learning disabili-
ties. The problem with that, says Dr. Jack Naglieri, is that IQ scores don’t tell us much
about which intervention strategies are likely to be effective with a given child (Benson,
2003a). To remedy this, Naglieri and others are developing tests that place less empha-
sis on a single number, such as IQ, and more on classifying people in ways that suggest
helping strategies, such as identifying reading problems, perceptual problems, or atten-
tion disorders.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
What Can You Do for an Exceptional Child?
As we have noted, mental retardation and giftedness lie at opposite ends of the intel-
ligence spectrum. As traditionally conceived, mental retardation occupies the IQ range
below 70—taking in scores achieved by approximately 2 percent of the population. Ar-
bitrarily, giftedness begins 30 points above average, at 130 points, comprising another
mental retardation Often conceived as repre-
senting the lower 2 percent of the IQ range, commenc-
ing about 30 points below average (below about 70
points). More sophisticated definitions also take into
account an individual’s level of social functioning and
other abilities.
giftedness Often conceived as representing the
upper 2 percent of the IQ range, commencing about
30 points above average (at about 130 IQ points).
SAMPLE IQ TEST ITEMS
Try your hand at the following items
adapted from group tests of intelligence.
Some of the items are more challenging
than others. You will find the correct
answers at the end.
VOCABULARY: Select the best defini-
tion for each word:
1. viable
a. traveled
b. capable of living
c. V-shaped
d. can be bent
2. imminent
a. defenseless
b. expensive
c. impending
d. notorious
ANALOGIES: Examine the relationship
between the first two words. Then, find an
answer that has the same relationship with
the word in bold letters:
3. Washington: Lincoln
July:
a. January
b. April
c. May
d. October
4. ocean: canoe
verse:
a. poem
b. pen
c. water
d. serve
SIMILARITIES: Which letter on the right
belongs to the same category as the one on
the left?
5. J A M S Z T
6. A S D U V X
SEQUENCES: Choose the answer that best
completes the sequence:
7. a z b y c x d?
e s u w f
8. 1 3 6 10 15?
16 18 21 27 128
MATHEMATICAL REASONING
9. Portland and Seattle are actually
150 miles apart, but on a map they
are 2 inches apart. If Chicago and
Norfolk are 5 inches apart on the
same map, what is the actual distance
between those two cities?
a. 125 miles
b. 250 miles
c. 375 miles
d. 525 miles
Answers 1. b 2. c 3. d (October comes after
July) 4. d (verse and serve have the same
letters) 5. S (the only one with a curve in it)
6. U (the only vowel) 7. W 8. 21 9. c

240 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
2 percent of the population. Bearing in mind all we have learned about limitations of
IQ tests, let’s take a brief look at these two categories.
Mental Retardation
The most current view of mental retardation deemphasizes IQ scores by focusing on
practical abilities to get along in the world (Robinson et al., 2000). In fact, the Ameri-
can Association of Mental Retardation now offers a definition of mental retardation
that does not even mention an IQ cutoff score. According to this new perspective, men-
tal retardation involves “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” that becomes
apparent before age 18. It also involves limitations in at least two of the following areas:
“communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work” (Turkington, 1993, p. 26).
Causes of Mental Retardation
Mental retardation has many causes (Daily et al., 2000; Scott & Carran, 1987). Some,
such as Down syndrome, are known to be genetic because we can point to a specific
genetically controlled defect. Some causes are purely environmental, as in fetal alcohol
syndrome, which involves brain damage incurred before birth, resulting from maternal
abuse of alcohol during pregnancy. Other environmental causes include postnatal ac-
cidents that damage the cognitive regions of the brain, or conditions of deprivation or
neglect that fail to give the developing child experiences needed for intellectual growth.
Some cases have no known cause.
Dealing with Mental Retardation
We have no cures, although research has found preventive measures for certain types
of mental retardation. For example, a simple test performed routinely on newborn
babies can identify a hidden genetic disorder known as PKU. If detected early, mental
retardation usually associated with PKU can be prevented by a special diet. More gen-
erally, genetic counseling, pregnancy care services, and education of new parents are
other preventive strategies (Scott & Carran, 1987).
Aside from prevention, special education programs help those with mental retarda-
tion learn vocational and independent living skills. Meanwhile, biological scientists
hope one day to treat genetically based forms of mental retardation with therapies just
now being conceived. For example, genetic treatment may involve splicing a healthy
gene into a benign virus to “infect” all the cells of a person with mental retardation
and replace the defective gene. At present, genetic treatments for certain physical dis-
eases are in experimental phases and are at least a few years away in the treatment of
mental retardation.
For now, what can you do if you have a child with mental retardation? Because the
nervous system is so immature at birth and so much physical and mental development
occurs during the first years of life, early interventions will have the greatest payoffs.
Psychological approaches involving sensory stimulation and social interaction can be
enormously important. With the benefit of an optimal educational program, gains of
up to 15 IQ points are possible (Robinson et al., 2000).
In fact, an enriched environment may be just as helpful to a child with mental
retardation as it is to a gifted child. Teams of special education teachers, speech
therapists, educational psychologists, physicians, and other specialists can devise
programs teaching persons with mental retardation to capitalize on the abili-
ties they have, rather than being held prisoner of their disabilities (Schroeder
et al., 1987). Behavior modification programs have been especially successful. As a
result, many citizens with mental retardation have learned to care for themselves
and acquired vocational skills enabling them to live independently (Landesman &
Butterfield, 1987).
Giftedness
At the other end of the intelligence spectrum are the “gifted,” with especially high IQs,
typically defined as being in the top 1 or 2 percent of the population (Robinson et al.,
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Down syndrome produces both
physical symptoms and mental
retardation; it arises from a
chromosomal defect (p. 47).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Behavior modification therapies
are based on behavioral learning
principles derived from operant and
classical conditioning (p. 568).
The Special Olympics offers children with
mental retardation (and others with dis-
abilities) an opportunity to capitalize on
their abilities and to build self-esteem.

How Is Intelligence Measured? 241
2000). But does a high IQ give its owner an advantage in life? A long look at gifted
individuals suggests that it does.
Terman’s Studies of Giftedness
The most extensive study of gifted individuals began in 1921 under the direction of
Lewis Terman, the same person who brought Binet and Simon’s IQ test to the United
States (Leslie, 2000). From a large pool of children tested in California schools, Ter-
man selected 1,528 children who scored near the top of the IQ range. His longitudinal
research program followed these children as they went through school and into adult-
hood. Periodically through their lives, Terman retested them and gathered information
on their achievements and adjustment patterns. The resulting decades of data revealed
much about the nature of giftedness. Almost uniformly, Terman’s gifted children ex-
celled in school—as one might expect from the strong correlation between IQ and
academic achievement. Terman also remarked on the good health and happiness of
children in his sample, although newer evidence suggests that highly gifted children are
susceptible to certain physical and psychological disorders (Winner, 2000).
As they moved into adulthood, the gifted group continued on the path of suc-
cess. An unusually high number of scientists, writers, and professionals emerged from
its ranks. Together they published more than 2,000 scientific articles, patented 235
inventions, and wrote 92 books. By middle age, more than 86 percent of the men in
Terman’s sample had entered high-status professions (Terman & Oden, 1959).
Yet, for all their achievements, no one in this high-IQ sample achieved the level of
an Einstein, a Picasso, or a Martha Graham. Nor did a high IQ guarantee wealth or
stature. In fact, many from Terman’s sample led ordinary, undistinguished lives. The
most visibly successful seemed to have, in addition to their high IQs, extraordinary
motivation and someone at home or at school who was especially encouraging to them
(Goleman, 1980; Oden, 1968)—some of the same characteristics found to be markers
of “genius.”
Dealing with Giftedness
Imagine you are the parent of a child with a very high IQ score, say 145. Which of the
following would be the best course of action?
• Enroll your child in special after-school classes.
• Hire a tutor to help the child with his or her homework.
• Send the child to a private school.
• Do nothing special.
What do experts say? Don’t rush out to enroll your child in special classes or provide
other “help” because of his or her IQ score (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Wong &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1991). Parents can destroy the spark of curiosity by pushing a child
toward goals that do not hold the child’s interest. Chances are you have already pro-
vided an environment in which your child’s native ability could thrive. So do not make
any rash and radical changes.
Above all, avoid making the child feel different because of his or her unusual
abilities and high IQ score. In part because of the personality traits common in gifted
children—especially a tendency to spend time alone, working on their interests—they
are already more likely than other children to suffer social and emotional disorders
(Winner, 2000). Nor should you feel smug about your genetic contribution to your
child’s intellect. Remember that intelligence involves a nature–nurture interaction—and,
besides, IQ tests sample only a small fraction of human abilities. Other people’s kids
may have equally amazing abilities in untested regions of their intellects. In fact, many
gifted individuals go unrecognized by schools because their outstanding talent shows
up primarily in art or music—domains in which formal abilities testing is rarely done.
Remember, also, that a high IQ is no guarantee of high motivation, high creativity,
or success in life. All it guarantees is an intellectual opportunity.
So, what should you do with a bright child? Nothing special that you would not
have done before you knew his or her IQ score.

242 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: One of Binet’s great ideas was the concept of mental
age, which he defined as .
2. APPLICATION: You tested a 12-year-old child and found a mental
age of 15. Using the original IQ formula, what is her IQ?
3. RECALL: A problem with the original IQ formula is that it gave a
distorted picture of the intellectual abilities of
a. adults.
b. children.
c. persons with mental retardation.
d. gifted students.
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: If intelligence is a
normally distributed characteristic, in what part of the distribution
would you expect to find most people’s scores on a test of
intelligence?
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
Answers 1. the average age at which individuals achieve a particular score. Or, in different words, mental age is determined by the average score
achieved by individuals of a particular chronological age. 2. 125. 3. a 4. Near the middle of the distribution
6.4 KEY QUESTION
Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities?
People who show aptitude in one area—language, for example—often score high on
tests of other domains as well, such as mathematics or spatial relationships. This fact
argues for the idea of a single, general intellectual ability. But there are some glaring ex-
ceptions, such as persons with savant syndrome. These rare individuals have a remarkable,
but limited, talent, such as the ability to multiply numbers quickly in their heads or de-
termine the day of the week for any given date, even though they are mentally slow in
other ways (Treffert & Wallace, 2002). Typically, they also show symptoms of autism
(Winner, 2000), as you may have seen in Dustin Hoffman’s classic portrayal of one
such person in the film Rain Man. Such cases raise a serious question about the whole
concept of a single, general intelligence factor. Obviously, there is no simple solution to
the question of one or many intelligences. Different psychologists have dealt with the
issue in different ways, as our Core Concept suggests:
Core Concept 6.4
Some psychologists believe that intelligence comprises one general
factor, g, while others believe that intelligence is a collection of
distinct abilities.
We will first examine this issue from the viewpoint of psychologists in the psycho-
metric tradition: those who have been interested in developing tests to measure mental
abilities. Following that, we will look at intelligence from the standpoint of cognitive
psychologists, who bring a fresh perspective to the problem.
Psychometric Theories of Intelligence
Psychometrics is the field of “mental measurements.” It is the psychological spe-
cialty that has given us most of our IQ tests, achievement tests, personality tests,
the SAT, and a variety of other assessment instruments. Many pioneers in psychol-
ogy, including Alfred Binet and Lewis Terman, carved their professional niches with
contributions to psychometrics. Yet another famous figure in this field was Charles
Spearman, a psychologist best known for his work suggesting that intelligence is a
single factor.
savant syndrome Found in individuals having a
remarkable talent (such as the ability to determine the
day of the week for any given date) even though they
are mentally slow in other domains.

Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities? 243
Spearman’s g Factor By the 1920s, there were many tests of intelligence available,
and British psychologist Charles Spearman (1927) found that individuals’ scores on
different tests tend to be highly correlated; in other words, those who score high on
one test also generally score high on others. These correlations, he said, point to a
single, common factor of general intelligence underlying performance across all intel-
lectual domains. Spearman did not deny that some people have outstanding talents or
deficits in certain areas. But, he said, these individual differences should not blind us
to a single general intelligence factor at work behind all our mental activity. Spearman
called this general intellectual ability the g factor. He assumed this general factor is in-
nate, and most psychologists at the time agreed with him (Tyler, 1988). More current
studies also find strong support for a g factor (Johnson et al., 2008), as well as evi-
dence of a significant innate component (Haworth et al., 2010).
Neuroscientists find some support for Spearman’s theory, too. Various tests of g
all point to certain regions of the brain, especially in the frontal lobes (Duncan et al.,
2000; Haier et al., 2004). Could these be the loci of g? Although some neuroscientists
think so, others believe this explanation oversimplifies both the nature of intelligence
and of the brain (McArdle et al., 2002; Sternberg, 1999, 2000). In general, psycholo-
gists accept the existence of a g factor but debate the parameters and meaning of what
it actually measures.
Cattell’s Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence Using sophisticated mathematical
techniques, Raymond Cattell (1963) determined that general intelligence can be bro-
ken down into two relatively independent components he called crystallized and fluid
intelligence. Crystallized intelligence, said Cattell, consists of the knowledge a person
has acquired, plus the ability to access that knowledge. Thus, crystallized intelligence
relates to the person’s ability to store and retrieve information from semantic memory.
It is measured by tests of vocabulary, arithmetic, and general information. In contrast,
Cattell proposed fluid intelligence as the ability to see complex relationships and solve
problems—abilities that involve algorithms and heuristics, which we discussed earlier
in this chapter. Fluid intelligence is often measured by tests of block design and spatial
visualization, tests that do not rely on the individual possessing certain “crystallized”
background information to solve a problem. For Cattell, both types of intelligence
were essential to adaptive living.
Cognitive Theories of Intelligence
Late in the 20th century, when the cognitive perspective emerged as a major force
in psychology, it produced some radical new ideas about intelligence. In brief, the
cognitive view of intelligence went well beyond the emphasis on vocabulary, logic,
problem solving, and other skills previously measured to predict school success (see
Table 6.1). Intelligence, said cognitive psychologists, includes cognitive processes un-
derlying success in many areas of life—not just school (Sternberg, 2000)—and thus is
much broader than the psychometric notion of intelligence. Instead of asking, “How
smart are you?” cognitive theories ask, “How are you smart?” We will focus on the
two most prominent of these cognitive theories.
Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory You may know someone who seems to have plenty of
“book smarts” but is not very successful in life, perhaps because they don’t get along well
with others or deal effectively with unexpected events. Psychologist Robert Sternberg
says they lack practical intelligence: the ability to cope with people and events in their
environment. Practical intelligence is sometimes called “street smarts,” although it ap-
plies just as well at home, on the job, or at school as it does on the street. At its core is
the ability to adapt to your environment, to shape an environment to suit your needs, or
to find an environment in which you can thrive. Self-awareness, or knowledge of your
strengths and limitations, is an important component of practical intelligence.
In contrast with practical intelligence, Sternberg calls the abilities measured by
most IQ tests analytical intelligence, relying on problem solving, rational judgment, and
g factor A general ability, proposed by Spearman,
as the main factor underlying all intelligent mental
activity.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 5
Much of our general knowledge
is stored in semantic memory, a
partition of long-term memory
(p. 185).
crystallized intelligence The knowledge a
person has acquired, plus the ability to access that
knowledge.
fluid intelligence The ability to see complex
relationships and solve problems.
practical intelligence According to Sternberg,
the ability to cope with the environment; sometimes
called “street smarts.”
analytical intelligence According to Sternberg,
the ability measured by most IQ tests; includes the
ability to analyze problems and find correct answers.

244 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
the ability to compare and contrast ideas. Your grades in college are likely to be closely
related to this logical reasoning ability.
Creative intelligence, Sternberg’s third type of intelligence, helps people develop new
ideas and see new relationships among concepts. Creative intelligence is what Picasso
used to develop the form of painting called Cubism and what Einstein used to formu-
late his theory of relativity. It is also the form of intelligence Sternberg used to develop
his new theory of intelligence.
Sternberg’s three-part formulation is often called the triarchic theory of intelligence,
because it combines three (tri = three) different kinds of intelligence. For Sternberg,
each of these abilities—practical intelligence, analytical intelligence, and creative
intelligence—is relatively independent of the others. That is, a person’s ability in one of
the three areas doesn’t necessarily predict his or her intelligence in the other two. Each
represents a different dimension for describing and evaluating human performance.
This theory suggests it is inaccurate to think of a single IQ score as summarizing
all that is important or valuable about people’s mental abilities (Sternberg, 1999;
Sternberg et al., 1995).
Recently, Sternberg and his colleagues (2003) put forth an additional element of
intelligence—namely, wisdom. For Sternberg, wisdom involves using one’s intelligence,
whether it be analytical, practical, or creative, toward a common good rather than a
selfish pursuit. For example, a car salesman who convinces a buyer to purchase a de-
fective car may demonstrate practical intelligence, but not wisdom. Only by promoting
wisdom can we achieve the societal goals that most people desire, says Sternberg. And
research indicates he may be right, in at least one respect: Studies show that wisdom is
one predictor of well-being in later life (Bianchi, 1994; Hartman, 2000).
Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences Like Sternberg, Harvard psychologist Howard
Gardner views traditional IQ tests as limited measures of human mental abilities. But
Gardner argues we have at least eight separate mental abilities, which he calls multiple
intelligences (Ellison, 1984; Gardner, 1983, 1999a, 1999b):
1. Linguistic intelligence. Often measured on traditional IQ tests by vocabulary tests
and tests of reading comprehension
2. Logical-mathematical intelligence. Also measured on most IQ tests with analogies,
math problems, and logic problems
creative intelligence According to Sternberg,
the form of intelligence that helps people see new
relationships among concepts; involves insight and
creativity.
triarchic theory The term for Sternberg’s theory
of intelligence; so called because it combines three
(“tri-”) main forms of intelligence.
wisdom According to Sternberg, using one’s
intelligence toward a common good rather than a
selfish pursuit.
multiple intelligences A term used to refer to
Gardner’s theory, which proposes that there are eight
(or more) forms of intelligence.
TABLE 6.1 Theories of Intelligence Compared
Spearman Cattell Sternberg Gardner
g factor
Crystallized intelligence
Fluid intelligence
Analytical
intelligence
Naturalistic intelligence
Logical–mathematical
intelligence
Linguistic intelligence
Spatial intelligence
Musical intelligence
Bodily–kinesthetic
intelligence
Creative
intelligence
Practical
intelligence
Interpersonal
intelligence
Intrapersonal
intelligence
Note: Different theorists see intelligence as having different components, as shown in the columns of this table.
The rows show roughly comparable components of intelligence described by various theories (although the reader
should be aware that the correspondences are not exact). For example, Sternberg’s practical intelligence is similar
to Gardner’s two components, called interpersonal intelligence and intrapersonal intelligence, while Spearman’s g
ignores these abilities.
Robert Sternberg on
Intelligence
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities? 245
3. Spatial intelligence. The ability to form and manipulate mental images of objects
and to think about their relationships in space
4. Musical intelligence. The ability to perform, compose, and appreciate musical
patterns, including patterns of rhythms and pitches
5. Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence. The ability for controlled movement and
coordination, such as that needed by an athlete or a surgeon
6. Naturalistic intelligence. The ability to classify living things as members of
diverse groups (e.g., dogs, petunias, bacteria) and recognize subtle changes in
one’s environment
7. Interpersonal intelligence. The ability to understand other people’s intentions, emo-
tions, motives, and actions, as well as to work effectively with others
8. Intrapersonal intelligence. The ability to know oneself, to develop a satisfactory
sense of identity, and to regulate one’s life
Each of these intelligences arises from a separate module in the brain, Gardner claims.
The latter two, interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence, are similar to a capacity
some psychologists call emotional intelligence (sometimes referred to as “EQ”).
People who are high in emotional intelligence are good at “reading” other people’s
emotional states, as well as being especially aware of their own emotional responses.
Assessing Cognitive Theories of Intelligence. Perhaps the major contribution of
the cognitive theories to our study of intelligence is their culturally inclusive value sys-
tem: For cognitive theorists, there are many ways to excel, and one way is not necessar-
ily superior to others. This notion has broad appeal. The challenge for these theories,
though, lies in assessment: How can we reliably measure creative, practical, or inter-
personal intelligence?
In an impressive project that was itself both creative and practical, Sternberg and
his associates developed supplemental questions for SAT tests designed to measure
creative and practical intelligences (Sternberg, 2007). Students wrote, for example,
a story to go with the title The Octopus’s Sneakers, or created a caption for an un-
titled comic strip, to measure creative intelligence. A variety of verbal and nonverbal
problems—such as how to respond if you ask a professor for a letter of recommen-
dation but the professor appears not to recognize you—aimed to assess practical
intelligence. Sternberg’s team scored the questions using originality, appropriateness
to the context, and engagement to assess creative intelligence, with feasibility and
suitability to the context as evaluators of practical intelligence. The results? Not
only did the new tests prove to be valid measures of creativity and practical intel-
ligence, they greatly increased colleges’ ability to predict freshmen success. They
also reduced ethnic group differences in college admissions, as the diversity of test
questions was better able to identify cultural variations in demonstration of intel-
ligence (Sternberg et al., 2006)—which is precisely the angle on intelligence we will
examine next.
Cultural Definitions of Intelligence
Both Sternberg and Gardner see all components of intelligence as equally important.
Yet the value of each is also culturally determined, according to what is needed by, use-
ful to, and prized by a given society. If you lived in a Pacific island culture, for example,
which would matter more: your SAT scores or your ability to navigate a boat on the
open ocean? With such examples, cross-cultural psychologists have called our atten-
tion to the notion that “intelligence” can have quite different meanings in different
cultures (Sternberg, 2000, 2004). In fact, many languages have no word at all for in-
telligence as we conceive of it: the mental processes associated with logic, vocabulary,
mathematical ability, abstract thought, and academic success (Matsumoto, 1996).
African Concepts of Intelligence In rural Kenya, Sternberg found that children
with the greatest practical intelligence skills actually scored lower on traditional IQ
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Emotional intelligence involves
the ability to understand and use
emotions effectively (p. 400).

246 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
tests that measure academic success. “In Kenya,” says Sternberg, “good grades don’t
get you anywhere. You’re better off getting an apprenticeship or learning to mine or
fish—those will allow you to support a family” (Winerman, 2005b). Consequently, the
kids with the best minds don’t learn academic skills but concentrate instead on practi-
cal skills that will get them ahead in life.
The Western assumption that intelligence is associated with school success and
quick solutions to problems is not universal. The Buganda people in Uganda, for ex-
ample, associate intelligence with slow and thoughtful responses. Yet another view is
found among the Djerma-Sonhai in Niger (West Africa), who see intelligence as a com-
bination of social skills and good memory. And for the Chinese, intelligence involves,
among other things, extensive knowledge, determination, social responsibility, and
ability for imitation.
A Native American Concept of Intelligence John Berry (1992) extensively stud-
ied mental abilities considered valuable among Native Americans. He began by asking
adult volunteers among the Cree in northern Ontario to provide him
with Cree words that describe aspects of thinking, starting with exam-
ples like “smart” or “intelligent.” The most frequent responses translate
roughly to “wise, thinks hard, and thinks carefully.”
Although Cree children attend schools introduced by the dominant
Anglo (English-European) culture, the Cree themselves make a distinction
between “school” intelligence and the “good thinking” valued in the Cree
culture that seems to center on being respectful. As one respondent explained,
intelligence “is being respectful in the Indian sense. You need to really know
the other person and respect them for what they are” (Berry, 1992, p. 79).
This attitude of respect for others is widespread in Native American cultures.
One term Berry’s respondents offered as an example of the opposite
of intelligence translates as “lives like a White.” This refers disparagingly
to behaviors the Cree have observed among some Anglo people. The Cree
define “lives like a White” as a combination of being “stupid” and having “backwards
knowledge.” A “stupid” person does not know the necessary skills for survival and
does not learn by respecting and listening to elders. One who has “backwards knowl-
edge” disrupts relationships, creating disharmony, instead of encouraging smooth
The popular TV show Survivor emphasizes practical intelligence. This scene is from the
“Redemption Island” episode in Nicaragua.
For this Native American teacher and her
student, “intelligence” may have a
different meaning from that used by Anglo
Americans. In the Cree culture, intelligence
involves wisdom and respect for others.

Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities? 247
interactions with others. Such disruption is not necessarily intentional or malicious.
For example, an English teacher may ask Cree students to write an essay to persuade
others to change certain behaviors. However, in Cree culture, the concept of “persuad-
ing” interferes with the traditional Cree value of “accepting others as they are.” By
encouraging such questioning of elders and traditions—a common practice in Anglo
education—the teacher promotes disruption, which may be a path to “wisdom” in
Anglo culture but is “backward” in Cree views of intelligence.
As you can see from these examples, different cultures have different notions of
intelligence. To understand and cooperate with people of diverse heritages, perhaps
the most “intelligent” behavior is to resist the impulse to impose our own definition of
“intelligence” on others.
The Question of Animal Intelligence
Animals can be taught to perform amazing tricks, as anyone who has ever been to the
circus can attest. In the wild, packs of wolves, prides of lions, and pods of killer whales
commonly cooperate in making a kill and in raising their young. Even your cat may
act with skill and cunning as she herds you toward the kitchen in apparent hope of be-
ing fed. But do these feats demonstrate true thinking and intelligence, or merely oper-
ant conditioning—the ability to learn from previous consequences—as demonstrated
by Thorndike’s cats in their escapes from his “puzzle boxes”?
Historically, scientists dismissed the idea of animal cognition as simple trained-
animal tricks in disguise—until startling new reports began trickling in from scientists
like Jane Goodall. Risking her career—and her life—in the jungles of Tanzania, Goodall
spent 30 years watching and recording the behavior of wild chimpanzees (1986). And
her gamble paid off handsomely. To give just one example from her long list of discov-
eries, Goodall reported that chimps strip leaves from twigs and use them to extract
tasty morsels from a termite nest. Why was that amazing? She had discovered chim-
panzees could make and use tools—an ability requiring forethought and planning, pre-
viously believed to set humans apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Goodall’s
work, then, raised the provocative question of human uniqueness.
What Abilities Make Humans Unique? If not tool making, what distinctive cogni-
tive abilities might we humans possess? One possibility is a theory of mind: the ability
to know that our own thoughts may differ from someone else’s thoughts. For example,
a poker player uses a theory of mind when bluffing. So does a child who lies about
raiding the cookie jar. But recent animal research shows the lowly Western scrub jay
(a relative of the crow) may also have a theory of mind: When a scrub jay sees another
bird watching while it is hiding a grub for a later meal, the jay will return later and re-
hide the grub in another location (Dally et al., 2005). So much for human-only theory
of mind conjecture!
Perhaps, then, it is language that distinguishes humans from animals. But alas for
human pride! Animal behaviorist Karl Von Fritsch (1974) showed that a honeybee
discovering a new source of nectar uses a language consisting of a “waggle dance,”
performed along a wall inside the hive, that conveys the direction and distance of the
food. Other scientists point out that many animals use distinctive sounds to communi-
cate different “ideas,” such as the approach of a predator. But such animal communica-
tions have a limited repertoire: Do they qualify as true language?
Language of the Apes One step toward the answer to that question came from
researchers Allen and Beatrix Gardner (1969), who taught a chimpanzee named Washoe
language skills previously thought to be impossible in nonhuman animals. By “adopt-
ing” Washoe when she was just 10 months old and raising her in an environment similar
to that of a human child, the Gardners taught Washoe to communicate using American
Sign Language (Dewsbury, 1996). By age 5, Washoe could sign some 160 words, and
what’s more, put them together in “sentences,” as when she would declare, “Me Washoe”
theory of mind An awareness that other people’s
behavior may be influenced by beliefs, desires, and
emotions that differ from one’s own.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
Theory of mind is thought to
underlie our human ability to
form effective social
relationships (p. 287).
about Thorndike’s Cats and
Tolman’s Rats
Read
at MyPsychLab
about Theory of Mind in Other
Animals
Read
at MyPsychLab

248 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
or request, “Please tickle more.” She could even create novel signs in unfamiliar situa-
tions, as when she first saw a swan and signed “water bird.” And, quite remarkably, she
demonstrated emotional intelligence as well: When one of her caretakers, who had missed
work for a time following a miscarriage, explained her absence to Washoe by signing,
“My baby died,” Washoe reportedly looked deep into the caretaker’s eyes, then slowly
and carefully signed “Cry,” touching her cheek. Later that day, when it was time for the
caretaker to leave, Washoe resisted, signing “Please person hug” (Fouts, 1997).
A parade of other primates followed in Washoe’s footsteps by communicating with
sign language, with plastic tokens of various shapes, and even with computers. Some out-
stripped Washoe by achieving vocabularies of up to 500 words (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990)
and responding to human vocal language in addition to sign language (Rumbaugh &
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1994). A bonobo named Kanzi has an impressive language reper-
toire that includes concept words like tomorrow and from, as well as some elements of
grammar, such as appropriate use of –ing and –ed to signal tense. When asked “Are you
ready to play?” after a visitor who had promised to play with Kanzi finally showed up,
Kanzi responded, “Past ready” (Kluger, 2010)—perhaps demonstrating a sense of wry
humor in addition to language prowess. And a gorilla named Koko has been caught
signing lies (Patterson & Linden, 1981), and even “swearing” at her handler in ASL,
making the signs for “dirty toilet.” At this point, then, most psychologists are convinced
that primates can learn at least the rudiments of human language, perhaps at the level of
a 2½-year-old human.
Channels of communication have also opened to a variety of other species.
Dolphins have been taught to interpret and respond to complex strings of gestures
and sounds. An African gray parrot, who answered to the name of Alex, could not
only speak but count up to six objects and understand concepts such as size, giving the
correct answers to questions such as “Which one is bigger?” And, not to be outdone,
a border collie named Chaser knows the names of more than 1,000 toys and can also
classify them by function and shape (Viegas, 2011).
What Are the Lessons of Research on Animal Language and Intelligence?
Without doubt, animals are capable of intelligent behavior, and all but the strictest
of behaviorists would acknowledge that many animals are capable of cognition. And
these abilities serve them well: Most animals are exquisitely adapted to a particular
biological niche, which makes them intelligent in ways that aid their survival. When
language is viewed as an adaptive function of a species, animals excel at it—in a
manner that suits their species, not ours. Prairie dogs and meerkats signal each other
differently in response to different predators; dolphins and whales use sounds and
body language to effectively communicate desires to play, hunt, and mate; and even
the lowly squid send messages to each other via changes in color and shape. In all these
ways, animals communicate effectively, demonstrating species-specific intelligence.
The study of language and problem solving in nonhuman animals has pulled us
down from our self-constructed pedestal by demonstrating that other creatures are
capable of using what humans define as language at a surprising level of sophistica-
tion. Those who worry about maintaining feelings of species superiority, however, can
take comfort in the knowledge that human language displays far more grammatical
structure and productivity than do languages of other animals—but, to some extent,
even that finding may reflect our limited ability to accurately measure animal language.
As our research methods evolve, so does our understanding: One species of monkeys
in the wild has recently been found to use syntax, a higher-order marker of language
defined as the ability to combine units of language (such as sounds or words) in differ-
ent ways to signal different meanings—much like humans distinguish between “Jesse
groomed the dog,” and “The dog groomed Jesse” (Outtara et al., 2009). And Chaser
the border collie reportedly understands the distinction between nouns and verbs.
Although human language abilities have certainly allowed us to grapple with abstract
problems far greater than those in the animal world, we must acknowledge the
human-centric nature of our perspective and be mindful of the limitations of both our
perspective and our methods.
Kanzi, a bonobo at the Great Ape Trust,
not only communicates effectively with
researcher Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, but
reportedly is quite skilled at the video
game Pac-Man, and also enjoys roasting
marshmallows.

Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities? 249
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Test Scores and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
If you have ever been called “slow,” “shy,” “plain,” “bossy,” or “uncoordinated,” you
know, firsthand, the powerful effect labels and expectations can have. Such labels can
influence not only people’s beliefs but also their outcomes. Research in psychology
sheds light on this fascinating process.
Expectations Influence Student Performance
In Chapter 1, you learned about the power of expectancy bias: Students who were told
that they had “smart” rats treated their rats with more enthusiasm and encouragement
than did the students who were told their rats were “slow learners,” and the differences
actually influenced rats’ performance on tasks such as maze running. Robert Rosenthal
and Lenore Jacobson, the researchers who led that study, wondered if teachers’ expec-
tations could similarly affect students’ performance.
To find out, they gave grade school teachers erroneous information about the
academic potential of about 20 percent of their students (approximately five in each
classroom). Specifically, teachers were told some students had been identified by a stan-
dardized test as “bloomers” who would blossom academically during the coming year.
In fact, testing had revealed no such thing; the “bloomers” had been randomly selected
by the experimenters.
Knowing what happened with the rats, you might guess what happened in the
classroom. Children whom teachers expected to blossom did exactly that. Further re-
search identified four factors that made the difference (Harris & Rosenthal, 1986):
Teachers unknowingly created a more encouraging climate for the students they ex-
pected to “bloom,” gave them more differentiated feedback and more opportunities
to demonstrate their knowledge, and also challenged them with more difficult work.
Teachers rated these children as more curious and having more potential for success
in life than other children. They also saw these children as happier, more interesting,
better adjusted, more affectionate, and needing less social approval. Significantly, at
the end of the year, the “bloomers” (who were really just randomly chosen children)
made greater gains in IQ points than did students who did not get special treatment.
The gains were especially pronounced among first and second graders. Rosenthal and
Jacobson call this effect a self-fulfilling prophecy. You can see it operating anywhere that
people live up to the expectations of others—or of themselves.
What happened to the other children in these same classrooms—did any of them
gain IQ points as well? Tests showed they did, although not as many as “ bloomers.”
But an unexpected, and disturbing, negative correlation surfaced: The more IQ points
gained by the students not expected to bloom, the less interesting and well-adjusted
they were rated by their teachers. Based on that, Rosenthal (2002) cautions that
unexpected intellectual growth may create negative responses from others in the
environment—a possibility he suggests is worthy of further exploration.
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Beyond the Classroom
Extending the pioneering work of Robert Rosenthal, social psychologists have car-
ried their investigations out of the classroom to find self-fulfilling prophecies in other
environments. In the workplace, positive expectations of employees have been found
to raise productivity significantly; in the military, positive expectations raise perfor-
mance to even greater levels than those observed in the private sector (Kierein & Gold,
2000). In jury trials, judges seem to deliver instructions to the jury differently when the
judge thinks the suspect is guilty than when the judge perceives innocence—a differ-
ence that increases the likelihood of the defendant being found guilty by more than 30
percent (Rosenthal, 2002). And one randomized, double-blind study in a nursing home
found that when caregivers had higher expectations, depression rates among patients
decreased (Learman et al., 1990). Clearly, expectations from others can exert a power-
ful psychological influence on our own beliefs and even our outcomes.
self-fulfilling prophecy Observations or
behaviors that result primarily from expectations.

250 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: In Cattell’s theory, the ability to use algorithms
and heuristics would be called intelligence.
2. APPLICATION: A friend tells you he has found a way to improve
his grades by stopping by his psychology professor’s office once a
week to ask questions about the reading. In Sternberg’s triarchic
theory, which kind of intelligence is this?
3. RECALL: Name one of Gardner’s eight intelligences that is also
measured on standard IQ tests.
4. RECALL: Why does a self-fulfilling prophecy come true?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Sternberg, Gardner,
and others maintain that there are multiple intelligences. What is
the position taken by Spearman and others on the opposite side of
this argument?
Answers 1. fluid 2. Practical intelligence 3. Either linguistic intelligence or logical–mathematical intelligence would be correct. (Some intelligence
tests also assess spatial intelligence.) 4. Expectations: We frequently observe what we expect to see, even when our expectations are erroneous. So if
we expect someone to be smart (obnoxious, stupid, pleasant, lazy, and so on), the chances are good that this “prophecy” will fulfill itself. 5. Although
they do not deny that different abilities exist, Spearman and others have argued intelligence involves a single general, or g, factor underlying all these
special abilities.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
6.5 KEY QUESTION
How Do Psychologists Explain IQ Differences Among Groups?
While we find the full range of IQ scores in every ethnic group, we also find IQ dif-
ferences among groups (Rushton & Jensen, 2005). In the United States, Americans
of Asian extraction score higher, on average, than do Euro-Americans. Hispanics,
African Americans, and Native Americans—again, on average—score lower. And we
find group differences based on social class as well: Children from middle-income
homes score higher on IQ tests than those from low-income homes (Jensen & Figueroa,
1975; Oakland & Glutting, 1990). Nobody disputes that these differences exist. What
experts disagree about are the causes of these IQ discrepancies. As we will see, that dis-
agreement is another example of the nature–nurture controversy. Our Core Concept
describes the issue this way:
Core Concept 6.5
While most psychologists agree that both heredity and environment
affect intelligence, they disagree on the source of IQ differences
among racial and social groups.
The controversy over the source of intelligence is potentially of great importance for
people’s lives—and a politically hot issue. And when race becomes involved, such
issues become even hotter. Never mind that the concept of distinct human “races” has
no precise biological meaning, but rather a social one (Cooper, 2005; Sternberg et al.,
2005).
If we assume intelligence is primarily the result of innate (hereditary) factors, we
will likely conclude it is fixed and unchangeable. For some, this easily leads to the
conclusion that a group (usually a racial group) with low IQ scores must be innately
inferior and, perhaps, should be treated as second-class citizens. On the other hand,
if we conclude that intelligence is shaped largely by experience (environment), we are
more likely to make a range of educational opportunities available for everyone and
to view people of all ethnic, cultural, and economic groups as equals. Either way, our
conclusion may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

How Do Psychologists Explain IQ Differences Among Groups? 251
In actuality, neither the hereditarian nor the environmentalist view is com-
pletely right. Repeatedly in this text, we have seen that psychologists now recog-
nize the roles of both heredity and environment in all our behavior and mental
processes. But there is more to the issue of group differences than this. In this
section, we will add an important complication to the heredity–environment inter-
action: While each individual’s intelligence is determined, in part, by heredity, this
fact does not mean that IQ differences among groups have some biological basis.
On the contrary, many psychologists have argued that group differences are totally
environmental—although this, too, is disputed, as our Core Concept suggests. His-
torically, the naturists’ side of the IQ question has received
most attention—but what does research reveal today?
Intelligence and the Politics of Immigration
In the early 1900s, Henry Goddard, an influential psychologist
who believed that intelligence is a hereditary trait, proposed all
immigrants undergo tests in order to exclude those found to
be “mentally defective” (Strickland, 2000). In 1924, Congress
passed legislation to limit immigration of groups and nationali-
ties “proven” to be of inferior intellect—based largely on God-
dard’s data. Among the groups restricted were Jews, Italians,
and Russians. What Goddard and the U.S. Congress ignored
was that the tests were given in English—often to people with
little familiarity with the English language and the culture in
which the tests were conceived. No wonder many of these im-
migrants received low scores!
Today we are more aware of the shortcomings of intelligence
tests. We also know that, while heredity has an effect on an individual’s intelligence,
experience does too. And we know that Goddard used faulty reasoning when he con-
cluded that heredity accounts for group differences in intelligence. To understand how
heredity could affect individual differences but not group differences, let us look first
at evidence supporting the hereditarian and environmentalist arguments.
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence Is Influenced by Heredity?
Many lines of research indicate a hereditary influence on intelligence. Studies compar-
ing IQ scores of identical twins with fraternal twins and other siblings show a strong
genetic correlation. The gold standard for differentiating the effects of heredity and
environment involves looking at children raised by adoptive parents and, in rare cases,
twins separated at birth. Such studies reveal that IQs are more closely correlated be-
tween children and their biological parents than between children and adoptive par-
ents (Plomin & DeFries, 1998). Work coming out of the Human Genome Project also
supports the notion that intelligence has a genetic component, most likely involving
the interaction of many genes (Chorney et al., 1998). The trend is clear: The closer
the genetic relationship—from cousins to siblings to twins—the closer the relationship
of IQ scores, as Table 6.2 shows. In fact, studies of twins and adopted children reveal
genetic influences on a whole range of attributes as diverse as heart functioning
(Brown, 1990), personality traits (Tellegen et al., 1988), hypnotizability (Morgan et al.,
1970), and intelligence (Sternberg et al., 2005).
While psychologists agree that heredity plays an important part in determining
an individual’s IQ scores, they also agree that it remains difficult to estimate the
relative weights of heredity and environment (Sternberg et al., 2005). One reason
for this is that children who live in the same family setting do not necessarily share
precisely the same psychological environment. First-born children, for example, are
treated differently from the youngest. You probably are aware of this fact if you
have siblings.
At Ellis Island, this customs official
attaches labels to the coats of this
German family.

252 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence Is Influenced by Environment?
The evidence for environment influences on intellectual development is persuasive too.
For example, in a longitudinal study of 110 children from impoverished homes (Farah
et al., 2008), researchers assessed children on both language ability and memory (two im-
portant aspects of intelligence). They also evaluated the children’s home environments on
two factors: (a) How stimulating were they? (judged by the child’s access to such things
as books and musical instruments) and (b) How nurturing were they? (rated according to
observations of positive emotional climate, along with attention and praise given by par-
ents). What the study revealed was a combination of the expected and the unexpected:
• A stimulating environment was strongly associated with language ability but not
with memory.
• A nurturing environment was associated with memory but not with language
ability.
How can we explain these results? The relationship between parental nurturing and
memory mirrors results of animal studies showing that nurturing reduces stress—and
since production of stress hormones interferes with memory, it makes sense nurturing
might improve memory. The expected connection between environmental stimulation
and language ability reinforced results from numerous other studies showing the posi-
tive impact of a rich environment on cognitive development.
Environmental effects surface even when we look for genetic effects: We find
greater similarities of IQ among people who have been reared together than those
reared apart. And, in laboratory animals, a stimulus-enriched habitat early in life re-
sults in a more complex, complete development of brain cells and cortical regions.
The superior performance of these animals on a range of tasks persists through life.
In other experiments, we find that young monkeys who are trained to solve problems
and also offered companionship from other monkeys display more active curiosity and
higher intelligence than those reared without this environmental stimulation.
Such findings hint that we might boost intellectual functioning of human infants
by enriching their environments. Indeed, we will see that early intervention programs
TABLE 6.2 Correlation of IQ Scores with Genetic Relationship
Genetic Relationship Correlation between IQ Scores
Identical Twins
Reared together 0.86
Reared apart 0.72
Fraternal Twins
Reared together 0.60
Siblings
Reared together 0.47
Reared apart 0.24
Parent/Child 0.40
Foster Parent/Child 0.31
Cousins 0.15
A correlation shows the degree of association between variables—in this case, between the IQs of pairs of
individuals. The closer to 1.0, the closer the connection. For example, we can see that the IQ scores of identical
twins reared together are more closely correlated (0.86) than the IQs of mere siblings reared together (0.47). The
data strongly suggest a genetic component that contributes to intelligence.
Source: Bouchard & McGue. (2003). Familial studies of intelligence: A review. Science, 212, 1055–1059. Adapted
with permission from AAAS.
Piano Lessons and
Development
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

How Do Psychologists Explain IQ Differences Among Groups? 253
can raise children’s IQ scores (Barlow, 2008). Moreover, the amount of schooling chil-
dren receive correlates well with their IQ scores (Ceci & Williams, 1997). Even in
adulthood, environmental factors, such as the cognitive complexity and intellectual
demands of one’s job, can influence mental abilities throughout life (Dixon et al., 1985).
Recently, William Dickens and James Flynn (2006) reported the first evidence that
the IQ gap between Euro-Americans and African Americans is narrowing—indicating
that environment rather than heredity is the cause of the difference. Citing data from
large groups on four different IQ tests over the past three decades, they find the gap has
narrowed by up to 50 percent—which translates into nearly eight IQ points (Krakovsky,
2007.) There is more evidence for the environmental side of the nature–nurture debate
about intelligence, but to understand it, we must pause to explore an important—and
often misunderstood—concept: heritability.
Heritability (not Heredity) and Group Differences
We see, then, that intelligence has a hereditary component. But, just because intelli-
gence can be influenced by heredity—perhaps even a substantial amount—does not
mean the environment has no impact (Dickens & Flynn, 2001; Neisser et al., 1996).
Moreover, the influence of heredity on individual intelligence does not mean that he-
redity accounts for differences we observe between groups. To understand why this
is so, we need to distinguish heredity from another important term: heritability. Spe-
cifically, heritability refers to the amount of trait variation within a group that can be
attributed to genetic differences.
To illustrate, suppose we examine a group of children all raised in an intellectually
stimulating environment, with devoted parents who spent lots of time interacting with
them and reading to them—things we know improve intellectual abilities. Among these
children, we would find variation in intellectual abilities. Because their environments were
essentially the same, however, we could attribute much of the differences in their IQ scores
to the effects of heredity. Thus, we could say that in this group, IQ has high heritability.
In contrast, suppose we examine a group of children raised in conditions of
neglect—given mere custodial care in an orphanage, with no intellectual stimulation
from their caregivers. We would most likely find little variance among these children’s
IQ scores because they are all intellectually stunted. For this group, IQ would have
low heritability—in other words, the genetic contribution to their IQ was minimized,
because the poor environment limited development of their genetic potential.
So the IQ differences between the two groups would be real. But—and this is the
important part—our observations tell us nothing about genetic differences (if any) be-
tween the groups. For all we know, they could have the same genetic potential. Because
the environments were so different, we cannot determine what role genetics may have
played in the differences between their IQ scores.
Because people are exposed to different cultural traditions and experience different lev-
els of wealth or discrimination, we have no way to evaluate what proportion of differences
between groups should be attributed to heredity or to environment. To reiterate: Heritabil-
ity is a concept that refers to within-group differences, not between-group differences. Thus,
it is important to realize that we can speak of heritable differences only within a group of
individuals who have shared essentially the same environment (Sternberg et al., 2005).
Another point is worth repeating as well: Biologists, including those working on the
Human Genome Project, have determined that “race” is not a valid biological concept
(Cooper, 2005; Sternberg et al., 2005). There are no biological boundaries defining differ-
ent races. Even if we use a social definition, where people define their own racial group,
differences between the gene pools of people who claim to be of different racial groups are
very small compared to genetic differences among individual members of the same group
(Bamshad & Olson, 2003). For all these reasons, then, evidence does not support the no-
tion of genetic differences producing IQ discrepancies we observe among “racial” groups.
The Jensen Controversy Despite the concerns we just cited, some psychologists
remain unconvinced that environment can account for group differences in IQ (Nisbett,
heritability The amount of trait variation within
a group raised under the same conditions that can be
attributed to genetic differences. Heritability tells us
nothing about between-group differences.
In the top photo, children are learning in
a stimulating environment; thus, because
their environment maximized the poten-
tial for all of them, we could attribute
their individual differences in IQ to their
heredity. For these children, IQ would
have high heritability.
In the lower photo of children at an
impoverished Albanian orphanage, the lack
of intellectual stimulation would result in
lower IQs for all the children. Thus, since
their genetic potential was limited by their
impoverished environment, we would say
their IQ had low heritability.

254 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
2005; Rushton & Jensen, 2005). In the 1960s, for example, Harvard psychologist
Arthur Jensen (1969) contended that racial differences in IQ have a substantial genetic
basis. We can boost IQ scores to some extent, said Jensen, by helping the poor and
disadvantaged, but there are limits imposed by heredity.
In support of his thesis, Jensen cited several studies showing a strong influence of
heredity on IQ. He also presented a complex statistical argument showing only weak
environmental effects on IQ and achievement. Then, turning his attention to government
programs attempting to give extra help to disadvantaged Black children, Jensen claimed
that, while most had shown some positive effects, none had erased the racial differences
in performance. What remained must be a genetic difference in abilities, he maintained.
Over the next five years, more than 100 published articles responded to Jensen’s
challenge. In what became a heated debate, critics pointed out several factors Jensen
minimized or ignored, including the effects of racism, lower teacher expectations for
Black children, lack of opportunity, low self-esteem, and a White, middle-class bias
built into IQ and achievement tests (Neisser, 1997; Neisser et al., 1996). While Jensen
holds to his original position (Jensen, 1998, 2000), many psychologists now agree that
a combination of environmental factors can explain the differences on which Jensen
built his case. Let us now look at some of the post-Jensen discoveries, beginning with a
study of children whose environment had been altered by adoption.
The Scarr and Weinberg Adoption Study A monumental study by Sandra Scarr
and Richard Weinberg (1967, 1978) confronted the issue head-on by comparing
115 Black and White children who were adopted into similar home environments in
Minnesota. Their research utilized educational records and IQ test scores from both
the biological families and the adoptive families. For both groups of children, the bio-
logical parents had average IQ scores (near 100), while the adoptive parents’ IQs were
somewhat higher, averaging above 115.
What did Scarr and Weinberg find when they reexamined the IQ scores of these
two groups of adoptees in late adolescence? There were no differences! Both the
Black group and the White group of adoptees had scores that averaged about 110—
significantly higher than their biological parents, though not quite as high as their
adoptive parents. Such results testify to a powerful effect of the environment on IQ.
The results also contradict Jensen’s claim that group differences are genetic.
Social Class and IQ Research on the relationship between social class and IQ shows
similar environmental effects. Socioeconomic class (as reflected in an individual’s finan-
cial status and lifestyle) clearly correlates with IQ: Affluence is associated with higher
IQ scores, while groups with the lowest average IQ scores experience the greatest de-
gree of poverty, illiteracy, and hopelessness. Supporters of the environmental position
claim that racism and discrimination initially landed many minorities in impoverished
neighborhoods, and these same factors continue to keep them there today.
How does social class affect IQ? The relationship is not a simple one: The negative
effects of growing up in a disadvantaged home far outweigh the benefits of growing
up in a wealthy family (Turkheimer et al., 2003). In fact, poverty creates circumstances
that limit individual potential in many ways, particularly in terms of nutrition, health
care, and education (Brown & Pollitt, 1996; Neisser et al., 1996). Poverty also means
less-adequate health care, so it should not surprise you that researchers have linked
poor health during pregnancy and low birth weight to low mental ability in children.
Research also shows a significant proportion of children with low IQs adversely af-
fected by “environmental insults,” such as living in homes with lead-based paint chips
peeling from walls, causing toxic lead exposure in children who ingest this material
(Needleman et al., 1990). And poverty also means less of other factors known to pro-
mote intellectual development, such as good nutrition and access to books and com-
puters. Job schedules leaving parents little time to stimulate a child’s intellect correlate
with poverty as well, and can be detrimental to performance on tasks such as those
demanded by IQ tests (for example, vocabulary or sentence comprehension).
Poverty has other crippling effects too. In most parts of the United States, public
schools are funded by revenue from local property taxes. Thus, wealthy neighborhoods

How Do Psychologists Explain IQ Differences Among Groups? 255
can provide bigger and better school facilities and amenities, while poorer districts
may suffer from crowding, physically deteriorating structures, threats to personal
safety, poorly prepared teachers, and lack of access to computers. In such environ-
ments, even children with the aptitude to learn may find it difficult to rise above their
circumstances. Proponents of the view that environment has a strong influence on in-
telligence usually support equal-opportunity legislation, better schools, and interven-
tion programs that help disadvantaged children build self-confidence and learn skills
necessary to succeed in school (Tirozzi & Uro, 1997).
Head Start: A Successful Intervention Program One such intervention program is
Head Start, originally implemented some 40 years ago to provide educational enrich-
ment for disadvantaged children. It grew from the assumption that many children from
deprived families need an intellectual boost to prepare them for school. The program
is intended to head off problems on several fronts by serving children’s physical and
mental needs with nutritional and medical support, plus a year or two of preschool
education. Wisely, Head Start also involves parents in making policy, planning pro-
grams, working in classrooms, and learning about parenting and child development.
Head Start centers around the country currently serve about 900,000 children yearly
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010)—estimated to be 40 percent
of the number who need it (Ripple et al., 1999).
Does it work? Again, there is some controversy (Jensen, 1969; Kantrowitz, 1992),
although a great deal of research suggests that Head Start does help disadvantaged
children get ready for school (Garces et al., 2002; Ripple & Zigler, 2003). Children
enrolled in the program score higher on IQ tests and have higher school achievement
during early grades than a matched control group who received no such intervention
(Zigler & Styfco, 1994). More important, their head start lasts. Although differences
between Head Start children and control group kids diminish over time, the effects
persist into adolescence. Among other things, Head Start children are less likely to be
placed in special education classes, less likely to fail a grade, more likely to graduate
from high school, and less likely to have trouble with the law.
Despite the positive effects of Head Start, newer research indicates programs such
as this may not start early enough. Most children in Head Start are preschoolers, but
educational intervention starting in the first months of life can raise infants’ scores
on intelligence tests by as much as 30 percent compared to control groups (Ramey &
Ramey, 1998a, 1998b; Wickelgren, 1999). Although gains may diminish with time, es-
pecially if supportive programs are withdrawn, significant differences remain when in-
tervention starts in infancy. Clearly, then, the earlier a child is immersed in an enriched
environment, the stronger the effects.
Test Biases and Culture-Fair Tests Still, other forces influence IQ scores and
contribute to group differences, including problems with the IQ tests themselves.
Many psychologists have argued that IQ test questions have built-in biases toward a
middle- or upper-class background—biases that favor the White child (Helms, 1992).
For an opposing view, however, that holds that test bias does not contribute to group
differences in IQ scores, see Jensen (2000) and Reynolds (2000).
One source of possible bias stems from the fact that most IQ tests rely heavily on
vocabulary level. This gives a big advantage to children who have been read to and who
are encouraged to read. We can see a related bias in a well-known IQ test that asks for
a definition of opulent (rich), a term one is far less likely to hear in a poor household.
To their credit, however, test makers are working hard to rid their tests of items that
discriminate against people of minority cultural backgrounds (Benson, 2003a).
Noted psychologist Janet Helms (1992) points out another possible flaw in current IQ
testing: It “assumes that White-American culture defines the most intellectually rich envi-
ronment” (p. 1086). Seldom do we ask how well White children learn the norms of other
cultures—which is a provocative and quite reasonable question. According to Helms, why
should the Caucasian American norm be the standard by which everyone else is judged?
Psychologists realize that a culture-free test of ability or achievement is an impossibil-
ity. Nevertheless, most agree we should strive for culture-fair tests that minimize cultural
Children in Head Start programs develop
higher IQs and perform better in school
than do children from similar environments
who do not attend Head Start programs.

256 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
biases as much as possible. So, for example, attempts are being made to develop non-
verbal intelligence tests involving mazes and the manipulation of shapes as a means of
overcoming test bias based on the test being constructed in a person’s nonnative language.
Given the importance of reducing discrimination, what criticisms could possibly
be leveled at the goal of culture-fair tests? First, not all minority groups do poorly on
traditional intelligence tests. For example, we have seen that Asian Americans often do
better than Americans of European ancestry (Sue & Okazaki, 1990). Second, culture-
fair tests do a poorer job than traditional IQ tests of predicting academic success: Be-
cause they de-emphasize verbal skills, they fail to assess one of the more important
components of school performance (Aiken, 1987; Humphreys, 1988).
The Bell Curve: Another Hereditarian Offensive The dispute over causes of
racial differences in IQ flared again in 1994. At issue was a book, The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, by Richard Herrnstein and Charles
Murray. The name echoes the bell-shaped “normal distribution” of IQ scores (see
shape of the graph in Figure 6.10 on page 237). Herrnstein and Murray argued that
racial differences in IQ have a strong genetic basis. If these innate differences were
accepted, the nation could move on to more enlightened and humane social policies,
they said. Critics immediately identified not only a racist bias but pointed to question-
able science at the core of The Bell Curve.
How is The Bell Curve’s argument flawed? The answer will be familiar to you by
now: While there is no doubt that heredity influences individual intelligence, Herrnstein
and Murray, like hereditarians before them, offered no proof that differences between
groups exposed to different environments have a hereditary basis (Coughlin, 1994; Fraser,
1995). Further, much of the “evidence” they offer is suspect (Kamin, 1994). One study
cited by Herrnstein and Murray claimed to document the low IQs of Black Africans, but
it relied on tests given in English—a language in which the Zulu subjects of the study were
not fluent (Kamin, 1995). The test used in that study also assumed subjects were familiar
with electrical appliances found in urban middle-class homes (rather than Zulu villages)
and equipment, such as microscopes, not typically found in Zulu schools.
Compounding the problems in their analysis of the evidence, Herrnstein and Murray
commit another critical thinking error we have emphasized in this text: They confuse
correlation with causation. In fact, the Herrnstein and Murray argument is just as plau-
sible when turned around: Poverty and all the social and economic disadvantages that
go with it could just as well be important causes—rather than results—of low IQ scores.
Despite its flaws, The Bell Curve struck a chord with many Americans. It resonates
with the preference for simple genetic “causes” for behavior rather than more complex
explanations. But not every culture places such emphasis on genetic causes. We can
see a different perspective in a study that asked Americans and Asians to account for a
child’s academic success: American respondents emphasized “innate ability,” whereas
Asian respondents emphasized the importance of “studying hard” (Stevenson et al.,
1993). Thus, the idea that individual and group differences in performance have an
innate basis is a widespread belief in American culture. Interestingly, however, Stan-
ford professor Carol Dweck’s (2007/2008) work shows that when parents and teach-
ers adopt an approach similar to the Asian view, their children are more interested in
school, learn more, and achieve higher grades.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Stereotype Threat
Can you get smarter? Or is your IQ a fixed number? As we have seen, many people
believe their “smarts” is a given. But, as Shakespeare once observed, there’s the rub:
If you think your intelligence is fixed, you will probably live up to your expectations.
This is, of course, the expectancy bias and the self-fulfilling prophecy at work.

How Do Psychologists Explain IQ Differences Among Groups? 257
Psychologists have argued that members of some groups harbor low expectations
about the abilities of everyone in their group. These expectations, as you might guess,
can adversely affect IQ scores, especially when people are reminded of the stereo-
type (Schwartz, 1997). Psychologist Claude Steele calls this stereotype threat and has
amassed a lot of evidence of its negative effect on many members of minority groups,
particularly in academic situations (Steele, 1997; Steele et al., 2002). One study found
that merely being asked to identify their race resulted in lower scores for minority stu-
dents on a test of academic abilities (Steele, 1997). In another study, a group of Black
women taking an IQ test were told that White women usually do better on the test. As
a result of this stereotype threat, these Black women received scores that averaged a
full 10 points lower than a comparison group who were told that Black women usu-
ally receive high scores (Thomas, 1991).
Stereotype threat is not necessarily a racial or ethnic issue. We find it also in the
domain of gender, where girls may learn to feel inferior in science and math, or boys
may be taught they have lesser verbal skills. Stereotype threat can also intimidate older
persons who worry about memory failure or that as “old dogs” they cannot learn
“new tricks.” Anyone who believes he or she is part of an inferior group is vulnerable
to these feelings of anxiety, intimidation, and inferiority.
Is there a way to combat stereotype threat? Social psychologist Joshua Aronson
and his colleagues (2001) found that grades improved for college students who were
encouraged to think of intelligence as being influenced by experience and expectations
rather than as a fixed trait. The grades of African American students actually rose more
than those of White students and those in a control group. Apparently, those who may
have felt themselves targets of stereotype threat reaped the most benefits from this
program.
CONNECTION CHAPTER 11
Aronson recently found similar
effects of a “stereotype threat
intervention” on gender: Women
in a physics class—traditionally
a male-dominated field—who
completed a short affirmation
statement of their personal values
performed better in the class
than a matched set of women in
a control group (p. 497).
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Did Goddard’s view of intelligence place more emphasis
on nature (heredity) or nurture (environment)?
2. ANALYSIS: What is the position taken by most modern
psychologists with regard to intelligence and the heredity–
environment issue?
3. APPLICATION: Cite one piece of evidence showing that
intelligence is influenced by heredity and one piece of evidence
that intelligence is influenced by the environment.
4. RECALL: Put the words between and within in the appropriate
places in the following statement: Heritability may account for
differences groups but not for differences
groups.
5. APPLICATION: Give an example of the conditions under which
you would you expect stereotype threat to occur.
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Although everyone
agrees that heredity produces differences in intelligence among
individuals, there is no evidence that it accounts for differences
among .
Answers 1. Goddard, along with most early American psychologists interested in intelligence, believed heredity was the most powerful influence
on intelligence. 2. Neither heredity nor environment acts alone: Intelligence involves an interaction of hereditary and environmental factors. 3.
Evidence for hereditary influence includes twin studies and correlations of IQs among biological relatives. Evidence for environmental influence
includes comparison of siblings reared together versus those reared apart, animals reared in stimulus-rich environments, the correlation of IQ scores
with amount of schooling, and the recent narrowing of the racial IQ gap. 4. within; between. 5. Stereotype threat occurs any time people have low
expectations of the group to which they belong, especially when they are reminded of those expectations. One example involves women who believe
they have low aptitude for math and who are taking a math class, particularly if the teacher raises the issue of gender differences in math. 6. racial
or ethnic groups
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
stereotype threat An expectation of being
judged by the standard of a negative stereotype. Such
expectations can adversely affect performance.
New research on stereotype threat indi-
cates that inferior performance by women
and men in non-traditional fields, as well
as by racial minorities in non-traditional
fields, may be overcome when stereotypes
are eliminated or countered.

258 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
In June 2006, Dr. Larry Summers, the president of Harvard University, lost his job, in part because he opined that fac-
tors other than socialization—most notably innate intellec-
tual differences—may account for the undisputed fact that
men outnumber women in most scientific fields. (Psychology,
incidentally, is an exception!) So, what is really going on? A
look at the evidence requires some interpretation—based on
your critical thinking skills.
What Are the Critical Issues?
It’s the nature–nurture controversy: Are the undisputed gen-
der differences we see the result of different ways men and
women are socialized? Are they the result of prejudice, dis-
crimination, and lack of opportunity for women who go into
science? Or are they the result of different ways that men’s
and women’s brains process information?
Could Bias Contaminate the Conclusion? Certainly, the
first thing that comes to mind is the possibility of bias—on both
sides of the issue. In addition to potential problems of “political
correctness,” we all have a vested interest in making sure our
gender doesn’t come off looking less smart than the other.
Beyond bias, we should be willing to judge the evidence
on its merits and, perhaps, be willing to look at the issue from
multiple perspectives. After all, it may be that both sides have
a piece of the truth.
What is the Evidence from the “Nurture” Perspective?
After an extensive review of the literature on gender, Janet Shibley
Hyde (2007) points out that men and women are far more
similar than different on nearly all dimensions studied—a
view she calls the gender similarities hypothesis. Similarities
include such diverse characteristics as mathematical ability,
problem solving, reading comprehension, leadership effec-
tiveness, and moral reasoning. But there are a few exceptions,
most of which won’t surprise you. These include greater male
aggression, acceptance of casual sex, and throwing velocity—
differences she allows may have biological roots. In general,
however, Hyde favors an explanation that emphasizes the dif-
ferent ways that males and females are socialized. One factor
may be the whole set of expectations (and limitations) society
offers girls as they are growing up. Hyde says the few physical
differences between men and women “are important mainly
because they are amplified by cultural beliefs and roles.”
Further, Hyde cautions, many people tend to believe that
any male–female differences we may find in the brains of men
and women are “hard wired” and unchangeable. Instead, she
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Question of Gender Differences
urges us to see such differences as rooted in the brain’s plas-
ticity, by which the very fabric of the brain is altered by ex-
perience. In fact, brains seem to be changing: The number of
women entering scientific fields has surged dramatically in the
last decade, with women now making up, for example, half of
the graduating classes at U.S. medical schools (Halpern et al.,
2007/2008).
What Is the Evidence from the “Nature” Perspective?
Taking quite a different approach, Roy Baumeister (2007)
calls our attention to a different set of facts. He notes
that men, as a group, are more variable and extreme than
women—with more men lying at the opposite poles of virtu-
ally all mental and behavioral dimensions. Men, he says, seem
to outnumber women among both the biggest losers and the
biggest winners. Thus, we find more men than women in pris-
ons and homeless shelters and among those with mental re-
tardation—as well as among jazz musicians, scientists (except
in psychology), members of Congress, and people whom we
call “geniuses.” If men go to extremes more than women, says
Baumeister, we would find these gender differences, and yet
the averages could be the same.
Baumeister is quick to point out that he doesn’t see one
gender as being better than the other—merely that evolu-
tion selected different traits in men and women. In general,
he says, cultures give the highest payoffs to men who take
risks and have the most extreme skills. These extremists,
the risk-takers, are also the ones who tend to have the most
children, who perpetuate the trend. The situation is quite
different for women, Baumeister argues. The evolutionary
pressures for women have emphasized playing it safer than
men do—which is the smart thing when your opportuni-
ties for leaving offspring are biologically much more limited
than are men’s.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Which side to believe? As we noted earlier, both sides may have
part of the truth. Both agree that gender differences in abilities
are small. Baumeister suggests the gender differences have more
to do with motivation (particularly the male willingness to take
risks) than with ability, while Hyde maintains the differences
are mainly cultural and, therefore, can be shaped. You will have
to decide the issue for yourself, but we urge you, as a critical
thinker, to be mindful of your own biases. In the end, this issue
may have to be seen from multiple perspectives—rather like the
changing views of the Necker cube.

Neuroscientists use brain imaging techniques to study the
connections between thought processes and the brain—
particularly the frontal lobes. At the same time, other sci-
entists have emphasized the role of emotions in thinking,
especially in intuition. Schemas and scripts assume spe-
cial importance in understanding thought because they
are mental structures that organize concepts, helping us
make sense of new information and events—and underlie
a sense of humor. Our schemas and scripts are influenced
by culture.
artificial concepts (p. 216)
computer metaphor (p. 214)
concept hierarchies (p. 216)
concepts (p. 216)
intuition (p. 220)
natural concepts (p. 216)
prototype (p. 216)
script (p. 222)
CHAPTER PROBLEM: What produces “genius,” and to what
extent are the people we call “geniuses” different from others?
• Although most people think geniuses are different from ordinary
people, little evidence exists to support this view.
• Research indicates that “geniuses” are people with ordinary
thought processes who have high degrees of motivation,
extensive knowledge in their field, and certain personality
characteristics.
• In addition to those listed above, key components in the
formula for becoming a genius include seeking out an area for
which you have high aptitude and great enjoyment and then
spending a minimum of 10,000 hours developing expertise in
that area.
6.1 What Are the Components of Thought?
Core Concept 6.1 Thinking is a cognitive process
in which the brain uses information from the senses,
emotions, and memory to create and manipulate mental
representations such as concepts, images, schemas, and
scripts.
Cognitive scientists often use the computer metaphor to conceive
of the brain as an information-processing organ. Thinking is a
mental process that forms new mental representations by trans-
forming available information coming from various sources,
including the senses, emotions, and memory. Natural concepts
and artificial concepts are building blocks of thinking; they are
formed by identifying properties that are common to a class
of objects or ideas. Concepts are often arranged in hierarchies,
ranging from general to specific, but the way they are organized
varies across cultures.
Other mental structures that guide thinking include
schemas, scripts, visual imagery, and cognitive maps.
How does your consideration of early
influences on your own gender develop-
ment influence your thinking about the
effects of nature and nurture in gender
differences?
RATIONAL THINKING ABOUT GENDER DIFFERENCES
Do you remember your favorite toys and
games when you were a child? Name two
or three of them, and consider how those
early preferences might have been influ-
enced by your environment.
For example, did you receive encour-
agement that guided you toward (or away
from) certain games, toys, or activities?
Were there opportunities in your school
or neighborhood targeted primarily at one
gender, to the exclusion of the other?
In what ways did these environmental
forces shape your preferences—both then
and now?
Chapter Summary 259
CHAPTER SUMMARY Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

In particular, Gardner and Sternberg have taken the lead in
extending the definition of intelligence beyond school-related
tasks. Sternberg’s triarchic theory proposes analytic, creative, and
practical intelligences, while Gardner’s theory of multiple intelli-
gences has claimed eight components of intelligence. Meanwhile,
cross-cultural psychologists have shown that “intelligence” has
different meanings in different cultures. A century of research
shows that animals, too, are capable of intelligent behavior, as
in chimpanzees that make tools and use language. Recent work
also shows that some animals may have a theory of mind.
In the United States, much emphasis is placed on men-
tal tests. In such a climate, however, a big danger lies in test
6.3 How Is Intelligence Measured?
Core Concept 6.3 Intelligence testing has a history of
controversy, but most psychologists now view intelligence
as a normally distributed trait that can be measured by
performance on a variety of tasks.
The measurement of intelligence is both common and con-
troversial. Assessment of mental ability has an ancient human
history but was not based on scientific practice until the 20th
century. In 1904, Binet and Simon developed the first work-
able test of intelligence, based on the assumption that educa-
tion can modify intellectual performance.
In America, IQ testing became widespread for the assessment
of Army recruits, immigrants, and schoolchildren. The original
good decision makers are those who use good critical
thinking skills.
People who are often called “creative geniuses” are
highly motivated experts who often have a certain cluster
of traits, such as independence and a need for stimulating
interaction. They appear, however, to use ordinary thinking
processes, although the role of natural talent is a subject of
dispute.
algorithms (p. 224)
anchoring bias (p. 228)
aptitudes (p. 230)
availability bias (p. 229)
base rate information (p. 229)
creativity (p. 230)
experts (p. 230)
functional fixedness (p. 226)
heuristics (p. 224)
hindsight bias (p. 227)
mental set (p. 225)
representativeness bias (p. 228)
tyranny of choice (p. 229)
6.2 What Abilities Do Good Thinkers
Possess?
Core Concept 6.2 Good thinkers not only have a
repertoire of effective strategies, called algorithms and
heuristics, they also know how to avoid the common
impediments to problem solving and decision making.
Two of the most crucial thinking skills involve identifying
the problem and selecting a problem-solving strategy. Useful
strategies include algorithms, which produce a single correct
answer, and heuristics, or “rules of thumb.” Among the most
useful heuristics are working backward, searching for analo-
gies, and breaking a bigger problem into smaller problems.
Common obstacles to problem solving include mental set,
functional fixedness, and self-imposed limitations.
Judgment and decision making can be flawed by biases
and faulty heuristics. These include the confirmation bias,
hindsight bias, anchoring bias, representativeness bias, and
availability bias. Judgment can also be affected by factors
outside the person, such as the tyranny of choice. In general,
IQ calculation was abandoned in favor of standard scores based
on the normal distribution. Today, IQ tests come in both individ-
ual and group forms. They are typically used to diagnose learn-
ing disabilities and to assess whether a child is eligible for special
education classes. In particular, IQ scores are a key ingredient in
identifying mental retardation and giftedness, which are often seen
as occupying the extremes of the IQ distribution.
chronological age (CA) (p. 235)
giftedness (p. 239)
intelligence (p. 234)
intelligence quotient (IQ) (p. 236)
mental age (MA) (p. 235)
mental retardation (p. 239)
normal distribution (or normal curve) (p. 237)
normal range (p. 238)
6.4 Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities?
Core Concept 6.4 Some psychologists believe
that intelligence comprises one general factor, g, while
others believe that intelligence is a collection of distinct
abilities.
Among the first psychometric theories of intelligence, Spear-
man’s analysis emphasized a single, common factor known as g.
Later, Cattell separated g into two components: fluid intelligence
and crystallized intelligence. Modern cognitive psychologists con-
ceive of intelligence as a combination of several abilities.
260 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence

multiple intelligences (p. 244)
practical intelligence (p. 243)
savant syndrome (p. 242)
self-fulfilling prophecy (p. 249)
theory of mind (p. 247)
triarchic theory (p. 244)
wisdom (p. 244)
scores becoming mere labels that influence people’s behavior
through the self-fulfilling prophecy.
analytical intelligence (p. 243)
creative intelligence (p. 244)
crystallized intelligence (p. 243)
fluid intelligence (p. 243)
g factor (p. 243)
6.5 How Do Psychologists Explain IQ
Differences among Groups?
Core Concept 6.5 While most psychologists agree that
both heredity and environment affect intelligence, they
disagree on the source of IQ differences among racial and
social groups.
Hereditarian arguments maintain that intelligence is substan-
tially influenced by genetics, a belief endorsed at one time by
the U.S. government, which used IQ tests to restrict immigra-
tion early in the 20th century. Environmental approaches argue
that intelligence can be dramatically shaped by influences such
as health, economics, and education. While most psychologists
now agree that intelligence is heritable, they also know that heri-
tability refers to variation within a group and does not imply that
between-group differences are the result of hereditary factors.
The dispute over the nature and nurture of group dif-
ferences in intelligence flared again in 1969, when Jensen
argued that the evidence favored a strong genetic influence.
This argument was echoed in the 1994 book The Bell Curve.
Critics have pointed out that much of the research cited by
those taking the extreme hereditarian position is flawed. In
addition, intelligence testing itself may be biased in favor
of those with particular language and cultural experiences.
Hereditarian claims, however, have stimulated much
research, such as Scarr and Weinberg’s research on adopted
children and follow-up studies of the Head Start program.
This research suggests that the racial and class differences in
IQ scores can be attributed to environmental differences and
to the influence of low expectations and negative stereotypes,
as found in stereotype threat.
heritability (p. 253)
stereotype threat (p. 257)
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Question of Gender Differences
While the topic of gender differences remains hotly con-
tested, supporters of both sides of the issue agree that the
differences—compared to the similarities—are quite small
and may be influenced by both nature and nurture.
Chapter Summary 261

262 C H A P T E R 6 Thinking and Intelligence
4. According to the program, why do people assume that Montreal is
farther north than Seattle?
a. because we have learned it
b. because we are less familiar with Montreal than with Seattle
c. because Canada is north of the United States in our mental maps
d. because we are not good at making such judgments
5. What is one way in which human problem solving appears to be
quite different from the way computers solve problems?
a. Humans can solve problems that don’t involve numbers.
b. Humans are more logical in their approach to problems.
c. Humans have trouble when content is unfamiliar.
d. Humans are less likely to be misled by bias.
6. What is a cognitive illusion?
a. a mental map that we can scan for information
b. a biased mental strategy
c. a concept formed on the basis of a perceptual illusion
d. a decision motivated by emotion
7. How did Freud explain the fact that human beings sometimes
make irrational decisions?
a. They are driven by primitive needs.
b. They are influenced by the emotions of the crowd.
Program Review
1. Michael Posner’s work on brain imaging showed
a. major differences between the brains of young and old
adults, with cognitive processes more localized in brains of
the elderly.
b. that blood flow decreases in the brain as thinking becomes
more efficient.
c. that electrical stimulation of the brain can enhance perfor-
mance on logic puzzles reliably.
d. that patterns of brain activity differ in predictable ways when
people see words versus read them aloud versus name the
function of the objects to which they refer.
2. A cognitive psychologist would be most interested in which one of
the following issues?
a. how you decide which answer is correct for this question
b. how pain stimuli are processed
c. maturation of the efferent system
d. how to distinguish mania from schizophrenia
3. What is one’s prototype of a tree most likely to be similar to?
a. a maple tree
b. a palm tree
c. a Christmas tree
d. a dead tree
Watch the following videos by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the videos, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 10: COGNITIVE PROCESSES
PROGRAM 11: JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
PROGRAM 16: TESTING AND INTELLIGENCE
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE

www.mypsychlab.com

14. What is the goal of psychological assessment?
a. to derive a theory of human cognition
b. to see how people vary in ability, behavior, and personality
c. to measure the stages of growth in intellectual abilities
d. to diagnose psychological problems
15. What was Binet’s aim in developing a measure of intelligence?
a. to identify children in need of special help
b. to show that intelligence was innate
c. to weed out inferior children
d. to provide an empirical basis for a theory of intelligence
16. What formula did Terman create to express intelligence?
a. MA/CA = IQ
b. MA × CA = IQ
c. CA/MA × 100 = IQ
d. MA/CA × 100 = IQ
17. The attempt by neuroscientists to find biologically based mea-
sures of intelligence rests on the assumption that intelligence
involves
a. multiple factors.
b. cultural learning.
c. speed of adaptation.
d. high excitability.
18. The growing practice of “teaching for tests” creates the
possibility of
a. lessened ecological validity (i.e., the test doesn’t tell us how
the subject might perform in the real world).
b. eliminating stereotype threat.
c. lowered reliability.
d. eliminating genetic influences on intelligence.
19. Standardized intelligence tests typically
a. overvalue verbal ability.
b. give too much value to creative problem solving.
c. are biased to give exceptionally high scores to people from
other cultures.
d. are the best available predictors of life success.
20. What we have learned about intelligence over the years is that
it is not
a. complex.
b. influenced by environment.
c. a singular process.
d. culturally defined.
c. They are basing their decisions on availability.
d. They are using standard human mental processes.
8. Why would smokers be likely to underestimate the chance of
developing lung cancer?
a. They do not dread the disease.
b. It is an unfamiliar risk.
c. It is not representative.
d. It represents a delayed consequence.
9. Irving Janis studied how the decision to invade Cuba was made
during the Kennedy administration. What advice does Janis offer
to promote better decision making?
a. Encourage groupthink by team-building exercises.
b. Appoint one group member to play devil’s advocate.
c. Restrict the size of the group.
d. Assume that silence means consent on the part of all group
members.
10. How does cognitive dissonance make us feel?
a. We are so uncomfortable that we try to reduce the
dissonance.
b. We enjoy it so much that we actively seek dissonance.
c. Our reaction to dissonance depends largely on personality.
d. It creates boredom, which we try to overcome.
11. You read the following sentences: “Mary heard the ice cream
truck. She remembered her birthday money and ran into the
house.” What allowed you to understand how these sentences are
related?
a. a cognitive illusion c. a schema
b. reasoning by analogy d. the anchoring heuristic
12. According to Robert Glaser, intelligence is
a. a skill and can be developed.
b. genetically determined.
c. a myth.
d. no higher in humans than it is in chimpanzees and bonobos.
13. Greg is visiting a foreign country that is known for its current
political unrest, and he has seen news reports over the past week
about tourists being kidnapped. Although his chances of being
killed in a car accident during his vacation are higher than his
chances of being killed by terrorists, he believes the opposite.
What cognitive process is behind his error?
a. representativeness heuristic
b. availability heuristic
c. anchoring and adjustment heuristic
d. framing heuristic
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 263

CHAPTER PROBLEM Do the amazing accounts of similarities in twins reared apart indicate we are primarily a product of our genes? Or do
genetics and environment work together to influence growth and development over the lifespan?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED The Mozart Effect
A Look Back at the Jim Twins,
and Your Own Development
Remarkable reports of similarities in twins
raised apart from each other may grab our
attention, but do they necessarily point to
genetics as the primary cause of human
thinking and behavior?
Nature and nurture continue to interact
as we progress through a series of
transitions in adulthood, with cultural
norms about age combining with new
technology to increase both the length
and quality of life for many adults.
7.4 What Developmental Challenges
Do Adults Face?
Early Adulthood: Explorations, Autonomy,
and Intimacy
The Challenges of Midlife: Complexity and
Generativity
Late Adulthood: The Age of Integrity
Development Over the Lifespan7
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
7.1 What Innate Abilities Does the
Infant Possess?
Prenatal Development
The Neonatal Period: Abilities of the
Newborn Child
Infancy: Building on the Neonatal Blueprint
Newborns have innate abilities for
finding nourishment, avoiding harmful
situations, and interacting with
others—all of which are genetically
designed to facilitate survival.
Not Just Fun and Games: The
Role of Child’s Play in Life
Success
Self-control is a big predictor of life
success—and certain types of play help
it develop.
7.2 What Are the Developmental Tasks
of Childhood?
How Children Acquire Language
Cognitive Development: Piaget’s Theory
Social and Emotional Development
Nature and nurture work together to help
children master important developmental
tasks, especially in the areas of language
acquisition, cognitive development, and
development of social relationships.
The Puzzle of ADHD
New research sheds light on the
prevalence, causes, and treatments of
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
Adolescence offers new developmental
challenges growing out of physical
changes, cognitive changes, and
socioemotional pressures.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
Our thinking processes continue to
grow and develop in a predictable
pattern as we pursue higher degrees of
education.
7.3 What Changes Mark the Transition
of Adolescence?
Adolescence and Culture
Physical Maturation in Adolescence
Adolescent Sexuality
Neural and Cognitive Development in
Adolescence
Moral Development: Kohlberg’s Theory
Social and Emotional Issues in Adolescence

265
W HAT COULD GRAB MEDIA INTEREST MORE THAN A STORY OF TWINS separated at birth and reunited as adults? Many such tales have emerged from psychologist Thomas Bouchard’s famous twin-study project at the University of Minnesota. But what really attracts journalists are reports of
uncanny similarities between identical twins raised by different parents, taught by different
teachers, influenced by different peers and siblings, and sometimes even raised in different
cultures.
Take, for example, the “Jim Twins.” Separated just a few weeks after they were born, iden-
tical twins Jim Springer and Jim Lewis were adopted separately and raised apart. Yet something
drove them on parallel paths, even though those paths didn’t cross again for 39 years. At their
reunion, the “Jim twins” discovered some remarkable similarities in their habits, preferences,
and experiences. Some examples:
• They achieved nearly identical scores on tests of personality, intelligence, attitudes, and
interests.
• Medically, both have mildly high blood pressure and have had spells that they mistak-
enly thought were heart attacks; both have had vasectomies; both suffer from migraine
headaches.
• Both chain-smoke Salem cigarettes and drink Miller Lite beer.
• Both had been indifferent students: Jim Lewis dropped out in the tenth grade, while Jim
Springer managed to graduate from high school.

266 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
• Both had been married twice, and both of their first wives were named Linda. Both of their
second wives were named Betty. Both men leave love notes around the house.
• Lewis had three sons, including one named James Alan. Springer had three daughters, plus
a son named James Allan.
• Both had owned dogs named Toy.
• Both drive Chevrolets, chew their fingernails, like stock-car racing, and dislike baseball.
• Both had been sheriff’s deputies.
• Both do woodworking as a hobby. Lewis likes to make miniature picnic tables, and Springer
makes miniature rocking chairs. Both had built white benches around trees in their yards.
When he first read about the two Jims in a newspaper, Bouchard knew their case presented
a rare opportunity to study the relative effects of heredity and environment and how they unfold
over time in the process we call development (Holden, 1980a,b; Lykken et al., 1992). The Jims
agreed to participate and thus became the first of some 115 pairs of reunited twins (plus four
sets of reared-apart triplets) to be studied over the next 20 years at the University of Minnesota.
Another remarkable pair, Oskar Stör and Jack Yufe, was also separated at birth, and from
that point on their lives went in almost unbelievably different directions. Stör was raised by
his grandmother in Czechoslovakia and attended a Nazi-run school during World War II, while
Yufe was taken to Trinidad and raised as a Jew by his biological father. Oskar is now mar-
ried, a strong union man, and a devoted skier, while Jack is separated, a businessman, and a
self-styled workaholic. Still, alongside these huge differences, researchers found some striking
similarities in seemingly trivial behavior patterns. Both twins wear neatly clipped moustaches;
both read magazines from back to front; both have a habit of storing rubber bands on their
wrists; both flush the toilet before using it; both like to dunk buttered toast in coffee; and both
think it is funny to sneeze loudly in public.
PROBLEM: Do the amazing accounts of similarities in twins reared apart indicate we are
primarily a product of our genes? Or do genetics and environment work together to influence
growth and development over the lifespan?
As compelling as these stories are, we must interpret them with care (Phelps et al.,
1997). Let’s begin that interpretation by putting on our critical thinking caps and ask-
ing some important questions:
• Are these twin stories representative of all twins reared apart, or are they excep-
tional cases?
• When we notice striking similarities between biological relatives—whether they
be twins, siblings, or parent–child relationships—what factors other than genetics
might account for these similarities?
• Are there methods by which we can reliably tease out the differences between the
genetic contributions and the influences of the environment to make an accurate
determination of the relative contribution of each?
These fascinating questions are just part of what we’ll explore in our study of
human development across the lifespan. Broadly speaking, developmental psychology is the
psychology of growth, change, and consistency from conception to death. It asks how
thinking, feeling, and behavior change through infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adult-
hood. It examines these changes from multiple perspectives—physical, emotional, cogni-
tive, and sociocultural. The primary questions for developmental psychologists, then, are
these: How do individuals predictably change throughout the lifespan, and what roles do
heredity and environment play in these changes?
developmental psychology The psychological
specialty that studies how organisms grow and change
over time as the result of biological and environmental
influences.

C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan 267
This issue of heredity and environment is important, so let’s take a closer look at
it. Psychologists call this the nature–nurture issue: As you know from Chapters 2 and 4,
nature refers to the contribution of our heredity, whereas nurture refers to the role of
our environment. In earlier years, the nature–nurture question was an either-or ques-
tion, but modern researchers have a more sophisticated understanding of this com-
plex issue (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; Dannefer & Perlmutter, 1990). Today, the
nature–nurture issue recognizes that both nature and nurture play a role in almost all
aspects of human behavior, and it now questions (1) what the relative weight of each
of these factors is and (2) how the two factors might interact to ultimately produce a
given characteristic.
What do we mean by interact? Simply put, nature–nurture interaction means we
are all born with certain predispositions (nature) that, if exposed to the proper experi-
ences in our environment (nurture), can reach their full potential. If you are good at,
say, math or music, your ability is really the result of a combination of genetic poten-
tial and experience. Heredity establishes your potential, but experience determines if
and how your potential will be realized. To put it yet another way: Nature proposes,
and nurture disposes.
Still, we may ask, “Which of our traits does heredity affect most? And which are
most heavily influenced by learning or other environmental factors (such as disease or
nutrition)?” More and more information is available to help answer these questions,
and we will explore this puzzle throughout this chapter. We must, however, be cautious
in our interpretation of these findings. For example, we know that in the genetic disor-
der known as Down syndrome, biology has a very strong influence. In this condition,
the output of abnormal chromosomes leads to mental retardation—and there is no
cure. But there is hazard in knowing this: Parents or teachers of children with such dis-
orders may erroneously conclude that biology determines the child’s destiny and give
up hope. By focusing on the genetic side of the disorder, they may overlook effective
learning-based treatments that can measurably improve the living skills of individuals
with this disorder.
Mindful of such dangers, psychologists have nonetheless forged ahead in the study
of hereditary and environmental contributions to thought and behavior. To do so, they
have invented several clever methods for weighing the effects of nature and nurture.
Twin studies represent one such method. The work of Thomas Bouchard, for example,
offers some tantalizing clues about the relative contribution of nature and nurture:
In this type of situation, any similarities between the two are likely a result of shared
heredity, since they did not share a common environment growing up. This type of
twin set, however, is a scarce resource. Far more common are twin sets raised together,
and fortunately, psychologists have figured out how to learn from these twins as well.
Because identical twins have essentially the same genotype and fraternal twins have
(on the average) only 50 percent of their genes in common, hereditary effects show
up more strongly in identical twins. (In studies comparing these two twin types, the
fraternal twins serve as a sort of control group.) Such studies have given us valuable
information on the role of genetics in a variety of mental and behavioral disorders, in-
cluding alcoholism, Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, depression, and autism (Muhle,
2004; Plomin et al., 1994).
Another method used to measure the effects of heredity and environment involves
adoption studies. If you adopted a baby, whom would he or she resemble most as an
adult: you, or the biological parents? Researchers in adoption studies compare the
characteristics of adopted children with those of their biological and adoptive fam-
ily members. Similarities with the biological family point to the effects of nature, while
similarities with the adoptive family suggest the influence of nurture. This work, in con-
cert with twin studies, has revealed genetic contributions to a variety of psychologi-
cal characteristics such as intelligence, sexual orientation, temperament, and impulsive
behavior—all of which we will learn about in more detail in the pages to come (Alanko,
et al., 2010; Bouchard, 1994; Dabbs, 2000).
nature–nurture issue The long-standing
discussion over the relative importance of nature
(heredity) and nurture (environment) in their influence
on behavior and mental processes.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
The control group in a study
serves as a standard against
which other groups can be
compared (p. 27).
twin study A means of separating the effects
of nature and nurture by which investigators may
compare identical twins to fraternal twins or compare
twins separated early in life and raised in different
environments.
adoption study A method of separating the
effect of nature and nurture by which investigators
compare characteristics of adopted children with those
of individuals in their biological and adoptive families.
Harry Potter is a good illustration of the
nature–nurture interaction. Born to pure-
bloods (parents with magical powers) but
raised by muggles (people without magi-
cal abilities), his own magic didn’t flour-
ish until he entered the magic-supporting
environment of Hogwarts School.

268 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
7.1 KEY QUESTION
What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess?
People used to think babies began life as a “blank slate”—with an empty brain and no
abilities. In modern times, however, that picture has changed. We now see that new-
borns possess a remarkable set of abilities acquired through their genes. They are adept
at locating food and avoiding potential harm, and their social nature facilitates their
survival as well. We focus on these inborn or innate abilities in the Core Concept for
this section:
Core Concept 7.1
Newborns have innate abilities for finding nourishment, avoiding
harmful situations, and interacting with others—all of which are
genetically designed to facilitate survival.
To be sure, the newborn’s capabilities are limited, but they are effective enough to
promote survival. You arrived in the world already “knowing,” for example, how to
get nourishment by suckling, how to raise your hands to shield your eyes from bright
light, and how to get attention by cooing and crying. Still, it is helpful to think of the
newborn’s basic abilities as a sort of scaffold to which new and more complex abilities
are added as the child grows and develops.
To explain where these abilities come from and how they develop, we will organize
our discussion around three important developmental periods: the prenatal period, the
newborn or neonatal period, and infancy. You will notice that, in each phase, develop-
ment builds on the abilities and structures laid down earlier.
Prenatal Development
The prenatal period is a time of furious developmental activity between conception and
birth that readies the organism for life on its own outside the womb. Development
typically occurs over the span of nine months and is divided into three phases: the ger-
minal, embryonic, and fetal stages.
Three Phases of Prenatal Development Shortly after conception, the fertilized egg,
also known as a zygote, begins to grow through cell division. During this germinal
phase, one cell becomes two; two become four; and when the number reaches about
150—a mere week or so after conception—the zygote implants itself in the lining of
the uterus. At this point, it (along with cells that will form the placenta and other sup-
portive structures) becomes an embryo. It is now connected to the mother’s body and
thus affected by anything she eats or drinks or to which she is otherwise exposed.
During the embryonic phase, the genetic plan determines how all the organs that will
ultimately be part of the newborn start to form. In a process known as differentiation,
the embryo’s cells begin to specialize as components of particular organ systems. (Before
differentiation, certain cells in the embryo, known as embryonic stem cells, are capable
of forming into any organ of the body.) One example of differentiation is the develop-
ment of anatomical sex: If the embryo’s genetic plan contains two X chromosomes, the
child will be female, but if it contains an X and a Y chromosome, a male will develop.
After the eighth week, the developing embryo is called a fetus. In the fetal stage,
spontaneous movements and basic reflexes begin to appear. For example, as early as
14 weeks, some babies can be seen on ultrasound to curve their hands around some-
thing that comes in contact with their palm (Sparling et al., 1999). This is the beginning
of the grasping reflex, and it has adaptive significance. By the 16th week, the brain is
fully formed and the fetus can feel pain (Anand & Hickey, 1987). The baby can hear
sounds from outside the womb by the 27th week, enabling the ability to recognize certain
sounds and rhythms shortly after birth. The brain will continue to develop, growing
innate ability Capability of an infant that is
inborn or biologically based.
prenatal period The developmental period
before birth.
zygote A fertilized egg.
embryo In humans, the name for the developing
organism during the first 8 weeks after conception.
fetus In humans, the term for the developing
organism between the embryonic stage and birth.
As the brain grows in the developing
embryo, it forms as many as 250,000
new neurons per minute.
about an Embryo’s BeginningRead
at MyPsychLab

What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess? 269
new neurons at an amazing rate of up to 250,000 per minute. At birth, the newborn’s
brain contains some 100 billion neurons (Dowling, 1992).
Teratogens: Prenatal Toxins During prenatal development, the placenta is the
organ that surrounds the embryo/fetus. It serves as a conduit between mother and
child, letting nutrients in and waste out, and it can also screen out some—but not
all—potentially harmful substances. Some toxic substances, called teratogens, still get in
and can cause irreparable damage. Teratogens include viruses (such as HIV, the AIDS
virus), certain drugs and other chemicals, and even some herbs. Among the most com-
mon teratogens are nicotine and alcohol.
Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) can occur in children of mothers who drink alcohol
during pregnancy. A leading cause of mental retardation, FAS may also cause babies
to have poor motor coordination, impaired attention, and hyperactivity. Mothers who
consume one or more drinks per day risk fetal alcohol exposure, which has been found
to impair development of language ability, memory, learning, and a host of other cog-
nitive and physical functions (Office of the Surgeon General, 2005). Furthermore, a se-
ries of studies at the University of Pittsburgh indicates that even minimal exposure—in
some cases fewer than five drinks per week—can result in lower IQ and significantly
retarded physical development: At age 14, children who had been exposed to even light
alcohol consumption in utero weighed on average 16 pounds less than children whose
mothers had abstained from alcohol during pregnancy (Day, 2002; Willford, 2006).
Exposure to nicotine, as well as some commonly taken herbs and supplements,
can also damage the developing fetus. Women who smoke during pregnancy are more
likely to have children with lower birth weight, learning deficits, and ADHD (Button
et al., 2005). Maternal smoking is also associated with greater risk of sudden infant
death syndrome (SIDS; Bruin et al., 2007). Even some popular herbal remedies and
supplements, such as gingko and ginseng, have been found to have detrimental effects
on a developing fetus (Chan et al., 2003; Dugoua et al., 2006).
The Neonatal Period: Abilities of the Newborn Child
By the time a newborn arrives in the world, then, a great deal of neural and sensory
development has already taken place. (The term neonatal period refers to the first month
after birth.) This current understanding of the newborn’s sensory awareness is a far cry
from the “great blooming, buzzing confusion” experts once thought characterized the
newborn’s world (James, 1950/1890). Indeed, more recent research has revealed that
newborns have all five senses working, as well as a variety of behavioral reflexes they
use to respond to and manipulate their environment. Together, these many abilities
effectively help newborns survive and thrive in their environment.
Sensory Abilities in the Newborn What exactly can newborns do with their senses?
For one thing, they can respond to taste: the sweeter the fluid, the more continuously
and forcefully an infant will suck (Lipsitt et al., 1976). For another, they smile when they
smell banana essence, and they prefer salted to unsalted cereal (Bernstein, 1990; Harris
et al., 1990). They recoil, however, from the taste of lemon or shrimp and the smell of
rotten eggs. And, as early as 12 hours after birth, they show distinct signs of pleasure at
the taste of sugar water or vanilla. All these responses are part of the newborn’s ability
to seek healthy nourishment—as the Core Concept for this section suggests.
Just as heredity biases newborns’ tastes, it also programs a preference for human
faces to most other visual patterns (Fantz, 1963). Even their neonatal nearsightedness
helps: Their optimal focus of about 12 inches is ideally suited for looking at faces. By
just a few days after birth, neonates recognize their mother’s face. Their distance vision,
however, is poor, with a visual acuity of about 20/500 (which means that they can dis-
criminate at 20 feet stimuli that most older children can see clearly at 500 feet). These
immature systems develop very rapidly (Banks & Bennett, 1988), however, and by about
seven weeks, infants’ visual pathways and motor coordination enable them to maintain
eye contact with a caregiver—an important element in establishing a relationship.
placenta The organ interface between the embryo
or fetus and the mother. The placenta separates the
bloodstreams, but it allows the exchange of nutrients
and waste products.
teratogen Substances from the environment,
including viruses, drugs, and other chemicals, that can
damage the developing organism during the prenatal
period.
fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) A set of
physical and mental problems seen in children whose
mothers drink excessive amounts of alcohol during
pregnancy.
neonatal period In humans, the neonatal
(newborn) period extends through the first month
after birth.
The Effects of
Prenatal Smoking on Children’s
Development
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

270 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
What else can newborns do with their senses? Although they can see colors, their
ability to differentiate colors, such as red from orange from blue, becomes dramat-
ically better a month or two after birth (Teller, 1998). They also prefer to look at
objects with a high degree of contrast, such as checkerboards, or target shapes. By
3 months, babies can perceive depth and are well on their way to enjoying the visual
abilities of adults. Moreover, it may surprise you to know that infants seem to possess
some basic mathematical ability. In one clever study, infants watched dolls being put
into and taken out of a display case. When the display case subsequently contained a
number of dolls inconsistent with what the infants had observed, they gazed longer at
that case, indicating greater interest in an unexpected outcome—as if they were trying
to figure out something that didn’t make sense (Wynn, 1992, 1995). Such core knowl-
edge serves as the foundation for the later development of more complex skills, such as
those required for arithmetic (Spelke, 2000).
Newborns also have strong auditory preferences, preferring human voices over
other sounds, and the sounds and rhythms of their own language to nonnative lan-
guages (Goodwyn & Acredolo, 2000). Before assuming these preferences genetic,
though, we must recall that the developing fetus can hear sounds from outside the
womb during the last few months in utero. Thus, an alternate interpretation is that
these auditory preferences result from prior exposure to human voices in their native
language. To test whether these preferences are genetic or environmental, one study
had expectant mothers read The Cat in the Hat aloud twice a day for the last six weeks
of their pregnancy; then, after the babies were born, the researchers played audiotapes
of the mothers reading that story as well as a different story. The findings? Babies
expressed an overwhelming preference for the sound of the familiar story being read
over the sound of a different story. Neonates also display greater attraction to female
voices than to those of men, and within a few weeks of birth they begin to recognize
their mothers’ voice (Carpenter, 1973; DeCasper & Spence, 1986). Thus, nurture—by
way of prior experience—may be the driving force behind these newborn auditory
preferences.
Social Abilities Have you ever noticed that if you stick your tongue out at a baby,
he will stick his tongue out back at you? This delightful game reveals just one of many
behaviors newborns and infants will mimic. While in the past, some child development
experts wondered if this reflected an in-depth cognitive understanding of the other per-
son’s behavior, the recent discovery of mirror neurons offers a more likely explanation.
Mimicry of a variety of behaviors, like other innate abilities we have discussed, helps the
infant survive and thrive in the environment.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, infants are built for social interaction. In fact,
they not only respond to, but also interact with, their caregivers from the moment of
birth. Film studies of this interaction reveal an amazing degree of synchronicity: close
coordination between the gazing, vocalizing, touching, and smiling of infants and moth-
ers or other caregivers (Martin, 1981). And while babies respond and learn, they also
send out their own messages to those willing to listen to and love them. The result of
this interaction is seen in studies showing how the expressions of mothers and infants
are coordinated (Fogel, 1991). So, a 3-month-old infant may laugh when her mother
laughs and frown or cry in response to her display of negative emotion (Tronick et al.,
1980). These early interactions, the combined result of nature (mirror neurons) and
nurture (positive reinforcement gained from mimicry), form the basis for the later devel-
opment of empathy.
Innate Reflexes Aside from their sensory abilities and mimicry, babies are born with
a remarkable set of innate reflexes providing a biological platform for later develop-
ment. Among these reflexes, the postural reflex allows babies to sit with support, and
the grasping reflex enables them to cling to a caregiver. The rooting reflex is apparent
when newborns turn their heads toward anything that strokes their cheeks—a nipple
or a finger—and begin to suck it. And if you have ever noticed that when you hold a
baby upright over a solid surface, her legs will lift up as if she were marching, you’ve
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Although research on mirror
neurons is still in the early stages,
we do know that when we see a
person performing some kind of
action, our own brain activates
in the same region as if we were
performing the action ourselves
(p. 70).
mimicry The imitation of other people’s behaviors.
synchronicity The close coordination between
the gazing, vocalizing, touching, and smiling of infants
and caregivers.
innate reflex Reflexive response present at birth.
about Newborns and Their
Preferences
Read
at MyPsychLab

What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess? 271
witnessed the stepping reflex, which helps prepare a baby to walk. There are also a
number of reflexes that act as built-in safety features to help them avoid or escape
from loud noises, bright lights, and painful stimuli. And in their cooing, smiling, and
crying, babies have perhaps their most effective tools for building social relationships.
All of this, of course, makes much evolutionary sense because these abilities are highly
adaptive and promote survival.
Infancy: Building on the Neonatal Blueprint
Following the neonatal period, the child enters infancy, a period that lasts until about
18 months of age—the time when speech begins to become better developed. (The Latin
root infans means “incapable of speech.”) It is a time of rapid, genetically programmed
growth and still-heavy reliance on the repertoire of reflexes and “instinctive” behaviors
that we discussed earlier. All of these abilities arise from a nervous system that contin-
ues to develop at a breathtaking pace.
Neural Development While the prenatal brain focused on producing new brain cells,
many of the neurons are not fully connected to each other at birth. Stimulation from
the environment assumes an important role in creating and consolidating connections.
Each time an infant is exposed to a new stimulus, dendrites and axons actually grow
and branch out to facilitate connections between the neurons involved in that experi-
ence (Kolb, 1989). The more frequently the fledgling neural connections are utilized,
the more permanent they become. In other words, “neurons that fire together, wire
together” (Courchesne et al., 1994).
Sensitive Periods The early years are the most fertile time for brain development in
many areas, including language and emotional intelligence. In fact, in some domains—
such as hearing and vision—stimulation must occur during a specific “window of op-
portunity,” or the ability will not develop normally (Lewis & Maurer, 2005; Trainor,
2005). This is called a sensitive period in development. Evidence for sensitive periods
comes from, for example, a study of adults who were born profoundly deaf. Some of
them learned American Sign Language (ASL) early in life, whereas others didn’t learn
it until much later. Those who didn’t learn ASL—their first learned language—until
adolescence or adulthood never reached the level of competency with the language as
did children who learned it in early childhood (Mayberry, 1991; Singleton & Newport,
2004). You might feel some connection to this finding if you ever tried to learn a new
language as an adult—it was probably far more difficult than it would have been if
you’d learned it as a child!
Brain Development As the dendrites and axons grow and connect, the total mass of
neural tissue in the brain increases rapidly—by 50 percent in the first two years. By
4 years of age, it nearly doubles its birth size. For the next ten years, the types of experi-
ences the infant is exposed to will largely determine which regions and functions of the
brain become most developed. The genetic program (along with physical limitations
imposed by the size of the skull) does not allow the tremendous growth of brain cir-
cuitry to continue indefinitely, however. By about 11 years of age, unused connections
begin to be trimmed away in a process called synaptic pruning. Notably, this process does
not destroy the neurons themselves but instead returns them to an uncommitted state,
awaiting a role in future development (Johnson, 1998).
Maturation and Development Sitting, crawling, and walking—like the growth of
the brain, the growth spurt of puberty, and the onset of menopause—all occur on their
own biological time schedules. Psychologists use the term maturation for the unfold-
ing of these genetically programmed processes of growth and development over time.
When organisms are raised under adequate environmental conditions, their matura-
tion follows a predictable pattern. In humans, maturation generates all the sequences
and patterns of behavior seen in Figure 7.1.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Instinct is a common but imprecise
term for behaviors that have a
strong genetic basis (p. 369).
infancy In humans, infancy spans the time between
the end of the neonatal period and the establishment of
language—usually at about 18 months to 2 years.
sensitive period A span of time during which the
organism is especially responsive to stimuli of a par-
ticular sort. Organisms may have sensitive periods for
exposure to certain hormones or chemicals; similarly,
they may have sensitive periods for learning language
or receiving the visual stimulation necessary for normal
development of vision.
synaptic pruning The process of trimming
unused brain connections, making neurons available
for future development.
maturation The process by which the genetic
program manifests itself over time.

272 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
Birth
1 month
2 months
3 months
4 months
5 months
6 months
7 months
8 months
9 months
10 months
11 months
1 year
Responds to sound
Becomes quiet when picked up
Vocalizes occasionally
Smiles socially
Recognizes mother
Rolls from side to back
Lifts head and holds it erect and steady
Vocalizes to the smiles and talk of an adult
Searches for source of sound
Sits with support, head steady
Gaze follows dangling ring, vanishing spoon,
and ball moved across table
Sits with slight support
Discriminates strangers from familiar persons
Turns from back to side
Makes distinctive vocalizations
(e.g., pleasure, eagerness, satisfaction)
Lifts cup and bangs it
Smiles at mirror image
Reaches for small object
Makes playful responses to mirror
Sits alone steadily
Crawls
Vocalizes four different syllables (such as da-da, me, no)
Listens selectively to familiar words
Pulls to stand
Plays pat-a-cake
Stands alone
Walks alone
FIGURE 7.1
Maturational Timetable for Motor Control
This figure shows average ages at which each behavior is performed. There are considerable individual differences in the rate of development, so
the time at which each response occurs is variable. Most infants, however, closely follow the sequence of development outlined here.

What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess? 273
We must, however, keep in mind the role of the environment and its interaction
with our hereditary nature. While maturation dictates the general time frame in which
an individual becomes biologically ready for a new phase, the environment can speed
up or slow down the exact time of development. Prominent biologist Edward Wilson
(1998, 2004) describes this principle as a genetic leash. Because of the genetic leash, a
child without special training learns to walk following a time-ordered pattern typi-
cal of all physically capable members of our species (see Figure 7.1). Indeed, in the
Hopi culture where children are carried in cradle boards, walking occurs on a similar
schedule (Dennis & Dennis, 1940). Children who receive special training, though,
can learn to walk up to several months earlier, a finding illustrated in several African
cultures who make a habit of bouncing babies on their feet, which speeds develop-
ment of their leg muscles and motor control (Gardiner et al., 1998). And at the
other extreme, children in Iranian orphanages who received little human contact
and little opportunity to leave their cribs were significantly slower in learning to
walk (Dennis, 1960).
The concept of the genetic leash will remain useful as we continue to study various
patterns of human development. It eloquently illustrates the inescapable interaction
between nature and nurture that is so fundamental to understanding how and why
individuals develop as they do. We will see examples of this interaction throughout
our study of language and cognitive development, social development, moral develop-
ment, and emotional development—and moreover, in all major stages of the human
lifespan.
Contact Comfort As infants develop greater sensory and motor abilities through
both nature and nurture, they rely on caregivers to provide the necessary stimula-
tion. One type of stimulation we haven’t yet discussed is the importance of touch.
In the first half of the 19th century, many experts assumed infants sought physical
contact with their caregivers only as a means to an end—with the end being food
or nourishment. Beyond providing the necessary nourishment, these “cupboard
theory” proponents argued, infants derived no further benefit from physical
contact. Psychologists Harry and Margaret Harlow disagreed (Harlow, 1965;
Harlow & Harlow, 1966) and tested their theory using infant monkeys separated
from their mothers at birth. The Harlows placed orphaned baby monkeys in cages
where they had access to two artificial surrogate mothers. One was a simple wire
figure that provided milk through a nipple—a “cupboard,” but little else. The other
was a cloth-covered figure providing no milk but offering abundant stimulation
from its soft terry-cloth cover. The results? Despite the nourishment provided by
the wire model, the baby monkeys spent little time with it, preferring instead to
remain nestled to the cloth mother. Moreover, when the infant monkeys were fright-
ened, they sought comfort by clinging to the cloth figure. They also used it as a
base of operations when exploring new situations. With these observations, then,
the Harlows were able to show that infant monkeys become attached to and pre-
fer a “mother” figure that provides contact comfort, the stimulation and reassurance
derived from physical touch.
Human infants need contact comfort too. Since the Harlow’s groundbreaking
study, we have learned that physical contact promotes the release of pleasure-
inducing endorphins. And touch stimulates physical development as well. Univer-
sity of Miami developmental psychologist Tiffany Field first experimented with
massage on premature babies in 1986 and found that daily massage resulted in
faster weight gain. Since Field’s landmark study, further research has revealed a
wide array of benefits associated with touch, including faster intellectual develop-
ment, improved digestive tract functioning, improved circulation, and decreased
production of stress hormones. Dovetailing with studies highlighting the benefits of
touch is research documenting negative outcomes in children who are abused or ne-
glected (Glaser, 2003). Clearly, a close, interactive relationship with loving adults is
a child’s first step toward healthy physical growth and normal socialization (Blum, 2002;
Sapolsky, 2002).
genetic leash Edward Wilson’s term for the
constraints placed on development by heredity.
contact comfort Stimulation and reassurance
derived from the physical touch of a caregiver.
One of Harlow’s monkeys, clinging to the
artificial terrycloth mother that provided
contact comfort. Next to it, you can also
see the wire mother that provided milk but
no contact comfort.

274 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
Attachment Psychologists refer to the establishment of a close emotional relationship
between a child and a parent figure as attachment. This relationship is especially impor-
tant because it lays the foundation for other close relationships that follow throughout
a person’s lifetime (Cassidy & Shaver, 2008).
Attachment appears to occur instinctively in many species, although it is not nec-
essarily limited to the infant’s interactions with the biological parents. One striking
example occurs in imprinting, the powerful attraction of infants of some species (no-
tably in birds) to the first moving object or individual they see. A baby chick hatched
by a mother duck will form an attachment to its surrogate mother—even though it is
a chicken, not a duck. The imprinted chick will even follow its duck-mother right up
to the water’s edge when she and her ducklings go for a swim. (This scientific concept
was illustrated in Hans Christian Andersen’s story “The Ugly Duckling.”) Thus, the
imprinting tendency is an innate predisposition, although the organism’s environment
and experience determine what form it will take.
In humans, research on contact comfort provided early evidence of the physical
need for attachment. Building on the Harlows’ work with monkeys, psychologist John
Bowlby (1969, 1973) suggested human attachment is innate, begins as early as the first
few weeks, and functions as a survival strategy for infants. From an evolutionary per-
spective, it stands to reason that infants who stay close to their caregivers would be less
vulnerable to threats from the environment. One study found, for example, that when
mothers left the room, their 2- to 4-month-old babies’ skin temperature dropped, a sign
of emotional distress (Mizukami et al., 1990). In these youngsters, skin temperature
dropped even more when a stranger replaced the mother. In contrast, skin temperature
remained steady if the mother stayed in the room—even if the stranger was present. Ap-
parently, children only a few months old rely on their caretakers as a “safe place,” even
before they can indicate attachment by walking or crawling (Bee, 1994).
Attachment Styles Have you ever noticed, though, that children seem to differ in their
types of attachment? Some children seem comfortable with strangers when their pri-
mary caregiver is present, while others appear clingy and fearful. Still others seem to
care very little who is present. Developmental psychologist Mary Ainsworth not only
noticed those patterns but also spent a career studying the various forms attachment
takes in humans. To do so, she developed an innovative laboratory procedure called the
“Strange Situation,” which continues to be used today as the standard for measuring
attachment.
What is this clever procedure? The Strange Situation involves putting young chil-
dren and their primary caregiver into a series of interactions—sometimes together,
sometimes separated, and sometimes with a stranger. Researchers then observe how
the child responds to these various situations (Ainsworth, 1989; Lamb, 1999). Using
such methods in a variety of cultures, Ainsworth found that children’s responses fell
into two main categories, reflecting either secure attachment or insecure attachment.
Securely attached children were relaxed and comfortable with their caregivers and tol-
erant of or even interested in strangers and new experiences. When separated from
their caregivers, they became upset—which, from 6 to 30 months, is a normal behavior
called separation anxiety—but calmed down immediately on the caregiver’s return and
resumed their normal activities. They seemed to perceive their caregivers as a “secure
base” from which to explore the world, confident the caregiver would be available to
help if needed.
Insecurely attached children could be divided into two categories: anxious-
ambivalent and avoidant. The anxious-ambivalent children wanted contact with their
caregivers but cried with fear and anger when separated from them and proved dif-
ficult to console even when reunited. They clung anxiously to their caregivers when a
stranger approached and were uncomfortable exploring new situations. Conversely,
the avoidant children weren’t interested in contact, displaying no distress when sepa-
rated from their caregivers and no particular happiness when reunited. Overall, some
65 percent of American children develop secure attachment, while about 20 percent
are avoidant, and 15 percent are anxious-ambivalent (Berk, 2007).
attachment The enduring socio-emotional
relationship between a child and a parent or other
regular caregiver.
imprinting A primitive form of learning in which
some young animals follow and form an attachment to
the first moving object they see and hear.
secure attachment The attachment style of
children who are relaxed and comfortable with their
caregivers and tolerant of strangers and new experi-
ences—as contrasted with children who are insecurely
attached.
separation anxiety A common pattern of
distress seen in young children when separated from
their caregivers.
anxious-ambivalent attachment One of two
primary response patterns seen in insecurely
attached children in which a child wants contact with
the caregiver, shows excessive distress when separated
from the caregiver, and proves difficult to console even
when reunited.
avoidant attachment One of two primary
response patterns seen in insecurely attached children
in which a child shows no interest in contact with the
caregiver and displays neither distress when separated
from the caregiver nor happiness when reunited.
Attachment
in Infants
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess? 275
Attachment has become a very hot topic over the past decade, as a burgeoning
body of research indicates that patterns established in infancy affect a variety of
childhood and adult behaviors, including aggression, friendships, job satisfaction,
relationship choices, and intimacy experiences (Berk, 2004; Gomez & McLaren,
2007). But what causes a child to develop a particular attachment style? For many
years, nurture was presumed to be the culprit: Specifically, it was thought that
good parents produced securely attached children, while inconsistent parenting
produced anxious-ambivalent children, and neglectful parenting led to avoidant
attachment.
Today, though, most researchers recognize that nature and nurture interact in
the development of attachment style. Infant temperament, for example, which is
largely genetic, influences how easy or difficult it is to be responsive to an infant. It
is not surprising, then, that one study found that babies who were fussier in the first
few days of life were more likely to have an anxious-ambivalent attachment style
one year later (Miyake, 1993). This seems quite logical, as most parents would have
more difficulty consistently “reading” the signals from a temperamental baby than
with an easy baby, thus creating an interaction effect between infant temperament
and parenting style.
Culture and Attachment Before making up your mind about which attachment style is
“best,” though, consider the important factor of culture. Did you assume, like many
Americans do, that secure attachment is the ideal? On the contrary, German fami-
lies prefer avoidant attachment, as it promotes greater self-sufficiency, while Japanese
parents rarely leave their children unattended, fostering greater dependence and an
WHAT’S YOUR ATTACHMENT STYLE?
Identify which one of the following three
self-descriptions you most agree with
(adapted from Shaver & Hazan, 1994):
1. I am somewhat uncomfortable being
close to others; I find it difficult to
trust them completely, difficult to allow
myself to depend on them. I am nervous
when anyone gets too close, and love
partners often want me to be more
intimate than I feel comfortable being.
2. I find that others are reluctant to get
as close as I would like. I often worry
that my partner doesn’t really love me
or won’t want to stay with me. I want
to get very close to my partner, and
this sometimes scares people away.
3. I find it relatively easy to get close to
others and am comfortable depending
on them. I don’t often worry about
being abandoned or about someone
getting too close to me.
What Your Choice Means We realize that
it is probably obvious to you which of the
statements above is “best.” Nevertheless,
just considering the alternatives should
help you understand attachment styles—
and, perhaps, yourself—a little better.
Here’s our interpretation: If you selected
the first statement, you agreed with the
attitude that reflects an avoidant, insecure
attachment. This style was chosen by
25 percent of Shaver and Hazan’s respon-
dent sample. The second statement reflects
an anxious-ambivalent, insecure attachment
style, selected by 20 percent of the sample.
The third statement reflects a secure at-
tachment style, the most common pattern
identified, accounting for 55 percent of
respondents (Shaver & Hazan, 1994).
What do these styles signify for later
life? Through interviews, observations, and
questionnaires, researchers have identi-
fied several consequences of attachment
style, secure or insecure, in adulthood
(Ainsworth, 1989; Collins & Read, 1990;
Hazan & Shaver, 1990; Kirkpatrick &
Shaver, 1992; Shaver & Hazan, 1993,
1994; Simpson, 1990):
• Secure individuals have more positive
self-concepts and believe that most
other people are good natured and well
intentioned. They see their personal
relationships as trustworthy and
satisfying.
• Secure respondents are satisfied with
their job security, coworkers, income,
and work activity. They put a higher
value on relationships than on work
and derive their greatest pleasure from
connections to others.
• Insecure, anxious-ambivalent persons
report emotional extremes and jealousy.
They feel unappreciated, insecure,
and unlikely to win professional
advancement. They make less money
than those with other attachment
styles, working more for approval and
recognition than financial gain. They
fantasize about succeeding but often
slack off after receiving praise.
• Avoidant people fear intimacy and
expect their relationships to fail.
They place a higher value on work
than on relationships and generally
like their work and job security. They
follow a workaholic pattern, but (not
surprisingly) they are dissatisfied with
their coworkers.
• Secure individuals tend to choose as
partners others who are secure. After
breakups, avoidant individuals claim
to be less bothered by the loss of the
relationship, although this may be a
defensive claim, with distress showing
up in other ways (e.g., physical
symptoms).

276 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
accompanying anxious-ambivalent attachment style (Grossman et al., 1985; Miyake
et al., 1985). Like many qualities, then, the judgment of which is “ideal” depends heavily
on the prevailing values of the culture.
Long-Term Effects of Attachment And attachment isn’t just for kids. As children grow
up and become adults, they no longer restrict their attachment to their primary care-
giver: They gradually widen their attachments to include other family members,
friends, teachers, coworkers, and others in their community. Evidence suggests the pri-
mary attachment relationship, though, continues to serve as a working model for later
important relationships. In other words, whatever the child learns to expect in that
first caregiver relationship becomes the lens through which later relationships are per-
ceived and interpreted. Securely attached children are likely to be well adjusted and
interact easily with others, whereas anxious-ambivalent children often turn into suspi-
cious adults, and avoidantly attached children are least likely to form close emotional
bonds with others.
We should emphasize, however, that—powerful as attachment is—individuals
who lack healthy attachments in infancy and childhood are not necessarily doomed
to failure in life. While attachment problems are good predictors of later problems
with social relationships, many people succeed in overcoming attachment diffi-
culties (Kagan, 1996, 1998). Healthy relationships, later in childhood or even in
adulthood, can “reset” the working model. With such caveats in mind, we now
invite you to take the quiz in the Do It Yourself! box, “What’s Your Attachment
Style?”
Psychosocial Development: Trust versus Mistrust The large body of research on
attachment dovetails nicely with the first stage in one of the major lifespan theories
of development. Erik Erikson (1902–1994) was a prominent psychoanalyst who be-
lieved that, on an unconscious level, we form basic beliefs about ourselves and our
relationship to our social world as we go through life. These basic beliefs influence our
development through the choices we make in our relationships. Furthermore, Erikson
thought each of these basic beliefs developed out of a crisis (which could be resolved
successfully or remain unresolved) at a critical period in our development. Thus, he
characterized each of the eight psychosocial stages in his developmental theory as a
choice between two opposing beliefs, such as trust versus mistrust, the first develop-
mental problem of our lives (see Table 7.1).
Erikson theorized that, in the first 18 months of life, the major developmental
task facing the infant is to develop a sense of trust in the world. As we have seen,
infants who develop a secure attachment style see the world as an interesting place,
full of new experiences to explore. With the knowledge of a primary caregiver as a
“safe base” from which to explore, these infants become prepared to develop into
children (and later into adults) who are comfortable in new situations and pos-
sess an adventurous and resilient spirit to help them through life. Children who do
not develop this will experience difficulties navigating through later developmental
challenges, as the issue of trust remains unresolved and acts as a barrier between the
individual and the social world. To put it more simply, infants who do not develop
a basic sense of trust in their social world will have trouble forming and maintain-
ing satisfactory relationships. In this way, the basic unconscious assumption of trust
fosters the choice to trust others, whereas a basic assumption of mistrust promotes
suspicion.
While Erikson’s theory has its critics, the criticism revolves primarily around
whether his eight stages occur in their prescribed order for everyone or whether
they can be experienced at different times for different people (based at least in
part on cultural norms). Critics also note Erikson’s work was based primarily on
his own clinical observations rather than rigorous scientific methods. Remarkably,
though, many of his observations have since been supported by methodologically
sound research. And his was the first theory of human development to encompass
the entire lifespan: Previous theories were interested only in the first 12 to 17 years
psychosocial stage In Erikson’s theory, the
developmental stages refer to eight major challenges
that appear successively across the lifespan, which
require an individual to rethink his or her goals, as well
as relationships with others.
trust The major developmental goal during the
first 18 months of life. According to Erikson’s theory,
the child must choose between trusting or not trusting
others.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Clinical observation is a form of
the case study method (p. 31).

What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess? 277
of life, with the misguided notion that, once you got through adolescence, you
were fully and permanently developed! For these reasons, Erikson’s theory remains
prominent today in the study of human development. We will return to his theory,
and explore the other seven stages he proposed, in later sections of this chapter.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Not Just Fun and Games: The Role of Child’s Play
in Life Success
Now that we understand that both nature and nurture influence our outcomes in
life, let’s illustrate their interaction by examining a psychological trait of utmost
importance to having success in life: self- control. This ability to restrain our impulses
and make effective choices often requires us to delay instant gratification in pursuit
of longer range success. An ever-growing body of research finds low self- control
to be a strong predictor of delinquency and criminal behavior, while higher self-
control is linked to a variety of positive outcomes—including happier relation-
ships, higher grades, better self-esteem, secure attachment, and less alcohol abuse
(Tangney et al., 2004). Even when the effects of intelligence and social class—two
self-control The ability to delay instant gratifica-
tion in pursuit of longer-range positive outcomes.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Impulse control, as seen in the
classic “marshmallow test,”
is a key element of emotional
intelligence (p. 401).
TABLE 7.1 Erikson’s Psychosocial Stages
Age/Period
(approximate)

Principal Challenge

Adequate Resolution
Inadequate
Resolution
0–1½ years Trust vs. mistrust Basic sense of safety,
security; ability to
rely on forces outside
oneself
Insecurity, anxiety
1½–3 years Autonomy vs. shame
or self-doubt
Perception of self
as agent; capable of
controlling one’s own
body and making
things happen
Feelings of
inadequacy about
self-control, control of
events
3–6 years Initiative vs. guilt Confidence in oneself
as being able to
initiate, create
Feelings of guilt over
one’s limitations or
inabilities
6 years to puberty Industry vs. inferiority Perceived competence
in basic social and
intellectual skills;
self-acceptance
Lack of
self-confidence;
feelings of failure
Adolescence Identity vs. role
confusion
Comfortable sense of
self as a person, both
unique and socially
accepted
Sense of self as
fragmented, shifting,
unclear sense of self
Early adulthood Intimacy vs. isolation Capacity for closeness
and commitment to
another
Feeling of loneliness,
separation; denial of
intimacy needs
Middle adulthood Generativity vs.
stagnation
Focus of concern
beyond oneself, to
family, society, future
generations
Self-indulgent
concerns; lack of
future orientation
Late adulthood Ego-integrity vs.
despair
Sense of wholeness;
basic satisfaction
with life
Feelings of futility,
disappointment

278 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
other strong predictors of success—are accounted for, self-control re-
mains one of the strongest predictors of these important life outcomes
(Moffitt et al., 2011). Clearly, then, self-control is important—so how
do we get it?
Nature—or our genetic inheritance—sets the stage for our baseline
ability to manage our emotions and control our impulses. Evidence for
this is found in twin studies that shows, for example, identical twins
are much more alike in impulsivity than fraternal twins (Vernon et al.,
2008). Notably, however, the genetic contribution to this trait appears to
account for only about 40 percent of it—leaving ample room for envi-
ronmental contributions.
Given what we learned in Chapter 2 about brain development and
plasticity, it stands to reason that the sooner we nurture self-control, the
better our chances of developing it. Parents can teach children to manage their impulses
in a variety of simple ways, such as picking up their toys before going outside, finishing
homework before getting television time, or eating all their vegetables in order to get
dessert. Clear, consistent rules help children learn to manage their worlds and provide
guidelines for achieving their goals. At school, teachers in some programs wear a double-
sided cue card around their neck, showing a green side when children are behaving well,
but flipping it over to the red side as a cue to a child acting irresponsibly. In this way,
children get instant and palatable feedback, which helps them learn to manage their emo-
tions and make positive choices—thus enabling environmental influences to stretch the
“genetic leash” of impulse control.
Rules and structure, however, can go too far. A growing number of child
psychologists are expressing concern at the way childhood play has evolved in past
decades (Berk, 2002). Compared to kids in previous generations, today’s child en-
gages in much more supervised and structured playtime, such as league sports, leaving
less time for imaginative, make-believe play. Why does that matter? Improvisational
play requires more thinking, planning, creativity, and self-management on the child’s
part than does structured play—and these are precisely the skills that help develop a
child’s executive function or the frontal lobe areas in our brains linked to goal attain-
ment and self-regulation. Studies show that kids who engage in more imaginative
play with their peers learn executive functions sooner, resulting in greater cooperation
with peers, more participation and responsibility in assigned tasks, and better social
skills (Elias & Berk, 2002).
What’s more, imaginative play helps build vocabulary. Young children playing doc-
tor, for example, use bigger words than they otherwise would, such as “injection” or
“thermometer.” Preschoolers playing “airport” were overheard telling another “pas-
senger” that her bottle exceeded the 3-ounce liquid limit (Bartlett, 2011). Psychologist
Laura Berk notes that for kids to regulate themselves and their games, they need to
engage in “private speech,” talking themselves through each phase in planning and
carrying out the game. As a result, they gain not only language skills but also cognitive
flexibility and self-control.
The evolution of play styles has another effect, powerfully demonstrated in a
replication study comparing 21st-century children to kids in the 1940s. Among other
things, kids aged 3, 5, and 7 were asked to stand still for a period of time. Seventy
years ago, 5-year-olds could stand still for about three minutes, and 7-year-olds could
do so as long as they needed to. In the current study, however, 5-year-olds couldn’t
stand still at all, and 7-year-olds managed to follow instructions for about three
minutes—equal to that of 5-year-olds in the 1940s study (Spiegel, 2008).
While modern life certainly offers a variety of advantages to children, enhanced self-
control does not appear to be one of them. And “nature” doesn’t evolve so fast as to
explain the changes. Thus, given what research tells us about the connection between
self-regulation and life success in a broad array of areas, parents and teachers may
do well to focus more efforts on creating environments that help kids develop this
important ability.
executive function Cognitive abilities in the
frontal lobes necessary for complex thinking, planning,
and goal-directed behavior
Unstructured, make-believe play helps
children develop executive function, self-
regulation, and self-control.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 279
7.2 KEY QUESTION
What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood?
Three of the greatest accomplishments of your life include acquiring your native
language, forming relationships with important people in your life, and developing your
ability to think and reason. Each of these serves as the basis for further development
later in life. And we will see that, as children work through these tasks, they undergo
profound psychological changes resulting from both their genetic code and their envi-
ronment. Here’s how our Core Concept states the main idea of this section:
Core Concept 7.2
Nature and nurture work together to help children master important
developmental tasks, especially in the areas of language acquisition,
cognitive development, and development of social relationships.
Developmental differences between children and adults are huge, but the differences in
language, thought, and socialization are not simply the result of adults’ greater experi-
ence or store of information. The differences between children and adults also involve
the unfolding of crucial maturational processes. In other words, children’s abilities are
a result of not only their learning but also their unique level of brain development. Let
us first explore these processes at work in the development of language.
How Children Acquire Language
One of the defining characteristics of humans is the use of complex language—our
ability to communicate through spoken and written words and gestures. From a devel-
opmental perspective, human language acquisition is awe inspiring: Newborn children
know no words at all, yet in only a few years, virtually all become fluent speakers of
any language they hear spoken regularly—or see, in the case of gestural languages such
as American Sign Language. What makes them such adept language learners? Develop-
mental specialists believe human infants possess innate abilities geared specifically for
this task (Pinker, 1994, 2006).
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: “Nature” refers to the effects of , and
“nurture” refers to the effects of .
2. APPLICATION: You are a psychologist working in a pediatric
hospital. According to research by Tiffany Fields, which of the
following should staff do to promote healthy development in the
newborns?
a. Talk to them.
b. Touch them.
c. Make eye contact.
d. Sing to them.
3. ANALYSIS: What factors influence the type of attachment style an
infant develops?
4. RECALL: Which of the following are teratogens? (Choose all that
apply)
a. alcohol
b. nicotine
c. prenatal vitamins
d. ginseng
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Describe three
ways that the infant comes into the world prepared to survive and
thrive.
Answers 1. genetics or heredity; the environment 2. b 3. Infant temperament and the consistency and responsiveness of the caregiver 4. a, b, and d
5. Infants have an array of behavioral reflexes, sensory abilities, and social abilities (such as mimicry) that promote adaptation to their environments.
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280 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
Language Structures in the Brain Do children learn language primarily by mim-
icking the sounds and/or signs they hear or see in their environment? According to one
prominent theory, mimicry accounts for only part of their learning. An elegant biologi-
cal foundation underlies the practice children get imitating others—a foundation that
enables much more rapid development of language than mere imitation would allow.
That foundation is an inborn mental structure that psycholinguist Noam Chomsky
(1965, 1977) calls a language acquisition device (LAD). Breaking new ground in our un-
derstanding of language development, Chomsky proposed that humans are born with
a sort of mental software program that helps children acquire the vocabulary, gram-
mar, and rules of the language to which they are exposed. Many experts agree (Hauser
et al., 2002). Further, research based on the Human Genome Project provides evidence
that the foundations of language are, in part, genetic (Liegeois et al., 2001).
In Chomsky’s theory, the LAD, or “mental software program,” contains some very
basic rules common to all human languages. One such rule might be the distinction
between nouns (for names of things) and verbs (for actions). These innate rules, Chom-
sky suggests, make it easier for children to discover patterns in languages to which
they are exposed. Additional evidence for Chomsky’s theory comes from the fact that
children worldwide learn their native languages in very similar stages at very similar
times. A logical hypothesis for explaining this pattern would be that children possess
inborn “programs” for language development that automatically run at certain times
in the child’s life.
Despite the widespread agreement that humans possess an innate ability to acquire
language, we cannot ignore the role of the environment. Although infants are born
with the ability to produce all the sounds in the approximately 4,000 languages spoken
on our planet, by about 6 months of age they seem to have zeroed in on the dominant
language in their environment. The months spent hearing these sounds combine with
their own experiments at verbalization to refine their efforts, and they lose the ability
to produce sounds that are not part of their own language. Children being raised in
a Japanese-speaking culture, for example, lose the ability to distinguish between the
sounds made by the letters R and L, as the letter L is not part of the Japanese language
(Iverson et al., 2003).
Such cultural variations in the specifics of children’s language development suggest
that the built-in capacity for language is not a rigid device, but rather a set of “listening
rules” or guidelines for perceiving language (Bee, 1994; Slobin, 1985a, b). Babies pay
attention to the sounds and rhythms of the sound strings they hear others speak (or
in sign language, see), especially the beginnings, endings, and stressed syllables. Rely-
ing on their built-in “listening guides,” young children can quickly deduce the patterns
and rules for producing their own speech. These observations underscore the notion
that the LAD is flexible, enabling ready adaptation to dominant language in the young
child’s environment (Goldin-Meadow & Mylander, 1990; Meier, 1991).
Acquiring Vocabulary and Grammar So, inborn abilities lay the foundation for
learning language, but how do children learn the specific words and structure of their
particular language? In fact, they are practicing earlier than you probably realized. By
4 months of age, for example, babies are babbling: making repetitive syllables such as
“mamamama.” And babbling isn’t just baby talk—it is the infant beginning to experi-
ment with the building blocks of his or her language. Interestingly, deaf babies raised
in a sign-language environment start babbling at just the same time—but with their
hands, mimicking repetitive syllables from ASL (Pettito & Marentette, 1991). Bab-
bling develops rapidly, and by about their first birthday, babies enter the one-word
stage and are speaking full words. They are also learning new words quite rapidly; you
might notice the “naming explosion,” when children seem to delight in their efforts to
point to objects and name them. By age 2, children enter the two-word stage, which
tremendously increases the range of meanings they can convey. At that point, the aver-
age child has a vocabulary of nearly 1,000 different words (Huttenlocher et al., 1991).
That number burgeons to an astounding 10,000 words by age 6 (Anglin, 1993, 1995).
Over the next several years, the pace of vocabulary acquisition accelerates even more,
language acquisition device (LAD) A
biologically organized mental structure in the brain
that facilitates the learning of language because
(according to Chomsky) it is innately programmed
with some of the fundamental rules of grammar.
babbling The production of repetitive
syllables, characteristic of the early stages
of language acquisition.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 281
as you can see in Figure 7.2, with the average child gaining about 50,000 new words
in that short time span.
Practice Makes Perfect Even though the rapid development of language seems driven
largely by a genetic timetable, the role of culture and the environment impact the de-
gree and the pace at which children learn language. Like many learning tasks, the fre-
quency of practice makes a difference. Mothers generally talk more with their young
daughters than with their young sons (Leaper et al., 1998). Even more pronounced
is the difference between children raised in low- versus middle-SES households (the
term SES refers to socioeconomic status, which is a composite indicator of income and
education level). Parents in low-SES households read to their children an average of
just 25 hours between the ages of 1 and 5—compared to a whopping 1,000 hours in
the middle-SES group (Neuman, 2003). These differences in early learning are evident
in findings that girls and middle-SES children begin kindergarten with more advanced
verbal skills than boys and children from low-income SES families (Ready et al., 2005).
Grammar Turns Vocabulary into Language Even if you have a limited vocabulary, you
can combine the same words in different sequences to convey a rich variety of mean-
ings. For example, “I saw him chasing a dog” and “I saw a dog chasing him” both
use exactly the same words, but switching the order of the words him and dog yields
completely different meanings. Grammar makes this possible: It is a language’s set of
rules about combining and ordering words to make understandable sentences (Naigles,
1990; Naigles & Kako, 1993). Different languages may use considerably different rules
about grammatical combinations. In Japanese, for example, the verb always comes
last, while English is much more lax about verb position. And if you speak Spanish,
you may know that while English speakers would say “the blue house,” in Spanish the
color name would come after the noun (la casa azul).
First Sentences In their early two- and three-word sentences, children produce
telegraphic speech: short, simple sequences of nouns and verbs without plurals, tenses,
or function words like the and of. For example, “Ball hit Evie cry” is telegraphic
speech. To develop the ability to make full sentences, children must learn to use other
forms of speech, such as modifiers (adjectives and adverbs) and articles (the, those),
and they must learn how to put words together grammatically. In English, this means
recognizing and producing the familiar subject-verb-object order, as in “The lamb fol-
lowed Mary.”
Finally, as children’s language ability develops, they become skilled in using
morphemes, the individual meaningful units that make up words. For example, the
word “unmarried,” has three morphemes: “un,” “marry,” and “ed.” Similarly, “subcat-
egories” has three: “sub,” “category,” and “es.” Morphemes can mark verbs to show
tense (walked, walking) and mark nouns to show possession (Maria’s, the people’s)
and plurality (foxes, children). (Can you identify the number of morphemes in each
of those examples?) Often, however, children make mistakes because they do not
know the rule or they apply an inappropriate one (Marcus, 1996). One common error,
known as overregularization, applies a rule too widely and creates incorrect forms. For
example, after learning to make past tense verb forms by adding -d or -ed, children
may apply this “rule” even to its exceptions, the irregular verbs, creating such non-
words as hitted and breaked. Learning to add -s or -es to make plurals, children may
apply the rule to irregular nouns, as in foots or mouses.
Other Language Skills To communicate effectively, words and the grammatical rules
for combining them are only the beginning: children also need to learn the social rules
of conversation. They must learn how to join a discussion, how to take turns talking
and listening, and how to make contributions that are relevant. Adult speakers use body
language, intonation, and facial expressions to enhance their communication. They also
respond to feedback they get from listeners and are often able to take the perspective
of the listener. Children must master these skills to become successful communicators,
which in turn enables them to become part of a human language community.
grammar The rules of a language, specifying how
to use the elements of language and word order to
produce understandable sentences.
telegraphic speech Short, simple sequences
of nouns and verbs without plurals, tenses, or function
words like the and of—somewhat like the language
once used in telegrams.
morpheme A meaningful unit of language that
makes up words. Some whole words are morphemes
(example: word); other morphemes include grammati-
cal components that alter a word’s meaning (examples:
-ed, -ing, and un-).
FIGURE 7.2
Growth in Grade School Children’s
Vocabulary
The number of words in a child’s
vocabulary increases rapidly during the
grade school years—an even faster rate
of increase than during the preschool
years. The chart shows total vocabulary,
including words that a child can use
(production vocabulary) and words that
a child can understand (comprehension
vocabulary). These data were reported in
1995 by J. M. Anglin of the University of
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
Es
ti
m
at
ed
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
w
o
rd
s
kn
o
w
n
10,000
30,000
40,000
20,000
0
50,000
60,000
First Third Fifth
Grade

282 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
As they grow older, children also learn to express abstract meanings, especially as
their thoughts extend beyond the physical world and into their psychological world.
For example, after the age of 2, children begin to use words such as dream, forget,
pretend, believe, guess, and hope as they talk about internal states (Shatz et al., 1983).
They also use words such as happy, sad, and angry to refer to emotional states. Later,
after further cognitive advances, we will explore in the next section, they understand
and use highly abstract words such as truth, justice, and idea.
What is the major point that stands out amid the complexities of language acquisi-
tion? It is part of our Core Concept: Language is a major developmental task of child-
hood—for which children are exquisitely prepared. And the way they acquire and use
language suggests that these early steps on the path to adulthood involve a combination
of learning and innate processes that unfold on their own developmental timetables.
Cognitive Development: Piaget’s Theory
If you have ever known a toddler going through the naming explosion, you have seen
that children have an insatiable appetite for labeling things they know. Behind this
labeling is their emerging ability for thinking, perceiving, and remembering. The next
few pages will focus on how these mental abilities emerge: a process called cognitive
development, which is the second of the three main developmental tasks of childhood
identified in our Core Concept.
Psychologists interested in cognitive development ask such questions as: When do
children realize that objects still exist even when they can’t see them? Do they know
it is possible to hold ideas that aren’t true? Can they understand that people have de-
sires and dreams, but objects do not? Developmental psychologists investigate not only
what children think but also how they think, as illustrated in the pioneering work of
Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget. For nearly 50 years, Piaget observed children’s intellec-
tual development and formulated his observations into a comprehensive theory.
Piaget began this quest to understand the child’s mind by carefully observing the
behavior of his own three children. His methods were simple: He would pose prob-
lems to them, observe their responses, slightly alter the situations, and once again ob-
serve their responses. Piaget paid special attention to the developmental transitions
and changes in his children’s thinking, reasoning, and problem solving. This focus led
to a stage theory of development, which emphasized Piaget’s view that people undergo
distinctive revolutions in their thought processes, producing four discrete stages that
emerge as they move through childhood and adolescence. We will see below that three
key ideas distinguish Piaget’s approach: (1) schemas, (2) the interaction of assimilation
and accommodation, and (3) the stages of cognitive development.
Schemas To illustrate the concept of schemas, think of some four-legged animals. Now
think of some that are friendly. Then think of one that barks. You might have started by
imagining elephants, tigers, cats, and dogs (all four-legged), then narrowed your choices
down to cats and dogs (four-legged and friendly), and finally to just dogs (which bark).
You could do this easily because you have developed mental structures that enable you
to interpret concepts and events. Piaget termed such mental structures schemas. We have
schemas for concepts, such as “dog” and “development.” We have schemas for actions,
such as “eating with chopsticks,” or “studying.” We also have schemas for solving prob-
lems, such as “finding the area of a circle” or “dealing with a crying baby.” In general,
schemas are mental frameworks that guide thinking. According to Piaget, they are also
the building blocks of development. Schemas form and change as we develop and orga-
nize our knowledge to deal with new experiences and predict future events. As you read
this, you are building a schema about schemas!
Assimilation and Accommodation In Piaget’s system, two dynamic processes underlie all
cognitive growth: assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is a mental process
that incorporates new information into existing schemas. So a baby who knows how
to grasp a rattle will apply the same strategy to grab onto a sparkly piece of jewelry
cognitive development The global term for
the development of thought processes from childhood
through adulthood.
stage theory An explanation of development that
emphasizes distinctive or rather abrupt changes. A
stage theory of cognitive development, then, empha-
sizes revolutionary changes in thought processes.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
Schemas are knowledge clusters
or general conceptual frameworks
that provide expectations about
topics, events, objects, people, and
situations in one’s life (p. 221).
schema In Piaget’s theory, a mental structure or
program that guides a developing child’s thought.
assimilation A mental process that incorporates
new information into existing schemas.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 283
worn by his caregiver. Likewise, an older child whose family has a pet canary
might use assimilation during a trip to the zoo when she learns that a large
parrot or flamingo is also a bird. You, too, experience assimilation when you
read about a favorite actor’s new film or learn to use an updated version of a
particular program on your computer. Essentially, when we assimilate, we are
broadening an existing schema by integrating new information into it.
By contrast, we use accommodation when new information does not fit neatly
into an existing schema. Accommodation is the process of restructuring or
modifying schemas to accommodate the new information. Thus, a child who
has learned to grasp rattles and jewelry may have trouble trying to grasp a large
ball the same way. Similarly, if the child on her first trip to the zoo encounters
a bat, she will have to create a new schema for “bat,” since it is a creature with
wings but is not a bird. Adults experience accommodation of their mental schemas too.
For example, the Internet has caused widespread accommodation in the schemas peo-
ple use to conceptualize shopping and communicating. As a student, you may some-
times need to modify your schema for studying when strategies that used to work for
you no longer result in the grades you desire.
Accommodation can also help you adapt to different customs and cultures. For
example, communication rules vary among different cultures, even in the United States.
If your schema for communicating includes a polite pause after one speaker finishes
and another begins, you might not be able to get a word in edgewise if you find
yourself in a group whose schema embraces interrupting and “talking over”
each other. In our increasingly multicultural world, accommodation can be a
very effective strategy in adapting to new environments.
For Piaget, cognitive development results from the continual interweaving
of assimilation and accommodation. Through these two processes, the individu-
al’s behavior and knowledge become less dependent on concrete external reality
and increasingly reliant on internal thought. In general, assimilation makes new
information fit our existing views of the world, and accommodation changes
our views to fit new information.
Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development Now that we understand sche-
mas and how they are affected by new information, let’s examine the four revo-
lutionary changes Piaget observed in children’s perception of the world as they develop.
He described these changes as stages of cognitive growth: the sensorimotor stage (in-
fancy), the preoperational stage (early childhood), the concrete operational stage (mid-
dle childhood), and the formal operational stage (adolescence). At each stage, distinct
thinking styles emerge as the child progresses from sensory reaction to logical thought.
It is important to note that the maturation process dictates that all children progress
through the four stages in the same sequence. Due to the interaction of heredity and
environment, though, some children pass more quickly through a given stage than oth-
ers. A child in an education-rich environment, for example, will master the cognitive
tasks of each stage more rapidly than one with limited educational opportunities.
The Sensorimotor Stage (Birth to about Age 2) We have seen that children enter the world
equipped with many innate sensory abilities and reflexive behaviors, such as recogniz-
ing familiar sounds and the grasping and sucking reflexes. According to Piaget, chil-
dren in the sensorimotor stage explore the world primarily through these senses and
motor actions. For example, they learn to coordinate the information they are receiv-
ing from their senses with their motor abilities, such as learning to swivel their head
to see something behind them, and then to crawl or walk toward it if they desire the
object. Piaget called this sensorimotor intelligence.
During this rapidly evolving stage of development, babies work toward the major
achievement of this stage: object permanence, which begins at about 8 months. Prior
to that time, you might have noticed babies will not look for a toy or other object
that disappears. Piaget interpreted this behavior to mean they did not understand that
the object still existed when they could no longer see it. In other words, it was “out
accommodation A mental process that modifies
schemas in order to include (or accommodate) new
information.
sensorimotor stage The first stage in Piaget’s
theory, during which the child relies heavily on innate
motor responses to stimuli.
sensorimotor intelligence Piaget’s term for
the infant’s approach to the world, relying on rela-
tively simple physical (motor) responses to sensory
experience.
object permanence The knowledge that objects
exist independently of one’s own actions or awareness.
An infant finds that the sucking reflex
works just as well with a bottle as with
a breast and, thus, assimilates when
she adds sucking a bottle to her existing
schema for sucking.
A child who knows that small creatures
with wings are birds uses accommodation
when he learns that this winged creature
is not a bird, but a butterfly.

284 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
of sight, out of mind.” Beginning around 8 months, though, if you show an infant a
toy and then let her see you hide it under, say, a blanket, she will look for it under the
blanket. What’s more, she will reliably do this even with a delay of a minute or more
between the hiding and the seeking. This demonstrates the beginning of the under-
standing of object permanence. Over the next several months, infants develop the abil-
ity to seek something after increasingly longer delays and also become more successful
at finding objects hidden in different locations than they were the first time (Moore &
Meltzoff, 2004).
Object permanence, then, helps us understand separation anxiety, which we briefly
discussed earlier in this chapter. As anyone who has cared for an infant has surely no-
ticed, infants typically become quite upset when you leave—which makes perfect sense
in the early stages of object permanence. After all, they don’t yet understand you will
come back at some point. Instead, when you leave the room, you cease to exist. Imag-
ine how frightening that would be for an infant! Once object permanence is completely
mastered, marking the end of the sensorimotor stage, a child understands that some-
one or something still exists, even when they can’t see it. As a result, most children
grow out of separation anxiety by about age 2.
Concurrently with these accomplishments, infants are learning goal-directed behavior,
as evidenced by their experiments with various objects. For example, a child who drops
a spoon might be very interested in the clatter it makes as it bounces off a tile floor and
want to repeat the action over and over again. What may seem annoying to an onlooker
with sensitive hearing is really just the infant delighting in exercising some control over
his world!
The emergence of object permanence, combined with an infant’s increasing experi-
ments with goal-directed behavior, provide substantial evidence that infants are begin-
ning to form mental representations of objects and to recognize their own relation to the
world. This mental imagery empowers a child’s thinking and problem solving. Imita-
tive behaviors that, early in infancy, were confined to the immediate present situation
will show up after increasing delays in time, in what is the beginning of observational
learning. By 6 months, infants will imitate behaviors they saw the previous day, and
during the second year, they can retain and imitate images of previously seen behaviors
for as long as a month (Klein & Meltzoff, 1999). These achievements of the senso-
rimotor stage propel the toddler into the next stage: the preoperational stage.
The Preoperational Stage (from about 2 to 7 Years of Age) The cognitive advances in the
next developmental stage, the preoperational stage, grow out of the ability to represent
objects mentally. After noting rapid development during the sensorimotor stage, Piaget
seems to have seen the preoperational stage as a sort of transition stage between the
sensorimotor stage and the third stage (the concrete operational stage). In his observa-
tions, this was a period in which symbolic abilities that emerged in the sensorimotor
stage expanded and consolidated. As such, he described the primary features of this
stage as limitations in a child’s thinking, rather than advances. Let’s consider some of
those features.
• Egocentrism causes children to see the world only in terms of themselves and
their own position. Further, they assume that others see the world in the same
way they do. (We hasten to add that Piaget did not intend egocentrism to be
interpreted as selfishness, but rather as a limited perspective on the world.)
Piaget discovered this through an experiment he called the “three mountains
task” (see Figure 7.3).
So, when you are talking to a preoperational child on the phone, she may sim-
ply nod in response to a question you ask (without saying anything), not realizing
you can’t see her nodding. Another charming example of egocentrism is the child
who covers his eyes and then thinks no one can see him! As a result of this egocen-
trism, Piaget thought preoperational children were not yet able to fully empathize
with others or take others’ points of view. This is one aspect of Piaget’s theory that
has been challenged, a point we will elaborate on shortly.
goal-directed behavior An ability that emerges
during the sensorimotor period by which infants de-
velop the ability to keep a simple goal in mind as they
pursue it.
mental representation The ability to form
internal images of objects and events.
preoperational stage The second stage in
Piaget’s theory, marked by well-developed mental
representation and the use of language.
egocentrism In Piaget’s theory, the inability to
realize that there are other viewpoints beside one’s own.
The Preschool
Years: Egocentrism
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What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 285
• Animistic thinking involves the belief that inanimate objects have life and
mental processes, just as people do. This is when we see children having a tea
party with their teddy bears, putting a Band-Aid on a doll that has fallen and
hit the ground, or worrying that trimming a tree might hurt it.
• Centration occurs when a child focuses his attention too narrowly, missing out on
other important information. That is, the child can “center” on only one bit of
information at a time. As a result, the child will not understand the “big picture”
of an event or problem. So, for example, a thirsty child may insist on drinking a
“big glass” of juice, preferring a tall narrow container to a short wide one that in
truth holds an equal amount. In the preoperational child’s mind, the height of the
glass is mistakenly assumed to hold more juice, and the bigger width of the other
glass is not noticed (see Figure 7.4). (See the Do It Yourself! box on page 286.)
• Irreversibility is the inability to think through a series of events or steps involved in
solving a problem and then to reverse course, returning to the mental starting point.
In short, preoperational children lack the mental trial-and-error ability of older chil-
dren to do and then undo an act in their minds. For example, Sam might see Maria
spill a box of raisins on the table and—because the raisins are spread out over a large
area—think, “Wow! Maria has lots more raisins than I have in my little box.” But
preoperational Sam cannot mentally reverse the process and think, “If she put them
all back in the box, it would look like the same amount I have in mine.” This inability
represents the biggest obstacle to logical thinking in the preoperational child.
While we might see these as limitations, it is important to recognize what develop-
ments are taking place during this time. Children are experimenting with their newly
acquired ability to use mental representations, and in the process they are often highly
creative. We see this creativity in the animism they display and in other make-believe
games that are a central feature of the preoperational stage. In fact, it can be argued
that, when creativity in problem solving declines in the next stage, the decline is not
just a gain but in some ways also a loss.
The Concrete Operational Stage (from about 7 to about 11 Years of Age) In the next stage,
children break through the barrier of irreversibility to understand, for the first time,
that many things stay essentially the same even when their superficial appearance
changes. In this concrete operational stage, they can understand that a short, wide glass
can hold as much juice as a tall, narrow one or that the spilled raisins that came out
of the box must fit back into the box. In mastering conservation, the problems that de-
feated the preoperational child now yield to a new understanding of the way volume is
conserved. Similarly, they now understand that a string of red beads is not longer than
an identical string of blue beads, even though the red beads are stretched out in a line
while the blue beads lie in a small pile. They realize the beads look different in their
grouping, but this does not mean they are different in number.
animistic thinking A preoperational mode of
thought in which inanimate objects are imagined to
have life and mental processes.
irreversibility The inability, in the preoperational
child, to think through a series of events or mental
operations and then mentally reverse the steps.
concrete operational stage The third of
Piaget’s stages, when a child understands conservation
but still is incapable of abstract thought.
FIGURE 7.3
Piaget’s Three-Mountain Task
In Piaget’s Three Mountain task, a child
is shown a figure of three mountains.
One mountain has a red cross at the top,
one has a small house, and the third is
snow-capped. On the other side of the
figure (across the table from the child)
sits a doll. When asked which mountain
view the doll has, the preoperational child
typically thinks the doll’s view is the same
as the child’s own view. Piaget used this
task to illustrate egocentrism or the
inability to understand that others’
perspectives may differ from our own.
Source: Berk, L. E. (2007). Development through
the lifespan. 4th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Copyright © 2007 by Pearson Education. Reprinted
by permission of the publisher.
FIGURE 7.4
Conservation of Liquid Task
Preoperational thinkers cannot understand that the amount of liquid remains the same when poured
into a different-sized container. Mastery of this conservation task marks the transition to the con-
crete operational stage
“Do they have the same amount
of water or a different amount?”
“Now watch what I do”
(pouring).
“Do they have the same amount
of water or a different amount?”
conservation The understanding that the
physical properties of an object or substance do not
change when appearances change but nothing is
added or taken away.
centration A preoperational thought pattern
involving the inability to take into account more than
one factor at a time.

286 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
Along with the ability to understand conservation, children at this stage have
another wondrous new ability. They now can solve problems by manipulating concepts
entirely in their minds: That is, they can perform mental operations. This allows concrete
operational children to think things through before taking action. As a result, they may
be less impulsive. They are also less gullible, giving up many “magical” notions, such
as the belief in Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy, that they now believe to be impossible.
Using their ability for performing mental operations, concrete operational
children begin to use simple reasoning to solve problems. The symbols they use in
reasoning are, however, still mainly symbols for concrete objects and events, not ab-
stractions. The limitations of their concrete thinking reveal themselves in the familiar
game of “20 Questions,” the goal of which is to determine the identity of an object
by asking the fewest possible yes/no questions of the person who thinks up the ob-
ject. A child in this stage usually makes a series of specific guesses about what the
object is (“Is it a bird?” “Is it a cat?”), rather than asking higher-level questions that
more efficiently narrow down the possibilities for the correct answer (“Does it fly?”
“Does it have fur?”).
We will save our discussion of Piaget’s final stage of cognitive development—the
formal operational stage—for our discussion of adolescence. For now, suffice it to say
that the final stage involves the development of abstract thought. Table 7.2 summarizes
Piaget’s four stages.
Beyond Piaget: Contemporary Perspectives on Cognitive Development Most
psychologists accept the broad picture Piaget painted of development (Beilin, 1992;
Lourenço & Machado, 1996). However, researchers have shown that children are,
mental operation Solving a problem by manipu-
lating images in one’s mind.
TABLE 7.2 Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development
Stage (Ages) Characteristics and Major Accomplishments
Sensorimotor (approximately 0–2 years) Children explore the world through their senses
and motor abilities. Object permanence and
goal-directed behavior emerge, along with the
beginning of symbolic thought.
Preoperational (approximately 2–7 years) Children’s thought is characterized by
egocentrism, animistic thinking, centration, and
irreversibility. Symbolic thought continues to
develop.
Concrete operations (approximately 7–11 years) Children have mastered conservation and
develop the ability to perform mental operations
with images of concrete, tangible objects.
Formal operations (approximately 12+ years) Teens and adults in this stage develop ability for
abstract reasoning and hypothetical thought.
PLAYING WITH CHILDREN—PIAGETIAN STYLE
If you have access to a child, you can try
out some of the problems Piaget posed for
his children to study their thinking. For
example, with a preoperational or concrete
operational child, it’s always fun to give a
conservation problem that involves pouring
liquid from a tall, narrow container into a
short, wide one. Begin by pouring the same
amounts into two identical vessels, such
as glass measuring cups. Get the child to
agree that you are starting with the same
amount in each. Then pour the liquid
from one vessel into a shallow pan. Ask
the child, “Does one of these have more
than the other, or are they both the same?”
Then see if your child’s responses fit with
Piaget’s observations.
Piaget found that the concrete
operational child—one who understands
conservation—will know that the volume of
liquid remains the same, regardless of the
shape of the container. The preoperational
child will think that the shallow pan has
less because the liquid does not come up as
high on the container. This shows that the
younger child does not know that volume
is conserved, regardless of the shape of the
container. Piaget claimed that it also showed
that the younger child cannot reason about
both height and width simultaneously.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 287
in some ways, more intellectually sophisticated at each stage than Piaget believed
(Munakata et al., 1997).
Hints of Abilities Appear Earlier Than Piaget Thought The limitations Piaget observed in
the sensorimotor and preoperational stages can sometimes be mastered by children
still in these age ranges. Object permanence is one example: The beginning of mental
representation occurs as early as 4 months of age rather than in the second year, as
Piaget thought. Children at that age shown “possible” and “impossible” events do not
show surprise when viewing the possible event, but do show surprise upon seeing the
“impossible” event (Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; see Figure 7.5).
Researchers have also found, in contrast with Piaget’s notion of centration, that
by age 3 or 4, children understand that the unseen insides of objects (such as the in-
side of an egg, a rubber ball, or a dog) are not necessarily identical to their external
appearances (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). And contrary to Piaget’s claims about ani-
mistic thinking, 3- to 5-year-old children, when pressed to do so, are consistently able
to distinguish between real and purely mental (imaginary) entities (Wellman & Estes,
1986). Finally, regarding egocentrism, by age 4 children can often see others’ perspec-
tives, as illustrated by the fact that they use simpler language and shorter words when
talking with 2-year-olds than they do with older children or adults (Gelman & Shatz,
1978). Overall, Piaget’s observations regarding the sequence of stages are accurate, but
children today seem to develop some cognitive skills at a more accelerated pace than
Piaget believed.
A Theory of Mind These cognitive advances signal development of a theory of mind,
which is an understanding that others may have beliefs, desires, and emotions differ-
ent from one’s own and that these mental states underlie their behavior (Frith & Frith,
1999). Your theory of mind underlies your expectations about how people will act in
certain situations—such as when given a gift or when spoken to angrily. Importantly,
it includes recognition that our expectations about others’ actions may have to be ad-
justed based on what we know about the individual in question. This understanding of
others’ mental worlds facilitates empathy for others, enables deception, and increases
our chance of making sound judgments about people when it counts.
Recent evidence indicates these abilities may begin as early as 6 months of age—
which dovetails with recent findings on object permanence discussed in the previous
section. At that age, one study discovered that infants could reliably distinguish be-
tween a helpful character and a harmful character and unfailingly chose the help-
ful character as a playmate (Hamlin et al., 2007). The cognitive milestones of the
theory of mind An awareness that other people’s
behavior may be influenced by beliefs, desires, and
emotions that differ from one’s own.
Test Events
(a) (b)
Possible event Possible event
(c)
Impossible event
FIGURE 7.5
Testing Infants for Object Permanence
In this innovative test of object permanence, infants are shown a series of “possible” and “impossible” events. In (a), a short carrot approaches a
screen with a window at the top, then moves behind the screen, and finally emerges from the other side of the screen. In (b), a tall carrot does the
same thing. The top of the short carrot is not visible through the window as it passes (because it is shorter than the window), but the top of the taller
carrot is visible as it passes the window. Because both of these scenarios are logical, they represent the “possible” events. In (c), a tall carrot
approaches and passes behind the screen, but this time the carrot top is not visible through the window (as it should be). Three- to 4-month-old
infants gaze longer at this “impossible” scenario than they do at the “possible” events, indicating what may be the beginnings of object permanence.
Source: Adapted from Fig. 1, Baillargeon, R., & DeVos, J., 1991, Object permanence in young infants: further evidence. Child Development, 62, p. 1230. © The Society for Research in
Child Development.

288 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
sensorimotor and preoperational stages facilitate further development of this initial ac-
complishment; and, by 5 years of age, children cross-culturally seem to understand that
others’ perceptions of the world may differ from their own (Callaghan et al., 2005).
Stages or Waves? A second criticism of Piaget’s theory questions his notion of the
stages as abrupt transitions. Newer research suggests the transitions between one stage
and another are more continuous than Piaget’s theory implies. Psychologist Robert
Siegler suggests a new metaphor for development (Siegler, 1994). Instead of the abrupt
changes implied by stage theories, he proposes we think of “waves.” The wave metaphor,
he says, better fits both the scientific data and our everyday experience, which shows
the variability of children’s behavior. For example, during a single day, a child may
use several different strategies to solve the same linguistic problem: “I ate,” “I eated,”
and “I ated.” This is not the pattern we would find if a child were making a sudden
leap from one stage to another. Instead, says Siegler, this is a pattern of overlapping
developmental waves, where each wave can be thought of as the ebb and flow in the
strength of a cognitive strategy (Azar, 1995).
The Importance of Culture in Learning Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1934, 1987)
emphasized the importance of cultural values and practices in a child’s cognitive de-
velopment, including the role of communication in learning. For Vygotsky, cognitive
development was really the mental mastery of the rules and norms of a culture, trans-
mitted via social interaction. Vygotsky’s work, supported by others in more recent years
(Conner & Cross, 2003; Rogoff, 2003), demonstrates how adults and other “experts”
can help children develop their cognitive abilities more rapidly using a process called
scaffolding. Just as a wood and steel scaffold provides support for the construction of
buildings, cognitive scaffolding creates a support structure for constructing knowledge.
By paying close attention to a child’s current skill level, parents or teachers can tailor
their instruction to that child by attaching each new lesson to something the child al-
ready knows. Vygotsky further identified the need for new challenges to be a bit beyond
the child’s current learning, but reachable with a little help, and not so far out of reach
as to set the child up to fail. This zone of proximal development provides an important
guideline for the parent or teacher in creating a learning plan for the child.
Social and Emotional Development
Our health, happiness, and even our survival depend on forming meaningful, effective
relationships in the family, with peers—and, later in life, on the job. As children, we
begin the long process of learning the rules our society follows for social and political
interactions. Children must also learn to monitor their own feelings and behavior and
to understand those of others. This process of social and emotional development is one
of the most important developmental tasks of childhood, and it relies on both nature
and nurture.
Temperament One powerful influence on the way children interact with the world
is their temperament. Psychologists use the term temperament for an individual’s
inherited, “wired-in” pattern of personality and behavior. Harvard researcher Jerome
Kagan, who has studied temperament in thousands of children, observed that about
20 percent of children are born with tendencies toward shyness, while about 40 percent
are born predisposed to boldness (Kagan, 1998). Shy babies, in the face of unfamiliar
situations, become upset or withdrawn and are likely to try to avoid the situation. Bold
babies, on the other hand, are more sociable and likely to react with interest to new
situations.
Brain-imaging studies indicate these differences are physiological: Shy babies have
more active amygdalas than do bold babies (Schwartz et al., 2003). These active amyg-
dalas set in motion a series of physiological responses to stress, such as higher heart
rate, release of stress hormones, and greater skin temperature changes in response to
new situations. Thus, the shy children are physiologically wired to be more sensitive
wave metaphor A way of conceptualizing
cognitive development as occurring more gradually—
in “waves”—rather than abruptly, as the stage theory
suggests.
temperament An individual’s characteristic
manner of behavior or reaction—assumed to have a
strong genetic basis.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
The amygdala, a part of the
limbic system, is especially
involved in the emotions of fear
and aggression (p. 68).
scaffolding A teaching strategy which empha-
sizes the role of help from others in providing support
for a person’s learning.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 289
to change and stress than their bold, sensation-seeking counterparts. This sensitivity
may promote an advantage in interpersonal relations, however. Child development re-
searcher Grazyna Kochanska (2009) suggests that fearfulness in children plays an im-
portant role in the child’s moral development, fostering awareness of the consequences
for wrongdoings—including empathy for the victim. Children who exhibit normal
fearfulness are more likely to feel guilty after committing an offense, and that guilt
helps serve as a deterrent later to repeated wrongdoings.
While basic temperaments can be recognized almost at birth, they are not written
in stone (Kagan, 1996). From very early on, the environment interacts with these genetic
tendencies, so that parenting styles and other aspects of a child’s experience can modify
the way temperament expresses itself. Oftentimes, people are less likely to engage and
be playful with a shy baby, which will accentuate the child’s initial disposition. On the
other hand, if a shy baby’s parents recognize the child’s withdrawal and gently play
with her and encourage her to interact, the child will become more outgoing than her
temperament would otherwise have predicted. And a bold child reared by bold parents
will certainly experience and respond to the world differently than will a bold child
reared by timid or fearful parents. Thus, children are capable of learning a variety of
responses to the world within their hereditary temperamental range—as long as people
in their environment teach them.
Temperament is remarkably stable over time; that is, your temperament at birth is
generally similar to your temperament throughout childhood, adolescence, and adult-
hood. While environmental influences can modify a temperament somewhat, the genetic
leash limits the extent of change. Thus, it is important to note that no temperament is
ideal for all situations. We should “remember that in a complex society like ours, each
temperamental type can find its adaptive niche” (Kagan, quoted in Gallagher, 1994,
p. 47). Much of our individual life success is linked to our ability to find an environment
that capitalizes on our strengths.
Socialization Through interaction with your parents, peers, and others, you learned
how to get along with people, a developmental task called socialization. Socialization,
however, doesn’t just happen in childhood. It is the lifelong process of shaping an indi-
vidual’s behavior patterns, values, standards, skills, attitudes, and motives to conform
to those considered desirable in a particular society (Hetherington & Parke, 1975).
Institutions such as family, schools, and the media exert pressure on the child to adopt
socially approved values. Socialization of gender roles is one example: Boys and girls
are often taught different ways of behaving and interacting. Leisure-time choices,
such as television and peers, have heavy influences as well. An increasing number of
preschool children are shaped also by their experiences in day care. And one other
influence is of supreme importance: parenting styles.
Four Parenting Styles and Their Effects Most approaches to child rearing fall into one
of four distinct parenting styles found in families all over the world (Baumrind, 1967,
1971; Russell et al., 2002). (As you read about these, you might try to imagine how
you may have turned out differently if your parents had used one of the other ap-
proaches.) Authoritarian parents often live by the slogan, “Spare the rod and spoil the
child.” They demand conformity and obedience and tolerate little discussion of rules,
which they enforce with punishment or threats of punishment. In an alternative ap-
proach, authoritative parents can be demanding, too. They have high expectations of
their children, which they enforce with consequences. But unlike authoritarian parents,
they combine high standards with warmth and respect for the child’s views: They are
quite willing to listen to a child’s ideas and feelings and often encourage a democratic
family atmosphere. Authoritative parents usually place a heavy emphasis on reasoning
and explaining to help children learn to anticipate the consequences of their behavior.
Taking a third approach, permissive parents set few rules and allow children to make
their own decisions. Like authoritative parents, they are caring and communicative,
but permissive parents give most decision-making responsibility to their children. Per-
missive parents believe children can learn better from the consequences of their own
socialization The lifelong process of shaping
an individual’s behavior patterns, values, standards,
skills, attitudes, and motives to conform to those
regarded as desirable in a particular society.
authoritarian parent One of the four parenting
styles, characterized by demands for conformity and
obedience, with little tolerance for discussion of rules,
which the parent enforces with punishment or threats
of punishment.
authoritative parent One of the four parent-
ing styles, characterized by high expectations of the
children, which the parent enforces with consequences
rather than punitive actions. Authoritative parents
combine high standards with warmth and respect for
the child’s views.
permissive parent One of the four parenting
styles, characterized by setting few rules and allowing
children to make their own decisions. While they may
be caring and communicative, permissive parents give
most decision-making responsibility to their children.
TemperamentWatch the Video
at MyPsychLab

290 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
actions than they can from following rules set by their parents. Finally, uninvolved par-
ents tend to be either indifferent or rejecting, sometimes to the point of neglect or abuse
(Maccoby & Martin, 1983). Typically, parents in this group lead such stress-filled lives
that they have little time or energy for their children (see Table 7.3).
You can probably guess the usual outcomes of these different parenting styles.
Research shows children with authoritative parents tend to be confident, self-reliant, and
enthusiastic. Overall, these children are happier, less troublesome, and more successful.
Those with permissive or uninvolved parents are typically less mature, more impulsive,
more dependent, and more demanding. Children with authoritarian parents tend to be
anxious and insecure. In fact, in some cases, authoritarian parenting may be a risk fac-
tor for antisocial behavior. A groundbreaking new study examined the combined effects
of parenting style and attachment style on children’s outcomes. The findings? In inse-
curely attached children, authoritarian parenting increased their risk of later antisocial
behavior. Securely attached children, on the other hand, were able to tolerate authoritar-
ian parenting without become oppositional. Researchers suggest that secure attachment
may serve a protective role, leading the child to interpret the parent’s harsher parenting
behaviors as benevolent rather than threatening—as an insecurely attached child might
(Kochanska et al., 2009).
Thinking back to our earlier discussion of attachment, these findings shouldn’t be
surprising. Generally speaking, authoritative parents take a more involved, interactive
role in their children’s lives—forming a stronger social–emotional attachment—than
do the other three types of parents. This lays a strong foundation for prosocial behav-
ior in the developing child.
Much of the early research on parenting styles was conducted in middle-class
Western cultures. Can we expect the same findings elsewhere? Recent studies reveal
that culture does play a role in parenting styles and parenting effectiveness, but not in
uninvolved parent One of the four parenting
styles, characterized by indifference or rejection, some-
times to the point of neglect or abuse.
TABLE 7.3 Features of the Four Parenting Styles

Style
Emotional
Involvement

Authority

Autonomy
Authoritarian Parent is cold and
rejecting; frequently
degrades the child.
Parent is highly
demanding; may
use coercion by
yelling, commanding,
criticizing, and
reliance on
punishment.
Parent makes most
decisions for the
child; rarely listens to
child’s viewpoint.
Authoritative Parent is warm,
attentive, and
sensitive to child’s
needs and interests.
Parent makes
reasonable demands
for the child’s maturity
level; explains and
enforces rules.
Parent permits child
to make decisions
in accord with
developmental
readiness; listens to
child’s viewpoint.
Permissive Parent is warm, but
may spoil the child.
Parent makes few or
no demands—often
out of misplaced
concern for child’s
self-esteem.
Parent permits child
to make decisions
before the child is
ready.
Uninvolved Parent is emotionally
detached, withdrawn,
and inattentive.
Parent makes few or
no demands—often
lacking in interest or
expectations for the
child.
Parent is indifferent to
child’s decisions and
point of view.
Source: Berk, L. E. (2004). Development through the lifespan, 3rd ed. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Copyright © 2004
by Pearson Education. Published and reprinted by permission of Allyn & Bacon, Boston, MA.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 291
the way you might think. Chinese, Hispanic, and Asian Pacific Island parents all tend
to engage in stricter parenting than many Western parents and, from a distance, may
resemble the authoritarian parenting style. A closer look, however, reveals that these
same parents typically combine their strict rules and demands for respect with a great
deal of warmth—especially from fathers. When this combination is present, children
exhibit the same positive outcomes seen in Western children with authoritative parents
(Berk, 2007). And in the United States, low-SES African American families exert high
degrees of control over their children with positive results: These children do better
in school and with peers than their counterparts who do not receive strict parenting
(Taylor, Hinton, & Wilson, 1995).
Effects of Day Care As working parents increasingly rely on day care for their children,
many people are asking the following question: How necessary is it to have a full-
time caregiver? The question is an urgent one in many countries, including the United
States, where more than 60 percent of women with children under 6 years of age work
outside the home, and more children are cared for by paid providers than by relatives
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009).
The research on this issue sends mixed messages. First, the good news: Most chil-
dren thrive in day care. Both intellectually and socially, they do as well as—sometimes
better than—children raised at home by a full-time parent. Now, the bad news: Poor-
quality day care experiences can influence children to be aggressive, depressed, or oth-
erwise maladjusted. Fortunately, ongoing nationwide studies of child care indicate that
the overwhelming majority of day care centers do a fine job (Bower, 1996; NICHD
Early Child Care Research Network, 2003, 2007).
As important as day care is in our society, it is comforting to note that having
alternative caregivers does not in itself cause psychological problems. Rather, difficul-
ties appear most often in poorly staffed centers where large numbers of children get
little attention from only a few adults (Howes et al., 1988; NICHD Early Child Care
Research Network, 2000). Another source of difficulty results from the unfortunate fact
that children who are placed in the poorest quality day care programs are most often
from the poorest, most disorganized, and most highly stressed families. Developmental
psychologist Laura Berk (2004) concludes that this volatile combination of inadequate
day care and family pressure places some children at high risk for emotional and be-
havioral problems. Yet, she says, using this evidence to curtail day care services would
be mistaken, because forcing a parent on a marginal income to stay home may expose
children to an even greater level of risk.
All this means that day care is, in itself, neither good nor bad. It is the quality of
care, whether given by a parent or a paid provider, that makes all the difference. Devel-
opment expert Sandra Scarr (1998) says:
There is an extraordinary international consensus among child-care researchers
and practitioners about what quality child care is: It is warm, supportive inter-
actions with adults in a safe, healthy, and stimulating environment, where early
education and trusting relationships combine to support individual children’s
physical, emotional, social, and intellectual development . . . (p. 102).
Leisure Influences Children and adolescents in the United States and other industrial-
ized countries have much more free time than do children elsewhere in the world. In
nonindustrialized societies, children average some six hours a day working at some
sort of chores or labor. By comparison, the typical American child spends less than
one-half hour at such tasks. On the other hand, American children spend more time
(on the average) doing schoolwork than did children in years past—although not as
much as their foreign counterparts in other industrialized countries. Overall, though,
the amount of free time available to U.S. children has increased dramatically over the
last several generations (Larson, 2001). On average, American children today spend
between 40 and 50 percent of their waking hours in discretionary activity.

292 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
What do children and teens do with all this leisure time? Almost seven hours
per day (averaged to include weekends) is spent with media: A majority of that
time is spent watching television, with an additional two hours a day on the com-
puter and playing video games (Kaiser Foundation, 2005). Reading for pleasure
is moderately popular; it is more so for girls than boys, though, and declines for
both sexes as children grow into adolescence (Nippold et al., 2005). Time spent
playing decreases as a child ages, becoming replaced largely by media-oriented
activities, which are often engaged in with friends as well. Overall, kids and teens
spend twice as much time with media as they do with friends and family com-
bined, and six times more than they spend in physical activity, reading, or doing
homework.
What impact do these leisure-time activities have on a child’s development?
Research findings are mixed. Time with friends is associated with well-being at all ages
(Rawlins, 1992) and may be especially important in adolescence. Playing sports, which
kids and teens do for just over an hour a day on average, has obvious benefits for
health, as well as—depending on the sport and the environment—leadership, coopera-
tion, and motivation. The effects of television, a topic of close scrutiny over the past
few decades, seem to depend primarily on the type of programming being viewed.
Educational television, which accounts for about 25 percent of children’s television
viewing, has a positive impact on literacy and cognitive development (Linebarger
et. al., 2004). Heavy viewing of entertainment television, on the other hand, is a
strong predictor of later deficiency in reading ability for young children (Ennemoser
& Schneider, 2007). And the hundreds of studies examining the impact of viewing
violent television leave no doubt that it increases aggressive behavior in viewers
(Strasburger, 1995). Moreover, viewing any kind of entertainment television prior
to the age of the 3 is powerfully linked to attention problems later in childhood
(Zimmerman & Christakis, 2007). We will examine the mechanics of this associa-
tion in the Psychology Matters feature on ADHD at the end of this section.
Playing video games with violent content affects aggression in a manner similar
to that of watching violent television. In addition, research shows that violent video
games decrease players’ sensitivity to real-world violence (Carnagey et al., 2007) and
also decrease prosocial (helping) behavior (Anderson & Bushman, 2001). On the other
hand, frequent video-gaming appears to improve visual–spatial processing (Green &
Bavelier, 2007). And not all video games are violent. Educational video games can im-
prove critical thinking and learning in a variety of subjects ranging from social stud-
ies to math. Once again, the message seems clear: The content matters more than the
medium itself.
Gender Differences in Socialization Anyone watching young boys and girls playing will
notice gender differences in their social interaction. The sexes usually prefer to segre-
gate themselves—a pattern that holds across cultures (Maccoby, 1998, 2000). In their
play, boys are typically more aggressive than girls, although there are certainly excep-
tions. Girls tend to organize themselves into small, cooperative groups. By contrast,
boys often form larger groups with a hierarchical structure or “pecking order.” In these
groups, individual boys continually compete for higher ranking positions. They fre-
quently resort to aggressive tactics, such as hitting, shoving, and verbal threats. Gender
differences are noticeable in choices of leisure activities as well. Boys are more likely
to play sports or computer games with their leisure time than girls are, whereas girls
watch more television (Cherney & London, 2006).
Evolutionary psychologists believe these gender differences have an innate basis
(Buss, 1999), which may be related, in part, to gender differences in testosterone lev-
els (Dabbs, 2000). This does not mean, of course, that environmental factors, such as
parenting styles and peer influences, make no difference. Social-cognitive theorists like
Kay Bussey and Albert Bandura (1999) remind us that children also learn gender roles
and gender-related behaviors, such as aggressiveness, competitiveness, or cooperation,
from their social environments and role models.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Habituation occurs when we
become desensitized to a
repeated stimulus so that it
no longer produces the initial
response (p. 135).
Children and teens in the United States
spend less time studying than do their
counterparts in other industrialized
countries—a finding thought to be related
to U.S. students’ lower scores on
standardized tests.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 293
Psychosocial Development in Childhood: Erikson’s Stages In the first section of
this chapter, we introduced you to Erikson’s theory of lifespan development and exam-
ined his first stage of trust versus mistrust. In childhood, individuals progress through
three more of Erikson’s stages, each time encountering a new “crossroad” and develop-
ing another key component in their schemas about themselves and their relation to the
world. What do these stages reveal about what the social world looks like through a
child’s eyes?
Autonomy versus Shame or Self-Doubt In the second stage, which runs from about
18 months to 3 years of age, toddlers are rapidly learning to walk and talk. This
increasing level of interaction with the world is laden with opportunities to directly
influence outcomes. To develop a sense of independence or autonomy—the main devel-
opmental task in this stage—children need freedom (and sometimes encouragement)
to try to do things on their own when appropriate. Too much restriction or criticism
can lead to self-doubt, whereas harsh demands made too early, such as attempting
toilet training before the child is ready, can lead to shame and discourage efforts to
persevere in mastering new tasks; hence the name for this stage, autonomy versus
shame or self-doubt. Children who enter this stage with a general sense of trust in the
world are more likely to successfully develop autonomy than children who did not
master the first stage.
Although Erikson didn’t address the role of temperament in psychosocial devel-
opment, we should point out its influence: We would expect shy children to need
more gentle encouragement than bold children. Thus, although a nurturing and
supportive environment is key to development of autonomy, nature plays a role
as well.
Initiative versus Guilt Once a child develops trust and autonomy, the third challenge is to
cultivate initiative, or the ability to initiate activities oneself, rather than merely responding
to others. During the preschool years, autonomous children will become more purpose-
ful, wanting to choose what to wear, what to eat, or how to spend their time. The danger
at this stage comes from overcontrolling adults, who may demand an impossible degree
of self-control (“Why can’t you sit still?”), which can result in the child feeling overcome
by inadequacy and guilt. The term for this stage reflects these two alternatives: initiative
versus guilt. Caregivers’ responses to self-initiated activities either encourage or discour-
age the freedom and self-confidence needed for the next stage.
Industry versus Inferiority Children who successfully master Erikson’s first three stages
enter elementary school ready to develop their skills and competencies in a more
systematic way. From ages 6 to 12, school activities and sports offer arenas for
learning more complex intellectual and motor skills, while peer interaction offers
the chance to develop social skills. Successful efforts in these pursuits lead to feel-
ings of competence, which Erikson called industry. Nurturing and supportive parent-
ing at this stage helps children reflect on their experiences, learning from both their
successes and failures and also recognizing that some failures are inevitable. On
the other hand, children with overly demanding or disengaged parents may have
trouble seeing their failures in perspective and ultimately develop a sense of inferi-
ority. Likewise, youngsters who had trouble with one or more of the earlier stages
may become discouraged spectators rather than performers, leading also to feelings
of inferiority rather than competence. The term for this stage, therefore, is industry
versus inferiority.
In summary, we have seen how development of language, cognitive skills, and
social competencies all interact during the rapid growth and changes of childhood.
Individual gains in each of these areas progress on a general biological timetable, but
the pace and nature of the gains are heavily influenced by our environment. In the
next section, we will see how these achievements of childhood lay the foundation for
another period of rapid changes: the world of adolescence.
autonomy In Erikson’s theory, autonomy is the
major developmental task of the second stage in
childhood. Achieving autonomy involves developing a
sense of independence, as opposed to being plagued
by self-doubt.
initiative In Erikson’s theory, initiative is the major
developmental task in the third stage of childhood.
Initiative is characterized by the ability to initiate
activities oneself, rather than merely responding to
others or feeling guilt at not measuring up to other’s
expectations.
industry Erikson’s term for a sense of confidence
that characterizes the main goal of the fourth develop-
mental stage in childhood. Children who do not develop
industry (confidence) will slip into a self-perception of
inferiority.

294 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
The Puzzle of ADHD
Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), is a psychological disorder found in
3 to 5 percent of school-age children in America, with cross-cultural prevalence similar
at about 5 percent (Faraone et al., 2003). Symptoms of ADHD include poor impulse
control, difficulty concentrating on a task for a sustained period of time, high distract-
ibility, and excessive activity. In boys, these symptoms often manifest themselves in dis-
ruptive behavior—such as the boy who frequently jumps out of his seat in class, blurts
out answers, or interrupts a conversation. In girls, however—who comprise only about
20 percent of ADHD diagnoses—the disorder more often looks like lack of organiza-
tion or a tendency to lose things. In both boys and girls, these difficulties bleed over
into multiple domains, often resulting in poor academic performance and unstable peer
relationships. In fact, the impact of symptoms on multiple domains in life is a key crite-
rion for diagnosis of ADHD and necessary to distinguish true ADHD from commonly
occurring symptoms of stressful lives or features of normal childhood development.
The disorder seems to follow a predictable developmental path, with symptoms ap-
pearing in the early childhood years and, in roughly 50 percent of cases, spontaneously
fading away as the child enters adolescence. Nonetheless, some individuals continue to
exhibit symptoms of ADHD throughout adulthood.
ADHD has received quite a bit of public attention in recent years, and as a result,
most people know something about it. As is often the case, though, the layperson’s
knowledge of a psychological disorder may rely on media reports, Hollywood por-
trayals, and the words of a well-meaning (but sometimes misinformed) friend or even
teacher—and consequently isn’t as factual as he or she thinks it is. And overconfidence
in one’s knowledge about something medical or psychological sometimes leads to self-
diagnosis, which may or may not be accurate. Given the increasing numbers of our
students who report having symptoms of ADHD, we think it’s important to set the re-
cord straight about what ADHD is, what we know about its causes, and what research
tells us about effective treatments.
What Causes ADHD?
Research to determine the causes of ADHD is in the early stages, although twin studies
and other heritability research point to a strong genetic component. From a nurture
perspective, prenatal exposure to nicotine and alcohol have been found to increase
incidence of ADHD. And while some theories of environmental causes—such as a diet
too high in sugar—have been debunked, recent research has revealed some provocative
findings. As we know, the first few years of life are a time when the brain is developing
synaptic connections at a furious pace. A recent longitudinal study with a nationally
representative sample now provides strong evidence that viewing noneducational tele-
vision prior to the age of 3 predicts attention deficits later in childhood (Zimmerman &
Christakis, 2007). What’s more, the culprit wasn’t only violent television—even non-
violent entertainment programs and DVDs produced this effect. Researchers suggest
it is the fast-paced movement of entertainment programming driving the finding: In
other words, watching programs that quickly and frequently switch from one scene
to another—during a time when brain connections are forming—limits the brain’s
opportunities to create pathways for more extended focus and concentration. Instead,
it trains the brain to seek rapid changes in stimulation. It’s easy to see how this sets a
child up for problems with attention span later in life. This also explains why viewing
similar amounts of educational television (which moves more slowly) did not increase
incidence of attention deficits later in childhood. The study controlled for other fac-
tors that may influence development of attention deficits, such as family environment,
parenting style, and cognitive stimulation. According to a companion study, 90 percent
of children under 24 months regularly watch television, and half of what they view is
entertainment television (Zimmerman et al., 2007).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
ADHD is classified as one of
several developmental disorders—a
category that also includes autism
and dyslexia (p. 542).
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) A psychological disorder involving poor
impulse control, difficulty concentrating on a task for
a sustained period of time, high distractibility, and
excessive activity.

What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood? 295
Physiologically, how does an ADHD brain differ from a “normal” brain? One impor-
tant difference has to do with the neurotransmitter dopamine, active when a person is
engaged in an interesting task. People with ADHD seem to receive fewer and/or weaker
dopamine bursts, which correlates with less engagement and long-term interest in a task.
And while earlier research indicated that ADHD brains were smaller than non-ADHD
brains, newer research reveals that ADHD brains develop normally and achieve normal
size; they simply take a few years longer to do so in the cortical regions. The prefron-
tal cortex is slowest to develop in ADHD brains—up to five years later than non-ADHD
brains—which fits with ADHD patients’ difficulties staying focused on a multistep task
requiring planning and follow-through. Interestingly, the motor cortex actually develops
faster than normal in ADHD brains, which researchers suggest might explain the hyperac-
tivity feature of ADHD (Shaw et al., 2007). Overall, the finding that ADHD brains develop
normally, albeit more slowly, may explain why some children with ADHD seem to “grow
out of it” sometime in adolescence—but still leaves a puzzle as to why some do not.
How Can ADHD Be Treated?
Both medication and psychological treatments can be effective in treating ADHD,
but optimal treatment varies considerably among individuals. Some do very well on
medication, but careful monitoring and management by a physician with expertise in
ADHD is highly recommended to match each patient with the right medication and
dosage for that individual. Also, findings suggest periodic “trial withdrawals” to deter-
mine whether a child still needs medication (Swanson et al., 2007a)—of course, trial
withdrawals must be conducted with the close supervision of the prescribing physician.
Alternatively, behavioral therapy helps children with ADHD learn to control some
of their problematic behaviors and replace them with more effective behaviors—for
example, learning to recognize an impulse and count to 10 before acting on it. Parents
and other family members are crucial partners in effective behavioral therapy. Parents
can set clear expectations and use principles of operant conditioning to help shape the
child’s behavior, one step at a time. All members of the family can help provide redirec-
tion when the child loses focus and reinforcement for each success. As with any type
of behavior modification program, though, consistency is important, which means the
family must prioritize the time and attention necessary for treatment to be effective—
which can be a challenge when a family is already juggling multiple tasks and priorities.
Behavioral therapy is the treatment of choice for very young children (for whom
medication is not recommended). Also, it may be the best initial treatment for some-
one who has recently developed symptoms of ADHD; then, if it does not improve
symptoms, medication may be added to the treatment plan. Indeed, one recent
national study found that, for many, a combination of medication and behavior treat-
ment works best (MTA Cooperative Group, 1999).
In closing, we offer a few notes of caution. First, although studies to date do not
show any serious long-term effects of ADHD medication, it may be too soon to know
for sure. We do know that children not taking ADHD medication grow about an inch
taller, on average, than those who have taken medication such as Ritalin (Swanson
et al., 2007). Also, families and teachers should keep in mind the power of labeling.
When we label someone as having ADHD, especially without a valid diagnosis, we
run the risk of the individual developing an identity consistent with the symptoms
of ADHD, habits that later may be hard to overcome—even if the individual’s brain
no longer fits the ADHD profile. Finally, a recent article offers what may be a more
balanced perspective on the disorder:
[We must] remember that ADHD children possess many positive traits. They
tend to be free-spirited, inquisitive, energetic and funny, as well as intelligent
and creative. Their behavior is often spontaneous, helpful and sensitive. Many
ADHD children are talented multitaskers, last-minute specialists and impro-
visationalists. Parents and educators should encourage these strengths and let
their children know whenever possible that these qualities are highly valued
(Rothenberger & Banaschewski, 2007).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Behavioral psychology examines
how we learn by association and by
reward and punishment (p. 135).

296 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
7.3 KEY QUESTION
What Changes Mark the Transition of Adolescence?
Were all your developmental tasks finished by the time you entered adolescence (or, in
plain English, were you “all grown up”)? Most early theorists thought so. After that,
they assumed, the psyche was set for life and would undergo few important changes.
Modern research disputes these older views. Today’s psychologists agree that we have
a remarkable capacity for developmental change throughout our lifespan (Kagan,
1996, 1998). Again, in adolescence, the big changes lie in three important areas—as
our Core Concept says:
Core Concept 7.3
Adolescence offers new developmental challenges growing out of
physical changes, cognitive changes, and socioemotional pressures.
When does adolescence begin? Or, to put the question more personally, what event first
made you think of yourself as an adolescent? Chances are it had something to do with
your sexual maturation, such as a first menstrual period or a nocturnal ejaculation.
Psychologists mark the beginning of adolescence at the onset of puberty, when sexual
maturity (the ability to reproduce) is attained. Besides sexual maturity, what else hap-
pens during adolescence? And when does adolescence end and adulthood begin?
Adolescence and Culture
Variations among cultures compound the difficulty of specifying the span of adolescence.
Although the physical changes that take place at this stage are universal, the social and
psychological dimensions of adolescence depend heavily on cultural context. For ex-
ample, if you enter your teen years in a society that celebrates puberty as the entry to
adulthood and rewards you with power to make responsible choices, you will have a
adolescence In industrial societies, a develop-
mental period beginning at puberty and ending (less
clearly) at adulthood.
Check Your Understanding
1. ANALYSIS: Is the human ability for language innate or learned?
Explain your answer.
2. MATCHING: Match the ability/limitation with the Piagetian stage
at which it becomes an important characteristic of thinking:
a. conservation
b. egocentrism
c. object permanence
1. sensorimotor stage
2. preoperational stage
3. concrete operational stage
3. APPLICATION: Imagine that you are a family counselor. What
parenting style would you encourage parents to adopt in order to
promote confidence and self-reliance in their children?
4. ANALYSIS: According to research cited in this section, what is
the best advice you can give parents about whether their children
should watch television and play video games?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Which is most
important for healthy development in childhood: nature or nurture?
Answers 1. We are born with specialized structures in our brain especially designed for language, but environmental factors—such as frequency
of exposure to language and the specific language spoken or signed in the environment—determine the pace and type of language that develops.
Thus, it is both innate and learned. 2. a = 3; b = 2; c = 1 3. Authoritative 4. Educational television promotes literacy and cognitive development, but
viewing of entertainment television predicts later reading deficiencies in young children and is also linked to development of ADHD. Violent television
increases aggression in viewers. Violent video games do the same and also decrease sensitivity to real-world violence and reduce the likelihood of
prosocial behavior. Educational video games can improve critical thinking and learning. 5. Nature and nurture both play critical roles in healthy
development.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

What Changes Mark the Transition of Adolescence? 297
very different experience than someone whose culture dismisses teenagers as confused
and potentially dangerous troublemakers.
Can you imagine becoming an “adult” around age 13? In most nonindustrial soci-
eties, that is the norm: There is not an adolescent stage as we know it. Instead, children
in these societies move directly into adulthood with rites of passage. These rituals usu-
ally take place about the time of puberty and serve as public acknowledgment of the
transition from childhood to adulthood. Rites of passage vary widely among cultures,
from extremely painful rituals to periods of instruction on sexual and cultural practices
or periods of seclusion involving survival ordeals. For example, in some tribal groups,
a young person takes a meditative journey alone or submits to symbolic scarring or
circumcision surrounded by friends and family. Once individuals have completed the
passage, there is no ambiguity about their status: They are adults, and ties to their
childhood have been severed.
Our own culture has some transition rituals, but the meanings are less well defined,
and as a result, they do not provide clear markers for the beginning of adolescent
or adult status. Qualifying for a driver’s license is one such rite of passage for many
middle-class teens in America. Another, which you might recall, is high school gradua-
tion. Mexican American girls may celebrate quinceañeras, and Jewish American teens
may celebrate bat mitzvahs or bar mitzvahs. All of these provide a young person with
an added measure of freedom and independence not available to children, but none
are necessarily aligned with the transition into or out of adolescence.
Although many issues loom large in adolescence, we will focus on the most impor-
tant developmental tasks confronting adolescents in the United States and the indus-
trialized Western world. The central task of this period is establishing one’s identity.
That complex process includes coming to terms with physical maturity, achieving a
new level of cognitive development, redefining social roles and emotional issues, deal-
ing with sexual opportunities and pressures, and the development of moral standards.
We begin with the physical changes marking the end of childhood and the onset of
adolescence.
Physical Maturation in Adolescence
One of the first signs of approaching adolescence is the pubescent growth spurt.
Puberty, or sexual maturity, for boys begins with increasing size of the testicles, while
for girls typically begins with the development of breasts. Sprouting of pubic hair gen-
erally follows for both sexes, along with growth of external genitalia. This process
generally commences around age 10 or 11 for girls, and about two years later for
boys. Puberty peaks with the production of live sperm in boys, (usually at about age
14 in the United States), and menarche, or the onset of menstruation, in girls (usually
between ages 11 and 14; Slyper, 2006).
Do you recall becoming more aware of your appearance during adolescence?
Dramatic physical changes and heightened emphasis on peer acceptance—especially
acceptance by sexually attractive peers—intensify concern with one’s body image. Boys
and girls alike often judge themselves harshly by the standards they think other people
may be applying to them. And, unfair as it may be, physical attractiveness does influ-
ence the way people think about each other (Hatfield & Rapson, 1993). Thus, one of
the most formidable tasks of adolescence involves coming to terms with one’s physical
self by developing a realistic—yet accepting—body image. This image is dependent
not only on measurable features, such as height and weight, but also on perceptions of
other people’s assessments and on cultural standards of physical beauty. And the age at
which teens go through puberty has an impact on their body image: boys who mature
earlier than their peers generally have a positive body image, whereas early-maturing
girls often have a negative body image. These girls also report more bullying from
peers (Downing & Bellis, 2009).
And note other gender differences: Approximately 44 percent of American adolescent
girls and 23 percent of boys claimed they have “frequently felt ugly and unattractive.”
Similar data have been found across many cultures (Offer et al., 1981, 1988). Physical
rite of passage Social ritual that marks the
transition between developmental stages, especially
between childhood and adulthood.
puberty The onset of sexual maturity.
menarche The onset of menstruation.
body image An individual’s perception of and
feelings about their physical appearance.

298 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
appearance is clearly one of the biggest concerns among adolescents (Perkins & Lerner,
1995). Girls’ self-concepts are particularly tied to perceptions of their physical attrac-
tiveness, while boys seem more concerned with their physical prowess, athletic ability,
and effectiveness in achieving goals (Lerner et al., 1976; Wade, 1991). In general, girls
and women are more dissatisfied with their weight and shape than are males, and they
experience more conflict about food and eating (Rolls et al., 1991). One study found
that 56 percent of teenage girls had gone on diets because they thought themselves too
heavy—when in reality, most of them were within a normal weight range (Patton et al.,
1997). These differences probably mirror a preoccupation with female beauty and male
strength—an inevitable source of concern because not all adolescents can embody the
cultural ideals of attractiveness.
Culture, however, influences the relationship between body image and self-acceptance.
For example, self-esteem of White adolescents is more tied to physical attractiveness than
is that of Black adolescents—for both sexes (Wade, 1991). Yet, for teens in Hong Kong,
while body fat is related to physical self-concept, it doesn’t decrease global self-esteem
at all. In fact, being too thin is perceived in a similar manner as being too fat, prob-
ably reflecting the Chinese cultural value on moderation, as well as greater acceptance
of obesity than American culture (Marsh et al., 2007). But the spread of Western ide-
als is expanding the reach of powerful media images and their impact on teens’ body
images: Young women in both the Middle East and Japan are developing body-image
problems at increasing rates (Chisuwa & O’Day, 2010; Thomas et al., 2010). Although
adolescents seem to become more accepting of their appearances over time, the attain-
ment of acceptable body images can be a difficult task.
Adolescent Sexuality
A new awareness of sexual feelings and impulses accompanies physical maturity. Not
surprisingly, perhaps, a majority of American adolescent males and females report
thinking about sex often (Offer et al., 1981). By age 17, about 40 percent of teens
in the United States and Canada have had their first sexual experience, a figure that
rises to about 75 percent by age 20 (Berk, 2007; Harvey & Spigner, 1995). Many
of these teens, however, lack adequate knowledge or harbor misconceptions about
sex and sexuality, and this lack of accurate knowledge creates a variety of problems
ranging from STIs (sexually transmitted infections) to unwanted pregnancy to unsat-
isfactory sexual experiences.
Masturbation is the most common orgasmic expression of sexual impulses in adoles-
cence (Wilson & Medora, 1990). By age 16, almost 90 percent of boys and 60 percent
of girls in the United States report they have masturbated (Janus & Janus, 1993). But
these figures are only estimates and could well be low. You can imagine the problems sci-
entists face in trying to get good data on private sexual practices. Sex research typically
involves surveys, which—even when anonymous, as most are—may not give a complete
picture of behaviors often associated with shame and guilt.
Sexual orientation also begins to emerge in adolescence, with the majority of
adolescents having a predominantly heterosexual orientation. Males and females,
though, differ in reports of their first sexual experiences. For the vast majority of
females, emotional involvement is an important ingredient of sexual attraction. In con-
trast, for most males, personal relationships appear to be less important than the sex
act itself. In fact, the average male reports little emotional involvement with his first
sexual partner (Miller & Simon, 1980; Sprecher et al., 1995).
The same cautions that apply to the data on masturbation also apply to the
research on the prevalence of gay, lesbian, and bisexual orientations. Studies generally
find that 8 to 12 percent of teens report having had sexual contact with a same-sex
partner. Same-sex behavior, however, does not necessarily mean the individual consid-
ers him- or herself to be gay, lesbian, or even bisexual. Some experiment with same-sex
activity yet think of themselves as heterosexual. For others, however, such experiences
do fit with a gay, lesbian, or bisexual orientation. And about one in every eight teens
say they are unsure of their primary sexual orientation (Faulkner & Cranston, 1998).
sexual orientation The direction of one’s sexual
interests (usually for individuals of the same sex, the
opposite sex, or both sexes).
Body image—for boys and girls alike—
becomes especially important in the
teenage years.
Adolescent
Sexuality
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

What Changes Mark the Transition of Adolescence? 299
Sexual attraction toward the same sex or both sexes is difficult to resolve during
adolescence, when individuals are intensely concerned with the conventions and norms
of their society. While most gay and lesbian individuals first become aware of their sexual
orientation in early adolescence, many may not attain self- acceptance of their sexual identi-
ties until their middle or late 20s or beyond (Newman & Muzzonigro, 1993). The time lag
undoubtedly reflects the relative lack of social support for nontraditional sexual orienta-
tions and exemplifies the importance of society’s role in all aspects of identity development.
Neural and Cognitive Development in Adolescence
Changes that began in the womb continue to occur in the adolescent brain (Spear,
2000). While early childhood is the most rapid period for development of neural con-
nections, the frontal lobes of the brain continue to mature throughout adolescence
and into young adulthood. What are the implications of this adolescent change in
neurology?
Teens: Guided by Reason or Emotion? The frontal lobes, as you learned in
Chapter 2, are necessary for rational thinking and judgment (among other things).
The orbito-frontal cortex, in particular, helps us weigh the emotional component of a
choice with a more rational evaluation of our long-term goals. It puts the brakes, so
to speak, on the basic impulses driven by our amygdala. In adolescence, the amygdala
is fully developed, but the frontal lobes (including the orbito-frontal cortex) are not.
This imbalance in the pace of brain development means the teen brain is wired to react
more emotionally than an adult (for whom both areas are developed) or a child (for
whom neither area is developed). Teens’ amygdalas send impulses their frontal cortices
can’t effectively process (McClure et al., 2004). Add to that the pubescent increases
in estrogen and testosterone levels (Spear, 2000), and it’s no wonder adolescents are
prone to sensation-seeking and risk-taking behaviors.
Is this unique brain pattern of adolescence necessarily bad, though? As previously
noted, adolescence is a time when individuals establish their identity, with the ultimate
goal of becoming independent from the family unit. Perhaps the increased risk taking
is a necessary component that helps teens explore and experiment in their environ-
ments. In other words, it may provide a biological basis for the courage necessary to
go out on one’s own. Further, the heightened emotional reactivity may aid in threat
perception, helping the teen become quickly aware of dangers associated with new
activities and thus promoting success and survival. The same brain patterns have, in
fact, been observed in nonhuman species such as primates and rodents, suggesting that
the neural development of adolescence may indeed serve an important evolutionary
purpose (Casey et al., 2008).
The Brain Undergoes Major Pruning Earlier in this chapter, we noted the impor-
tance of sensitive periods for development of certain abilities, along with the pruning
process that begins to occur around the time of adolescence (Kurth et al., 2010). The
two concepts together underscored the importance of a rich environment in the early
years of life, so neural pathways can form to support a wide variety of skills and abili-
ties. By early adolescence, regions of the brain that haven’t been adequately stimulated
begin to be trimmed away in the process of synaptic pruning. As this occurs, the ado-
lescent brain becomes gradually less adept at learning completely new things as op-
portunities for neural connections begin to diminish. On the plus side, this allows for
enhanced development of stronger regions: Continued use of established connections
increases the myelin of the neurons, which in turn enables faster functioning. On the
minus side, though, plasticity is reduced and problematic behavior patterns or traits
that have developed become more resistant to change or intervention. And if the prun-
ing process goes awry, important connections may be lost, which could help explain
the onset in late adolescence and early adulthood of disorders such as schizophrenia
(Moskowitz, 2009).
Sexual orientation is an important element
of identity.

300 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
By adolescence, then, behavior patterns developed in earlier years have strength-
ened considerably. Adolescence may represent the last fertile opportunity to intervene
in the development of strong traits, be they athletic, artistic, linguistic, or psychopathic.
For example, studies of various treatment programs for individuals with psychopathic
traits such as callous and unemotional behavior show the highest rate of success
among 4- to 6-year-olds, with moderate success among teen offenders and no measur-
able success among adults (Caldwell et al., 2007; Dadds & Fraser, 2006). Also, a twin
study found that maintaining a high GPA could act as a buffer against development of
antisocial behavior in the teen years, decreasing the impact of other genetic and envi-
ronmental risk factors (Johnson et al., 2009).
Piaget’s Final Stage: Formal Operational Thought Adolescence brings with
it Piaget’s final stage of cognitive growth, involving the ability for abstract and
complex thought. In this formal operational stage, the individual begins to ponder
introspective problems, such as how to become better accepted by peers. Teens also
become capable of dealing with abstract and intangible issues, such as fairness, love,
and reasons for existence. Essentially, they learn to deal with hypothetical problems
rather than needing the concrete base of the previous stage. With these formal
operational reasoning powers, adolescents and adults can now approach life’s
problems using more systematic thinking strategies. In the “20 Questions” game we
mentioned earlier in the chapter, for example, they impose their own structures on
the task, starting with broad categories and then formulating and testing hypotheses
in light of their knowledge of categories and relationships. Their questioning moves
from general categories (“Is it an animal?”) to subcategories (“Does it fly?”) and
then to specific guesses (“Is it a bird?”; Bruner et al., 1966).
Current research, however, questions Piaget’s notion that formal operational
thought necessarily develops in adolescence. Some adults, it seems, never develop this
capacity; instead, it appears dependent on education and experience. College-educated
people are more likely to demonstrate formal operational thought, and in general,
people are most skillful with abstractions and hypotheticals in their areas of exper-
tise (Keating, 2004). Overall, development of this type of cognitive ability, more than
any of Piaget’s other cognitive tasks, appears highly reliant on cultural values and the
environment.
Moral Development: Kohlberg’s Theory
Is there a pattern in the development of our sense of right and wrong? The best-known
psychological approach to moral development comes from the late Lawrence Kohlberg
(1964, 1981), who based his theory on Piaget’s view of cognitive development. After
all, reasoned Kohlberg, moral thinking is just a special form of cognition. Mirroring
Piaget’s stages, each stage in Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning is based on a differ-
ent moral standard. Table 7.4 summarizes these stages.
What interested Kohlberg most were the ways people reason about moral prob-
lems, rather than what they might do when led into temptation (Alper, 1985; Kohlberg,
1968). Accordingly, Kohlberg probed people’s moral thinking by presenting people with
a series of moral dilemmas, such as this one:
In Europe a woman was near death from a very special kind of cancer. There
was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium
that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expen-
sive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to
make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the
drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow
the money, but he could only get together about $1000, which is half of what it
cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper
or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug, and I’m
going to make money from it.” So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man’s
formal operational stage The last of Piaget’s
stages, during which abstract thought appears.

What Changes Mark the Transition of Adolescence? 301
store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have done that? Why (Colby
et al., 1983, p. 77)?
Think about your own response to this situation before you read further.
It made no difference to Kohlberg whether a person said Heinz should or should
not have stolen the drug. The problem is a genuine dilemma, so a well-reasoned case
can be made on either side. For Kohlberg and his colleagues, the interesting part of
an individual’s answer was the moral thinking behind it. They found that the reasons
given fell into six categories, corresponding to the following stages. See if you can tell
where your own response to the Heinz problem fits:
• Stage 1. People reasoning at this stage think only of reward and punishment. They
show no concern for others. In response to the Heinz dilemma, they might say,
“He should take the drug because he might get in trouble if he let his wife die.” Or,
on the other hand, “He shouldn’t steal the drug because he might get caught and
go to jail.”
• Stage 2. The first sign of awareness of other perspectives shows itself at the second
stage of moral reasoning. Still concerned about reward and punishment, the Stage
2 person may seek personal gain by appealing to another person’s self-interest,
saying, in effect: “You scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours.” Here is a sample
Stage 2 response to the Heinz case: “He should steal the drug because he is poor
and needs his wife to help him make a living.”
• Stage 3. The main concerns at this stage are seeking social approval and keeping
everyone happy. Decisions are based on personal relationships, rather than on
principle. A typical Stage 3 response: “They won’t blame him for stealing the drug,
but everyone would think he is bad if he let his wife die.”
• Stage 4. Maintaining social order is paramount at Stage 4. In this stage, people
often emphasize laws, rules, policies, promises, duty, or respect for authority in
their responses. Someone at Stage 4 might say, “He shouldn’t steal the drug
because it would violate the Ten Commandments,” or “He should steal the drug
because his first obligation is to his wife.”
• Stage 5. Kohlberg called this the “social contract” stage because it emphasized the
idea that rules and laws are flexible and can be changed by social consensus and
by legislation. Emphasis at this stage is on fairness rather than on the blind obedi-
ence of the previous stage. A possible Stage 5 response to the Heinz dilemma:
“He should take the drug, and the law should be interpreted to allow an exception
under such desperate circumstances.”
TABLE 7.4 Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Reasoning
Levels and Stages Reasons for Moral Behavior
I. Preconventional morality
Stage 1: Egocentric pleasure/pain/profit Avoid pain or avoid getting caught orientation
Stage 2: Cost/benefit orientation; reciprocity Achieve/receive rewards or mutual benefits (“I’ll
scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine”)
II. Conventional morality
Stage 3: “Good child” orientation Gain acceptance, avoid disapproval
Stage 4: Law-and-order orientation Follow rules, avoid penalties
III. Postconventional (principled) morality
Stage 5: Social contract orientation Promote the welfare of one’s society
Stage 6: Ethical principle orientation (e.g.,
Gandhi, Jesus, Mohammed)
Achieve justice, be consistent with one’s
principles, avoid self-condemnation

302 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
• Stage 6. At this stage, the individual bases a decision on universal principles of
conscience that he or she would apply to all people in all situations. These are
abstract and general principles, which often refer to the dignity and worth of each
person rather than concrete rules such as the Ten Commandments. A possible
Stage 6 response: “He should take the drug because, if he doesn’t, he is putting a
greater value on property than on human life.”
You can see how Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning parallel the stages of Piaget’s the-
ory, as the individual moves from concrete, egocentric reasons to more other-oriented,
abstract ideas of right and wrong. Accordingly, in the first stages, a child may not steal
a cookie for fear of punishment, while at a more advanced level, the child may resist
stealing for fear of not living up to the parents’ expectations. In general, the earliest
stages of moral reasoning are based on self-interest, while later, more advanced stages
center on others’ expectations or on broader standards of social good. Unfortunately,
not all people attain the later, least egocentric stages. In fact, Kohlberg found that many
adults never even reach Stage 4.
Critiques of Kohlberg’s Theory Does moral development follow the same devel-
opmental sequence everywhere? Yes, said Kohlberg. Cross-cultural work shows that
individuals attain the same stages in the same order in all cultures studied, including
Turkey, Taiwan, Guatemala, Japan, and the United States (Eckensberger, 1994). How-
ever, this research also hints at some limitations of the theory to explain moral devel-
opment in other cultural contexts: The higher stages, as defined by Kohlberg, have not
been found in all cultures. Even in his native United States, Kohlberg found that Stages
5 and 6 do not always emerge. Their emergence appears to be associated with high
levels of verbal ability and formal education (Rest & Thoma, 1976).
One of the most stinging criticisms of Kohlberg’s theory has come from Carol
Gilligan (1982), a colleague at Kohlberg’s own campus. Gilligan argued that the theory
has a male bias and ignores uniquely feminine conceptions of morality. For women,
says Gilligan, morality is embedded in social relationships and personal caring, which
makes them appear to reach a plateau at Stage 3. To his credit, Kohlberg responded by
taking a fresh look at his data for Stage 3 and Stage 4. As a result, he redefined Stage
4 by moving militant law-and-order responses (most often given by males) to Stage 3.
Most subsequent studies have found no significant sex differences in moral reasoning
(Walker, 1989, 1991; Walker & de Vries, 1985).
A more telling critique suggests research on moral reasoning may have limited
practical value. Studies have found no close connection between people’s moral rea-
soning and their behavior. Moreover, most moral reasoning comes after people have
intuitively decided how to act. Moral reasoning, then, may be little more than rational
justification for an emotional decision, claims psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2001).
Social and Emotional Issues in Adolescence
As teens develop their own identity, the relative importance of others in their spheres of
influence shifts. Family ties become stretched as the adolescent spends more time out-
side the home (Paikoff & Brooks-Gunn, 1991). What adolescents do with that time,
however, depends on gender (Buhrmester, 1996). Friendships among girls are built on
emotional closeness, with girls often getting together “just to talk.” By contrast, friend-
ships among boys emphasize activities, with talk centering on personal achievements
or those of others.
Do Parents Still Matter? Some developmental experts argue that the effects of
parents, family, and childhood become nearly lost as the adolescent peer group
gains influence (Harris, 1995). In American society, the adolescent encounters new
values, receives less structure and adult guidance, and feels a strong need for peer
acceptance. As a result, adolescents report spending more than four times as much
time talking to peers as to adults (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1977; Larson, 2001).
stage of moral reasoning Distinctive way
of thinking about ethical and moral problems.
According to Kohlberg, moral reasoning progresses
through a series of developmental stages that are
similar to Piaget’s stages of cognitive development.

What Changes Mark the Transition of Adolescence? 303
With their peers, adolescents refine their social skills and try out different social
behaviors. Gradually, they define their social identities, the kind of people they
choose to be, and the sorts of relationships they will pursue.
Are parents still important to the adolescent? The answer is an unequivocal yes.
Parents who continue to monitor their teens’ activities, and maintain open and healthy
communication through these years, are most likely to see their teenagers success-
fully navigate the challenges of adolescence. A high-quality parent–child relationship
remains the strongest predictor of adolescent mental health (Steinberg & Silk, 2002).
Erikson’s Psychosocial Development in Adolescence Erik Erikson noted the emer-
gence of an independent self in adolescence and characterized it as the essential dilemma
of adolescence. This search for identity, Erikson asserted, can be impeded by the con-
fusion of playing many different roles for different audiences in an expanding social
world. Thus, he called this stage identity versus role confusion. Resolving this identity
crisis helps the individual develop a sense of a coherent self. Psychologist James Marcia
suggests that, as teens seek their own identities, they may experience several different lev-
els of identity development based on their degrees of commitment to an identity and the
amount of exploration they have done (see Figure 7.6). While it is normal and healthy
for one’s identity to change throughout life, failure of the adolescent to find a satisfactory
resolution for his or her identity issues may result in a self-concept that lacks a stable core.
Resolution of this issue is both a personal process and a social experience (Erikson, 1963).
Is Adolescence a Period of Turmoil? Problems with loneliness, depression, and shy-
ness can also become significant during adolescence, which is one reason for the sharp
increase in suicide among teenagers (Berk, 2004; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002). Stud-
ies of adolescent suicide show that the triggering experience for such a tragedy is often a
shaming or humiliating event, such as failure in some achievement or a romantic rejection
(Garland & Zigler, 1993). The intensity of a young person’s social and personal motives,
combined with the overactive emotional brain, can make it hard to keep perspective and
recognize that even difficult times will pass and everyone makes mistakes.
But is adolescence inevitably a period of turmoil? It is a period in which individuals
are likely to have conflicts with their parents, experience extremes of mood, and en-
gage in risky behaviors (Arnett, 1999). For some, adolescence certainly presents
overwhelming problems in relationships and in self-esteem. Yet for most teens, these
years are not a time of anxiety and despair (Myers & Diener, 1995). While many par-
ents anticipate that the relationship with their children will encounter a rocky road
when the children enter adolescence, the more typical experience is relatively tranquil.
identity In Erikson’s theory, identity is a sense of
who one is—a coherent self. Developing a sense of
identity is the main goal of adolescence.
FIGURE 7.6
Marcia’s Stages of Identity Development
Has the individual thoroughly
explored a variety of options
regarding personal beliefs,
values, and interests?
Has the individual made a commitment to
certain beliefs, values, and interests?
Yes
Yes
No
No
Identity Achievement:
Commitment to personal identity
as a result of significant
exploration
Identity Moratorium:
Actively exploring identity options
prior to making identity
commitment.
Identity Foreclosure:
Commitment to personal identity
based on conformity to values of
others (parents, peers, etc.),
without having personally
explored other options.
Identity Diffusion:
Undeveloped identity,
characterized by lack of interest in
such matters, or indecision about
them.
In adolescence, peer relationships take
on increasing importance.

304 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
In fact, the majority of adolescent youth say they feel close to their parents (Galambos,
1992). In general, those who have the least trouble are adolescents with authorita-
tive parents—who are responsive and, at the same time, hold their children to high
standards. Adolescents who have the most difficulty are more likely to come from
homes where parenting is either permissive or authoritarian (Collins et al., 2000).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology: Cognitive Development
in College Students
Does your arrival at the formal operational stage, in the middle or high school years,
signal the end of the cognitive line? Or will your thinking abilities continue to develop
as you go on through college? If you are a returning student in your 30s, 40s, or beyond,
will your cognitive development continue apace with your younger counterparts? A
study by developmental psychologist William Perry suggests that your perspective on
learning will change and mature as your college experience unfolds. This prediction
is based on a sample of students Perry followed through their undergraduate years at
Harvard and Radcliffe. He found that students’ views of psychology and their other
social science courses changed radically, as did their views of what they were there to
learn (Perry, 1970, 1994).
At first, students in Perry’s study had difficulty coming to grips with the diverse
and conflicting viewpoints they encountered in their courses. For example, many con-
fronted, for the first time, the idea that reasonable people can disagree—even about
their most cherished “truths” concerning good and evil, God, nature, and human
nature:
A few seemed to find the notion of multiple frames of reference wholly unintel-
ligible. Others responded with violent shock to their confrontation in dormitory
chat sessions, or in their academic work, or both. Others experienced a joyful
sense of liberation (Perry, 1970, p. 4).
In dealing with this academic culture shock, Perry’s students passed through a series of
distinct intellectual stages reminiscent of Piaget’s stages. And, although they arrived at
college at different levels of cognitive maturity and continued to develop at different
rates, all progressed through the same intellectual stages in the same sequence. Here
are some of the highlights of this intellectual journey:
• Students at first typically see college or university as a storehouse of information—
a place to learn the Right Answers. Thus, they believe it is the professor’s job to
help students find these answers.
• Sooner or later, students discover an unexpected—perhaps shocking—diversity of
opinion, even among the experts. At this stage, college students are likely to attri-
bute conflicting opinions to confusion among poorly qualified experts.
• Eventually, students begin to accept diverse views as legitimate—but only in the
fuzzy areas (such as psychology, other social sciences, and humanities) where ex-
perts haven’t yet found the Right Answers. They decide that, in subjects where the
Right Answers haven’t been nailed down, professors grade them on “good expres-
sion” of their ideas.
• Next, some students (not all) discover that uncertainty and diversity of opinion are
everywhere—not just in the social sciences and humanities. They typically solve
this problem in their minds by dividing the academic world into two realms: (a)
one in which Right Answers exist (even though they haven’t all been discovered)
and (b) another in which anyone’s opinion is as good as anyone else’s. Often, at
this stage, they perceive math and the “hard” sciences as the realm of Right
Answers, leaving the social sciences and humanities in the realm of opinion.

What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face? 305
• Finally, the most mature students come to see that multiple perspectives exist and
are valuable in all fields of study.
The students who achieve the final stage begin to see “truth” as tentative. They now
realize knowledge is always building and changing—even in the “hard” sciences. And
they realize a college education is not just learning an endless series of facts. Rather, it
is learning how to think critically about the important questions and major concepts
of a field. In this text, we have called them “Key Questions” and “Core Concepts.”
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: What is the major developmental task of adolescence,
according to Erikson?
a. puberty
b. formal operational thought
c. identity
d. intimacy
2. ANALYSIS: You are watching a television program and see an
interview with a psychologist who has written a new book entitled
The Teen Years: Face It, Parents—You Don’t Matter Anymore! Is
this point of view accurate, according to research? Why or why not?
3. RECALL: About what percent of North American teens have had
their first sexual experience by age 17?
a. 20 percent
b. 40 percent
c. 60 percent
d. 75 percent
4. APPLICATION: Your next-door neighbor is a teenage boy who
recently got arrested for shoplifting. In talking about it, he says, “I
realize now I shouldn’t have done that. My parents are really mad at
me, and my teachers think I’m a troublemaker.” Which of Kohlberg’s
stages of moral development does this boy seem to be in?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What three
categories of changes lead to the challenges faced in adolescence?
Answers 1. c 2. No, it is not accurate. Although peers become more influential in adolescence, parents still play a key role in their teens’ healthy
development. 3. b 4. Kohlberg’s stage 3 5. Physical changes, cognitive changes, and socioemotional pressures
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
7.4 KEY QUESTION
What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face?
The transition from adolescence to young adulthood is marked by decisions about
advanced education, career, and intimate relationships. Making such decisions and
adjusting to the consequences are major tasks of adulthood because they shape the
course of adult psychological development. But development doesn’t stop there. Con-
tinuing pressures of careers, families, and friends, along with the relentless physical
maturation (and eventual decline) of the body, continually present new developmental
challenges. In today’s world, though, the traditional clock for aging has been set back,
essentially “buying more time” for adults in all stages of adulthood. This revolution in
aging is a key element in our Core Concept for this section:
Core Concept 7.4
Nature and nurture continue to interact as we progress through a
series of transitions in adulthood, with cultural norms about age com-
bining with new technology to increase both the length and quality of
life for many adults.
A couple of points in our Core Concept should be noted before we examine adulthood
in more depth. First, you have probably gathered from earlier sections of this chapter
that stage theories—although very popular for describing human development—are
often guilty of oversimplification. While the major developmental tasks and categories

306 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
of leading stage theories, such as those proposed by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Erikson,
are largely holding up to empirical scrutiny, psychologists now agree that develop-
ment doesn’t occur in rigid stages. Rather, it is a more continuous process, occurring in
waves or spurts. In other words, then, the stage theories may have gotten the “what”
correct, but the “when” is more fluid than they thought it was. At no time in the lifes-
pan is this more true than in adult development. Research finds that healthy adults
pass through a series of transitions as they progress from early through middle and
into late adulthood. Successful passage through these transitions involves reflection
and readjustment, which we will discuss over the next few pages.
A second point worth noting is the changing nature of adulthood in the Western
world. Thanks to better health care and technology, people are living longer than ever
before and often enjoying better health in their later years than previous generations.
This, in turn, is changing adults’ perceptions of the lifespan and its various ages and
stages. Fewer adults feel compelled to marry or settle down in their early 20s, or to re-
tire when they hit 65. We are seeing the beginning of a “revolution” in aging, spawned
by both nature (the longer lifespan) and nurture (the ways our culture is adapting to
the change).
This revolution in aging is prompting renewed attention to the study of adult devel-
opment in psychological science. Although for many years we relied on theories based
on clinical observation, we are now accumulating an increasing body of empirical re-
search. Interestingly, much of this new research supports traditional clinical theories—
but it also sheds new light on the processes of adulthood in the 21st century. To see
how these developmental changes unfold, let’s begin with personality—where we find
some surprising agreement among otherwise diverse theories.
Freud taught that adult development is driven by two basic needs: love and work.
Abraham Maslow (1970) described the critical needs as love and belonging, which,
when satisfied, allow emergence of our needs for esteem and fulfillment. Other theo-
rists divide the basic needs of adulthood into affiliation or social acceptance needs,
achievement or competence needs, and power needs (McClelland, 1975, 1985;
McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982). And in Erikson’s theory, the early and middle adult
years focus on needs for intimacy and “generativity.” While all these theories offer
important clues to healthy adulthood, what they all share is recognition of the need for
human relationships. Because Erikson gave the most comprehensive account of adult
development, we will use his theory as our framework, into which we will build recent
empirical research that illuminates the course of adulthood today.
Early Adulthood: Explorations, Autonomy, and Intimacy
What are the developmental tasks of early adulthood? And perhaps a bigger question
for 20-somethings is this: When exactly does adulthood begin? In our teen years, many
of us look forward to the “freedom” of turning 18 and becoming a legal adult. But
does psychological adulthood arrive at 18 as well?
Intimacy versus Isolation Early adulthood, said Erikson, poses the challenge of
establishing close relationships with other adults (look again at Table 7.1 on page 277).
He described intimacy as the capacity to make a full commitment—sexual, emotional,
and moral—to another person. Making intimate commitments requires compromising
personal preferences, accepting responsibilities, and yielding some privacy and inde-
pendence, but it also brings great rewards. To achieve intimacy, however, the individual
must resolve the conflict between the need for closeness and the fear of vulnerability
and risks such closeness can bring. Failure to successfully resolve this crisis leads to
isolation and the inability to connect to others in meaningful ways.
For Erikson, the young adult must first consolidate a clear sense of identity
(resolving the crisis of adolescence) before being able to cope successfully with the
risks and benefits of adult intimacy. In essence, you must know who and what you
are before you can successfully commit to love and share your life with someone else.
However, the sequence from identity to intimacy Erikson described may not accurately
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Personality theories aim to
explain the whole person and
focus on characteristics that
remain relatively stable in an
individual throughout his or her
lifespan (p. 414).
revolution in aging A change in the way people
think about aging in modern industrialized nations.
This new perspective grows out of increased longevity,
better health care, and more lifestyle choices available
to older adults. It has also stimulated the psychological
study of adult development.
intimacy In Erikson’s theory, the main develop-
mental task of early adulthood, involving the capacity
to make a full commitment—sexual, emotional, and
moral—to another person.

What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face? 307
reflect present-day realities. The trend in recent years has been for young adults to live
together before marrying and to delay making contractual commitments to lifelong
intimacy with one person. In addition, many individuals today struggle with identity
issues (for example, career choices) at the same time they are trying to deal with
intimacy issues. Life for young adults in the 21st century offers more choices and
more complications than did the same period of life for the generation described by
Erikson.
Emerging Adulthood: The In-Between Stage Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett (2000a,
2001), in recognition of the differences between adulthood today and in previous gen-
erations, proposes a transitional period to adulthood he calls emerging adulthood. This
period encompasses the late teens through the 20s, a time during which many indi-
viduals in industrialized societies have passed through adolescence but do not yet per-
ceive themselves to be adults. Whereas in earlier historical times, visible events such as
marriage, the birth of the first child, and establishment in a career were perceived as
the markers of entrance into adulthood, today’s young people cite more opaque events,
such as accepting personal responsibility for themselves and making independent
decisions, as the important indicators of adulthood. And most emerging adults today
report only partial progress toward these milestones of self-sufficiency (Arnett, 1997).
Emerging adulthood is a time of exploration and experimentation in all areas. Late
teens and 20-somethings are trying out different types of work, exploring alternative
lifestyles and worldviews, and figuring out what kind of person is right for them ro-
mantically. As they do so, they are less predictable in their educational pursuits, choice
of residences, and degree of financial responsibility than at any other time in their life.
Almost half will move out of their parents’ home and back in again during this period,
and while 60 percent start taking college classes within one year of graduating from
high school, only half of these students have completed four or more years by their
late 20s (Bianchi & Spain, 1996; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2011). Of those who do
graduate from college, more are choosing graduate school than in previous genera-
tions (Mogelonsky, 1996). Young adults also take more risks than at any other time
of their life—including adolescence. Rates of alcohol and substance abuse, reckless
driving, and unprotected sex peak during these years (Arnett, 1992). These patterns of
experimentation may be due to the absence of serious role responsibilities combined
with freedom from parental supervision.
Did Erikson get it right, then, in his identification of the major tasks of adolescence
and early adulthood? In general, he did. Although not widely noted, he observed that,
in industrialized societies, young people seemed to enjoy what he called a prolonged
period of adolescence during which role experimentation continued. This, indeed, is
exactly what empirical research such as Arnett’s is demonstrating today. And current
studies indicate that, by about age 30, a majority of Westerners have married and had
their first child, have made the transition from school to full-time work, and perceive
themselves as having entered adulthood. Presumably, then, at this point they have
achieved the intimacy that Erikson described as the major developmental task of early
adulthood. Notably, young adults today also name intimacy, or personal relationships,
as the key to a happy life (Arnett, 2000b), although many admit struggling to balance
the competing needs of intimacy and autonomy. As we will see, this pursuit of an opti-
mal balance of these two needs will continue to characterize later phases of adulthood.
Modern Approaches to Intimacy How, then, do today’s adults achieve intimacy?
Though 90 percent or more still marry, marriage often occurs more than once in an
individual’s life. The same pattern applies to gay and lesbian long-term relationships—
whether they may legally marry in their state or not (Knox & Schact, 2008). In fact,
about half of all U.S. marriages end in divorce (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002).
Moreover, an increasing number of couples are cohabiting rather than getting married
(Doyle, 2002b). The high divorce rate probably results, in part, from individuals seek-
ing intimacy before they have resolved their own identities. Unrealistic expectations of
each other and of what constitutes an ideal marriage and family structure contribute
emerging adulthood A transition period
between adolescence and adulthood.

308 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
to divorce as well (Cleek & Pearson, 1985), as does our cultural priority on individual
happiness. On the other hand, there is evidence that communication and affection be-
tween spouses is better than it was in earlier times, and that those who learn good
communication skills substantially improve their chances of avoiding divorce (Caplow,
1982; Markman & Notarius, 1993).
In the 21st century, married people are more likely to see each other as partners and
friends and less likely to feel constrained by society’s expectations of a “husband” or
“wife.” Partners in peer marriages talk with and help each other in ways that work best
for their relationship, irrespective of traditional ideas about the man being “boss” or
the wife being responsible for “women’s work” (Schwartz, 1994). The key to a fair and
satisfying relationship is communication in which both partners feel able to openly ex-
press their hopes and fears (Klagsbrun, 1985). A mushrooming of knowledge on how
good communication sustains relationships has helped our culture to view marriage
as a worthwhile investment and see therapy as a valuable option for supporting such
efforts (Gottman, 1994; Notarius, 1996). In brief, relating is no longer viewed as a
set of skills that “comes naturally” with the establishment of intimacy. Instead, close
relationships are seen as lifelong works in progress—worthwhile investments of time
and energy whose quality can be improved with clearer self-understanding, effective
conflict resolution, and good communication.
What makes for good communication and effective conflict resolution? Surpris-
ingly, there is no correlation between the frequency of a couple’s conflicts and the
health of their relationship: Couples who disagree often are no more likely to divorce
than couples with less frequent conflict. What does matter is the ratio of positive inter-
actions to negative interactions, with the optimal balance found to be 5:1 (Gottman,
1995). In other words, regardless of how much conflict there is in a marriage, the
marriage will be healthy if the couple has five times more positive than negative in-
teractions with each other. And “positive interactions” don’t have to be long romantic
weekends or elaborate dates: small things such as a smile, a kiss, a compliment, or a
thank-you all count. (A long romantic weekend or a great date would, then, presum-
ably have quite a few positive interactions.) Negative interactions, on the other hand,
can also be small—but pack a powerful punch—and include such behaviors as hostile
sarcasm, name calling, a frustrated roll of the eyes, or an angry slam of the door. By
maintaining a 5:1 ratio of positive to negative interactions, the couple is creating a
supportive foundation that strengthens the relationship’s immune system, so to speak.
When conflict does arise, then, partners are less likely to take things personally or feel
defensive, which allows the focus to remain on problem solving rather than blaming.
The Challenges of Midlife: Complexity and Generativity
For many people, the concept of midlife conjures up thoughts of the dreaded midlife
crisis and birthday cards poking fun at being “over the hill.” Contrary to stereotypes
of middle age, though, research finds middle adulthood to be a peak period of devel-
opment in many respects. Cognitively, many adults in this age range have developed
considerable skill in combining and integrating a variety of thinking styles, including
reflection, analysis, and dialectical reasoning (which is the ability to compare and
evaluate contradictory viewpoints; Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; King & Kitchener,
1994). They are also experts at integrating their cognitions and emotions, resulting in
more thoughtful, deliberate, and reflective coping responses to stressful events (Diehl
et al., 1996).
Taken together, these skills enable the midlife adult to juggle a variety of interests,
which often include work, family, community, hobbies, and self-care. And indeed, this
busy, complex lifestyle is what characterizes healthy midlife adults today. Psychologists
Rosalind Barnett and Janet Hyde (2001) note that dual-career families are now the
norm, with women receiving professional training at an unprecedented level. Hand
in hand with this trend is greater fluidity among roles as worker and family member:
Men less often define themselves only as workers and family providers, and women
are less likely to define themselves solely as wives and mothers. For most people,
peer marriage Marriage in which the couple see
each other as partners and friends, as contrasted with
the older stereotypic roles of “husband” and “wife.”
This happy couple can expect a success-
ful marriage if they maintain a 5:1 ratio
of positive to negative interactions with
each other.

What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face? 309
these expanded roles provide a greater network of social support and an increased
sense of well-being. In addition to greater diversity in roles, midlife adults today enjoy
greater variety in their relationships, resources, and lifestyle than ever before (Moen &
Wethington, 1999). This complexity is related to well-being in that complex individu-
als see life as a series of challenges, full of variety, that lead to growth (Ryff & Heincke,
1983). And, overall, adults over age 50 are less stressed, more happy, and less worried
than younger individuals (Stone et. al,, 2010).
Generativity versus Stagnation According to Erikson, generativity is the major
developmental task of middle adulthood. For those who successfully met the earlier
challenges of identity and intimacy, generativity provides an opportunity to make a
meaningful and lasting contribution to family, work, society, or future generations.
Thus, people in this phase of life broaden their focus beyond self and partner, often
by raising children, serving as volunteers in community service groups, or nurturing
the next generation in some other way. Research confirms that adults who express
a strong sense of being generative and productive also report high life satisfaction
(McAdams et al., 1993). In contrast, those who have not resolved earlier crises of
identity and intimacy may experience a “midlife crisis.” Such people may question
past choices, becoming cynical and stagnant or, at the other extreme, self-indulgent
and reckless. The good news is—once again contrary to stereotypes of midlife—most
people do not undergo a midlife crisis. What’s more, the idea that adults become de-
pressed and lose direction when their children “leave the nest” is also a myth (Clay,
2003a, b).
Transitions What does happen for most adults in midlife is that they progress through
a transition that involves redefining, or transformation, of a life role. Indeed, evidence
indicates that adult life is characterized by a series of transitions, starting with the tran-
sition to adulthood and occurring perhaps every 15 to 20 years throughout adulthood
(Levinson, 1986; Sugarman, 2001). Successful transitions typically involve a period of
heightened self-reflection, which includes reappraisal of the current role, exploration
of new possibilities offering a renewed sense of meaning, and the decision to let go of
the old role and commit to the new one. Transitions may involve expected events such
as getting married, having children, or retiring, or unexpected events such as a sudden
illness, breakup, or loss of a job or loved one. In addition, events that were expected
but did not occur—such as a job promotion that never materialized or a person who
always wanted children but never had any—can prompt a transition. And finally, tran-
sitions can be gradual, as with a relationship or job that, over time, becomes less and
less fulfilling, or a person who becomes increasingly self-confident: In any case, at some
point the individual becomes aware of a critical difference, which propels him or her
into the transition period.
Given that our physical, cognitive, and emotional capabilities—as well as our social
contexts—tend to evolve and change throughout our lives, transitions are a natural
response to these shifts in our internal and external worlds. And there is accumulating
evidence that adults who live the longest and healthiest lives are the ones who suc-
cessfully navigate through these transitions and emerge from each one with a renewed
sense of meaning and passion for life (Levinson, 1978, 1996; Ryff & Heidrich, 1997).
Interestingly, transitions may sometimes involve a revisit to one of Erikson’s earlier
stages, such as a retooling of one’s identity or the transformation of an intimate rela-
tionship. And, given what we know about complexity, we might predict that complex
individuals—with their positive, challenge- and growth-oriented outlook—would be
more likely to experience successful transitions.
In summary, the reality of middle adulthood in today’s Western society is a far cry
from the “over-the-hill” stereotype that still persists in some people’s minds. Many
midlife adults are energetic, forward-moving individuals who are making meaningful
contributions to the world and enjoying the many opportunities available to them in
love, work, and personal growth. And it appears to be generativity and complexity
that fuel achievement of this healthy model of middle adulthood.
generativity The process of making a commit-
ment beyond oneself to family, work, society, or future
generations. In Erikson’s theory, generativity is the
developmental challenge of midlife.
transition A period of time during which an individual
redefines or transforms a life role, goal, value, or lifestyle.
Engaging in new challenges is one of the
keys to successful passage through the
transitions of adulthood. This woman
earned her Masters degree in Elementary
Education at the age of 52.

310 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
Late Adulthood: The Age of Integrity
At the beginning of the 20th century, only 3 percent of the U.S. population was over
65. One hundred years later, that figure is about 13 percent. And as the Baby Boom
generation reaches this age over the next few years, nearly one-fourth of our popula-
tion will be in this oldest group.
By the year 2030, we will witness a profound demographic shift (change in pop-
ulation characteristics). By that time, more than 80 million Americans will be over
60 years of age. For the first time in history, the number of people in the 60-plus age
group will outnumber those under 20 years of age. This will represent a dramatic rever-
sal of all previous demographics and a potentially significant shift away from today’s
youth-oriented culture (Pifer & Bronte, 1986). Among the effects: Tattoos and body
piercings will become common in nursing homes, and there will be far fewer people to
pay Social Security and Medicare bills.
With drastic changes in our society’s age distribution looming, it is more crucial
than ever to understand the nature of aging as well as the abilities and needs of the
elderly (Roush, 1996). And, on a personal level, it may be helpful to anticipate some
of the developmental challenges your parents and grandparents are facing, as well as
what you can expect in the last phase of your life.
From a biological perspective, aging typically means decline: Energy reserves are
reduced, and cell machinery functions less efficiently. From a cognitive perspective,
however, aging is no longer synonymous with decline (Qualls & Abeles, 2000). Many
abilities, including expert skills and some aspects of memory, can actually improve
with age (Azar, 1996; Krampe & Ericsson, 1996). A lifetime’s accumulation of experi-
ence may finally culminate in wisdom—if the mind remains open and active. Activity,
in fact—whether physical, social-emotional, or cognitive—seems to be key to healthy
aging: The phrase “Use it or lose it!” applies to many aspects of late adulthood. Thus,
theories of aging are models of balance or trade-offs: In old age, a person may lose en-
ergy reserves but gain an ability to control emotional experiences and thereby conserve
energy (Baltes, 1987). And many of our negative assumptions about aging are related
to our cultural values: Cultures that revere their elders have very different perspectives
and expectations of aging. What are the tasks of aging, and what opportunities and
limitations will we confront in our later years?
Ego-Integrity versus Despair According to Erikson, an increasing awareness of your
own mortality and the changes in your body, behavior, and social roles sets the stage for late
adulthood. Erikson called the crisis of this stage ego-integrity versus despair. Ego-integrity,
the healthy end of this dimension, involves the ability to look back on life without
regrets and to enjoy a sense of wholeness. It requires reflection on times both good
and bad, with appreciation for what turned out well and acceptance of what did not.
By now, you know that Erikson believed previous crises must have enjoyed successful
resolutions in order to master new challenges, so you are probably considering how
a well-developed identity, meaningful close relationships, and a sense of having con-
tributed to the next generation would probably facilitate this type of reflection and
acceptance. For those whose previous crises had unhealthy solutions, however, aspira-
tions may remain unfulfilled, and these individuals may experience futility, despair, and
self-deprecation. Sadly, they often then fail to resolve the crisis successfully at this final
developmental stage.
Physical Changes Some of the most obvious changes that occur with age affect peo-
ple’s physical appearances and abilities. As we age, we can expect our skin to wrinkle,
our hair to thin and gray, and our height to decrease an inch or two. Our hearts and
lungs operate less efficiently, decreasing our physical stamina. We can also expect some
of our senses to dull. More and more, however, modern life is finding older adults tak-
ing control of their bodies in ways that are reducing the deterioration long thought to
be inevitable. Successful aging takes into consideration both individual potential and
realistic limits (Baltes, 1993).
ego-integrity In Erikson’s theory, the develop-
mental task of late adulthood—involving the ability to
look back on life without regrets and to enjoy a sense
of wholeness.
Read about Sensory Deficiencies in
at MyPsychLabAging

What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face? 311
To what extent can older adults influence their physical aging? Continuing (or even
beginning) a consistent program of physical exercise helps ward off some of the physi-
cal decline typically associated with aging. Aerobic activity such as walking or swim-
ming improves cardiovascular functioning, and weight training improves blood flow
and builds muscle mass, which in turn improves posture, balance, and the ability to
physically manage everyday activities (such as grocery shopping or gardening). Even
for individuals who have previously been sedentary, beginning an exercise program as
late as age 80 results in measurable gains physically, emotionally, and even cognitively.
Regular exercise provides better blood and oxygen flow to the brain, which in turn
reduces deterioration of brain cells and improves attention (Colcombe et al., 2004).
There is also evidence that exercise reduces incidence of Alzheimer’s and other brain
disorders (Marx, 2005).
Another myth about aging in Western culture is that elderly people cannot or should
not be sexually active. Belief in this myth can be a greater obstacle than any physical
limitations to experiencing satisfying sex in late adulthood. Although frequency and
desire may decrease somewhat, there is no age, for either men or women, at which the
capability for arousal or orgasm ceases. (This is particularly true now that drugs, such as
the well-advertised Viagra, have enhanced erectile ability for millions of older men.) And
while sex loses its reproductive functions in late adulthood, it doesn’t lose its capacity for
providing pleasure. Regular sex also enhances healthy aging because it provides arousal,
aerobic exercise, fantasy, and social interaction (Ornstein & Sobel, 1989). Experience
and creativity can compensate for physical changes or loss of physical stamina.
Cognitive Changes Older adults often fear that aging is inevitably accompanied by
the loss of mental abilities. But is this fear justified? Certain parts of the brain, particu-
larly the frontal lobes, do lose mass as we age, but there is little evidence this causes a
general mental decline in healthy adults. On one hand, performance on tasks requir-
ing imagination, such as vivid imagery strategies for memorizing, does seem to decline
with age (Baltes & Kliegl, 1992). And people do acquire information more slowly by
the time they are in their 70s and 80s. But on the other hand, the decline for the average
person may not be as severe as folk wisdom assumes (Helmuth, 2003c). Brain-imaging
studies reveal that older people’s brains compensate for decline by processing infor-
mation differently, bringing more regions into play (Cabeza, 2002; Helmuth, 2002).
And, just like physical exercise prolongs physical health, mental exercise keeps aging
brains working more effectively. Moreover, some abilities improve with age. Vocabu-
lary, for example, is consistently better in older adults, as are social skills. And, with
regard to skilled performance, musicians have been shown to improve well into their 90s
(Krampe & Ericsson, 1996). Psychologists are now exploring age-related gains in wis-
dom, such as expertise in practical knowledge and life experience (Baltes, 1990). Finally,
we note persistent evidence that physical exercise improves learning, memory, and other
cognitive functions in older adults, along with new research showing that consumption
of omega fatty acids can combine with physical exercise to produce exponential benefits
to brain functioning and plasticity (Chodzko-Zajko et al., 2009; von Praag, 2009). The
message is clear: More active elders enjoy better cognitive and better physical health.
What about memory? A common complaint among older adults is that their ability
to remember things is not as good as it used to be. Most of these age-related mem-
ory difficulties appear in the part of the memory system associated with processing
and storing new information (Poon, 1985); aging does not seem to diminish access to
knowledge or events stored long ago. So an elderly person may have to ask the name
of a new acquaintance several times before finally remembering it but has no trouble
recalling the names of old friends. A more important concern might be that people
explain memory loss differently depending on the age of the forgetful person. Using a
double standard, younger adults attribute other young adults’ memory failures to lack
of effort but those of older adults to loss of ability (Parr & Siegert, 1993). We may also
fall prey to confirmation bias: If we assume older people forget more, we will notice
and remember when one does and chalk it up to age, whereas when a younger person
forgets something, we either dismiss it or attribute it to something situational.
Older adults who pursue higher degrees of
environmental stimulation tend to main-
tain higher levels of cognitive abilities.

312 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
Particularly worrisome to older people and those who love them is Alzheimer’s
disease, a degenerative disorder of the brain that produces diminished thinking abili-
ties, memory problems and, ultimately, death. Alzheimer’s disease is estimated to occur
in about 10 percent of the population over the age of 65, with the incidence increas-
ing with age to more than 50 percent in people beyond age 85 (National Institute on
Aging, 2004). One of the early symptoms involves memory problems, causing many
older persons to become anxious when they are unable to remember a name or an
event—a difficulty to which they would have given little thought when younger. It is an
especially frightening disorder because it can render people helpless, rob them of their
ability to make new memories, and make them forget loved ones. New advances in
Alzheimer’s research, though, are making some promising headway into our understand-
ing and treatment of this serious disorder. In fact, new tests can identify Alzheimer’s
disease with a remarkably high accuracy rate—years before symptoms even appear
(DeMeyer et al., 2010). And although a cure has not yet been discovered, early diagno-
sis and treatment can now slow the progress of the disease, thus extending the quality
of life of an individual with Alzheimer’s disease.
Social and Emotional Changes The social and emotional state of older adults is
another area rife with misconceptions and stereotypes of grumpy and isolated old folks.
While it is true that an unfortunate consequence of living a long life is outliving some
friends and family members, research finds older adults largely maintaining healthy emo-
tions and social relationships. Stanford University professor Laura Carstensen notes that,
as people age, they tend to engage in selective social interaction, maintaining only the most
rewarding contacts for the investment of their physical and emotional energy (Carstensen,
1987, 1991; Lang & Carstensen, 1994). Maintaining even a single intimate relationship
can markedly improve personal health, as can living with a beloved pet (Siegel, 1990).
Older adults also seem to benefit from emotional systems that, in some ways, grow
keener with age. One recent study found that older adults felt greater sadness than
middle or younger adults when exposed to sad movie scenes (Seider et al., 2010). At
the same time, though, older adults feel more positive emotions and fewer negative
emotions than their younger counterparts (Mroczek, 2001). How do we reconcile
these seemingly contradictory findings? According to Carstensen (1987, 1991), older
adults manage their emotions by seeking out positive environments and avoiding the
negative ones (Sanders, 2010). Moreover, they enjoy a broader perspective on their
experiences, probably as a result of their assortment of life experiences. They are more
likely to take disappointment in stride, bounce back from personal criticism, and focus
on the positive. Overall, most older adults feel satisfied with life and enjoy fairly high
levels of well-being (Charles & Carstensen, 2010).
How do older adults characterize well-being? In a series of interviews with middle-
aged and older adults, Ryff (1989) found that both men and women defined well-being
in terms of relationships with others: They strived to be caring, compassionate people
and valued having a good social support network. The keys to well-being, according to
these interviews, are accepting change, enjoying life, and cultivating a sense of humor.
Keys to Successful Aging What other strategies are effective in coping with aging?
Older adults can remain both active and close to people by doing volunteer work
in the community, traveling, joining clubs and classes, or spending time with grand-
children. Much research supports this notion of the need for close relationships with
others. And it is the basis for one of the most practical applications you can take with
you from this text: Anything that isolates us from sources of social support—from
a reliable network of friends and family—puts us at risk for a host of physical ills,
mental problems, and even social pathologies. We are social creatures, and we need
each other’s help and support to be effective and healthy (Basic Behavioral Science
Task Force, 1996). In addition, we might learn lessons from other cultures where
older citizens are respected and venerated for their wisdom. Before this happens, how-
ever, people must overcome stereotypes of the elderly as incapable and incompetent
(Brewer et al., 1981).
Alzheimer’s disease A degenerative brain
disease, usually noticed first by its debilitating effects
on memory.
selective social interaction Choosing to
restrict the number of one’s social contacts to those
who are the most gratifying.

What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face? 313
Successful aging, then—much like success at any age—seems to consist of making
the most of gains while minimizing the impact of losses (Schulz & Heckhausen, 1996).
Additionally, it is helpful to realize that loss of specific abilities need not represent threats
to one’s sense of self. As one’s physical and psychological resources change, so do one’s
goals (Carstensen & Freund, 1994). From this perspective, late adulthood is a time of
increasing fulfillment. If you ask adults in midlife and beyond if they wanted to be 25
again, “you don’t get a lot of takers,” notes researcher Arthur Stone (Fields, 2010).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
A Look Back at the Jim Twins and Your Own Development
Now that you have learned some key elements of human development over the lifespan,
what conclusions can you draw about why each of us develops into the individuals
we are? By now, you have enough knowledge about the interaction of genes and envi-
ronment to know that neither, on its own, can account for a person’s outcomes. Both
play key roles, often at different stages of development. But can you apply what you’ve
learned to your own outcomes? First, let’s try our hand at explaining the Jim twins,
whom we met in the introductory section of this chapter.
To see the twin pairs in a broader perspective, you need to know that they are
“outliers”—extreme among the twins studied at Minnesota, even though they have
received a lion’s share of media coverage. Although Bouchard and his colleagues found
many unexpected developmental similarities between individuals in all the twin pairs
they studied, most were not nearly so much alike as Oskar and Jack or the Jims. More-
over, even Bouchard acknowledges that many of the similarities are just coincidences
(The Mysteries, 1998). And while mere coincidence does not offer a dazzling explana-
tion, the alternatives seem absurd. No one seriously suggests, for example, that the
names of Betty and Linda could have been written into the genes of the two Jims or
that heredity really specifies storing rubber bands on one’s wrists.
The real story, then, is both less dramatic and more important: Identical twins do
show remarkable similarities, but mainly in the characteristics you might expect: intel-
ligence, temperament, gestures, posture, and pace of speech—all of which do make
sense as genetically influenced traits. And the fact that fraternal twins and other sib-
lings show fewer similarities also suggests that hereditary forces are at work in all of
us, whether we are twins or not. Bouchard (1994) himself takes a rather extreme posi-
tion, suggesting that heredity accounts for up to 80 percent of the similarities observed
among identical twins (What We Learn, 1998). Critics aren’t so sure.
What objections do critics raise concerning the twin studies Bouchard and others
have been conducting? First, they note that, stunning as the similarities between identi-
cal twins may seem, the effects of the environment also show up in twin pairs. None
of them displays behavior that is identical across the board. And the fact that twins
reared together typically are more alike than those reared apart provides additional
testimony to the effects of environment. Furthermore, the personalities of most twin
pairs become less alike as they age, providing even greater evidence that the environ-
ment, as well as heredity, continues to shape development (McCartney et al., 1990).
We should note, too, that many of the twin pairs studied by Bouchard had been reunited
for some time before he found them—an environmental condition that could easily accen-
tuate, or even create, similarities. This was true, for example, of Oskar Stör and Jack Yufe,
the Nazi and Jewish twins, who met five months before Bouchard got to them. In fact,
says psychologist Leon Kamin, Bouchard’s twins face strong incentives to exaggerate their
similarities and minimize their differences to please the research team and to attract media
attention (Horgan, 1993). (Since their story broke in the press, Stör and Yufe have hired
agents, made paid appearances on TV, and sold their story to a Hollywood film producer.)
A third criticism points out that because identical twins look alike, people of-
ten treat them alike. This is an environmental factor that can account for many

314 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
similarities in behavior. For example, attractive people generally are seen by others
as more interesting and friendly, which in turn elicits friendliness from others—
and ultimately leads to different outcomes than would be found in less attractive
individuals, whether or not they have been raised together. The resulting similarity,
then, can be due to environment as much as it is to heredity.
Finally, critics also remind us that scientists’ hopes and expectations can influence
their conclusions in this sort of research. Because Bouchard and other investigators of
identical twins expect to find some hereditary influences, their attention will be drawn
more to similarities than to differences. In fact, this is what most people do when they
meet: Their conversation jumps from topic to topic until they discover common inter-
ests, attitudes, experiences, or activities.
So, is there any point of consensus about the twin studies and the effects of hered-
ity and environment? Bouchard and his critics alike would agree that neither heredity
nor environment ever acts alone to produce behavior or mental processes. They always
interact. Thus, from a developmental perspective, heredity and environment work to-
gether to shape an individual throughout a person’s life—in all the ways we have noted
throughout this chapter.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Expectancy bias can distort
perceptions and research
findings (p. 31).
Check Your Understanding
1. ANALYSIS: How is emerging adulthood different than early
adulthood?
2. APPLICATION: The couple who lives next door to you has a very
successful marriage: They have been together more than 25 years,
have raised three well-adjusted children, and spend a lot of time
together doing things they both enjoy. When a friend of yours visits,
though, and notices them arguing in the backyard—which they
often seem to do—she asks you how they can have such a good
marriage but argue so much. How can you explain that to her?
3. RECALL: What are the keys to successful middle adulthood?
4. RECALL: Describe at least two ways the phrase “Use it or lose it!”
applies to healthy aging.
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Describe two factors
that contribute to the current “revolution” in aging.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
Answers 1. Emerging adulthood is a transitional period between adolescence and early adulthood, during which individuals in industrialized
societies experiment with different roles, viewpoints, and relationships. 2. They probably maintain a ratio of 5:1 positive to negative interactions. 3.
Generativity and complexity 4. Older adults must keep physically and mentally active in order to keep their bodies and brains healthy. 5. Technology
is helping us stay healthier and live longer, and changing social norms are changing the Western perception of aging.
this trait. Remember, though, that if
you shared an environment with these
family members, similarities could be
genetic (if your family is biologically
related to you)—or learned.
3. Next, see what information you
can find in the way of research
to determine what portion of that
particular trait is found to be genetic,
and what portion is thought to be
learned. (If you look in the index of
this book, you might find references
to your trait in this book; if not, your
professor will provide suggestions for
references.)
4. Finally, summarize the findings you
discover, then apply them to your
own life by discussing your new
thoughts about to what extent your
trait is inherited, as well as ways
you might have learned it from your
environment.
NATURE AND NURTURE IN YOUR OWN DEVELOPMENT
Consider one of your own traits—choose
one that interests you, or that you are espe-
cially curious about.
1. Name and describe the trait, and give
an example or two of how the trait
shows up in your behavior and impacts
your life.
2. Then, consider nature and nurture
in your particular trait: First, discuss
similarities you have noticed between
you and your family members with

Does the Reasoning Avoid Common Fallacies? One com-
mon fallacy is the correlation–causation issue. In this study,
researchers used an experimental design with random assign-
ment to groups, so the findings do appear causal rather than cor-
relational in nature. Even when the findings of a study are valid,
though, another common fallacy can occur when they are inter-
preted in a manner that oversimplifies or exaggerates the mean-
ing of the findings. In this case, is it reasonable to conclude from
the findings of this study that listening to Mozart boosts IQ?
Here’s where it gets really interesting: A closer look at the
findings reveals the IQ gain found in the study was only tem-
porary and disappeared after about 15 minutes. And, second,
the measure used to assess IQ (which by definition is a global
measure) was actually a test of visual–spatial competence
(which is just one specific element of IQ tests). To say that
Mozart boosts intelligence is clearly an exaggeration of the
actual findings.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
In the years following the original study, more than 20 similar
studies have been conducted and published in recognized scien-
tific journals. While a few found evidence of what has become
popularly known as “the Mozart effect,” most did not (Steele
et al., 1999). In fact, in-depth studies of the process reveal that
the short-term boost in IQ score is more accurately a result of a
slight increase in positive mood reported by most participants
when listening to the particular Mozart composition used in
many of the studies: When mood was measured before and af-
ter listening to the music and statistically removed from the
equation, the temporary IQ increase disappeared (Thompson
et al., 2001). What’s more, other mildly positive experiences,
such as listening to a story rather than sitting in silence for ten
minutes, produce the same increase in mood and subsequently
the same temporary IQ gain (Nantais & Schellenberg, 1999).
A more reasonable conclusion of these studies is that
experiences that increase positive mood facilitate better visual–
spatial reasoning while the mood remains elevated. This find-
ing, contrary to the “Mozart effect” claim, is corroborated by
other psychological research. Some studies, for example, have
uncovered a relationship between positive mood and perfor-
mance on cognitive tasks (Ashby et al., 1999; Kenealy, 1997).
And listening to music that promotes happiness has been
found to increase speed and productivity on a variety of tasks.
To be fair, it wasn’t the original research report that ex-
aggerated the findings or implied they would apply to ba-
bies, but media reports that proliferated in the wake of the
research. Stanford University professor Chip Heath thinks
he knows why: His analysis reveals that the original 1993
article received far more attention in newspaper stories than
Imagine this: You have just had your first child and are now the proud parent of what you are sure is the most amazing
baby ever born (we aren’t making fun of you—we all feel that
way about our kids!). Like many parents, you want to offer
your child every opportunity you can to help him (or her)
reach full potential. So what would you do if you heard that
listening to Mozart would make your baby smarter? In 1993,
this provocative finding was announced by a pair of scien-
tific researchers who, indeed, found that listening to Mozart
boosted IQ scores (Rauscher et al., 1993). The report received
widespread media coverage and gave birth to a host of innova-
tions. Governors in at least two states instituted requirements
to provide a Mozart CD to every newborn; websites sprang up
that sold all things musical with promises of transforming the
listener’s “health, education, and well-being” (www.themozar-
teffect.com); and expectant mothers began to play Mozart to
their unborn children via headphones on their tummies. Before
jumping on the bandwagon, though, it might be wise to apply
some critical thinking to this remarkable claim.
What Are the Critical Issues?
Could listening to Mozart really improve IQ? If the study
appears valid, how does the new finding fit with other es-
tablished findings about effects of music and about boosting
intelligence? Would other types of music—classical or other-
wise—have similar effects? And finally, if listening to a certain
type of music really does boost IQ, can we be sure it is the mu-
sic itself boosting the IQ, or could it be something else about
the experience of listening to music that was driving the IQ
gain? These are just a few of the questions that a good critical
thinker might ask when first hearing this remarkable claim.
Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence The
first thing that might come to mind for you is the extreme na-
ture of this assertion: The original study reported that IQ
scores increased by 8 to 9 points after listening to just ten
minutes of Mozart! Is there extraordinary evidence to sup-
port this extraordinary claim? An inspection of the source
reveals the claimants are researchers at a respected university,
which lends initial credibility to their assertion. What, then, is
the nature of the evidence? First, the finding was indeed based
on an empirical study rather than anecdotal evidence, so it
passes that test. A second element of the evidence to exam-
ine is the sample: Who were the participants, and how well
do they represent the population at large? In this case, par-
ticipants were college students, which might give you pause.
Would the findings necessarily apply to babies? Or could the
effect be limited to people already at a certain level of cogni-
tive development?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Mozart Effect
What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face? 315

www.themozarteffect.com

www.themozarteffect.com

316 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
PROBLEM: Do the amazing accounts of similarities in twins
reared apart indicate we are primarily a product of our genes? Or
do genetics and environment work together to influence growth and
development over the lifespan?
• Dramatic media stories, such as that of the Jim Twins, represent
the most unusual cases of similarities among identical twins
raised apart. Moreover, any two individuals reared in the same
culture will most likely find some “amazing” coincidences in their
beliefs, attitudes, experiences, or behaviors.
any other research report published around that time, and the
greatest coverage in states with the lowest student test scores.
“Problems attract solutions,” says Heath, and Americans as a
culture seem more obsessed with early childhood education
than many other cultures worldwide (Krakovsky, 2005).
The anxiety noted by Heath, as we learned in Chapter 1,
can breed emotional bias, which in turn can influence people
to latch on to solutions that seem simple and promise grand
results. Add to that findings from memory research indicating
that each time a story is told by one person to another, details
become distorted—and can you imagine how many people
read a newspaper article (which likely distorted the original
finding), then told a friend, who told another friend, and so
on? It’s no wonder the myth of the Mozart effect took such a
strong hold in our culture. And finally, the confirmation bias
helps us understand why people still persist in believing the
Mozart effect to be true, despite research reports and news-
paper articles that have debunked it.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
• Many of our physical characteristics are primarily genetic. Of
our psychological characteristics, traits such as intelligence,
temperament, and certain personality traits—currently known
to be some of the most strongly genetically-influenced traits—
can only be partly attributed to our genetic inheritance.
• Throughout our lives, from conception to death, our
environments play a strong role in development of all our
psychological characteristics.
DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE
Choose another example of a widely held
belief about factors influencing develop-
ment of children, adolescents, or adults. (For
example, you might choose the controversy
about autism and immunizations, the impact
of sex education on sexual behavior, or a
topic within this chapter you’d like to learn
more about.) Then find three websites that
claim to offer information about the topic—
they can be pro, con, or a combination of
both. Evaluate each website using our critical
thinking guidelines.
7.1 What Innate Abilities Does the Infant
Possess?
Core Concept 7.1 Newborns have innate abilities for
finding nourishment, avoiding harmful situations, and
interacting with others—all of which are genetically designed
to facilitate survival.
From the moment of conception, genetics and the environ-
ment interact to influence early development. During the
9-month prenatal period, the fertilized egg (zygote) becomes
an embryo and then a fetus. Teratogens are harmful substances
taken in by the mother that can cause damage to the develop-
ing fetus. Development of sensory abilities and basic reflexes
begins in the prenatal period, and at birth newborns prefer
sweet tastes and familiar sounds and have visual abilities ide-
ally suited for looking at faces. Innate reflexes such as grasping
and sucking help them survive and thrive, as does their abil-
ity for mimicry. The newborn brain contains some 100 billion
neurons.
Infancy spans the first 18 months of life. Maturation refers to
the genetically programmed events and timeline of normal de-
velopment, such as crawling before walking and babbling before
language development. And while exposure to a rich variety of
stimuli in the environment promotes optimal brain development
and can speed up the “average” pace of development, the genetic
leash limits the degree to which the environment plays a role.
Infants need human contact to survive and thrive, and their
innate sensory abilities, reflexes, and mimicry promote devel-
opment of social relationships. During infancy, they establish
a close emotional relationship with their primary caregiver,
which lays the foundation for the way they perceive and in-
teract in close relationships later in their lives. This attachment
style is either secure, anxious-ambivalent, or avoidant, and it is in-
fluenced by both the child’s temperament and the responsive-
ness and accessibility of the primary caregiver. Erikson referred
to this first stage of social development as trust versus mis-
trust. Cultural practices and preferences regarding attachment
style vary, illustrating the role of the environment in develop-
ment. The role of play also varies among different cultures
and impacts development of children’s executive function.
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master conservation. Piaget’s fourth stage doesn’t begin un-
til adolescence. Although many of Piaget’s observations have
withstood the test of time, today’s researchers note that chil-
dren progress more rapidly and less abruptly through the
stages than Piaget believed. Vygotsky’s theory of cognitive
development notes the importance of culture in development
and adds the concepts of scaffolding and a zone of proximal
development to our understanding of how children’s mental
processes develop.
The third developmental task of childhood is develop-
ment of social relationships. Our basic temperament, present
at birth, plays a strong role in our socioemotional develop-
ment; but, like most other abilities, it can be modified by
support or challenges in our environment. Socialization refers
to the process by which children learn the social rules and
norms of their culture, and parenting style plays a significant
role in socialization. Overall, the best child outcomes typi-
cally result from an authoritative parenting style. The influence
of day care on development depends entirely on the quality
of day care rather than the amount of time spent in day care.
The influence of leisure activities, such as television and video
games, depends on both the time spent in the activity as well
as the type of program or game being viewed or played.
Erikson observed three major developmental stages during
childhood. Autonomy can be encouraged by an optimal balance
of freedom and support. Initiative, the goal of the third stage, is
marked by increased choices and self-directed behavior. Industry
can develop in the elementary school years when children are
encouraged to develop their skills and abilities and learn to
respond effectively to both successes and failures. Optimal
development at each stage increases the chances for mastery of
each successive stage.
accommodation (p. 283)
animistic thinking (p. 285)
assimilation (p. 282)
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (p. 294)
authoritarian parent (p. 289)
7.2 What Are the Developmental Tasks
of Childhood?
Core Concept 7.2 Nature and nurture work together
to help children master important developmental tasks,
especially in the areas of language acquisition, cognitive
development, and development of social relationships.
The rapid development of language ability is one of the most
amazing developmental feats of early childhood. There is
widespread agreement that we are born with innate mental
structures that facilitate language development, which Chom-
sky called language acquisition devices (LADs). While all nor-
mally developing infants will acquire language on a relatively
predictable timeline—as long as they are exposed to language
in their environment—the specific language they develop de-
pends on the language(s) to which they are exposed and can
be verbal or sign language. Frequency of exposure can also
modify the pace of language development. Babbling begins
at about 4 months of age and is the first step toward lan-
guage development. Grammar, telegraphic speech, and use of
morphemes follow in just a few years.
Cognitive development refers to the emergence of mental
abilities such as thinking, perceiving, and remembering. Jean
Piaget proposed the most influential model of cognitive de-
velopment, which suggests that children progress through
four distinct stages, each of which is characterized by iden-
tifiable changes in mental abilities. Throughout the stages,
schemas form the mental frameworks for our understanding
of concepts, and these schemas are modified by assimilation
and accommodation as we acquire new information. The
sensorimotor stage is characterized by the emergence of goal-
directed behavior and object permanence, while the subse-
quent preoperational stage is marked by egocentrism, animistic
thinking, centration, and irreversibility. Progression beyond
the limitations of the preoperational stage marks the begin-
ning of the concrete operations stage, during which children
adoption study (p. 267)
anxious-ambivalent attachment (p. 274)
attachment (p. 274)
avoidant attachment (p. 274)
contact comfort (p. 273)
developmental psychology (p. 266)
embryo (p. 268)
executive function (p. 278)
fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) (p. 269)
fetus (p. 268)
genetic leash (p. 273)
imprinting (p. 274)
infancy (p. 271)
innate ability (p. 268)
innate reflex (p. 270)
maturation (p. 271)
mimicry (p. 270)
nature–nurture issue (p. 267)
neonatal period (p. 269)
placenta (p. 269)
prenatal period (p. 268)
secure attachment (p. 274)
self-control (p. 277)
sensitive period (p. 271)
separation anxiety (p. 274)
synaptic pruning (p. 271)
synchronicity (p. 270)
teratogen (p. 269)
trust (p. 276)
twin study (p. 267)
zygote (p. 268)
Chapter Summary 317

7.3 What Changes Mark the Transition
of Adolescence?
Core Concept 7.3 Adolescence offers new developmental
challenges growing out of physical changes, cognitive
changes, and socioemotional pressures.
Physically, adolescence begins with the onset of puberty. Psycho-
logically, the meaning of adolescence varies culturally, as does
the time at which adolescence is thought to end. In Western cul-
ture, the physical changes brought on by puberty often promote
greater attention to physical appearance, which in some Western
cultures is linked to self-esteem. Sexuality and sexual orientation
begin to develop during adolescence, with almost half of North
American teens having their first sexual experience by age 17.
Cognitively, adolescence is characterized by Piaget’s formal
operational stage, during which increasing ability for abstract
thought develops—if cultural educational norms support
morpheme (p. 281)
object permanence (p. 283)
permissive parent (p. 289)
preoperational stage (p. 284)
psychosocial stage (p. 276)
schema (p. 282)
sensorimotor intelligence (p. 283)
sensorimotor stage (p. 283)
scaffolding (p. 288)
socialization (p. 289)
stage theory (p. 282)
telegraphic speech (p. 281)
temperament (p. 288)
theory of mind (p. 287)
uninvolved parent (p. 290)
wave metaphor (p. 288)
authoritative parent (p. 289)
autonomy (p. 293)
babbling (p. 280)
centration (p. 285)
cognitive development (p. 282)
concrete operational stage (p. 285)
conservation (p. 285)
egocentrism (p. 284)
goal-directed behavior (p. 284)
grammar (p. 281)
industry (p. 293)
initiative (p. 293)
irreversibility (p. 285)
language acquisition device (LAD) (p. 280)
mental operation (p. 286)
mental representation (p. 284)
7.4 What Developmental Challenges Do
Adults Face?
Core Concept 7.4 Nature and nurture continue to
interact as we progress through a series of transitions in
adulthood, and cultural norms about age combine with new
technology to increase both the length and quality of life for
many adults.
Adult development is a relatively new field of study and is
receiving increased attention by psychologists as more adults
live longer and healthier lives. Rather than perceiving adult-
hood as a series of concrete and well-defined stages, research
indicates that well-developed adults progress through a series
abstract thought. Moral thinking may also progress to higher
levels. Risk taking increases during adolescence for Western
teens, and although hormonal surges sometimes increase emo-
tionality, most teens do not experience adolescence as a time of
turmoil. While the influence of peers takes on greater impor-
tance than in the childhood years, a stable relationship with
parents is a crucial factor in the successful transition through
adolescence. The primary developmental task of this period,
according to Erikson, is the development of a unique identity.
adolescence (p. 296)
body image (p. 297)
formal operational stage (p. 300)
identity (p. 303)
menarche (p. 297)
puberty (p. 297)
rite of passage (p. 297)
sexual orientation (p. 298)
stage of moral reasoning (p. 302)
of transitions throughout adulthood, each of which is marked
by reflection on past years and growth into new directions.
According to Erikson, the major developmental task of
early adulthood is the development of intimacy, character-
ized by a long-term commitment to an intimate partner. In
previous generations, Westerners expected this to occur in a
person’s 20s, but in industrialized societies today, a transi-
tion period called emerging adulthood may precede intimacy
and early adulthood. After the exploration and experimen-
tation of emerging adulthood, most adults marry. Successful
intimate relationships rely on effective communication and
conflict resolution and on a 5:1 ratio of positive to negative
interactions.
Contrary to popular belief, research indicates that midlife
is a peak period of development in many respects. Middle
318 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan

with age. Cultural norms also have an impact on aging and fos-
ter expectations of positive or negative changes along with it.
Remaining active and engaged on all levels—physically, intellec-
tually, and socially—is the most important key to healthy aging.
Alzheimer’s disease (p. 312)
ego-integrity (p. 310)
emerging adulthood (p. 307)
generativity (p. 309)
intimacy (p. 306)
peer marriage (p. 308)
revolution in aging (p. 306)
selective social interaction (p. 312)
transition (p. 309)
adults’ ability to integrate a variety of complex thinking skills
facilitates a complex life that includes work, relationships,
and healthy coping with stressful life events. Erikson saw the
main developmental task of middle adulthood as generativity,
which involves contributing to the next generation. Midlife
crises are not experienced by most midlife adults, although
those who have not resolved earlier developmental tasks suc-
cessfully are more at risk for a midlife crisis.
Late adulthood, according to Erikson, is best navigated by
the achievement of ego-integrity or the ability to accept both the
successes and failures of one’s past and present. Both cognitive
and physical decline can—to some extent—be slowed signifi-
cantly by regular physical and mental exercise. Moreover, some
abilities, such as vocabulary and social skills, actually improve
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Mozart Effect
The notion that playing classical music for babies before birth
will subsequently increase their IQ score has become a popu-
lar belief. But a closer look at the research indicates that the
claim is wildly exaggerated. The gain in IQ score disappeared
after just 15 minutes, and further testing revealed that it was
actually positive mood that temporarily increased cognitive
functioning.
Chapter Summary 319

PROGRAM 5: THE DEVELOPING CHILD
PROGRAM 6: LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM 17: SEX AND GENDER
PROGRAM 18: MATURING AND AGING
Program Review
1. Jean Piaget has studied how children think. According to Piaget,
around what age does a child typically master the idea that the
amount of a liquid remains the same when it is poured from one
container to another container with a different shape?
a. 2 years old c. 6 years old
b. 4 years old d. 8 years old
2. A baby is shown an orange ball a dozen times in a row. How would
you predict the baby would respond?
a. The baby will make the same interested response each time.
b. The baby will respond with less and less interest each time.
c. The baby will respond with more and more interest each time.
d. The baby will not be interested at any time.
3. The Wild Boy of Aveyron represents which important issue in
developmental psychology?
a. ethics in experimentation
b. the relation of physical development to social development
c. nature versus nurture
d. interpretation of experimental data
4. At 1 month of age, babies
a. are best described as “a blooming, buzzing
confusion.”
b. prefer stimuli that are constant and don’t vary.
c. have not yet opened their eyes.
d. prefer human faces over other visual stimuli.
5. Which of the following psychological characteristics appear(s) to
have a genetic component?
a. activity level
b. tendency to be outgoing
c. risk for some psychopathologies
d. all of the above
6. What sounds do very young babies prefer?
a. ocean sounds
b. human voices
c. other babies
d. soft music
320 C H A P T E R 7 Development Over the Lifespan
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 321
7. How does the development of language competence compare
from culture to culture?
a. It varies greatly.
b. It is remarkably similar.
c. Western cultures are similar to each other, whereas
Eastern cultures are very different.
d. This topic is just beginning to be explored by
researchers.
8. Which of the following stages of communication consists of sim-
ple sentences that lack plurals, articles, and tenses, but tend to
have the constituent words in the order appropriate to the child’s
native language?
a. telegraphic speech
b. babbling
c. question asking
d. ritualistic speech
9. According to research by Zella Lurin and Jeffrey Rubin, the differ-
ence in the language parents use to describe their newborn sons
or daughters is primarily a reflection of
a. actual physical differences in the newborns.
b. differences in the way the newborns behave.
c. the way the hospital staff responds to the babies.
d. the parents’ expectations coloring their perceptions.
10. The term androgynous would best apply to which of the following
people?
a. a macho man who participates in body-building
competitions
b. a dainty woman who belongs to a sewing club
c. a young boy who never talks in class because
he feels shy
d. a male rock star who wears heavy makeup,
long hair, and feminine clothing
11. Because of the way we socialize our children, men tend to experi-
ence more freedom to , whereas women tend to experi-
ence more freedom to .
a. explore; criticize
b. withdraw; invent
c. discover; express themselves
d. express themselves; explore
12. How has research on lifespan development changed our idea of
human nature?
a. We see development as a growth process of early life.
b. We see that a longer lifespan creates problems for society.
c. We view people as continuing to develop throughout life.
d. We regard development as a hormonally based process.
13. According to Erikson, the young adult faces a conflict between
a. isolation and intimacy.
b. heterosexuality and homosexuality.
c. autonomy and shame.
d. wholeness and futility.
14. Assuming that a person remains healthy, what happens to the
ability to derive sexual pleasure as one ages?
a. It does not change.
b. It gradually diminishes.
c. It abruptly ceases.
d. It depends on the availability of a suitable partner.
15. In which of the following areas do the elderly typically have an
advantage over college students?
a. The elderly are better able to climb stairs.
b. The elderly generally have higher short-term memory capacity.
c. The elderly are less lonely.
d. The elderly have a more developed sense of humor.

States of Consciousness8
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
8.1 How Is Consciousness Related to
Other Mental Processes?
Tools for Studying Consciousness
Models of the Conscious and
Nonconscious Minds
What Does Consciousness Do for Us?
Coma and Related States
The brain operates on many levels
at once—both conscious and
unconscious.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
The trick is to organize material in
preconscious long-term memory so you
can find it when you need it.
8.2 What Cycles Occur in Everyday
Consciousness?
Daydreaming
Sleep: The Mysterious Third of Our Lives
Dreaming: The Pageants of the Night
Consciousness fluctuates in cycles that
correspond to our biological rhythms
and to patterns of stimulation in our
environment.
Sleep Disorders
Insomnia, sleep apnea, narcolepsy, and
daytime sleepiness can be hazardous
to your health—and perhaps even to
your life.
An altered state of consciousness
occurs when some aspect of normal
consciousness is modified by mental,
behavioral, or chemical means.
Dependence and Addiction
Psychoactive drugs alter brain
chemistry and can produce physical
or psychological addiction. But is
addiction a disease or a character flaw?
CHAPTER PROBLEM How can psychologists objectively examine the worlds of dreaming and other
subjective mental states?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED The Unconscious—Reconsidered
8.3 What Other Forms Can
Consciousness Take?
Hypnosis
Meditation
Psychoactive Drug States

323
H AVE YOU EVER HAD A DREAM YOU ENJOYED SO MUCH THAT YOU wanted to linger in bed so you could disappear back into it? On a hot June morning in Phoenix, a housewife and mother of three awoke from just that sort of dream.
In my dream, two people were having an intense conversation in a meadow in the woods.
One of these people was just your average girl. The other person was fantastically beautiful,
sparkly, and a vampire. They were discussing the difficulties inherent in the facts that (A) they
were falling in love with each other while (B) the vampire was particularly attracted to the scent
of her blood, and was having a difficult time restraining himself from killing her immediately
(Meyer, 2011).
Captivated by the intensely handsome young man in the dream and intrigued by the per-
sonalities and the dilemma of the couple, she began to write a story about them—a story that
quickly developed into the blockbuster series of books and movies called Twilight.
Stephenie Meyer was not the first to be inspired by a dream. From ancient times, dreams
have been regarded as sources of insight, creativity, and prophecy. We can see this, for ex-
ample, in the Old Testament story of the Israelite Joseph, who interpreted Pharaoh’s dreams of
fat and lean cattle as predicting first the years of plenty and then the years of famine that lay in
store for the Egyptian kingdom (Genesis, 41:i–vii).
In more modern times, English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge attributed the imagery of his
poem “Kubla Khan” to a dream (possibly drug-induced) that he experienced after reading a biog-
raphy of the famed Mongol warrior. Likewise, artists such as surrealist Salvador Dali found dreams
to be vivid sources of imagery. Composers as varied as Mozart, Beethoven, the Beatles, and

324 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
Sting have all credited their dreams with inspiring certain works. In the scientific world, chemist
August Kekule’s discovery of the structure of the benzene molecule was sparked by his dream of
a snake rolled into a loop, grasping its own tail tucked in its mouth. Even the famous horror writer
Stephen King claims to have harvested story ideas from his own childhood nightmares.
Why do we dream? Do dreams help us solve problems? Do they reflect the workings of the
unconscious mind? Or are dreams just random mental “junk”—perhaps debris left over from
the previous day? The difficulty in studying dreams with the methods of science is that these
mental states are private experiences. No one else can experience your dreams directly. These
issues, then, frame the problem on which we will focus in this chapter.
PROBLEM: How can psychologists objectively examine the worlds of dreaming and other
subjective mental states?
Dreaming represents one of many states of consciousness possible for the human mind. Others
include our familiar state of wakefulness and the less-familiar states of hypnosis, meditation,
and the chemically altered states produced by psychoactive drugs—all of which we will study in
this chapter. But that’s not all. Behind these conscious states, much of the brain’s work occurs
offline—outside of awareness (Wallace & Fisher, 1999). This includes such mundane tasks as
the retrieval of information from memory (What is seven times nine?), as well as the primitive
operations occurring in the deep regions of the brain that control basic biological functions,
such as blood pressure and body temperature. Somewhere between these extremes are parts
of the mind that somehow deal with our once-conscious memories and gut-level responses, as
varied as recollections of this morning’s breakfast or your most embarrassing moment. As we
will see, the nature of this netherworld of nonconscious ideas, feelings, desires, and images
has been controversial ever since Freud suggested that dreams may reflect unrecognized and
unconscious fears and desires. In this chapter, we will evaluate this claim, as well as others
made for hidden levels of processing in the mind. To do so, we begin with the familiar state of
consciousness that fills most of our waking hours.
8.1 KEY QUESTION
How Is Consciousness Related to Other Mental Processes?
What does it mean to be conscious? Is it alertness? Is it awareness, perhaps of oneself
and of one’s environment? Both these suggestions seem reasonable. But consider this:
Discovery of the chemical transmission between neurons (rather than electrical trans-
mission, as previously thought) came to physiologist Otto Loewi in a dream, from
which he awoke and scribbled down his idea on paper next to his bed. He went back
to sleep, but in the morning found he couldn’t decipher his handwriting and could
not remember the design of the experiment he had dreamed of. Fortunately, he had
the same dream the next night, and this time he got out of bed immediately, raced to
his lab, and tried the experiment—which set the stage for his Nobel Prize-winning
contribution to medicine in 1936.
So here is the question: Was Loewi conscious when, in his sleep, he designed the revo-
lutionary experiment? Although we generally assume that alertness is a prerequisite for
clear thinking or problem solving—such as that which produced Loewi’s idea—we don’t
typically think of sleeping or dreaming as a state of alertness, so we probably wouldn’t
say he was alert. Was he conscious when he wrote it down, only to find he could not read
what he wrote the next morning? He was aware enough to reach for a pen and paper,
and we generally assume we must be conscious for such goal-directed behavior. But if he
was conscious when he wrote it down, why couldn’t he make sense of it the next day?
This puzzling example illustrates the difficulty psychologists sometimes have in
defining exactly what it means to be conscious. The problem is that consciousness is
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
The hypothalamus, for example,
unconsciously regulates several
biological drives (p. 68).

How Is Consciousness Related to Other Mental Processes? 325
so subjective and elusive—like searching for the end of the rainbow (Damasio, 1999,
2000). The conundrum first presented itself when structuralists attempted to dissect
conscious experience more than a century ago. As you will recall, they used a simple
technique called introspection, asking people to report on their own conscious experi-
ence. The slippery, subjective nature of consciousness quickly became obvious to nearly
everyone, and psychologists began to despair that science would never find a way to
study objectively something so private as conscious experience. (Think about it: How
could you prove that you have consciousness?)
The problem seemed so intractable that, early in the 20th century, the notori-
ous and influential behaviorist John Watson declared the mind out of bounds for the
young science of psychology. Mental processes were little more than by-products of
our actions, he said. (You don’t cry because you are sad; you are sad because some
event makes you cry.) Under Watson’s direction, psychology became simply the sci-
ence of behavior. And so psychology not only lost its consciousness but also lost its
mind!
The psychology of consciousness remained in limbo until the 1960s, when a coali-
tion of cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, and computer scientists brought it back
to life (Gardner, 1985). They did so for two reasons. First, many psychological issues
had surfaced that needed a better explanation than behaviorism could deliver: quirks
of memory, perceptual illusions, and drug-induced states (which were very popular in
the 1960s). The second reason for the reemergence of consciousness came from tech-
nology. Scientists were acquiring new tools—especially computers, which made brain
scans possible. Computers also provided a model that could explain how the brain
processes information.
The combination of new tools and unsolved problems, then, led to a multidisci-
plinary effort that became known as cognitive neuroscience. Attracting scientists from
a variety of fields, cognitive neuroscience set out to unravel the mystery of how the
brain processes information and creates conscious experience. From the perspective
of cognitive neuroscience, the brain acts like a biological computing device with vast
resources—among them 100 billion transistor-like neurons, each with thousands of
interconnections—capable of creating the complex universe of imagination and experi-
ence we think of as consciousness (Chalmers, 1995).
The big picture that emerges is one of a conscious mind that can take on a va-
riety of roles, as we will see. But the conscious mind must focus sequentially, first
on one thing and then another, like a moving spotlight (Tononi & Edelman, 1998).
Consciousness is not good at multitasking; so, if you try to drive while texting on
your cell phone, you must shift your attention back and forth between tasks
(Rubenstein et al., 2001; Strayer et al., 2003). Meanwhile, nonconscious processes have
no such restriction and can work on many jobs at the same time—which is why you
can walk, chew gum, and breathe simultaneously. In more technical terms, conscious-
ness must process information serially, while nonconscious brain circuits can process
many streams of information in parallel. This big picture, then, leads us to our core
concept for this section:
Core Concept 8.1
The brain operates on many levels at once—both conscious and
unconscious.
Let’s get back to the question we posed at the beginning of this section: What exactly
is consciousness? Thanks to advances in cognitive neuroscience, we now define
consciousness not as a state of being but as the brain process that creates our mental
representation of the world and our current thoughts. Identifying it as a process
acknowledges that consciousness is dynamic and continual rather than static and con-
crete. And it is a process with links to other processes we have studied, including mem-
ory, learning, sensation, and perception.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Wundt and the structuralists
pioneered the use of
introspection in their search
for “the elements of conscious
experience” (p. 14).
cognitive neuroscience An interdisciplinary
field involving cognitive psychology, neurology, biology,
computer science, linguistics, and specialists from
other fields who are interested in the connection
between mental processes and the brain.
nonconscious process Any brain process that
does not involve conscious processing, including both
preconscious memories and unconscious processes.
consciousness The process by which the brain
creates a mental model of our experience. The most
common, or ordinary, consciousness occurs during
wakefulness, although there are can be altered states
of consciousness.
Although Freud used a psychodynamic
perspective for his pioneering work on
unconscious processes in his patients,
it was the cognitive psychologists who
showed that subjective mental states
could be studied objectively with the tools
of science.

326 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
For example, everything entering consciousness passes through working memory.
When sensory stimulation gains our attention and passes from sensory memory into
working memory, we become conscious of it. Thus, we can also say we are conscious
of everything that enters working memory. Therefore, some psychologists have sug-
gested working memory is actually the long-sought seat of consciousness (Engle; 2002;
LeDoux, 1996).
Consciousness is also linked to learning. As you might recall from Chapter 4, cog-
nitive learning and behavioral learning seem to involve different brain mechanisms.
Most cognitive learning (such as your learning of the material in this chapter) relies on
conscious processes. On the other hand, much behavioral learning, particularly classi-
cal conditioning—such as the acquisition of a phobic response—relies heavily on pro-
cesses that can occur outside of consciousness.
Another process linked to consciousness is attention, a feature that makes one
item stand out among others in consciousness—as when someone calls your name in
a crowded room. Attention also enables you to follow the thread of a conversation
against a background of other voices. (Psychologists call this selective attention or the
cocktail party phenomenon.) Attention, in turn, is closely related to the dual processes
of sensation and perception, which we studied in Chapter 3. There, you also read
about pain perception—a mental process for which the link to consciousness is only
partially known. Later in this chapter, we will explore how states of consciousness,
such as hypnosis, may be effective in managing pain.
One last point about the role of consciousness is this: It helps you combine both
reality and fantasy and creates a sort of ongoing “movie” in your head. For example, if
you see a doughnut when you are hungry, working memory forms a conscious image
of the doughnut (based on sensation and perception) and consults long-term memory,
which—thanks to behavioral learning—associates the image with food and allows you
to imagine eating it. In this way, consciousness relies on all the processes we have dis-
cussed. But exactly how the brain does this is perhaps psychology’s greatest mystery.
How do the patterns in the firing of billions of neurons become the conscious image of
a doughnut—or of the words and ideas on this page?
Tools for Studying Consciousness
High-tech tools, such as the fMRI, PET, and EEG, have opened new windows to the
brain that enable researchers to see which regions are active during various mental
tasks. In other words, we can identify some of the “what” of consciousness: Although
these imaging devices do not, of course, reveal the actual contents of conscious ex-
perience, they do indicate distinct groups of brain structures that “light up,” for ex-
ample, when we read, speak, or shift our attention (see Figure 8.1). The resulting
images leave no doubt that conscious processing involves simultaneous activity in
many brain circuits, especially in the cortex and pathways connecting the thala-
mus to the cortex. But, to glimpse the underlying mental processes—the “how” of
consciousness—psychologists have devised other, even more ingenious, techniques.
We will see many of these throughout this chapter and, in fact, throughout this book.
For the moment, though, we will give you just two examples as previews of coming
attractions.
Mental Rotation A classic experiment by Roger Shepard and Jacqueline Metzler
(1971) showed that it’s not merely a metaphor when people speak of “turning things
over” in their minds. Using drawings like those in Figure 8.2, Shepard and Metzler
asked volunteers to decide whether the two images in each pair show the same object
in different positions. They reasoned that, if the mind actually rotates images when
comparing them, people would take longer to respond when the difference between
the angles of the images in each pair is increased. And that is exactly what they found.
If you try this experiment on your friends, it is likely that they, too, will respond more
quickly to pair A—where the images have been rotated through a smaller angle—than
to pairs B and C.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 5
Working memory imposes a
limitation on consciousness
because it holds only about seven
“chunks” of information (p. 177).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Behavioral learning includes
operant conditioning and
classical conditioning (p. 135).
attention A process by which consciousness
focuses on a single item or “chunk” in working memory.

How Is Consciousness Related to Other Mental Processes? 327
Zooming in with the Mind Another clever approach to the “how” of conscious-
ness takes a different twist: Stephen Kosslyn found we can use our conscious minds
to “zoom in,” camera-like, on the details of our mental images. To demonstrate this,
Kosslyn (1976) first asked people to think of objects, such as an elephant or a cat or a
chair. Then he asked questions about details of the imagined object (for example, “Is
it a black cat?” or “Does it have a long tail?”), recording how long it took for people
to answer. He discovered that the smaller the detail he asked for, the longer subjects
needed for a response. People required extra time, Kosslyn proposed, to make a closer
examination of their mental images.
Both these experiments suggest we consciously manipulate our visual images. And
we do so in much the same way that we might manipulate physical objects in the
outside world (Kosslyn, 1983). You can try this yourself with the demonstration in
the box on the next page, Do It Yourself! Zooming in on Mental Images. As we prog-
ress through the chapter, you will learn about other techniques used by neuroscientists
to study consciousness and its allied mental processes. First, though, let’s look more
closely at some models of the mind.
Models of the Conscious and Nonconscious Minds
As psychologists have attempted to study and understand consciousness, several models
have emerged that remain useful today. You might recall from Chapter 6 that searching
for analogies can be a useful problem-solving strategy. Psychologists have employed a
similar strategy in trying to nail down the essence of consciousness by searching for the
best metaphor to represent this elusive concept. Let’s look at a few of these models.
Freud’s Levels of Consciousness Sigmund Freud originally suggested a notion
many of us take for granted today: that our minds operate on several levels at once.
The metaphor he developed as a model for consciousness compared it to the tip of an
iceberg, suggesting a much larger presence beneath the surface. Freud saw this larger
presence—the unconscious—as a reservoir of needs, desires, wishes, and traumatic
memories. Moreover, he believed that processing in the unconscious—outside our
awareness—could influence our conscious thoughts, feelings, dreams, fantasies, and
actions. A large body of evidence now confirms Freud’s insight that much of the mind
lurks and works out of sight, beneath the level of awareness.
The Preconscious Psychologists often use Freud’s term, the preconscious, in referring
to memories of events (your birthday last year, for example) and facts (Salem is the
preconscious Freud’s notion that the mind has
a special unconscious storehouse for information not
currently in consciousness but readily available to con-
sciousness. Example: your telephone number is stored
in the preconscious.
FIGURE 8.1
PET Scans of the Brain at Work
These PET scans show how distinct
regions of the brain become active
during different conscious tasks.
FIGURE 8.2
Figures for the Mental Rotation
Experiment
These figures are similar to those used
in Shepard and Metzler’s mental rotation
experiment. Results showed that people
took longer to decide whether the images
were the same or different as the images
in each pair were rotated through greater
angles. You might try your own test to
verify their findings.

328 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
capital of Oregon) that are not conscious but are readily accessible. These memories
can cross over to consciousness with relative ease when something cues their recall.
Otherwise, they lie in the background of the mind, just beyond the boundary of con-
sciousness until needed. Thus, the preconscious, in the modern cognitive sense, is much
the same as long-term memory.
Preconscious processing isn’t restricted to the serial, one-thing-at-a-time limi-
tation of consciousness. That is, it can search for information in many places at
once—an ability called parallel processing. On the other hand, the preconscious
lacks the ability consciousness has for deliberate thinking. You might think of the
preconscious as a memory storehouse, where the stock is constantly rotated so that
the most recently used and most emotionally loaded information is most easily
accessed.
The Unconscious A dictionary might define the term unconscious as the absence of
all consciousness, as in one who has fainted, become comatose, or is under anesthe-
sia. Freud, however, defined the unconscious as a reservoir of primitive motives and
threatening memories hidden from awareness. And cognitive psychologists have still
another meaning for unconscious that refers to any sort of nonconscious process (in-
cluding breathing, turning your head, etc.) produced in the brain. Pulling these notions
together, we will define the unconscious as a broad term that refers to many levels of
processing below the level of awareness. These can range from preconscious memory
to brain activity that controls basic body functions to the processes that operate in the
background when we form a perception, say, of a table or a comment made by a friend.
Such unconscious processes can be subtle—perhaps leading, without our realization,
to anxiety or depression (Kihlstrom, 1987).
You can get some idea of how unconscious processes can affect us if you think
about how you often follow a familiar route to work or school without apparent
thought—even when you are driving! Unconscious processing can also be studied in
the laboratory, as you will see in the following demonstration. Try filling in the blanks
to make a word from the following stem:
D E F — — —
unconscious In classic Freudian theory, a part
of the mind that houses emotional memories, desires,
and feelings that would be threatening if brought to
consciousness. Many modern cognitive psychologists,
however, view the unconscious in less sinister terms,
as including all nonconscious mental processes.
ZOOMING IN ON MENTAL IMAGES
Ask a friend to close his or her eyes
and imagine a house. Then ask your
friend to describe the color of the roof,
the front door, and doorbell button.
Using a watch or clock that displays
seconds, record the amount of time it takes
to get each answer. Based on Kosslyn’s
research, which item would you predict
would require the longest response time?
The shortest?
You will probably find that the
smaller the detail you ask for, the longer
it takes your friend to respond. Kosslyn
interpreted this to mean that people need
the extra time to “zoom in” on a mental
image to resolve smaller features. In
other words, we examine our mental im-
ages in the same way that we examine
physical objects in the external world in
order to perceive the “big picture” or the
details.

How Is Consciousness Related to Other Mental Processes? 329
Using a technique called priming, psychologists can influence the answers people
give to such problems—without their being conscious that they were influenced. In the
example just given, there are a number of possible ways to complete the word stem,
including defend, defeat, defect, defile, deform, defray, and defuse. We don’t know for
sure what your answer was, but we did set you up to think of the word define. How?
We deliberately “primed” your response by using the word define several times in
the previous paragraph. (There is no certainty, of course, that you would respond as
predicted—merely an increased probability.) With methods such as this, psychologists
have a powerful tool for probing the interaction of conscious and unconscious processes.
James’ Stream of Consciousness William James offered a different metaphor for
consciousness, likening ordinary waking consciousness to a flowing stream carrying
ever-changing sensations, perceptions, thoughts, memories, feelings, motives, and de-
sires. This “stream of consciousness” includes awareness of ourselves and of stimula-
tion from our environment. According to James, it can also include physical sensations
from within, such as hunger, thirst, pain, and pleasure.
Part of James’ theory was somewhat similar to Freud’s distinction between the con-
scious and the preconscious. For James, consciousness had two levels: an area of focus,
which included whatever we are attending closely to at any given time, and a peripheral
consciousness encompassing the feelings and associations that give meaning and context
to our focus. So, for example, when you attend the wedding of a friend, your focus is on
the couple getting married and the guests with whom you are interacting. The feelings
you have about the marriage, all the things you know about what led the couple to this
pivotal moment in their lives, and whatever other memories the event triggers for you are
all part of the peripheral conscious, like the supporting actors in a drama. In this way, we
might use vision as another metaphor to describe James’ model of consciousness: Like our
peripheral vision, our peripheral consciousness is not the subject of our focus, but lends
meaning and context to it.
The Modern Cognitive Perspective The final metaphor we offer for consciousness
comes from cognitive psychology. The computer metaphor likens consciousness to the
information and images that appear on a computer screen, while nonconscious processes
are like the electronic activity behind the scenes, deep inside the computer. Most of the time,
our nonconscious machinery quietly operates in parallel with consciousness, but occasion-
ally a nonconscious motive or emotion becomes so strong it erupts into consciousness—
as when a peculiar odor associated with an emotional memory suddenly brings that
emotion to the forefront, or when a growing hunger drive bursts into awareness.
All these metaphors can help us grasp the nature of consciousness, and we will re-
turn to them periodically throughout the chapter as we develop our understanding of
this fascinating process. Before leaving this section, though, let’s ask one more impor-
tant question: Why is consciousness important?
What Does Consciousness Do for Us?
At this moment, your consciousness is focused on these words, written in black letters
on a white page. But the words don’t stand alone. Like James suggested in his discus-
sion of peripheral consciousness, the words also have meaning, which flows through
consciousness as you read. You can, of course, shift the spotlight of your attention to
something else—music in the background, perhaps—and, as you do so, the words on
the page slip into the fringes of awareness. You may be moving your eyes across the
page, but the meaning does not really register. (Every student has had this experience.)
Now, if we can have your attention again, we’d like to remind you that conscious-
ness has many functions. Three especially important ones were illustrated by the sce-
nario in the previous paragraph (Solso, 2001; Tononi & Edelman, 1998):
• Consciousness restricts our attention. Because consciousness processes information
serially, it limits what you notice and think about. In this way, consciousness
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 5
Psychologists use priming to
study implicit memory (p. 192).
Both James and Freud theorized that we
have two levels of consciousness. The
focus of our consciousness, like the
focus of our attention on the singer in
the spotlight, takes center stage. Equally
important, however, is what James called
our peripheral conscious: Just as the band
adds richness to the singer’s performance,
our peripheral consciousness adds rich
contextual detail to our area of focus.
William James spoke of the “stream of
consciousness,” which portrayed con-
sciousness as an active, ever-changing
process. (Courtesy Susan Dupor.)

330 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
keeps your brain from being overwhelmed by stimulation. Unfortunately, the
one-thing-at-a-time property of consciousness will not let you concentrate on
what you are reading when you shift your attention to music playing in the
background.
• Consciousness provides a mental “meeting place,” where sensation can combine
with memory, emotions, motives, and a host of other psychological processes
in the process we have called perception. Consciousness, then, is the canvas on
which we customarily create a meaningful picture from the palette of stimula-
tion offered by our internal and external worlds. This is the aspect of conscious-
ness that links meaning to words on a page or connects the emotion of joy to
the sight of an old friend’s face. Indeed, neuroimaging research indicates that
the essence of consciousness is to make linkages among different parts of the
brain (Massimini et al., 2005). Consciousness, therefore, lies at the very heart of
cognition.
• Consciousness allows us to create a mental model of the world—a model we can
manipulate in our minds. Unlike simpler organisms, consciousness frees us from
being prisoners of the moment: We don’t just react reflexively to stimulation.
Instead, we use a conscious model of our world that draws on memory and fore-
thought, bringing both the past and the future into awareness. With this model,
we can think and plan by manipulating our mental world to evaluate alternative
responses and imagine how effective they will be. It is this feature of conscious-
ness that, for example, helps you make associations between concepts in this text
and your own experiences, or keeps you from being brutally honest with a friend
wearing clothes you don’t like.
These three features—restriction, combination, and manipulation—apply in varying
degrees to all states of consciousness, whether dreaming, hypnosis, meditation, a drug-
induced state, or our “normal” waking state. But what about the condition known as a
coma: Where does it fit into our study of consciousness?
Coma and Related States
The general public profoundly misunderstands what it means to be in a coma. This
misunderstanding stems, in part, from a few highly publicized and emotional cases
that provoked heated discussion about the ethics of discontinuing life support in se-
verely brain-injured patients (Meyers, 2007). The flames are fanned, too, by reports of
“miraculous” recoveries. So what are the facts?
Comas are not stable, long-term states. Rather, they usually last only a few days—
up to about two weeks—after brain injury. In a comatose state, patients lack the nor-
mal cycles of sleep and wakefulness, their eyes usually remain closed, and they cannot
be aroused. Those who improve transition to a minimally conscious state, during
which they may have limited awareness and a functioning brain. Recovery is usually
gradual (National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, 2007). Those who
do not improve deteriorate into a persistent vegetative state. In this condition, they
may open their eyes periodically, and they pass in and out of normal sleep cycles, but
they have only minimal brain activity and basic reflexes. Chances for full recovery
from a persistent vegetative state are slim.
But diagnosis of a persistent vegetative state is sometimes inaccurate, as the
measurement of brain activity is not a perfect science. And such a mistake could
potentially be fatal when the diagnosis is used to make decisions about whether
or not to continue life support. Promising new brain imaging techniques are being
discovered, however, that can more accurately identify the level of brain activ-
ity and awareness in patients who appear to be in persistent vegetative states.
Advances in PET and MRI technology have recently enabled researchers to predict
successfully which patients in persistent vegetative state would improve and tran-
sition into minimally conscious states (Owen et al., 2009). Stay tuned for further
developments.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 3
Perception is the process of adding
meaning to sensation (p. 89).
coma An unconscious state, during which a person
lacks the normal cycles of sleep and wakefulness,
that usually lasts only a few days. The comatose state
differs from the minimally conscious state and the
persistent vegetative state.

How Is Consciousness Related to Other Mental Processes? 331
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Want to expand your consciousness? In the strictest sense, it is not really possible,
because consciousness has a limited capacity. As we have noted, consciousness can
focus on only one thing at a time. What can be expanded, however, is the access your
consciousness has to information stored in your preconscious memory. Learning how
to do that can be of tremendous help to students who need to absorb a large amount
of information and to prove it on an exam.
You will, of course, have an advantage if you face an exam with your conscious-
ness unimpaired by the massive sleep debt students sometimes incur in an “all-nighter”
study session. No amount of caffeine can bring your sleep-deprived consciousness
back to optimum functioning. Just as your teachers have always preached—and as
you learned in Chapter 5—it is far better to spread your studying over several days
or weeks than to try to learn everything at once. So there is your first tip to increasing
your access to your preconscious!
Because of its severely limited capacity, you cannot possibly hold in consciousness ev-
erything you need to remember for an exam. The material must be stored, readily accessi-
ble but outside of consciousness, in preconscious long-term memory. The trick is to be able
to bring it back into consciousness when needed. Here are some more strategies to help:
1. Study for the gist. Students sometimes think their professors ask “trick questions,”
although professors almost never do so intentionally. In reality, a good exam ques-
tion will show whether students understand the meaning of a term—the gist—
rather than having merely memorized a definition. A twofold study strategy can
help you get the gist (pronounced JIST) of a concept. First, put the textbook or
class definition into your own words. Second, think of an example from your own
experience that illustrates the concept.
2. Look for connections among concepts. Once you have the gist of the concepts, you
will probably also need to know how those concepts are related to each other.
The professor may ask you to explain, for example, the relationship between con-
sciousness and preconsciousness. Therefore, a good study strategy is to ask your-
self how a new concept (e.g., preconscious) is related to other concepts learned
previously (e.g., conscious or unconscious). As we noted in Chapter 6, the
cognitive mapping tool in MyPsychLab can be a great asset to help you find
connections between concepts.
3. Anticipate the most likely cues. Just because you “know” the material doesn’t mean
the exam questions will automatically prompt the release of the information from
long-term memory back into consciousness. It pays, therefore, to spend some of
your study time thinking about the kinds of questions your professor might ask.
For example, you will learn in this chapter about the effects of various psychoac-
tive drugs, but you could be stumped if the professor asks you to explain why
alcohol is more like barbiturates than opiates. You can often anticipate such ques-
tions by noting what the professor emphasizes in lecture. It also helps to think
of the kinds of questions that your professor is known to favor. (A study partner
helps a lot with this.) Some of the most common essay questions begin with terms
such as “Explain,” “Evaluate,” or “Compare and contrast.”
In general, the relationship between consciousness and memory suggests that to
learn the kind of material required in your college classes, you must actively process
the material while it is in your consciousness. To do so effectively, you must make the
material meaningful. This requires understanding it in your own words, with your own
examples—thus making connections between new information and old information
already in your memory. It also requires organizing information so you see how it is
interconnected. And, finally, it requires anticipating the cues that will be used to bring
it back to consciousness.
A good study partner can help you gain
a deeper and stronger grasp of the
concepts.
Map the Concepts at
MyPsychLab

332 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
8.2 KEY QUESTION
What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness?
If you are a “morning person,” you are probably at your peak of alertness soon after
you awaken. But this mental state doesn’t last all day. Like most other people, you likely
experience a period of mental lethargy in the afternoon—at which point you may join
much of the Latin world and wisely take a siesta. Later, your alertness increases for a
time, only to fade again during the evening hours. Punctuating this cycle may be periods
of heightened focus and attention and periods of reverie, known as daydreams. Finally,
whether you are a “morning” or “night” person, you eventually drift into that third of
your life in which conscious contact with the outside world nearly ceases: sleep.
Psychologists have traced these cyclic changes in consciousness, looking for reliable
patterns. Our Core Concept for this section of the chapter summarizes what they have
found:
Core Concept 8.2
Consciousness fluctuates in cycles that correspond to our biological
rhythms and to patterns of stimulation in our environment.
In this section, we focus primarily on the cyclic changes in consciousness involved in
sleep and nocturnal dreaming. We begin, however, with another sort of “dreaming”
that occurs while we are awake.
Daydreaming
In the mildly altered state of consciousness we call daydreaming, attention turns inward
to memories, expectations, and desires—often with vivid mental imagery (Roche &
McConkey, 1990). Daydreaming occurs most often when people are alone, relaxed,
engaged in a boring or routine task, or just about to fall asleep (Singer, 1966, 1975).
But is daydreaming normal? You may be relieved to know that most people daydream
every day. In fact, it is abnormal if you do not! On average, about 30 percent of our
waking hours is spent daydreaming, with young adults reporting the most frequent
and vivid daydreams. Both the incidence and the intensity of daydreams appear to
decline significantly with increasing age (Giambra, 2000; Singer & McCraven, 1961).
daydreaming A common (and quite normal)
variation of consciousness in which attention shifts to
memories, expectations, desires, or fantasies and away
from the immediate situation.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Why did behaviorist John Watson object to defining
psychology as the science of consciousness?
2. RECALL: What technology would a cognitive neuroscientist be
likely to use in studying consciousness?
3. APPLICATION: How would you sample the contents of another
person’s preconscious mind?
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Returning to the
example at the beginning of this section, in which Otto Loewi
discovered the chemical nature of neural transmissions based on a
dream: In what ways might Loewi’s brain have been simultaneously
operating on both conscious and unconscious levels? For example,
how might the inability of his consciousness to parallel process
have played a role in his messy handwriting as he attempted to
remember the dream? Also, if he thought about the problem and
the dream before going to bed the second night, how could the
preconscious have helped him awaken when he had the dream the
second time and jump out of bed?
Answers 1. Watson and other behaviorists argued that consciousness is a subjective mental state that cannot be studied with objective methods of
science. 2. Cognitive neuroscientists commonly use fMRI and other brain scanning techniques. 3. Ask him or her to recall specific information from
memory, such as a phone number or a concept that had been previously learned. 4. Although we cannot know for sure, we might speculate something
like this: Loewi’s idea originated in his unconscious while dreaming; then, his consciousness attempted to take over when he awoke and thought to
write it down. Because our conscious mind cannot parallel process, though, the restriction of his focus to the attempt to remember the dream may
have interfered with his ability to legibly record the dream. Then, when the dream recurred the next night, the boundary between his preconscious and
unconscious may have fluctuated as a result of thinking about the lost dream before he went to bed that night—thus allowing his conscious mind to
come to attention when he had the dream the second time and prompting him to jump out of bed and test it right away so as not to lose it again.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness? 333
Why Do We Daydream? A brain scan study by Malia Mason and her colleagues
(2007) recently discovered that daydreaming may be inevitable. A complex web of
regions in the brain, concentrated in the frontal and temporal lobes and dubbed the
“brain default network,” automatically activates when the brain is in a restful state,
or not focused on something in the external environment. Activity in this network
appears to be highest when people are daydreaming about future events or personal
memories of the past or imagining how someone is feeling or thinking (Buckner et al,
2008). Thus, the brain seems wired to remain active, even at rest—a finding that will
help us understand our nighttime dreams a little later in this section.
Is Daydreaming Helpful or Harmful? Daydreams can serve valuable, healthy func-
tions (Klinger, 1987). They often dwell on practical and current concerns in our lives,
such as classes, goals (trivial or significant), and interpersonal relationships. As we ru-
minate on these concerns, daydreaming can help us make plans and solve problems:
for some people, this kind of daydreaming increases the chances of reaching their goals
(Langens, 2003). Daydreams can also be a source of creative insight, rather like the
flashes of intuition we discussed in Chapter 6. When faced with a difficult problem,
occasional periods of mind-wandering can give our brains access to unconscious asso-
ciations and possibilities that may provide that “Aha!” moment that reveals the perfect
solution (Schooler et al., 1995).
Be careful about the timing of your daydreaming, though. New research indicates
that daydreaming can interfere with memories of recently learned material. And the
more distant the daydream from reality, the greater the effect: Students who day-
dreamed about an international vacation forgot more than students who dreamed
about a local vacation (Delaney et al., 2010). This suggests that if you slip into day-
dreaming during an important study session, you risk forgetting some of what you just
learned.
And we must include one more caution about daydreaming. Research coming out
of the Harvard laboratory of Matthew Killingsworth and Dan Gilbert (2010) threat-
ens one of our most common assumptions about daydreaming—the notion that day-
dreaming is a happy pursuit. A study of more than 2,000 adults of all ages used a
specially created iPhone app to check in with participants at random times of the day.
When their app chimed, participants answered a few quick questions about what they
were doing, whether they were focused on it or not, and how happy they were. Find-
ings revealed something that might surprise you: People were happiest when they were
fully immersed and focused on a task—not when they were daydreaming. So, despite
the fact that a wandering mind may be part of our brain’s wiring system, it appears
that an engaged mind is a happier mind.
How do daydreams compare with dreams of the night? No matter how realistic
our fantasies may be, daydreams are rarely as vivid as our most colorful night dreams.
Neither are they as mysterious—because they are more under our control. Nor do they
occur, like night dreams, under the influence of biological cycles and the strange world
that we call sleep. It is to this nighttime world that we now turn our attention.
Sleep: The Mysterious Third of Our Lives
If you live to be 90, you will have slept for nearly 30 years. But what is this mysterious
mental state? Once the province of psychoanalysts, prophets, poets, and painters, the
world of sleep is now a vibrant field of scientific study revealing that sleep is one of our
natural biological cycles (Beardsley, 1996). We begin our exploration of this realm of
altered consciousness with an examination of these cycles.
Circadian Rhythms All creatures are influenced by nature’s cyclic changes, espe-
cially the daily pattern of light and darkness. Among the most important for us hu-
mans are those known as circadian rhythms, bodily patterns that repeat approximately
every 24 hours. (Circadian comes from the Latin circa for “about” and dies for “a
day.”) Internal control of these recurring rhythms resides in our hypothalamus, where
circadian rhythm A physiological pattern that
repeats approximately every 24 hours—such as the
sleep–wakefulness cycle.

334 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
our “biological clock” sets the cadence of such functions as metabolism, heart rate,
body temperature, and hormonal activity (Pinel, 2005). A group of cells in the hypo-
thalamus known as the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) receives input from the eyes,
so it is especially sensitive to the light–dark cycles of day and night (Barinaga, 2002).
From a biological perspective, then, the cycle of sleep and wakefulness is just another
circadian rhythm.
For most of us, the normal sleep–wakefulness pattern is naturally a bit longer than
a day. When living for long periods in environments with no time cues, most peo-
ple settle into a circadian cycle closer to 25 hours. In a 24-hour world, however, our
pattern becomes trained to readjust itself each day by our exposure to light and our
habitual routines (Dement & Vaughan, 1999).
Circadian Rhythms Impact Travelers—and Everyone Else The slightly-longer-than-24-hour
timespan of our natural circadian cycle sheds light on the condition know as jet lag,
with its symptoms of fatigue, irresistible sleepiness, and temporary cognitive deficits.
When we fly from east to west, our bodies adapt fairly easily to the longer day in the
new locale, since the lengthening of the day matches up with our natural tendency for
a longer cycle. Arriving in Seattle from New York, for example, at 7 p.m., your body
on New York time thinks it is 10 p.m. In this situation, most people can stay up a little
later to fit in with the new time zone and awaken the next morning at an appropriate
local time without taking a circadian-rhythm hit. Flying eastward is a different story,
though, because you lose hours. Your 7 a.m. wake-up call—when your body thinks it
is 4 a.m.—will likely be a rude awakening, and you will have trouble being functional.
The loss of hours in your circadian cycle, then, creates greater jet lag than a gain—and
for each hour lost, it can take your body about a day to recover. For this reason, ex-
perts recommend a variety of strategies to help yourself start adjusting to the new local
time a few days before actually arriving.
Even people who don’t routinely jet around the world experience the effects of sim-
ilar circadian shifts—often on a weekly basis. Here’s why: Most of us tend to stay up
later at night on weekends, when we don’t have to get up for school or work the next
morning. But research indicates that, for every hour you stay up later on the weekend,
thus sleeping later the next morning, you are shifting your circadian rhythm forward
in a manner that feels natural to our bodies. When Monday morning rolls around,
then, and your alarm rings to wake you up, the surprise to your circadian cycle causes
a condition known as the “Monday morning blues.”
Is It Natural to Sleep Through the Night? You may think of sleep as a process that
occurs in an approximately eight-hour period, from the time you go to bed until your
alarm wakes you in the morning. But that pattern is rather new in human history and
limited mainly to people in industrialized countries. The “natural” human tendency is
to sleep in a more fluid pattern, whenever one feels like it, in shorter periods during
the day or longer stretches during the night (Bosveld, 2007; Warren, 2007). In rural
villages throughout the world, sleepers will often wake up for an hour or two in the
middle of the night and talk, play, have sex, or tend the fire—showing us just how mal-
leable our sleep–wakefulness schedules can be.
Yet anything that cuts your sleep short or throws your internal clock off its biologi-
cal schedule can affect how you feel and behave. Work schedules that shift from day to
night are notorious for such effects (Dement & Vaughan, 1999; Moore-Ede, 1993)—
although, like jet lag, symptoms are worse when shifts move backward in time than
forward. And effects can be drastic: One study found that nurses with rotating shifts
were twice as likely as those with regular shifts to fall asleep while driving to or from
work, with double the risk of accident or error related to sleepiness on the job (Gold
et al., 1992). Staying up all night studying for an exam will have similar consequences.
The Main Events of Sleep Sleep was a mystery for most of human history—until
late one night in 1952, when graduate student Eugene Aserinsky decided to record
his sleeping son’s brain waves and muscle movements of the eyes (Brown, 2003).
Almost one-third of workers in America
report having fallen asleep on the job at
least once in the past month, according
to the National Sleep Foundation. Among
shift workers—who, among other things,
work in hospitals and air traffic control—
that figure rises to over 50 percent.
about Tips for Managing
Jet Lag
Read
at MyPsychLab

What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness? 335
The session proceeded uneventfully for about an hour and a half, with nothing but
the slow rhythms of sleep appearing as tracks on the EEG. Then, suddenly, a flurry
of eye movements appeared. The recording showed the boy’s eyeballs darting back
and forth as though he were watching a fast-changing scene. At the same time, brain
wave patterns showed the boy was alert. Expecting to find his son awake and look-
ing around, Aserinsky entered the bedroom and was surprised to see him fast asleep,
lying quietly with his eyes closed. Intrigued, the researcher ran more volunteers
through the same procedure and found similar patterns in all of them.
About every 90 minutes during sleep, we enter the state Aserinsky discovered. What
we now call REM sleep is marked by fast brain waves and rapid eye movements (REM)
beneath closed eyelids, lasting several minutes or longer and then abruptly ceasing
(Aserinsky & Kleitman, 1953). The interim periods, without rapid eye movements, are
known as non-REM (NREM) sleep.
What happens in the mind and brain during these two different phases of sleep? To
find out, researchers awakened sleepers during either REM sleep or NREM sleep and
asked them to describe their mental activity (Dement & Kleitman, 1957; McNamara
et al., 2005). The NREM reports typically contained either brief descriptions of ordi-
nary daily events or no mental activity at all. By contrast, REM reports were filled with
vivid cognitions, featuring fanciful, bizarre scenes, often of an aggressive nature. In
other words, rapid eye movements were a sign of dreaming.
Strangely, while the eyes dance during REM sleep, voluntary muscles in the rest of
the body remain immobile, in a condition known as sleep paralysis. From an evolution-
ary perspective, this probably kept our ancestors from wandering out of their caves
and into trouble while acting out their dreams. (In case you’re wondering: Sleepwalk-
ing and sleep talking don’t occur during REM sleep but in the deeper stages of NREM
sleep.) We’ll have much more to say about dreaming in a moment. For now, let’s see
how REM sleep fits with the other phases of sleep.
The Sleep Cycle Imagine you are a volunteer subject in a laboratory sleep experi-
ment. Connected to EEG recording equipment, you get comfortable with the wires
linking your body to the machinery and settle in for a night’s snooze. While you
are still awake and alert, the EEG shows your brain waves pulsing at a rate of about
14 cycles per second (cps). As you relax and become drowsy, they slow to about 8
to 12 cps. When you fall asleep, your brain waves register a cycle of activity much
like the pattern in Figure 8.3—a cycle that repeats over and over through the night.
REM sleep A stage of sleep that occurs approxi-
mately every 90 minutes, marked by bursts of rapid eye
movements occurring under closed eyelids. REM sleep
periods are associated with dreaming.
non-REM (NREM) sleep The recurring peri-
ods, mainly associated with the deeper stages of sleep,
when a sleeper is not showing rapid eye movements.
sleep paralysis A condition in which a sleeper
is unable to move any of the voluntary muscles except
those controlling the eyes. Sleep paralysis normally oc-
curs during REM sleep.
FIGURE 8.3
Stages of Sleep
In a typical night, the deepest sleep
(Stages 3 and 4) occurs mainly in the
first few hours. As the night progresses,
the sleeper spends less time in Stages 3
and 4 and more time in REM.
Awake
REM REM REM REM REM
Hours of sleep
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
7654321 8

336 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
A closer look at the recording of this cycle the next morning will show several distinct
stages, each with a characteristic EEG signature (see Figure 8.4):
• In Stage 1 sleep, the EEG displays some slower (theta) activity, along with fast
(beta) brain waves similar to those seen in the waking state.
• During Stage 2, the generally slower EEG is punctuated by sleep spindles—short
bursts of fast electrical activity that reliably signal the end of Stage 1.
• In the following two stages (3 and 4), the sleeper enters a progressively
deeper state of relaxed sleep. Heart rate and breathing slow down. Brain
waves also slow dramatically, with delta waves appearing for the first time.
The deepest point in the sleep cycle occurs in Stage 4, about a half hour after
sleep onset.
• As Stage 4 ends, the electrical activity of the brain increases, and the sleeper climbs
back up through the stages in reverse order.
• Rather than going into Stage 1 again, though, the sleeper begins to produce fast
beta waves on the EEG, along with rapid eye movements—the sign of REM
sleep. After about 10 minutes of REM, the sleeper slips back into Stage 2 and the
entire cycle repeats itself, with each succeeding REM period getting longer and
longer.
Over the course of an average night’s sleep, most people travel through the stages of
sleep four to six times. In each successive cycle, the amount of time spent in deep sleep
(Stages 3 and 4) decreases, and the amount of time spent in REM sleep increases—so we
may get up to an hour of REM at the end of a full sleep session. A look at Figure 8.3 will
show you how this pattern plays out through a typical night’s sleep. Please note the three
most important features of normal sleep: (a) the 90-minute cycles, (b) the occurrence of
deepest sleep near the beginning of the night, and (c) the increase in REM duration as
sleep progresses.
What would happen if a person were deprived of REM for a whole night? Labora-
tory studies, waking sleepers up each time they slip into REM, reveal tiredness and ir-
ritability in these REM-deprived sleepers the next day. During the following night, they
typically spend much more time in REM sleep than usual, a condition known as REM
rebound. This observation suggests that REM sleep satisfies some kind of biological
need. Sleep-deprived college students take note: Because we get most of our REM sleep
during the last few cycles of the night, we inevitably suffer some REM deprivation and
REM rebound if we cut our night’s sleep short.
Why Do We Sleep? Sleep is so common among animals that it surely must have some
essential function, but sleep scientists disagree on what that function is (Maquet, 2001;
Rechtschaffen, 1998). There are several possibilities. Evolutionary psychology sug-
gests sleep may have evolved to enable animals to conserve energy and stay out of harm’s
way at times when there was no need to forage for food or search for mates (Dement &
Vaughan, 1999; Miller, 2007). These functions, then, are coordinated by the brain’s
circadian clock. Some experiments also show that sleep improves mental functioning,
particularly memory and problem solving (Wagner et al., 2004).
Another function of sleep was poetically described by William Shakespeare, when
he spoke of “sleep that knits up the ravelled sleave of care.” Thus, sleep may have
a restorative function for the body and mind. Some studies suggest that damaged
brain cells get repaired during sleep; others find that sleep promotes formation of
new neurons in the brain—while sleep deprivation inhibits this process (Siegel, 2003;
Winerman, 2006b). Sleep and dreams may also help the brain to flush out the day’s accu-
mulation of unwanted and useless information—much like reformatting a computer disk
(Crick & Mitchison, 1983). While progress has been made in learning how sleep actually
restores us, a detailed picture still eludes sleep scientists (Winerman, 2006b).
The Need for Sleep How much sleep we need depends on several factors. Genetics,
for one, sets the sleep requirements and individual variations of our circadian rhythms
REM rebound A condition of increased REM
sleep caused by REM-sleep deprivation.
FIGURE 8.4
EEG Patterns in Stages of Sleep
Stage 1:
Drowsy:
alpha waves (8 –12 cps)
Awake:
low voltage—irregular, fast
Stage 2:
(12–14 cps)
Stages 3 and 4:
delta waves (1/2–2 cps) >75 microvolts
REM sleep:
low voltage — random, fast activity
with sawtooth waves
1 sec.
50μV
theta waves (3–7 cps)
Sleep spindle K complex
Sawtooth
waves
Sawtooth
waves

What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness? 337
(Barinaga, 1997b; Haimov & Lavie, 1996). Personal characteristics and habits are
other factors. For example, people who sleep longer than average tend to be more
artistic, creative, nervous, worrisome, and nonconforming, whereas short sleepers are
generally more energetic and extroverted (Hartmann, 1973). And it is no surprise that
our exercise habits influence the need for sleep. Strenuous physical activity during the
day increases the amount of slow-wave sleep in Stage 4—although it has no effect on
REM time (Horne, 1988).
From a developmental perspective, sleep duration and the shape of the sleep cycle
change over a lifetime. As Figure 8.5 shows, newborns sleep about 16 hours per day,
with half that time devoted to REM. During childhood, those numbers gradually decline,
probably as a result of the maturing brain. Teens need more than nine hours’ sleep per
night, according to recent research, but get only about seven and a half (Carskadon,
2002), with about 20 percent REM. By old age, we sleep even less, with only 15 percent
of sleep spent in REM. Find out whether you are getting enough sleep by answering
the questions in the accompanying Do It Yourself! box.
Sleep Debt Wreaks Havoc Your mother was right: Most adults need to sleep about
eight hours, or a bit more, to feel good and function efficiently. In the sleep laboratory,
when volunteers are placed in a dark room and allowed to sleep without interruption
and without reference to clocks, the average adult settles into a pattern that produces
about eight and one-half hours of sleep each night. Yet most Americans get signifi-
cantly less—night after night (Greer, 2004b; Maas, 1999). This creates a sleep shortage
researcher William Dement calls a sleep debt (Dement & Vaughan, 1999).
People who pile up a chronic sleep debt usually don’t realize it (Dement, 2000;
Dement & Vaughan, 1999). They may be groggy when the alarm clock rouses them
in the morning but fail to recognize it as a sign of a sleep debt because their circadian
clocks nudge them into wakefulness over the next few hours. Afternoon drowsiness
may be attributed to a big lunch—which, in truth, does not cause sleepiness. (It’s the
internal clock again.) They may also rationalize their struggle to stay awake in a meet-
ing or class by telling themselves sleepiness is a normal response to boredom (Van
Dongen et al., 2003). In fact, the normal response to boredom is restlessness—not
sleepiness—unless one is sleep deprived.
Even when you have not had enough sleep, the clock in your brain can make you
feel relatively alert at certain times of the day—usually late morning and late after-
noon. But with a chronic sleep debt, you are never as alert and mentally efficient as
you could be if the sleep debt were paid with a few good nights of sleep (Van Dongen
et al., 2003). And it can affect your very life: Sleep deprivation is associated not only
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
The brain continues to develop
and also to prune excessive
neurons throughout childhood
and adolescence (p. 271).
sleep debt A sleep deficiency caused
by not getting the amount of sleep required for
optimal functioning.
FIGURE 8.5
Patterns of Human Sleep Over
a Lifetime
The graph shows changes with age in the
total amounts of REM and NREM sleep
and in the percentage of time spent in
REM sleep. Note that, over the years, the
amount of REM sleep decreases consider-
ably, while NREM diminishes less sharply.
Source: From Roffwarg et al., Ontogenetic Develop-
ment of the human sleep-dream cycl. Science, 152,
604–616. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
Key:
Waking
REM sleep
NREM (delta sleep)
24
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
To
ta
l d
ai
ly
s
le
ep
(
h
o
u
rs
)
1–15
days
3–5
mos
6–23
mos
2–3
yrs
3–5
yrs
5–9
yrs
10–13
yrs
14–18
yrs
29–30
yrs
33–45
yrs
50
yrs
90
yrs
Older adultsAdultsInfants Children Adolescents
Age

338 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
with weight gain but also with a shortened lifespan (National Institute of Medicine,
2006). In addition, the sleep debt is sometimes “paid” with a tragedy—as in the 2010
crash of an airliner in India. All 158 people on board were killed when the pilot—who
had fallen asleep at the controls for almost two hours and was too groggy to make
sound judgments when he awoke just before landing—overshot the runway and the
plane exploded into a ball of fire (Athrady, 2010).
Of special interest to students is this fact: Sleep deprivation has devastating effects
on cognitive and motor functioning (Pilcher & Walters, 1997). According to William
Dement, it “makes you stupid” (Dement & Vaughan, 1999, p. 231). Just how “stupid”
was shown in a study that deprived one group of volunteers of sleep and gave another
group enough alcohol to make them legally drunk (their blood alcohol content reached
0.1 percent). After 24 hours of sleep loss—like staying up all night studying for a test—the
sleepy volunteers performed just like the intoxicated group on tests of thinking and coor-
dination (Fletcher et al., 2003). What effects do you suppose chronic sleep deprivation, so
common during medical internships and residencies, has on physician performance?1
Dreaming: The Pageants of the Night
Every night of your life, a spectacular series of events is staged in your dreams. What
produces these fantastic cognitive spectacles? And what—if anything—do they mean?
As we saw earlier, sleep scientists now know that dreams occur regularly throughout
the night, most often in REM sleep. They also know which parts of the brain control
dreaming—including, especially, parts of the brain stem. What remains most mysteri-
ous about this stage of sleep is why we dream.
The ancient Israelites interpreted dreams as messages from God. Their Egyptian
contemporaries attempted to influence dreams by sleeping in temples dedicated to the
god of dreaming, Serapis. In India, the sacred Vedas described the religious significance
of dreams. Meanwhile, in China, dreaming held an element of risk. During a dream,
the ancient Chinese believed the soul wandered about outside the body. For that rea-
son, they were reluctant to awaken a sleeper hastily, lest the soul not find its way back
to the body (Dement, 1980).
From the perspective of many African and Native American cultures, dreams are
an extension of waking reality. Consequently, when traditional Cherokee Indians
dreamed of snakebite, they received appropriate emergency treatment upon awaken-
ing. Likewise, when an African tribal chieftain dreamed of England, he ordered a set
HOW MUCH SLEEP DO YOU NEED?
Many college students operate in a chronic
state of sleep deprivation. Because their
schedules are crowded with study, work,
and social events, students may convince
themselves that they need only a few hours
sleep each night. And, in fact, the aver-
age college student sleeps only about 6.8
hours a night (Hicks, 1990). Does too little
sleep really make a difference in how well
you perform in your classes? Psychologist
Cheryl Spinweber (1990) has found that
sleep-deprived undergraduates get lower
grades than their counterparts who get
enough sleep. Recent studies also suggest
that sleep deprivation contributes to weight
gain: People who sleep less than seven
hours a night have high rates of obesity
(Harder, 2006).
How can you tell if you need more
sleep? Answer the following questions
honestly:
1. Do you often feel sleepy in your
classes?
2. Do you sleep late on weekends?
3. Do you usually get sleepy when you
get bored?
4. Do you often fall asleep while reading
or watching TV?
5. Do you usually fall asleep within five
minutes of going to bed?
6. Do you awake in the morning feeling
that you are not rested?
7. Would you oversleep if you did not use
an alarm clock to drive you out of bed?
If you answered “Yes” to any of these
questions, chances are that you are short-
ing yourself on sleep. You may also be pay-
ing the price in the quality of your learning
and in your grades.
Drowsy driving accounts for 100,000
accidents each year, many of them
fatalities.
1Further information on the hazards associated with sleep deprivation in physicians is available online from PubMed:
www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1200708.

www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1200708

What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness? 339
of European clothes; and, when he appeared in the new togs, his friends congratulated
him on making the trip (Dement, 1980).
In contrast with these folk theories, sleep scientists approach dreaming with this
question: What biological function do dreams have? Most experts suspect dreams may
be necessary for healthy brain functioning, although the evidence for that is not cer-
tain, as you will see in the following text (Siegel, 2003). And, most recently, researchers
have been focusing on the cognitive functioning of dreams.
A closely related issue concerns the meaning of dreams. Evolutionary psychologists
propose dreams may offer safe opportunities to rehearse ways of dealing with danger-
ous situations, but the evidence is iffy (Franklin & Zyphur, 2005). From a cognitive
perspective, some experts see dreams as meaningful mental events, reflecting important
events or fantasies in the dreamer’s mental world. Other cognitive scientists are find-
ing connections between dreaming and memory, and even propose that dreams help us
construct meaning in our lives (Stickgold, 2011). But others argue dreams may have no
meaning at all and are merely random brain activity during sleep. Let’s look at all sides
of this debate on the meaningfulness of dreams.
Dreams as Meaningful Events At the beginning of the 20th century, Sigmund Freud
laid out the most complex and comprehensive theory of dreams and their meanings
ever developed—a theory that has enjoyed enormous influence, despite lack of sci-
entific evidence (Squier & Domhoff, 1998). In this view, dreams represent “the royal
road to the unconscious,” paved with clues to an individual’s hidden mental life. For
Freud, dream analysis became the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, as described in his
classic book The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Freud’s Theory of Dreams In psychoanalytic theory, dreams have two main functions: to
guard sleep (by disguising disruptive thoughts with symbols) and to serve as sources
of wish fulfillment. Freud believed dreams play their guardian role by relieving psychic
tensions created during the day and serve their wish-fulfillment function by allowing
the dreamer to work harmlessly through unconscious desires.
Freud made an important distinction between a dream’s manifest content—the
dream’s story line—and the latent content—the (supposed) symbolic meaning of the
dream. Psychoanalytic therapists, therefore, scrutinize the manifest content of their pa-
tients’ dreams for clues relating to hidden motives and conflicts lurking in the uncon-
scious. For example, clues relating to sexual conflicts might take the form of long rigid
objects or containers that, in Freudian theory, symbolize the male and female genitals.
Similarly, a departure or a journey may represent a death, loss, or a new beginning.
Must you be a trained psychoanalyst to understand dreams? Not necessarily. In
some cases, the manifest content of our dreams has a fairly obvious connection to our
waking lives—thus, the symbolism is only thinly disguised. For example, one study
found that individuals depressed about divorce often had dreams about past relation-
ships (Cartwright, 1984). By analyzing the patterns and content of your own dreams,
you may be able to start to decode many of the images and actions you dream about
(Hall, 1953/1966; Van de Castle, 1994). We must emphasize, however, there is little
solid scientific support for Freudian interpretations of latent dream content.
Dreams Vary by Culture, Gender, and Age The influence of culture on dream content
reveals itself in a variety of ways. For example, reports from the West African nation
of Ghana tell us dreams in that region often feature attacks by cows (Barnouw,
1963). Americans frequently find themselves embarrassed by public nudity in their
dreams, although such reports rarely occur in cultures where people customar-
ily wear few clothes. Images of death appear more often in dreams of Mexican
American college students than in dreams of Anglo American students, probably
because concerns about death are a more important feature of life in Latin American
cultures (Roll et al., 1974). In general, cross-cultural research lends support to Rosalind
Cartwright’s (1977) hypothesis that dreams reflect life events that are important to
the dreamer.
manifest content The story line of a dream,
taken at face value without interpretation.
latent content The symbolic meaning of objects
and events in a dream. Latent content is usually an
interpretation based on Freud’s psychoanalytic theory
or one of its variants. For example, the latent content
of a dream involving clocks might involve fear of the
menstrual cycle and, hence, of one’s sexuality.
Death-related images appear more often
in dreams of Mexican American college
students than in those of Anglo-American
college students. This probably occurs
because death is more prominently a part
of Mexican culture, as can be seen in
this figure, used in the Day of the Dead
celebration.

340 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
Sleep scientists now know that the content of dreams also varies by age and
gender (Domhoff, 1996). Children are more likely to dream about animals than
adults are, and the animals in their dreams are more likely to be large, threaten-
ing, and wild. In contrast, college students dream more often of small animals, pets,
and tame creatures. This may mean children feel less in control of their world than
adults do and thus see the world depicted in scarier imagery while they sleep (Van de
Castle, 1983, 1994).
Women everywhere more commonly dream of children, while men more often
dream of aggression, weapons, and tools (Murray, 1995). And American women may
be more equal-opportunity dreamers than their male counterparts: In a sample of more
than 1,800 dreams collected by dream researcher Calvin Hall, women dreamed about
both men and women, while men more often dreamed about men—twice as often, in
fact, as they dreamed about women. Hall also found that hostile interactions between
characters outnumbered friendly exchanges, and that two-thirds of emotional dreams
had a negative complexion, such as anger and sadness (Hall, 1951, 1984).
Dreams and Recent Experience Dream content frequently connects with recent expe-
rience and things we thought about during the previous day. But, strangely, if you
deliberately try not to think about something, it is even more likely to pop up in your
dreams (Wegner et al., 2004). So, if you have been worrying about your job all day—
or trying to forget about it—you’re likely to dream about work tonight, especially dur-
ing your first REM period.
Typically, then, the first dream of the night connects with events of the previous
day. Dreams in the second REM period (90 minutes later) often build on a theme that
emerged during the first REM period. And so it goes through the night, like an evolv-
ing rumor passed from one person to another: The final dream that emerges may have
a connection—but only a remote one—to events of the previous day. Because the last
dream of the night is the one most likely to be remembered, we may not recognize the
link with the previous day’s events (Cartwright, 1977; Kiester, 1980).
Dreams and Memory Some of the most exciting research on dreams comes from cog-
nitive neuroscience. For example, we now know that REM sleep plays an important
role in memory consolidation. When students learned a difficult logic game, those who
enjoyed a full night of REM sleep afterward performed better on the task the next day
than did those deprived of postlearning REM (Smith, 2004). Indeed, the brain replen-
ishes neurotransmitters in its memory networks during REM, notes sleep researcher
James Maas. It may be that REM sleep helps weave new experiences into the fabric of
old memories (Greer, 2004b).
Recent research suggests that NREM sleep also selectively reinforces certain kinds
of memory, especially for facts and locations (Miller, 2007). In the lab of Harvard
sleep scientist Bob Stickgold, students spent an hour working on a difficult three-
dimensional maze problem on a computer, starting over repeatedly in new loca-
tions in the maze. One of their goals was to find and remember the location of a
tree in the maze. Next, half the students took a nap while the other half engaged
in quiet activity. Nappers were awakened from NREM sleep and questioned about
their dreams. Nonnappers answered questions about their thoughts at the same in-
tervals. Later, when students worked again on the maze problem, nappers who had
dreamed about the maze found the tree more quickly than did other students in the
study (Bower, 2010).
Dreams as Random Activity of the Brain Not everyone believes dream content is
meaningful. In particular, activation-synthesis theory posits that dreams result when the
sleeping brain tries to make sense of its own spontaneous bursts of activity (Leonard,
1998; Squier & Domhoff, 1998). In this view, dreams originate in periodic neural dis-
charges emitted by the sleeping brain stem. As this energy sweeps over the cerebral
cortex, the sleeper experiences impressions of sensation, memory, motivation, emotion,
and movement (the “activation” part of the theory). Although the cortical activation
activation-synthesis theory The theory that
dreams begin (are activated) with random electrical
activation coming from the brain stem. The storyline
of dreams are the brain’s attempt to make sense of
(to synthesize) this random activity.

What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness? 341
is random, and the images it generates may not be logically connected, the brain tries
to make sense of the stimulation it receives. To do so, it weaves a coherent story that
pulls together the “messages” in these random electrical bursts (the “synthesis” part
of the theory). A dream, then, could merely be the brain’s way of making sense out of
nonsense.
The original proponents of this theory, J. Allan Hobson and Robert McCarley
(1977), based their argument on the idea that the brain needs constant stimulation to
grow and develop. During sleep, the brain blocks out external stimulation, so REM
sleep steps in to provide stimulation from within. Dream content, therefore, results
from brain activation, not from unconscious wishes or other meaningful mental
processes. While Hobson (1988, 2002) still claims the story line in our dreams is added
as a “brainstorm afterthought,” he does acknowledge that a dreamer’s synthesis of the
activations may nevertheless have some psychological meaning based on the influences
of culture, gender, personality factors, and recent events.
Dreams as a Source of Creative Insights Even if Hobson and McCarley
are right—that dreams have no special meaning other than an attempt by the
brain to make sense out of nonsense—dreams could still be a source of cre-
ative ideas. In fact, it would be astonishing if we did not turn to such wild
and sometimes wonderful scenes in the night for inspiration. As we have seen,
writers, composers, and scientists have done just that.
“Dream explorer” Robert Moss (1996) cites 19th-century physiologist
Herman von Helmholtz, who insisted that creative dreaming would result
from doing three things: first, saturating yourself in a problem or issue that
interests you; next, letting your creative ideas incubate by shifting attention to
something relaxing and unrelated; and finally, allowing yourself time to expe-
rience illumination, a sudden flash of insight into the answer you seek.
Now, in the 21st century, empirical support is accumulating for this notion. In REM
sleep, our brains seem primed to put ideas together in previously unconceived ways.
When awakened from REM sleep and given word-association tasks, people produce
more novel associations than when they are awake. And students studying complex
math problems double their chances of finding novel solutions to the problem after a full
night of sleep (Stickgold & Walker, 2004). It’s as if our REMing brain is released from
the boundaries of our waking sensibilities and uses the opportunity to try out new com-
binations of ideas—which is precisely the basis of creativity.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Sleep Disorders
Are you among the more than 100 million Americans who get insufficient or poor-
quality sleep? Some of these sleep problems are job related. Among people who work
night shifts, for example, more than half nod off at least once a week on the job. And
it may be no coincidence that some of the world’s most serious accidents—including
the disastrous radiation emissions at the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear
plants and the massive toxic chemical discharge at Bhopal—have occurred during late-
evening hours when workers are likely to be programmed for sleep. Sleep experts specu-
late that many accidents occur because key personnel fail to function optimally as a
result of insufficient sleep—as we noted earlier in the case of the 2010 plane crash in
India (Dement & Vaughan, 1999).
Along with these job-related sleep problems, several clinical sleep disorders are
studied in the labs of sleep researchers. Some are common, while others are both rare
and bizarre. Some are relatively benign, and some are potentially life threatening. The
single element tying them together is a disruption in one or more parts of the normal
sleep cycle.
Sleep and dreaming have inspired many
artists, as seen here in Rousseau’s
Sleeping Gypsy.
about Finding Your Creative
Inspiration in Dreams
Read
at MyPsychLab

342 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
Insomnia is usually the diagnosis when people feel dissatisfied with the amount of
sleep they get. Its symptoms include chronic inability to fall asleep quickly, frequent
arousals during sleep, or early-morning awakening. Insomnia sufferers number about
one-third of all adults, making this the most common sleep disorder (Dement &
Vaughan, 1999).
An occasional bout of sleeplessness is normal, especially when you have exciting or
worrisome events on your mind. And don’t worry: These incidents pose no special dan-
ger unless you try to treat the problem with barbiturates or over-the-counter “sleeping
pills.” These drugs disrupt the normal sleep cycle by cutting short REM sleep periods
(Dement, 1980). As a result, they can actually aggravate the effects of insomnia by mak-
ing the user feel less rested and more sleepy. A new generation of prescription drugs for
the treatment of insomnia—the ones you see heavily advertised on TV—seems to avoid
many of these problems, although long-term-use studies are still in progress. (Harder,
2005). And side effects such as rebound insomnia and morning grogginess still plague
some users. An alternative is psychological treatment employing cognitive behavioral
therapy, which has had remarkable success in helping people learn effective strategies
for avoiding insomnia (Smith, 2001).
Incidentally, counting sheep won’t help you break the insomnia barrier. Neither
will some other boring mental task. Researchers at Oxford University have shown that
it is better to imagine some soothing but complex scene, such as a waterfall. Counting
one sheep after another apparently isn’t interesting enough to keep the sleep-inhibiting
worries of the day out of mind (Randerson, 2002). And there are a variety of ways you
can control your own environment to promote a good night’s sleep—visit the Read
section in MyPsychLab for tips.
Sleep apnea, another common disorder, often goes unnoticed, apparent only as
daytime sleepiness and a sleep partner’s complaints about snoring. But behind the curtain
of the night, the cause lies in an abnormality of breathing. A person with sleep apnea actu-
ally stops breathing for up to a minute, as often as several hundred times each night! (In
case you’re concerned, the brief cessation of breathing a few times each hour during the
night is normal.) Most commonly, this results from collapse of the airway in the throat
when the sleeper’s muscle tone relaxes. The result is the second major symptom of sleep
insomnia The most common of sleep disorders—
involving insufficient sleep, the inability to fall asleep
quickly, frequent arousals, or early awakenings.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Cognitive behavior therapy
combines cognitive and
behavioral techniques in treating
psychological disorders (p. 571).
sleep apnea A respiratory disorder in which the
person intermittently stops breathing many times while
asleep.
This student struggles with insomnia, a
problem that has many different psycho-
logical, environmental, and biological
causes. About one-third of all adults are
plagued by this most common of sleep
disorders.
Read
MyPsychLab
about Controlling Your
Environment to Promote a Good
Night’s Sleep at

What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness? 343
apnea: frequent loud snoring, occurring each time the patient runs short of oxygen and
tries mightily to get air through the collapsed airway (Seligson, 1994). As breathing stops
and the sleeper’s blood oxygen level plummets, the body’s emergency system kicks into
gear, causing distress hormones to course through the body. In the process, the sleeper
awakens briefly, begins breathing again, and then falls back to sleep. Because most of this
happens in deep sleep, there is usually no memory of the episode.
Failure to recognize the nature of the problem can cause those with sleep apnea—
and their families and coworkers—to interpret unusual daytime behavior, such as
inattention or falling asleep, as laziness or neglect. While this may be disruptive to
relationships, sleep apnea can also have harmful biological effects that include damage
to brain cells, along with elevated blood pressure that can impose dangerous levels of
stress on the blood vessels and heart (Gami et al., 2005).
Occasional episodes of sleep apnea are likely to occur in premature infants, who
may need physical stimulation to start breathing again. Further, any tendency toward
sleep apnea can be aggravated by putting a young child to bed on his or her stomach.
(Instead, sleep scientists strongly recommend “back to sleep.”) Obviously, the problem
can be lethal, and it is one possible cause of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS).
Until their underdeveloped respiratory systems mature, “preemies” must remain
connected to breathing monitors while they sleep. In contrast, permanent breathing fail-
ure is not a strong concern for adults with sleep apnea, for whom treatment focuses on
decreasing the hundreds of nightly apnea episodes. This is usually accomplished by us-
ing a device that pumps extra air into the lungs and keeps the airway open during sleep.
Night terrors, occurring primarily in children, pose no health threat—although they
can be quite distressing. Typically, a night terror attack presents itself in the scream-
ing of a terrified-looking child who is actually in Stage 4 sleep and very difficult to
awaken. When finally alert, the child may still feel afraid but have no specific memory
of what mental events caused the night terror. In fact, the whole experience is likely to
be more memorable to beleaguered family members than to the child.
Unlike garden-variety nightmares, sleep-terror episodes occur in deep sleep rather
than in REM sleep. In this respect, they are like sleepwalking, sleep talking, and bed
wetting, which also occur in Stage 4. All these conditions seem to have a genetic com-
ponent. In themselves, they pose no danger, although sleepwalkers can inadvertently
climb out of upper-story windows or walk into a busy street—so it pays to take some
precautions. (Incidentally, it’s just a myth that waking a sleepwalker is dangerous.) In
most cases, sleepwalking and night terrors diminish or disappear in adulthood, but
if they pose persistent and chronic problems, the individual should be evaluated by a
sleep specialist. Bed wetting can usually be ameliorated by a simple behavior modifi-
cation procedure that employs a pad with a built-in alarm that sounds when damp.
Narcolepsy, one of the most unusual of sleep disorders, produces sudden daytime
sleep attacks, often without warning. But these are no ordinary waves of drowsiness.
So suddenly do these sleep attacks develop that narcolepsy sufferers have reported fall-
ing asleep while driving a car, climbing a ladder, or scuba diving under 20 feet of water.
Narcoleptic sleep attacks may also be preceded by a sudden loss of muscle control, a
condition known as cataplexy.
Strangely, anything exciting can trigger a narcoleptic episode. For example, these
patients commonly report they fall asleep while laughing at a joke or even during sex.
Obviously, narcolepsy can be dangerous—and not so good for intimate relationships,
either.
Assembling the pieces of this puzzle, we find that narcolepsy is a disorder of REM
sleep (Marschall, 2007). Specifically, a sleep recording will show that the narcolepsy
victim has an abnormal sleep-onset REM period. That is, instead of waiting the usual
90 minutes to begin REM, the narcoleptic person enters REM as sleep begins. You may
have already guessed that the accompanying cataplexy is simply REM sleep paralysis.
Studies of narcoleptic animals show that the disorder stems from a genetic prob-
lem affecting the sleep-control circuitry in the brain stem. Recent research implicates
a diminished supply of hypocretin, a chemical produced in the hypothalamus (Harder,
2004; Marschall, 2007). So far, there is no cure, but certain drugs can diminish the
night terrors Deep sleep episodes that seem
to produce terror, although any terrifying mental
experience (such as a dream) is usually forgotten on
awakening. Night terrors occur mainly in children.
narcolepsy A disorder of REM sleep, involving
sleep-onset REM periods and sudden daytime
REM-sleep attacks usually accompanied by cataplexy.

344 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
frequency of both the sleep attacks and the cataplexy. Now that we know the cause is
biological, narcoleptic patients are no longer sent to psychotherapy aimed at searching
for the unconscious conflicts once assumed to underlie the disorder.
So, what should you do if you suspect that you have a sleep disorder, such as
chronic insomnia, sleep apnea, or narcolepsy? An evaluation by a sleep expert is the
place to start. Many hospitals have sleep disorder clinics to which your physician or
clinical psychologist can refer you.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: What do brain scans tell us about the daydreaming
brain?
2. RECALL: What muscular changes occur during REM sleep?
3. RECALL: Suppose you are working in a sleep laboratory,
monitoring a subject’s sleep recording during the night. As the
night progresses, you would expect to see that
a. sleep becomes deeper and deeper.
b. REM periods become longer.
c. Stage 3 and 4 sleep periods lengthen.
d. dreaming becomes less frequent.
4. RECALL: According to the activation-synthesis theory, what causes
our dreams?
5. APPLICATION: Which sleep disorder is marked by a REM period
at the beginning of sleep?
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Our Core Concept
states that consciousness changes in cycles that normally
correspond to our biological rhythms and to the patterns of our
environment. Give an example of a recurring mental state that
illustrates this concept.
Answers 1. Brain scans suggest daydreaming is generated by activity in a “default network” of circuits in the brain that remains active during the
restful waking state. 2. Sleep paralysis affects all the voluntary muscles except those controlling eye movements. 3. b 4. According to the activation-
synthesis theory, dreams are an attempt by the brain to make sense of random activity in the brain stem during sleep. 5. Narcolepsy 6. Sleep and
dreaming are among the cyclic changes in consciousness.
8.3 KEY QUESTION
What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take?
Children stand on their heads or spin around to make themselves dizzy. You may seek
similar sensations from hair-raising theme-park rides or sky diving. But why do we do
these strange things to ourselves? One view says “human beings are born with a drive
to experience modes of awareness other than the normal waking one; from very young
ages, children experiment with techniques to change consciousness” (Weil, 1977,
p. 37). So sleep, dreams, fantasies, and thrilling experiences offer compelling alterna-
tives to everyday conscious experience.
Psychological techniques, such as hypnosis and meditation, can alter conscious-
ness too. So can drugs, which some people use to find the altered state of consciousness
they seek. In this section, we will explore these variations on consciousness and find the
theme that ties these altered states of consciousness together. Our Core Concept for this
section puts it this way:
Core Concept 8.3
An altered state of consciousness occurs when some aspect of normal
consciousness is modified by mental, behavioral, or chemical means.
This notion carries the important implication that altered states do not involve myste-
rious or paranormal phenomena that defy rational explanation. Rather, altered states
are modifications of ordinary consciousness that we can study with the tools of sci-
ence. Let’s begin with what we know about hypnosis.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 345
Hypnosis
The cartoon images have it wrong. Neither the hypnotist’s eyes nor fingertips emit
strange, mesmerizing rays that send subjects into a compliant stupor—nor does a
dangling shiny bauble have the power to control people’s minds. A more accurate
picture would show the hypnotist making suggestions to promote concentration
and relaxation (Barber, 1976, 1986). Soon the subject appears to be asleep, al-
though he or she can hear suggestions and carry out requests. But this real-life
depiction can be just as dramatic as the cartoon images: In some cases, the indi-
vidual under hypnosis demonstrates amazing powers to ignore pain, remember
long-forgotten details, and create hallucinations. But what mental processes make
these things happen?
The term hypnosis derives from Hypnos, the Greek god of sleep. Yet EEG
records tell us that ordinary sleep plays no role in hypnosis, even though hypno-
tized individuals may appear to be in a relaxed, sleeplike state. In fact, there is
no unique EEG signature for hypnosis. Most authorities would define hypnosis as
a state of awareness characterized by deep relaxation, heightened suggestibility,
and focused attention.
When deeply hypnotized, some people respond to suggestion with dramatic
changes in perception, memory, motivation, and sense of self-control (Orne,
1980). Stage hypnotists can make carefully selected volunteers quack like a duck
or appear to enjoy the taste of a bitter lemon. Afterward, people often report
they experienced heightened responsiveness to the hypnotist’s suggestions and
performed their behavior without intention or conscious effort. But are all people
susceptible to hypnosis?
Hypnotizability Dramatic stage performances of hypnosis give the impression that
hypnotic power lies with the hypnotist. But the real star is the person who is hypno-
tized. The hypnotist is more like an experienced guide showing the way. And some
individuals can even learn to practice self-hypnosis, or autohypnosis, by inducing the
hypnotic state through self-administered suggestions.
The single most important factor in achieving a hypnotic state is susceptibility.
Experts call this hypnotizability and measure it by a person’s responsiveness to stan-
dardized suggestions. Individuals differ in this susceptibility, varying from complete
unresponsiveness to any suggestion to total responsiveness to virtually every sugges-
tion. A highly hypnotizable person may respond to suggestions to move his or her
arms, walk about, experience hallucinations, have amnesia for important memories,
and become insensitive to painful stimuli. And, we should add, because hypnosis in-
volves heightened suggestibility, any “recovered memories” obtained by this means are
highly suspect.
Hypnotizability also depends on age. Among adults, only 10 to 15 percent
are highly hypnotizable, while up to 85 percent of children fall into that category
(Blakeslee, 2005). Figure 8.6 shows the percentage of college students who achieved
various levels of hypnotizability the first time they were given a hypnotic induction
test. For example, a hypnotist may test a new subject’s acceptance of suggestion by
saying, “Your right hand is lighter than air,” and observing whether the subject allows
his or her arm to float upward. High scorers are more likely than low scorers to ex-
perience pain relief, or hypnotic analgesia, and to respond to hypnotic suggestions for
experiencing perceptual distortions.
Is Hypnosis a Distinct State of Consciousness? The experts disagree about the
psychological mechanisms involved in hypnosis (Kirsch & Lynn, 1995, 1998). Some
believe hypnosis is a distinct state of consciousness, quite separate from sleep or our
normal waking state (Fromm & Shor, 1979). Others propose that hypnosis is simply
suggestibility (Barber, 1979; Kirsch & Braffman, 2001). In this latter view, hypnotic
subjects are not entranced but merely motivated to focus their attention and respond
to suggestion. Yet, a third view argues that hypnosis is essentially a social process,
hypnosis An induced state of awareness, usually
characterized by heightened suggestibility, deep
relaxation, and highly focused attention.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 5
Studies in which false memories
are created call into question
“recovered” memories obtained
as the result of any sort of
prompting or suggestion (p. 206).
For many people, hypnosis can help
control pain. Here, a woman is learning
hypnotic techniques that she will use in
natural childbirth.
FIGURE 8.6
Level of Hypnosis Reached at First
Induction
This graph shows the results achieved by
533 participants hypnotized for the
first time. (Hypnotizability was measured
by the 12-item Stanford Hypnotic
Susceptibility Scale.)
Su
sc
ep
ti
b
ili
ty
s
co
re
Very high
(11–12)
High
(8–10)
Medium
(5–7)
Low
(0–4)
Percent of participants
0 20 40 50

346 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
involving role playing—in which people act as they believe a hypnotized person would,
often to please the hypnotist (Sarbin & Coe, 1972). In support of this view, critics of
hypnosis as an “altered state” note that people who have not been hypnotized can
duplicate apparently amazing feats, such as becoming “human planks” suspended
between two chairs.
An intriguing perspective, originally proposed by researcher Ernest Hilgard (1992),
portrays hypnosis as a dissociated state, involving a “hidden observer” in the person’s
mind, operating in parallel with normal consciousness. Hilgard has shown that hyp-
notized individuals who say they feel no pain when their hand is placed in ice wa-
ter will nevertheless respond affirmatively when told, “If some part of you does feel
pain, please raise your right index finger.” Hilgard believed that attention to the painful
sensation was shifted to the hidden observer, leaving normal consciousness blissfully
unaware.
Finally, a cognitive view proposes that hypnosis involves a shift in top-down
processing—that is, thinking driven by expectations and mental imagery rather than
by incoming stimulation. Thus, people are hypnotized because they want or expect
to be, so they focus on expressing and achieving the responses the hypnotist tries to
evoke. To test this idea, neuroscientist Amir Raz and his colleagues altered volunteers’
top-down processing by means of hypnotic suggestions that they would “forget” how
to read. Brain scans showed the suggestion temporarily inactivated the part of their
brains that decodes words (Blakeslee, 2005; Raz et al., 2002).
In support of the idea that hypnosis creates profound top-down changes in the
brain, another study suggested to deeply hypnotized patients they were touching un-
comfortably warm metal. What happened? The parts of their brains associated with
pain perception “lit up” in the same pattern found in brain scans of a control group
who actually touched a 120-degree metal rod (Derbyshire et al., 2004; Winerman,
2006b).
Is there common ground among these perspectives? Perhaps all have a bit of the
truth. It may be that hypnosis, like the normal waking state, can cover a whole range
of dissociated states, intensified motives, shifted expectations, and social interactions.
Practical Uses of Hypnosis Stage tricks aside, what is hypnosis good for? Because
of its powerful influence on psychological and physical functions in some people,
hypnosis is a useful tool for researchers studying the mind–body connection (Oakley,
2006). By using normal volunteers under hypnosis, an experimenter can induce tempo-
rary mental conditions, such as anxiety, depression, or hallucinations, instead of hav-
ing to find individuals who already have these problems. For example, in one study of
psychological issues associated with hearing loss, college students given the hypnotic
suggestion to become deaf on cue reported feeling paranoid and excluded because they
could not hear what other subjects were saying and assumed they were being deliber-
ately whispered about and excluded (Zimbardo et al., 1981).
Hypnosis can aid in psychological treatment too. For instance, it can be an effective
tool in desensitizing people with phobias (fears) of heights or spiders. It can also be
part of a relaxation training program designed to combat stress. In addition, therapists
find it useful for eliminating unwanted behaviors, such as smoking, where a frequently
used technique calls for planting posthypnotic suggestions to diminish a patient’s
cravings for nicotine (Barnier & McConkey, 1998; Kihlstrom, 1985). In the same way,
a therapist can also induce the patient to forget events that occurred during or prior to
the hypnotic session, an effect called posthypnotic amnesia.
Finally, hypnosis has a growing role in pain management, especially during pro-
cedures that would otherwise involve the risks of anesthesia (Nash, 2001; Patterson,
2004). For example, the Lamaze method of natural childbirth uses a hypnosis-like pro-
cedure as a primary means of pain control. It is important to note, however, that not
everyone can be hypnotized deeply enough for effective pain relief (Callahan, 1997).
Still, hypnosis alone allows some patients to undergo treatments that would otherwise
cause excruciating pain (Finer, 1980), in some cases masking pain more effectively than
acupuncture, aspirin, Valium, or even morphine (Stern et al., 1977). In randomized,
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
In certain clinical disorders,
known as dissociated states,
part of the personality becomes
disconnected from the rest
of the personality. This is the
defining feature of dissociative
identity disorder—formerly called
“multiple personality disorder”
(p. 535).
The “human plank” is one of the earliest
stage tricks used by performers pretend-
ing to hypnotize people.
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab
Hypnosis

What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 347
experimental studies, hypnosis has reduced pain across a wide variety of conditions,
including women with metastatic breast cancer, patients with dental sensitivity, and
survivors of physical trauma, just to name a few (Nash & Tasso, 2010; Patterson et
al., 2010). Chronic pain conditions such as arthritis, fibromyalgia, and headaches have
also been treated effectively with hypnosis (Patterson, 2010).
How does hypnosis produce pain relief? Hilgard’s hidden-observer explanation is
one possibility, although other scientists have taken a more biological approach to the
problem. Currently there is no universally accepted explanation, although we can rule
out one contender. Experiments have demonstrated that the opiate-like endorphins,
which account for the pain-relieving property of placebos, are not responsible for
hypnotic analgesia (Grevert & Goldstein, 1985). As you will recall, we considered
another possibility, called the gate-control theory, in our discussion of pain (in Chapter 3).
For now, we will accept hypnosis as a valuable tool about which much remains to be
learned concerning the ways in which it alters consciousness.
Meditation
Many religions and traditional psychologies of Asian and Pacific cultures use forms of
meditation to direct consciousness away from worldly concerns and temptations. Al-
though the purpose of meditation varies, many practitioners seek some form of spiri-
tual enlightenment and an increase in self-knowledge and well-being. Meditators use
a variety of techniques but commonly begin by concentrating on a repetitive behavior
(such as breathing), assuming certain body positions (yogic postures), and minimizing
external stimulation. Meditation can last from just a few minutes to several hours.
Viewing meditation as an altered state of consciousness may reflect a particularly
Western worldview, because Asian beliefs about the mind are typically different from
those of Western cultures (Austin, 1998; Rosch, 1999). Buddhism, for example, teaches
that the visible universe is an illusion of the senses. To become enlightened, a Buddhist
aims to control bodily yearnings, to stop ordinary experiences of the senses and mind,
and to see things in their truest light. Thus, in the Buddhist view, meditation more ac-
curately captures reality.
In contrast with its long history in Asia and the Pacific, meditation has only
recently been taken seriously by psychology as a subject for scientific study. Its spiritual
aspects aside, early studies indicated meditating was in many ways like resting, because
it reduced various signs of bodily arousal (Morrell, 1986). Newer studies, however,
are finding a provocative array of changes in the brain associated with meditation—
changes that, in turn, may affect empathy, self-awareness, attention, and stress.
What effects of meditation can be demonstrated objectively? Experienced medita-
tors show changes in brain wave patterns, especially in frontal lobe activity, associ-
ated with positive emotions (Davidson et al., 2003; Kasamatsu & Hirai, 1966). Other
studies link meditation with beneficial changes in blood pressure and stress hormones
(Seeman et al., 2003). Research also finds that meditation produces relaxation and
reduces anxiety, especially in people who live and work in stress-filled environments
(Benson, 1975; van Dam, 1996)—although some research with control groups does not
show meditation to be superior to other relaxation techniques (Toneatto & Nguyen,
2007). Meditation also seems to produce at least short-term gains in attention and
problem solving (van den Hurk et al., 2010). And a first-of-its-kind study using MRI
scans to study the brains of people before and after eight weeks of meditation train-
ing discovered what happens in the brain to explain these findings: The hippocampus,
parts of the frontal lobes, and brain areas relevant to learning, memory, compassion,
and attention all increased in size in the meditators as compared to a control group
(Hölzel et al., 2011). Furthermore, the density of meditators’ amygdalas decreased,
providing a clue to the role of meditation in stress reduction.
The overall picture shows meditation to be an effective method for relaxing, reducing
stress, disengaging from worldly concerns, and—possibly—improving cognitive func-
tion. It also produces health-promoting physical changes. And increasingly, practitio-
ners in medicine and in psychology are seeking to understand it and try to harness it
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 3
Endorphins are the body’s own
opiate-like substances (p. 110).
meditation A state of consciousness often
induced by focusing on a repetitive behavior, assum-
ing certain body positions, and minimizing external
stimulation. Meditation may be intended to enhance
self-knowledge, well-being, and spirituality.
Meditation produces relaxation, changes
in brain waves and density, lower blood
pressure, a decrease in stress hormones,
and perhaps new insights.

348 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
for therapeutic purposes (Barinaga, 2003b). But whether meditation holds an advantage
over other techniques—psychological, physical, and spiritual—awaits findings of future
research.
Psychoactive Drug States
For millennia, humans have used alcohol, opium, cannabis, mescaline, coca, caffeine,
and other drugs to alter their everyday perceptions of reality. Especially under stress,
people throughout the world take drugs for pleasure, for relaxation, or just to avoid
the cares of their daily lives. Some drugs, such as LSD, are taken in pursuit of hallu-
cinations. Other drugs (alcohol is an example) can act as “social lubricants” to help
people feel comfortable with each other. Still others are used by those seeking a eu-
phoric “rush,” a “buzz,” a state of tranquility, or even stupor. What, if anything, do all
these drugs have in common?
To some extent, all psychoactive drugs impair brain mechanisms that usually help us
make decisions (Gazzaniga, 1998a). In addition, the most widely abused drugs, such
as cocaine, heroin, cannabis, and methamphetamines, all stimulate the brain’s “reward
circuits.” From an evolutionary perspective, our brains are built to find pleasure in
many substances (such as the taste of sweet or fatty foods) that helped our ancestors
survive and reproduce. Cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines trick the brain by exploit-
ing these same mechanisms with strong, direct, and pleasurable signals that make our
bodies “think” that these substances are good for us (Nesse & Berridge, 1997).
Trends in Drug Use Cultural trends influence drug-taking behavior. The United
States saw this vividly during the 1960s and 1970s, when the country entered a period
of casual experimentation with recreational drugs and other mind-altering techniques.
Data from several sources, including emergency room visits, drug arrests, and surveys,
indicate that overall illicit drug use has declined since the early 1990s. Today, while
almost half of adults have tried drugs, only about 15 percent have used an illicit drug
in the past year. Marijuana remains by far the most common, accounting for more
than half of illicit drug use. Recreational use of prescription drugs (such as Vicodin and
Oxycontin) accounts for about 30 percent, and cocaine and hallucinogens account for
only about 10 percent each—which translates to about one person in 75 for the latter
two. Alcohol and tobacco far outstrip illicit drugs in popularity, however: About two-
thirds of adults in America drink alcoholic beverages, and one in four uses tobacco
products (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA],
2010).
Age of drug use varies as well, with peak use between the ages of 18 and 20. Usage
declines steadily as age increases—with one curious exception: Recent data show that
drug use among 50-somethings has more than doubled since 2002. Experts explain
this aberration as a result of the influx of baby-boomers into this age range—a unique
generation of Americans who came of age in a culture of drug use and apparently
never gave it up (SAMHSA, 2009).
Among teens, use of some drugs is falling while use of others is on the rise (see Figure
8.7). Cigarette smoking is at its lowest point in 35 years. Alcohol use, including binge
drinking, is decreasing as well, as is use of hallucinogens, cocaine, and methamphetamine.
Use of MDMA (ecstasy), however, is increasing—especially among eighth and tenth
graders—corresponding with a worrisome decline in teens’ perception of risk associated
with the drug. In 2010, one in 20 high school students used MDMA. Nonprescription
use of Vicodin is even higher, with about one in ten high school students saying they’ve
used it in the past month, often trading it and other prescription pills like Xanax and
Oxycontin at “pharming” parties.
Let us now have a closer look at the most commonly used and abused psychoactive
drugs, grouping them in categories: hallucinogens, opiates, depressants, and stimulants
(see Table 8.1). In general, all the drugs in each category have similar effects on the
mind and brain.
psychoactive drug Chemical that affects mental
processes and behavior by its effect on the brain.
MDMA (commonly known as ecstasy) is
marketed as a harmless, feel-good drug.
Research shows serious side-effects,
however—both short and long term—that
many users don’t know about.

What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 349
FIGURE 8.7
Trends in an Annual Use of Illicit Drug
Use Index
This graph shows the percentage of teens
reporting the use of illegal drugs.
Source: From the Monitoring the Future Study,
University of Michigan. Reprinted by permission
of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research.
0
20
40
60
80
’74’76’78’80’82’84’86’88
Year
’90’92’94’96’98’00’02’04’06’08’10
Twelfth Grade
Tenth Grade
Eighth Grade
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e
TABLE 8.1 Characteristics of Psychoactive Drugs
Drug Medical Uses Common Effects Reported
by Users
Opiates
Morphine Painkiller, cough suppressant Euphoria (“rush”), tranquillity,
drowsiness
Heroin No medical uses in the United
States
Euphoria, tranquillity,
drowsiness (more powerful
than morphine)
Codeine Painkiller, cough suppressant Euphoria, drowsiness,
“silliness”
Methadone Treatment of heroin addiction Slow action prevents heroin
craving
Hallucinogens
Mescaline None Hallucinations, sensuality;
similar to LSD but fewer
reported emotional responses
Psilocybin None Well-being, perceptual
distortions, less emotionally
intense than LSD
LSD None Hallucinations, often
emotional reactions
PCP Veterinary anesthetic Body image distortions,
amnesia, unpredictable
emotional reactions,
dissociation (feeling of being
cut off from one’s environment)
Cannabis Reduces nausea from
chemotherapy; reduces
pressure in the eye
Euphoria, time distortion,
intensified sensory experience
(Continued)

350 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
Hallucinogens The class of drugs known as hallucinogens produces changes in con-
sciousness by altering perceptions, creating hallucinations, and blurring the boundary
between the self and the external world. For example, an individual experiencing hal-
lucinogenic effects might listen to music and suddenly feel he or she is producing the
music or that the music is coming from within. Most hallucinogenic drugs act in the
brain at specific receptor sites for the neurotransmitter serotonin (Jacobs, 1987).
Commonly used hallucinogens include mescaline (made from a type of cactus), psi-
locybin (from a mushroom), LSD or “acid,” and PCP (also called phencyclidine or
“angel dust”). Both LSD and PCP are synthetic drugs made in chemical laboratories.
PCP was a favorite of young people who used hallucinogens until word got around
that the intensity and duration of its effects were quite unpredictable. The drug pro-
duces a strange dissociative reaction in which the user feels disembodied or removed
from parts of his or her personality. Users may become confused or insensitive to pain
and, when using high doses, experience convulsions or even death.
Cannabis, or marijuana, derived from the hemp plant (used to make rope as well
as dope), acts primarily as a hallucinogen. (Experts disagree to some extent on its
hallucinogen A drug that creates hallucinations
or alters perceptions of the external environment and
inner awareness.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Serotonin is a neurotransmitter
involved with reward, sleep,
memory, and depression (p. 54).
Drug Medical Uses Common Effects Reported
by Users
Depressants and Antianxiety Drugs
Barbiturates Sedative, sleep,
anticonvulsant, anesthetic
Relaxation, sedation, euphoria
Benzodiazepines Antianxiety, sleep,
anticonvulsant, sedative
Stress and anxiety reduction
(“tranquilizing”)
Rohypnol None in United States
(elsewhere: sedation, anxiety,
anesthesia, and treatment of
insomnia)
Same as other
benzodiazepines, but longer
lasting; also amnesia (hence
its reputation as the “date-
rape drug”)
Alcohol Antiseptic Relaxation, well-being,
cognitive and motor
impairment
Stimulants
Amphetamines Weight control, ADHD,
counteract anesthesia
Confidence, mental energy,
alertness, hallucinations,
paranoia
Methamphetamine None Same as other amphetamines,
but more intense
MDMA (ecstasy) None (originally an appetite
suppressant)
Euphoria, hot flashes,
perceptual distortions,
excitement
Cocaine Local anesthetic Much the same as
amphetamines, sexual arousal
(except in chronic users),
dramatic mood changes as
effects wear off (irritability,
depression)
Nicotine Gum, patch for cessation of
smoking
Stimulant effect, relaxation,
concentration, reduces
nicotine craving
Caffeine Weight control, stimulant
in acute respiratory failure,
analgesia
Stimulant effect, increased
alertness and concentration
TABLE 8.1 (Continued)

What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 351
classification, however, as it also has properties of stimulants and depressants.) Its ac-
tive ingredient is THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), found in both the plant’s dried leaves
and flowers and in its solidified resin (hashish). Most commonly it is smoked, although
it can also be eaten.
The experience obtained from ingesting THC depends on its dose. Small doses may
create mild, pleasurable highs, and large doses can cause long hallucinogenic reactions.
Unlike alcohol, its effects can last for many hours—long after users feel the drug’s influ-
ence has ended. The pleasant effects include altered perception, sedation, pain relief, mild
euphoria, and distortions of space and time—similar in some respects to the effects of
heroin (Wickelgren, 1997). Depending on the social context and expectations, the effects
can also be an unpleasant mixture of fear, anxiety, and confusion. In addition, cannabis
often produces temporary failures in memory, as well as impairments in motor coordina-
tion. Those who work or drive under its influence suffer a higher risk of accidents—and
those who attempt to study under its influence are likely to be wasting their time.
Some habitual cannabis users become psychologically addicted to its pleasurable
effects, craving it so often that it interferes with other pursuits, including school or
work. The potential for physical dependence on this drug, however, is lower than most
other psychoactive substances (Grinspoon et al., 1997; Pinel, 2005). And, although
controversial, cannabis also has medical uses, especially in treating nausea associated
with chemotherapy and in reducing eye pressure associated with glaucoma.
What causes the mind-altering effects of this drug? In the brain, THC causes the release
of dopamine, which suggests an effect on the brain’s reward system (Carlson, 2007).
Neuroscientists have discovered cannabis receptors in many other parts of the brain too
(Nicoll & Alger, 2004; Wilson & Nicoll, 2002). This strongly suggests that the brain makes
its own THC-like chemicals, which it uses to modulate information flow. Thus, marijuana
and hashish seem to produce their mind-altering effects by exploiting the natural chemistry
of the brain. Their interference with thinking and memory, then, is no wonder, because
these receptors are particularly abundant in pathways involving these functions.
An evolutionary perspective suggests that the brain’s own cannabis must have some
beneficial function. Following this lead, a few neuroscientists are exploring just what the
brain’s “natural marijuana,” more properly termed endocannabinoids, does for us. The
hope is to eventually develop new therapies for a variety of human afflictions linked to
brain areas that respond to THC, including circuits implicated in appetite, pain, nausea,
and addiction. Thus, the research may lead to new treatments for obesity, chronic pain,
the nausea produced by chemotherapy, and addiction by developing drugs to regulate
the body’s use of its own endocannabinoids (Marx, 2006; Nicoll & Alger, 2004).
Opiates Another class of drugs, known as opiates, includes morphine, heroin, and
codeine—all made from the opium poppy. These are highly addictive drugs that
suppress physical sensation and response to stimulation. As a result, some of them
have found wide use in medicine, where they have particularly good analgesic (pain-
relieving) properties and also serve as cough suppressants. (The only other medical use
for opiates is in managing diarrhea.)
Derived from morphine, heroin originally was developed in 19th-century Germany
by the Bayer Company (of aspirin fame) but was abandoned because it is so highly
addictive (more so than morphine). For the intravenous heroin user, however, the drug
is attractive because, in the absence of pain, it gives a strong rush of pleasurable sensa-
tions. These feelings of euphoria supplant all worries and awareness of bodily needs,
although—surprisingly—there are no major changes in cognitive abilities. Under hero-
in’s influence, the user can usually converse normally and think clearly. Unfortunately,
serious addiction is likely once a person begins to inject heroin for pleasure. To avoid
the intense cravings and painful sensations of withdrawal, the addict must take the
drug frequently—at least daily—making it a very expensive habit to maintain.
In recent years, several opiate-based drugs have come on the market, under brand
names such as Oxycontin, Vicodin, Darvon, Percodan, and Demerol. Medically, they
are effective painkillers, although their potential for addiction is high in chronic users.
Unfortunately, because they produce the same feel-good effects as other opiates, they
are also widely abused.
opiate Highly addictive drug, derived from opium,
that can produce a profound sense of well-being and
has strong pain-relieving properties.

352 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
Like marijuana, opiates have special receptor sites in the brain. The discovery of
these opiate receptors led to the realization that the brain makes its own opiates, the
endorphins, which act as the body’s natural analgesics or painkillers. This research
stimulated a quest for drugs that have the same pain-fighting qualities as opiates but
without their addictive properties. The hope is, so far, unfulfilled.
Methadone, a synthetic opiate, can be taken orally and therefore doesn’t require
injection. It has essentially the same euphoric, analgesic, and addictive effects as her-
oin but doesn’t produce the same “rush” because the drug level in the brain increases
slowly. This feature makes methadone useful as a substitute for heroin in drug treat-
ment programs, in which the patient is switched to methadone and then gradually
weaned from opiates altogether.
Paradoxically, patients who take opiates for pain control under medical supervision
rarely become highly addicted. The reason for the difference in effects between the use
of opiates for pleasure and for pain is unclear. It appears, however, the presence of pain
causes opiates to affect parts of the brain other than the “reward centers” involved in
pleasure. The practical point is this: There is little to fear from legitimate medical use
of opiates for controlling pain (Melzack, 1990).
Depressants and Antianxiety Drugs The broad class of drugs that slows mental
and physical activity by inhibiting activity in the central nervous system is collectively
known as depressants. (Depressants don’t necessarily make people feel clinically de-
pressed, in the sense of “sad.”) They include barbiturates (usually prescribed for seda-
tion), benzodiazepines (antianxiety drugs), and alcohol (a social stimulant and nervous
system depressant). In appropriate dosages, these drugs can relieve symptoms of pain
or anxiety, but overuse or abuse is dangerous because they impair reflexes and judg-
ment. They may also be addictive.
Barbiturates, commonly used in sleeping pills, can induce sleep. Unfortunately, they
have the side effect of interfering with REM sleep. This leaves the user feeling groggy and
at risk for severe REM rebound, filling sleep with unpleasant dreams. Worse yet, over-
doses of barbiturates may cause loss of consciousness, sometimes to the point of coma
and even death. Fatal reactions to barbiturates are made all the more likely because the
lethal dose is relatively close to the dose required for inducing sleep or other desired ef-
fects. The chance of accidental overdose can be compounded by alcohol or other depres-
sant drugs, which magnify the depressant action of barbiturates (Maisto et al., 1995).
Benzodiazepines (pronounced BEN-zo-dye-AZ-a-peens), commonly prescribed to
treat anxiety, are safer than barbiturates and reduce anxiety without causing sleepi-
ness or sedation. For this reason, physicians often call them “minor tranquilizers”—the
best-known and most widely prescribed, which include Valium and Xanax.
While most benzodiazepines are relatively safe, they can be overused and abused.
Overdoses produce poor muscle coordination, slurred speech, weakness, and irrita-
bility, while withdrawal symptoms include increased anxiety, muscle twitching, and
sensitivity to sound and light. Significantly, benzodiazepines are almost never taken by
recreational drug users because people who are not suffering from anxiety usually do
not like their effects (Wesson et al., 1992).
Alcohol, another drug that acts as a brain depressant, was one of the first psy-
choactive substances used by humankind. Under its influence, people have a variety
of reactions involving loosening of inhibitions. At first, this may seem like a contra-
diction: How can a depressant make people less inhibited? What actually happens
is that alcohol depresses activity in the brain circuits that control self-monitoring
of our thoughts and behavior. The result depends on the context and the personal-
ity of the imbiber, who may become more talkative or quiet, friendly or abusive,
ebullient or, sometimes, psychologically depressed. Alcohol’s effects also depend
on whether other drugs, such as MDMA or Rohypnol (a form of benzodiazepine
sometimes known as the “date-rape drug”), are being used simultaneously. Such
drugs are believed by users to enhance social interaction and empathy, although
their effects can easily spin out of control, especially in combination with alcohol
(Gahlinger, 2004).
depressant Drug that slows down mental and
physical activity by inhibiting transmission of nerve
impulses in the central nervous system.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Benzodiazepines are used to treat
anxiety-related problems such
as panic disorder and obsessive
compulsive disorder (p. 580).

What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 353
Physically, alcohol in small doses can induce relaxation and even slightly
improve an adult’s reaction time. In just slightly larger amounts, it impairs co-
ordination and mental processing—although sometimes drinkers believe their
performance has been improved. Moreover, it is quite easy for alcohol to ac-
cumulate in the system because the body may not metabolize it as fast as it is
ingested. In general, the body breaks down alcohol at the rate of only 1 ounce
per hour, and greater amounts consumed in short periods stay in the body and
depress activity in the central nervous system. When the level of alcohol in the
blood reaches a mere 0.1 percent (1/1000 of the blood), an individual experi-
ences deficits in thinking, memory, and judgment, along with emotional instabil-
ity and coordination problems. In some parts of the United States, this level of
blood alcohol qualifies a driver as being legally drunk. (Most states, in fact, set
a somewhat lower limit of 0.08 percent as the legal threshold for drunkenness.)
Distillers, brewers, and wine makers spend millions of dollars annually promoting
the social and personal benefits of alcoholic beverages. And, to be sure, many adults use
alcohol prudently. Nevertheless, an estimated 5 to 10 percent of American adults who
use alcohol drink to the extent that it harms their health, career, or family and social re-
lationships. To some extent, the problem is rooted in our genes—but genetics is far from
the whole answer (Nurnberger & Bierut, 2007). People also learn to abuse alcohol, often
in response to social pressure. Eventually, physical dependence, tolerance, and addiction
develop with prolonged heavy drinking—of the sort that often begins with binge drink-
ing, common on college campuses. When the amount and frequency of drinking alcohol
interferes with job or school performance, impairs social and family relationships, and
creates serious health problems, the diagnosis of alcoholism is appropriate (see Julien,
2007; Vallee, 1998).
Abuse of alcohol is a significant problem for more than 17 million Americans (Adelson,
2006; Grant & Dawson, 2006). And alcoholism affects more than just the individual
drinker. For example, alcohol ingested by a pregnant woman can affect the fetus and is a
leading cause of mental retardation (Committee on Substance Abuse, 2000). Alcohol abuse
affects other family members, too. Some 40 percent of Americans see the effects of alcohol
abuse in their families (Vallee, 1998). The problem is especially prevalent among White
males and young adults. Too often, the problem becomes a lethal one, because alcohol-
related automobile accidents are the leading cause of death in the 15 to 25 age group.
Stimulants In contrast with depressants, stimulants speed up central nervous system
activity. The result is a boost in both mental and physical activity level, which is why
long-distance truck drivers sometimes use them to stay awake behind the wheel. Par-
adoxically, stimulants can also increase concentration and reduce activity level, par-
ticularly in hyperactive children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).
Physicians also prescribe them for narcoleptic patients to prevent sleep attacks.
Recreational users of stimulants seek other effects: intense pleasurable sensations,
increased self-confidence, and euphoria. Cocaine, in particular, packs what may be the
most powerfully rewarding punch of any illegal drug (Landry, 1997). Crack, an espe-
cially addictive form of cocaine, produces a swift, pleasurable high that also wears off
quickly. Amphetamines (often called “speed”) and related drugs have effects compa-
rable to cocaine. Among these, a particularly notorious variant known as methamphet-
amine came into widespread use during the 1990s. Use of “meth” can lead to severe
health problems, including physical damage in the brain.
Still another stimulant, known as MDMA (often called “ecstasy”), has grown popular
in “rave” culture, where it has a reputation for creating a feeling of euphoria and closeness
to others (Thompson et al., 2007). It is also known for energizing users to dance for hours,
sometimes leading to convulsions, death, and other unpleasant consequences (Gahlinger,
2004; Yacoubian et al., 2004). Ecstasy produces increased blood pressure and heart rate,
hyperthermia (elevated temperature), and dehydration. Long-term use is also known to
impair attention, learning, and memory, probably through impairment of serotonin-using
neurons (Levinthal, 2008; Verbaten, 2003).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
ADHD is a relatively common
disorder of attention span and
behavior, usually diagnosed in
children but sometimes found in
adults (p. 294).
stimulant A drug that arouses the central nervous
system, speeding up mental and physical responses.
Physical dependence, tolerance, and
addiction to alcohol may begin with social
pressure and binge drinking—as seen in
this student who readies himself to drink
from an ice luge at a party.

354 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
Stimulant drugs hold other dangers as well. Heavy amphetamine and
cocaine users may experience frightening hallucinations and paranoid
delusions— symptoms also associated with severe mental disorder. And these
drugs can send users on an emotional roller coaster of euphoric highs and
depressive lows, leading to an increase in frequency and dosage, quickly mak-
ing the abuse of such drugs spiral out of control. Yet another danger accrues to
“secondhand” users: Children exposed to cocaine in their mother’s blood while
in the womb are at increased risk for developing cognitive problems, emotional
difficulties, and behavior-control disorders (Vogel, 1997).
Two other stimulants you may not even think of as psychoactive drugs are
caffeine and nicotine—yet their effects on the brain are swift and powerful.
Within ten minutes, two cups of strong coffee or tea deliver enough caffeine
to have a measurable effect on the heart, blood circulation, and brain signals. Nico-
tine inhaled in tobacco smoke can have similar effects within just seconds. Both drugs
are addictive, and both augment the effects of natural reward chemicals released by
the brain. In this way, nicotine and caffeine tease the brain’s reward pathways into
responding as if using these substances were associated with something beneficial. For-
tunately, in the case of caffeine, the negative effects are minor for most people. Further,
caffeine has a built-in “braking” action that limits its intake because high dosages also
produce uncomfortable anxiety-like feelings.
In contrast to caffeine, nicotine is a much more dangerous drug for two reasons:
Nicotine is highly addictive, and it has been associated with a variety of health prob-
lems, including cancer, emphysema, and heart disease. In fact, the negative impact of
smoking on health is greater than that of all other psychoactive drugs combined—
including heroin, cocaine, and alcohol. According to the U.S. Public Health Service,
smoking is the leading cause of preventable disease, carrying a human cost of about
438,000 deaths annually (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007). As a re-
sult, the American Medical Association has formally recommended that the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration regard nicotine as a drug to be regulated.
The Altered States of Anesthesia While anesthetics have come a long way in the
160 years since the discoveries of chloroform and ether, science has relatively little
knowledge of how general anesthetics alter consciousness and suppress pain awareness
(Orser, 2007). Although anesthetized people appear to “go to sleep,” general anesthesia
is quite different from sleep. Anesthesia involves none of the REM and NREM stages
associated with sleep, even though it induces these sleep-like components: sedation
(greatly reduced arousal), unconsciousness (lack of awareness and responsiveness), im-
mobility (temporary paralysis), and amnesia (lack of recall for the period under the
influence of the anesthetic). Strangely, these four components of anesthesia seem to be
independent of one another. For example, conscious patients often carry on lively con-
versations as they “go under”—yet they rarely have a memory of these events.
One tentative theory suggests that anesthetics interrupt the process by which differ-
ent parts of the brain work together, or “synchronize,” thereby preventing conscious-
ness. They may do so by mimicking or enhancing the action of GABA, one of the brain’s
main inhibitory neurotransmitters. In this respect, anesthetics may be just another group
of psychoactive drugs that interfere with consciousness.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Dependence and Addiction
We have seen that psychoactive drugs alter the functioning of neurons in the brain and,
as a consequence, temporarily change one’s consciousness. The same may be true about
the steroids used by some athletes (Adelson, 2005). Once in the brain, such drugs usually
act on synapses to block or stimulate neural messages. In this way, drugs profoundly alter
the brain’s communication system, affecting perception, memory, mood, and behavior.
general anesthetic Substance that suppresses
consciousness and awareness of pain. Most anesthet-
ics also produce sedation and immobility.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Most psychoactive drugs mimic
neurotransmitters or enhance
or dampen their effects at the
synapses (p. 53).
Brain changes during use of drugs can be
seen on PET scan images. Much
less activity is seen in the limbic system
of the brain under the influence
of amphetamines.

What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 355
Significantly, a given dose of many psychoactive drugs has a weaker consciousness-
altering effect with continued use. As a result, the user needs larger and larger dosages
to achieve the same effect. This reduced effectiveness with repeated use of a drug is
called tolerance. Hand-in-hand with tolerance goes physical dependence—a process in
which the body adjusts to and comes to need the substance, in part because the pro-
duction of neurotransmitters in the brain is affected by the frequent presence of the
drug (Wickelgren, 1998c). A person with a physical dependence requires the drug in
his or her body and may suffer unpleasant withdrawal symptoms if the drug is not
present. Some scientists believe the desire to avoid withdrawal is as important as the
pleasurable effects of drugs in producing addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2005).
A person who develops tolerance to a highly addictive drug such as heroin becomes
less sensitive to all sorts of natural reinforcers, including the pleasures of friendship,
food, and everyday entertainment: The drug, in increasing dosages, becomes the only
thing capable of providing pleasure (Helmuth, 2001a). Addiction is said to occur when
the person continues to use a drug in the face of adverse effects on his or her health or
life—often despite repeated attempts to stop.
Addiction is not all physical, however. When heroin addicts routinely “shoot up”
in the same environment—say, in the bathroom—a learned response actually antici-
pates the drug and prepares the body for it. The result is that the addict can tolerate
dosages that are larger than when drugs are injected at a novel location (Dingfelder,
2004b). Thus, overdoses may occur if the user attempts to shoot up with his or her
“usual amount” in a novel location.
Withdrawal involves uncomfortable physical and mental symptoms that occur when
drug use is discontinued. It can include physical trembling, perspiring, nausea, in-
creased sensitivity to pain and, in the case of extreme alcohol withdrawal, even death.
Although heroin and alcohol are the drugs that most commonly come to mind when
we think of withdrawal symptoms, nicotine and caffeine, as well as certain sleeping
pills and “tranquilizing” drugs, also cause unpleasant withdrawal symptoms.
Individuals may find themselves craving or hungering for a drug and its
effects, even when they are not physically dependent—a condition known as
psychological dependence or psychological addiction. This usually results from
the powerfully rewarding effects they produce. Psychological dependence can
occur with many drugs, including caffeine and nicotine, prescription medica-
tions, and over-the-counter drugs.
Addiction, whether biological or psychological, ultimately affects the brain
(Nestler & Malenka, 2004). Consequently, in the view of many public health
professionals, this makes both forms of addiction brain diseases (Leshner, 1997).
On the other hand, the general public has been reluctant to view drug addicts as
people who have an illness. Instead, the public often thinks of addicts as weak or
bad individuals who should be punished (MacCoun, 1998).
What difference does it make whether we label addiction a “disease”? When
addicts are seen as persons suffering from a disease, they are most logically placed in
treatment programs. By contrast, when they are seen as persons with character defects,
addicts are sent to prison for punishment—which does little to break the cycle of drug
use, crime, and addiction.
Strange as it may seem, some experts argue that viewing addiction as a disease may
also interfere with the effective treatment of drug addicts. How could this be? The
disease model of addiction, with its emphasis on biological causes and medical treat-
ment, does little to deal with the social and economic contexts in which addictions de-
velop. This may explain why psychologically based programs that treat alcohol abuse
as a behavioral problem may work better than medically based programs (Miller &
Brown, 1997).
Treatment programs have an especially poor record with heroin addicts who
learned their habits on the streets of the United States. In contrast, treatment was more
successful with the thousands of veterans who became addicted to the heroin readily
available to troops during the Vietnam war. What made the difference? The addicted
veterans did not remain in the environment where they had become addicted—which
tolerance The reduced effectiveness a drug has
after repeated use.
physical dependence A process by which
the body adjusts to, and comes to need, a drug for its
everyday functioning.
addiction A condition in which a person continues
to use a drug despite its adverse effects—often de-
spite repeated attempts to discontinue using the drug.
Addiction may be based on physical or psychological
dependence.
withdrawal A pattern of uncomfortable or painful
physical symptoms and cravings experienced by the
user when the level of drug is decreased or the drug is
eliminated.
psychological dependence A desire to
obtain or use a drug, even though there is no physical
dependence.
The line between substance use and
abuse is easy to cross with addictive
drugs, most of which act on the brain’s
“pleasure centers.”

356 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
was the wartime culture of Vietnam. Instead, they returned home to an environment
not usually supportive of a heroin habit. On the other hand, heroin users who become
addicted at home tend to return, after treatment, to the same environment that origi-
nally led to their addiction.
Whether it be physical or psychological, a disease, or a character flaw, drug addic-
tion poses many personal and social problems. Clearly, this is a field that has much
room for new ideas and new research.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: What does evidence show concerning hypnosis as a
distinct state of consciousness?
2. RECALL: What physical changes are associated with meditation?
3. RECALL: Psychoactive drugs usually create their effects by
stimulating in the brain.
4. RECALL: Most hallucinogens act on brain sites that involve the
neurotransmitter .
5. SYNTHESIS: In what respect are opiates like cannabis?
6. APPLICATION: Which of the following groups of drugs have
the opposite effects on the brain?
a. hallucinogens and stimulants
b. opiates and sedatives
c. stimulants and depressants
d. depressants and opiates
7. RECALL: Why do many psychologists object to the “disease
model” of addiction?
8. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Altered states do
not involve any mysterious or paranormal phenomena. Rather, they
are modifications of ordinary consciousness we can study with
the tools of science, because they are produced by ,
, and changes in the person.
Answers 1. No solid evidence to date shows that hypnosis is a unique state of consciousness. 2. Many physical changes occur with meditation,
including changes in brain wave patterns, frontal lobe changes associated with positive emotions, beneficial changes in blood pressure and stress
hormones and, over time, increased thickness of the brain’s cortex. 3. reward circuits (so-called “pleasure centers”) 4. serotonin 5. Both have specific
receptor sites in the brain. 6. c 7. The disease model tends to emphasize biological causes and medical treatment at the expense of recognizing the
social and economic contexts in which addictions develop. 8. mental; behavioral; physical changes in the person
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Unconscious—Reconsidered
As we have seen, the term unconscious can have many mean-ings. In Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, for example, pow-
erful unconscious forces actively work to block (or repress)
traumatic memories and destructive urges (Freud, 1925). If al-
lowed to break through into consciousness, these would cause
extreme anxiety, Freud taught. In this view, then, the uncon-
scious mind serves as a mental dungeon where terrible needs
and threatening memories can be kept “locked up” outside of
awareness.
Freud’s ideas captivated artists and writers in the Western
world. For example, Joseph Conrad’s novel Heart of Dark-
ness tells the story of one man’s internal and unconscious
struggle with his evil desires for power, destruction, and
death. Unconscious desires can be sexual, as well, said Freud.
What else could account for the dubious success of the titil-
lating stories splashed so obviously across the pages of the
tabloids and the screens of the “soaps”?
Freud also taught that we “forget” anniversaries because
we have unconscious reservations about the relationship. He
said we choose mates who are, on an unconscious level, sub-
stitutes for our fathers and mothers. And he gave us the con-
cept of the “Freudian slip,” which one wag defined as “saying
one thing when you really mean your mother.”
Freud, then, placed the ego—the rational decision-maker
part of the mind—at the center of consciousness. There, he said,
it assumes the responsibility of keeping the sexual and aggres-
sive forces of the unconscious in check. But was he right? Or
were Freud’s ideas better as metaphors than as objective science?
What Are the Critical Issues?
Freud’s theory can explain almost anything—and in very compel-
ling language. He portrayed a mind perpetually locked in an in-
ternal struggle against itself. And we can see evidence all around
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

us of the sexual and aggressive urges that loomed so important in
his theory: in advertising, video games, movies, politics, and the
ways people fight and flirt. So the issue is not whether sexual and
aggressive urges influence human behavior, but whether these
urges operate as Freud suggested: primarily at an unconscious
level and in a mind continually in conflict with itself.
What Is the Source? Without a doubt, Freud was a percep-
tive observer of people and a creative theorist, and his views
have been enormously influential. But his genius and his influ-
ence don’t necessarily make his views correct. For example,
his seeming obsession with sex makes sense in the context of
the rigid and “proper” culture of early-20th-century Europe,
which frowned on public references to sexuality. (In some
quarters, the term leg was considered inappropriate for mixed
company.) From the perspective of 21st-century Europe and
North America, however, with sexual content quite common in
conversation and in the media, we have no reason to believe
that sexual thoughts are mostly unconscious. If anything, many
people seem consciously preoccupied with sex. This does not
mean, of course, that the unconscious does not exist. But it does
raise questions about the unconscious as Freud envisioned it.
Could Bias Contaminate the Conclusion? Given the
cultural constraints of his time, we should consider whether
the seething sexual cauldron of desire that was the Freudian
unconscious might be the result of biases in Freud’s thinking—
biases produced by the sexually uptight culture of which he
was a part. Anytime there exist strong feelings toward some-
thing, emotional bias is a risk. Freud may have also been
guilty of confirmation bias, finding evidence of the uncon-
scious everywhere: in dreams, forgetting, slips of the tongue
and other everyday errors, developmental stages of childhood,
and mental disorders.
Does the Reasoning Avoid Common Fallacies? Freud
may have also committed a common logical fallacy known as
begging the question, or assuming the very thing one is trying to
prove. We suggest that Freud begs the question by assuming that
unconscious conflict is the cause of all the mental phenomena
he describes—from forgetting an anniversary to a fear of dogs
to having a dream about flying. Why is this a logical fallacy? Be-
cause Freud’s argument is also an attempt to prove the existence
of a conflicted unconscious. He even suggested that resistance
to his arguments is evidence of the unconscious at work! Such
arguments are sometimes called circular reasoning.
And for our part, as critical thinkers, we must be careful
not to commit the fallacy often described as “throwing the
baby out with the bath water.” That is, even if we find fault
with some of Freud’s notions, we do not need to reject the
concept of an unconscious altogether. In fact, as you will see
in the next chapter, the unconscious plays a huge role in our
motivations and emotions.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
We can question Freud and still respect his brilliance and his
stature. After all, he developed an amazingly comprehensive
and appealing theory of mind in the early days of the 20th
century—long before brain scans and other tools of modern
psychology were available. Almost certainly, some of his ideas
had to be erroneous in light of newer knowledge. The impor-
tant question, then, is whether Freud’s concept of conscious-
ness and the unconscious mind is still reasonable in view of
the evidence psychology has accumulated since Freud’s time.
In recent years, techniques such as brain scans and priming
have made it possible to probe unconscious thought processes in
ways never dreamed of by Freud (Kihlstrom, 1990; Kihlstrom
et al., 1992). In the resulting picture, the unconscious—although
quite expansive, as Freud imagined—does not appear so sinister
as Freud portrayed it. In fact, it may have a much simpler struc-
ture than the complicated censoring and repressing system that
Freud proposed (Greenwald, 1992).
Brain scans do provide support for some of Freud’s broad
notions, such as the idea that many parts of the brain can oper-
ate outside of consciousness. What Freud didn’t know is how
much of this activity is devoted to simple background tasks,
such as maintaining body temperature and controlling hunger
and thirst. Likewise, the brain performs a sort of “preconscious”
screening on the incoming stream of sights, sounds, smells, and
textures. This screening also provides a quick-and-dirty ap-
praisal of events for their attractiveness or harmfulness (LeDoux,
1996). Such processing can even save your life, as when you re-
act “without thinking” to a swerving car coming at you.
Ironically, then, the cognitive view of an unconscious
that monitors, sorts, discards, and stores the flood of data
we encounter may give the unconscious an even larger role
than Freud originally conceived. But it is not the picture of
a scheming and plotting unconscious, full of sinister urges
that must be vented (Baumeister, 2005; Wilson, 2002).
Rather, the less-than-conscious mind seems to work, for
the most part, in concert with consciousness, rather than
against it—although, when we discuss mental disorders, we
will see that a fearful experience can sometimes leave a last-
ing mark on the unconscious screening process that is dif-
ficult to eradicate.
CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Do an Internet search on “drugs” and
“cultural differences.” What cultures allow
consciousness-altering practices that your
culture makes illegal? Conversely, are there
cultures that ban consciousness-altering
practices (such as drinking alcohol) that
Western culture allows? How might
the belief systems of the culture impact
the altered states they support or prohibit?
What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take? 357

358
recently begun to be studied scientifically, but early results
show that these altered states of consciousness do produce
some predictable changes in the brain.
• Psychoactive drugs also produce altered states of
consciousness, which result from the effects of the
particular drug on the brain’s communication system
and neurotransmitters.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
8.1 How Is Consciousness Related to
Other Mental Processes?
Core Concept 8.1 The brain operates on many levels
at once—both conscious and unconscious.
Consciousness represents one of the major mysteries of
psychology, both in its ordinary waking state and in its many
altered states. Consciousness is a process linked to work-
ing memory, learning, and attention. Behaviorists rejected
consciousness as a topic too subjective for scientific study,
but cognitive neuroscience shows that scientific methods can be
applied to consciousness using both psychological techniques
and brain scanning technology.
Psychologists have used various metaphors for conscious-
ness. Freud likened consciousness to an iceberg, in which
the unconscious played a powerful role in motivation. James
spoke of a “stream of consciousness”. The modern cognitive
perspective uses a computer metaphor. In addition to con-
sciousness, the mind has many nonconscious modes that can
operate outside awareness. These include the preconscious and
various levels of unconscious processing. While conscious-
ness is limited to serial processing, the mind can process
information nonconsciously in parallel channels.
Consciousness involves at least three important factors:
restricted attention, widespread connections among diverse
areas of the brain, and a mental model of the world used in
thinking. Comas are short-term states that transition into
either a minimally conscious state or a persistent vegetative
state. Measuring consciousness in coma patients is difficult
and sometimes erroneous but is improving with advanced
brain scanning techniques.
Because consciousness is limited, students using their knowl-
edge of consciousness can employ study methods that facilitate
the passage of information from consciousness into long-term
memory so that it remains accessible to consciousness. All such
techniques involve making the material meaningful.
attention (p. 326)
cognitive neuroscience (p. 325)
coma (p. 330)
consciousness (p. 325)
nonconscious process (p. 325)
preconscious (p. 327)
unconscious (p. 328)
CHAPTER PROBLEM: How can psychologists objectively
examine the worlds of dreaming and other subjective mental states?
• Brain scanning technologies such as EEG, PET, MRI, and fMRI
help scientists study subjective mental states.
• Using these technologies, combined with other scientific
methods such as experiments, researchers have learned much
about the nature of sleep. Hypnosis and meditation have only
8.2 What Cycles Occur in Everyday
Consciousness?
Core Concept 8.2 Consciousness fluctuates in cycles
that correspond to our biological rhythms and to the patterns
of stimulation in our environment.
Consciousness shifts and changes in everyday life, commonly
taking the form of daydreaming, sleep, and nocturnal dreams.
Daydreaming is probably inevitable and is a function of the
default status of the waking. Daydreaming can enhance prob-
lem solving and creative insight but can also interfere with
memory and happiness.
Although the function of sleep is not altogether clear,
everyone agrees that sleep and wakefulness are part of the
circadian rhythms. Too little sleep incurs a sleep debt, which
impairs mental functioning. Sleep researchers have revealed
the features of the normal sleep cycle, including the four stages
of sleep, as revealed by recordings of brain waves on the EEG.
These sleep stages recur in 90-minute cycles, featuring both
REM and non-REM periods. Over the course of the night, each
ensuing sleep cycle involves less deep sleep and more REM
sleep. The sleep cycle also changes dramatically with age.
Most adults need at least 8 hours of sleep every night.
The function of dreams is also unclear, but they often occur
in REM sleep, accompanied by sleep paralysis. Dreams have,
however, always been a source of inspiration and creativity
for humankind in cultures around the world. Among theories
of dreams, Freud’s has been the most influential—although
it has little empirical support. Studies show that dreams vary
by culture, gender, and age. Many theories suggest dreams
are meaningful events, and research shows they often involve
problems of the previous day; activation-synthesis theory claims
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

Chapter Summary 359
that dreams are essentially meaningless. Recent studies suggest
that dreams may help in the consolidation of memory.
Abnormalities in the sleep cycle can produce various sleep
disorders. Narcolepsy is a disorder of REM sleep, insomnia
involves shortened sleep, and sleep apnea involves abnormalities
in deep sleep. Other disorders of a less serious nature include
night terrors, sleep talking, bed wetting, and sleepwalking.
activation-synthesis theory (p. 340)
circadian rhythm (p. 333)
daydreaming (p. 332)
insomnia (p. 342)
latent content (p. 339)
manifest content (p. 339)
narcolepsy (p. 343)
night terrors (p. 343)
non-REM (NREM) sleep (p. 335)
REM rebound (p. 336)
REM sleep (p. 335)
sleep apnea (p. 342)
sleep debt (p. 337)
sleep paralysis (p. 335)
8.3 What Other Forms Can Consciousness
Take?
Core Concept 8.3 An altered state of consciousness
occurs when some aspect of normal consciousness is
modified by mental, behavioral, or chemical means.
Altered states of consciousness include hypnosis, meditation, and
psychoactive drug states. Hypnosis remains especially puzzling as
to whether it is a separate state of consciousness. Some scientists
view it merely as a suggestible state; others see it as role playing
or involving a “hidden observer.” Cognitive psychologists have
suggested it involves a shift in top-down processing. It is known
to block pain, although it does not act like placebos. While hyp-
nosis has many uses in therapy and research, one drawback is
that not everyone can be deeply hypnotized.
Meditation has a long history in Asian and Pacific cultures
but has only recently been studied by psychologists. Likewise,
experts dispute whether meditation is a distinct state of con-
sciousness, even though it has measurable effects on arousal
and anxiety, as well as producing changes in brain waves,
blood pressure, and stress hormones. Meditation has recently
been found to improve brain functioning in several areas.
Most psychoactive drugs produce sensations of pleasure
and well-being that make these drugs especially attractive
and potentially addictive. Hallucinogens (such as cannabis,
mescaline, psilocybin, LSD, and PCP) generally affect recep-
tor sites for serotonin. Distinct receptor sites for THC and
for the opiates (including morphine, heroin, codeine, and
methadone) suggest that the brain makes its own version of
these substances. Depressants (including barbiturates, benzo-
diazepines, and alcohol) act to inhibit communication within
the brain; many depressants are among the commonly abused
drugs. Medically, barbiturates are often prescribed for their
sleep-inducing properties, while benzodiazepines are used to
treat anxiety. Most people use alcohol responsibly, although
between 5 and 10 percent of American adults are problem
drinkers. Stimulants (such as amphetamines, cocaine, and
MDMA) are widely abused, although amphetamines are pre-
scribed for ADHD. Caffeine and nicotine also act as stimu-
lants. General anesthetics alter consciousness and suppress
pain. Their effects are different from sleep. In general, they
produce sedation, unconsciousness, immobility, and amnesia
for events occurring during anesthesia.
Many psychoactive drugs can lead to addiction. One
indication of this potential is increased tolerance; another is
physical dependence, marked by withdrawal symptoms. Some
drugs that are not physically addicting produce psychological
dependence. Although addiction has been characterized as a
disease, some psychologists believe that the disease model of
addiction is shortsighted.
addiction (p. 355)
depressant (p. 352)
general anesthetic (p. 354)
hallucinogen (p. 350)
hypnosis (p. 345)
meditation (p. 347)
opiate (p. 351)
physical dependence (p. 355)
psychoactive drug (p. 348)
psychological dependence (p. 355)
stimulant (p. 353)
tolerance (p. 355)
withdrawal (p. 355)
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
more expansive than Freud imagined. On the other hand, these
same technologies reveal our unconscious processes to be far
less sinister than Freud theorized.
The Unconscious—Reconsidered
Over 150 years ago, Freud proposed a model of the unconscious
that remains widely referenced today. Modern technologies
show that the unconscious exists and, in fact, is possibly even

360 C H A P T E R 8 States of Consciousness
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following videos by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the videos, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 13: THE MIND AWAKE
AND ASLEEP
PROGRAM 14: THE MIND HIDDEN
AND DIVIDED
Program Review
6. What are Freudian slips thought to reveal?
a. what we have dreamed about
b. how we really feel
c. who we would like to be transformed into
d. why we make certain choices
7. What happens if a hypnotized person who expects to smell
cologne actually smells ammonia?
a. The ammonia smell wakes him from the trance.
b. He recognizes the ammonia smell, but he remains
hypnotized.
c. He interprets the ammonia smell as a musky cologne.
d. He overgeneralizes and finds that the cologne smells like
ammonia.
8. All of the following appear to fluctuate based on circadian
rhythm, except
a. intelligence.
b. hormone levels.
c. blood pressure.
d. body temperature.
9. Consciousness performs all of the following functions,
except
a. filtering sensory data.
b. enabling us to respond flexibly.
c. allowing us to have a sense of our own mortality.
d. guiding performance of highly routinized actions.
10. What occurs about every 90 minutes throughout sleep?
a. rapid eye movement
b. rapid irregular changes in brain activity
c. dreaming
d. more than one of the above
1. Which of the following is an example of a circadian rhythm?
a. eating three meals a day at approximately the same time
b. experiencing alternate periods of REM and non-REM sleep
c. having systematic changes in hormone levels during 24 hours
d. having changes in fertility levels during a month
2. What is a positive function of daydreaming?
a. It focuses attention on a task.
b. It reduces demands made on the brain.
c. It enables us to be mentally active when we are bored.
d. It provides delta wave activity normally received only
in sleep.
3. According to Freud, dreams are significant because they
a. permit neurotransmitters to be regenerated.
b. reveal unconscious fears and desires.
c. forecast the future.
d. supply a story line to patterns of electrical charges.
4. According to McCarley and Hobson, what is true about
REM sleep?
a. Adults spend more time in REM sleep than do infants.
b. REM sleep is an unnecessary physiological function.
c. The random burst of brain activity occurs first, followed by the
dreamer’s attempt to make sense of it.
d. The subconscious expresses its deepest desires during REM
sleep.
5. According to Freud, how do we feel when painful memories or
unacceptable urges threaten to break into consciousness?
a. relieved
b. guilty
c. sad
d. anxious

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 361
11. How normal is it to experience alternate states of consciousness?
a. It happens to most people, mainly in times of stress.
b. It is something we all experience every day.
c. It is rare and generally indicates a mental disorder.
d. It is common in childhood and becomes rarer with age.
12. In the program, the part of the brain that is identified as the
“interior decorator” imposing order on experience is the
a. pons.
b. hippocampus.
c. limbic system.
d. cerebral cortex.
13. Ernest Hartmann points out the logic behind Shakespeare’s de-
scription of sleep. According to Hartmann, a major function of
sleep is that it allows the brain to
a. process material too threatening to be dealt with consciously.
b. integrate the day’s events with previously learned material.
c. make plans for the day ahead.
d. discharge a buildup of electrical activity.
14. Which part of the brain is responsible for conscious awareness?
a. cerebral cortex
b. brain stem
c. limbic system
d. hypothalamus
15. When societies around the world were studied, what proportion
of them practiced some culturally patterned form of altering
consciousness?
a. practically none
b. about a third
c. about half
d. the vast majority
16. Instances in which people believe they have remembered long-
forgotten traumatic events are known as
a. repression.
b. suppression.
c. recovered memories.
d. fugue states.
17. Sigmund Freud is to the unconscious as is to discov-
ered memories.
a. B. F. Skinner
b. Jonathan Schooler
c. Michael Gazzaniga
d. Stephen LaBerge
18. According to Freud, normal people banish undesirable memories
from their conscious minds through
a. repression.
b. projection.
c. anterograde amnesia.
d. hysteria.
19. Which topic related to human consciousness is conveyed by the
story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde?
a. witchcraft
b. hypnosis
c. identity transformation
d. sleep disorders
20. Communication between the two hemispheres of the brain is
disrupted when
a. a person is in deep meditation.
b. a person is in deep Freudian denial.
c. a person has just recovered an early memory.
d. the corpus callosum is severed.

9.4 How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us?
What Emotions Are Made Of
What Emotions Do for Us
Counting the Emotions
Cultural Universals in Emotional Expression
9.3 Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into
the Motivational Hierarchy?
Hunger: A Homeostatic Drive and a
Psychological Motive
The Problem of Will Power and Chocolate
Cookies
Sexual Motivation: An Urge You Can Live
Without
Sex, Hunger, and the Hierarchy of Needs
9.2 How Are Our Motivational
Priorities Determined?
Instinct Theory
Drive Theory
Freud’s Psychodynamic Theory
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
Putting It All Together: A New Hierarchy
of Needs
9.1 What Motivates Us?
Why People Work: McClelland’s Theory
The Unexpected Effects of Rewards on
Motivation
9.5 What Processes Control Our
Emotions?
The Neuroscience of Emotion
Arousal, Performance, and the
Inverted U
Theories of Emotion: Resolving Some Old
Issues
How Much Conscious Control Do We Have
Over Our Emotions?
Motivation and Emotion9
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
Motives are internal dispositions to act
in certain ways, although they can be
influenced by multiple factors, both
internal and external.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
When you study, try to get into a state
of flow.
A new theory combining Maslow’s
hierarchy with evolutionary psychology
solves some long-standing problems by
suggesting that functional, proximal,
and developmental factors set our
motivational priorities.
Determining What Motivates
Others
If it’s not extrinsic, motivation may
well come from feelings of personal
inadequacy.
Although dissimilar in many respects,
hunger and sex both have evolutionary
origins, and each has an essential
place in the motivational hierarchy.
The What and Why of Sexual
Orientation
It is still a puzzle, but it’s not a choice.
CHAPTER PROBLEM Motivation is largely an internal and subjective process: How
can we determine what motivates people like Lance Armstrong to work so hard at
becoming the best in the world at what they do?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Do Lie Detectors Really Detect Lies?
Emotions are a special class of motives
that help us attend to and respond to
important (usually external) situations
and communicate our intentions to
others.
Research has clarified the processes
underlying both our conscious and
unconscious emotional lives, shedding
light on some old controversies.
Gender Differences in Emotion
Depend on Biology and Culture
Culture and socialization account for
many of the differences—but not for
everything.
Detecting Deception
Nonverbal cues are the best signs of
deceit.

363
W HAT MOTIVATES LANCE ARMSTRONG? THE WORLD’S BEST-KNOWN cyclist, Lance has seven times won his sport’s premiere event, the Tour de France, a gruelling three-week bicycle race covering more than 2,000 miles. His mother Linda declared that he was always a competitive child—and one
that often tested the boundaries, as well as her patience.
Did his competitive spirit originate in his tumultuous family life? When Lance was a baby, his
father moved out, and his parents divorced. About three years later, his mother remarried a man
named Armstrong, who adopted the boy and gave him his name. But it was always his mother
who was the dominant figure in Lance’s early years in Plano, Texas (“Lance Armstrong,” 2010).
Despite having little money, his mother managed to buy Lance his first bicycle when he
was seven. He loved the bike, but it was the Plano city swim team that gave him, at age 12,
his first competitive athletic experiences. (Lance rode his bike 10 miles to swim practice in
the morning and then cycled on to school. After school in the afternoon, he rode back to swim
some more—after which he pedalled home.) At the peak of his swimming career, the young
Armstrong won fourth at the state tournament in the 1500-meter freestyle.
Armstrong’s focus shifted when, at age 13, he entered the Iron Kids Triathlon, an event
that combined swimming with biking and running. He won easily. Three years later, he turned
professional and soon triumphed in several national triathlon championships. Eventually
Armstrong’s achievements attracted the attention of scientists at the Cooper Institute for Aero-
bic Research, who found that his oxygen consumption during exercise was the highest they had
ever recorded. Clearly, he was a specimen ideally suited for sustained aerobic exercise. So, was
it Lance’s natural athletic ability, plus a string of early successes, that kept him training and
eventually pushed him onto the world stage? 363

364 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
In 1992, he decided to narrow his focus exclusively to bicycle racing. A spot on the U.S.
Olympic team quickly led to a sponsorship by Motorola on the professional cycling tour. A string
of increasingly prestigious victories followed—until the bad news came in 1996. At the age of 25,
Armstrong, who was experiencing unexplained fatigue and pain while riding, received a diagnosis of
advanced testicular cancer. Worse, tests showed that the disease had spread to his lungs and brain.
After consultations with doctors, he chose an aggressive regimen of surgery and chemo-
therapy, even though the doctors estimated his chances of survival at less than 40 percent. Two
years later, when they said that somehow, he had beaten the odds, Lance was already training
for a comeback.
And come back he did. In 1999, he won the first of his seven Tour de France titles. And in
2002, Sports Illustrated magazine named him Sportsman of the Year.
Shortly after he fell ill, he launched the Lance Armstrong Foundation, devoted to fighting
cancer through national awareness programs and funding initiatives for new treatments. But
what role did the disease play in his motivation to excel? His website quotes him as saying,
“Cancer was the best thing that ever happened to me” (“Lance’s Bio,” 2010).
PROBLEM: Motivation is largely an internal and subjective process: How can we
determine what motivates people like Lance Armstrong to work so hard at becoming the best
in the world at what they do?
Throughout this chapter, we will use Lance Armstrong’s case to illustrate the basic concepts
involved in motivation and emotion. We begin by defining what we mean by motivation, followed
by consideration of what motivates people to work—or, like Lance Armstrong, to log hours of
gruelling training for the Tour de France. Is it for some external (extrinsic) reward, or is it done
for personal (intrinsic) satisfaction?
9.1 KEY QUESTION
What Motivates Us?
In everyday conversation, we use many terms that refer to motivation: drive, instinct,
energy, purpose, goal, intensity, perseverance, desire, want, and need. You will note that
all these terms refer to internal psychological “forces” that presumably make us do
what we do. But the fact that we cannot observe these internal forces is what makes
the psychology of motivation so challenging.
Questions about motivation seldom arise when people behave predictably: get-
ting up in the morning, answering the phone, stopping for red lights, or greeting their
friends. On the other hand, we do wonder what motivates people whose behavior falls
outside the bounds of the ordinary, such as those who seem obsessed with food or sex,
those who gamble away their life savings, those who rob banks—and those celebrities
who behave indiscreetly.
Yet another part of the problem of motivation involves motivating people. If you
are also an employer, you probably want to motivate your employees to work hard. If
you are a coach, you want to motivate your players to train hard so the team can win.
But let’s bring it closer to home: As a student, you probably also want to learn how to
motivate yourself to study a bit more.
So, how do we go about understanding and controlling motivation? Let’s begin
with the basics, by defining what we mean by motivation.
Core Concept 9.1
Motives are internal dispositions to act in certain ways, although they
can be influenced by multiple factors, both internal and external.

What Motivates Us? 365
More broadly, the concept of motivation refers to all the processes involved in (a) sensing a
need or desire, and then (b) activating and guiding the organism by selecting, directing,
and sustaining the mental and physical activity aimed at meeting the need or desire;
and finally, when the need is met, (c) reducing the sensation of need. Take thirst, for
example: On a warm day, you may sense a biological need for fluids that causes you
to feel thirsty. That feeling of thirst then focuses your behavior on getting something
to drink. When you have drunk your fill, the uncomfortable sensation of thirst dimin-
ishes, and the motive fades into the background.
Sometimes, of course, students drink beer not to quench their thirst, but because
their friends are drinking or because TV ads have primed them to associate beer drink-
ing with fun. In this case, the need is said to be purely psychological, not a biological
need. In fact, many of our motives involve a complex combination of biological and
psychological needs, especially those involving our social interactions, emotions, and
goals. Take, for example, the complex processes that underlie our motivation for work.
Why People Work: McClelland’s Theory
Most people work to make money, of course. Psychologists refer to money and other
incentives as extrinsic motivators, because they come from outside the person. In gen-
eral, extrinsic motivation involves external stimuli that goad an organism to action. For
students, grades are one of the most powerful extrinsic motivators. Other examples of
extrinsic motivators include food, drink, praise, awards, and sex.
People can also have intrinsic motives for working—motives that arise from within
the person. You are intrinsically motivated when you enjoy meeting a new challenge
on the job. More generally, intrinsic motivation involves engaging in an activity—work
or play—for its own sake, regardless of an external reward or threat. You just do it
because it meets a psychological need. In short, an intrinsically motivated activity is its
own reward.
So, how could we assess a person’s motivation for work? Psychologist David
McClelland (1958) suspected that the stories people would tell to describe a series of
ambiguous pictures could reveal their motives—using the Thematic Apperception Test
(TAT), developed by Henry Murray (1938). You can see one such picture in Figure 9.1,
but before you read the caption, imagine what might be happening with the boy and
the violin. Initially, McClelland rated the stories for what they described as the need for
achievement (n Ach), defined as the desire to attain a difficult, but desired, goal.
Now read the caption for Figure 9.1 if you haven’t already done so: It gives
examples of how a high–n Ach individual and a low–n Ach individual might interpret
the same picture. With these examples in mind, you can judge whether your own story
is low or high in n Ach.
Indeed, McClelland found that certain characteristics distinguish people with
a high need for achievement, as measured by the stories they told about ambiguous
pictures. They not only work harder and become more successful at their work than
those lower in achievement motivation, but they also show more persistence on dif-
ficult tasks (McClelland, 1987b; Schultz & Schultz, 2006). In school, those with high
n Ach tend to get better grades (Raynor, 1970), perhaps because they also tend to have
higher IQ scores (Harris, 2004). In their career paths, they take more competitive jobs
(McClelland, 1965), assume more leadership roles, and earn more rapid promotions
(Andrews, 1967). If they go into business, they are more successful than those with low
n Ach (McClelland, 1987a, 1993).
I/O Psychology: Putting Achievement Motivation in Perspective Worker motiva-
tion is the domain of industrial/organizational (I/O) psychologists, who know that not
everyone has a high need for achievement, nor does every job offer intrinsic challenges.
At least two other motives propel us to work (McClelland, 1985). For some of us,
work meets a need for affiliation, while for others work satisfies a need for power. (The
need for power should not necessarily be construed as negative but rather in the more
positive sense of wanting to plan projects and manage people to get a job done.) Given
motivation Refers to all the processes involved
in initiating, directing, and maintaining physical and
psychological activities.
extrinsic motivation The desire to engage in an
activity to achieve an external consequence, such as a
reward.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Money can also be a secondary
reinforcer, because it can be
associated with things that satisfy
more basic needs (p. 147).
intrinsic motivation The desire to engage in an
activity for its own sake rather than for some external
consequence, such as a reward.
need for achievement (n Ach) In McClelland’s
theory, a mental state that produces a psychological
motive to excel or to reach some goal.
FIGURE 9.1
Alternative Interpretations of an
Ambiguous Picture
Story Showing High n Ach: The boy has
just finished his violin lesson. He’s happy
at his progress and is beginning to believe
that all his sacrifices have been worth-
while. To become a concert violinist, he
will have to give up much of his social
life and practice for many hours each day.
Although he knows he could make more
money by going into his father’s business,
he is more interested in being a great vio-
linist and giving people joy with his mu-
sic. He renews his personal commitment
to do all it takes to make it.
Story Showing Low n Ach: The boy is
holding his brother’s violin and wishing he
could play it. But he knows it isn’t worth
the time, energy, and money for lessons.
He feels sorry for his brother, who has
given up all the fun things in life to prac-
tice, practice, practice. It would be great
to wake up one day and be a top-notch
musician, but it doesn’t happen that way.
The reality is boring practice, no fun, and
the likelihood that he’ll become just an-
other guy playing a musical instrument
in a small-town band.

366 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
these three needs for work—achievement, affiliation, and power—it becomes
the manager’s task to structure jobs so that workers simultaneously meet their
own needs as well as the manager’s goal for productivity. (Managers, them-
selves, are usually motivated both by the needs for achievement and power.)
There are, of course, other reasons why we work beyond achievement,
affiliation, and power needs. As we have said, work is a way to make a living.
It is also a means to a desired lifestyle. But most of all, work is wrapped up in
a person’s identity: I am a teacher, a surgeon, a farmer, a park ranger, and so
on. We focus on achievement, affiliation, and power here because those are the
motives that have received the most attention so far by psychologists.
Should you find yourself in a management position, here are some need-
specific pointers that come out of the research on motivating employees:
• Give those high in n Ach tasks that challenge them, but with achievable goals.
Even though high–n Ach employees are not primarily motivated by extrinsic
rewards, you can use bonuses, praise, and recognition effectively with them as
feedback for good performance.
• A cooperative, rather than competitive, environment is best for those high in the
need for affiliation. Find opportunities for such employees to work with others in
teams rather than at socially isolated workstations.
• For those high in power, give them the opportunity to manage projects or work
teams. You can encourage power-oriented workers to become leaders who help
their subordinates satisfy their own needs. Again—although power motivation can
be purely self-serving—don’t fall into the trap of thinking that the need for power
is necessarily bad.
Satisfying people’s needs should make them happier with their jobs and more
motivated to work. I/O psychologists call this job satisfaction. But does job
satisfaction actually lead to better employee performance? Studies show that higher
job satisfaction indeed correlates with lower absenteeism, lower employee turnover,
and increased productivity—all of which are reflected in increased profits for any
business (Schultz & Schultz, 2006).
It is also worth noting that the need for achievement is not limited to work. It can
also boost performance in art, science, literature—and in athletics. Let’s explore two
instructive cases in point.
A Cross-Cultural View of Achievement When she won the Olympic gold medal in the
women’s 200-meter butterfly, American swimmer Misty Hyman said:
I think I just stayed focused. It was time to show the world what I could do. I am
just glad I was able to do it. I knew I could beat Suzy O’Neil, deep down in my
heart I believed it, and I know this whole week the doubts kept creeping in, they
were with me on the blocks, but I just said, “No, this is my night” (Neal, 2000).
Contrast that with Naoko Takahashi’s explanation of why she won the women’s
marathon:
Here is the best coach in the world, the best manager in the world, and all of the
people who support me—all of these things were getting together and became
a gold medal. So I think I didn’t get it alone, not only by myself (Yamamoto,
2000).
As you can see from these distinctively different quotes, the American’s perspective
on achievement motivation reflects a distinctively Western bias. Americans tend to see
achievement as the result of individual talent, determination, intelligence, or attitude.
Much of the world, however, sees achievement differently—in a broader context, as a
combination of personal, social, and emotional factors (Markus et al., 2006).
This observation fits with Harry Triandis’s (1990) distinction between cultures that
emphasize individualism or collectivism. Western cultures, including the United States,
According to McClelland, people have
different patterns of motivation for
work. Some are motivated by affliliation,
some by power, and some by the need
for achievement (n Ach). A good leader
knows how to capitalize on each of these.
Misty Hyman (top) and Naoko Takahashi
(bottom) have very different perspectives on
their athletic achievements—perspectives
that reflect their cultural differences.

What Motivates Us? 367
Canada, Britain, and Western Europe, emphasize individualism. People growing up in these
cultures learn to place a premium on individual performance. By contrast, says Trian-
dis, the cultures of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East often emphasize
collectivism, which values group loyalty and subordination of self to the group. Even in
the collectivist cultures of Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, where high values are
placed on doing well in school and business, the overarching goal is not achieving indi-
vidual honors but bringing honor to the family, team, or other group.
Without a cross-cultural perspective, it would be easy for Americans to jump to the
erroneous conclusion that motivation for individual achievement is a “natural” part of the
human makeup. But Triandis’s insight suggests that n Ach has a strong cultural compo-
nent. In collectivist cultures, the social context is considered just as important for achieve-
ment as are talent, intelligence, or other personal characteristics in individualistic cultures.
The Unexpected Effects of Rewards on Motivation
We have suggested that extrinsic rewards are among the many reasons people work.
But what do you suppose would happen if people were given extrinsic rewards (praise,
money, or other incentives) for leisure activities—rewards for doing things that they find
intrinsically enjoyable? Would the reward make the activity more—or less—enjoyable?
Would a reward affect motivation?
Overjustification To find out, Mark Lepper and his colleagues (1973) performed a
classic experiment using two groups of schoolchildren who enjoyed drawing pictures.
One group agreed to draw pictures for a reward certificate, while a control group made
drawings without any expectation of reward. Both groups made their drawings enthusi-
astically. Some days later, however, when given the opportunity to draw pictures again,
without a reward, the previously rewarded children were much less enthusiastic about
drawing than those who had not been rewarded. In fact, the group that had received
no rewards were actually more interested in drawing than they had been the first time!
Lepper’s group concluded that external reinforcement had squelched the internal
motivation in the reward group, an effect they called overjustification. As a result of
overjustification, they reasoned, the children’s motivation had changed from intrinsic
to extrinsic. Consequently, the children were less interested in making pictures in the
absence of reward. It appears that a reward can sometimes take the fun out of doing
something for the sheer pleasure of it.
When Do Rewards Work? But do rewards always have this overjustification effect?
If they did, how could we explain the fact that many professionals both love their
work and get paid for it? Subsequent experiments have made it clear that rewards can
interfere with intrinsic motivation, but only under certain conditions (Covington,
2000; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996).
Specifically, the overjustification effect occurs when a reward is given without
regard for quality of performance. This explains what happened to the children who
were given certificates for their drawings. The same thing can happen in the business
world, when employees are given year-end bonuses regardless of the quality of their
work or in the classroom when all students get As.
The lesson is this: Rewards can be used effectively to motivate people—but only if
the rewards are given for a job well done, contingent on quality of performance, not as
a bribe. In general, rewards can have three major effects on motivation, depending on
the conditions:
• Rewards can be an effective way of motivating people to do things they would not
otherwise want to do—such as mowing the lawn or taking out the garbage.
• Rewards can actually add to intrinsic motivation, if given for good performance:
We saw this clearly in the case of Lance Armstrong.
• And, as we have also seen, rewards can interfere with intrinsic motivation, if given
without regard for the quality of the work—as Lepper’s study showed.
individualism The view, common in the Euro-
American world, that places a high value on individual
achievement and distinction.
collectivism The view, common in Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and the Middle East, that values group
loyalty and pride over individual distinction.
overjustification The process by which extrinsic
(external) rewards can sometimes displace internal
motivation, as when a child receives money for playing
video games.
Overjustification occurs when extrinsic
rewards for doing something enjoyable
take the intrinsic fun out of the activity. It
is likely that this person would not enjoy
video games as much if he were paid for
playing.

368 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
So, if a child doesn’t like to practice the piano, wash the dishes, or do homework, no
amount of reward is going to change her attitude. On the other hand, if she enjoys piano
practice, you can feel free to give praise or a special treat for a job well done. Such re-
wards can make a motivated person even more motivated. Similarly, if you have disinter-
ested employees, don’t bother trying to motivate them with pay raises (unless, of course,
the reason they’re unmotivated is that you are paying them poorly). But when it is de-
served, impromptu praise, an unexpected award, or some other small recognition may
make good employees perform even better. The danger of rewards seems to occur only
when the rewards are extrinsic and are given without regard to the level of performance.
So, how do you think professors should reward students in order to encourage
their best work?
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
The world’s greatest achievements in music, art, science, business, and countless other
pursuits usually arise from intrinsically motivated people pursuing ideas or goals in
which they are deeply interested. People achieve this state of mind when absorbed by
some problem or activity that makes them lose track of time and become oblivious
to events around them. Psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 1998) calls this
special state of mind flow. And although some people turn to drugs or alcohol to expe-
rience an artificial flow feeling, meaningful work produces far more satisfying and sus-
tained flow experiences. Athletes, such as Lance Armstrong, could probably not endure
their intense daily training regimens without entering the flow state.
What is the link with studying and learning? If you find yourself lacking in motiva-
tion to learn the material for a particular class, the extrinsic promise of eventual good
grades may not be enough to prod you to study effectively tonight. You may, how-
ever, be able to trick yourself into developing intrinsic motivation and flow by posing
this question: What do people who are specialists in this field find interesting? Among
other things, the experts are fascinated by an unsolved mystery, a theoretical dispute,
or the possibility of an exciting practical application. A psychologist, for example,
might wonder: What motivates violent behavior? Or, how can we increase people’s
motivation to achieve? Once you find such an issue, try to discover what solutions
have been proposed. In this way, you will share the mindset of those who are leaders in
the field. And—who knows?—perhaps you will become fascinated too.
flow In Csikszentmihalyi’s theory, an intense focus
on an activity accompanied by increased creativity
and near-ecstatic feelings. Flow involves intrinsic
motivation.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Give four reasons why psychologists find the concept of
motivation useful.
2. APPLICATION: Give an example of an extrinsic motivator that
might induce a child to do her homework.
3. RECALL: McClelland theorized that some workers are motivated by
n Ach, while others are motivated by needs for
a. money and praise.
b. affiliation and power.
c. sex and aggression.
d. intrinsic reinforcement.
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Motivation takes
many forms, but all involve inferred mental processes that select
and direct our
a. cognitions.
b. behaviors.
c. sensations.
d. emotions.
Answers 1. The concept of motivation (1) connects observable behavior to internal states, (2) accounts for variability in behavior, (3) explains
perseverance despite adversity, and (4) relates biology to behavior. 2. Any incentive, such as money, extra TV time, or a favorite food. (Threat of
punishment could also be an intrinsic motivator, but probably wouldn’t work as well.) 3. b 4. b
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Are Our Motivational Priorities Determined? 369
9.2 KEY QUESTION
How Are Our Motivational Priorities Determined?
Until recently, psychology had no comprehensive explanation or theory that success-
fully accounted for the whole range of motivation. Hunger seemed so different from
the need for achievement. Fears often have roots hidden from consciousness. Most
biological drives feel unpleasant, but sexual arousal is pleasurable. The result was that
some psychologists concentrated on the most basic survival motives, such as hunger
and thirst, while other psychologists tried to explain sex, affiliation, creativity, and a
variety of other motives. No one, however, managed to put together a motivational
“theory of everything” that could encompass all our motives and, at the same time, be
consistent with real-world observations.
But now, a new contender has emerged that, many psychologists say, may be able
to do it all.
Core Concept 9.2
A new theory combining Maslow’s hierarchy with evolutionary psy-
chology solves some long-standing problems by suggesting that
functional, proximal, and developmental factors set our motivational
priorities.
About a half-century ago, Abraham Maslow proposed one of the most influential ideas
ever to come out of psychology: that different motives have different priorities, based
on a hierarchy of needs. For example, a threat to one’s life usually trumps thirst. But
thirst takes priority over the needs for affiliation or respect. But what about the artist
who, in the flow state, disregards the need for food or warmth, sometimes for days at
a time? And what about those “instincts” that drive animal migrations and, perhaps,
some human behaviors, such as nursing in newborn infants? Let’s see how a new hier-
archy of needs incorporates these concepts.
Instinct Theory
Since the early days of William James, psychologists have realized that all creatures,
humans included, possess an inborn set of behaviors that promotes survival. According
to instinct theory, these built-in behaviors account reasonably well for the regular cycles
of animal activity, found in essentially the same form across a species. We see these
cycles in bird migrations, in the mating rituals of antelope, and in the return of salmon
to the streams in which they were hatched only to spawn and die after a journey of
more than 1,000 miles.
Although such so-called “instinctive” behavior patterns do not depend heavily on
learning, experience can modify them. Thus, we see a combination of instinctive be-
havior and learning when bees communicate the location of food to each other or
a mother cat helps her kittens hone their hunting skills. Such examples show that
“instincts” involve both a lot of nature (genetically determined) and a little nurture
(learning).
Because the term instinct seemed to explain so much, it migrated quickly from the
scientific vocabulary to the speech of everyday life. Unfortunately, it lost precision in
the process. So we now speak casually of “maternal instincts” or of an athlete who
“instinctively catches the ball” or of an agent who has an “instinct” for picking new
talent. In fact, we use the term in so many ways that its meaning has become almost
meaningless—a mere label rather than an explanation for behavior.
As a result, the term instinct has long since dropped out of favor among scientists
(Deckers, 2001). Ethologists, who study animal behavior in natural habitats, now pre-
fer the term fixed-action patterns, more narrowly defined as unlearned behavior patterns
that are triggered by identifiable stimuli and that occur throughout a species. Examples
instinct theory The now-outmoded view that
certain behaviors are completely determined by innate
factors. The instinct theory was flawed because it over-
looked the effects of learning and because it employed
instincts merely as labels rather than as explanations
for behavior.
fixed-action patterns Genetically based
behaviors, seen across a species, that can be set off by
a specific stimulus. The concept of fixed-action
patterns has replaced the older notion of instinct.

370 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
of fixed-action patterns include not only the “instinctive” behaviors described earlier
but also such diverse behaviors as nest building in birds, suckling responses in new-
born mammals, and dominance displays in baboons.
Do instincts—perhaps in their new guise as fixed-action patterns—explain any part
of human behavior? The question raises the nature–nurture controversy under a new
name. Biology does seem to account for some human behaviors, such as nursing, that
we see in newborns. But instincts or fixed-action patterns are not very useful in ex-
plaining the array of more complex behaviors found in people at work and play. For
example, while we might speculate that the motivation of a hard-driving executive
could involve some basic “killer” instinct, such an explanation is no better than attrib-
uting Lance Armstrong’s success to a bicycle-riding instinct.
Drive Theory
The concept of drive originated as an alternative to instinct for explaining behavior
with a strong biological basis, as in eating, drinking, and mating. Psychologists defined
a biological drive as the state of energy or tension that moves an organism to meet a
biological need (Woodworth, 1918). Thus, thirst drives an animal in need of water to
drink. Likewise, a need for food arouses a hunger that drives organisms to eat. So, in
drive theory, a biological need produces a drive state that, in turn, channels behavior
toward meeting the need. When the need is satisfied, drive level subsides—a process
called drive reduction. You have experienced drive reduction when you feel satisfied
after a big meal or when you get in a warm bath after being chilled.
According to drive theory, what organisms seek is a balanced condition in the body,
known as homeostasis (Hull, 1943, 1952). So, creatures that have an unbalanced condi-
tion (caused, say, by lack of fluids) are driven to seek a homeostatic balance (by drink-
ing). Similarly, we can understand hunger as an imbalance in the body’s energy supply.
It is this imbalance that drives, or motivates, a food-deprived animal to eat in order to
restore a condition of equilibrium.
Unfortunately for drive theory, the story of motivation has proved not to be that
simple. In particular, drive theory faltered when cognitive, social, and cultural forces
were at work, as we will see later in our discussion of hunger. Moreover, drive the-
ory cannot explain why, in the absence of any apparent deprivation or obvious needs,
organisms sometimes act merely to increase stimulation. It is hard to imagine, for
example, a basic need or a biological drive that could prompt people to go skiing or
jump out of airplanes. Even at an animal level, laboratory rats that are hungry or
thirsty and given opportunity to eat or drink in a new maze environment do not ini-
tially eat or drink. Rather, they explore the novel setting first: Curiosity trumps hunger
and thirst (Zimbardo & Montgomery, 1957).
Cognitive psychologists also pointed out that biological drives could not explain
behavior motivated by goals, such as getting a promotion at work or an A in psychol-
ogy. Nor will drives explain why laboratory rats will cross an electrified grid merely
to reach a novel environment to explore or why Lance Armstrong endured thousands
of hours of grueling training to win glory. Psychologists call these psychological mo-
tives. In contrast to biological drives, psychological motives serve no immediate bio-
logical need but, rather, are strongly rooted in learning, incentives, threats, or social
and cultural pressures. The human need for achievement is another good example of a
psychological motive. Obviously, many motivated behaviors, especially in humans, can
stem from a combination of biological and cognitive or environmental factors. We will
see the practical side of the biological versus psychological distinction later when we
dissect hunger, the quintessential example of a combined biological drive and psycho-
logical motive.
For these reasons, psychologists have concluded that drive theory holds some—but
not all—answers to the riddle of motivation. Still, they have been reluctant to abandon
the concept of drive, which has come to mean a biologically based motive that plays
an important role in survival or reproduction. We now look on drive theory as a useful
but incomplete theory of motivation.
biological drive A motive, such as thirst, that is
based primarily in biology. A drive is a state of tension that
motivates an organism to satisfy a biological need.
drive theory Developed as an alternative to
instinct theory, drive theory explains motivation as a
process in which a biological need produces a drive
that moves an organism to meet the need. For most
drives this process returns the organism to a balanced
condition, known as homeostasis.
need In drive theory, a need is a biological imbal-
ance (such as dehydration) that threatens survival if
the need is left unmet. Biological needs are believed to
produce drives.
homeostasis The body’s tendency to maintain a
biologically balanced condition, especially with regard
to nutrients, water, and temperature.
According to drive theory, a need for
fluids motivates (drives) us to drink. A
homeostatic balance is reached when the
need is satisfied.

How Are Our Motivational Priorities Determined? 371
Freud’s Psychodynamic Theory
Sigmund Freud challenged the view that we know what motivates our own behavior.
Instead, Freud proposed, most human motivation stems from the murky depths of the
unconscious mind, which he called the id. There, he said, lurked two basic desires:
eros, the erotic desire; and thanatos, the aggressive or destructive impulse. Virtually ev-
erything we do, said Freud, is based on one of these urges or on the maneuvers that the
mind uses to keep these desires in check. To avoid mental problems, we must continu-
ally seek acceptable outlets for our sexual and aggressive needs. Freud believed that
work, especially creative work, indirectly satisfied the sex drive, while aggressive acts
like swearing and shouting or playing aggressive games serve as a psychologically safe
outlet for our deeper destructive tendencies.
It is important to realize that Freud developed his ideas in the heyday of instinct
theory, so eros and thanatos are often thought of as instincts. But it would oversimplify
Freud’s theory to think of it as just another instinct theory. He wasn’t trying to explain
the everyday, biologically based behaviors that we find in eating, drinking, mating,
nursing, and sleeping. Rather, he was trying to explain the symptoms we find in mental
disorders such as phobias or depression.
The new evolutionary theory of motivation borrows Freud’s notion that two main
motives underlie all we do. Evolutionary psychologists agree that just two fundamen-
tal motives underlie everything we do. But in place of sex and aggression, the new
theory posits the Darwinian needs for survival and reproduction.
Modern-day psychologists also agree that Freud had put his finger on another
important idea: Much mental activity, including motivation, does occur outside of
consciousness. But, as we saw in Chapter 8, they stand divided on the details of the
Freudian unconscious, a thread that will continue in the next chapter (Bornstein, 2001;
Westen, 1998).
One more of Freud’s ideas was also on target, according to the evolutionary theo-
rists. Among the principal theories of motivation discussed in this chapter, Freud’s is the
only one that takes a developmental approach to motivation. That is, Freud taught that
our motives undergo change as we move from childhood to adulthood. With maturity,
he said, our sexual and aggressive desires become less conscious. We also develop more
and more subtle and sophisticated ways of meeting our needs— particularly desires for
sex and aggression—without getting into trouble (see Table 9.1).
TABLE 9.1 Theories of Motivation Compared
Theories Emphasis Examples
Instinct Theory Biological processes that
motivate behavior patterns
specific to a species
bird migration, fish schooling
Drive Theory Needs produce drives that
motivate behavior until drives
are reduced
hunger, thirst
Freud’s Theory Motivation arises from
unconscious desires;
developmental changes in
these urges appear as we
mature
sex, aggression
Maslow’s Theory Motives result from needs,
which occur in a priority order
(a needs hierarchy)
esteem needs,
self-actualization
Evolutionary Theory Priority of motives determined
by functional, proximal, and
developmental factors
Food odor (proximal stimulus)
may raise the priority of hunger
drive

372 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
What happens when you must choose between meeting a biological need and fulfill-
ing a desire based on learning—as when you choose between sleeping and staying up
all night to study for an exam? Abraham Maslow (1970) said that you usually act on
your most pressing needs, which occur in a natural hierarchy or priority order, with
biological needs taking precedence. Unlike the other theories of motivation we have
considered, Maslow’s perspective attempts to span the whole gamut of human motiva-
tion from biological drives to social motives to creativity (Nicholson, 2007).
Maslow’s most memorable innovation, then, was his hierarchy of needs, which pos-
ited six classes of needs listed in priority order (see Figure 9.2). The “higher” needs
exert their influence on behavior only when the more basic needs are satisfied:
• Biological needs, such as hunger and thirst, lie at the base of the hierarchy and
must be satisfied before higher needs take over.
• Safety needs motivate us to avoid danger, but only when biological needs are rea-
sonably well satisfied. Thus, a hungry animal may risk its physical safety for food
until it gets its belly full, at which point the safety needs take over.
• Love, attachment, and affiliation needs energize us when we are no longer
concerned about the more basic drives such as hunger, thirst, and safety. These
“higher” needs make us want to affiliate with others, to love, and to be loved.
• Esteem needs, following next in the hierarchy, include the needs to like oneself, to
see oneself as competent and effective, and to do what is necessary to earn the
respect of oneself and others.
• Self-actualization, the “highest” need, but with the lowest priority, motivates us to
seek the fullest development of our creative human potential. Self-actualizing
persons are self-aware, self-accepting, socially responsive, spontaneous, and open
to novelty and challenge.
In his original formulation, Maslow put self-actualization at the peak of the needs
hierarchy. But late in his life, Maslow suggested yet another highest order need, which
he called self-transcendence. This he conceptualized as going beyond self-actualization,
seeking to further some cause beyond the self (Koltko-Rivera, 2006). Satisfying this
need could involve anything from volunteer work to absorption in religion, poli-
tics, music, or an intellectual pursuit. What distinguishes self-transcendence from
self- actualization is its shift beyond personal pleasure or other egocentric benefits.
But how does Maslow’s theory square with observation? It explains why we may
neglect our friends or our career goals in favor of meeting pressing biological needs
signaled by pain, thirst, sleepiness, or sexual desire. Yet—in contradiction to Maslow’s
theory—people may sometimes neglect their basic biological
needs in favor of higher ones, as we might see in a father risking
his life to rescue his child from a burning building. To Maslow’s
credit, he recognized these problems. Just as important, he called
attention to the role of social motivation in our lives at a time when
these motives were being neglected by psychology (Nicholson,
2007). As a result, a great body of work now demonstrates this
need we have for relationships with others.
Critics point out that Maslow’s theory also fails to explain
other important human behaviors: why you might miss a meal
when you are absorbed in an interesting book or why sensa-
tion seekers would pursue risky interests (such as rock climb-
ing or auto racing) that override their safety needs. The theory
also fails to explain the behavior of people who deliberately take
their own lives. And it ignores the powerful sex drive.
Cross-cultural psychologists have also criticized Maslow’s
theory and other “self theories,” noting that an emphasis on self-
actualization applies primarily to individualistic cultures, which
hierarchy of needs In Maslow’s theory, the
notion that needs occur in priority order, with the
biological needs as the most basic.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
Note the similarity between
self-transcendence and Erikson’s
notion of generativity, which
involves making a contribution
to family, work, society, or future
generations (p. 309).
FIGURE 9.2
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
Self Actualization
Esteem (respect)
Love (affection, belongingness),
attachment, affiliation
Safety
Immediate Physiological Needs

How Are Our Motivational Priorities Determined? 373
emphasize individual achievement (Gambrel & Cianci, 2003). In contrast, group-
oriented (collectivistic) cultures emphasize success of the group rather than self- actualization
(Shiraev & Levy, 2006). In fairness to Maslow, however, we should note that he recognized
that there could be cultural differences in motivation (1943). And even the severest critics will
acknowledge that, with all its flaws, Maslow’s theory was an important step toward a com-
prehensive theory of motivation.
Putting It All Together: A New Hierarchy of Needs
In the face of such criticism, can we find something in Maslow’s theory worth saving?
Douglas Kenrick and his colleagues (2010) point to the idea of a motivational
hierarchy as Maslow’s singular great insight. But, they note, its major difficulty is that
our motivational priorities are not rigidly fixed—as Maslow himself realized. Indeed,
an individual may change motivational priorities from time to time. Nor do different
people necessarily have the same motivational priorities. The solution, said Kenrick’s
group, is to understand that that we must view the needs hierarchy as fluid—subject to
change by three sorts of influences, seen as what they call the functional, proximal, and
developmental levels of analysis.
The functional level of analysis looks at the function of a motive, which (from an
evolutionary perspective) relates to survival and reproductive success. Functional in-
fluences arrange our motives in a kind of “default” hierarchy, grounded in the basic
needs, such as hunger and thirst. These needs motivate us to seek such things as food
drink, warmth, and shelter, without which we could not live. Similarly, sexual motiva-
tion arises from the evolutionary mandate to propel one’s genes into future genera-
tions. This need for sexual gratification and reproduction, then, gives rise to a whole
range of social needs, including not only the physical urge for sex but also needs for
affiliation, esteem, and parenting. These “higher” reproductive needs, however, gener-
ally have lower priority than the survival needs.
Proximal means “nearby”—so the proximal level of analysis focuses on immediate
events, objects, incentives, and threats that influence motivation. For example, the
aroma of freshly baked bread is a proximal stimulus that can suddenly arouse the hun-
ger motive. Or imagine that you are at a theater enjoying a movie when someone yells,
“Fire!” Your motivation suddenly shifts from relaxation and enjoyment of the movie
to fear and self-preservation. In more formal terms, an important proximal stimulus
can trigger a temporary modification in your usual motivational hierarchy.
Your stage of life can also affect your motivational profile. Thus, the developmen-
tal level of analysis shows how the order in which motives appear changes throughout
your life span. For example, hunger, thirst, and contact comfort held center stage when
you were a baby, but you didn’t give a whit about reproduction or about garnering
the esteem of your peers. But, when you became a teenager, sexual motives and the
need for social approval probably occupied a prominent place in your needs hierarchy,
sometimes trumping even the biological hunger and thirst drives. Likewise, proximal
cues may affect you differently at different developmental stages. So, you may be most
sensitive to different proximal cues—for example to contact comfort when you are
young or to a comely peer in your teens.
Less obvious are the evolutionary foundations for artistic creativity, athletic pursuits,
stamp collecting, or any of a thousand other human pursuits. And this is where the
new theory proposed by Kenrick and his group becomes controversial: They push self-
actualization off the pinnacle of Maslow’s hierarchy and replace it with needs for mat-
ing and parenting (which Maslow had neglected). All the productivity and creativity
that Maslow thought of as self-actualization is really just a means to the real ends
of reproduction and assuring the survival of one’s genetic offspring. As you might
expect, critics have raised objections (Ackerman & Bargh, 2010; Kesebir et al., 2010;
Lyubomirsky & Boehm, 2010; Peterson & Park, 2010).
What Kenrick’s group may have overlooked is the possibility that “higher” motives—
including a need to be creative or to satisfy one’s curiosity—may have become func-
tionally independent of their evolutionary roots. Certainly, creative persons—famous
functional level of analysis Concerns the
adaptive function of a motive in terms of the
organism’s survival and reproduction.
proximal level of analysis Concerns stimuli
in the organism’s immediate environment, which can
change motivational priorities. (In humans, proximal
could also refer to things that the individual is thinking
about.)
developmental level of analysis Concerns
changes in the organism’s developmental progress that
might change motivational priorities, as when
hormones heighten sexual interest in adolescence.
MyPsychLab
about Maslow‘s Influence atRead

374 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
entertainers, for example—have an advantage in the mating game. Nevertheless, evo-
lution may also have taken a shortcut by wiring our creative urges directly to our
pleasure centers. If that is true—and it remains to be explored by researchers—people
may pursue their interests just for the pure joy of doing so (Peterson & Park, 2010).
This intrinsic motivation may have become functionally independent of its original
biological aims.
Where does all this leave us? A consensus seems to be emerging on a few ideas
that may bring some unity to the field of motivation at long last (Schaller et al., 2010).
Most psychologists would likely agree that:
• Our motives have a “default” hierarchy or priority order that is essentially the
same from person to person—much as Maslow described.
• This default hierarchy of motives must be understood in a functional or evolution-
ary context, with the most basic motives being related to survival, followed by
motives related to reproduction and to survival of offspring.
• An individual’s motivational hierarchy is not rigid but can be influenced by proxi-
mal stimuli and by the person’s developmental level.
As we have noted, there remains some disagreement as to whether the “higher” motives
(such as creativity) are always based on the reproductive urge or can instead become
independent intrinsic motives.
What this new hybrid approach to motivation does for us, then, is to bring together
Maslow’s hierarchy and evolutionary psychology to make a big tent that can encom-
pass motivation of all sorts—from hunger and thirst to affiliation, status, and creativ-
ity. All must be ultimately understood in terms of a hierarchy and in terms of their
evolutionary roots. We still don’t know precisely how the brain manages to arrange
and rearrange the motivational hierarchy, but at last we may have a framework within
which the theoretical details can be worked out.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Determining What Motivates Others
Where do you start when you want to know what motivates a person’s behavior—perhaps
someone who has been self-destructive or hurtful to you? We suggest caution before
deciding that the source is some immutable personality trait. Instead, we recommend
FIGURE 9.3
Evolutionary Psychology’s Revision of
Maslow’s Hierarchy
Mating
and
Parenting
Esteem (respect) and status
Proximal Stimulus or
Developmental Change
shifts motivational emphasis
to a new level in the hierarchy.
Love (affection, belongingness),
attachment, affiliation
Safety and self-protection
Immediate Physiological Needs

Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational Hierarchy? 375
first looking for any external incentives or threats—extrinsic motivators—that might be
at work. Many times, these will tell the whole story.
Beyond that, we suggest you consider social motivation. While Maslow emphasized
social motives in his hierarchy of needs, he wasn’t the first to suggest their impor-
tance in human behavior. Alfred Adler, a contemporary of Sigmund Freud, was argu-
ably the first social psychologist (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956). Adler taught that
problem behavior often grows out of feelings of personal inadequacy and perceived
social threats. The counterbalancing trend in the healthy personality is a goal or need
for cooperation and the desire for acceptance by others. He called this social interest.
Modern social psychologists combine the notions of social motivation with extrinsic
incentives and threats in what they call the “power of the situation.”
Applying these notions to Lance Armstrong, it is not a stretch to suspect that his
motivation involves a highly competitive desire to win. But whether that is a “neurotic”
goal growing out of deep feelings of inferiority, we do not have enough information to
know. Should he ever seek psychological help, the therapist would certainly raise that
question—to which Armstrong may or may not know the answer.
Adler’s ideas are much more complex than we can detail here. Suffice it to say that
a person who feels threatened may respond defensively, with annoying behavior or ag-
gression. If you are that person’s parent, teacher, employer, or friend, the trick is not to
respond in kind. Don’t give attention to an attention getter. Don’t respond aggressively
to an aggressor. Don’t try to “get even” with a vengeful person. And don’t smother a
withdrawn individual with pity. Instead, treat the person with respect—and an under-
standing of the social motives behind the unwanted behavior.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 11
For social psychologists, the
power of the situation better
explains human behavior than do
personality traits (p. 462).

Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Why has the term instinct dropped out of favor with
psychologists?
2. ANALYSIS: What is the role of homeostasis in drive theory?
3. RECALL: In Freud’s theory, our basic motives are
a. social.
b. conscious.
c. unconscious.
d. established by evolutionary pressures.
4. ANALYSIS: Explain why self-actualization is characterized as the
“highest” need, but with the lowest priority.
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: The evolution-based
modification of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests that our
motivational priorities can change, depending primarily on
a. our developmental level and proximal stimuli.
b. our stress level and social status.
c. our intellect and experience.
d. peer pressure and social status.
Answers 1. Instinct has become an imprecise term that merely labels behavior rather than explaining it. 2. Homeostasis refers to the equilibrium
condition to which an organism tends to return after reducing a biological drive. 3. c 4. Self-actualization is at the top of the pyramid of Maslow’s
hierarchy—and in this sense is the “highest” of the needs. However, the needs lower in the hierarchy are more basic and so have higher priority than
self-actualization. 5. a
9.3 KEY QUESTION
Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational
Hierarchy?
In this section of the chapter, we focus on hunger and sex, two quite different
motives that represent the twin forces that evolution has used to shape the human
species: the drives to survive and reproduce. Everyone reading this book inherited
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376 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
the genes of ancestors who managed to do both. Here’s the big idea around which
this section is organized.
Core Concept 9.3
Although dissimilar in many respects, hunger and sex both have
evolutionary origins, and each has an essential place in the motiva-
tional hierarchy.
Ultimately, our task is to show how an evolutionary new perspective on motivation
manages to bring both of these motives together under one theoretical umbrella.
Hunger: A Homeostatic Drive and a Psychological Motive
You will probably survive if you don’t have sex, but you will die if you don’t eat.
Unlike sex, hunger is one of our personal biological survival mechanisms (Rozin,
1996). When food is available, the hunger drive leads quite naturally to eating. Yet
there is more to hunger than biology: It has social and cognitive foundations, too,
as we will see in the multiple-systems approach to hunger and weight control (see
Figure 9.4).
The Multiple-Systems Approach to Hunger Your brain generates hunger by
combining biological and psychological information of many kinds, including your
body’s energy requirements and nutritional state, your food preferences, food cues
in your environment, and cultural demands. For example, your readiness to eat a
slice of bacon depends on factors such as your blood sugar level, how long it has
been since you last ate, whether you like bacon, what time of day it is (breakfast?),
whether a friend might be offering you a slice, and whether bacon is an acceptable
food in your culture. Assembling all these data, the brain sends signals to neural,
hormonal, organ, and muscle systems to start or stop bacon seeking and eating
(DeAngelis, 2004b; Flier & Maratos-Flier, 2007). As you may have surmised, the
multiple-systems approach is another way of saying that hunger operates at many
What Initiates Eating?
Internal cues:
low blood sugar level
low blood levels of fatty acids
hormone signals from fat cells
empty stomach
Biologically based food preferences:
salty foods
sweet foods
fatty foods
Environmental factors:
preference for certain diets
(e.g., vegetarian)
stress-induced eating
depression-induced eating
eating to prevent hunger later
eating by the clock
eating stimulated by the presence
of food
social eating
other eating cues (e.g., watching TV)
What Stops or Prevents Eating?
Internal cues:
high blood sugar level
high blood levels of fatty acids
hormone signals from fat cells
full stomach
Factors of mixed origin:
moderate exercise
fear
anorexia and bulimia
Biologically based food aversions:
bitter foods
foods with fetid odors
Environmental factors:
portion size
foods associated with disgust
religious aversions (e.g., pork)
stress-inhibited eating
depression-inhibited eating
cultural pressures toward slimness,
dieting
FIGURE 9.4
Multiple-Systems Model of Hunger
and Eating
Hunger isn’t just a matter of an empty
stomach. The multiple-systems model
combines all the known influences on
hunger and eating.

Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational Hierarchy? 377
levels of the motivational hierarchy, meeting many needs that do not necessarily stem
from the biological hunger drive.
Biological Factors Affecting Hunger and Eating In the brain, the stomach, the blood, and
fat cells stored all over the body, a host of biological factors work to regulate hunger
and eating behavior. Among the most important are these:
• Brain mechanisms controlling hunger. The hypothalamus is literally a “nerve center”
for hunger, with one region activating feelings of hunger and another dampening
hunger. But the hypothalamus does not operate alone. Other regions, particularly
in the brain stem, work with the hypothalamus to monitor the status of blood
sugar, nutrients in the gut, and fat stores, using a suite of receptors and chemical
messengers (Flier, 2006).
• Set point (homeostatic) mechanisms. An internal biological “scale” continually assesses
the body’s fat stores and informs the central nervous system of the result. Whenever
deposits stored in specialized fat cells fall below a certain level, or set point, signals
trigger eating behavior—a homeostatic process. Research suggests that obesity may
result when this homeostatic balance gets off kilter. Studies implicate certain chemi-
cals (such as the hormone ghrelin) that signal hunger, along with others (such as
leptin) that signal when the set point has been reached. Animals lacking leptin, for
example, continue to eat even when not hungry (Grimm, 2007).
• Sensors in the stomach. Pressure detectors in the stomach signal fullness or a feeling
of emptiness. These messages are sent to the brain, where they combine with infor-
mation about blood nutrients and the status of the body’s fat cells.
• Reward system preferences. The brain’s reward system gives us preferences for sweet
and high-fat foods. These preferences have a biological basis that evolved to steer
our ancestors toward calorie-dense foods, enabling them to survive when food
supplies were unpredictable. This tendency has been exploited in modern times by
the manufacturers of sweet and fatty snack foods.
• Exercise. Physical activity also contributes to hunger and satiation. Extreme
exercise provokes hunger, but studies show that moderate exercise actually
suppresses appetite (Hill & Peters, 1998).
These biological hunger mechanisms operate at the most basic level of the needs
hierarchy.
Psychological Factors Affecting Hunger and Eating In addition to the biological mecha-
nisms that regulate eating, our emotional state can encourage or discourage eating.
For example, both humans and animals refrain from eating when they feel threatened.
(These are some of the proximal factors that we discussed earlier.) Stress and depres-
sion can also affect appetite, although the effects are variable: Some people respond by
eating more and some by eating less.
Learning plays a role too. Because we also associate certain situations with food,
we may feel hungry regardless of our biological needs. This explains why you suddenly
want to eat when you notice that the clock says lunchtime. It also explains why you
snack while watching TV or dish up a second helping at Thanksgiving dinner.
Culture can have a huge effect too. This can be seen in societies, such as the United
States, where media influences and social norms promote a thin body type. On the
other hand, in Oceania, where larger figures are often considered more attractive,
social norms promote heftier bodies (Newman, 2004).
While the ideal promoted in movies, magazines, and on TV is one of thinness,
Americans receive a different message from commercials that encourage eating. That
message, combined with an abundance of cheap, tasty junk food results in a growing
obesity problem in a population obsessed with weight. Moreover, as the influence of
U.S. culture becomes more global, American eating habits have become more univer-
sal, with the result that calorie-dense snacks and fast foods are making people fatter all
over the world (Hébert, 2005; Popkin, 2007).
set point Refers to the tendency of the body to
maintain a certain level of body fat and body weight.
In the global economy, calorie-dense fast
foods have become readily available,
changing dietary habits and contributing
to a worldwide epidemic of obesity.

378 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
Eating Disorders Only rarely does the condition called anorexia (persistent lack
of appetite) result from a physical disorder, such as shock, nausea, or an allergic
reaction. More commonly, the cause has psychological roots—in which case the
syndrome is called anorexia nervosa. “Nervous anorexia” typically manifests itself in
extreme dieting. It can be so extreme, in fact, that the disorder posts the highest mor-
tality rate of any recognized psychological condition (Agras et al., 2004; Park, 2007).
In the following discussion, we will revert to common usage by calling the disorder
simply anorexia.
What qualifies as anorexia? When a person weighs less than 85 percent of her
desirable weight and still worries about being fat, anorexia is the likely diagnosis.
People with anorexia may also face a problem called bulimia or bulimia nervosa, char-
acterized by periods of binge eating followed by drastic purging measures, which may
include vomiting, fasting, or using laxatives. In many cases, depression and obsessive-
compulsive disorder further complicate the clinical picture.
Commonly, a person with anorexia acts as though she is unaware of her condition
and continues dieting, ignoring other danger signs that may include cessation of
menstruation, osteoporosis, bone fractures, and shrinkage of brain tissue. Over time,
bulimic vomiting, done to purge the food she has eaten, results in damage to her
esophagus, throat, and teeth caused by stomach acid.
What causes anorexia? A strong hint comes from the finding that most persons
with the disorder are young females. Significantly, such eating disorders are most prev-
alent in Western cultures, particularly among middle- and upper-middle-class young
women (Striegel-Moore & Bulik, 2007). Clearly, it is not a hunger disorder caused by
lack of resources.
Those with anorexia commonly have histories of good behavior, as well as aca-
demic and social success, but they nevertheless starve themselves, hoping to become
more acceptably thin and attractive (Keel & Klump, 2003). In an effort to lose imag-
ined “excess” weight, the person with anorexia rigidly suppresses her appetite, feeling
rewarded for such self-control when she does lose pounds and inches—but never feel-
ing quite thin enough (see Figure 9.5).
Work focusing on genetic factors has complicated the assumption that social pres-
sures cause anorexia and bulimia (Novotney, 2009; Striegel-Moore & Bulik, 2007).
This makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint, says clinical psychologist Shan
Guisinger (2003). She points out the hyperactivity often seen in individuals with
anorexia—as opposed to the lethargy common in most starving persons—suggesting
that hyperactivity under conditions of starvation may have been an advantage that
motivated the ancestors of modern-day individuals with anorexia to leave famine-
impoverished environments.
anorexia nervosa An eating disorder involving
persistent loss of appetite that endangers an individ-
ual’s health and stemming from emotional or psycho-
logical reasons rather than from organic causes.
bulimia nervosa An eating disorder character-
ized by eating binges followed by “purges,” induced by
vomiting or laxatives; typically initiated as a weight-
control measure.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
People with obsessive-compulsive
disorder have persistent and
intrusive thoughts and may also
feel compelled to act out ritual
behaviors (p. 533).
FIGURE 9.5
Women’s Body Images
April Fallon and Paul Rozin (1985) asked
female college students to give their current
weight, their ideal weight, and the weight
they believed men would consider ideal.
The results show that the average woman
felt that her current weight was significantly
higher than her ideal weight—and higher
than the weight she thought men would
like. To make matters worse, women also
see their bodies as looking larger than they
actually are (Thompson, 1986). When men
were asked to rate themselves on a similar
questionnaire, Fallon and Rozin found
no such discrepancies between ideal and
actual weights. But, when asked what they
saw as the ideal weight for women, they
chose a higher weight than women did.
No wonder women go on diets more often
than men and are more likely to have a
major eating disorder (Mintz & Betz, 1986;
Striegel-Moore et al., 1993).
What women
believe is ideal
Average of
women’s
current
body imageWhat women
believe men
like best
What men
actually
like best
Lighter Heavier

Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational Hierarchy? 379
All in all, it is beginning to appear that anorexia—like hunger itself—is a condition
caused by multiple factors that stem from biology, cognition, and social pressures.
Obesity and Weight Control At the other extreme of weight control, the problem
of obesity has grown at an alarming rate since the early 1980s, with the result that
65 percent of Americans are overweight and 30 percent are now classified as obese
(DeAngelis, 2004b; Mann et al., 2007). The real problem, of course, is not obesity but
the associated health risks for such problems as heart disease, stroke, and diabetes—
although experts disagree on just how much of a problem this is among those who
are only slightly overweight (Couzin, 2005; Gibbs, 2005). Unfortunately, the funda-
mental causes of this obesity epidemic are not well understood (Doyle, 2006).
No one in the field of obesity research believes that the condition results from
the lack of “will power”—a simplistic and scientifically useless concept, as we will
see in the next section (Friedman, 2003). Rather, most experts believe that obesity
results from multiple factors. Prominent among them are poor diet, including super-
size portions and an increasing prevalence of food high in fat and sugar. In one
laboratory experiment, rats given a diet of sausage, Ho Hos, pound cake, bacon, and
cheesecake lost the ability to control their eating and quickly became obese (Johnson &
Kenny, 2010).
Genetics also have a role (Bell, 2010; DeAngelis, 2004a; Flier & Maratos-Flier,
2007), but so does activity level. For example, the long-term Nurses’ Health Study
showed that every two-hour increase in daily TV watching translated into a 23-percent
increase in obesity among the nurses in the sample (Hu et al., 2003). Finally, one study
suggests not getting enough sleep may trigger eating and a resulting weight gain,
perhaps because the body mistakes sleepiness for hunger (Hasler et al., 2004).
From an evolutionary viewpoint, humans are still Stone Age creatures biologically
adapted to deal with periods of feast and famine. So we tend to eat more than we need
when food is abundant as a hedge against future periods of starvation. Unfortunately,
this Stone-Age strategy is not well suited to life in a modern world—where most peo-
ple in developed countries also have no need to expend energy running down game or
digging roots. Nor are we well suited for a world of French fries, deep-dish pizzas, do-
nuts, Snickers, and nachos, which appeal to our deeply ingrained tastes for salty, fatty,
and sweet foods—which just happen to be rich in calories (Parker-Pope, 2009; Pinel
et al., 2000).
The problem is also not lack of awareness. Americans, especially, seem obsessed by
weight and weight loss, as a glance at the magazine headlines on the newsstand will
show. At any given time, approximately three out of ten adult Americans say they are
on some sort of weight-control diet (Gallup, 2010).
Yet, despite all we know about hunger and weight control, no one has yet discov-
ered a weight-loss scheme that really works for most people. Notwithstanding nation-
ally advertised claims, no diet, surgical procedure, drug, or other weight-loss gimmick
has ever produced long-term weight loss for a majority of the people who have tried
it. At this point, the best odds for most people lie in cognitive-behavioral therapies
(Institute of Medicine, 2002; Rich, 2004). And for those struggling with weight, it is
encouraging to know that some potentially effective weight-control chemicals are be-
ing tested as you read this, although it may be several years before anything both safe
and effective comes to market (Flier & Maratos-Flier, 2007). In the meantime, experts
suggest that the best pathway to long-term weight control involves maintaining a
well-balanced diet, a program of moderate exercise and, if you want some extra help,
cognitive-behavioral therapy.
The Problem of Will Power and Chocolate Cookies
Psychologists don’t talk much about “will power,” although the term can be heard in
everyday conversation, where it usually refers to resisting food, drink, or some other
temptation. In particular, psychologists don’t like the archaic assumption of the “will”
as a special faculty of the mind—a throwback to 19th-century phrenology. Thus, “will

380 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
power” is like the term “instinct”—merely a label rather than an explanation. Psy-
chologists also object to the term “will power” because it is often used as a moral judg-
ment, suggesting that a person has a deficiency in character—a “weak will.”
Alternatives to Will Power Modern psychologists usually prefer terms such as self-
control or impulse control—terms that carry less baggage and can be related to envi-
ronmental influences and to known brain mechanisms. For example, we know that
controlling one’s eating is more difficult during the holiday season, with its abundance
of food. Similarly, damage to parts of the limbic system is known to make control of
eating more difficult.
Psychologists have also contrived devilish tests to measure impulse control. What
have they found? To nobody’s surprise, the ability to control one’s impulses correlates
with all sorts of positive outcomes, including better mental health, more effective cop-
ing skills, better relationships, and higher academic achievement. But such findings still
leave the big question unanswered: What is self-control—or “will power”?
The Biology of Self-Control A team of researchers at Florida State University seems
to have placed the ability to resist temptation on a solid scientific footing (Gailliot et al.,
2007). What they found is that self-control has a biological basis. And it also has a price.
The Florida group first placed undergraduate psychology students in one of several
onerous situations in which they were asked to exercise self-control—such as resist-
ing a tempting plate of warm, freshly baked chocolate cookies or watching a funny
video clip without laughing. Then the researchers gave the students a second task, such
as a scrambled-word problem or a hand–eye coordination test. A control group also
performed the second task, but they were not first asked to stifle their laughter, nor
were they exposed to plates of tempting cookies.
Before we go any further, see if you can predict who did better on the second task.
Was it those in the experimental group, who had to resist their impulses? Or was it the
control group, who had been allowed to indulge themselves?
You were right if you guessed that those who had to face down temptation (resisting
the cookies or soberly watching the funny video) were less successful on the second
task. Apparently self-control is a cognitive resource that, like physical stamina, can
become temporarily depleted. And, surprisingly, self-control seems to have a physical
presence in the blood, as well as in behavior. The study found that those who had
been asked to control their urges had lower blood-sugar levels than those who had
not restrained themselves. Because sugar (glucose) is an energy source for the body,
the researchers speculate that exerting will power used up some of that energy, making
people less efficient on the second task (Baumeister et al., 1998, 2007; Wargo, 2009).
But there is hope for those weak of will! A sugared drink not only brought blood glu-
cose back up to its original level, but it brought the performance of the self-controllers
back to the level of the indulgers. Apparently, what we call “will power” is based, at least
in part, on the body’s ready energy reserves.
So, should you have a cola and a candy bar to boost your “will” before the next
psychology test? Probably not such a good idea, says Matthew Gaillot, leader of the
Florida study—especially if you are trying to control your weight. Better, he says, to
keep your energy level up with a diet that includes longer-lasting proteins or complex
carbohydrates (Cynkar, 2007).
And some additional advice from a cognitive perspective: If you want to insure that
you are mentally sharp, moderation is a better strategy than denial.
Sexual Motivation: An Urge You Can Live Without
No one enjoys being hungry or thirsty. But we can’t say the same for sex: Unlike hun-
ger or thirst, arousal of the sex drive can be pleasurable. And even though sexually
aroused individuals may seek to reduce the tension by mating or other sexual activity,

Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational Hierarchy? 381
the sex drive is not homeostatic—again unlike hunger and thirst. That is, having sex
does not return the body to an equilibrium condition. Moreover, sexual motivation
can serve diverse goals, including pleasure, reproduction, and social bonding. In other
words, sex—like hunger—is linked with diverse motives in the hierarchy.
In one other respect, sexual motivation has a kinship with hunger and thirst: It has
its roots in survival. But even in this respect, sex is unique among biological drives
because lack of sex poses no threat to the individual’s survival. We can’t live for long
without food or water, but some people live their lives without sexual activity (although
some would say that that’s not really living!). Rather, sexual motivation involves the
survival of the species, not the individual.
All the biological drives—sex included—exert such powerful influences
on behavior that they have led to numerous social constraints and taboos,
such as prohibitions on eating certain meats or drinking alcohol. In the
realm of sexuality, we find extensive culture-specific rules and sanctions
involving a wide variety of sexual practices. In fact, all societies regulate
sexual activity, but the restrictions vary widely. For example, homosexuality
has been historically suppressed in the United States and in Arab cultures,
but it is widely accepted in many Asian and Pacific Island nations. Rules
about marriage among relatives and exposure of genitals and breasts also
vary from culture to culture.
Even the discussion of sex can become mired in taboo, misinformation,
and embarrassment. Scientists who study human sexuality have felt intense
social and political pressures, which show no signs of abating in the present.
The result is that the scientific understanding of sexuality, which we will survey
below, has been hard won.
The Scientific Study of Sexuality In the mid-20th century, a titillated public clam-
ored to read the first major scientific study of human sexuality, based on interviews of
some 17,000 Americans. In two notorious books—one on men and one on women—
Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues (1948, 1953) revealed that certain behaviors (oral
sex, for example) previously considered rare and even abnormal were actually quite
widespread. While Kinsey’s data are now more than 50 years old, his interviews con-
tinue to be considered an important source of information about human sexuality,
especially since no one else has conducted such in-depth interviews of such a large and
varied sample.
In the 1990s, another large survey of American sexuality was described in The
Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States (Laumann et
al., 1994) and in a smaller, more readable companion volume called Sex in America
(see Table 9.2) (Michael et al., 1994). This project, known as the National Health and
Social Life Survey (NHSLS), involved interviews of 3,432 adults, ages 18 to 59. While
there were some built-in sources of bias (for example, only English-speaking persons
were interviewed), the NHSLS managed to get a remarkable response rate: Of those
recruited for the survey, 79 percent agreed to participate. When melded with other
surveys taken since Kinsey’s time, this study showed, among other things, a marked in-
crease in the percentage of youth who are sexually active, along with a declining age at
first intercourse (Wells & Twenge, 2005). A smaller but more recent survey, however,
shows that the percentage of teens who say they are virgins has increased slightly in
the past decade (Doyle, 2007). Estimates of homosexual and bisexual preferences have
also risen moderately.
But sexuality is not controlled solely by social pressures. In a study comparing
identical twins with fraternal twins, researchers have found that the age at which
individuals first have sex is strongly influenced by genetics (Weiss, 2007). Because
the same work also showed a genetic influence on the tendency to get in trouble
with the law, the scientists speculate that the underlying factor may be a risk-taking
tendency.
Our cultural lessons and life experiences
influence the meaning of sex in our lives.

382 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
Masters and Johnson: Gender Similarities and the Physiology of Sex Although Kinsey first
shocked the nation’s sexual sensibilities, it was William Masters and Virginia John-
son (1966, 1970, 1979) who really broke with tradition and taboo by bringing sex
into their laboratory. Never before had scientists studied sex by directly observing and
recording the responses of people engaging in sexual behavior of various sorts, in-
cluding masturbation and intercourse. During these observational studies, Masters and
Johnson discovered not what people said about sex but how people actually reacted
physically during sex. In the wake of their daring departure from tradition, the study
of human sexual behavior has become much more accepted as a legitimate field of
scientific inquiry.
These observations revealed four phases of human sexual responding, which Mas-
ters and Johnson collectively called the sexual response cycle (see Figure 9.6). Here are
the distinguishing events of each phase:
• In the excitement phase, blood vessel changes in the pelvic region cause the clitoris
to swell and the penis to become erect. Blood and other fluids also become con-
gested in the testicles and vagina.
• During the plateau phase, a maximal level of arousal is reached. Rapid increases
occur in heartbeat, respiration, blood pressure, glandular secretions, and muscle
tension.
• Reaching the orgasm phase, males and females experience a very intense and plea-
surable sense of release from the cumulative sexual tension. Orgasm, characterized
by rhythmic genital contractions, culminates in ejaculation of semen in men and
clitoral and vaginal sensations in women.
• During the resolution phase, the body gradually returns to its preexcitement
state, as fluids dissipate from the sex organs. At the same time, blood pres-
sure and heart rate, which had increased dramatically, drop to their customary
levels.
sexual response cycle The four-stage
sequence of arousal, plateau, orgasm, and resolution,
occurring in both men and women.
TABLE 9.2 Sexual Preferences and Behaviors of Adult Americans
Frequency of
Intercourse

Not at All
A Few Times
per Year
A Few Times
per Month
Two or More
Times per Week
Percentage of men 14 16 37 34
Percentage of women 10 18 36 37
Number of Sexual Partners
Since Age 18

0

1

2–4

5–10

10–20

21+
Percentage of men 3 20 21 23 16 17
Percentage of women 3 31 31 20 6 3
Infidelity While Married
Men 15.1%
Women 2.7%
Sexual Orientation Males Females
Heterosexual 96.9 98.6
Homosexual 2.0 0.9
Bisexual 0.8 0.5
Source: Adapted from Michael, R. T., Gagnon, J. H., Laumann, E. O., & Kolata, G. (1994). Sex in America:
A definitive survery. New York: Little, Brown. Table based on survey of 3,432 scientifically selected adult
respondents. There has not been a major survey of American sexual preferences and behaviors since
1994.

Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational Hierarchy? 383
Note also that Masters and Johnson focused on physiological arousal and responses.
Accordingly, they paid relatively little attention to psychological aspects of sexual-
ity, such as emotional responses or social pressures on sexual activity. Nevertheless,
Masters and Johnson drew several newsworthy conclusions about the biology of sex:
• Men and women have remarkably similar patterns of biological response, regard-
less of the source of sexual arousal—whether it be intercourse or masturbation.
• Although the phases of the sexual response cycle are similar in the two sexes,
women tend to respond more slowly but often remain aroused longer. This makes
sense from a biological standpoint because the male is likely to ejaculate before
the female loses interest.
• Many women can have multiple orgasms in a short time period, while men rarely do.
• Size of the genitals or other physical sex characteristics (such as vulva, breasts, and
penis) is generally unrelated to any aspect of sexual performance (except, perhaps,
attitudes about one’s sexual capability).
Most important, perhaps, Masters and Johnson used their discoveries about sexual
behavior to develop effective behavioral therapies for a variety of sexual disorders, in-
cluding male erectile disorder (inability to achieve or maintain an erection), premature
ejaculation, and female orgasmic disorder.
An Alternative View: Men and Women Differ in Their Sexuality While Masters and Johnson
called our attention to the similarities between men and women in the sexual response
cycle, other researchers have focused on the differences. For example, Meredith Chiv-
ers and her colleagues (2007) have discovered that heterosexual women are aroused by
a broader range of erotic stimuli than are heterosexual men. Moreover, gay men and
lesbian women are more particular in their erotic tastes than were their heterosexual
counterparts. Other researchers have looked deep in the brain, pinpointing the reward
areas associated with orgasm—which can be as strong, for example, as the brain’s
response to heroin (Portner, 2008).
Ann Peplau (2003) has pointed out four especially important differences between
men and women. First, she notes, men show more interest in sex than do women—on
the average, of course. Men not only think about sex more often, but they are also
more likely to attend to visual sexual stimuli. They also generally prefer to have sex
more frequently than do women.
Second, women are more likely than men to view sex in the context of a committed
relationship. That is, says Peplau, women are more likely to “romanticize” sexual desire as
a longing for emotional intimacy, while men tend to see sex more as physical pleasure. As
a result, women generally (both heterosexual and lesbian women) have a less permissive
attitude toward casual sex than do men (including both gay and straight men).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
The behavior therapies focus on
what people do rather than on
what they think or feel. Such
treatments are effective for a
variety of problems, including
not only sexual problems but
also phobias and other anxiety
disorders (p. 568).
FIGURE 9.6
The Sexual Response Cycle
Note that the phases of sexual response
in males and females have similar pat-
terns. The primary differences are in the
time it takes for males and females to
reach each phase and in the greater like-
lihood that females will achieve multiple
orgasms.
Source: Gagnon, J. H. (1977). Human Sexualities.
Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman. Reprinted by
permission of J. H. Gagnon.
High
Time
Orgasm
Male
Female
Resolution
Resolution
Plateau
Excitement
A
ro
u
sa
l
Refractory
period

384 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
Third, sex is more likely to be linked with aggression for males than for females. As
you probably know, rape is almost exclusively an act committed by males. But even in
milder forms, aggression is more a male than a female characteristic. For example, men
are more likely to be domineering or abusive in a sexual relationship. (We should add
that, even though these gender differences seem to have a biological basis, nothing in
this fact excuses hurtful or forced sexual behavior.)
Fourth, Peplau argues that women’s sexuality has greater “plasticity.” By that she
means that women’s behaviors and beliefs are more readily shaped by cultural and
social factors, as well as by the immediate situation. For example, women’s sexual ac-
tivity over time is far more variable in its frequency than men’s. This is especially true
when circumstances change, as in a divorce. Cultural factors, such as religion and cul-
tural norms, also influence women’s sexuality more than men’s. Especially interesting
is the fact that higher education is, for both men and women, correlated with more
liberal sexual attitudes—but the effect is much stronger for women.
Neuroscientists have also found gender differences in the brain’s responses (Portner,
2008). Specifically, during orgasm, many regions associated with emotional control in a
woman’s brain—unlike a man’s—seem to fall silent. That response, suggest researcher
Gert Holstege and her colleagues (2003), involves the dampening of anxiety responses
that could otherwise inhibit orgasm.
An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexuality The evolutionary perspective looks for
the basis of sexual motivation in the pressures of natural selection. Accordingly, some
observers (Buss, 2008) argue that selection pressures have produced different mating
strategies and, therefore, different gender roles for men and women. (We are speaking
of heterosexuals here, because the evolutionary aspects of homosexuality and bisexual-
ity are unclear at this point.)
Biologically speaking, the goal of both sexes is to leave as many offspring
as possible. Yet the potential physical costs of mating and parenting differ for
males and females (Bjorklund & Shackelford, 1999). As a result, the sexes have
evolved different—and sometimes conflicting—mating strategies, say evolutionary
psychologists.
Females can produce only a few children over a lifetime, and they make a huge
biological investment in pregnancy and a substantial commitment of time and en-
ergy in child rearing. Therefore, the best sexual strategy for females involves cau-
tion in mate selection. For males, however, the costs and benefits are much different
because they cannot become pregnant—nor do they usually spend as much time with children
as women do. For males, evolutionary theory says, the biggest payoff results from
copulating as often as possible with mates who are in prime breeding condition.
As a result, men tend to seek young and physically well-developed partners, while
females may seek somewhat older mates who can offer resources, status, and protection for off-
spring. Not incidentally, these agendas often produce conflict, promiscuity, and sexual jealousy.
Although the evolutionary perspective may seem cold hearted in its view of sexual
motivation, it does account for many gender differences in mating behaviors, such as the
larger number of sexual partners typically reported by men than women (see Table 9.2
on page 382). Even so, biology does not prohibit the learning of alternative sex roles and
scripts, nor does it explain the social and cultural pressures that cast men and women in
different roles (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Moreover, evolutionary psychology does not ex-
plain why most people remain with their mates over extended periods of time (Hazan &
Diamond, 2000) or why gay and lesbian relationships persist across cultures. A complete
understanding of human sexual motivation, therefore, must include both its evolutionary
roots and the many variations that occur through learning.
Sex, Hunger, and the Hierarchy of Needs
Maslow said almost nothing about sex. The new evolution-based needs hierarchy,
however, corrects this omission. Kenrick’s group still gives priority to hunger, thirst,
and other survival needs at the base of the hierarchy. Sex and related motives follow
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Natural selection is Darwin’s term
for the environmental conditions
that favored the “survival of the
fittest” (p. 44).
about Sexual Cues and Sexual
Scripts at
Read
MyPsychLab

Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational Hierarchy? 385
at the “higher” levels: attachment, affiliation, belongingness, and parenting. But this
doesn’t mean that a pizza always wins over the opportunity for sex. As we have seen,
the hierarchy is fluid, not rigid. In addition, hunger and sex are both biological drives
and psychological motives. Because biological drives generally have priority over psy-
chological motives, the attraction of sex can sometimes take precedence over eating—
in which case proximal sex overpowers proximal pizza.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
The What and Why of Sexual Orientation
Ever since Kinsey’s first reports were published, we have known that human sexual
orientation is a complex issue relating to sexual attraction, along with several other as-
pects of human relating, including our sexual behavior, desired intimate relationships,
affiliation with gay or straight (or other) communities, and how we personally identify
our sexual orientation (Herek et al., 2010).
Heterosexuality and homosexuality represent the two major forms of sexual
orientation: A heterosexual orientation is to the opposite sex; a homosexual orienta-
tion is to the same sex. Another common variation is bisexuality, which refers to sexual
interest in both males and females (Diamond, 2008). But to complicate matters, cross-
cultural studies reveal considerable variability in sexual orientation. In parts of New
Guinea, for example, the culture dictates that homosexual behavior is universal among
young males, who then switch to a heterosexual orientation when they marry (Money,
1987). Among American adults, various estimates put the percentage of homosexuality
at 1 to 9 percent, more or less, depending on whether homosexuality is defined
as (a) feelings of attraction to persons of the same sex, (b) one’s primary
orientation or, (c) having ever engaged in same-sex erotic behavior (Diamond,
2007; Savin-Williams, 2006). As Table 9.2 (page 382) indicates, the incidence
of homosexuality among females is about half that of males. Incidentally,
homosexual behavior is quite common among animals— particularly bonobos
(pigmy chimpanzees), who are genetically close relatives to humans (Driscoll,
2008).
Transsexualism refers to people who view themselves as persons of the
sex opposite to their biological sex. Thus, a transsexual person with the
phenotype of a male thinks of him/herself as a female. Such persons should
not be confused with cross-dressers, who indulge in a sexual fetish known
as transvestism. (Those who cross-dress for nonsexual reasons are not clas-
sified under transvestism.) It is also important to realize that none of these
variations predicts sexual orientation. That is, knowing that a person is trans-
sexual or a cross-dresser does not tell us whether he or she is gay, lesbian,
bisexual, or straight (Devor, 1993).
Origins of Sexual Orientation
So, what does the available evidence tell us about the factors that determine
sexual orientation? We know several things that are not involved. Speaking bio-
logically, we know that sexual orientation in adults is not related to testosterone
levels—although the issue of testosterone or estrogen influences on the fetus is
still an open question (McAnulty & Burnette, 2004). From a social perspec-
tive, we also know that parenting styles or family configurations do not cause
children to identify as straight or gay (Golombok & Tasker, 1996). Similarly,
researchers have come up empty handed in their attempts to link human sexual
orientation to early sexual experiences, such as molestation or other abuse.
Although much of the work has focused on biology, most experts have concluded
that a combination of biological, environmental, and social factors are at play. To illus-
trate this research, let’s look at a famous study of male identical twins. Richard Pillard
sexual orientation One’s erotic attraction
toward members of the same sex (a homosexual orien-
tation), the opposite sex (heterosexual orientation), or
both sexes (a bisexual orientation).
The origins of sexual orientation are
unclear, although some evidence points
to biological factors. What is clear is that
research on sexual orientation often
generates controversy.

386 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
and Michael Bailey (1991) discovered that when one twin is homosexual, the chance
of the other being homosexual is about 50 percent. This compares with an incidence
of roughly 5 or 6 percent in the general population. The same study also found that
the rate drops to 22 percent for fraternal twins and 11 percent for adoptive brothers of
homosexuals. A later study of female twin pairs produced essentially the same results
(Bower, 1992).
One of the more puzzling findings links sexual orientation in males (but not females)
to birth order, specifically how many older brothers one has (Abrams, 2007; Blanchard,
2008; Bogaert, 2005). The more older brothers a boy has, the more likely he is to have
a same-sex orientation. This effect occurs whether or not boys are raised with their
biological brothers, according to a study of adopted versus biological brothers—a finding
that apparently rules out environmental influences after birth (Bogaert, 2006). While no
one knows what the causative factor is, some scientists believe that some aspect of the
prenatal environment tips the balance one way or the other. (Bower, 2006a).
Again, research shows that social and environmental factors must also be taken
into account. While few studies examine how adolescents develop a sexual orientation,
some scholars theorize that social influences such as peers, the media, schools, and par-
enting can affect the direction of sexual development. Hyde and Jaffee (2000) reviewed
numerous large studies that suggest adolescent girls who become heterosexual often
develop their identities and social roles amidst messages that disparage homosexuality
and promote heterosexuality.
Turning to the earlier preadolescent period, a longitudinal study of 182 children in
fourth to eighth grade looked at the ways some children enter into a period of sexual
questioning (Carver et al., 2004). Specifically, the researchers found that girls and boys
who, for various reasons, question whether they will marry someone of the other sex
and whether they will fulfill typical gender roles come to feel distressed about their
competence in peer relationships (although this turmoil seems not to affect how much
they are liked and accepted by their peers).
Research in this area remains controversial because of the strong feelings, political
issues, and prejudices involved (Herek, 2000). Further, it has attracted scientific criti-
cism because much of it is correlational—rather than experimental—so the data can-
not establish cause and effect with certainty. Moreover, some observers object to this
whole line of research, saying that gay men and lesbians should not feel pressured to
justify their behavior by seeking a ”cause” for it (Byne, 1995).
Not a Disorder
We should also note that, until the 1970s, the diagnostic manual of the American
Psychiatric Association listed homosexuality as a mental disorder—a classification
that has since been removed and repudiated by both psychologists and psychiatrists
(Greenberg, 1997). Then, more recently, the American Psychological Association passed
a resolution advising against therapies aimed at changing sexual orientation, on the
grounds that they are ineffective, unnecessary, and potentially harmful (Munsey, 2009).
And what does the evidence say about sexual orientation and mental health? The
message coming through numerous studies says that mental disorders and relation-
ship problems occur in about the same proportion in heterosexuals and homosexuals
(DeAngelis, 2002c; Kurdek, 2005). As we might expect, the only exception involves
stress-related problems—e.g., anxiety and depression—associated with discrimination
against homosexuals. The research also shows no differences in adjustment or develop-
ment of children raised by heterosexual or homosexual parents (APA, 2010; Patterson,
2006).
So, where does this leave us in our understanding of sexual orientation? Attitudes
toward minority forms of sexual orientation, such as homosexuality, differ sharply
among cultures around the world, with Americans among the most divided on issues
such as gay marriage. Most experts—but not all—would say that the research strongly
supports some biological influence on sexual orientation. Just how biology might influ-
ence our behavior in the bedroom, however, remains a major puzzle and a topic for
continuing research.

How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us? 387
9.4 KEY QUESTION
How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us?
One of the most pervasive misunderstandings about the human mind is the idea that
emotion is the opposite of reason. Consider the case of Elliot. Once a model employee,
he had let the quality of his work slip to the point that he finally lost his job. If any-
thing, said his supervisors, Elliot had become almost too focused on the details of his
work, yet he had trouble setting priorities. He often latched onto a small task, such as
sorting a client’s paperwork, and spent the whole afternoon on various classification
schemes—never quite getting to the real job he had been assigned (Damasio, 1994).
His personal life also fell apart. A divorce was followed by a short marriage and an-
other divorce. Several attempts at starting his own business involved glaringly flawed
decisions that finally ate up all his savings.
Yet, surprisingly, in most respects Elliot seemed normal. He had a pleasant
personality and an engaging sense of humor. He was obviously smart—well aware of
important events, names, and dates. He understood the political and economic affairs
of the day. In fact, examinations revealed nothing wrong with his movements, memory,
perceptual abilities, language skills, intellect, or ability to learn.
Complaints of headaches led the family doctor to suspect that the changes in Elliot
pointed to something wrong in his brain. Tests proved the suspicion correct, reveal-
ing a mass the size of a small orange that was pressing on the frontal lobes just above
Elliot’s eyes.
The tumor was removed, but not before it had damaged the frontal lobes in a
pattern remarkably similar to that of the notorious Phineas Gage, whom you met in
Chapter 2. But the effects in Elliot were more subtle than in Gage. As a psychologist
who examined him said, “We might summarize Elliot’s predicament as to know but
not to feel” (Damasio, 1994, p. 45). His reasoning abilities were intact, but the dam-
age to the circuitry of Elliot’s frontal lobes disrupted his ability to use his emotions to
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Describe the multiple systems approach to
understanding hunger.
2. RECALL: Explain, from an evolutionary perspective, why obesity is
becoming more prevalent in industrialized nations.
3. RECALL: From a biological perspective, in what respect is sex
different from other biological drives, such as hunger and thirst?
4. RECALL: What are the four major differences between men’s and
women’s sexuality, according to Peplau?
5. ANALYSIS: Why do psychologists avoid the term will power? What
terms do they prefer instead?
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: For which of the
motives discussed in this section would biological factors be least
important in accounting for the differences between one person and
another?
a. hunger
b. thirst
c. a n Ach
d. sex
Answers 1. Because hunger has not only biological components but also cognitive, social, and cultural aspects, it must be understood as involving a
complex interaction of factors. The multiple systems approach recognizes such factors as blood sugar and fat levels monitored by the hypothalamus,
homeostatic feedback from fat cells, pressure and nutrient detectors in the stomach, reward systems in the brain, physical activity, emotional state,
food-related stimuli, and social-cultural pressures. 2. From an evolutionary standpoint, the human body evolved in an environment that required much
more physical exertion than is required of most people in industrialized countries. This decrease in activity, along with an abundance of calorie-dense
foods, has led to obesity. 3. Sex is not a homeostatic drive, nor is it essential for the survival of the individual. 4. Peplau says that (a) men show more
interest in sex than do women, (b) women are more likely to view sex in the context of a committed relationship, (c) males are more likely to associate
sex with aggression, and (d) women’s sexuality has more plasticity than men’s. 5. The term will power suggests that it is a separate faculty of the
mind, yet there is no evidence of a “will” that cannot be explained in more conventional terms that do not carry the baggage of a defect in character.
Psychologists prefer to speak of “self-control” or “impulse control.” 6. c (because all the others involve biological drives)
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

388 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
establish priorities among the objects, events, and people in his life. In short, Elliot had
been emotionally crippled. With a disruption in his ability to connect concepts and
emotions, Elliot could not value one course of action over another.
So, what does Elliot’s case tell us about the role of emotions in our thinking? What
happened to Elliot, Phineas Gage, and others with similar problems makes it clear that
emotion is a vital ingredient in thinking and, especially, in decision making (Forgas,
2008; Gray, 2004). In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore some discoveries
about how the brain processes emotions and what these discoveries mean about the
intimate connection between emotion and reason.
Core Concept 9.4
Emotions are a special class of motives that help us attend to and
respond to important (usually external) situations and communicate
our intentions to others.
How is emotion linked to motivation? Note that both words share a common root,
“mot-” from the Latin motus, meaning “move.” The psychology of emotion has re-
tained this meaning by viewing emotion as a special sort of motivation directed out-
ward. Emotions also increase our arousal, attach the values we call “feelings” to people,
objects, and events that we judge important, and produce an approach or avoidance
response. Let’s look more closely at these components of emotion.
What Emotions Are Made Of
In brief, every emotion has four main components: physiological arousal, cognitive
interpretation, subjective feelings, and behavioral expression. We can illustrate with an
example closer to home.
Suppose that you win a cool $50 million in the lottery. Chances are that the news
will make you jump and shout, your heart race, and a wave of joy wash over your
brain. Congratulations! You have just had an emotion! The physiological arousal com-
ponent involves an alarm broadcast simultaneously throughout the autonomic ner-
vous system and the endocrine system. The result is an extensive visceral response that
includes your racing heart.
The second component of emotion, a cognitive interpretation of events and feel-
ings, involves a conscious recognition and interpretation of the situation. Undoubtedly,
you would interpret the news about your winning lottery ticket as good fortune. The
same processes—both conscious and unconscious—can happen with unpleasant expe-
riences too. (Think of a hungry bear chasing you.)
The subjective feeling component of your fear may come from several sources. One
involves the brain sensing the body’s current state of arousal. The other comes from
memories of the body’s state in similar situations in the past. There, the brain stores a
sort of emotional “body-image” that Antonio Damasio (1994, 2003) calls a somatic
marker. In response to the hungry bear, your brain retrieves a body-image memory
of how you felt during past encounters with danger, including a racing heart, a cold
sweat, and the feeling of running away.
The recently discovered “mirror neuron” system is yet another source of emotional
feelings. These brain circuits activate to make you feel the somatic marker of an emo-
tion when you see someone else’s emotional state, as in a sad movie (Miller, 2006c;
Niedenthal, 2007). In our hungry bear example, your mirror neurons may reflect the
emotions of a companion who sees the bear before you do. Numerous studies support
this conjecture, but one of the more interesting ones involved the positive emotions
of romantically involved couples. When researchers looked at the simultaneous brain
scans of such couples, they found that when one had an unpleasant experience, the
other showed essentially the same changes in the emotion-related parts of the brain
(Singer et al., 2004).
emotion A four-part process that involves
physiological arousal, subjective feelings, cognitive
interpretation, and behavioral expression. Emotions
help organisms deal with important external events.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
“Mirror neurons” allow us to
understand others’ behaviors,
emotional states, and intentions
(p. 70).

How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us? 389
Finally, the fourth component of emotion produces an expression of emotion in
behavior. So, when you learned of your lottery winnings, you probably smiled, gave a
whoop of joy, and perhaps danced around the room as you babbled the news to your
companions. Alternatively, the sight of a hungry bear most likely would activate the
“fight-or-flight” response, as well as in emotion-laden facial expressions and vocaliza-
tions, such as crying, grimacing, or shouting.
And what functions do these emotional responses serve? Surely emotions must do
more than just adding variety or “color” to our mental lives. Let’s see.
What Emotions Do for Us
Whether they occur in humans, hyenas, cats, or kangaroos, emotions serve as arousal
states that signal important events, such as a threat or the presence of a receptive mate.
They also become etched in memory to help the organism recognize such situations
quickly when they recur (Dolan, 2002; LeDoux, 1996; Lee, 2009). Thus, Lance Arm-
strong uses emotion in deciding when to overtake an opponent in a race. And our
own ability to connect emotional memories to new situations accounts for emotions as
diverse as the fear generated by a hungry bear, the joy produced by a winning lottery
ticket, or an A on a term paper.
In general, emotions are either positive or negative, which leads to a tendency for
approach or avoidance (Davidson et al., 2000). The “approach” emotions, such as de-
light and joy, are generally positive, and they make a person, object, or situation attrac-
tive (as when we find another person desirable). Brain scans suggest that these approach
emotions involve the dopamine reward system. In contrast, most of the negative emo-
tions, such as fear and disgust, are associated with rejection or avoidance (as when we
fear going to the dentist). These avoidance emotions usually involve the amygdala.
Natural selection has shaped our emotions, which explains why they well up in
situations that might affect our survival or reproductive success (Gross, 1998; Izard,
2007). For example, fear undoubtedly helped individuals in your family tree to avoid
situations that could have made them a meal instead of an ancestor. Similarly, the emo-
tion we call “love” may commit us to a family, which helps to continue our genetic line.
Likewise, sexual jealousy can be seen as an emotion that evolved to deal with the bio-
logically important problem of mate infidelity, which threatens the individual’s chances
of producing offspring (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Humor, too, may have evolved to serve
a social purpose, as we can surmise from the “in-jokes” and rampant laughter among
people in tightly knit social groups (Ayan, 2009; Provine, 2004; Winerman, 2006d).
We glimpsed yet another important-but-little-known function of emotions in
Elliot’s story. You will recall that his tumor interfered not only with his ability to
process emotion but also with his judgment. The cases of Elliot and others like him
confirm that our emotions help us make decisions, because they attach values to the
alternatives (De Martino et al., 2006; Miller, 2006a).
And where do emotions fit in the new evolution-based hierarchy? Obviously, many
emotions relate to survival, as does the fear you might feel in our hungry-bear ex-
ample. Other emotions relate to sexual arousal and reproduction, as in the attraction
you feel to potential mate. The survival-related emotions, then, would operate near the
bottom of the motivational pyramid, where they generally have a high priority. That
leaves the sex- and affiliation-related emotions—attraction and love, for example—on
the upper levels of the hierarchy, where they generally have lower priority than the
survival-based motives.
Counting the Emotions
How many emotions are there? A long look in the dictionary turns up more than 500
emotional terms (Averill, 1980). Most experts, however, see a more limited number
of basic emotions. Carroll Izard (2007) argues for six: interest, joy/happiness, sad-
ness, anger, disgust, and fear. Paul Ekman’s list contains seven: anger, disgust, fear, hap-
piness, sadness, contempt, and surprise—based on the universally recognized facial
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
The amygdala is a part of the
limbic system that is particularly
involved in fear (p. 68).
Sexual jealousy probably has an
evolutionary basis because mate infidelity
threatens the individual’s chances of
producing offspring.

390 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
expressions he has studied. And Robert Plutchik (1980, 1984) has
made a case for eight basic emotions that emerged from a math-
ematical analysis of people’s ratings of a large number of emotional
terms (see Figure 9.7). Recent work suggests that Plutchik’s list
could be expanded to include pride (Azar, 2006; Tracy & Robins,
2006). Even though different theorists approach the problem in
different ways, their differences are relatively minor. The essential
idea that we have a limited number of basic emotions with a larger
number of secondary emotions involves blends of the more basic
emotions.
Cultural Universals in Emotional Expression
You can usually tell when a friend is happy or angry by the look on
her face or by her actions. This can be useful in deciding whether to
spend Friday evening with her at the movies. More generally, com-
munication through emotional expression aids our social interac-
tions. But does raising the eyebrows and rounding the mouth convey
the same message in Minneapolis as it does in Madagascar? Much
research on emotional expression has centered on such questions.
According to Paul Ekman (2003), the leading authority on facial
expression of emotions, people speak and understand the same basic “facial language”
the world around. Ekman’s group has demonstrated that humans share a built-in set
of emotional expressions that testify to the common biological heritage of the human
species. Smiles, for example, usually signal happiness, and frowns indicate sadness on
the faces of people in such far-flung places as Argentina, Japan, Spain, Hungary, Poland,
Sumatra, the United States, Vietnam, the jungles of New Guinea, and the native villages
north of the Arctic Circle (Biehl et al., 1997).
But it may not surprise you to learn that gender can make a difference in what
we read into other people’s facial expressions. One study found a bias toward seeing
anger in men’s faces and happy expressions in women’s faces (Becker et al., 2007).
This finding makes sense from an evolutionary perspective, because angry men have
always been a source of danger, while a happy woman’s face may have signaled safety
(Azar, 2007).
You can check your own skill at interpreting facial expressions by taking the quiz
in the Do It Yourself! box on the next page. Ekman and his colleagues (1987) claim
that people everywhere can recognize at least seven basic emotions: sadness, fear, anger,
disgust, contempt, happiness, and surprise. Nevertheless, huge differences exist across
cultures in both the context and intensity of emotional displays—because of so-called
display rules. In many Asian cultures, for example, children are taught to control emo-
tional responses—especially negative ones—while many American children are encour-
aged to express their feelings more openly (Smith et al., 2006). As a result, people are
generally better at judging emotions of people from their own culture than in members
of another cultural group (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003).
Regardless of culture, babies express emotions almost at birth. In fact, a lusty cry is
a sign of good health. And from their first days of life, babies display a small repertoire
of facial expressions that communicate their feelings (Ganchrow et al., 1983). Like-
wise, the ability to read facial expressions develops early (but not so early as emotional
expression). Very young children pay close attention to facial expressions, and by age
5 they nearly equal adults in their skill at reading emotions in people’s faces (Nelson,
1987). New evidence, however, suggests that at least one of Ekman’s “basic” emotional
expressions doesn’t come so easily. According to James Russell, children do not under-
stand the facial expressions indicating disgust until about age 5, even though they use
words to express disgust (such as “gross” and “yucky”) much earlier (Bower, 2010;
Russell & Widen, 2002).
All this work on facial expressions points to a biological underpinning for our
abilities to express and interpret a basic set of human emotions. Moreover, as Charles
display rules The permissible ways of displaying
emotions in a particular society.
FIGURE 9.7
The Emotion Wheel
Robert Plutchik’s emotion wheel arranges
eight primary emotions on the inner ring
of a circle of opposite emotions. Pairs of
adjacent emotions can combine to form
more complex emotions noted on the
outer ring of the figure. For example, love
is portrayed as a combination of joy and
acceptance. Still other emotions, such as
envy or regret (not shown), emerge from
still other combinations of more basic
emotions portrayed on the wheel.
Source: Plutchik, R. (1980, February) A language
for the emotions. Psychology Today, 13(9), 68–78.
Used with permission of Psychology Today © 2008.
Subm
ission
Love
O
pt
im
ism

A
g
g
re
ss
iv
en
es
s
Contempt
Remorse
Dis
ap
po
in
tm
en
t
A
w
e
Fear
Acceptance
Joy
A
n
ti
ci
pa
tio
n
A
nger
Disgust Sadn
ess

Su
rp
ri
se

How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us? 391
Darwin pointed out more than a century ago, some emotional expressions cross species
boundaries. Darwin especially noted the similarity of our own facial expressions of
fear and rage to those of chimpanzees and wolves (Darwin, 1998/1862; Ekman, 1984).
But are all emotional expressions universal? Cross-cultural psychologists tell us
that certain emotional responses carry different meanings in different cultures (Ekman,
1992, 1994; Ellsworth, 1994). These, therefore, must be learned rather than innate.
For example, what emotion do you suppose might be conveyed by sticking out the
tongue? For Americans, this might indicate disgust or fatigue, while in China it can
signify surprise. Similarly, a grin on an American face may indicate joy, while on a
Japanese face it may just as easily mean embarrassment. To give one more example,
a somber expression and downcast eyes might indicate unhappiness to someone in a
Euro-American culture, whereas it could be a sign of respect to many Asians. Clearly,
culture influences emotional expression.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Gender Differences in Emotion Depend on Biology and Culture
You may have suspected that some emotional differences between males and females
have a biological basis. This would explain, for example, why certain emotional dis-
turbances, such as panic disorder and depression, occur more commonly in women.
Biological differences may also explain why men show more anger and display more
physiological signs of emotional arousal during interpersonal conflicts than do women
(Fischer et al., 2004). Anger, of course, can lead to violence—and men commit most of
the world’s violent acts.
Some gender differences, however, may depend as much on culture as on biology.
For instance, in the United States, males and females may learn quite different lessons
about emotional control. Display rules dictate that men and boys show their anger
(Fischer, 1993). Indeed, they may be rewarded for displays of anger and aggression.
IDENTIFYING FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION
Take the facial emotion identification test
to see how well you can identify each of
the seven emotions that Ekman claims are
culturally universal. Do not read the an-
swers until you have matched each of the
following pictures with one of these emo-
tions: disgust, happiness, anger, sadness,
surprise, fear, and contempt. Apparently,
people everywhere in the world interpret
these expressions in the same way. This
tells us that certain facial expressions of
emotion are probably rooted in our human
genetic heritage.

Answers The facial expressions are (top row from left) happiness, surprise, anger, disgust; (bottom row) fear, sadness, contempt.
Recognizing Facial Expressions of
Emotions
Simulate the Experiment
at MyPsychLab

392 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
On the other hand, they may also be punished for “weak” emotional displays such
as crying, depression, and sadness (Gottman, 1994). At the same time, the pattern of
reinforcement and punishment is reversed for females. Women and girls may receive
encouragement for emotions that show vulnerability. But they may be punished for
displaying emotions that suggest dominance (Fischer et al., 2004).
Despite these differences, neither sex is more emotionally expressive overall. Rather,
cultures differ in emotional expression much more than do the sexes (Brannon, 2008;
Wallbott et al., 1986). In Israel and Italy, for instance, men more often than women
hide their feelings of sadness. The opposite holds true in Britain, Spain, Switzerland,
and Germany, where women are more likely than men to hide sadness. In many col-
lectivist cultures, as we have noted, both genders learn display rules to restrain all
their emotional expressions. Overall, however, the differences among individuals over-
shadow the differences of either gender or culture.
9.5 KEY QUESTION
What Processes Control Our Emotions?
Suppose that you are touring a haunted house at Halloween when a filmy figure star-
tles you with ghostly “Boo!” Your emotional response is immediate. It may involve
an outward reaction such as jumping, gasping, or screaming. At the same time, you
respond internally with changes in your body chemistry, the function of your inter-
nal organs, and arousal in certain parts of your brain and autonomic nervous system.
Moreover, gut-level emotional responses, such as an accelerated heartbeat, can persist
long after you realize that you were really in no danger—after you realize that you
were frightened merely by someone dressed in a sheet.
This suggests that emotion operates on both the conscious and unconscious levels.
And that idea connects to one of the great recent discoveries in psychology: the exis-
tence of two emotion pathways in the brain. These dual pathways are the focus of the
Core Concept for this section:
Core Concept 9.5
Research has clarified the processes underlying both our con-
scious and unconscious emotional lives, shedding light on some old
controversies.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: What are four main components of emotions?
2. RECALL: Name an emotion that is not one of the culturally
universal emotions identified by Ekman’s research.
3. ANALYSIS: Give an example that illustrates how display rules can
modify the universal facial expressions of emotion.
4. RECALL: What differences in emotional expression of men and
women seem to be heavily influenced by culture?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What is the
adaptive value of communicating our emotional states?
a. to help us understand our own needs better
b. to help us deceive others about our emotional states and get
what we want
c. to help us anticipate each other’s responses and so to live more
easily in groups
d. to help us get rid of strong negative emotions, such as fear and anger
Answers 1. Four main components of emotions: physiological arousal, cognitive interpretation, subjective feelings, and behavioral expression
2. Pride, optimism, jealousy, envy, anxiety—in fact, any emotion other than Ekman’s seven universal emotions: sadness, fear, anger, disgust,
contempt, happiness, and surprise 3. Smiles may indicate happiness in some cultures and embarrassment in others. Other examples are mentioned
in the section on display rules. 4. Cultures often encourage men to show emotions related to anger, aggression, and dominance, while they encourage
women to show emotions related to compliance and submission. 5. c; our emotions convey our intentions to others.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

What Processes Control Our Emotions? 393
In the following pages, we will see how the young neuroscience of emotion has begun
to identify the machinery that produces our emotions. The details have not yet become
fully clear, but we do have a broad-brush picture of the emotion pathways in the brain
and their connections throughout the body. So in this last section, we will first see
how the two emotion pathways work. Then we will see how they have helped resolve
some ancient disputes in the field. Finally, at the end of this section, we will turn to a
practical application to learn how emotional arousal can affect our performance on an
examination or in an athletic contest.
The Neuroscience of Emotion
People who suffer from intense fears of snakes or spiders usually know that their
responses are irrational, yet they can’t seem to conquer them. But how can a person to
hold two such conflicting mindsets? The answer lies in the brain’s two distinct emotion
processing systems (LeDoux, 1996, 2000).
Emotions in the Unconscious One emotion-processing system—the fast response
system—operates mainly at an unconscious level, where it quickly screens incoming
stimuli and helps us respond quickly to potentially dangerous events, even before they
reach consciousness. This system, linked to implicit memory, acts as an early-warning
defense that produces, for example, a near-instantaneous fright response to an unex-
pected loud noise (Helmuth, 2003b). It relies primarily on deep-brain circuitry that
operates automatically, without requiring deliberate conscious control (see Figure 9.8).
The unconscious emotion circuits have a built-in sensitivity to certain stimuli, such
as snakes and spiders, that posed threats throughout human history. This explains
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 5
Implicit memories involve
material of which we are
unaware—but that can affect
behavior (p. 191).
FIGURE 9.8
Two Emotion-Processing Pathways
Two emotion systems are at work when
the hiker sees a snake. One is fast and
unconscious; the other operates more
slowly and consciously. The fast sys-
tem routes incoming visual information
through the visual thalamus to the amyg-
dala (dotted pathway), which quickly
initiates fear and avoidance responses—
all occurring unconsciously. The slower
pathway involves the visual cortex, which
makes a more complete appraisal of the
stimulus and also sends an emotional
message to the amygdala and other lower
brain structures. The result of this is a
conscious perception of the situation and
a conscious feeling of fear.
Amygdala
Visual Thalamus
Visual
Cortex
Blood
pressure Muscle
Heart rate

394 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
why fears of spiders and snakes are more common than fears of, say, electricity or
automobiles, which now cause more deaths than do spiders and snakes but have only
recently become dangers. Moreover, this quick-response system can easily learn new
fears through classical conditioning.
You can see how this configuration of the fast response system could be adap-
tive, because it errs on the side of caution. Unfortunately, the fast response system is
also a slow-to-forget system, making it hard to extinguish the anxieties and fears that,
instead, can blossom into more serious problems known as phobias.
Conscious Emotional Processing The other emotional system—the one that
involves conscious processing—has links to explicit memory (LeDoux, 1996; Mather,
2007). Its responses are comparatively slow and considered. This is the system that
makes our hiker become cautious in places likely to harbor snakes. Because the con-
scious system uses different brain circuits from those supporting unconscious emo-
tional processing, your conscious view of events can differ significantly from the
emotions roused by your unconscious. Thus, if you have a phobia, you can truly be
of “two minds”—feeling fear, despite “knowing” that there is no sensible basis for the
feeling.
The Cerebral Cortex’s Role in Emotion The cerebral cortex—the outermost layer
of brain tissue and our “thinking cap”—plays the starring role in the conscious emo-
tion pathway, where it both interprets events and associates them with memories and
feelings. As we have seen, emotional memories help us make decisions by attaching
emotional values to the choices we face. It is this process at work when you ask your-
self, “Do I want chocolate or strawberry?” or, “Do I want to save my money or buy a
new stereo?”
We must add a caution here: Although emotion is an integral part of decision making,
it does not necessarily guarantee the right decisions. Moreover, intense emotions can
immobilize the organism, rendering measured decision making impossible (Pham,
2007). And, as we will see in our discussion of stress in the last chapter of this book,
extreme or prolonged emotional responses can produce physical illness.
One other cortical quirk deserves mention: The two frontal lobes have comple-
mentary roles in controlling our emotions. Just as distinct patches of cortex produce
different sensations, positive and negative emotions are associated with opposite hemi-
spheres, an effect called lateralization of emotion. The evidence comes from EEG record-
ings of normal people’s emotional reactions along with EEGs of people with damage
to the right or left hemisphere (Davidson et al., 2000). In general, the right hemisphere
specializes in negative emotions, such as anger and depression, while the left processes
more positive, joyful emotions (Kosslyn et al., 2002).
Emotions Where the Cortex Meets the Limbic System Neuroscientists now
think they know where emotion and reason meet in the brain—where the conscious
emotion-processing pathway meets the limbic system. It’s a small patch of brain with
a big name: the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). Located on the floor of
the brain’s frontal lobes, just behind the eyes, the VMPFC has extensive connections
with both the amygdala and the hippocampus (Wagar & Thagard, 2006). There, like
a recording technician combining inputs for a sound track, the VMPFC mixes external
stimulation with the body’s “gut” reaction and converts the result into an emotional
memory: Was it positive or negative? Did it make your skin creep? Did you feel a lump
in your throat? A knot in your stomach? Thanks to your VMPFC, most of your memo-
ries probably have such visceral associations attached.
The fast-and-unconscious emotional pathway also connects to the brain’s limbic
system, as you can see in Figure 9.8. Situated in the layer above the brain stem, the
limbic structures undoubtedly evolved as control systems for behaviors used in attack,
defense, and retreat: the “fight-or-flight” response (Caldwell, 1995; LeDoux, 1994,
1996). Evidence for this comes from lesioning (cutting) or electrically stimulating parts
of the limbic system, which can produce dramatic changes in emotional responding.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
Phobias are one form of anxiety
disorder (p. 532).
lateralization of emotion The two brain hemi-
spheres process different various emotions. The left
hemisphere apparently focuses on positive emotions
(for example, happiness), while the right hemisphere
deals primarily with negative emotions (such as anger).

What Processes Control Our Emotions? 395
Depending on which part of the limbic system is affected, tame animals may become
killers, whereas prey and predators may become peaceful companions (Delgado, 1969).
Particularly well documented is the importance of the amygdala in the emotion
of fear (LeDoux, 1996; Whalen, 1998; Winkielman et al., 2007). Like a guard dog,
the amygdala stands alert for threats (Hamann et al., 2002; Helmuth, 2003a). As you
can see in the figure, the amygdala receives messages from the quick-and-unconscious
emotion-processing pathway as well as from the longer-and-slower conscious pathway.
The Autonomic Nervous System’s Role in Emotion When you become emotion-
ally aroused, the messages that you “take to heart” (and to your other internal organs)
flash to their destinations through the autonomic nervous system (Levenson, 1992). It’s
the parasympathetic division that usually dominates in pleasant emotions. But when
you are startled or when you experience some unpleasant emotion, the sympathetic
division goes into action (see Table 9.3).
Suppose you are in an emergency. (A speeding car is coming directly at you!).
Your brain alerts your body by means of messages carried along the nerves of the
sympathetic system. Signals speeding along the sympathetic pathways direct the adre-
nal glands to release stress hormones. Other signals make your heart race and blood
pressure rise. Simultaneously, the sympathetic system directs certain blood vessels to
constrict, diverting energy to the voluntary muscles and away from the stomach and
intestines. (This causes the feeling of a “knot” in your stomach.)
When the emergency passes, the parasympathetic division takes over, carry-
ing instructions that counteract the emergency orders of a few moments earlier. You
may, however, remain aroused for some time after experiencing a strong emotional
activation because hormones continue to circulate in the bloodstream. If the emotion-
provoking situation is prolonged (as when you work for a boss who hassles you every
day), the sustained emergency response can sap your energy and cause both physical
and mental problems.
Emotional Chemistry The body produces hundreds of chemicals, but among the most
important for our emotions are the neurotransmitters serotonin, epinephrine (adrena-
lin), and norepinephrine. Serotonin is linked with feelings of depression. Epinephrine is
the hormone that accompanies fear. Norepinephrine is more abundant in anger.
Steroid hormones (the same ones abused by some bodybuilders and other athletes)
also exert a powerful influence on our emotions. In addition to their effects on mus-
cles, steroids act on nerve cells, causing them to change their excitability. This is a
normal part of the body’s response to emergency situations. But when steroid drugs
are ingested over extended periods, these potent chemicals have the effect of keeping
the body (including the brain) in a continual emergency state. Brain circuits, especially
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
The autonomic nervous system
controls the internal organs along
with many signs of emotional
arousal (p. 57).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Drugs that inhibit the reuptake of
serotonin are often used to treat
depression (p. 579).
TABLE 9.3 Responses Associated with Emotion
Component of Emotion Type of Response Example
Physiological arousal Neural, hormonal, visceral, and
muscular changes
Increased heart rate, blushing,
becoming pale, sweating, rapid
breathing
Subjective feelings The private experience of one’s
internal affective state
Feelings of rage, sadness,
happiness
Cognitive interpretation Attaching meaning to the
emotional experience by
drawing on memory and
perceptual processes
Blaming someone, perceiving
a threat
Social/behavioral reactions Expressing emotion through
gestures, facial expressions, or
other actions
Smiling, crying, screaming for
help

396 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
those associated with arousal, threat, stress, and strong emotions, remain in a state of
heightened alert. The result can be “roid” rage or, sometimes, depression (Daly et al.,
2003; Miller et al., 2002). You will learn much more about the effects of steroid hor-
mones in our discussion of stress in Chapter 14.
Can you learn to control these responses? Yes—at least to some extent. Biofeed-
back and cognitive-behavioral therapy target just such responses associated with anxi-
ety, fear, and anger. In the final section of this chapter, we will see how programs aimed
at developing emotional intelligence can help people learn to control their emotional
responses before they catapult out of control. In the meantime, let’s see how a certain
level of emotional arousal helps you achieve your best performance in athletics, on the
job, and even during your next psychology exam.
Arousal, Performance, and the Inverted U
Athletes always want to be “up” for a game—but how far up should they be? Cheering
sports fans might think that increased arousal will always improve performance—but
that is not necessarily true. Too much arousal can make an athlete “choke” and cause
performance to falter. The same is true when you take an examination. Up to a point,
increasing levels of arousal can motivate you to study and to remember at exam time
what you studied. Unfortunately, only slightly higher levels can cause test anxiety and
poor performance.
This complex relationship between arousal and behavior has been studied both in
laboratory animals and in humans under all sorts of conditions. For example, in ex-
periments on learning, the curve plotting the performance of hungry rats working to
get a food reward first rises and then later declines with increasing arousal. The same
pattern holds for humans in a variety of circumstances, including neurosurgeons, truck
drivers, and professional entertainers.
Psychologists call this the inverted U function (so named because the graph resembles
an upside-down letter U, as you can see in Figure 9.9). It suggests that either too little or
too much arousal can impair performance. Think about it: How much pressure would
you want your dentist or surgeon to feel? Which brings us to a second important point.
The optimum amount of arousal varies with the task. As you see in the figure, it
takes more arousal to achieve peak performance on simple tasks or tasks in which
responses have been thoroughly rehearsed (as in most sports) than it does on complex
tasks or those that require much thinking and planning as the situation develops. So it
should not surprise you that cheers and high levels of arousal are more likely to boost
performance in basketball games than in brain surgery.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Cognitive-behavioral therapy
focuses on changing both mental
and behavioral responses
(p. 571).
inverted U function A term that describes the
relationship between arousal and performance. Both
low and high levels of arousal produce lower perfor-
mance than does a moderate level of arousal.
FIGURE 9.9
The Inverted U
Performance varies with arousal level and task difficulty. For easy or well-practiced tasks, a higher level of arousal increases performance effective-
ness. However, for difficult or complex tasks, a lower level or arousal is optimal. A moderate level of arousal is generally best for tasks of moderate
difficulty. These inverted U-shaped functions show that performance is poorest at both low and high extremes.
Low
Low
High
Optimum
High
Arousal level
Pe
rf
o
rm
an
ce
Low
Low
High
High
Arousal level
Pe
rf
o
rm
an
ce
Low
Low
High
High
Arousal level
Pe
rf
o
rm
an
ce
Easy or Well-practiced Task Moderately Difficult Task Difficult or Complex Task
Optimum Optimum

What Processes Control Our Emotions? 397
Finally, the amount of stimulation needed to produce optimal arousal also varies
with the individual. In fact, some people seem to thrive on the thrill of dangerous
sports, such as rock climbing and skydiving—activities that would produce immobiliz-
ing levels of arousal in most of us. Marvin Zuckerman (2004), who has studied people
he calls sensation seekers, believes that such individuals have a biological need for
high levels of stimulation. Frank Farley also refers to them as Big T (thrill-seeking) per-
sonalities, who he believes are prominent in sports, business, science, and art. Einstein
was a Big T “mental personality,” says Farley (Munsey, 2006). Research suggests that
the underlying biology involves the brain’s dopamine pathways (Bevins, 2001). You
can test your own sensation-seeking tendencies with Zuckerman’s scale, found in the
Do It Yourself! box.
Theories of Emotion: Resolving Some Old Issues
Let’s return to our hungry bear: Suppose that you have the unlikely misfortune to
encounter a this creature while on your way to class one morning. We will bet that
you will experience the emotion of fear. But what internal process actually produces
the feeling of fear? Does it come from the thought, “Uh-oh. I’m in danger”? Or does it
sensation seekers In Zuckerman’s theory, indi-
viduals who have a biological need for higher levels of
stimulation than do most other people.
ARE YOU A SENSATION SEEKER?
Different people seem to need differ-
ent levels of emotional arousal. Marvin
Zuckerman argues that “sensation seekers”
have an unusually high need for stimula-
tion that produces arousal. In addition to
the need for thrills, sensation seekers may
be impulsive, engage in risky behaviors,
prefer new experiences, and be easily bored
(Kohn et al., 1979; Malatesta et al., 1981;
Zuckerman, 1974).
From your score on the Sensation
Seeking Scale below, you can get a rough
idea of your own level of sensation seek-
ing. You may also want to give this scale
to some of your friends. Do you suppose
that most people choose friends who have
sensation-seeking tendencies similar to
their own? Wide differences in sensation-
seeking tendencies may account for strain
on close relationships when one person is
reluctant to take the risks that the other
actively seeks.
The Sensation-Seeking Scale
Choose A or B for each item, depending
on which response better describes your
preferences. The scoring key appears at the
end.
1. A I would like a job that requires a lot
of traveling.
B I would prefer a job in one location.
2. A I am invigorated by a brisk, cold day.
B I can’t wait to get indoors on a cold
day.
3. A I get bored seeing the same old
faces.
B I like the comfortable familiarity of
everyday friends.
4. A I would prefer living in an ideal
society in which everyone is safe,
secure, and happy.
B I would have preferred living in the
unsettled days of our history.
5. A I sometimes like to do things that
are a little frightening.
B A sensible person avoids activities
that are dangerous.
6. A I would not like to be hypnotized.
B I would like to have the experience
of being hypnotized.
7. A The most important goal of life is to
live it to the fullest and experience
as much as possible.
B The most important goal of life is to
find peace and happiness.
8. A I would like to try parachute
jumping.
B I would never want to try jumping
out of a plane, with or without a
parachute.
9. A I enter cold water gradually, giving
myself time to get used to it.
B I like to dive or jump right into the
ocean or a cold pool.
10. A When I go on a vacation, I prefer the
comfort of a good room and bed.
B When I go on a vacation, I prefer
the change of camping out.
11. A I prefer people who are emotionally
expressive even if they are a bit
unstable.
B I prefer people who are calm and
even tempered.
12. A A good painting should shock or jolt
the senses.
B A good painting should give one a
feeling of peace and security.
13. A People who ride motorcycles must
have some kind of unconscious
need to hurt themselves.
B I would like to drive or ride a
motorcycle.
Key Each of the following answers earns
one point: 1A, 2A, 3A, 4B, 5A, 6B, 7A,
8A, 9B, 10B, 11A, 12A, 13B. Compare
your point total with the following norms
for sensation seeking: 0–3: Very low, 4–5:
Low, 6–9: Average, 10–11: High, 12–13:
Very high
Source: Zuckerman, M. (1978, February).
The search for high sensation. Psychology
Today, 12, 38–46. Reprinted by permission
of Sussex Publishers, Inc.
Sensation seekers thrive on stimulation
that might terrify others.

398 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
come from sensing your racing heart and wrenching gut? And, you may be wondering,
why would anyone care where emotions come from?
In response to the last question: Psychologists have long argued over the relation-
ship between emotion, cognition, and physical responses—not only out of intellectual
curiosity but also because an understanding of emotion is a key to finding effective
treatments for certain emotional problems, such as panic attacks and depression, as
well as the everyday problems of anger, envy, and jealousy. Should we try to treat an-
ger, for example, by targeting angry thoughts? Or should we focus on angry behaviors
or, perhaps, the visceral responses that accompany rage?
Recent discoveries in neuroscience have helped us resolve some long-disputed
issues surrounding the interaction of biology, cognition, and behavior in emotion
(Forgas, 2008). Let’s look briefly at the controversies and how new insights have
begun to resolve them.
Do Our Feelings Come from Physical Responses? In the early days of psychol-
ogy, just over a century ago, William James taught that physical sensations underlie
our feelings. “We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because
we tremble,” James said (1890/1950, p. 1006). As for your response to the bear, James
argued that you would not run because you are afraid, but that you would feel afraid
because you run. While this statement may appear absurd on its face, James was no
fool. He knew that emotion was more than just feelings. What he was really saying
was something quite sensible—that emotions require a combination of cognitions
and physical sensations—and that the physical sensations were the feelings. In James’
(1884) own words:
Without the bodily states following on the perception [of the bear], the lat-
ter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional
warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the
insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry
(pp. 189–190).
This view, simultaneously proposed by Danish psychologist Carl Lange, became
known as the James–Lange theory.
Or Do Our Feelings Come from Cognitions? Other scientists, notably Walter
Cannon and Philip Bard, objected that physical changes in our behavior or our inter-
nal organs occur too slowly to account for split-second emotional reactions, such as
those we feel in the face of danger. They also objected that our physical responses are
not varied enough to account for the whole palate of human emotion. In their view,
referred to as the Cannon–Bard theory, cognitive appraisal of a situation (the hun-
gry bear again) simultaneously produces both the emotional feeling and the physical
response.
Which side was right? It turns out that each had part of the truth. On the one
hand, modern neuroscience has confirmed that our physical state can influence our
emotions—much as the James–Lange theory argued (LeDoux, 1996). In fact, you may
have noted how your own physical state affects your emotions, as when you get edgy
feelings after drinking too much coffee or become grumpy when hungry. In a similar
fashion, psychoactive drugs, such as alcohol or nicotine or Prozac, influence the physi-
cal condition of the brain and hence alter our moods.
Other support for the James–Lange theory comes from the discovery that the brain
maintains memories of physical states that are associated with events. These are the
“somatic markers” we mentioned earlier (Damasio, 1994; Niedenthal, 2007). When
you see the bear leaping toward you, your brain quickly conjures a body-memory of
the physical response it had previously in another threatening situation. This somatic-
marker hypothesis, then, effectively counters Walter Cannon’s objection that physi-
cal changes in the body occur too slowly to cause our feelings—because the somatic
marker of emotion resides in the brain itself.
James–Lange theory The proposal that an
emotion-provoking stimulus produces a physical
response that, in turn, produces an emotion.
Cannon–Bard theory The counterproposal that
an emotional feeling and an internal physiological
response occur at the same time: One is not the cause
of the other. Both were believed to be the result of
cognitive appraisal of the situation.

What Processes Control Our Emotions? 399
On the other hand—and in support of the Cannon–Bard view—emotions can also
be aroused by external cues detected either by the conscious or the unconscious emo-
tional system. Thus, emotion can result from conscious thought (as when you fret over
an exam) or from unconscious memories (as when you feel disgust at the sight of a
food that had once made you sick). Incidentally, cognitive psychologists now believe
that both depression and phobic reactions can result from conditioned responses of the
unconscious emotional system.
When the Situation Gets Complicated: The Two-Factor Theory As we noted, you
can make yourself emotional just by thinking, as any student with “test anxiety” will
testify. The more you think about the dire consequences of failing a test, the more the
anxiety builds. “Method” actors, like the late Marlon Brando, have long exploited this
fact to make themselves feel real emotions on stage. They do so by recalling an incident
from their own experience that produced the emotion they want to portray, such as
grief, joy, or anger.
Stanley Schachter’s (1971) two-factor theory adds an interesting twist to
the role of cognition in emotion. His theory suggests that the emotions we feel
depend on our appraisal of both (a) our internal physical state and (b) the external
situation in which we find ourselves. Strange effects occur when these two factors
conflict—as they did in the following classic study of emotion, which enter-
prising students may want to adopt in order to spice up their romantic lives.
An attractive female researcher positioned herself at the end of a footbridge
and interviewed unsuspecting males who had just crossed. On one occasion she
selected a safe, sturdy bridge; another time, a wobbly suspension bridge across
a deep canyon—deliberately selected to elicit physical arousal. The researcher,
pretending to be interested in the effects of scenery on creativity, asked the men
to write brief stories about a picture. She also invited them to call her if they
wanted more information about the study. As predicted, those men who had just crossed
the wobbly bridge (and were, presumably, more physically aroused by the experience)
wrote stories containing more sexual imagery than those who used the safer structure.
And four times as many of them called the female researcher “to get more informa-
tion”! Apparently, the men who had crossed the shaky bridge interpreted their increased
arousal as emotional attraction to the female interviewer (Dutton & Aron, 1974).
Before you rush out to find the love of your life on a wobbly bridge, we must
caution you, numerous attempts to test the two-factor theory have supported
the two-factor theory only under certain conditions (Leventhal & Tomarken,
1986; Sinclair et al., 1994). What are the conditions under which we are likely
to confound physical arousal with emotion? Normally, external events confirm
what our biology tells us, without much need for elaborate interpretation—
as when you feel disgust at smelling an unpleasant odor or joy at seeing an
old friend. But what happens when we experience physical arousal from not-
so-obvious sources, such as exercise, heat, or drugs? Misattribution, it seems,
is most likely in a complex environment where many stimuli are competing
for our attention, as in the bridge study. It is also likely in an environment
where we have faulty information about our physical arousal, as when unsus-
pected caffeine in a soft drink makes us edgy (see Figure 9.10).
How Much Conscious Control Do We Have Over Our Emotions?
The ability to deal with emotions is important in many professions. Physicians, nurses,
firefighters, and police officers, for example, must be able to comfort others yet main-
tain a “professional distance” when dealing with disability and death. Likewise, in
many social situations, it can be desirable to mask or modify what you are feeling.
If you dislike a professor, you might be wise not to show your true emotions. And if
you have strong romantic feelings toward someone—more than he or she realizes—it
might be safest to reveal the depth of your feelings gradually, lest you frighten the
person away with too much too soon. Even in leisure activities like playing poker or
two-factor theory The idea that emotion results
from the cognitive appraisal of both physical arousal
(Factor #1) and an emotion-provoking stimulus
(Factor #2).
The two-factor theory would predict that
decaffeinated-coffee drinkers who acci-
dentally drank coffee with caffeine could
mistake the resulting physical arousal
for an emotion. Could that be happening
here?
During a break at the Western Psycho-
logical Association convention near Van-
couver, British Columbia, psychologists
Susan Horton and Bob Johnson (one of
your authors) reenact the Dutton study of
attraction on the Capilano Bridge, where
the original study was performed.

400 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
planning your next move in chess, you will be most successful if you keep your real
feelings, beliefs, and intentions guarded. All of these examples testify that emotional
control has an important role in our ability to interact with other people.
Developing Emotional Intelligence Peter Salovey and John Mayer (1990) have sug-
gested that it takes a certain sort of “smarts” to understand and control one’s emotions.
They called it emotional intelligence. More recently, Salovey and his colleague Daisy
Grewal (2005) have emphasized four components of emotional intelligence:
• Perceiving emotions. The ability to detect and decipher emotions in oneself
and others
• Using emotions. The ability to harness one’s emotions in the service of think-
ing and problem solving
• Understanding emotions. The ability to comprehend the complex relationships
among emotions, such as the relationship between grief and anger or how
two people can have different emotional reactions to the same event
• Managing emotions. The ability to regulate one’s own emotions and influence
those of others
The Predictive Power of Emotional Intelligence As Salovey and Grewal suggest, those
with high emotional intelligence are not only tuned in to their own emotions and those
emotional intelligence The ability to under-
stand and control emotional responses.
Stimulus
-snake
James–Lange Theory: Every emotion corresponds to a
distinctive pattern of physiological arousal.
Physiological arousal
-trembling
-increased heart rate
Emotion
-fear
Emotion
-fear
Cognitive
appraisal
Stimulus
-snake
Cannon–Bard Theory: Emotions arise from a cognitive
appraisal (interpretation) of the stimulus. (This theory
was proposed as an alternative to the James–Lange theory
because Cannon and Bard believed that emotions occur too
quickly to be the result of physiological arousal, as the
James–Lange theory asserted.)
Physiological arousal
-trembling
-increased heart rate
Emotion
-fear
Stimulus
-snake
Schacter’s Two-Factor Theory: Emotions arise from a cognitive interpretation of the stimulus
and physiological arousal. Sometimes, however, the person attributes feelings of arousal
to one stimulus (the snake), even though the arousal has really been caused by another
stimulus—e.g., caffeine or, as in the Capilano Bridge study, having just crossed the swinging
bridge. (Dutton & Eron, 1974).
Physiological arousal
-trembling
-increased heart rate
Arousing stimulus to
which the person does
not attribute the
arousal (e.g., caffeine,
swinging bridge)
Cognitive appraisal
Theories of Emotion
?
FIGURE 9.10
Theories of Emotion Compared
An Army squad leader needs emotional
intelligence to lead people under stressful
conditions.

What Processes Control Our Emotions? 401
of others, but they can also manage their negative feelings and curtail inappropriate
expression of their impulses. The power of this ability can be seen in Stanford psy-
chologist Walter Mischel’s ingenious “marshmallow test.”
Just imagine you’re four years old, and someone makes the following proposal:
If you’ll wait until after he runs an errand, you can have two marshmallows for
a treat. If you can’t wait until then, you can have only one—but you can have it
right now (Goleman, 1995, pp. 80–81).
How did the children in this experiment respond to the temptation of the single marsh-
mallow that sat before them, within reach? Goleman continues:
Some four-year-olds were able to wait what must surely have seemed an endless
fifteen to twenty minutes for the experimenter to return. To sustain themselves
in their struggle they covered their eyes so they wouldn’t have to stare at tempta-
tion, or rested their heads in their arms, talked to themselves, sang, played games
with their hands and feet, even tried to go to sleep. These plucky preschoolers
got the two-marshmallow reward. But others, more impulsive, grabbed the one
marshmallow, almost always within seconds of the experimenter’s leaving the
room on his “errand” (Goleman, 1995, pp. 80–81).
When these same children were tracked down in adolescence, the amazing predictive
power of the marshmallow test was revealed. As a group, those who had curbed their
impulse to grab the single marshmallow were, as adolescents, better off on all counts.
They had become more self-reliant, more effective in interpersonal relationships, bet-
ter students, and better able to handle frustration and stress. By contrast, the children
who had given in to temptation had adolescent lives marked by troubled relationships,
shyness, stubbornness, and indecisiveness. They also were much more likely to hold
low opinions of themselves, to mistrust others, and to be easily provoked by frus-
trations. In the academic sphere, they were more likely to be uninterested in school.
Daniel Goleman (1995) notes that the marshmallow test also correlated clearly with
SAT scores: Those who, as 4-year-olds, were able to delay gratification scored, on the
average, 210 points higher than did their counterparts who had grabbed the single
marshmallow years earlier.
The usefulness of the marshmallow test, of course, is limited to young children. But
other, more sophisticated measures have been developed for use with older children
and adults (see Figure 9.11). The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
(MSCEIT), for example, predicts satisfaction with social relationships among college
students, deviant behavior in male adolescents, marital satisfaction, and success on the
job (Salovey & Grewal, 2005).
But, cautions John Mayer (1999), emotional intelligence is not a perfect predictor of
success, happiness, and good relationships. Nor should we think of it as a replacement
FIGURE 9.11
Sample Item from a Test of Emotional
Intelligence
Shown is an item similar to those found
on the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional
Intelligence Test. Respondents are asked
to click on the number on each scale that
corresponds to the emotional state of the
person shown in the photo.
Source: Salovey, P. & Grewel, D. (2005) The science
of emotional intelligence. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 14, 283. Reprinted by
permission of Blackwell Publishing.
1. No Happiness
2. No Fear
Extreme
Happiness
Extreme
Fear
5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4

402 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
for traditional IQ scores. Rather, says Mayer, emotional intelligence is merely another
variable that can help us refine our understanding of behavior.
The Nature and Nurture of Emotional Intelligence Is emotional intelligence a charac-
teristic fixed by nature, or is it nurtured by experience? Indeed, studies show that
severely maltreated children often have difficulty as adults in forming attachments
and interpreting emotional expressions (Pollak, 2008).
But Goleman (1995) believes that learning can also have a positive effect. Based
on programs already in place in visionary schools across the country, he has a plan
for adding emotional training to the curriculum. The result, he believes, will bring
improved relationships, increased self-respect, and even, perhaps, gains in academic
achievement. The takeaway message, then, is that while emotions do sometimes slip
out of control, we are not simply at their mercy. Emotional understanding and control
are skills that can be acquired (Clifton & Myers, 2005).
Not so fast, say Matthew Lieberman and Robert Rosenthal (2001) in an article
titled “Why Introverts Can’t Always Tell Who Likes Them.” Lieberman and Rosenthal
suggest that emotional intelligence may be just another name for extraversion, a per-
sonality characteristic that has roots in biology as well as learning. Introverts, accord-
ing to their study, are just not as good at sensing other people’s emotions, especially
in settings that require multitasking—and, Lieberman and Rosenthal suggest, per-
haps they can never learn to be as sensitive as extraverts. The resolution of this issue
remains uncertain at the moment.
Critics also point out that emotional control has a dark side. Just as some people
get into trouble when they let their emotions—particularly negative emotions—go
unchecked, others take emotional control to the opposite extreme. They become so
guarded that they never convey affection, humor, or honest displeasure. Studies also
show that overcontrolling emotions interferes with memory for emotionally charged
events (Carpenter, 2000; Richards & Gross, 2000). Before we launch a program
of encouraging emotional control, perhaps we should consider what such training
may do to people who already overcontrol their emotions. In fact, research shows
that emotionally healthy people know how both to control and to express their
emotions—and when it is appropriate to do so (Bonanno et al., 2004).
Let It Out: A Dangerous Myth Experts agree that the public clings to some danger-
ous misinformation about venting anger, a process also known as catharsis. On televi-
sion shows, for example, you can see people attacking and humiliating others, as if the
public dumping of hostile feelings will somehow eliminate their anger. In fact, “getting
it out of your system” is likely to bring only the most fleeting feeling of satisfaction. It’s
also likely to encourage more angry responses in the future.
While many people believe that “bottling up” emotions risks an uncontrollable
emotional outburst, this belief is at odds with the truth. While expressing your anger
can sometimes be helpful, merely giving vent to your rage usually just makes you more
angry—even if you just punch the wall or throw your coffee mug. Moreover, studies
show that such ventilation makes you more apt to react with anger the next time you
are provoked (Tavris, 1989, 1995).
Sure, there are examples of angry workers who have “gone postal” on a murderous
rampage—but there is no evidence at all to suggest that giving them an opportunity to
hit a punching bag or give the boss “a piece of their mind” would have prevented such
tragedies. In fact, the evidence suggests just the opposite.
As for your own anger management, a saner and safer strategy is to keep your
feelings to yourself, at least until the passion of your anger has subsided and you can
be more rational about the nature of your real complaint and what might be done to
solve the problem (Tavris, 1989, 1995). Often, all it takes to defuse a tense and angry
situation is to communicate the facts and your feelings to the person toward whom
you feel anger.
about Keeping Anger Under
Control at
Read
MyPsychLab

What Processes Control Our Emotions? 403
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Detecting Deception
How easy is it for people to conceal their emotions while telling a lie? You might
think you can spot deception when someone fails to “look you in the eye” or fidgets
nervously. If so, you could be setting yourself up to be duped. Most of us are poor lie
detectors—or truth detectors, for that matter. One reason is that our social interactions
usually occur in familiar situations, with people we know and trust, and where we pay
little attention to nonverbal cues.
Experts who study deception find that these nonverbal cues are the best signs of
deceit: A person who deliberately tries to hoodwink us may “leak” uncontrolled non-
verbal signals of deception. Knowing how to read these cues could help you decide
whether a huckster is lying to you, your physician might be holding back some bad
news, or a politician is shading the truth. Keep in mind, however, that the studies of
deception are based on probabilities, not certainties. None of this has yet reached the
level of an exact science.
The real key to effective deception detection, say the experts, is observing a per-
son’s behavior over time. Without the chance for repeated observations, you are much
less able to judge a person’s honesty (Marsh, 1988). Still, we can offer some pointers
for situations in which even a little help in deception detection might be better than
none at all (Adelson, 2004; DePaulo et al., 2003):
• Some lies involve giving false information, as when a used-car salesperson is tell-
ing you that a junker is in good working order. In such cases, the effort to hide the
truth requires some cognitive effort. This may result in heightened attention (evi-
dent in dilation of the pupils), longer pauses in speech (to choose words carefully),
and more constrained movement and gesturing (in an attempt to avoid “giving
away” the truth).
• Criminals sometimes confess to crimes for which they know the police have other
evidence of guilt. In these cases, criminals may lie to minimize the extent of their
involvement in the crime. Analysis of such taped confessions shows that the liar tends
to repeat selectively the distorted or falsified details of the story (Dingfelder, 2004c).
• When a lie involves hiding one’s true feelings of anger or exuberance—as a good
poker player does when holding a straight flush—the liar may become physically
and behaviorally more aroused and animated. This becomes evident in postural
shifts, speech errors, nervous gestures (such as preening by touching or stroking
the hair or face), and shrugging (as if to dismiss the lie).
• The face is easier to control than the body, so a deceiver may work on keeping a
“poker face” but forget to restrain bodily clues. A smart deception detective might
therefore concentrate on a speaker’s body movements: Are they rhythmic? Are
they calculated? Do the hands move freely or nervously?
• The eyes sometimes give deceivers away—especially when they’re using the com-
mon social deception of trying to look happy or amused when they are not. While
our attention may more naturally focus on a smile as an indicator of happiness
or amusement, the mouth can be manipulated much more easily than the muscles
around the eyes. Only in genuine grins do the eye muscles crinkle up the skin on
either side of the eyes. You can test your ability to tell a real from a fake smile in
the Do It Yourself! box below.
• Speaking of eyes, the ability to “look you straight in the eye” is, in fact, a reason-
ably good indicator of truth telling—but only when dealing with people who
usually tell the truth. When they do lie, their amateurish efforts to deceive often
show up in averted gaze, reduced blinking (indicating concentration of attention
elsewhere), and less smiling. You may be fooled by a practiced liar who can look
straight at you while telling complete fiction.

404 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
• Culture affects the way we distinguish truth from lies. Thus, people are more accu-
rate in detecting liars among people in their own culture. For example, one study
found that Jordanians are generally more animated than Americans when talking
and that Americans may incorrectly perceive this as “nervousness” and judge the
Jordanian to be lying (Bond & Atoum, 2000; Dingfelder, 2004c).
And what about polygraph machines—so-called “lie detectors” that are sometimes
used by police interrogators and government security agencies? We will take a closer
look at these devices in our Critical Thinking Applied section on the next page.
THE EYES HAVE IT
Can you tell if people are sincere when
they smile at you? Smiles aren’t made just
with the mouth, but with the whole face,
especially the eyes. A real smile is differ-
ent from a fake one, primarily around the
eyes. Specifically, when we feel genuine
joy or mirth, the orbicularis occuli muscles
wrinkle up the skin around the eyes.
With this in mind, take a look at these
two pictures of smiling faces and see if you
can tell which one is the real smile and
which one is forced.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: During emotional arousal, the _____ nervous system
sends messages to the internal organs.
2. APPLICATION: Give an example of a situation in which a person
would be likely to misattribute the source of arousal.
3. RECALL: The debate between William James and Walter Cannon
over the nature of emotion involved the roles played by
a. biology, cognition, and behavior.
b. nature and nurture.
c. learning, memory, and instincts.
d. arousal and stress.
4. RECALL: Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis gives support for
the James–Lange theory of emotion because
a. it argues that emotions are purely psychological, not biological.
b. it requires cognitive appraisal of all factors involved in emotion.
c. it argues that physical responses involved in emotion are
represented in the brain.
d. it requires no cognitive appraisal of feelings.
5. ANALYSIS: The “marshmallow test” revealed emotional
intelligence by measuring a child’s
a. self-control.
b. ability to manipulate others.
c. blood sugar level.
d. interactions with other children under highly stressful
conditions.
6. APPLICATION: Venting your anger on some safe object, such as a
punching bag, is likely to
a. help you get rid of your anger.
b. make you more angry.
c. have no effect.
d. extinguish the aggressive impulse in your unconscious (fast)
emotional pathway.
7. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Briefly describe the
two emotion pathways that neuroscientists have discovered.
Answers 1. autonomic 2. The “swinging bridge” study is the classic example, but others include unexpected physical changes that might occur when
you are getting sick, becoming overheated or dehydrated, or mistakenly drinking a caffeinated beverage instead of one without caffeine. 3. a 4. c 5. a
6. b 7. The fast pathway produces a near-immediate response and operates mainly at an unconscious level. The slower pathway involves the cerebral
cortex and operates largely at the conscious level.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

The polygraph or “lie detector” test is based on the assump-tion that people will display physical signs of arousal
when lying; so most polygraph machines make a record of
the suspect’s heart rate, breathing rate, perspiration, and
blood pressure. Occasionally, voice-print analysis is also em-
ployed. Thus, the device really acts as an emotional arousal
detector rather than a direct indicator of truth or lies. But
does it work? Let’s see how a polygraph examination is
conducted.
Polygraphers typically employ several tricks of their trade.
They may start the interview by persuading the subject that
the machine is highly accurate. A common ploy is to ask a
series of loaded questions designed to provoke obvious emo-
tional reactions. For example, “Did you ever, in your life, take
anything that did not belong to you?” In another favorite
technique, the examiner uses a deceptive stimulation proce-
dure, or “stim test,” in which the subject draws a card from
a “stacked” deck. Then, the examiner pretends to identify the
card from the subject’s polygraph responses (Kleinmuntz &
Szucko, 1984).
When the actual interrogation begins, it will consist of an
artistic mix of relevant questions, irrelevant questions, and
control questions. The irrelevant questions (“Are you sitting
down right now?”) are designed to elicit truthful answers
accompanied by a physical response consistent with truth
telling. The control questions (“Did you ever lie to your par-
ents?”) are designed to elicit an anxious, emotionally aroused
response pattern. Then, the examiner can compare the sub-
ject’s responses to these two types of questions with responses
to the relevant questions (“Did you steal the jewels?”). It is
assumed that a guilty suspect will give a stronger response to
these questions than to the irrelevant and control questions.
What Are the Critical Issues?
If you are unfamiliar with the controversy surrounding “lie
detectors,” you should inform yourself on the positions taken
by both sides (not a bad approach to any issue!). A good way
to begin is by typing “polygraph” into your favorite search
engine. Your authors have done this and have searched the
scientific literature, as well. Here’s what we have turned up.
Is There a Possibility of Bias? We think there is, and it
comes in two forms—both on the “pro” side of the issue. A
formidable polygraph industry has an economic interest in
convincing the public that polygraph tests can, indeed, dis-
tinguish truth tellers from liars. A second form of bias comes
from those obsessed by fear of crime and terrorism and who
see humanity in stark black-and-white terms—as consisting
of good people and evil people.
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Do Lie Detectors Really Detect Lies?
Are There Logical Errors Involved? We believe that pro-
ponents of the polygraph commit two types of logical error.
The first involves pointing to individual cases in which they
claim a “lie detector” test either revealed a liar or forced a
confession from a reluctant suspect. This is nothing more
than “proof by testimonial,” as we see all the time in ads for
“miracle” weight-loss products or engine-oil additives. The
fact is that testimonials are no substitute for a controlled
scientific test.
The other main logical error is oversimplification. By focus-
ing on apparent successes, they may gloss over the failures—
which, in the case of the polygraph, can be quite serious. As we
will see, the polygraph failures can lead to a surprisingly large
number of honest people being identified as liars.
What Is the Evidence? Without a doubt, wrongdoers
sometimes confess when confronted with polygraph evidence
against them. Yet, critics have pointed out several problems
with the polygraphic procedure that could easily land in-
nocent people in prison and let the guilty walk free (After-
good, 2000). For example, polygraph subjects know when
they are suspects, so some will give heightened responses to
the critical questions even when they are innocent. On the
other hand, some people can give deceptive responses be-
cause they have learned to control or distort their emotional
responses. To do so, they may employ simple physical move-
ments, drugs, or biofeedback training—a procedure in which
people are given moment-to-moment information on certain
biological responses, such as perspiration or heart rate (Saxe
et al., 1985). Either way, a polygraph examiner risks incor-
rectly identifying innocent people as guilty and failing to
spot the liars.
Important statistical issues call the polygraph procedure
into further question. Even if the examination were 95 per-
cent accurate, a 5 percent error rate could lead to the mis-
identification of many innocent people as being guilty. To
illustrate, imagine that your company arranges for all 500 of
your employees to take a polygraph test to find out who has
been stealing office supplies. Imagine also that only about
4 percent (20 out of 500 people) are really stealing, which
is not an unreasonable estimate. If the lie detector test is 95
percent accurate, it will correctly spot 19 of these 20 thieves.
But the test will also give 5 percent false positives, falsely fin-
gering 5 percent of the innocent people. Of the 480 innocent
What Processes Control Our Emotions? 405
polygraph A device that records or graphs many (“poly”) measures of physical arousal,
such as heart rate, breathing, perspiration, and blood pressure. A polygraph is often called a
“lie detector,” even though it is really an arousal detector.
false positive Mistaken identification of a person as having a particular characteristic.
In polygraphy, a false positive is an erroneous identification of a truthful person as being a liar.

406 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
very well, according to reports by the American Psychological
Association and by the U.S. government’s Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment. In general, like the polygraph, these instru-
ments seem to be more accurate than mere interviews, but
they also suffer from a high false-positive rate.
More recently, researchers have turned to brain scan-
ning techniques to see if they can catch liars (Ross, 2003). A
certain brain wave pattern known as P300 has been linked
with a variety of attention-getting cues, such as hearing one’s
name, but studies show it can also be evoked by fibbing. In
addition, fMRI images show that lying activates all the brain
areas involved in telling the truth, plus several more (Langleben
et al., 2002). This suggests that lying is not something com-
pletely separate from the truth but an operation the liar must
perform on the truth, says psychiatrist Daniel Langleben, all
of which raises the concern that there is too much hype and
too little solid evidence behind brain-scan-based lie detection
(Gamer, 2009; Stix, 2008). In addition, some neuroscien-
tists worry about the ethics of peering directly into people’s
brains to “read” the neural traces of their private thoughts
(Pearson, 2006).
The potential advantage of these newer brain-scan tech-
niques is that they bypass the anxiety-response pathway used
by polygraphy. By registering neural activity, they get much
closer to the person’s actual thoughts. But how well do these
alternative methods work? Not well enough for the police
and the courts—yet.
Finally, Paul Ekman—the same one who studies universal
facial expressions of emotion—has found that liars often
display fleeting “microexpressions” and other nonverbal
cues. In one study, Ekman and his colleague Maureen
O’Sullivan found that some people are especially good at
detecting deception, but they are a small minority. In their
tests, most people perform at about the chance level. Still,
Ekman and O’Sullivan hope to learn what those most skilled
at detecting deception look for and teach that to police
officers and other concerned with crime and security issues
(Adelson, 2004).
employees, the polygraph will inaccurately implicate 24 as
liars. That is, you could end up with more people falsely ac-
cused of lying than people correctly accused of lying. This was
borne out in a field study of suspected criminals who were
later either convicted or declared innocent. The polygraph re-
sults were no better than a random coin flip (Brett et al.,
1986).
An equally serious concern with polygraphy is that there
are no generally accepted standards either for administering
a polygraph examination or for interpreting its results. Dif-
ferent examiners could conceivably come to different conclu-
sions based on the same polygraph record.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
For these reasons, the U.S. Congress has outlawed most uses
of polygraph tests in job screening and in most areas of the
government, except for high-security-risk positions. National
Academies of Science (2003) has gone even further in a report
saying that the polygraph is too crude to be useful for screen-
ing people to identify possible terrorists or other national
security risks. Your authors agree.
As far as criminal investigations are concerned, we find a
patchwork of laws on the admissibility of polygraph evidence
among the states. Few have gone so far as imposing complete
bans and 20 more allow such evidence only on agreement of
both sides—although, in a few states, polygraph results are still
routinely admissible in court (Gruben & Madsen, 2005). So
where do you come down on the issue of using the polygraph
in criminal cases? Does the fact that a “lie detector” test can
sometimes force a confession from a suspect justify its use?
Alternative Approaches to Deception Detection
The reining-in of polygraph testing has spurred the develop-
ment of alternative means of detecting dishonesty (Capps &
Ryan, 2005; Lane, 2006). Much of this work has been de-
voted to paper-and-pencil instruments that are often called
“integrity tests.” How well do these instruments work? Not
THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT POLYGRAPHY
A quick Web search, using such terms
as polygraph, lie, and lie detection, will
reveal hundreds of sites arguing either for
or against the use of polygraph exams to
identify lawbreakers, potential terrorists, or
other security risks. Pick a site—either pro
or con—and analyze it according to our six
criteria for critical thinking:
1. The source is credible—either
an expert on the subject or
someone who relies on those with
expertise.
2. The claim is reasonable—not extreme.
3. The claim is supported by
scientifically sound evidence, not
testimonials or anecdotes.
4. There is no reasonable suspicion of
bias, such as self-interest, emotional
bias, or confirmation bias.
5. The claim avoids common logical
fallacies, such as selective use of the
evidence (e.g., using only the data
that support one’s position, while
ignoring the rest).
6. Does the source use multiple
psychological perspectives when
appropriate?
Additional resources to help you with this
Thinking Critically exercise are available in
MyPsychLab. See also “The Truth About
Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph Tests)” on the
American Psychological Association’s
website: /www.apa.org/research/action/
polygraph.aspx.

www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph.aspx

www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph.aspx

407
None of these approaches successfully explains the full range
of human motivation, however.
With his influential hierarchy of needs, Maslow attempted
to explain the priorities in which human motives appear.
Critics have, however, pointed out many exceptions to his hi-
erarchy. Recently, evolutionary psychologists have proposed
a revision of Maslow’s theory suggesting that our “default”
motivational priorities can change, depending on develop-
mental factors and on important (proximal) stimuli.
In trying to understand another person’s motivation, a
good place to start is with extrinsic incentives and threats.
In addition, Alfred Adler taught that social motives explain
many problem behaviors. Social psychologists combine these
notions under the heading of the power of the situation.
instinct theory (p. 369)
fixed action patterns (p. 369)
CHAPTER SUMMARY
9.1 What Motivates Us?
Core Concept 9.1 Motives are internal dispositions to act
in certain ways, although they can be influenced by multiple
factors, both internal and external.
The concept of motivation refers to inferred internal processes
that select and direct behavior toward a goal. Motivation also
helps explain behavior that cannot be explained by the cir-
cumstances alone. Psychologists find it useful to distinguish
intrinsic motivation from extrinsic motivation.
David McClelland pioneered the study of the need for
achievement (n Ach), a motive important for I/O psychologists
concerned about worker motivation and job satisfaction.
The need for achievement also correlates with academic suc-
cess and other accomplishments in life. But just as important
as n Ach are the needs for power and affiliation, according
to McClelland. Cross-cultural research also shows that so-
cieties vary in the intensity of their need for achievement,
depending on their tendencies toward individualism or
collectivism.
Psychologists have found that extrinsic rewards can de-
stroy motivation for intrinsically rewarding tasks through
overjustification. This is not always the case, however, but
rather when rewards are given without regard for the quality
of performance.
Great achievements usually come from people in a state of
flow. Those in a flow state are intrinsically motivated by some
problem or activity. The use of drugs or alcohol to achieve an
artificial flow feeling is not usually effective.
motivation (p. 365)
extrinsic motivation (p. 365)
intrinsic motivation (p. 365)
need for achievement (n Ach) (p. 365)
individualism (p. 367)
collectivism (p. 367)
overjustification (p. 367)
flow (p. 368)
9.2 How Are Our Motivational Priorities
Determined?
Core Concept 9.2 A new theory combining Maslow’s
hierarchy with evolutionary psychology solves some long-
standing problems by suggesting that functional, proximal,
and developmental factors set our motivational priorities.
Psychology has no successful theory that accounts for all of
human motivation. Psychologists have explained biologi-
cally based motivation in terms of instinct theory, fixed-action
patterns, and drive theory, and homeostasis. Cognitive psy-
chologists have emphasized biological motives. Freud called
attention to unconscious motivation and taught that all our mo-
tives derive from unconscious sexual and aggressive desires.
CHAPTER PROBLEM: Motivation is largely an internal and
subjective process: How can we determine what motivates people
like Lance Armstrong to work so hard at becoming the best in the
world at what they do?
• The subjective nature of motivation has forced psychologists
to study the underlying processes indirectly, using a variety of
methods, including animal studies, the TAT, and brain scans.
• Psychologists have identified many important influences on
motivation, including culture, goals, unconscious processes,
various biological factors, and social pressures. Rewards,
both intrinsic and extrinsic are also important for world-class
athletes like Lance Armstrong.
• One of the biggest questions involves the priorities we give to
our motives—an issue that Maslow addressed in his famous
hierarchy of needs. Recently, evolutionary psychologists
have proposed an updated needs hierarchy. Many athletes,
performers and artists apparently do much of their work in a
state of flow—a mental state in which the person focuses on
an intrinsically rewarding task to the exclusion of all other
needs.
• Understanding motivation also requires understanding a
person’s emotions—because emotions are a class of motives
aroused by persons, objects, and situations in the individual’s
external world. Emotions serve as the “values” we place on
alternatives when we make choices and decisions.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

9.4 How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us?
Core Concept 9.4 Emotions are a special class of
motives that help us attend to and respond to important
(usually external) situations and communicate our intentions
to others.
Emotion is a process involving four main components: physio-
logical arousal, cognitive interpretation, subjective feelings, and
behavioral expression. Emotions can also act as motives. From
an evolutionary standpoint, they help us approach or avoid re-
curring stimuli that are important for survival and reproduc-
tion. Socially, emotional expressions serve to communicate
feelings and intentions, apparently aided by “mirror neurons.”
Most experts posit a limited number of basic emo-
tions that, in combination, produce a larger number of
9.3 Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the
Motivational Hierarchy?
Core Concept 9.3 Although dissimilar in many respects,
hunger and sex both have evolutionary origins, and each has
an essential place in the motivational hierarchy.
Hunger is both a biological drive and a psychological motive,
best understood by a multiple-systems approach. Americans re-
ceive mixed messages from the media, promoting both thinness
and calorie-dense foods, which may play a role in disorders
such as obesity, anorexia nervosa, and bulimia nervosa. None of
these problems is completely understood, although both social
and biological factors are thought to be involved. The problem
of obesity has become an epidemic in America and is rapidly
being exported throughout the world. Many people seek to
control their appetite and body weight, although no weight-
loss scheme is effective for most people over the long run.
Will power is a common term in everyday language,
although psychologists avoid it because it suggests a separate
faculty of the mind. They prefer impulse control or self-control,
terms that can be explained in terms of brain mechanisms and
environmental influences. Recently, researchers have found that
impulse control takes a cognitive toll and is reflected in blood
sugar levels.
Unlike hunger and weight control, the sex drive is not
homeostatic, even though sexual motivation is heavily
influenced by biology, but learning also plays a role, especially
in humans. Particularly since Kinsey’s surveys, the scientific
study of sexuality has caused controversy in America, even
though survey research shows that, over the last half century,
Americans have become more liberal in their sexual practices.
Masters and Johnson were the first to do extensive studies
of sexual behavior in the laboratory, finding that the sexual
response cycles of men and women are similar. More recently,
Peplau has emphasized differences in male and female sexual-
ity. Those adhering to the evolutionary perspective argue that
differences in male and female sexuality arise from conflict-
ing mating strategies and from the large biological invest-
ment women have in pregnancy—both of which encourage
more promiscuity in men.
As Maslow’s hierarchy did, the new evolution-based hier-
archy generally gives hunger priority over sex, although the
hierarchy is fluid.
The greatest puzzle about sexuality centers on the origins
of sexual orientation, especially the factors leading to hetero-
sexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality. Transsexualism and
transvestism are not predictive of sexual orientation. Most
experts agree that sexual orientation involves a combination
of biological, environmental, and social factors, although
much of the research has focused on biology. Since the 1970s,
homosexuality has not been viewed as a disorder by psychol-
ogists and psychiatrists.
set point (p. 377)
anorexia nervosa (p. 378)
bulimia nervosa (p. 378)
sexual response cycle (p.382)
sexual orientation (p. 385)
secondary emotions. At least seven basic facial expressions
of emotion are universally understood across cultures, al-
though these can be modified by culture-specific display
rules. These universal emotions are probably biologically
based.
Some emotional differences between males and females
have biological roots. This is seen in differential rates of cer-
tain emotional disorders, as well as more frequent displays of
anger in men. On the other hand, cultural differences dem-
onstrate that some gender differences in emotion are learned.
Specifically, different cultures teach men and women different
display rules about controlling emotional expression. Despite
the differences, neither sex can be said to be more emotional
than the other.
emotion (p. 388)
display rules (p. 390)
408 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
biological drive (p. 370)
drive theory (p. 370)
need (p. 370)
homeostasis (p. 370)
hierarchy of needs (p. 372)
functional level of analysis (p. 373)
proximal level of analysis (p. 373)
developmental level of analysis (p. 373)

9.5 What Processes Control Our Emotions?
Core Concept 9.5 Research has clarified the processes
underlying both our conscious and unconscious emotional
lives, shedding light on some old controversies.
Neuroscience has revealed two distinct emotion systems in the
brain. One, a fast-response system, operates mainly at an un-
conscious level and relies on deep limbic structures, especially
the amygdala. The other involves conscious processing in the
cortex. The pathways intersect in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex. Emotions also involve visceral changes in response to
messages transmitted by the autonomic nervous system and
the hormone system. In addition to the two emotion pathways,
the two hemispheres have a lateralization of emotion by which
each specializes in processing a different class of emotion.
The inverted U theory describes the complex relationship
between emotional arousal and performance: Increasing arousal
improves performance—but only up to a certain optimum level
of arousal, which depends on the complexity of the task. Sensa-
tion seekers seem to have an especially high need for arousal.
Understanding how the two emotion systems work has
begun to resolve some long-standing controversies involv-
ing the roles of cognition and physical responses in emotion.
The James–Lange theory argued that physical sensations and
physical responses produce emotional feelings. The opposing
Cannon–Bard theory stated that our cognitive appraisal pro-
duces both emotions and the accompanying physical re-
sponse. Stanley Schachter’s two-factor theory suggested that
emotions are the result of cognitive appraisal of both our in-
ternal physical state and the external situation. The research
shows that all three viewpoints have a share in the truth.
Emotional intelligence, the ability to keep one’s emotions
from getting out of control, is vital for maintaining good so-
cial relationships. It is distinct from the abilities measured
by traditional IQ tests. Increased emotional control can be
achieved by learning, as demonstrated in anger management
programs. Tests of emotional intelligence show that those
who score highly tend to succeed in social situations.
Under some circumstances, the expression of anger with-
out aggression can have positive results. The public, however,
generally holds the dangerous misconception that it is always
best to “vent” one’s anger and “get it out of the system.”
Studies show that such venting often leads to the increased
likelihood of aggression later.
lateralization of emotion (p. 394)
inverted U function (p. 396)
sensation seekers (p. 397)
James–Lange theory (p. 398)
Cannon–Bard theory (p. 398)
two-factor theory (p. 399)
emotional intelligence (p. 400)
Chapter Summary 409
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Do Lie Detectors Really Detect Lies?
“Lie detectors” work on the assumption that people will
show physical signs of arousal when lying. While polygraph
examiners sometimes extract confessions when they convince
suspects that the test can show them lying, the evidence does
not indicate that the results are always reliable. Particularly
troubling is that, under some circumstances, the polygraph
test can identify more false positives than actual liars. Alter-
native approaches that use facial expressions or brain scans
are being explored, but so far they have not been validated.

7. Behaviors, such as male peacocks displaying their feath-
ers or male rams fighting, are related to which part of sexual
reproduction?
a. providing a safe place for mating
b. focusing the male’s attention on mating
c. selecting a partner with good genes
d. mating at the correct time of year
8. In Norman Adler’s research on mating behavior in rats, what is the
function of the ten or so mountings?
a. to trigger hormone production and uterine contractions in the
female
b. to warn off rival males
c. to cause fertilization
d. to impress the female
9. What kinds of emotions tend to be involved in romantic love?
a. mainly intense, positive emotions
b. mainly intense, negative emotions
c. a mixture of intense and weak emotions that are mainly positive
d. a mixture of positive and negative emotions that are intense
10. Charles Darwin cited the similarity of certain expressions of
emotions as evidence that
a. all species learn emotions.
b. emotions are innate.
c. emotions promote survival of the fittest.
d. genetic variability is advantageous.
11. Pictures of happy and sad American workers are shown to U.S.
college students and to Italian workers. Based on your knowledge
of Paul Ekman’s research, what would you predict about how well
the groups would identify the emotions?
a. Both groups will identify the emotions correctly.
b. Only the Americans will identify the emotions correctly.
c. Only the Italians will identify the emotions correctly.
d. Neither group will identify the emotions correctly.
Program Review
1. What is the general term for all the physical and psychological
processes that start behavior, maintain it, and stop it?
a. explanatory style
b. repression
c. addiction
d. motivation
2. Phoebe has a phobia regarding cats. What is her motivation?
a. environmental arousal
b. overwhelming fear
c. repressed sexual satisfaction
d. a need for attachment to others
3. What is the role of the pleasure–pain principle in motivation?
a. We repress our pleasure in others’ pain.
b. We seek pleasure and avoid pain.
c. We persist in doing things even when they are painful.
d. We are more intensely motivated by pain than by pleasure.
4. Which activity most clearly involves a “reframing” of the tension
between desire and restraint?
a. eating before you feel hungry
b. seeking pleasurable physical contact with others
c. working long hours for an eventual goal
d. getting angry at someone who interferes with your plans
5. Sigmund Freud thought there were two primary motivations. One
of these is
a. expressing aggression.
b. seeking transcendence.
c. fulfilling creativity.
d. feeling secure.
6. Compared with Freud’s view of human motivation, that of Abra-
ham Maslow could be characterized as being more
a. negative. c. optimistic.
b. hormonally based. d. pathologically based.
410 C H A P T E R 9 Motivation and Emotion
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the video, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 12: MOTIVATION AND EMOTION

www.mypsychlab.com

12. Theodore has an explanatory style that emphasizes the external,
the unstable, and the specific. He makes a mistake at work that
causes his boss to become very angry. Which statement is
Theodore most likely to make to himself?
a. “I always make such stupid mistakes.”
b. “I was just distracted by the noise outside.”
c. “All my life, people have always gotten so mad at me.”
d. “If I were a better person, this wouldn’t have happened.”
13. Why does Martin Seligman believe that it might be appropriate to
help children who develop a pessimistic explanatory style?
a. These children are unpleasant to be around.
b. These children lack contact with reality.
c. These children are at risk for depression.
d. Other children who live with these children are likely to
develop the same style.
14. What other outcome will a pessimistic explanatory style likely
affect, according to Seligman?
a. health
b. artistic ability
c. reasoning skills
d. language competence
15. All of the following are possible origins of a pessimistic explana-
tory style, except
a. assessments by important adults in our lives.
b. the reality of our first major negative life event.
c. our mother’s pessimism level.
d. our level of introversion/extraversion.
16. Which theorist is best known for positing a hierarchy of needs that
humans strive to meet?
a. Freud c. Maslow
b. Rogers d. Seligman
17. Although motivation can lead to unpleasant states
(e.g., hunger, frustration), it seems to have evolved because
of its benefits to
a. survival. c. health.
b. propagation of the species. d. all of the above.
18. What has Robert Plutchik argued about emotions?
a. There are three basic types of emotions: happiness, sadness,
and anger.
b. There are eight basic emotions, consisting of four pairs of
opposites.
c. Love is not a universal emotion; some cultures do not show
signs of having it.
d. Emotional experience is determined by physiology
alone.
19. Four people have been obese for as long as they can remember.
Their doctors tell all of them that their obesity is putting them at
risk for several illnesses. Who is most likely to join a gym, go on a
diet, and get in shape?
a. Al, whose explanatory style includes an internal locus of
control
b. Bob, who has a pessimistic explanatory style
c. Chuck, whose explanatory style includes an unstable locus of
control
d. Dwayne, who is depressed about his obesity
20. Wolves and squirrels are most likely to show which of the follow-
ing in their mating patterns?
a. romantic love
b. competition by females for males
c. competition by males for females
d. a preference for mating in the autumn so that the offspring
will be born during the winter
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 411

10.3 How Do Mental Processes Help
Shape Our Personalities?
Psychodynamic Theories: Emphasis on
Motivation and Mental Disorder
Humanistic Theories: Emphasis on Human
Potential and Mental Health
Social-Cognitive Theories: Emphasis on
Social Learning
Current Trends: The Person in a Social
System
10.2 What Persistent Patterns, or
Dispositions, Make Up Our
Personalities?
Personality and Temperament
Personality as a Composite of Traits
10.1 What Forces Shape Our
Personalities?
Biology, Human Nature, and Personality
The Effects of Nurture: Personality and
the Environment
The Effects of Nature: Dispositions and
Mental Processes
Social and Cultural Contributions to
Personality
The Personality of Time
Whether you live in the past, present,
or future can have a big impact on
your life.
Our understanding of ourselves
and others is based on implicit
theories of personality and our own
self-narratives—both of which are
influenced by culture.
10.4 What “Theories” Do People Use to
Understand Themselves and Others?
Implicit Personality Theories
Self-Narratives: The Stories of Our Lives
The Effects of Culture on Our Views of
Personality
Personality: Theories
of the Whole Person10
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
Personality is shaped by the combined
forces of biological, situational, and
mental processes—all embedded in
a sociocultural and developmental
context.
Explaining Unusual People and
Unusual Behavior
You don’t need a theory of personality
to explain why people do the expected.
The dispositional theories all suggest a
small set of personality characteristics,
known as temperaments, traits, or
types, that provide consistency to the
individual’s personality over time.
Finding Your Type
When it comes to classifying
personality according to types, a little
caution may be in order.
While each of the process theories sees
different forces at work in personality,
all portray personality as the result of
both internal mental processes and
social interactions.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
An external locus of control about
grades poses danger for students.
CHAPTER PROBLEM What influences were at work to produce the unique
behavioral patterns, high achievement motivation, and consistency over time and
place that we see in the personality of Mary Calkins?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED The Person–Situation Controversy

413
D O YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS UNIQUE? OR ARE YOU PRETTY MUCH the same as most other people? Are you able to predict pretty well what things you will or won’t do in the coming year based on your sense of who you are and what you stand for? Do your friends and family see you as consistent and predict-
able in how you behave in different settings? Most people assume that how they usually behave
is largely the function of a set of inner determinants, genes, character, and personality traits
that, taken together, form their core self.
The idea that you are a distinct individual with a self that makes you different from every-
one else is an assumption that we rarely question. But what most of us probably don’t realize is
that the concept of the self took root in psychology because of a woman who struggled all her
life to be recognized as a competent scholar by an academic world that dismissed her because
of her “unacceptable” gender (Calkins, 1906, 1930; DiFebo, 2002).
Mary Calkins came into psychology through the back door. Wellesley College, where she had
been teaching languages, recognized her as an outstanding teacher and offered her a job in the
emerging discipline of psychology, provided she could get some additional training—a practice
not unusual at women’s colleges at the time. But finding a graduate school that would take
a woman was not easy in the late 1800s. Nevertheless, Harvard was a possibility, especially
because the legendary William James (discussed in Chapter 1) wanted her to be his student.
There was only one obstacle: Harvard did not accept female students at that time. Its president,
Charles Eliot, strongly believed in separate education for men and women but he relented under
pressure from James and other members of the psychology department—only under the condition
that Mary Calkins attend classes informally and not be eligible for a degree. (Harvard refused to
award doctorates to women until 1963.)

414 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
By the spring of 1895, Calkins had finished her coursework and had completed ground-
breaking research on memory, which became her doctoral dissertation, Association: An Essay
Analytic and Experimental. The rebellious psychology faculty at Harvard held an unauthorized
oral defense of her dissertation and petitioned the board of directors to award her a PhD. William
James praised her performance as “the most brilliant examination for the PhD that we have had
at Harvard.” Nevertheless, the directors refused. An incensed William James told Calkins that
Harvard’s action was “enough to make dynamiters of you and all women” (Furumoto, 1979, p. 350).
Despite being denied the doctoral degree she had earned, Mary Calkins returned to Welles-
ley where, as promised, she was welcomed as a teacher of psychology. A productive scholar as
well as a teacher, she eventually published more than 100 articles and books, including her
best-selling text, An Introduction to Psychology. In 1902, she pointedly refused the consolation
prize of a PhD from Radcliffe College, a women’s institution associated with Harvard. And in
1905, she became the first woman president of the American Psychological Association.
Calkins’s pattern of persistent motivation to learn and succeed despite the obstacles span-
ning her entire professional life illustrates the central idea of this chapter: Personality consists
of all the psychological qualities and processes that bring continuity to an individual’s behavior
in different situations and across different times. It’s a broad concept that we might also de-
scribe as the thread of consistency that runs through our lives (Cervone & Shoda, 1999). And
should this thread of consistency break, it may leave a personality fraught with the inconsisten-
cies that we see, for example, in personality disorders or more extreme mental impairments as
in bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and so-called “multiple personality” disorder.
The puzzle facing the psychologist interested in personality requires fitting together all the
diverse pieces that make up the individual. It requires an integration of everything we have
studied up until now—learning, perception, development, motivation, emotion, and all the
rest—in the attempt to understand the individual as a unified whole. In Chapter 1, we named
this the whole-person perspective.
In some respects, personality is pretty simple because we are all somewhat alike. We gener-
ally prefer pleasure to pain, we seek meaning in our lives, and we often judge ourselves by the
standards set by the behavior of others. But beyond such obvious similarities, we are also unique
individuals—each unlike anyone else. Just as there are no two fingerprints exactly alike among
the billions of people worldwide, so too there are really not any two people exactly alike who are
totally interchangeable—not even identical twins. So personality is also the psychology of individ-
ual differences—what makes us think, feel, and act differently from others in the same situation.
How does a psychologist go about making sense of personality? Let us illustrate using Mary
Calkins as the subject of the problem around which this chapter is organized.
PROBLEM: What influences were at work to produce the unique behavioral patterns,
high achievement motivation, and consistency over time and place that we see in the
personality of Mary Calkins?
Was her personality shaped primarily by the people around her and events in her life? Those
events were so often beyond her control that we must consider another possibility: that her
courage and determination arose more from internal traits—from her basic makeup. That basic
makeup includes her values, attitudes, work habits, and self-reinforcing tendencies. You may
recognize these two broad alternatives as another variation on the basic nature–nurture ques-
tion we have encountered earlier. The answer, of course, lies with both: Experience and innate
factors shaped Mary Calkins’s personality, just as they shape yours and ours.
In this chapter, we will examine several theoretical explanations for what personality is,
how it develops, and how it functions. As we do so, you will find that some theories place more
personality The psychological qualities that bring
continuity to an individual’s behavior in different situa-
tions and at different times.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
Multiple personality and split
personality are older terms for
dissociative identity disorder
(p. 536).
Mary Whiton Calkins, the first woman to
become president of the American Psy-
chological Association, never received her
PhD although she earned it.

What Forces Shape Our Personalities? 415
emphasis on nature and others on nurture. You will also find that particular theories are suited
to dealing with particular kinds of personality issues. For example:
• If what you need is a snapshot of a person’s current personality characteristics—as
you might want if you were screening job applicants for your company—a theory of
temperaments, traits, or types may be your best bet.
• If your goal is to understand someone as a developing, changing being—a friend who asks
you for advice, perhaps—you will probably find one of the psychodynamic, humanistic,
or social-cognitive theories of personality most helpful.
• If you are most interested in how people understand each other—as you might be if you
were doing marriage counseling or conflict management—you will want to know the
assumptions people make about each other. That is, you will want to know their
implicit theories of personality.
• And, if you are wondering whether people understand each other in the same ways the
world around, you will want to know about the cross-cultural work in personality that we
have infused throughout the chapter.
We begin our exploration of personality now with an overview of the forces that have shaped
us all.
10.1 KEY QUESTION
What Forces Shape Our Personalities?
Personality makes us not only human but also different from everyone else. Thus, we
might think of personality as the “default settings” for our individually unique pat-
terns of motives, emotions, and perceptions along with our learned schemas for un-
derstanding ourselves and our world (McAdams & Pals, 2006). Personality is also the
collective term for the qualities that make us who we are. All of this, in turn, is embed-
ded in the context of our culture, social relationships, and developmental level. In other
words, virtually every aspect of our being comes together to form our personality (see
Figure 10.1.). We can capture this idea in our Core Concept for this section.
Core Concept 10.1
Personality is shaped by the combined forces of biological, situ-
ational, and mental processes—all embedded in a sociocultural and
developmental context.
FIGURE 10.1
Personality as the Psychology of
the Whole Person
We can think of personality as the inter-
section of all the psychological charac-
teristics and processes that make us both
human and, at the same time, different
from everyone else.
Biology &
Evolution PERSONALITY
Nurture
(environment)
Development
Social
Networks
& Culture
Nurture
(environment)
Biology &
Evolution
Development
PERSONALITY

416 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Let’s look at each of these elements of personality, beginning with an overview of the
forces of biology and evolution.
Biology, Human Nature, and Personality
Put two laboratory rats in a cage and electrify the floor with repeated shocks, and the
rats will attack each other. We can see much of the same behavior in humans, who
lash out at any convenient target when they feel threatened. Thus, in the early 20th
century, the number of lynchings of Blacks in the Southern United States rose and
fell in a mirror-image response to the state of the economy—particularly the price of
cotton. And in the 1930s, Nazi leader Adolph Hitler placed the blame for Germany’s
economic troubles on Jews, against whom he turned Germany into a racist Nazi state
that embraced the Holocaust—the systematically orchestrated genocide of all Euro-
pean Jews.
These are all examples of what Sigmund Freud called displacement of aggression.
Sometimes we call it scapegoating, after the ancient Hebrew ritual of symbolically
transferring the sins of the tribe to a goat that was then driven out into the desert to
die. Displacement was also what William James was talking about when he suggested
that Harvard’s refusal to give Mary Calkins the degree she earned was “enough to
make dynamiters of you and all women.” He meant female terrorists who would feel
justified in using dynamite to blow up Harvard University, or at least its sexist male
administration.
Nothing, of course, can justify mayhem, murder, or genocide—but perhaps we can
explain these actions. According to David Barash (2007), human history is the story of
those who responded to painful or threatening situations by striking at the nearest tar-
get. Those who did so had a clear evolutionary advantage over those who just sat and
“took it” because they were less likely to be victims the next time around. They were
also more likely to breed and pass along this tendency for aggression and displacement
to their descendants.
Displacement of aggression is not the only human characteristic that seems to
be built into our biology. As we noted earlier, most people prefer pleasure to pain—
often sexual pleasure. The obvious human propensity for sex and aggression fits with
Darwin’s idea that we come from a long line of ancestors who were driven to survive
and reproduce. Sigmund Freud, picking up this “survival of the fittest” notion, argued
that everything we do arises from a sex-based survival “instinct” and an “instinct”
for defense and aggression. Other theorists have proposed that personality is based
on still other motives that undoubtedly have some basis in biology—particularly
social motives. Much like ants and bees, they have pointed out, we humans are “social
animals” too.
Which view is right? Modern neuroscience and evolutionary psychology suggest
that the search for only a few basic urges behind all human behavior is misguided
(McAdams & Pals, 2006). The emerging picture is a far messier one. We (that is, our
brains) seem to be collections of “modules,” each adapted to a different purpose—
which may be the reason we have so many different motives, each operating by differ-
ent rules, as we saw in the previous chapter. Sex, aggression, hunger, affiliation, thirst,
and achievement—each is simultaneously a separate module in the brain but also a
part of the collective entity we call “personality.”
The Effects of Nurture: Personality and the Environment
Biology and evolution can’t explain everything. Even the geneticists grudgingly admit
that heredity accounts for only roughly half our characteristics (Robins, 2005). For
example, a child whose parents both have schizophrenia, a largely genetically based
mental disorder, is likely also to develop schizophrenia only 50 percent of the time.
What accounts for the rest of the equation? The rest, broadly speaking, comes from the
environment, which molds us according to the principles of behavioral conditioning,
cognitive learning, and social psychology.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Environment often affects us
through operant conditioning and
classical conditioning (p. 135).
William James studied consciousness and
was interested in how the mind functions
to guide behavior.

What Forces Shape Our Personalities? 417
What environments make the most difference? Many personality theorists empha-
size early childhood experiences: From this perspective, your own personality owes
much to your parents, not just for their genes but also for the environment they gave
you (assuming you were raised by your parents). At the extreme, children who receive
essentially no human contact, as in those abandoned to custodial care in the worst of
orphanages, emerge as stunted on virtually every measure of physical and mental well-
being (Nelson et al., 2007; Spitz, 1946).
There is some dispute over just how persistent the family environment is as we
come under the sway of adolescent peer pressures (Harris, 1995). Yet even birth order
seems to influence personality throughout our lives, because the environment for each
successive child in a family—from the oldest to the youngest—is different. Were you
the first child? If so, you are more likely than your later-born siblings to end up in a
career that requires use of your intellect and high achievement, says development theo-
rist J. Frank Sulloway (1996). Or are you the youngest? Chances are that you are more
likely to make people laugh than your more sober older siblings. A specific example
underscores the point: In a study of more than 700 brothers who played professional
baseball, Sulloway found that younger brothers were far more likely to take chances
and risks, such as attempting to steal bases, than were their more conservative first-
born siblings. In addition, the younger brothers were also more likely to be successful
when they took such risks (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010). Incidentally, the high-
achieving Mary Calkins, as the first-born of five children in her family, fits the pattern.
(We should add that no one believes these patterns always hold true; they are merely
statistical probabilities that hold on average.)
So important are environmental influences that personality psychologist Walter Mischel
(2003) has suggested that they usually overwhelm all other effects—including any inborn
traits. Just think how often during the day you simply respond to environmental dictates,
from the ringing of your alarm clock to the commands of red traffic lights to the inquiry,
“How are you?” So, is Mischel right? We will examine this issue, better known as the person–
situation controversy, in the Critical Thinking Applied section at the end of the chapter.
The Effects of Nature: Dispositions and Mental Processes
Important as the environment is, we still must pass our experiences through a series
of internal mental “filters” that represent core elements of personality. Suppose, for
example, that you are an outgoing person—an extravert—who prefers to be with other
people than to be more solitary. Your sister, however, prefers to spend more time alone
practicing music and painting with watercolors. She would be classified as an introvert.
You will interpret your experiences from your extraverted point of view. Party time!
The introvert–extravert dimension exemplifies the descriptive approach to personality,
focusing on an individual’s relatively stable personality characteristics or dispositions.
Others that we might call process theories go beyond description to explain personality
in terms of the internal personality processes we have been studying throughout this text:
motivation, perception, learning, and development, as well as conscious and unconscious
processes. For a complete explanation of personality, we seem to need both the disposi-
tional theories and process theories that we will encounter later in the chapter.
Social and Cultural Contributions to Personality
According to cross-cultural psychologist Juris Draguns (1979), the very concept of
personality theory is a Western (Euro-American) invention. So it is not surprising that
the most comprehensive and influential theories of personality were created by people
trained in the framework of the Western social sciences, with a built-in bias toward
individualism and a unique “self” (Guisinger & Blatt, 1994; Segall et al., 1999). Other
cultures, however, address the problem of differences among people in their own ways.
Most of these non-Western perspectives have originated in religion (Walsh, 1984).
Hindus, for example, see personality as a union of opposing characteristics (Murphy &
Murphy, 1968). The Chinese concept of complementary opposite forces, yin and yang,
provides another variation on this same theme.
disposition Relatively stable personality pattern,
including temperaments, traits, and personality types.
personality process The internal working of the
personality, involving motivation, emotion, perception,
and learning, as well as unconscious processes.

418 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
But what about the inverse problem? What influence does culture have on personal-
ity? We will see that, in a few respects, personality is much the same across cultures. That
is, we can describe people all over the world in terms of just a few basic personality traits.
For instance, people everywhere vary in their level of anxiety and in their tendency to be
outgoing or introverted. But there are also components of personality on which cultures
themselves exert huge differences. One example involves individualism versus collectiv-
ism. People in the United States and other Western countries tend to emphasize individual-
ism, which rewards those who stand out from the crowd because of such characteristics
as talent, intelligence, or athletic ability. In contrast, people in the more group-oriented
cultures of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East emphasize collectivism, which
rewards people for fitting in with the group and promoting social harmony.
And within any culture, be it individualistic or collectivistic, social relationships
have an enormous impact on personality—as we have noted in neglected children and
in those forced to grow up in “tough” neighborhoods. To a large extent, who you are
is determined by those with whom you interacted while growing up, including not just
your parents but also your siblings, classmates, teachers, and anyone else with whom
you had spent time interacting. Thus, your personality is, in part, a creation of other
people—so, in the final section of this chapter, we will look more closely at just how
these social and cultural factors shape our personalities. An interesting new issue to
consider is the impact on you of your Facebook friends and contacts, with some of
whom you may never have “face time.”
Cross-Cultural Differences in Shyness The interplay of culture and environmental
learning is revealed when we examine differences in shyness between Asians and Israe-
lis. Research has shown that in the United States, about 40 percent of adults considered
themselves to be shy people (in 1970 to 1980), but that figure rose to about 60 percent
among Asian-Americans and dropped to about 25 percent among Jewish-Americans
(Zimbardo, 1977). Similar disparities were found when Chinese and Israelis were
surveyed in their home countries.
Why such a striking difference in this universal trait of shyness? Interviews with
parents, teachers, coaches, and children uncovered a simple causal factor: How each
culture dealt with a child’s successes and failures. In many Asian cultures, when a child
or anyone tries a task and succeeds, who gets the credit? Answer: the grandparents,
parents, teachers, coaches, and perhaps even Buddha get some credit in that belief sys-
tem. But what if that child fails at a task, who gets the blame? Answer: All blame
is heaped on the child. The resulting behavioral style becomes one of low risk tak-
ing, cautiousness, and minimizing personal visibility in general; in short, becoming a
shy person. “A nail that sticks out will soon be hammered down” is a theme in those
cultures that promotes modest reserve.
In Israel, the child who fails at an assigned task is greeted by everyone else fully
ready to take the blame—for not feeding him enough, for not giving her sufficient
training, for the unfairness of the competition, and more. But should the child succeed,
the heavens open with endless praise. (The Yiddish term is kvelling, or making much
ado, sometimes about nothing.) Thus, Israeli children are encouraged to take risks,
to put both feet forward, to be outgoing because—their culture teaches them—there
is nothing to lose and everything to gain. It’s a recipe for antishyness, to be sure
(Carducci & Zimbardo, 1995; Pines & Zimbardo, 1978).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Explaining Unusual People and Unusual Behavior
You don’t need a theory of personality to explain why people generally get to work on
time, sing along at concerts, or spend weekends with their family and friends. That is, you
don’t need a theory of personality to explain why people do what you would expect them
to do, because in some situations, most of us do the same thing. But, when they behave
individualism The view, common in the
Euro-American world, that places a high value on
individual achievement and distinction.
collectivism The view, common in Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and the Middle East, that values group
loyalty and pride over individual distinction.

What Forces Shape Our Personalities? 419
in odd and unexpected ways, a personality theory comes in very handy.
A good theory can help you understand interesting and unusual people,
such as Mary Calkins, or those whom you read about in the newspaper—
perhaps a serial killer, a politician embroiled in sex scandal, or the antics
of a favorite movie star who is in and out of drug rehab seemingly every
other week.
In early 2011, a 22-year-old man, Jared Loughner, shocked the na-
tion by gunning down 19 citizens assembled in a public space in Tucson,
Arizona, to meet and greet their Congresswoman, Gabrielle Giffords
(Lacey & Herszenhorn, 2011). The senator survived a bullet shot into
her head, but six others died. The disaster would have been even worse
had the shooter been able to reload his automatic weapon and fire off
another round of 31 bullets. Fortunately, he was prevented from doing
so by the heroic actions of three people, a young man assisted by an el-
derly man and woman. What was wrong with the killer, and what was
right with those heroes? The general public, as well as psychologists,
wants to know the answers to those questions.
Going from this unknown person engaging in unusual behavior to a super well-known
person also engaging behavior that was unusual for him, we have the case of golfing
legend Tiger Woods. This seemingly happily married family man was publicly exposed as
having engaged repeatedly in sexual escapades with many different “escorts.” The scandal
destroyed his marriage, seriously damaged his career, and cost him tens of millions of dol-
lars in lost income from his sponsors. To understand the why of his transgression, we will
need to turn to both personality and motivational psychology later on.
But which approach to personality is best? Unfortunately, we will see that none
has the whole truth. Each theory we cover in this chapter can help you see people
from a different angle, so you may need to use several perspectives to get the whole-
person picture. To give you a preview of coming attractions, let’s suppose that you
are a counseling psychologist working at a college counseling center and a client, a
young woman, tells you that she is contemplating suicide. How can your knowledge of
personality help you understand her?
From a purely descriptive point of view, you might assess her personality traits and
temperament. Is she conscientious? Is she outgoing or shy? Anxious? To find out, you
might give her one of several personality “tests” that we will talk about in the next sec-
tion of the chapter. Her profile of traits and temperament may suggest some form of
psychological treatment or, perhaps, a more direct drug therapy.
If you decide on a psychological therapy, you will be working with the internal
processes in her personality and, perhaps, social forces at work in her environment and
culture. This is the territory originally staked out by Sigmund Freud and his supporters
and, more recently, by experimental psychologists.
A psychodynamic theory would direct your focus toward her motives and emo-
tions, some of which may be unconscious, that she does not recognize. Is she a hostile
person who has turned her hostility on herself? Does she have some unfinished emo-
tional business from an earlier developmental stage, such as guilt for angry feelings
toward her parents? What is the nature of her social relationships?
In contrast, a humanistic theory would emphasize the exploration of her potentiali-
ties rather than of her deficiencies. What are her talents? Her hopes and desires? And
what obstacles stand between her and her goals? A humanistic theory would also help
you explore her unmet needs. Do her suicidal thoughts result from conscious feelings
that she is alone, unloved, or not sufficiently respected?
A social-cognitive theory, with its emphasis on perception and learning, might sug-
gest that her difficulty is in the way she interprets events. Does she always assume that
her best efforts are not good enough? Does she believe that she can control the events
in her life, or do external events control her? A cognitive approach might also alert
you to the possibility that her suicidal thoughts reflect a suicidal role model—perhaps
a friend, a family member, or, as in “copycat suicides,” some celebrity who has recently
committed suicide in a particular way.
Tiger Woods, one of the world’s most
recognized personalities, was exposed as
having sexual affairs with many women.
His sexual obsession cost him his mar-
riage and millions of dollars in alimony
and lost endorsements, as well as public
disgrace.

420 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
All of these approaches to personality will be explored in detail later in the chap-
ter. For now, here is the take-away message: No one theory has a complete answer to
the problem of understanding why people do what they do. The trait and tempera-
ment theories can provide a descriptive snapshot of a person’s characteristics, while the
“process” theories (psychodynamic, humanistic, or social-cognitive theories) describe the
forces that underlie those characteristics. And in most cases—whether they be heroes,
villains, Tiger Woods, or the suicidal young woman we described—some combination
of both is in order.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: The fact that displacement of aggression is found in
humans everywhere, as well as in animals, suggests that it is rooted
in .
2. APPLICATION: Give an example that shows the influence of
nurture on personality.
3. ANALYSIS: What is the distinction between trait and temperament
theories and the process theories of personality?
4. RECALL: A person from a collectivist culture is more likely than
one from an individualist culture to emphasize .
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What are the major
factors that affect the formation of the personality?
Answers 1. our biological nature 2. An example given in the text involves the influence of birth order on personality. There are many others, including,
perhaps, examples from your own experience. And in the news we read of “child soldiers” who are caught in the civil wars of the world’s poorest
countries and are trained as hardened killers. 3. The dispositional theories describe personality in terms of characteristics (traits, temperaments,
or types), while the process theories describe personality in terms of internal processes (e.g., motivation, learning, or perception) and social
interactions. 4. the importance of the group and harmonious relationships within the group 5. Personality is shaped by biology, the environment
(situational pressures), mental processes, development, and the sociocultural context.
10.2 KEY QUESTION
What Persistent Patterns, or Dispositions,
Make Up Our Personalities?
Two thousand years before academic psychology appeared, people were classifying
each other according to four temperaments, based on a theory proposed by the Greek
physician Hippocrates (Hip-POCK-rah-tees). A person’s temperament, he suggested, re-
sulted from the balance of the four humors, or fluids, secreted by the body (see Figure 10.2).
A sanguine, or cheerful, person was characterized by strong, warm blood. A choleric
temperament, marked by anger, came from yellow bile (called choler), believed to flow
from the liver. Hippocrates thought that the spleen produced black bile, from which
arose a melancholic, or depressed, temperament. Finally, if the body’s dominant fluid
is phlegm, or mucus, the person will have a phlegmatic temperament: cool, aloof, slug-
gish, and unemotional. Hippocrates’ biology may have been a little off the mark, but
his notion of temperaments established itself as “common sense.” Even today, you will
occasionally encounter his terms used to describe people’s personalities.
In modern times, other personality classification systems have appeared. The most
simplistic ones are just stereotypes: if fat, then jolly; if an engineer, then conservative;
if female, then sympathetic. Obviously, these beliefs oversimplify the very complicated
problem of understanding the patterns found in personality. Even you may be guilty
of such oversimplifications if you think of people strictly according to categories and
stereotypes: college major, gender, ethnicity, and qualities such as honesty, friendliness,
or sense of humor.
Still, something in human nature and the cognitive tendency to simplify complex-
ity seems to encourage us to group people into categories. So some personality theo-
rists have sought to describe people in terms of just a few basic temperaments: global
humors Four body fluids—blood, phlegm, black
bile, and yellow bile—that, according to an ancient
theory, control personality by their relative abundance.
Hippocrates was an early contributor to the
idea of a mind–body connection. One of his
beliefs was that our individual temperament
is driven by our predominant body fluid, or
humor, and could be either sanguine,
choleric, melancholic, or phlegmatic.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

dispositions of personality, such as “outgoing” or “shy,” that have a strong biological
basis. Others prefer to look for combinations of traits, which are generally thought
of as multiple dimensions of personality, such as cautious versus reckless or friendly
versus unfriendly, which are usually considered to be more influenced by experience
(learning) than are temperaments. Still others classify people according to personality
types, which are categories rather than dimensions: You either fit the pattern for a type
or you do not. For example, if introversion is a trait dimension, then people can have
degrees of introversion. On the other hand, if introversion is a type, then people are
classified as either being introverted or not.
While each of these approaches is a bit different, our Core Concept indicates that
they also have a common meeting ground:
Core Concept 10.2
The dispositional theories all suggest a small set of personality
characteristics, known as temperaments, traits, or types, that provide
consistency to the individual’s personality over time.
Because the terms temperament, trait, and type overlap, we will follow the custom of
placing them all under the generic heading of dispositional theories. But what makes
such theories different from mere stereotypes—the conservative engineer, the ma-
cho male, or the blond bimbo? It’s all in the science. A good temperament, trait, or
type theory must have a solid scientific base. In that light, let’s evaluate each of these
approaches to personality, beginning with temperament.
Personality and Temperament
Psychologists define temperament as the biologically based personality dispositions
that are usually apparent in early childhood and that establish the foundation of the
personality and the mood of an individual’s approach to life (Hogan et al., 1996;
Mischel, 1993). When speaking of temperaments, psychologists are usually referring
to one or two dominant and long-standing themes, such as shyness or moodiness, that
characterize a person’s personality, perhaps from birth. Modern psychology has, of
course, abandoned the four humors theory of temperament, but it has retained its most
basic concept: Biological dispositions do affect our basic personalities. In support of
this view, psychologists can now point to structures in the brain that are known to
regulate fundamental aspects of personality (LeDoux, 2002). You will recall, for ex-
ample, the case of Phineas Gage, who received an accidental “lobotomy” and thereby
demonstrated the role of the frontal lobes in regulating one’s basic disposition—an
observation confirmed by modern neuroscience.
Temperament from Transmitters? Biological psychologists now suspect that some
individual differences in temperament also arise from the balance of chemicals in the
dispositional theory A general term that
includes the temperament, trait, and type approaches
to personality.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Phineas Gage was a railroad worker
who experienced an amazing
consequence of an exploding
metal rod shooting into and out
of his skull. He survived, but his
personality and basic response
style changed dramatically to
become more confrontational
and emotional (p. 62).
Humors Source Temperament
blood heart sanguine (cheerful)
choler (yellow bile) liver choleric (angry)
melancholer (black bile) spleen melancholy (depressed)
phlegm brain phlegmatic (sluggish)
The Humor Theory
FIGURE 10.2
The Humor Theory
What Persistent Patterns, or Dispositions, Make Up Our Personalities? 421

422 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
brain, which may, in turn, have a genetic basis (Azar, 2002b; Sapolsky, 1992). In this
sense, the theory of humors still lives but in a different guise: Modern biological psy-
chology has replaced the humors with neurotransmitters. So, depression—which char-
acterizes most suicidal people with suicidal thoughts—may result from an imbalance
of certain transmitters. Likewise, anxiety, anger, and euphoria may each arise from
other neurochemical patterns. As developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan says, “We
all have the same neurotransmitters, but each of us has a slightly different mix” (Stavish,
1994, p. 7). That, says Kagan, is what accounts for many of the temperamental differ-
ences among people.
In fact, Kagan runs a fascinating research program focusing on the inherited
basis of shyness (Kagan, et al. 2005; Kagan et al., 1994). This program has clearly
demonstrated that, on their very first day, newborns in the nursery already differ in
the degree to which they are responsive to stimulation. About 20 percent of all chil-
dren are highly responsive and excitable, and 10 percent are extremely “inhibited.”
While approximately twice as many (35 to 40 percent) remain calm in response
to new stimulation, another 10 percent can be seen as “bold.” Over their first few
months of life, these initial differences manifest themselves in temperamental differ-
ences: Many of the excitable, inhibited infants become shy and introverted, while
the less excitable, more bold ones become extraverted. Although these tendencies
change in some children, for most they persist over time, with the majority of chil-
dren being classified with the same temperament in measurements taken over an
11-year interval. Kagan describes such effects as being due to “push of nature” in
different directions.
Tempered With a Bit of Learning? On the other hand, we know that the percentage
of shy college-age students—40 percent or more—is much higher than the percentage
of these initially inhibited shy babies (Zimbardo, 1990). It is thus reasonable to assume
that some shyness is inherited, while even more is learned through negative experiences
in one’s social life. It is also the case that if a child is withdrawn, startles easily, is un-
likely to smile, and is fearful of both strangers and novelty, then that child will create
an environment that is not friendly, playful, or supportive. Which baby would you pick
up and play with more, an easily startled one or a smiling, outgoing one? This differ-
ence in social stimulation, in turn, pushes the inhibited child toward shyness and the
bold child toward being a cheerleader. In this way, heredity and environment interact,
with initially inherited characteristics becoming amplified—or perhaps muted—over
time, because they produce social signals telling others to either approach and play or
stay away.
So does biology determine your destiny? An inherited temperament may set the
range of your responses to some life situations. However, temperament by itself does
not fully determine your life experiences (Kagan & Snidman, 1998). Even among your
biological relatives, your unique family position, experiences, and sense of self all com-
bine to guarantee that your personality pattern is unlike that of anyone else in the
known universe (Bouchard et al., 1990).
Personality as a Composite of Traits
If you were to describe a friend, you would probably use the language of traits: moody,
cheerful, melancholy, enthusiastic, volatile, friendly, or smart. Traits are multiple, stable
personality characteristics that are presumed to exist within the individual and guide
his or her thoughts and actions under various conditions. We might think of traits as
the product of hidden psychological processes—the way our motives, emotions, and
cognitions are customarily expressed in behavior (Winter et al., 1998).
How do traits differ from temperament? Think of temperament as the founda-
tion of personality, deeply rooted in our individual biological nature. Then think of
traits as a multidimensional structure built on the foundation of temperament but also
influenced by experience. Traits emerge from temperaments as nature is expanded by
nurture.
traits Multiple stable personality characteristics
that are presumed to exist within the individual and
guide his or her thoughts and actions under various
conditions.
Some shyness is inherited, and some is
learned through personal experience and
cultural norms.

What Persistent Patterns, or Dispositions, Make Up Our Personalities? 423
The “Big Five” Traits: The Five-Factor Theory Trait theorists focus primarily on the
motivational and emotional components of personality, excluding other attributes such
as IQ and creativity. With the statistical tool of factor analysis (which helps them look
for relationships, or common clusters, among personality test items), many investiga-
tors have identified five dominant personality factors. This perspective is known as the
five-factor theory. Personality theorists often call these factors the Big Five (Carver &
Scheier, 2008; John & Srivastava, 1999). As yet, we have no universally accepted names
for these five factors, although the italicized terms in the list below are widely used.
You will note that, although we give each trait a single label, the Big Five traits are
really bipolar dimensions—not to be confused with bipolar disorders. That is, they ex-
ist on a continuum, with most people falling somewhere between the extremes—near
the middle of the continuum—on most of these dimensions. (In parentheses below, we
list the name of the opposite end of the dimension for each trait.)
• Openness to experience, also called inquiring intellect, curiosity, independence (at
the opposite pole: closed-mindedness, low curiosity, unimaginative)
• Conscientiousness, also called dependability, goal-directedness, perseverance,
superego strength, prudence, or constraint (at the opposite pole: impulsiveness,
carelessness, or irresponsibility)
• Extraversion, also called social adaptability, assertiveness, sociability, boldness, or
self-confidence (at the opposite pole: introversion, shyness)
• Agreeableness, also called warmth and likeability, with those on this end of the
continuum taking a prosocial approach to others (at the opposite pole: coldness,
negativity, or antagonism)
• Neuroticism, also called anxiety or emotionality (at the opposite pole: emotional
stability or emotional control)
Here’s an aid to remembering these five trait dimensions: Think of the acronym
OCEAN, standing for Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and
Neuroticism.
As you ponder this five-factor theory, it is important to realize that no score is
necessarily “good” or “bad.” While U.S. culture tends to value extroversion over
introversion, either one can be adaptive, depending on the social and cultural situa-
tion. Thus, introversion may be a desirable trait for a writer, while extraversion may
be preferred in a sales manager. Similarly, we value conscientiousness, openness, agree-
ableness, and emotional stability, but scoring on the “lower” end of each of these isn’t
necessarily a bad thing. For example, for a creative person, the tendency to follow
one’s own beliefs and not be unduly swayed by others (lower agreeableness) is benefi-
cial. Similarly, too much conscientiousness probably limits one’s ability to take advan-
tage of unexpected opportunities, and too much openness could lead a person to be a
“Jack (or Jill) of all trades” and master of none. Rather than making judgments about
what traits we “should” possess, it is better to capitalize on the traits we have and find
an environment that offers the best fit with what we have going for us.
The five-factor theory greatly simplifies a formerly confusing picture. Although
debate still continues about the details, a broad coalition of theorists has now concluded
that we can describe people with reasonable accuracy on just these five dimensions—
quite an achievement in view of the several hundred trait terms one can find listed
in the dictionary (Allport & Odbert, 1936)! “The five-factor model has fulfilled its
promise to bring order to a Babel of Taxonomies and instruments,” according to some
prominent personality theorists (Caprara & Cervone, 2000). Researchers have identi-
fied both genetic and environmental influences on the development of these individual
differences in personality (Bourchard & McGue, 2003).
Significantly, the five-factor model also seems to have validity across cultures, with
several large studies demonstrating that the five-factor model works in more than 50
cultures in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas (McCrae et al., 2005; Schmitt et al.,
2007). However, that broad conclusion must be tempered because most of these stud-
ies utilized university students as respondents, who are people more influenced by
five-factor theory A trait perspective suggest-
ing that personality is composed of five fundamental
personality dimensions (also known as the Big Five):
openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraver-
sion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.
The Five Factor
Model
Explore the Concept
at MyPsychLab

424 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
European-American world views, and have not included cultural subgroups that may
not fit the descriptors of this simplified model. Anthropologist Rick Shweder (1991) re-
minds us that in some cultures, people are defined not by their personal dispositions; in-
stead, what matters are their social roles, position within the family structure, or goals.
Assessing Traits with Personality Inventories If you were a clinical or counseling
psychologist, you might want to assess a client’s personality on the five factors using
a paper-and-pencil instrument such as the NEO Personality Inventory (or NEO-PI).1
This simple but highly respected measure has been used to study personality stability
across the lifespan and also the relationship of personality characteristics to physical
health and various life events (see Figure 10.3).
If, however, you want an instrument that measures clinical traits—that is, signs of
mental disorder—the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, usually referred
to as the MMPI-2, is a good bet. (The “2” means it is a revised form of the original
MMPI.) Unlike the NEO-PI, the MMPI-2 does not measure the Big Five personal-
ity dimensions. Rather, its ten clinical scales (shown in Table 10.1) were developed to
assess serious mental problems such as depression, schizophrenia, and paranoia (Helmes
& Reddon, 1993). Its 567 items deal with a variety of attitudes, habits, fears, prefer-
ences, physical health, beliefs, and general outlook. We won’t compromise the actual
test items, but here are some true–false statements similar to those on the MMPI-2:
• I am often bothered by thoughts about sex.
• Sometimes I like to stir up some excitement.
• If people had not judged me unfairly, I would have been far more successful.
Respondents are asked to indicate whether each statement describes them, and their
answers are compared against responses of people in clinical populations with known
MMPI-2 A widely used personality assessment
instrument that gives scores on ten important clinical
traits; also called the Minnesota Multiphasic Personal-
ity Inventory.
1NEO stands for neuroticism, extraversion, and openness. Conscientiousness and agreeableness were added later,
but the name, NEO Personality Inventory, was not changed.
Strongly
disagree
Disagree
somewhat
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree
somewhat
Strongly
agree
1. I am a talkative person.
2. I often feel shy.
3. I am usually full of energy.
4. I worry a lot.
5. I am inventive.
6. I have no artistic interests.
7. I like new challenges and
experiences.
8. I see myself as reliable.
9. I like to be with people.
10. I can remain calm in difficult
situations.
FIGURE 10.3
Sample Five-Factor Personality Inventory Items
An instrument measuring the Big Five personality traits might ask you to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement by check-
ing the circle under the appropriate point on the scale. There are no right or wrong answers.

What Persistent Patterns, or Dispositions, Make Up Our Personalities? 425
mental disorders of various kinds. Thus, the scoring is empirically based—that is, it is
based on scientific data of comparisons of each individual’s pattern of responding with
the average, or base rate responses, of each of a number of different clinical popula-
tions. It is not just the reasonable opinion of the test maker.
People who take personality inventories such as the MMPI-2 often agonize over
their answers to particular questions, concerned that a “wrong” answer might lead to
being diagnosed as mentally disturbed. Not to worry! Personality profiles derived from
MMPI-2 responses are never based on a single item—or even two or three. Rather,
each item merely makes a weighted contribution to one or more of the many subscales.
Could you fake a good or bad score on the MMPI-2? Probably not. The test has
four cleverly designed “lie” scales that signal something amiss when they pick up too
many unusual responses. Here are some items similar to those on the lie scales:
• Sometimes I put off doing things I know I ought to do.
• On occasion, I have passed on some gossip.
• Once in a while, I find a dirty joke amusing.
Too many attempts to make yourself look good or bad will elevate your lie scale scores
into the questionable range.
From a scientific standpoint, the MMPI-2 and the NEO-PI are exemplary instruments—
for two reasons. First, they have excellent reliability. This means that they provide consistent
and stable scores. So, when a person takes the same test on two different occasions, the
scores are likely to be much the same. In fact, any usable test must have good reliability;
otherwise the scores would be erratic and undependable. If the individual has not changed
from test time 1 to time 2, then her or his test scores should remain relatively constant.
When the scores do change significantly, then it means something has intervened during
those two time periods, which is affecting the individual’s mental state or functioning. This
is cause for an alert.
Second, the MMPI-2 and the NEO-PI have good validity, which means that they
actually measure what they were designed to measure—e.g., personality traits or signs
of mental disturbance. The MMPI-2 does a credible job, for example, of identifying in-
dividuals with depression or psychosis (Greene, 1991)—although it must be used with
care in non-Western cultures because it is not clear that its validity holds when the
instrument has been translated into other languages (Dana, 1993). Moreover, some ob-
servers suggest that some items may have culture-specific content (Golden & Figueroa,
2007). Clinicians should also exercise caution when giving personality inventories to
members of ethnic minorities in the United States, because minority groups are not al-
ways well represented in the samples used in developing the test originally (Butcher &
Williams, 1992; Graham, 1990).
reliability An attribute of a psychological test that
gives consistent results.
validity An attribute of a psychological test that
actually measures what it is being used to measure.
TABLE 10.1 MMPI-2 Clinical Scales
Hypochondriasis (Hs): Abnormal concern with bodily functions
Depression (D): Pessimism; hopelessness; slowing of action and thought
Conversion hysteria (Hy): Unconscious use of mental problems to avoid conflicts or responsibility
Psychopathic deviate (Pd): Disregard for social custom; shallow emotions; inability to profit from
experience
Masculinity–femininity (Mf): Differences between men and women
Paranoia (Pa): Suspiciousness; delusions of grandeur or persecution
Psychasthenia (Pt): Obsessions; compulsions; fears; low self-esteem; guilt; indecisiveness
Schizophrenia (Sc): Bizarre, unusual thoughts or behavior; withdrawal; hallucinations; delusions
Hypomania (Ma): Emotional excitement; flight of ideas; overactivity
Social introversion (Si): Shyness; disinterest in others; insecurity

426 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Evaluating the Temperament and Trait Theories Several criticisms have been leveled
at the temperament and trait theories and the tests they have spawned. For one, these
theories give us a “snapshot” of personality—a picture that portrays personality as fixed
and static rather than as a dynamic process that can undergo developmental changes
depending on our experience. Another criticism says that they oversimplify our com-
plex natures by describing personality on just a few dimensions. What would we gain,
for example, by finding that Mary Calkins scored high on traits such as conscientious-
ness and dominance but low on agreeableness? While such judgments might validate
our observations, labels leave out important details.
On the positive side, trait theories give us some ability to predict behavior in com-
mon situations, such as work settings—to select employees who are well suited to the
job and to screen out those who might cause problems. Moreover, the Big Five traits
really do predict most of the things that truly matter to most of us, including health,
academic success, and success in our interpersonal relationships—and with accuracy
comparable to that of many diagnostic tests used in medicine (Robins, 2005).
But in the end, trait theories suffer from one of the same problems as the old instinct
theories. Both describe behavior with a label but do not explain it. For example, we
can attribute depression to a depressive trait or an outgoing personality to extraversion
without really understanding the behavior. In short, trait theories identify common traits,
but they do not tell us much about their source or how traits interact (McAdams, 1992;
Pervin, 1985). Moreover, because most people display a trait only to a moderate degree,
we must ask how useful traits are for understanding all but the extreme cases.
Finally, with trait theory, we again encounter the problem of the self-fulfilling
prophecy. When given trait labels, people may be influenced by the expectations implied
by those labels, making it difficult for them to change undesirable behavior. A child
labeled “shy,” for example, may have to struggle against both the label and the trait.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Finding Your Type
Do you fancy yourself an introvert or an extravert? Emotionally stable or excitable?
Dependable or irresponsible? Modern trait theory assumes that you could fall any-
where between these extremes, while the older notion of personality types puts people
in distinct categories. Which view—trait or type—more accurately captures human
nature? To find out, let’s perform a critical examination of the most widely used in-
strument for assessing personality types, the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). Because
the Myers–Briggs derives from the personality types found in Carl Jung’s theory, this
discussion will also serve as a bridge to the next section of the chapter, where we will
study Jung’s theory, as well as other classical theories of personality, in detail.
Uses of the MBTI
Chances are you have taken the MBTI, because it is given to some two million
people each year, often at self-awareness workshops and team-building business seminars
(Druckman & Bjork, 1991). In the business world, consultants commonly use the
MBTI in management training sessions to convey the message that people have dis-
tinct personality patterns that suit them for specific kinds of jobs. In college counseling
centers, students may be advised to select a career that fits with their personality type,
as revealed on the MBTI. It also finds a use in relationship counseling, where couples
are taught to accommodate to each other’s personality types.
On the Myers–Briggs test, examinees answer a series of questions about how they
make judgments, perceive the world, and relate to others (Myers & Myers, 1995).
Based on these responses, a scoring system assigns an individual to a four-dimensional
personality type, derived from the Jungian dimensions of Introversion–Extraversion,
Thinking–Feeling, Sensation–Intuition, and Judgment–Perception. We will discuss
these dimensions further in the next section of this chapter.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
The original self-fulfilling
prophecy in psychology involved
an experiment in which students’
academic performance was
altered by manipulating teachers’
expectations (p. 249).
personality type Similar to a trait, but instead
of being a dimension, a type is a category that is
believed to represent a common cluster of personality
characteristics.
Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) A
widely used personality test based on Jungian types.

What Persistent Patterns, or Dispositions, Make Up Our Personalities? 427
What Does Research on the MBTI Tell Us about Personality Types?
Remember that a reliable test gives consistent results, as when a person takes the same
test repeatedly. Unfortunately, the reliability of the MBTI is questionable. One study,
for example, found that fewer than half of those tested on the MBTI had the same type
when retested 5 weeks later (McCarley & Carskadon, 1983). Another study found a
change in at least one of the four type categories in about 75 percent of respondents
(Druckman & Bjork, 1991). Such results certainly raise questions about the fundamen-
tal concept of “type.”
A second issue concerns the validity of the Myers–Briggs test. We have said that
a valid test actually measures what it is intended to measure. And again, the research
on the MBTI gives a mixed picture (Druckman & Bjork, 1991). The data fail to show
that the MBTI truly identifies distinct personality types (Furnham et al., 2003)—that a
person is a sum of each of the four type designations. Instead, the test shows that peo-
ple are distributed all along the introversion–extraversion continuum. This evidence is
much more consistent with the concept of traits—that different people have different
degrees of a characteristic—rather than the type notion of either having it or not.
As for identifying personality patterns associated with particular occupations, the
evidence is also shaky. True enough, those who work with people in service profes-
sions—entertainers, counselors, managers, and those in sales—tend to score higher on
extraversion. By comparison, librarians, computer specialists, and physicians number
many introverts in their ranks. The danger lies, however, in turning averages into stereo-
types. In fact, the data show a diversity of types within occupations. Further, we find a
conspicuous lack of evidence documenting a relationship between personality type and
occupational success: There is no basis for the idea that having a particular personality
type makes you better suited for a particular career. Although proponents of the MBTI
claim it to be useful in vocational counseling, a review of the literature by a team from
the National Academy of Sciences found no relationship between personality type, as
revealed by the MBTI, and performance on a particular job (Druckman & Bjork, 1991).
This report has, however, been hotly disputed by users of the instrument (Pearman,
1991). But overall, we can say that the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator has not proven to
have the validity or reliability needed as the basis for making important life decisions.
The National Academy of Sciences Report concludes, “Lacking such evidence, it is a
curiosity why the instrument is used so widely” (Druckman & Bjork, 1991, p. 99).
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Jerome Kagan has suggested that the biological basis for
different temperaments may come from each person’s unique mix of
.
2. APPLICATION: A friend of yours always seems agitated and
anxious, even when nothing in the circumstances would provoke
such a response. Which one of the Big Five traits seems to describe
this characteristic of your friend?
3. RECALL: The MMPI-2 does not assess conventional personality
traits. Instead, its 10 clinical scales assess .
4. RECALL: The limits to applying the big five trait scale to non-Western
cultures may be due, in part, to differences in the importance of
.
5. ANALYSIS: If you were using a trait theory, you would assess people
; but if you were using a type theory, you would assess
people .
a. clinically / experimentally
b. according to their behavior / according to their mental processes
c. on their positive characteristics / on their negative
characteristics
d. on dimensions / in categories
6. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Temperament, trait,
and type theories describe the differences among people in terms
of but not .
a. personality characteristics/personality processes
b. mental disorders/mental health
c. nature/nurture
d. conscious processes/unconscious processes
Answers 1. neurotransmitters 2. Neuroticism 3. tendencies toward serious mental problems 4. social roles and family structure patterns 5. d 6. a
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

428 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
10.3 KEY QUESTION
Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities?
Tiger Woods is the most successful golfer of all time, as well as the highest paid profes-
sional athlete in the world, making as much as $90 million in 2010. His tournaments
were avidly followed by throngs of adoring fans, and he was admired as a family man,
close to his parents and to his beautiful wife and their two young children. All that
changed dramatically when it was revealed in December 2009 that Tiger had been
having numerous extramarital sexual affairs. His life fell apart, his wife divorced him,
sponsors stopped endorsing him, and though he took time off from golf for several
months, Tiger never returned to his old top-of-the-scoreboard game again. It has been
estimated that his infidelities cost him up to $12 billion of lost income and alimony,
not to mention loss of respect and social acceptance.
We will use the case of Tiger Woods, along with that of Mary Calkins, to illustrate
various theories of personality throughout the rest of the chapter.
To understand the psychological forces underlying both Woods’s and Calkins’s
traits, we turn to theories that look at the mental processes that actively shape people’s
personalities—as opposed to the static traits, types, and temperaments that we have
been considering to this point. Specifically, we will consider three kinds of “process”
theories: the psychodynamic, the humanistic, and the cognitive theories. What do they
have in common? Our Core Concept says:
Core Concept 10.3
While each of the process theories sees different forces at work in
personality, all portray personality as the result of both internal
mental processes and social interactions.
Although the three viewpoints we will consider in this section of the chapter—the psy-
chodynamic, humanistic, and social-cognitive theories—share some common ground,
each emphasizes a different combination of factors. The psychodynamic theories call at-
tention to motivation, especially unconscious motives, and the influence of past ex-
periences on our mental health. Humanistic theories emphasize consciousness and our
present, subjective reality: what we believe is important now and how we think of
ourselves in relation to others. And the social-cognitive theories describe the influence of
learning, perception, and social interaction on behavior.
Psychodynamic Theories: Emphasis on Motivation and Mental Disorder
The psychodynamic approach originated in the late 1800s with a medical puzzle called
hysteria, now known as conversion disorder. In patients with this condition, the physi-
cian sees physical symptoms such as a muscle weakness, loss of sensation in a part of
the body, or even a paralysis—but no apparent physical cause, such as nerve damage.
The psychological nature of hysteria finally became apparent when the French physi-
cian Jean Charcot (pronounced Shar-COE) demonstrated that he could make hysteri-
cal symptoms disappear by suggestion while his patients were in a hypnotic trance.
Freud and Psychoanalysis Hearing of Charcot’s work, the young and curious doc-
tor Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) traveled to Paris to observe Charcot’s renowned hyp-
notic demonstrations for himself. Inspired by what he saw, Freud returned to Vienna,
resolving to try the hypnotic cure on his own patients. But to his dismay, Dr. Freud
found that he could not hypnotize many of them deeply enough to duplicate Charcot’s
results. He did not know that people vary widely in their degree of hypnotizability, the
ability to follow suggestions offered by a hypnotic agent. Moreover, even the ones who
lost their symptoms under hypnosis usually regained them after the trance was lifted.
Finally, a frustrated Freud resolved to find another way to understand and treat the
psychodynamic theory A group of theories that
originated with Freud. All emphasize motivation—often
unconscious motivation—and the influence of the past
on the development of mental disorders.
humanistic theories A group of personality
theories that focus on human growth and potential
rather than on mental disorder. All emphasize the func-
tioning of the individual in the present rather than on
the influence of past events.
social-cognitive theories A group of theories
that involve explanations of limited but important as-
pects of personality (e.g., locus of control). All grew out
of experimental psychology.

Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 429
mysterious illness. The result was the first comprehensive theory of personality—and
still a standard by which all others are compared.
The new approach Freud created became known as psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic
theory. Technically, psychoanalytic theory is the term for Freud’s explanation of person-
ality and mental disorder, while psychoanalysis refers to his system of treatment for
mental disorder. In practice, however, it has always been difficult to separate Freud’s
theory from his therapeutic procedures. Thus the term psychoanalysis is often used to
refer to both (Carver & Scheier, 2008).
As you study Freud’s theory, you may find some points on which you agree and
others on which you disagree. We recommend bringing all your critical thinking skills
to bear, but at the same time, you should maintain a respect for Freud and the task he
faced, more than 100 years ago, as the first great explainer of human personality.
The Freudian Unconscious At center stage in personality, Freud placed the unconscious,
the mind’s hidden, seething cauldron of powerful impulses, instincts, motives, and con-
flicts that energize the personality. We normally have no awareness of this hidden psy-
chic territory, said Freud, because its contents are so threatening and anxiety provoking
that the conscious mind refuses to acknowledge its existence, even in the healthiest of
us. Only by using the special techniques of psychoanalysis can a therapist find, for
example, that a person who had been sexually molested in childhood still retains these
aversive memories in the unconscious. We glimpse such memories when they attempt
to escape from the unconscious, disguised perhaps as a dream or a slip of the tongue or
as a symptom of mental disorder, such as depression or a phobia. So, mentally healthy
or not, Freud maintained that we all go about our daily business without knowing the
real hidden motives behind some of our behaviors.
Unconscious Drives and Instincts Freud taught that the turbulent processes in the
unconscious mind are fueled by psychological energy from our most basic and secret
motives, drives, and desires—the mental equivalent of steam in a boiler. Psychoana-
lytic theory, then, explains how this mental “steam” is transformed and expressed in
disguised form in our conscious thoughts and behavior.
The unconscious sex drive, which Freud named Eros after the Greek god of
passionate love, could be expressed either directly through sexual activity or indirectly
through such releases as joking, work, or creative pursuits. (Perhaps you had never
thought of activities like dancing, drawing, cooking, studying, or body building as
sexual acts—but Freud did!) The energy produced by Eros he termed libido, from the
psychoanalysis A method of treating mental dis-
orders that is based on Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic
theory. The goal of psychoanalysis is to release unac-
knowledged conflicts, urges, and memories from the
unconscious. (In common usage, the term often refers
broadly both to Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and to his
psychoanalytic treatment method.)
psychoanalytic theory Freud’s theory of
personality and mental disorder.
unconscious In Freudian theory, this is the psy-
chic domain of which the individual is not aware but
that is the storehouse of repressed impulses, drives,
and conflicts unavailable to consciousness.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 5
False memory experiments by
Elizabeth Loftus and others have
raised serious questions about
memories of abuse recovered
during therapy (p. 200).
libido The Freudian concept of psychic energy that
drives individuals to experience sensual pleasure.
French physician Jean Charcot showed
that he could temporarily eliminate symp-
toms of hysteria in patients who were
hypnotized. Young Sigmund Freud found
inspiration in Charcot’s demonstrations.

430 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Sigmund Freud is seen here walking with
his daughter Anna Freud, who later be-
came a psychoanalyst in her own right.
Latin word for “lust.” Libidinal energy, in turn, fuels or energizes the rest of the per-
sonality as a primitive life force.
But Eros and its libidinal energy did not explain everything that fascinated Freud.
Specifically, it did not explain acts of human aggression and destruction. Nor did it
explain the symptoms of the war veterans who continued to relive their wartime trau-
mas in nightmares and hallucinations. Such misery could only be accounted for by
another drive, which he named Thanatos (from the Greek word for “death”). Freud
conceived of Thanatos as the unconscious “death instinct” that drives the aggressive
and destructive acts that humans commit against each other and even against them-
selves. (Think of smoking, compulsive gambling, reckless driving, or drug abuse.)
The Structure of the Personality Freud pictured the personality as a trinity composed
of the ego, the id, and the superego, which together form a mind continually at war
within itself. He believed that the sexual and aggressive forces of the id wage a continu-
ing battle against the moralistic forces of the superego. The ever-practical ego serves as
the moderator of this conflict. (Figure 10.4 represents the three parts of the personality
pictorially.)
Freud conceived of the id as the primitive, unconscious reservoir that contains
the basic motives, drives, and instinctive desires—including Eros and Thanatos—that
energize all three parts of the personality. Like a child, the id always acts on impulse
and pushes for immediate gratification—especially sexual, physical, and emotional
pleasures—to be experienced here and now without concern for consequences.
By contrast, the superego serves as the mind’s parental avatars—virtual “parents”
living in the mind—in charge of values and morals learned from parents, teachers,
other authority figures, and society. The superego corresponds roughly to our common
notion of “conscience.” It develops as the child forms an internal set of rules based
on the external rules imposed by parents and other adults. And it is the inner voice of
“shoulds” and “should nots.” The superego also includes the ego ideal, an individual’s
view of the kind of person he or she should strive to become. Understandably, the
superego frequently opposes id’s desires, because the id wants to do only what feels
good, while the superego insists on doing only what is right and moral.
Former President Jimmy Carter, a model of decorum, got in
trouble for his honest confession in a Playboy interview, “I’ve
looked on a lot of women with lust. I’ve committed adultery in
my heart many times.” In Freudian parlance, that was his ego, the
conscious, rational portion of the mind, describing how it must
resolve conflicts between desires of the id and moral ideals of the
superego. The ego, like a referee, often must make decisions that
satisfy no part of the personality completely, but it keeps the whole
out of trouble. This enabled President Carter to sin only in his
heart, but not in his Oval Office, unlike former President Clinton,
whose ego was dominated by id or underwhelmed by superego.
That was even more true with Tiger Woods, whose id ruled the
roost as his superego was put on hold. In extreme instances, when
pressures escalate to the point where the ego cannot find workable
compromises to major conflicts, mental disorder may be triggered.
The Influence of Early Experience on Personality Development As
Freud talked with his patients about their pasts, he began to
understand that personality follows a developmental pattern
through childhood and into adulthood. He proposed that emerging sexual and aggres-
sive drives propel the child through a series of psychosexual stages. In each stage, stimu-
lation of specific body regions is associated with erotic pleasure.
In the oral stage, pleasure is associated with the mouth: suckling, crying, spew-
ing. In the anal stage, pleasure comes from stimulating parts of the body associated
with elimination. (This explains the pleasure young children get from sharing dirty
words, like “shit.”) Next, in the phallic stage, pleasure comes from “immature” sexual
id The primitive, unconscious portion of the per-
sonality that houses the most basic drives and stores
repressed memories.
superego The mind’s storehouse of values, includ-
ing moral attitudes learned from parents and from
society; roughly the same as the common notion of the
conscience.
ego The conscious, rational part of the personality,
charged with keeping peace between the superego and
the id.
psychosexual stages Successive, instinctive
developmental phases in which pleasure is associated
with stimulation of different bodily areas at different
times of life.
FIGURE 10.4
Freud’s Model of the Mind
In another famous metaphor, Freud
likened the mind to an iceberg because
only a small portion appears “above the
surface”—in consciousness. Meanwhile,
the vast unconscious mind lurks “beneath
the surface” of our awareness.
Ego
Id
Preconscious level
Conscious level
Unconscious level
Su
pe
re
go

Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 431
expression, such as masturbation. Finally, after a quiet period of latency, the
adult genital stage brings maturity and mental well-being to those fortunate
enough to resolve the conflicts of earlier stages.
Why such a seemingly bizarre theory of child development? Among the
issues that Freud was trying to resolve with his theory of psychosexual devel-
opment were those of gender identity and gender roles. Why, he wondered,
do boys usually develop a masculine identity, even though most boys are
raised primarily by their mothers? Why do boys and girls, as they become
adults, most often develop a sexual attraction to the opposite sex? And why
do some not follow this pattern?
Freud’s answers to these questions were convoluted and, many psycholo-
gists would say, contrived. His psychodynamic perspective ignored the exter-
nal influence of the different ways that boys and girls are socialized; it also
ignored the possibility of differences in genetic programming, of which almost nothing
was known in Freud’s day. For boys, his solution was the Oedipus complex, an uncon-
scious conflict that initially drives young males to feel an immature erotic attraction
toward their mothers. (You may have heard a little boy say that he wants to marry his
mother when he grows up.) As the boy goes through the stages of psychosexual devel-
opment, resolution of the Oedipal conflict requires him to displace (shift) his emerging
sexual desires away from his mother, directing them instead to females of his own age.
At the same time, he develops an identification with his father. In a parallel fashion,
Freud theorized that girls develop an attraction to their fathers and so become com-
petitive with their mothers for his affection. This unconscious conflict among girls is
known as the Electra complex, named after another important Greek figure.
Most psychologists today reject these Freudian assumptions about psychosexual
development because they lack scientific support. It is important, however, to remem-
ber three things: First, we still don’t fully understand how sexual attraction works.
Second, Freudian concepts about psychosexual development—strange as they may
seem—continue to have a wide impact outside psychology, particularly in literature,
and notably so in current psychology in France. And finally, while Freud may have
been wrong about the details of psychosexual development, he may have been right
about the overall pattern and about the idea that children all progress through stages
of development (Bower, 1998b) that is a central focus among many developmental
psychologists.
For example, Freud may have been right in his assertion that certain difficulties
early in life lead to fixation or arrested psychological development. An oral stage fixa-
tion, caused by a failure to throw off the dependency of the first year of life, may lead
to dependency on others in later childhood and adulthood. We may also see an oral
fixation, he said, in certain behaviors involving “oral tendencies,” such as overeating,
alcoholism, smoking, and talkativeness. Among these diverse problems, we find a com-
mon theme: using the mouth as the way to connect with what one needs or wants.
Similarly, Freud presumed that fixation in the anal stage came from problems asso-
ciated with the second year of life when toilet training is a big issue. Anal fixations,
he said, can result in a stubborn, compulsive, stingy, or excessively neat pattern of
behavior—all related to the theme of controlling one’s body or life.
Ego Defenses In dealing with conflict between the id’s impulses and the superego’s
demand to deny them, Freud said that the ego calls upon a suite of ego defense mechanisms.
All operate, he said, at the preconscious level—just beneath the surface of conscious-
ness. So under mild pressure from the id we may rely, as President Carter did, on sim-
ple ego defenses, such as fantasy or rationalization. But if unconscious desires become
too insistent, the ego may solve the problem by “putting a lid on the id”—that is, by
sequestering both extreme desires and threatening memories deep in the unconscious
mind. Freud called this repression. It is the most central of all ego defenses because it is
assumed to influence much of our behavior and perceptions in disguised fashion. It can
lead to dysfunctional sexual relationships as well as failures to relate openly to others
who are symbolically similar to some repressed ideal or feared person.
Oedipus complex According to Freud, a largely
unconscious process whereby young males displace an
erotic attraction toward their mother to females of their
own age and, at the same time, identify with their fathers.
identification The mental process by which an
individual tries to become like another person, espe-
cially the same-sex parent.
Electra complex Concept advanced by Carl
Jung, highlighting a girl’s psychosexual competition
with mother for the father’s love, which is resolved
in psychoanalyitic theory when girl comes to identify
with same sex adult; equivalent to Oedipus Complex
in males.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
Recall our discussion of
developmental stages as central
to human development across the
lifespan (p. 306).
fixation Occurs when psychosexual development is
arrested at an immature stage.
ego defense mechanism A largely uncon-
scious mental strategy employed to reduce the experi-
ence of conflict or anxiety.
repression An unconscious process that excludes
unacceptable thoughts and feelings from awareness
and memory.
During the phallic stage, said Freud, a
child must resolve feelings of conflict and
anxiety by identifying more closely with
the same-sex parent.

432 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Repression can block access to feelings as well as memories. So a child might
repress strong feelings of anger toward her father—which, if acted on, might incur
severe punishment. Likewise, boys repress the erotic Oedipal feelings they have for
their mothers. Once repressed, a feeling or a desire can no longer operate consciously.
But, said Freud, it is not gone. At an unconscious level, repressed feelings, desires, and
memories continue to influence behavior, but in less direct ways, perhaps disguised, as
we have seen, in dreams, fantasies, or symptoms of mental disorder.
Always the keen observer of human behavior, Freud proposed many other ego de-
fense mechanisms besides fantasy, rationalization, and repression. Here are some of the
most important:
• Denial. “I don’t have a problem.” This defense avoids a difficult situation by
simply denying that it exists. Denial is a defense frequently seen, for example, in
people with drinking problems, people who have problems managing anger, and
people who engage in risky behavior, such as casual, unprotected sex.
• Rationalization. A student who feels stressed by academic pressures may decide
to cheat on a test, rationalizing it by saying that “everyone does it.” People using
this defense mechanism give socially acceptable reasons for actions that are really
based on motives that they believe to be socially unacceptable.
• Reaction formation. We see reaction formation in people who, troubled by their
own sexual desires, rail against “dirty books” in the city library or seek coercive
laws regulating other people’s sexual behavior. This ego defense mechanism occurs
whenever people act exactly in opposition to their unconscious desires. Recently, a
member of Congress who had long been openly attacking homosexuality as a sin
was exposed playing footsies with another man in a public toilet. Such behavior is
either an instance of reaction formation or blatant hypocrisy.
• Displacement. When your boss makes you angry, you may later displace your
anger by yelling at your friend or pounding on the wall. More generally, displace-
ment involves shifting your reaction from the real source of your distress to a safer
individual or object.
• Regression. Under stress, some people hide; others cry, throw things, or even wet
their pants. That is, they regress to an earlier developmental stage by adopting
immature, juvenile behaviors that were effective ways of dealing with stress when
they were younger.
• Sublimation. When sexual energies are bottled up, the person may seek more so-
cially acceptable outlets by engaging in intense creative actions or in excessive
work activities. Freud conjectured that sublimation was responsible for some of
civilization’s major advances. (Perhaps Tiger Woods’s obsession with perfecting his
golfing came at the expense of making time for engaging in youthful sexual explo-
rations. Once having achieved super success in his work, he may have felt entitled
to unleash his sexual desires.)
• Projection. When some personal attitudes or values cannot be fully accepted or
owned up to, they can be directed outward as characteristics of others. Thus,
a person in a committed relationship who is feeling attracted to someone else
accuses his or her partner of cheating. Someone who cannot accept harboring
prejudiced views toward some outgroup comes to see others as prejudiced, sexist,
or racist, for example. More generally, people may use the defense of projection
to misattribute their own unconscious desires and fears onto other people or
objects.
This latter concept—projection—led to the development of projective tests, which have
found extensive use in clinical psychology for evaluating personality and mental disor-
ders. We take a brief detour at this point to introduce you to these projective techniques.
Projective Tests: Diagnosis via a Defense Mechanism What do you see in Figure 10.5? The
head of an insect? An MRI scan of the brain? Something else? Ambiguous images such
as these are the basis for projective tests that psychodynamic clinicians employ to probe
their patients’ innermost feelings, motives, conflicts, and desires. The assumption is
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 8
Freud developed an elaborate
system of dream interpretation
(p. 339).
projective test Personality assessment instru-
ment, such as the Rorschach and TAT, which is based
on Freud’s ego defense mechanism of projection.

Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 433
FIGURE 10.5
An Inkblot Similar to Those Used
in the Rorschach Test
that troubled people will project their hidden motives and conflicts onto such images,
much as people gazing at the clouds may see objects in them that fit their fantasies.
In the most famous of projective techniques, the Rorschach Inkblot Technique
(pronounced ROAR-shock), the stimuli are merely symmetrical inkblots. The tech-
nique calls for showing the images one at a time and asking the respondent, “What
do you see? What does this seem to be?” The examiner usually interprets responses
psychoanalytically by noting how they might reflect unconscious sexual and aggressive
impulses or repressed conflicts (Erdberg, 1990).
How well does the Rorschach work? It gets low marks from many psy-
chologists because objective studies have been disappointing in the lack of
consistency and accuracy in measuring individual differences in personal-
ity (Lilienfeld et al., 2010). Moreover, critics claim that the test is based on
concepts such as unconscious motivation that are impossible to demonstrate
objectively. Despite these criticisms, many clinicians have continued to cham-
pion the Rorschach, arguing that it can provide unique insights as part of a
broader personality assessment (Hibbard, 2003).
By comparison, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), developed by Harvard
psychologist Henry Murray, is a projective test that stands on somewhat firmer
scientific ground, especially for assessing achievement motivation, as we saw
in Chapter 9. The test consists of ambiguous pictures, like the one in Figure
10.6, for which respondents are instructed to generate a story, telling what the
characters in the scenes are doing and thinking (present focus), what led up
to each event (past focus), and how each situation might end (future focus).
According to the projection hypothesis underlying the TAT, the respondent
first perceives the elements in the picture and then apperceives (fills in) personal
interpretations and explanations based on his or her own thoughts, feelings,
and needs. The examiner then interprets the responses by looking for psycho-
logical themes, such as aggression, sexual needs, achievement motives, and rela-
tionships among people mentioned in the stories. (What do you imagine Tiger
Woods’s TAT story would have focused on prior to his sexual scandal?)
Rorschach Inkblot Technique A projective
test requiring subjects to describe what they see in a
series of ten inkblots.
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) A pro-
jective test requiring subjects to make up stories that
explain ambiguous pictures.
FIGURE 10.6
Images similar to this one are used in the TAT
to elicit motivational themes from respondents.

434 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Psychic Determinism Psychoanalysis literally leaves nothing to accident. According
to the principle of psychic determinism, all of human behavior is determined by our
inner mental states—by unconscious memories, desires, and conflicts. Chance and
coincidence do not exist in the Freudian dictionary. Inevitably, the way you feel uncon-
sciously leaks out in your behavior. You just can’t help it. You are late for a class you
don’t like or to a meeting with a snobby person, you forget someone’s birthday, or you
say, “‘sad to meet you,’ oh, I’m sorry, I meant ‘glad to meet you,’” and so forth.
Accordingly, everything a person does potentially has a deep psychological mean-
ing to the Freudian analyst. In therapy, mental symptoms such as fears and phobias
are signs of unconscious difficulties that are to be uncovered and worked through.
Similarly, the analyst may catch a glimpse of the unconscious at work in a so-called
Freudian slip—when “accidental” speech or behavior belies an unconscious conflict or
desire. Former President George W. Bush was famous for slips of the tongue, as when
intending to emphasize how strongly his party felt about the family, he said instead,
“Republicans understand the importance of bondage between a mother and child.” Or,
when a radio announcer was promoting Wonder Bread, extolling it in comparison to
other brands, as “the best of breasts.” (We hasten to add, in defense of anyone who has
committed a speech blunder, that cognitive psychologists today believe that most slips
of the tongue are mix-ups in the brain mechanisms we use to produce language and so
have no relationship to unconscious intentions.)
Evaluating Freud’s Work Whatever your reaction to Freud, you must give him credit
for developing the first and still, perhaps, the most comprehensive theory of person-
ality, mental disorder, and psychotherapy. He did so at a time when we had no un-
derstanding of genetics and neurotransmitters, no particularly effective treatments for
most mental disorders, and no understanding of the influences on gender identity or
sexual development. His writing was so incisive and his arguments so compelling that
he has had a greater impact than any other theorist on the way all of us think about
personality and mental abnormality, whether we realize it or not. He gave us the un-
conscious, the concept of developmental stages, the notion of defense mechanisms, and
the idea that behavior—and even our dreams—may have hidden meanings. Moreover,
he made human sexuality a central theme in personal development and disordered
functioning during a Victorian era where any mention of sex was taboo. Even among
psychologists, who had largely rejected his ideas in recent years, Freud is enjoying re-
newed support as one of the keenest observers of human behavior who has ever lived
(Solms, 2004). Again and again he saw in little things big antecedents or consequences.
Freud was to Sherlock Holmes as a mind detective is to a homicide detective. Nearly
everyone would agree that people do displace aggression, rationalize their behavior,
and see their own shortcomings more easily in others than in themselves.
Freud as Unscientific Nevertheless, Freud still plays to mixed reviews (Azar, 1997; Mc-
Cullough, 2001). The biggest problem is that many of his concepts, such as “libido,”
“anal stage,” or “repression,” are vague, lacking clear operational definitions. In an
earlier chapter, we saw this problem in the controversy over recovery of repressed
memories. Without credible, independently verifiable evidence (which rarely exists),
how could one ever determine whether a recovered memory had been truly repressed
or was merely implanted by suggestion of a therapist or social worker or from read-
ing media accounts? Such difficulties make psychoanalytic theory difficult to evaluate
scientifically.2
Although Freud never bothered to build a careful scientific case for his observa-
tions, critics may have judged him too harshly on this count, argues Drew Westen
(1998), one of Freud’s staunch defenders. Researchers have validated many of his most
fundamental insights, says Westen. Among these well-established notions:
psychic determinism Freud’s assumption that
all our mental and behavioral responses are caused by
unconscious traumas, desires, or conflicts.
2Because many of Freud’s ideas are not testable, his psychoanalytic theory is not truly a scientific theory as we
defined the term in Chapter 1. Here, we follow common usage, which nevertheless calls it a theory because it is such
a comprehensive explanation for personality and mental disorder. It should be noted, however, that valiant efforts are
being made to put Freud’s concepts on a scientific footing (Cramer, 2000).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Operational definitions are stated
in objective, observable, and
measurable terms (p. 24).

Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 435
• Much of mental life is unconscious (although the unconscious may not operate
exactly as Freud envisioned);
• People can have conflicts arising from conflicting motives (some conscious and
some unconscious) that push them in different directions simultaneously;
• Stable personality patterns do begin to form in childhood—sometimes for better,
sometimes for worse—in part as the result of childhood experiences.
Retrospective but Not Prospective A second criticism says that Freudian theory is a seduc-
tive explanation for the past but a poor predictor of future responses. That is, it may be
merely a clever example of hindsight bias, in which we have the illusion of seeing things
more clearly in retrospect. And by overemphasizing the origins of behavior in childhood,
psychoanalysis may compound the problem by directing attention away from the stress-
ors of the present that may be the real causes of mental and behavioral disorders.
Gender Issues A third criticism faults Freud for giving short shrift to women. Particularly
aggravating is his portrayal of women as inevitably suffering from “penis envy.” (He
thought that women spent their lives unconsciously trying to make up for their biological
deficit in this department.) A better explanation is that Freud’s theory simply projects
onto women his own attitudes and those of the male-centered world of his time.
Newer Views of the Unconscious A final criticism claims that the unconscious mind is
not as smart or purposeful as Freud believed (Loftus & Klinger, 1992). In this newer
view, coming out of neuroscience research in emotion, the brain has parallel conscious
and unconscious processing pathways, with the unconscious quick to detect emotion-
provoking stimuli (think of your “gut” reaction to a shadowy figure approaching you
on a dark street), while consciousness acts more deliberately and logically (“OK,”
you say to yourself. “Remain calm and act naturally, and maybe he won’t sense that
you are scared.”) This new view of an unconscious emotional processing system is
much less malign and turbulent than the unconscious filled with raging sexual desires
and destructive death wishes that Freud had imagined (LeDoux, 1996).
Freud’s Appeal beyond Psychology Despite these objections, Freud’s ideas
have found a receptive audience with the public at large (Adler, 2006).
Much of his appeal may be explained by his graceful writing and by his
emphasis on sexuality, a topic that grabs everyone’s interest—as Freud
well knew! As a result, Freudian images and symbols abound in the
art and literature of the 20th century. His ideas have had an enormous
influence on marketing as well. For example, advertisers make billions
by associating products with sexy models, hinting that the products
will bring sexual satisfaction to their owners. They also capitalize on
Freud’s destructive instinct by reminding us of threats to our happiness
(social rejection, irregularity, untimely death) and then offering prod-
ucts and services to reduce our anxiety and restore hope. Perhaps Freud
was right after all!
How Would Freud Have Seen Mary Calkins? Let us end our discussion of
Freud by seeing whether his explanation of personality can give us a useful perspective
on Mary Calkins. A psychoanalyst interpreting her sense of purpose and willingness to
fight the system might look first to her childhood for experiences that may have shaped
her personality.
The Calkins family was especially close (Furumoto, 1979). Mary’s mother,
Charlotte Calkins, suffered from deteriorating health, so Mary, as the eldest child, took
over many of the duties of running the household—an especially interesting devel-
opment in view of Freud’s suggestion that girls compete with their mothers for their
fathers’ attention. For his part, Mary’s father, the Reverend Wolcott Calkins, was a
Congregationalist minister who placed a high value on education and personally tu-
tored Mary at a time when education for women was not fashionable. Any sexual
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Emotion-provoking stimuli
are processed in two parallel
pathways in the brain (p. 394).
Sex sells cars and virtually everything
in our culture by association of objects
with sexy models.

436 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
feelings she may have felt from this close association with her father would then get
sublimated into Mary’s intense work habits for the rest of her life.
Another decisive event, which caused Mary great distress, was the death of her
younger sister. From a Freudian viewpoint, her sister’s death may have produced a
conflict based on unconscious feelings of sibling rivalry for the parents’ affections. A
Freudian analyst might suggest that, in her work, Calkins sublimated her sadness or,
perhaps, her anger at the necessity of taking on mother’s role and at the sexist preju-
dices she endured. As is usual with psychoanalysis, of course, these guesses are guided
by hindsight—and cannot be either proved or disproved.
The Neo-Freudians Freud was always a controversial and charismatic figure—
an image he liked to promote (Sulloway, 1992). And although he attracted many
followers, Freud tolerated no criticism from any of them concerning the basic princi-
ples of psychoanalysis. So, like rebellious children, several of Freud’s equally strong-
willed disciples broke away to establish their own systems of personality, mental
disorder, and treatment. While these neo-Freudians (literally, “new Freudians”) some-
times departed from Freud’s theory, they always retained his psychodynamic empha-
sis. That is, they kept Freud’s idea of personality as an emerging process driven by
motivational energy—even as they disagreed about the specific motives that energize
personality. And you may disagree too: Are our motives primarily sexual or social?
Conscious or unconscious? Is personality determined by events in the past or by our
goals for the future? Let’s examine some of the divergent paths followed by these
neo-Freudians.
Carl Jung: Extending the Unconscious Freud attracted many disciples, but none
was more famous than Carl Jung (pronounced YOONG), a member of the inner cir-
cle of colleagues who helped Freud develop and refine psychoanalytic theory during
the first decade of the 1900s. For a time, Freud viewed the somewhat younger Jung
as his “crown prince” and probable successor. But Freud’s paternal attitude increas-
ingly vexed Jung, who was developing radical theoretical ideas of his own (Carver &
Scheier, 2008). Eventually this personality conflict—which Freud interpreted as Jung’s
unconscious wish to usurp his fatherly authority—caused a split in their relationship.
For Jung, the break with Freud centered on two issues. First, Jung thought that his
mentor had overemphasized sexuality at the expense of other unconscious needs and
desires that Jung saw at the heart of personality. In particular, he believed spirituality
to be a fundamental human motive, coequal with sexuality. Moreover, he disputed the
very structure of the unconscious mind. Jung’s new and expanded vision of the uncon-
scious is Jung’s most famous innovation.
The Collective Unconscious In place of the Freudian id, Jung installed a two-
part unconscious, consisting of both a personal unconscious and a collective
unconscious. While the Jungian personal unconscious spanned essentially the
same territory as the Freudian id, its collective twin was another matter—and
wholly a Jungian creation. He saw in the collective unconscious a reservoir for
instinctive “memories” shared by people everywhere—in much the same way
that humans share a common genetic code. These collective memories tie
together countless generations of human history and give us the ancient im-
ages, called archetypes, that appear and reappear in art, literature, and folk-
tales around the world (Jung, 1936/1959). For Jung, the causes of mental
disorder include not only repressed traumas and conflicts in the personal un-
conscious but also failure to acknowledge the archetypes we find unaccept-
able in our collective unconscious.
Among these archetypal memories, Jung identified the animus and the anima, which
represent the masculine and feminine sides of our personalities. Other archetypes give
us the universal concepts of mother, father, birth, death, the hero, the trickster, God,
and the self. On the darker side of the self lurks the shadow archetype, representing the
destructive and aggressive tendencies (similar to Freud’s Thanatos) that we don’t want
neo-Freudian Literally “new Freudian;” refers
to theorists who broke with Freud but whose theories
retain a psychodynamic aspect, especially a focus on
motivation as the source of energy for the personality.
archetype One of the ancient memory images in the
collective unconscious. Archetypes appear and reappear
in art, literature, and folktales around the world.
personal unconscious Jung’s term for that
portion of the unconscious corresponding roughly to
the Freudian id.
collective unconscious Jung’s addition to
the unconscious, involving a reservoir for instinctive
“memories,” including the archetypes, which exist in
all people.
Jungian archetypes abound in art, litera-
ture, and film. This photo, from The Lord
of the Rings, shows Gandalf who embodies
the archetype of magician or trickster. The
same archetype is evoked by the coyote in
Native American legends and by Merlin
in the King Arthur legends.

Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 437
to acknowledge in our personalities. You can recognize your own shadow archetype at
work the next time you feel angry, hostile, envious, or jealous. From a Jungian perspec-
tive, we might wonder whether Tiger Woods was denying, even to himself, the shadow
in his personality.
Personality Types Revisited Jung’s principle of opposites portrays each personality as a bal-
ance between opposing pairs of tendencies or dispositions, which you see in Table 10.2.
Jung taught that most people tend to favor one or the other in each pair. The overall
pattern of such tendencies, then, was termed a personality type, which Jung believed to
be a stable and enduring aspect of the individual’s personality.
The most famous of these pairs is introversion and extraversion. Extraverts turn
attention outward, on external experience. As a result, extraverts are more in tune with
people and things in the world around them than they are with their own inner needs.
They tend to be outgoing and unaffected by self-consciousness. Introverts, by contrast,
focus on inner experience—their own thoughts and feelings—which makes them seem
more shy and less sociable. Jung believed that few people have all pairs of forces in
perfect balance. Instead, one or another dominates, giving rise to personality types
(Fadiman & Frager, 2001).
Evaluating Jung’s Work Like Freud, Jung’s influence is now most evident outside of psy-
chology, particularly in literature and the popular press—again because they do not
lend themselves to objective observation and testing. In two respects, however, Jung
has had a big impact on psychological thinking. First, he challenged Freud and thereby
opened the door to a spate of alternative personality theories. Second, his notion of
personality types, and especially the concepts of introversion and extraversion, makes
Jung not only a psychodynamic theorist but a pillar of the temperament/trait/type ap-
proach. And, as we noted earlier, his theory of types underlies the widely used (yet
controversial) Myers-Briggs test.
Could Jung’s theory give us a new perspective on Mary Calkins? He might have
suspected that her determination to succeed in the male-dominated world of her day
was energized by conflicts between the masculine and feminine sides of her nature, the
animus and anima. Another Jungian possibility is that her mother’s ill health, which
caused her to relinquish much of the maternal role, made Mary deny her own mater-
nal archetype—which may have been why she never married, and also why she was
so willing to embrace the intense work schedule within a male-dominated world of
academia.
Karen Horney: A Feminist Voice in Psychodynamic Psychology Karen Horney
(HORN-eye) and Anna Freud, Sigmund Freud’s daughter, represent virtually the only
feminine voices within the early decades of the psychoanalytic movement. In this
role, Horney disputed the elder Freud’s notion of the Oedipus complex and especially
his assertion that women must suffer from penis envy (Horney, 1939). Instead, said
Horney, women want the same opportunities and rights that men enjoy, and many
introversion The Jungian dimension that focuses
on inner experience—one’s own thoughts and
feelings—making the introvert less outgoing and
sociable than the extravert.
extraversion The Jungian personality dimension
that involves turning one’s attention outward, toward
others.
TABLE 10.2 Jung’s Opposing Tendencies in Personality
conscious unconscious
extravert introvert
rational irrational
thinking feeling
intuition sensation
good bad
masculine feminine
Carl Jung:
Unconscious
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

438 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
personality differences between males and females result from learned social roles,
not from unconscious urges. She also disputed Freud’s contention that personality is
determined mainly by early childhood experiences. For Horney, normal growth in-
volves the full development of social relationships and of one’s potential. This devel-
opment, however, may be blocked by a sense of uncertainty and isolation that she
called basic anxiety. It is this basic anxiety that can lead to adjustment problems and
mental disorder.
Neurotic Needs When basic anxiety gets out of control, people become neurotic. The
neurotic person, said Horney (1942), suffers from “unconscious strivings developed in
order to cope with life despite fears, helplessness, and isolation” (p. 40). These uncon-
scious strivings manifest themselves in one or more neurotic needs, which are normal
desires taken to extremes. You can see these neurotic needs listed in Table 10.3.
Horney also identified three common patterns of attitudes and behavior that peo-
ple use to deal with basic anxiety: They move either toward others, against others, or
away from others. Those who neurotically move toward others have a pathological
need for constant reminders of love and approval. Such persons may need someone
to help, to take care of, or for whom to “sacrifice” themselves. Alternatively, they
may seek someone on whom they can become dependent. They may end up behav-
ing passively and feeling victimized. In contrast, those who move against others earn
power and respect by competing or attacking successfully, but they risk being feared
and ending up “lonely at the top.” Those who take the third route, moving away
from others to protect themselves from imagined hurt and rejection, are likely to
close themselves off from intimacy and support. “Better to be feared, than loved” is
a theme of one of the Mafia gangsters in the movie A Bronx Tale that concisely de-
picts what Horney meant by dealing with basic anxiety with a personality style that
moves against people.
What analysis would Horney have made of Mary Calkins? We suspect that she
would have focused on Calkins’s achievements, attempting to determine whether they
were the result of a healthy drive to fulfill her potential or a neurotic need for power.
Undoubtedly, Horney would have reminded us that society often praises these needs
in men and punishes them in women. She would also have pointed out that much of
Calkins’s professional identity was shaped by having to deal with the male-centered
academic world of her time. In that context, Calkins not only drew on the strength of
a supportive family of her childhood but also the support of the all-female Wellesley
faculty that became the “family” of her adulthood. From this point of view, it is likely
that Horney may have seen in Calkins a robust and healthy personality caught in a dif-
ficult web of social constraints and contradictions.
Horney might have seen in Tiger Woods his ambivalence toward a dominating
father who forced him to practice golf endlessly starting at a very young age and was
perhaps aware of his “alleged womanizing.” After his father’s death in 2006, Tiger
became all that his father seemed to want from him: to become a super star golfer and
super womanizer.
basic anxiety An emotion, proposed by Karen
Horney, that gives a sense of uncertainty and loneliness
in a hostile world and can lead to maladjustment.
neurotic needs Signs of neurosis in Horney’s
theory, the ten needs are normal desires carried to a
neurotic extreme.
TABLE 10.3 Horney’s Ten Neurotic Needs
1. Need for affection and approval
2. Need for a partner and dread of being left alone
3. Need to restrict one’s life and remain inconspicuous
4. Need for power and control over others
5. Need to exploit others
6. Need for recognition or prestige
7. Need for personal admiration
8. Need for personal achievement
9. Need for self-sufficiency and independence
10. Need for perfection and unassailability
Psychoanalyst Karen Horney asserted that
personality differences between men and
women are largely the result of differ-
ent social roles rather than unconscious
urges or early childhood experiences. She
believed that people are driven more by
social motives than sexual motives.

Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 439
Evaluating Horney’s Work Karen Horney’s ideas were largely neglected early in her
career (Monte, 1980). Then her 1967 book, Feminine Psychology, appeared at just the
right time to elevate her among those seeking a feminist perspective within psychology
and psychiatry (Horney, 1967). But, having attracted renewed interest, will Horney
eventually slip again into oblivion? Her ideas suffer from the same flaw that plagues
the other psychodynamic theories: a weak scientific foundation. It awaits someone to
translate her concepts into operational terms that can be put to a scientific test. What
should be evident to you even as a young student of psychology is that all these people
were big-time thinkers, theorizing in grand fashion and abstractly about the nature
of human nature. They were not oriented nor fully trained toward testing parts of
their ideas as hypotheses relating independent to dependent variables in experimental
paradigms.
Other Neo-Freudian Theorists Sigmund Freud’s revolutionary ideas attracted
many others to the psychoanalytic movement—many of whom, like Carl Jung, Karen
Horney, Erik Erikson, and Alfred Adler, also broke from Freud to develop their own
ideas. For the most part, the post-Freudian theorists accepted the notions of psychic
determinism and unconscious motivation. But they did not always agree with Freud on
the details, especially about the sex and death instincts or the indelible nature of early
life experiences. Broadly speaking, the neo-Freudians made several significant changes
in the course of psychoanalysis:
• They put greater emphasis on ego functions, including ego defenses, development
of the self, and conscious thought as the major components of the personality—
whereas Freud focused primarily on the unconscious.
• They gave social variables (culture, family, and peers) an important role in shaping
personality—whereas Freud focused mainly on instinctive urges and unconscious
conflicts.
• They extended personality development beyond childhood to include the lifespan—
whereas Freud focused mainly on early childhood experiences.
As we saw in Chapter 7, neo-Freudian Erik Erikson proposed an elaborate theory of
personality development that unfolded in stages throughout the lifespan, a conjec-
ture that has recently received support from psychologist Sanjay Srivastava and his
team (2003) at the University of Oregon. Their data show that personality continues
to change well into adulthood, with people in their 20s growing more conscientious
and those in their 30s and beyond gaining as they age on measures of agreeableness,
warmth, generosity, and helpfulness.
In such ways, then, the post-Freudians broke Freud’s monopoly on personality the-
ory and paved the way for the new ideas developed by the humanistic and cognitive
theorists.
Humanistic Theories: Emphasis on Human
Potential and Mental Health
Neither Freud nor the neo-Freudians had much to say about those of us who are “normal.”
With an emphasis on internal conflict and mental disorder, they offered compelling
explanations for mental disorders, but they largely failed to provide a usable theory
of the healthy personality. And so the humanistic approach stepped in to fill that need
for a bright-light view of human nature in place of the dark lenses of their theoretical
predecessors.
Humanistic psychologists are optimistic on a grand scale. For them, personality is
not driven by unconscious conflicts and defenses against anxiety but rather by positive
needs to adapt, learn, grow, and thrive. They have retained the idea of motivation as a
central component of personality, but they have accentuated the positive motives, such
as love, esteem, and self-actualization. They see mental disorders as stemming from
unhealthy situations rather than from unhealthy individuals. Once people are freed
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
Erikson’s theory described the
development of personality across
the lifespan (p. 276).

440 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Self-Concept
(Perception of
oneself)
Perceptions of
objects, events,
and other people
FIGURE 10.7
Rogers’s Phenomenal Field
For Carl Rogers, what we perceive and
feel is the only reality. The totality of all
our feelings and perceptions he dubbed
the phenomenal field. Note that the self-
concept is a perception of oneself and
therefore a part of the phenomenal field.
In the fully functioning person, the self-
concept is both positive and congruent
with the feedback received from others.
Maslow considered Eleanor Roosevelt to
be a self-actualizing person.
from negative situations, such as negative self-evaluations (“I’m not smart”) and abu-
sive relationships or jobs and careers that are demeaning or debilitating, the innate
tendency to be healthy should actively guide them to life-enhancing choices.
Abraham Maslow and the Healthy Personality Abraham Maslow referred to the
humanistic view as psychology’s “third force,” to contrast his ideas with the psychoan-
alytic and behaviorist movements that had dominated psychology during most of his
lifetime. He was especially concerned by the Freudian fixation on mental disturbance
and maladjustment. Instead, Maslow argued, we need a theory that describes mental
health as something more than just the absence of illness. That theoretical need became
his life’s quest. He sought the ingredients of the healthy personality where no one had
ever looked for them before: in people who had lived especially full and productive
lives (Maslow, 1968, 1970, 1971).
Self-Actualizers Maslow’s subjects included the historical figures Abraham Lincoln
and Thomas Jefferson, plus several persons of stature during his own lifetime:
Albert Einstein, Albert Schweitzer, and Eleanor Roosevelt. In these individuals,
Maslow found healthy personalities focused on goals beyond their own basic needs.
Some, like Lincoln and Roosevelt, were oriented toward the needs of humanity.
Others, like Einstein, were oriented toward understanding the natural world. Most
became engaged in causes about which they felt deeply. Maslow called them all
self-actualizing personalities. He characterized his self-actualizers as creative, full of
good humor, and given to spontaneity—but, at the same time, accepting of their
own limitations and those of others. In brief, self-actualizers are those who feel
free to fulfill their potentialities. It is a state of being that we should aspire to
become and embrace.
Needs in a Hierarchy Although Maslow was most interested in the healthy, self-
actualizing personality, his theory of a hierarchy of needs also offers an explanation
of maladjustment. As you will recall, Maslow proposed that our needs are arranged
in a priority order, from the biological needs to needs for safety, love, esteem, and
self-actualization. An unfulfilled “deficiency” need, such as a need for love or esteem,
can produce maladjustment, while satisfaction of such needs allows the person
to pursue interests that promote growth and fulfillment. Indeed, research shows
that people who have low self-esteem may go through life feeling fearful, angry, or
depressed, while those who are self-accepting lead far happier lives (Baumeister, 1993;
Brown, 1991).
Carl Rogers’s Fully Functioning Person Unlike Maslow, Carl Rogers
(1961) was a therapist who often worked with dysfunctional people rather
than self-actualizers. Yet he did not overlook the healthy personality, which
he called the fully functioning person. He described such an individual as hav-
ing a self-concept that is both positive and congruent with reality. That is,
the fully functioning person has high self-esteem, which is consistent (con-
gruent) with the messages he or she receives from others who express their
approval, friendship, and love. Negative experiences, such as loss of a job or
rejection by a lover, can produce incongruence, a threat to one’s self-esteem.
The Phenomenal Field: The Person’s Reality Rogers insisted that psychology recognize
the importance of perceptions and feelings, which he called the phenomenal field. We
respond only to this subjective experience, not to an objective reality. That is why a
student’s reaction to a grade depends entirely on her or his perception of the personal
meaning of that letter grade. Receiving a C may shock a student who is used to receiv-
ing As but thrill one who has been failing: Both are reacting to their own subjective
phenomenal fields. In Rogers’s system, then, the phenomenal field is part of the per-
sonality, as a sort of filter for our experiences (see Figure 10.7). It contains our inter-
pretations of both the external and internal worlds, and it also contains the self, the
humanists’ version of the Freudian ego.
self-actualizing personality A healthy indi-
vidual who has met his or her basic needs and is free
to be creative and fulfil his or her potentialities.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
claims that motives occur in a
priority order (p. 372).
fully functioning person Carl Rogers’s term
for a healthy, self-actualizing individual who has a self-
concept that is both positive and congruent with reality.
phenomenal field One’s psychological reality,
composed of one’s perceptions and feelings.
about Maslow’s Help in Founding
Great Businesses
Read
at MyPsychLab

Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 441
Conditional versus Unconditional Relationships Interestingly, Rogers himself had an
unhappy and dysfunctional childhood, dominated by the rigid rules of his parents’
strict religious beliefs. So restrictive was this environment that he once remarked that he
felt “wicked” when he first tasted a bottle of soda pop without his parents’ knowledge
(Rogers, 1961). Later, from an adult perspective, Rogers concluded that children from
homes like his, where parental love is conditional (dependent) on good behavior, may
grow up with excessive anxiety and a strong sense of guilt that leads to low self-esteem
and mental disorder. Instead of parental “guilt-mongers,” he believed, we need people
who can give us unconditional positive regard—love without conditions attached.
Unlike the psychodynamic theorists who focused on sinister motives, Rogers,
Maslow, and other humanistic personality theorists including Rollo May (1966) be-
lieve that our most basic motives are for positive growth. In its healthiest form, self-
actualization is a striving to realize one’s potential—to develop fully one’s capacities
and talents. According to the humanistic theorists, this innate quest is a constructive,
guiding force that moves each person toward positive behaviors and the enhancement
of the self.
A Humanistic Perspective on Mary Calkins A humanist trying to understand what drove
Mary Calkins would probably begin by asking: How did she see her world—and her-
self? And what mattered to her? They would be especially interested in her strengths:
her intelligence, her nurturing family background, and her supportive circle of col-
leagues at Wellesley and in the psychology group at Harvard. They would also note
that Calkins worked all her life to make psychology the science of the self (by which she
meant the whole person, not the fragmented and narrow approach of the structuralists
or the “mindless” approach of the behaviorists of that era). In this respect, Mary Calkins
might be considered one of the pioneers of humanistic psychology.
Evaluating the Humanistic Theories The upbeat humanistic view of personality
brought a welcome change for therapists who had wearied of the dark, pessimistic
Freudian perspective, with its emphasis on unspeakable desires and repressed traumas.
They liked the humanistic focus on making one’s present and future life more palatable
rather than dredging up painful memories of an unalterable past. They also liked its
attention to mental health rather than mental disorder.
Are Humanistic Theories “Self”-Centered? But not everyone jumped on the humanists’
bandwagon. Many critics chided the humanists for their fuzzy concepts: What exactly
is “self-actualization,” they asked? Is it an inborn tendency, or is it created by one’s cul-
ture? And, added the psychoanalysts, the humanistic emphasis on conscious experience
does not recognize the power of the unconscious. Finally, cross-cultural psychologists
criticized the humanists’ emphasis on the self—as in self-concept, self-esteem, and self-
actualization. This “self-centered” picture of personality, they noted, may merely be the
viewpoint of observers looking through the lens of an individualistic Western culture
that is alien to non-Western views where community and family are more vital than
any selfhood (Heine et al., 1999).
We should be clear: No one denies the existence of a self within the personality—
that is, some sort of process that distinguishes the individual from everything else.
We all distinguish “me” from “thee.” In fact, MRI and PET scans demonstrate the
existence of specialized brain modules related to processing thoughts about the self
(Heatherton et al., 2004). And even in the collectivistic cultures, the self exists, al-
though the emphasis is on a self embedded in a social context. The real issue, then, is
whether the self should be the centerpiece of personality or a side show.
Self-Esteem: Cause or Effect? Recently, the whole popular notion of self-esteem as the
essential ingredient for mental health has been brought under the lens of research and
critical thinking . . . and surprisingly found questionable. Why is this important? Many
programs designed to improve education, combat drug abuse, and discourage teen
sex and violence are based on boosting self-esteem of adolescent students. Yet after
a review of the research, psychologist Roy Baumeister et al. (2003) report that low
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Structuralism sought the
“elements” of conscious
experience (p. 14).

442 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
self-esteem causes none of these problems. In fact, studies show that bullies and drug
users often have high self-esteem. So rather than focusing on high self-esteem as an
end in itself, Baumeister and his colleagues urge promoting positive achievements and
prosocial behaviors, with the expectation that self-esteem will follow in their wake.
Positive Psychology: The New Humanism? In the past decade, a move-
ment known as positive psychology, pioneered by psychologist Martin
Seligman, was formed to pursue essentially the same goals established
by the humanists. The difference is that those allied with positive psy-
chology are more concerned than were most humanists about laying a
scientific foundation for their theories, with greater precision for the
specific terms in the lexicon that comprises human strengths and virtues
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). This ever-expanding “fourth force” has
produced important work that we will see on happiness, social support,
health, and well-being in Chapter 14. Even so, the positive psychology
movement itself is limited as an all-purpose explanation of personality
by its restricted focus on only the desirable aspects of human function-
ing. In a sense, it is similar to the Dalai Lama’s emphasis on becoming
a compassionate person, which is perhaps one of the noblest personal
virtues, but fails to recognize its function in a world filled with evil of
all kinds. That positive self-oriented compassion must be transformed
into heroic action if it is to become a mechanism for social and political
change (Dalai Lama, 2007).
So, is there an alternative view that overcomes the problems we
have seen in the psychodynamic, humanistic, and the new positive psy-
chology theories? Let’s next consider the cognitive approach.
Social-Cognitive Theories: Emphasis on Social Learning
To understand why we must put up with those tamper-proof seals on pill bottles, we
need to go back a few years to 1982, when someone (the case is still unsolved) slipped
cyanide into a batch of Tylenol capsules. The result was seven deaths. And before
manufacturers could get those pesky new seals in place, several copycat attempts
to contaminate other drugs occurred. Sales of those drugs plummeted, so observers
speculated that the motive—held maybe by competitors, not just psychopathic
individuals—was to bankrupt certain drug companies.
The personality-related question is this: Can we explain these despicable acts
entirely by looking at unconscious motives, selves being actualized, or perverted
strengths and virtues? Social-cognitive theorists answer with a resounding, “No!” We
must take learning into account—social learning, to be more precise. In fact, we must
take into account the full range of psychological processes, including cognition, moti-
vation, and emotion, as well as the environment (Cervone, 2004). Here, we will sample
two of these approaches.
Observational Learning and Personality: Bandura’s Theory You don’t have to
yell “Fire!” in a crowded theater to know what would happen if you did. Stanford Uni-
versity’s Albert Bandura maintains that we are driven not just by inner motivational
forces or even by receiving external rewards and punishments but by our expectations
of how our actions might gain us rewards or cost us pains. And many of those expec-
tations, he notes, don’t come from direct experience but rather from observing what
happens to others (Bandura, 1986). Thus, a distinctive feature of the human personal-
ity is the ability to foresee the consequences of actions, particularly in learning what
happens to others when they behave in certain ways.
Perhaps this is the most important contribution of Bandura’s theory: the idea that
we can learn vicariously—that is, from others. This social learning, or observational
learning, is the process by which people learn new responses by watching each oth-
er’s behavior and noting its consequences. That is, others act as role models that we
positive psychology A recent movement
within psychology, focusing on desirable aspects of
human functioning, as opposed to an emphasis on
psychopathology.
observational learning A form of cognitive
learning in which new responses are acquired after
watching others’ behavior and the consequences of
their behavior.
Author Phil Zimbardo being greeted
by the Dalai Lama, prior to their pub-
lic dialogue about the importance of
compassion, as a personal virtue being
transformed ino the civic virtue of heroic
action in order to challenge evil in the
world.

either accept or reject, depending on whether they are rewarded or
punished for their behavior. So, when Ramon sees Billy hit his brother
and get punished for it, Ramon learns through observation that hit-
ting is not a good strategy to adopt. But if he gets away with it or is
praised for toughening up his kid brother, a different lesson is learned.
Thus, through observational learning, Ramon can see what works and
what does not work without having to go through trial and error for
himself. In Bandura’s view, then, personality is a collection of learned
behavior patterns, many of which we have borrowed by observational
learning.
Through observational learning, children and adults acquire infor-
mation about their social environment. Likewise, skills, attitudes, and
beliefs may be acquired simply by noting what others do and the con-
sequences that follow. In this way, children may learn to say “please”
and “thank you,” to be quiet in libraries, and to refrain from public nose picking. The
down side, of course, is that bad habits can be acquired by observing negative role
models, such as a relative with a fear of spiders, or by exposure to TV shows that seem
to reward antisocial behaviors, like shooting people, abusing drugs, or putting poison
in Tylenol capsules. The point is that people don’t always have to try out behaviors
themselves in order to learn from experience.
But, says Bandura, personality is not just a repertoire of learned behavior. Under-
standing the whole person means understanding the continued interaction among be-
havior, cognition, and the environment. He calls this reciprocal determinism (Bandura,
1981, 1999).
How does reciprocal determinism work in real life? If, for example, you like psy-
chology, your interest (a cognition) will probably lead you to spend time in the psy-
chology department on campus (an environment) interacting with students and faculty
(social behavior) who share your interest. To the extent that you find this stimulating
and rewarding, this activity will reciprocally strengthen your interest in psychology
and encourage you to spend more time in the psychology department. Each of the
three elements—behavior, cognition, and the environment—reinforces the others. You
can see the simple but powerful relationship among these variables in Figure 10.8.
Locus of Control: Rotter’s Theory Another cognitive psychologist, Julian Rotter
(rhymes with voter) developed a hybrid theory that we first introduced to you in con-
nection with motivation in Chapter 9. Rotter tells us that our behavior depends on our
sense of personal power or locus of control. Perceived locus of control, then, acts as a
sort of filter through which we see our experiences and as a motive for action or inac-
tion. Thus, Rotter’s theory is both a trait theory and a “process” theory that focuses on
a single but important dimension of personality.
To illustrate, we ask you this question: When you ride in a car, do you always use
a seat belt, or do you think that being hurt or killed in an accident depends on when
your “number comes up”? If you always use the belt and automatically click it every
time you get into a car as driver or passenger, you probably have an internal locus
of control because by doing so you are exerting some control over your fate. On the
other hand, if you have a fatalistic feeling that you have no control over the events in
your life, that whatever will be, will be, you probably don’t buckle up (except to avoid
being fined where it is illegal not to do so). In that case, you have an external locus
of control.
Scores on Rotter’s Internal–External Locus of Control Scale correlate with people’s
emotions and behavior in many situations (Rotter, 1990). For example, those with
an internal locus of control are not only more likely to get good grades, but they also
are more likely to exercise and watch their diets than are externals (Balch & Ross,
1975; Findley & Cooper, 1983). As you might expect, externals are more likely to be
depressed (Benassi et al., 1988).
Many studies suggest that locus of control is an important characteristic of our per-
sonalities. That is, an internal or external disposition seems to be a reliable personality
reciprocal determinism The process in which
cognitions, behavior, and the environment mutually
influence each other.
locus of control An individual’s sense of whether
control over his or her life is internal or external.
As Bandura’s theory suggests, children
develop a clearer sense of identity by
observing how men and women behave
in their culture.
Cognition
Behavior
Environment
FIGURE 10.8
Reciprocal Determinism
In reciprocal determinism, the
individual’s cognitions, behavior,
and the environment all interact.
Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 443

444 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
characteristic—although Rotter resists calling this a trait because he believes the
term conveys the erroneous idea that internality–externality could be fixed and
unchangeable. It is also quite likely that your own locus of control varies with dif-
ferent situations in your everyday life. If you are a good student, smart, and get good
grades, you are internal in academic settings. But if you are overweight and come
from a family where obesity is common, you are also likely to be external in restau-
rants and wherever tasty but unhealthy food is presented to you. You can capture the
flavor of Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale by following the instructions in the Do It
Yourself! box.
Evaluating the Social-Cognitive Approach to Personality Critics argue that the
cognitive theories generally overemphasize rational information processing and over-
look both emotion and unconscious processes as important components of personality.
So for those who feel that emotions and motives are central to the functioning of hu-
man personality, the cognitive approaches to personality have a blind spot. However,
because emotion and associated unconscious processes have assumed a greater role in
cognitive psychology recently, we can anticipate a new generation of cognitive theories
of personality that do take these aspects of personality into account (Mischel & Shoda,
1995).
The real strength of the social-cognitive theories is their foundation of solid
psychological research—unlike most of the ideas proposed by the Freudians, neo-
Freudians, and humanists. You will recall, for example, Bandura’s famous Bobo doll
experiment in observational learning, which we discussed in Chapter 4. The price
paid for the social-cognitive theories, however, is that they are much less comprehen-
sive than the old and grand theories of personality proposed by Freud and his suc-
cessors. The payoff, however, has come in the form of both explanations and specific
treatments for a number of mental disorders that often seem to involve observational
learning, particularly anxiety-based disorders, such as phobias, and behavior disor-
ders in children.
Finally, we might ask how a cognitive psychologist would explain Mary Calkins.
One focus would be on how she interpreted the rewards and punishments she
experienced in trying to complete her graduate work in psychology and how these
interpretations shaped her behavior. A cognitive theorist might note that Calkins
obviously had an internal locus of control that was part of a reciprocal interaction
with the social support she received at home, at Wellesley, and from her mentors at
Harvard—which, in turn, reinforced her determination and hard work. And, they
might add, Mary Calkins became a role model for the women who came after her to
study psychology.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
Other anxiety disorders include
panic disorder and obsessive-
compulsive disorder (p. 530).
FINDING YOUR LOCUS OF CONTROL
Julian Rotter (1966) has developed a test
that assesses a person’s sense of internal or
external control over events. The test items
consist of pairs of contrasting statements,
and subjects must choose one statement
with which they most agree from each pair.
This format is called a forced-choice test.
Unlike many other personality tests, the
scoring for each item on Rotter’s Internal–
External Scale is transparent: The test-taker
can easily tell in which direction most items
are scored. Here are some items from a pre-
liminary version of the test (Rotter, 1971).
You can see which direction you lean
by counting up the number of statements
with which you agreed in each column.
Agreement with those in the left column
suggests an internal locus of control.
1a. Promotions are earned through hard
work and persistence.
2a. In my experience I have noticed that
there is usually a direct connection
between how hard I study and the
grades I get.
3a. If one knows how to deal with people,
they are really quite easily led.
4a. People like me can change the course of
world affairs if we make ourselves heard.
5a. I am the master of my fate.
1b. Making a lot of money is largely a
matter of getting the right breaks.
2b. Many times the reactions of teachers
seem haphazard to me.
3b. I have little influence over the way
other people behave.
4b. It is only wishful thinking to believe
that one can really influence what
happens in society at large.
5b. A great deal that happens to me is
probably a matter of chance.

Current Trends: The Person in a Social System
Gone are the days when Freud, Jung, Horney, and others were building the grand,
sweeping theories of personality that attempted to explain everything we humans do.
First the humanistic and later the cognitive theorists arose to point out blind spots in
the older psychodynamic theories. Now the emphasis has shifted again, as psycholo-
gists have brought elements of the psychodynamic, humanistic, and cognitive perspec-
tives together with new knowledge about the impact of culture, gender, and family
dynamics. You should be especially aware of three important new trends in our think-
ing about personality.
In family systems theory, for example, the basic unit of analysis is not the individual
but the family (Gilbert, 1992; Mones et al., 2007). This perspective holds that the ways
people interacted first in their family and, later, in their peer groups shape personality.
While Freud and others did recognize that parents influence children, the new em-
phasis is on interaction—on the ways that members of the family or the peer group
influence each other. This has led to viewing people with psychological problems as
individuals embedded in dysfunctional groups rather than as “sick” persons. This em-
phasis has also given us a new interpersonal language for personality. We often speak
now of codependence (instead of dependent personalities) and communication (instead
of mere talk). We also have a heightened awareness of relationships and process (the
changes that occur as relationships develop).
A second trend comes from psychology’s increasing awareness of cultural differ-
ences, as more and more publications on personality come from psychologists around
the world—not just from Europe and America (Quiñones-Vidal et al., 2004). Psychol-
ogist Stanley Sue (1991) also reminds us that our own society is becoming ethnically
more diverse. No longer can we assume that everyone we meet shares the same cul-
tural experience or the same values. This also means that psychologists must be sensi-
tive to the role of cultural factors both in shaping personality and in contributing to
the mental health and illness of ethnically and racially diverse people (Sue, 1983).
A third trend comes from an increasing appreciation of gender influences. While we
do not know the weights to assign nature and nurture in our attempts to understand
gender differences, we do know that males and females often perceive situations differ-
ently (Tavris, 1991). We have also seen that males tend to be more physically aggres-
sive than females. And females tend to form close relationships in small, equal-status
groups, while males tend to connect in larger groups (teams) organized hierarchically
with leaders and followers.
Together, these three trends have enlarged our understanding of the forces that
shape personality. The new emphasis is on diversity and group processes rather than
on the traits and mental processes of individuals. As a result, the picture of personality
has become much more complex—but it is becoming far more realistic.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Although an internal or external locus of control can be a central feature of your per-
sonality, your perceived locus of control can also change from situation to situation.
When you are speaking in front of a group, you may feel that the situation is beyond
your control, yet when you are behind the wheel or on skis, you may feel that you are
fully the master. And what about your education? Do you have a sense of internal or
external control with regard to—say—your grade in psychology?
An external locus of control about grades poses a danger for the college student
because college life is so full of distractions and temptations. If you believe that your
grades are largely beyond your control, you can easily be driven by the enticements
of the moment and let your studies slide. This attitude can, of course, become a self-
fulfilling prophecy that ruins your grades not only in psychology but across the board.
family systems theory A perspective on
personality and treatment that emphasizes the family
rather than the individual as the basic unit of analysis.
Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities? 445

446 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
The following questions will help you assess your own academic locus of
control:
• On a test do you often find that, even when you know the material, anxiety wipes
the information from your memory?
• Do you often know the material well but perceive that the test is unfair or covers
material that the professor did not indicate would be on the test?
• Are you so easily distracted that you can never quite get around to studying?
• Do you believe that some people are born to be good students and some
are not?
• Do you feel that you have no control over the grades you receive?
• Do you feel that you are not smart enough to cope with college-level work?
• Do you feel that success in college is largely a matter of playing up to the
professors?
If you answered “yes” to several of these questions, then you probably have an
external locus of control with respect to your college work—an attitude that can ham-
per your chances of college success. What can be done? Nothing—if you are com-
pletely convinced that your success in college is beyond your control. If, however, you
are open to the idea of establishing more control over your college experience, here are
a few suggestions:
• If you experience test anxiety, get help from your counseling center or learning
resources center.
• Form a study group among friends taking the same classes, or find a tutor at your
learning resources center.
• Talk to your professors individually: Ask them to give you some pointers on what
they consider to be especially important in their classes. (But don’t ask, “What’s
going to be on the test?”)
• Go to your school’s learning resources center, and get an assessment of your
strengths and weaknesses and of your interest patterns. Then make a plan to cor-
rect your weaknesses (e.g., with tutoring or with remedial classes in your weak ar-
eas). At the same time, build on your strengths by selecting a major that capitalizes
on your aptitudes and interests.
We would wish you good luck—but only an externalizer would want that!
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: What was Sigmund Freud’s greatest discovery—and the
concept that distinguishes psychoanalysis from the humanistic and
social-cognitive theories?
2. APPLICATION: Name a type of behavior that, according to the
Freudians, is driven by Thanatos.
3. RECALL: What is the ego defense mechanism on which the
Rorschach and TAT are based?
4. APPLICATION: If you react strongly to angry outbursts in others,
you may be struggling with which Jungian archetype?
5. RECALL: In contrast with Freud, Karen Horney believed that the
forces behind our behaviors are .
6. RECALL: The humanistic theorists were very different from the
psychodynamic theorists because of their emphasis on .
7. APPLICATION: You try to understand people based on the role
models they follow. Which kind of personality theorist are you?
8. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What do the
psychodynamic, humanistic, and cognitive theories of personality
have in common?
a. They all view personality as largely unconscious.
b. They all acknowledge the importance of internal mental processes.
c. They all say that men and women have entirely different motives
underlying their behaviors.
d. They all have a strong basis in psychological research.
Answers 1. Most psychologists would say that it was Freud’s discovery of unconscious mind. 2. Any aggressive or destructive behavior would be
correct. 3. Projection 4. The shadow archetype 5. social 6. the healthy personality and human potential 7. A social-cognitive theorist 8. b
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

What “Theories” Do People Use to Understand Themselves and Others? 447
10.4 KEY QUESTION
What “Theories” Do People Use to Understand
Themselves and Others?
We have seen how psychologists view personality. But how do ordinary people go
about understanding each other? And how do they understand themselves? All of us
regularly make assumptions—right or wrong—about other people’s personalities as
well as our own. You do so when you go on a date, apply for a job, or form your first
impression of a professor or classmate. We might also wonder whether people in other
cultures make the same assumptions about personality that we do. These issues are
significant because the “folk theories,” or implicit personality theories, that people use
to understand people can support or undermine relationships among individuals—or
even among nations. Our Core Concept says:
Core Concept 10.4
Our understanding of ourselves and others is based on implicit theo-
ries of personality and our own self-narratives—both of which are
influenced by culture.
Let’s look first at the implicit theories we use to understand others before moving on to
consider how we understand ourselves.
Implicit Personality Theories
Think of someone who has been a role model for you. Now think of someone you
can’t stand to be around. In both cases, you associate those individuals with personal
traits: honesty, reliability, sense of humor, generosity, outgoing attitude, aggressiveness,
moodiness, pessimism, and so on. Even as a child, you had a rudimentary system for
appraising personality. You tried to determine whether new acquaintances would be
friend or foe; you worked out ways of dealing with your parents or teachers based on
how you read their personalities.
In each case, your judgments were personality assessments reflecting your implicit
personality theory, your personal explanation of personality that almost certainly relied
on connecting people’s behavior with the traits you attributed to them. Like the im-
plicit memories we studied in Chapter 5, implicit theories of personality operate in the
background, largely outside of our awareness, where they simplify the task of under-
standing other people (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae et al., 1994).
Most of the time, implicit theories work well enough to make social relationships
run smoothly—at least in familiar environments. While our expectations can easily
miss the mark in unfamiliar cultures, in more familiar territory, our implicit theories
of personality help us anticipate people’s motives and behavior, allowing us to perform
our work, buy our morning mochas, pass our courses, and interact with our friends.
In some respects, our implicit theories may not be all that different from the five-factor
theory. According to a study in which college students rated the personalities of other
students they had observed but didn’t know, their impressions agreed remarkably well
with scores derived from the Big Five Inventory (Mehl et al., 2006). There was one
interesting exception: Assertive or argumentative behavior was seen by the raters as
a sign of emotional stability in men but as indicating emotional instability in women!
Implicit theories can have other blind spots too. They may err by relying on
naive assumptions and stereotypes about traits and physical characteristics (Hochwalder,
1995). So hefty people may be assumed to be jolly or blondes a little short on intellect.
Similarly, we may erroneously assume certain traits always go together—creativity and
emotional instability, for example. So what implicit assumptions would you make about
the personality of Tiger Woods knowing that he was one of the most highly visible and
identifiable men in the world, who, to experience moments of pleasure, would risk
everything if his adventures were ever made public?
implicit personality theory A person’s set of
unquestioned assumptions about personality, used to
simplify the task of understanding others.

448 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Implicit theories may also give bad predictions when people’s motives and feelings
influence their judgment of others’ personalities, as Freud suggested with his concept
of projection. Accordingly, a person who is feeling angry, happy, or depressed may
naïvely assume that other people are feeling the same way too.
Finally, people’s implicit theories may conflict on the issue of whether personality
traits are fixed or changeable. As you might expect, those believing in fixed traits are
more likely to see others as stereotypes (e.g., “all Italians are alike”) than are those
whose implicit theories assumed the malleability of personality (Levy et al., 1998;
Molden & Dweck, 2006). And consider the impact that either assumption—personality as
fixed or changeable—could have on how parents raise their children, teachers respond
to certain students, and coaches, trainers, and business leaders deal with success or
failures of their players and personnel.
Carol Dweck (2006) has discovered in her 20 years of research on this issue that
our mindset is not just a sideshow of personality; it is a major aspect of our entire
mental world. It helps to shape our goals, influences whether we become optimistic
or pessimistic about our future, and even whether we are likely to fulfill our potential.
What happens when you, your parents, teachers, or coaches believe that any particular
ability or talent is “fixed”—you have it or you do not? And say you and they believe
you are one of the special ones who has IT. You are a musical protégé as a child, a
super track star, or a gifted writer. With abilities “fixed by nature,” you are entitled to
succeed without having to break a sweat. So you are likely to work less hard, practice
less, and then you even do well initially when the competition is rather low level. On
the other side of aisle is the kid with the “growth” mind set: He and others in his cor-
ner share the view that any talent or ability is in a constant state of development and
can improve only with intensive practice and hard work. Next, assume that both fail
to meet some goal. The growth-mindset kid realizes it is essential to work harder and
practice more hours to get ahead in contrast to the fixed-mindset kid who comes to
feel inadequate, as less than advertised, as letting down all those who believed in her
or his innate superiority. Popular author Malcolm Gladwell builds on such ideas in his
bestseller, Outliers (2008), to inform us all that the single major difference between
those youth who were praised as child protégés and succeeded versus those who failed
to realize their assumed potential is 10,000 hours of practice!
Self-Narratives: The Stories of Our Lives
How do you respond when someone says, “Tell me about yourself”? You probably
reply with a few sentences about where you are from, what you like to do with your
leisure time, and what your occupational goals are. But what do you say when you ask
yourself the same question? The “story” that you tell yourself about yourself is what
psychologist Dan McAdams (2006) calls a self-narrative. He claims that the self-narrative
is just as important a component of personality as are motives, emotions, or social
relationships. The self-narrative is really a broader conception of the self-concept: It is
the story of the self-concept over time. The self-narrative serves as the common thread
that holds the elements of personality together, like beads on a necklace. And, says
McAdams, our identity depends on keeping this narrative going throughout our lives,
to give us a sense of unity and purpose.
Culture, of course, has a big effect on the self-narrative stories we want to tell
ourselves. While McAdams hasn’t yet done extensive cross-cultural research, he has
identified a peculiarly important self-narrative in the American culture. He calls it
the redemptive self. See if you recognize yourself in some elements of the redemptive
self-narrative:
• You have always felt fortunate—not necessarily because of an economic advan-
tage, but perhaps because you have a special talent or were singled out for special
treatment by a teacher or other nurturing adult.
• At some point, you realized that other people are not so fortunate. Through no
fault of their own, they experience suffering or disadvantage.
mindset The extent to which one believes abilities
and talents are fixed by nature or can change and grow
through practice and that experience influences suc-
cess that requires hard work and effort, and also one’s
reactions to failure.
self-narrative The “stories” one tells about
oneself. Self-narratives help people sense a thread of
consistency through their personalities over time.
redemptive self A common self-narrative identi-
fied by McAdams in generative Americans. The redemp-
tive self involves a sense of being called to overcome
obstacles in the effort to help others.

What “Theories” Do People Use to Understand Themselves and Others? 449
• Because you are advantaged and others are not, you feel a responsibility or a
challenge to improve the lives of others in some way.
• Probably in childhood or adolescence, you developed a belief system, perhaps
rooted in religion, although not necessarily so, that has since guided your actions,
particularly in your efforts to help others.
• You meet unexpected obstacles and overcome them. You have negative experi-
ences but learn and grow from them, and you see a future of continued growth
and progress, despite the near certainty of daunting obstacles ahead.
Not everyone’s self-narrative follows exactly this pattern, of course. But McAdams
often finds a pattern like this in generative adults, a term originally used by devel-
opmental psychologist Erik Erikson to describe healthy, productive adults. More
specifically, generativity refers to adults who are committed to something outside
themselves—to the community and to the welfare of future generations. It remains to
be seen what narratives characterize healthy adults in other cultures.
The Effects of Culture on Our Views of Personality
As we have seen, Westerners tend to put the individual or the self at the center of per-
sonality. While people the world over do make the assumption of a distinct self, much
of the world—especially those in collectivist cultures—assumes that the self is embed-
ded in a larger social network. They further assume that individuals cannot be under-
stood in isolation from others with whom they have some sort of relationship—which
brings us to cross-cultural researcher Harry Triandis.
Individualism, Collectivism, and Personality According to Triandis
(1995), cultures differ most fundamentally on the dimension of individ-
ualism versus collectivism. For those raised in the Euro-American tradi-
tion, the individual is the basic unit of society, while those raised in many
Asian and African cultures emphasize the family or other social groups. In
collectivistic cultures, people tend to form identities that blend harmoni-
ously with the group, and they expect that others are motivated to do
the same. In individualistic cultures, people think of themselves as hav-
ing a unique identity, independent of their social relationships (Pedersen,
1979). Thus, for Euro-Americans, the self is a whole, while for many
Asians and Africans the self is only a part (Cohen & Gunz, 2002).
Let us be clear: Neither the individualistic nor the collectivistic ap-
proach is “better.” Each has advantages and disadvantages from different
perspectives. The collectivist cultures encourage group effort, typically for the benefit
and glory of the group—often a work group or a family group. On the other hand, a
person such as Mary Calkins, who challenged society’s norms, would be more likely to
thrive in an individualistic culture.
Many aspects of peoples’ personalities and behavior derive from their culture’s
position on the individualism versus collectivism spectrum. So, in judging people,
Americans and Europeans tend to make the fundamental attribution error or FAE. This
bias is twofold in overestimating the causes of any behavior as primarily a function of
dispositional factors—internal to the actor—while simultaneously underestimating the
social-situational—external—factors. This misperception stems from the assumption
that other people’s actions, especially annoying, clumsy, inappropriate, or otherwise
undesirable behaviors, result from their personalities rather than from the situation. If
you come to your psychology class late, other students are likely to assume that you
are a “late” or disorganized person—if you are at an American college or university.
But if you arrived late to a psychology class in China or Japan, the students there
would be more likely to assume that your behavior had some external cause, such
as traffic problems. In general, the fundamental attribution error is less common in
group-oriented, collectivistic cultures, such as are found in Latin American and Asia
(Church et al., 2005; Lillard, 1997).
fundamental attribution error The dual ten-
dency to overemphasize internal, dispositional causes
and minimize external, situational pressures. The FAE
is more common in individualistic cultures than in col-
lectivistic cultures.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 11
To avoid the fundamental
attribution error, social
psychologists recommend
first looking for a situational
explanation for unusual
behavior (p. 490).
Most Asian cultures have a collectivist
tradition that affirms the group, rather
than the individual, as the fundamental
social unit.

450 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
Cultures differ on other dimensions too. For example, when given the choice of
competition or cooperation, individualistic Americans characteristically choose to
compete (Aronson, 2004; Gallo & McClintock, 1965). And as we saw in Chapter 9,
Americans, on the average, also score higher on measures of need for achievement than
do people in collectivist cultures.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
The Personality of Time
Life is filled with decisions, big ones and small ones, trivial and significant ones. Study
or party with friends? One more beer before driving home or give keys to a responsible
driver? Spend Saturday playing new video game or writing term paper? In one sense,
your personality is composed of the sum of all the actions you take based on how
you resolve those decisions. But what are the major influences on your decision-making
process?
We can identify three ways most people go about making such decisions. Actually,
they are embedded in one of three time zones. For some, the biggest influences come
from stimulation in the immediate situation: sensory (smell, taste, look, feel), biologi-
cal (arousal, hunger, tiredness), and social (what others are doing, saying, modeling).
Decisions based primarily on such input are focused on the present, and when they are
typical of a given person, we can call him or her present-oriented. Others faced with
the same decisions look back to similar situations in the past and use those memories
of what happened to do it again or not. Again, when this focus becomes typical for
most decisions, that person can be considered past-oriented. Still others deal with that
decisional matrix not by attending solely to the present or the past, because their focus
is on the future consequences of their imagined actions. They do quick cost–benefit
estimations and then act when rewards are greater than losses. We can consider such
people who do so habitually to be future-oriented.
These subjective conceptions of time have powerful consequences on our values,
judgments, decisions, and behaviors. And they do so nonconsciously, out of our aware-
ness, because these temporal biases have been learned from childhood by many experi-
ences such as cultural and social modeling, education, social class, religion, stability of
family and nation, and more. Thus, for example, those most likely to develop a future
time orientation are more educated, from industrialized nations, from Protestant back-
grounds and stable families, and do not live near the equator (where the climate never
changes so people live more in the present).
Such ideas were transformed into a series of 56 inventory items that college stu-
dents replied to on five-point response measures according to how characteristic each
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
McClelland has found the
need for achievement to be an
important variable predicting
employee performance (p. 365).
FIGURE 10.9
Conceptual Time Perspective Model
Make a decision
?
Take an action
Memories
Anticipated
consequences
Present-oriented
Immediate
situation/
stimulation
Past-oriented Future-oriented
about Other Cultural Differences
in Views of Personality at MyPsychLab
Read

What “Theories” Do People Use to Understand Themselves and Others? 451
one was for them. The five time factors that emerged formed a resulting scale that was
very reliable and also had high predictive validity, known as the Zimbardo Time Per-
spective Inventory or ZTPI (Boyd & Zimbardo, 2008; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).
The five time perspective factors and a typical scale item of each are:
Future: “Meeting tomorrow’s deadlines and doing other necessary work comes before
tonight’s play.”
Present-Hedonistic: “I believe that getting together with one’s friends to party is one
of life’s important pleasures.”
Present-Fatalistic: “It doesn’t make sense to worry about the future, since there is
nothing I can do about it anyway.”
Past-Positive: “I prefer family rituals that are regularly repeated.”
Past-Negative: “I think about the good things that I have missed out in my life.”
(Note: To check out your own time perspective scores, complete the ZTPI on www.
TheTimeParadox.com.)
When the scores on each of these factors were correlated with many standard
personality test responses and other personally reported traits in a sample of more
than 200 college students, the following major correlations emerged. (Recall that most
results correlating any personality trait measures with other standard measures are
usually in the range of 0.20 to 0.30 when you consider the robust correlations found
with this new measure.)
Future: Conscientiousness, r 5 10.70; Preference for Consistency, r 5 10.60; but
r 5 20.40 for Sensation Seeking.
Present-Hedonistic: Novelty and Sensation Seeking, r 5 10.70; but r 5 20.75 for
Ego Under Control.
Present-Fatalistic: Aggression, r 5 10.50; Trait Anxiety, r 5 10.50; Depression,
r 5 10.45; but r 5 20.70 for Concern for Future Consequences.
Past-Positive: Happiness, r 5 10.40; Self-Esteem, r 5 10.30; but Trait Anxiety,
r 5 20.30, and r 5 20.20 Aggression.
Past-Negative: Trait Anxiety, r 5 10.75; Depression, r 5 10.70; Aggression,
r 5 10.60; but Self-Esteem, r 5 20.60, and Emotional Stability, r 5 20.55.
What does all this mean to you? Knowing how strong the relationships between
these factors are, and also how many different patterns are seen in a group of function-
ing college students, you can apply these findings to your own habits to get a sense of
what your own direction currently is. To be someone high on Present-Fatalism or Past-
Negative is a sign of risk given the adverse nature of the traits and experiences related
to each of these states. Obviously success in academia and business will depend on a
healthy dose of Future orientation, but not to the point of becoming a nerdy work-
aholic who sacrifices friends, family, fun, and sleep for success. Present-Hedonism is es-
sential in moderation to reward oneself for a task completed well, but in excess, it can
become impulsive and addictive to whatever is the source of pleasure for the person,
such as food, gambling, drugs, sex, or video games.
It is also important to highlight that robust relationship between being Future- Oriented
and Conscientiousness. Why? Because Conscientiousness is the only personality trait
directly linked to biological mortality: Conscientious people live at least 2 years longer
at every age level than their less-conscientious peers and family members! This powerful
finding is the conclusion from a recent meta-analysis of 20 independent studies with more
than 9,000 individuals from six different nations that used a variety of different meanings
for this construct (Kern & Friedman, 2008).
It is not a magical relationship with Future-Orientation, but why it occurs is obvi-
ous when we note that students who are high on the Future factor get regular medical
and dental checkups, get cancer checks regularly, eat healthier foods, wear seat belts,
drink less alcohol, smoke less, and do not engage in risky behaviors. Viola! Longer
lives than those who do the opposite.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Correlations measure the strength
of the relationship between two
variables, with larger numbers
such as 0.70 and –0.55
representing stronger associations
than smaller correlations such as
0.20 and –0.10 (p. 29).

www.TheTimeParadox.com

www.TheTimeParadox.com

452 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
But Is Time Perspective a Personality Trait? What do we have to add to the information
presented thus far for you to answer this question, “yes it is, or likely it is”? How about
determining whether the five time perspective factors are significantly related to each
of the Big Five Factors in the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992a)? A
new dissertation from Lithuania has done just that for us with surprisingly supportive
findings (Kairys, 2010).
This study tested more than 700 people comprising both genders in three differ-
ent age groups: young (18–22); mid-aged (30–50); and older (60 and above). Thus, its
findings are generalizable across age and gender in a large population from a European
nation. The results? “Time perspective and personality traits in the Five Factor model
are highly correlated, and such correlations are found when correlating similar per-
sonality traits between themselves” (Kairys, 2010, p. 22). Moreover, “time perspective
is related to personality traits” and “it [time perspective] should belong to the domain
of personality traits” (Kairys, 2010, 27, 28). What, specifically, were the relationships
found between time perspective and the Big Five traits?
Conscientiousness is significantly and positively related to Future TP (time perspective).
Openness to Experience and Extraversion relate to Present-Hedonistic TP, which has
low scores on Conscientiousness.
Neuroticism is positively related to Present-Fatalistic TP, as we might expect.
Extraversion and Agreeableness relate strongly to Past-Positive TP.
Finally, Neuroticism is positively related to Past-Negative TP, but this Past-Negative
factor correlates negatively with both Extraversion and Conscientiousness.
It is important to note that no differences were found in the relationships between
the time perspective factors and the personality traits across the three age groups,
although hedonism decreases with age. Nevertheless, TP is relatively stable in the pop-
ulation over time.
We would like you to think more deeply about how you relate to time perspective
and how your behavior might be under the influence of something you carry around
in your head without knowing about it. Now that you are mindful of it, make it work
for you to create a more optimal time perspective that enables you to shift time zones
flexibly depending on the demands of each of life’s situations you face. The alterna-
tive is to be a mindless slave of time, stuck in the past, locked into future overdrive, or
endlessly idling in a present mode. Our advice: Carpe diem—but after exams are aced.
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: Name a country that generally values the
achievement of a team or group over that of the individual.
2. RECALL: In what important respect have people’s implicit
theories of personality been found to differ?
3. RECALL: What is the term that best describes the dynamic
relationship between culture and personality?
4. APPLICATION: Give an example of the fundamental attribution
error. In what cultures would you be likely to find people
committing the fundamental attribution error?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: People’s implicit
personality theories involve
a. negative, but not positive, characteristics.
b. the assumptions that they make about each other’s motives,
intentions, and behaviors.
c. assumptions about themselves that they want to hide from
others.
d. opinions that they privately hold about others but will not
say openly.
Answers 1. China, Japan, India, Mexico, or nearly any country in Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East 2. People’s implicit theories differ on
whether personality traits are fixed or changeable. 3. Interaction 4. The fundamental attribution error (FAE) occurs when you attribute a person’s
behavior to an internal disposition rather than to external factors. So, for example, you would be committing the FAE when someone trips and drops
his books and you attribute it to clumsiness. Research shows the FAE to be more common in individualistic cultures, such as the majority cultures in
Europe and the United States. 5. b
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same situation on different occasions. Consider: Do you always
order the same thing when you go to your favorite restaurant?
Or are you always cheerful with your friends? Psychologist
William Fleeson urges us to think of personality traits as a
sort of average of how the person customarily behaves. (Per-
haps you are usually cheerful—on the average.)
Even more surprising was what researchers found when
they monitored people as they moved from one situation to
another. One study had volunteers carry small personal data
assistant (PDA) devices and, several times a day, record their
situation, their behavior, and their self-assessment on the Big
Five traits. The discovery: People’s self-described personality
traits change as radically as their behavior when they move
from one situation to another (Fleeson, 2004).
The lesson to be learned here is that the majority of fac-
tors affecting behavior simply cannot be assigned to the
person or the situation. Behavior seems to result from an
interaction of trait and situational variables (Kenrick &
Funder, 1988). In fact, Mischel has never suggested that we
abandon theories of personality. Rather, he sees behavior as
a function of the situation, the individual’s interpretation
of the situation, and the personality (Mischel, 1990, 2003;
Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
It Also Depends on What Kind of Situation It also makes
a difference if the situation is familiar or novel. If familiar, then
one’s habitual ways of dealing with it are likely to be elicited
and thus our knowledge of the person’s personality will allow
reasonably accurate predictions. However, in novel situations
where old habits are not appropriate, individuals tend to look
to others to define what is the appropriate way to behave,
and situational forces submerge personality differences. In the
next chapter on social psychology, remember this lesson when
you are introduced to some of the most fascinating studies in
psychology that shocked the world.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Which side of the person–situation debate is right? Both are.
The difficulty was that that they were right about different
things. According to personality psychologist William Fleeson
(2004), traits help us understand behavior over long periods
of time, when a thread of consistency can be seen in personality—
as an individual’s behavior converges on a personal average.
Over shorter intervals, and especially in particular situations, a
Cognitive theorist Walter Mischel dropped a scientific bomb-shell on the personality theorists with evidence suggesting
that we behave far less consistently from one situation to an-
other than most had assumed (1968, 1973, 2003). A person
who is extraverted at a party can become shy and retiring in
class; your “neurotic” friend may become a pillar of strength
in a crisis. Like Rosalind in Shakespeare’s As You Like It, one
person can present different personalities in different situations
and to different people. So, Mischel argued, knowledge of the
situation is more important in predicting behavior than know-
ing a person’s traits. The ensuing tumult within the field has
become known as the person–situation controversy (Pervin, 1985).
Mischel’s argument challenged the very foundations of
most personality theories. After all, if people do act incon-
sistently in different situations, then what good is a theory
of personality? Is there no continuity in personality? Crit-
ics mounted withering attacks on Mischel’s thesis, pointing
out that his methods underestimated a thread of consistency
across situations (Epstein, 1980). Bem and Allen (1974) have
also pointed out that some people behave more consistently
than others. Moreover, people are most consistent when oth-
ers are watching (Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980) and when in
familiar situations (Funder, 1983a, b; Funder & Ozer, 1983).
While the foundations of personality psychology were
shuddering, the person–situation controversy gave a boost
to social psychology, where psychologists had always ar-
gued the power of the situation. As we will see in the next
chapter, situations can turn normal college students into li-
ars, lovers, or even cruel tormentors. But where does all this
leave us in dealing with the person–situation controversy?
What Are the Critical Issues?
This is not an either-or dispute: It’s not a question of whether
traits or situations control behavior. Rather, it is a question
of which has more influence and when it does. All sides of
the person–situation debate agree that both the person and
the situation have an effect. It’s the degree of weighting of the
person and the situation that is at issue.
There is a second issue too. How much does the power
of personality traits vary from one situation to another? At
the extreme, for a prisoner in solitary confinement, the situ-
ation obviously has overwhelming importance. But the more
important focus is on ordinary people in their everyday lives:
How much power does the situation have vis-à-vis traits? It’s
not an easy question to answer.
People Are Inconsistent If we look at the same person over
time, we may find him or her reacting very differently to the
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Person–Situation Controversy
What “Theories” Do People Use to Understand Themselves and Others? 453
person–situation controversy Debate over the relative contributions to understand-
ing human behavior from personality processes, like traits, versus social psychological pro-
cesses, like the power of situational variables.

454 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
processes. We need both dispositional theories and process
theories for a complete understanding of personality.
Cross-cultural psychologists have complicated the
problem of personality by suggesting that personality may
not be a universal concept and that Western cultures have
a bias toward individualism and a unique self. In fact, all
cultures have a tendency either to individualism or collectiv-
ism, both of which leave their imprint on personality. In
any culture, however, an individual’s personality is, in part,
a creation of interactions with other people.
One does not need a theory of personality for explaining
ordinary behavior. A good theory, however, is helpful for
explaining unusual behavior and eccentric people. The
most common theories can be grouped as follows: dispo-
sitional theories (trait and temperament theories) and pro-
cess theories (psychodynamic theories, humanistic theo-
ries, and social-cognitive theories).
collectivism (p. 418)
dispositions (p. 417)
individualism (p. 418)
personality (p. 414)
personality processes (p. 417)
influence on behavior in individualistic cultures than in col-
lectivistic cultures (Church et al., 2006). That makes sense, of
course, when we think that an individualistic culture places
high values on certain traits such as intelligence (as opposed
to hard work). And it also makes sense in light of the finding
that people in collectivist cultures are less susceptible to the
fundamental attribution error—because they emphasize the
power of the situation.
person’s behavior can be highly variable, as we have seen. So,
by taking a long view, the trait perspective is right, while on a
moment-to-moment basis, the situation perspective wins.
But which side gets the most weight also depends on
whether the situation is strong or weak, as Mischel has
said. And to further complicate matters, we have to figure
culture into the equation as part of the situation: Evidence
has emerged that an individual’s personality traits have more
10.1 What Forces Shape Our
Personalities?
Core Concept 10.1 Personality is shaped by the
combined forces of biological, situational, and mental
processes—all embedded in a sociocultural and
developmental context.
We can think of personality as the “default settings” for our
unique pattern of motives, emotions, and perceptions, along
with our learned schemas for understanding ourselves and
our world. Personality also has deep evolutionary roots, as
seen in displacement of aggression. Neuroscience suggests
that the biology of personality comprises a collection of
brain modules, each adapted to a different purpose.
But personality also involves nurture—that is, learning
driven by the environment, as seen in the effect of family posi-
tion on personality. The person–situation controversy centers
on the relative importance of situations (the environment) as
compared with internal traits and mental processes.
The chapter makes an important distinction between
personality characteristics, or dispositions, and personality
CHAPTER PROBLEM: What influences were at work to
produce the unique behavioral patterns, high achievement mo-
tivation, and consistency over time and place that we see in the
personality of Mary Calkins?
• Psychologists recognize the uniqueness of human
personalities, yet seek to discover the common patterns
between people in their traits, characters, and dispositional
features based on genetic, biological, experiential, social,
and cultural contributions.
• Psychodynamic theories, particularly Freud’s theory, would
emphasize early experiences—especially traumas—as well
as relations among siblings and with parents. Horney and
Jung would have focused on the societal pressures faced by
women.
• Trait and temperament theories would look for
enduring personality characteristics, such as openness,
conscientiousness, and introversion. A major
contribution in this domain of psychology has been the
quantification of features of personality using a variety of
assessment techniques to reveal individual differences in
personality.
• Humanistic psychologists, such as Maslow, would focus
on a person’s goals, strengths, self-concept, and social
relationships.
• Social-cognitive theorists would be interested in the person’s
locus of control. They would also assess the individual’s
interpretation of important experiences in life.
CHAPTER SUMMARY Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

10.3 How Do Mental Processes Help Shape
Our Personalities?
Core Concept 10.3 While each of the process theories
sees different forces at work in personality, all portray
personality as the result of both internal mental processes
and social interactions.
The psychodynamic, humanistic, and social-cognitive theories all
seek to explain the internal processes and social interactions
that shape our personalities. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory states
that the personality arises out of unconscious desires, conflicts,
and memories. None of our thoughts or behaviors happens
by accident, according to the principle of psychic determin-
ism. Early childhood experiences also have a strong influence
on personality, as the child goes through predictable psycho-
sexual stages in which conflicts are dealt with unconsciously.
Freud believed that the personality consisted of three main
structures, the id (the reservoir of unconscious desires), the
ego (the largely conscious part of the mind), and the superego
(which contains the conscience and the ego ideal). Part of the
ego, involving the ego defense mechanisms, operates outside
of consciousness. One of these defense mechanisms, projec-
tion, is the basis for widely used projective tests, including the
Rorschach and the TAT.
Freud’s theory has been extremely influential. Still, critics
fault Freud’s work for being scientifically unsound, a poor basis
for prediction, and unfair to women. Modern psychology also
suggests that the unconscious mind is less clever and purposeful
than Freud believed.
Other psychodynamic theories, such as those proposed by
Jung and Horney, also assume that personality is a dynamic pro-
cess that involves strong and often-conflicting motives and emo-
tions. Each of these neo-Freudians, however, emphasizes different
aspects of personality. Jung proposed a collective unconscious
and may be influenced by both heredity and learning. Many
psychologists now agree on the Big Five traits, which seem to
have validity across cultures. Trait assessment is the basis for
many psychological tests: Some assess common traits, such as
the Big Five, while others, such as the MMPI-2, assess clinical
characteristics. Both the trait and temperament theories do a
reasonably good job of describing and predicting behavior, but
they offer no explanations for the underlying processes.
Type theory is exemplified in the controversial and widely
used MBTI, based on Jung’s personality typology. Research sug-
gests that people’s characteristics, as measured by the MBTI or
other personality tests, do not fall into neat type categories but
are more accurately conceived of on trait dimensions.
10.2 What Persistent Patterns, or
Dispositions, Make Up Our Personalities?
Core Concept 10.2 The dispositional theories all
suggest a small set of personality characteristics, known as
temperaments, traits, or types, that provide consistency to
the individual’s personality over time.
Temperament, trait, and type theories are descriptive ap-
proaches to personality with a long history stretching back to
the humor theory of the ancient Greeks. Modern theories speak
of types, traits, and temperaments. In this chapter, we group all
three under the heading of dispositional theories perspectives.
Temperament refers to innate personality dispositions,
which may be tied to factors in the brain and in the genes.
Kagan’s work has focused on the inhibited versus uninhibited
dimension of temperament. By contrast, traits are thought of as
multiple dimensions existing, to some degree, in each person’s
personality. Traits give personality consistency across situations
populated by archetypes. He also proposed that people fall into
certain personality types, characterized especially by tendencies
to introversion and extraversion. Horney, on the other hand, em-
phasized conscious processes, basic anxiety, neurotic needs, and
feminist issues in personality theory. Some other neo-Freudians,
such as Erikson, also emphasized consciousness as well as life-
long personality development.
The humanistic theories, such as those of Maslow and
Rogers, argue that people are naturally driven toward self-
actualization, but this tendency can be suppressed by unhealthy
conditions and perceptions. Maslow proposed a hierarchy of
needs, suggesting that when the deficiency needs are met, a per-
son is more likely to pursue self-actualization. Rogers taught
that the fully functioning person has a positive self-concept that
is congruent with reality, while mental disorder arises from in-
congruence. High self-esteem is more likely when a child comes
from a family that provides unconditional positive regard.
The humanistic theories have had considerable impact on
psychotherapy, but they have been criticized for being “self”-
centered and lacking a strong scientific base. The social-
cognitive theories, by contrast, do have a scientific basis,
although they are much more limited in scope than are the
psychodynamic and humanistic theories. Bandura’s social-
cognitive theory suggests that personality is shaped by obser-
vational learning. This occurs in an interaction of cognition,
behavior, and the environment known as reciprocal determinism.
According to Rotter’s locus-of-control theory, those with an inter-
nal locus are more likely to feel they can control events in their
lives than those who have an external locus of control.
Modern theories of personality, unlike those of Freud,
Jung, Horney, and the other psychodynamic theorists, have
not attempted to provide comprehensive explanations for all
aspects of personality. In family systems theory, for example,
emphasis has turned to the individual acting in a social envi-
ronment. Other emphases include cultural influences on per-
sonality as well as an awareness of gender differences.
Chapter Summary 455
dispositional theories (p. 421)
five-factor theory (p. 423)
humors (p. 420)
MMPI-2 (p. 424)
Myers–Briggs Type Indicator
(MBTI) (p. 426)
personality type
(p. 426)
reliability (p. 425)
traits (p. 422)
validity (p. 425)

456 C H A P T E R 1 0 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
The Person–Situation Controversy
10.4 What “Theories” Do People Use to
Understand Themselves and Others?
Core Concept 10.4 Our understanding of ourselves and
others is based on implicit theories of personality and our
own self-narratives—both of which are influenced by culture.
People everywhere deal with each other on the basis of their
implicit personality theories, which simplify the task of under-
standing others. Implicit theories often use the same traits
that the five-factor theory does, although some gender biases
have been reported. Implicit theories also may rely on naïve
assumptions, and they often differ on whether personality is
fixed or changeable.
positive psychology (p. 442)
projective tests (p. 432)
psychic determinism (p. 434)
psychoanalysis (p. 429)
psychoanalytic theory (p. 429)
psychodynamic theory (p. 428)
psychosexual stages (p. 430)
reciprocal determinism
(p. 443)
redemptive self (p. 448)
repression (p. 431)
Rorschach Inkblot
Technique (p. 433)
self-actualizing
personality (p. 440)
social-cognitive
theories (p. 428)
superego (p. 430)
Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT) (p. 433)
unconscious (p. 429)
archetype (p. 436)
basic anxiety (p. 438)
collective unconscious (p. 436)
ego (p. 430)
ego defense mechanism (p. 431)
Electra complex (p. 431)
extraversion (p. 437)
family systems theory (p. 445)
fixation (p. 431)
fully functioning person (p. 440)
humanistic theories (p. 428)
id (p. 430)
identification (p. 431)
introversion (p. 437)
libido (p. 429)
locus of control (p. 443)
neo-Freudian (p. 436)
neurotic needs (p. 438)
observational learning (p. 442)
Oedipus complex (p. 431)
personal unconscious (p. 436)
phenomenal field (p. 440)
Moreover, cross-cultural psychologists have found that
the assumptions people make about personality and behav-
ior vary widely across cultures—depending especially on
whether the culture emphasizes individualism or collectiv-
ism. Those in individualistic cultures are more prone to the
fundamental attribution error. There are many other dimensions
impinging on personality on which cultures differ, including
social status, romantic love, expression of feelings, locus of
control, and thinking versus feeling.
fundamental attribution error (p. 449)
implicit personality theory (p. 447)
mindset (p. 448)
person–situation controversy (p. 454)
understand any human action. As with the nature versus nur-
ture controversy, both play important roles when they inter-
act in shaping behavioral outcomes.
This ongoing controversy between personality psychologists
and social psychologists focuses on the relative significance
of what the person brings into a given behavioral setting, and
what the situation brings out of that person when trying to
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the video, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 15: THE SELF

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 457
c. Schemas are what makes us individuals.
d. Schemas are always negative, since they underlie
prejudice.
11. In Teresa Amabile’s work on creativity, how did being in a com-
petitive situation affect creativity?
a. It reduced creativity.
b. It increased creativity.
c. Its effects varied depending on the person’s innate
creativity.
d. There was no effect.
12. According to Hazel Markus, culture is what you
a. think. c. do.
b. see. d. hate.
13. The phrase “mutual constitution” refers to which two compo-
nents, according to Hazel Markus?
a. parent and child
b. art and scholarship
c. religion and society
d. self and culture
14. In which culture are you most likely to find a definition of the per-
son as a part of the group?
a. Japanese c. Portuguese
b. American d. Russian
15. The high rate of alcoholism among Native Americans was cited as
an example of
a. individualism.
b. the psychological effects of prejudice.
c. mutual constitution.
d. striving for superiority.
16. According to William James, which part of the self serves as our
inner witness to outside events?
a. the material self c. the social self
b. the spiritual self d. the outer self
17. Of the following psychologists, who is considered to be the least
optimistic about the human condition?
a. Freud c. Rogers
b. Adler d. Maslow
18. Which of the following refers to how capable we believe we are of
mastering challenges?
a. self-efficacy c. confirmatory behavior
b. self-handicapping d. status transaction
19. Teresa Amabile is to creativity as is to behavioral
confirmation.
a. Alfred Adler c. Mark Snyder
b. Patricia Ryan d. Albert Bandura
20. Who is credited as being responsible for psychology’s return
to the self?
a. William James c. Patricia Ryan
b. B. F. Skinner d. Carl Rogers
Program Review
1. What name did William James give to the part of the self that
focuses on the images we create in the mind of others?
a. the material self c. the social self
b. the spiritual self d. the outer self
2. Gail is a toddler who is gradually separating from her mother. This
process is called
a. identification. c. self-presentation.
b. individuation. d. self-consciousness.
3. In Freudian theory, the part of the person that acts as a police
officer restraining drives and passions is called the
a. superego. c. id.
b. ego. d. libido.
4. Which statement reflects the humanistic view of the self,
according to Carl Rogers?
a. Our impulses are in constant conflict with society’s
demands.
b. We have a capacity for self-direction and self-understanding.
c. We form an image of ourselves that determines what we can do.
d. Our views of ourselves are created by how people react to us.
5. When we characterize self-image as a schema, we mean that
a. we use it to organize information about ourselves.
b. other people see us in terms of the image we project.
c. it is a good predictor of performance in specific situations.
d. we rationalize our behavior to fit into an image.
6. In Albert Bandura’s research, people were given the task of im-
proving production at a model furniture factory. They performed
best when they believed that performance
a. depended on their intelligence.
b. related mainly to how confident they felt.
c. would be given a material reward.
d. was based on learning an acquirable skill.
7. Which of the following behaviors signal low status in a status
transaction?
a. maintaining eye contact
b. using complete sentences
c. moving in slow, smooth way
d. touching one’s face or hair
8. According to the principles of behavioral confirmation, what
reaction do people generally have to a person who is depressed?
a. People sympathetically offer help to the person.
b. People regard the person as inadequate.
c. People act falsely cheerful to make the person happy.
d. People treat a depressed person the same as anybody else.
9. What was referred to in the film as a type of psychological genocide?
a. drugs c. prejudice
b. falling emphasis on education d. immigration
10. What is the relevance of schemas to the self?
a. We try to avoid schemas in constructing our sense of self.
b. We organize our beliefs about ourselves in terms of schemas.

11.2 Constructing Social Reality: What
Influences Our Judgments of
Others?
Interpersonal Attraction
Loving Relationships
Making Cognitive Attributions
Prejudice and Discrimination
11.1 How Does the Social Situation
Affect Our Behavior?
Social Standards of Behavior
Conformity
Obedience to Authority
Cross-Cultural Tests of Milgram’s Research
Some Real-World Extensions of the Milgram
Obedience to Authority Paradigm
The Bystander Problem: The Evil of Inaction
Need Help? Ask for It!
Social Psychology11
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
We usually adapt our behavior to the
demands of the social situation, and in
new or ambiguous situations, we take
our cues from the behavior of others in
that setting.
On Being “Shoe” at Yale U
How college students dress may be
a matter of their “taste,” but it may
also be a matter of unconscious social
influence to dress like the “in-crowd”
dresses.
The judgments we make about others
depend not only on their behavior
but also on our interpretation of their
actions within a social context.
Stereotype Lift and Values
Affirmations
Stereotype lift boosts performance
in domains linked positively to one’s
racial, ethnic, or gender identity, as
does acknowledging one’s personal
values affirms self-identity.
Systems shape situations, which
in turn affect behavior—and by
understanding systems, we can learn
how to change them and modify their
influences on us.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
There is an art as well as a science
to persuasion.
CHAPTER PROBLEM What makes ordinary people willing to harm other people, as they did in
Milgram’s shocking experiment?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Is Terrorism “a Senseless Act of Violence, Perpetrated by Crazy Fanatics”?
11.3 How Do Systems Create Situations
That Influence Behavior?
The Stanford Prison Experiment
Chains of System Command
Preventing Bullying by Systemic Changes
and Reframing

459
W HILE READING THE SUNDAY NEWSPAPER, BILL NOTICES THAT A prestigious university is recruiting adults to participate in a psychological study designed to help people improve their memory. He decides to volunteer for what seems like an interesting and worthwhile experiment, for which he
will also get paid a small fee. On his arrival at the university’s laboratory, Bill is greeted by the
researcher and introduced to a second applicant named Douglas. The Experimenter, impres-
sive in his laboratory coat, explains that the research study will test a new method of improving
people’s learning and memory—by punishing them for their errors. “We know that positive
reinforcement for correct responding is a key to developing animal and human memory. We
now want to test whether punishing someone for incorrect responses will have a similar effect,”
he says. The two men draw straws to determine who plays each role of Teacher and Learner; it
does not seem to matter which man plays which role.
The task is straightforward: Bill will play the role of the “Teacher” and give Douglas, the
“Learner,” a set of word pairings to memorize in a given time period. Every time that the
Learner provides the correct answer, the Teacher gives him a verbal reward, “Good” or “That’s
right.” When wrong, the Teacher is to press a lever on the impressive-looking shock apparatus
that delivers an immediate shock to punish the Learner.
The shock generator has 30 switches, starting from a low level of only 15 volts and increas-
ing in intensity in 15-volt steps all the way up to 450 volts. The control panel indicates both
the voltage level of each of the switches and a corresponding description of that level. For
instance, the 25th level (375 volts) is labeled “Danger, Severe Shock,” and at the 29th and

460 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
30th levels (435 and 450 volts), the control panel is simply marked with an ominous “XXX.”
The experimenter goes on to note that every time the Learner makes a mistake, the Teacher
must press the next higher-level voltage switch.
The Learner is escorted into an adjacent room, where his arms are strapped down and an
electrode is attached to his wrist. The shock generator in the next room will deliver the shocks
to the Learner’s wrist—if and when he makes any errors. Douglas mentions that he has a slight
heart condition and hopes the shocks will not hurt him much. The Experimenter reassures him
not to worry, that the shocks may become strong but will not cause any permanent damage.
Bill administers the test material and communicates over the intercom to Douglas, while the
Experimenter stands near him.
Initially, Douglas performs well, getting rewarding praise from Bill. However, he soon starts
making errors, for which Bill immediately starts pressing those shock switches. As Douglas
messes up more and more, the shock levels increase, and he complains that the shocks are
starting to hurt. At 75 volts, he moans and groans; at 150 volts, the 10th level, Douglas has
had enough and demands to be released from the experiment. Bill looks anxiously at the
Experimenter, who nods that he must continue. As the shock levels increase in intensity, so
do Douglas’s screams, as well as his reminder that he has a heart condition. Bill is now really
distressed: “Sir, who will be responsible if anything happens to that man?” The Experimenter
dismisses his concern about personal responsibility by declaring, “I will be fully responsible,
now continue your task, Teacher.” More trials, more shocks, more screams from the next room.
Bill hesitates, questioning whether he should go on, but the Experimenter insists that he has
no choice but to do so.
At 300 volts, Douglas demands to be freed and complains louder about his heart condition.
Bill has had enough; He verbally dissents, “I can’t continue to hurt him, sir, I refuse to go on.”
The Experimenter calmly insists that Bill must continue because he has a contract to complete
the experimental procedure.
Reluctantly, Bill continues to punish Douglas for his errors until he reaches the level of
330 volts. Bill hears a scream, a thud, and then silence from the shock chamber. “He is not
responding; someone should go in there to see if he is all right.” But the Experimenter remains
impassive, telling Bill, “If the Learner doesn’t answer in a reasonable time, consider it wrong
because errors of omission (failing to respond) must be punished in the same way as errors of
commission—that is The Rule you must obey.”
As Bill continues to give the next shock level, there is no response from his pupil, Douglas.
Bill complains louder that it doesn’t make sense for him to continue under these circum-
stances. However, nothing he says sways the Experimenter to allow him to exit from this unex-
pectedly distressing situation. Instead, he is told to simply follow the rules because Bill’s job
as Teacher is to keep posing the test items and shocking the Learner’s errors—even if it means
going all the way up the scale to the full and final 450 volts.
How do you think you would act if you were in Bill’s seat as the Teacher in this social
memory experiment? At what shock level would you absolutely refuse to continue? Most of us
believe that we would have verbally dissented, then disobeyed behaviorally, and just walked
out. You would never sell out your morality for few dollars, would you?
This experiment was actually conducted by a young social psychologist named Stanley
Milgram back in 1963 at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, where he was a new
assistant professor. He tested more than 500 ordinary citizens from all walks of life (none were
students) and discovered that two out of every three Teachers (65 percent) went all the way
up to the maximum shock level of 450 volts. Most dissented along the way, but the majority
obeyed the authority figure to deliver what they believed might be lethal levels of shock. (We
should add that the Learner was actually a research confederate, trained to act like another

middle-aged participant. He did not get shocked, but the teacher-subject believed he was.) You
will read more about Milgram’s experiment later in this chapter, but for now let’s examine what
this experiment tells us about human nature.
PROBLEM: What makes ordinary people willing to harm other people, as they did in
Milgram’s shocking experiment?
It is equally important to realize that although the majority obeyed fully, there was a minority
who did refuse to give into this unjust authority. We then want to consider what makes people
help others, come to the aid of the distressed, volunteer their time and services, and even act
heroically?
Welcome to social psychology, the field that investigates how individuals affect each
other. It may be a relief to hear that not all of social psychology brings such bad news
about ourselves as does this experiment on obedience to authority. This exciting field
of social psychology also explores the forces that bring people together for friend-
ships and loving relationships, as well as for cooperation and conflict resolution. As
you study social psychology in this chapter, you will learn how people’s thoughts,
feelings, perceptions, motives, and behavior are influenced by their interactions with
others. Social psychologists try to understand behavior within its social context.
Defined broadly, the social context includes the real, imagined, or symbolic presence of
other people; the activities and interactions that take place among people; the settings
in which behavior occurs; and the expectations and social norms governing behavior in
a given setting (Sherif, 1981). Simply put, social psychologists study the person in
her or his behavioral context. They are curious to discover the interrelationships be-
tween the person and the situation, how individual personality and character may
affect behavior in social settings, and also how they are in turn influenced by factors
in the social situation. Of course, such a focus includes investigating group behavior,
such as teamwork and conformity, as well as group prejudice and terrorism. They
believe that by understanding the processes and mechanisms that give rise to negative
social behaviors, positive interventions can be developed to prevent or transform
such actions.
Most of all, the obedience research underscores the power of social situations
to control human behavior. This is a major theme to emerge from social psychological
research of the past 50 years. In the first part of this chapter, you will see how seem-
ingly minor features of social settings can have a huge impact on what we think and
how we feel and act.
Yet as powerful as any situation can be, psychologists know that it is not only
objective reality to which we respond. It is not just the physical size and shape and
color of a room that might affect how we act when in it; rather, we respond to our sub-
jective interpretation of the situation—to our personal perception—of what it means
to us. Thus, the same physical setting can differ significantly from person to person,
and it can change over time as we experience it differently. This, then, is the second
important theme in social psychology: the personal construction of a subjective social
reality. We must grasp this world of expectations and perceptions to understand the
attractive forces at work in building friendships and romantic relationships as well as
the repulsive forces underlying violence, prejudice, and discrimination.
In the third part of this chapter, we inquire who or what creates various situations
and maintains them, such as prisons, gangs, cults, torture centers, but also positive
settings, like your college, volunteer organizations, AAA, summer camps, and many
other settings that have an impact on human behavior. Initially, we will focus on
research that highlights the ways that situations matter in influencing how we think,
feel, and act. Next, we expand our perspective to highlight the ways that systems matter
in creating, maintaining, and justifying various life situations, for better or for worse.
A classroom where bullying is taking place would be a situation, a behavioral context,
social psychology The branch of psychology that
studies the effects of social variables and cognitions
on individual behavior and social interactions.
social context The combination of (a) people,
(b) the activities and interactions among people,
(c) the setting in which behavior occurs, and (d) the
expectations and social norms governing behavior in
that setting.
C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology 461

462 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
whereas the system would be the school administration and its policies and proce-
dures. We will also see how social psychologists have experimented with altering the
situation to change subjective social reality that, in turn, helps to promote the human
condition. That is a lofty goal of many social psychologists who are hard at work to
help realize it in many domains.
We begin now with the first of these three themes, the power of the situation, and
we are delighted to share with you what we consider to be some of the most interesting
research in all of psychology.
11.1 KEY QUESTION
How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior?
Imagine you find yourself in an interview for a great summer job, with the possibil-
ity of being hired as an intern at Google.com. During the interview, the interviewer
tries to break the ice by telling an off-color sexual joke that you personally find a bit
offensive. Do you let him know what you are feeling, or do you laugh? Afterward, he
suggests that you go to lunch together in the company cafeteria. Because the lunch is
free, do you go all out and order a full-course meal with some good wine, or a simpler,
healthier one? Do you start the conversation or wait for him to direct it? Do you gulp
down your favorite dessert before the soup that is less appealing to you? After you cut
the meat, will you shift your fork from your left hand to your right hand as you put
the food you cut into your mouth, or do you always keep the fork in your left hand?
Even in this simple social situation, there are many social and cultural rules
governing what is appropriate and acceptable behavior. If you are like most people in
an unfamiliar situation such as this, you will take your cues of what is the “right” thing
to do from those around you. The interviewer essentially sets the table for the conver-
sation, and you follow suit, as well as order the kind of meal he is having, and pretend
to like his off-color joke. You want the job and therefore are more compliant than you
might be otherwise. Europeans do not switch hands, as Americans do, when eating,
a habit learned unconsciously in family settings by observing others, rarely being told
to do so. Desserts, however desirable, come last in the eating sequence—that is part of
a standard restaurant or home meal script.
The power of situations to dominate our personalities and override our history
of learning, values, and beliefs is greatest when we are enmeshed in new settings. The
more novel the situation, the less we rely on our past habitual ways of responding and
call into action our usually automatic cognitive biases. We look to others to define for
us what is necessary to behave in ways others will find acceptable and appropriate.
But what is acceptable in your first visit to a church service or a funeral will be quite
different from your first experience with fraternity hazing or at a rock concert. We will
see that the pressures of these social situations can have powerful psychological effects,
getting us to do things we might never do ordinarily—even immoral, unethical, and
illegal actions.
Those pressures were operating on Bill when he was acting the role of “Teacher”
in Milgram’s obedience experiment, leading him to deliver extremely painful shocks
to an innocent, likeable “Learner.” Social roles, situational rules, how we are dressed,
whether we are anonymous or highly visible, if we are in a competition, or the mere
presence of others can all profoundly influence how we behave. Often, these subtle sit-
uational variables affect us in many ways even without our awareness. They may even
guide our actions in mindless or stupid ways. Our Core Concept emphasizes this point:
Core Concept 11.1
We usually adapt our behavior to the demands of the social situation,
and in new or ambiguous situations, we take our cues from the
behavior of others in that setting.

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 463
In this section, we will explore the concept called situationism and the research that
supports it. Situationism assumes that the external environment, or the behavioral
context, can have both subtle and forceful effects on people’s thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors. Situationism is contrasted with dispositionism, the tendency to attribute
behavior to internal factors such as genes, personality traits, and character qualities.
Dispositionism is the tendency to look within the individual actor for explanations of
why someone acted in a particular way. Social psychologists argue that such a ten-
dency has limited our appreciation of the extent to which social situations offer the
better explanation for that behavior. Of course, it is not a matter of either-or, but usu-
ally there is an interaction between dispositional tendencies and situational forces to
shape the final behavior that we observe and want to understand. This Person 3 Situation
interaction is at the core of both personality and social psychology, yet relatively little
research has been done identifying the relative contributions of each factor in a given
behavior in a particular social setting for specific kinds of individuals (Kihlstrom,
2011). Next, let’s look more closely at the power of the situation to create mischief
under the headings of conformity, obedience, mindless groupthink, and the failure to
help others in distress.
Social Standards of Behavior
A job interview, such as the one described above for a job at Google, provides an
example of situational influences on your behavior as you try to do “what is right” in
front of your prospective employer, sometimes to do anything to get that prized job.
You will also notice the power of the situation when you compare the way students
talk to their friends versus their professors or how you act at family dinners versus
watching favorite TV programs with your pals. Most people learn to size up their
social circumstances and conform their behavior to situational demands. The responses
most people make depend heavily on two factors, the social roles they play and social
norms of the group. Let us look at both of these closely.
Social Roles and Social Norms How do you go about answering the basic ques-
tion: Who are you? One answer might be: I am a college student, work part time at
a store, firstborn in a big family, religious, a cyclist, rock musician, and good looking.
Each of those descriptors becomes a social role you play in your personal life drama.
People from a culture that is more focused on collective values than individual values
might answer the “Who am I?” question with: I am a sister, a part of family X, of
member or tribe Y. A social role is one of several socially defined patterns of behavior
that are expected of persons in a given setting or group. The roles you assume may
result from your interests, abilities, and goals—or they may be imposed on you by the
group or by cultural, economic, or biological conditions beyond your control. In any
case, social roles prescribe your behavior by making obvious what you should do, how
you should do it, when, where, and why. Some roles are organized around our gender,
such as women being more likely to be caregivers for children and the elderly. Other
key roles are organized around family activities, such as planning vacations, taking out
the trash, cooking, setting the table, repairing broken things, and so forth. Occupations
are filled with many roles, such as receptionist, union organizer, manager, claims agent,
technician, and more.
The situations in which you live and function also determine the roles that are
available to you and the behaviors others expect of you. Being a college student, for
example, is a social role that carries certain implicit assumptions about attending classes,
studying, and handing in papers before deadline. It also implies a certain degree of privi-
lege, of usually not having to work full time, and of being interested in improving how
your mind works and also having the luxury of time to explore your career options.
In addition, the adoption of this role makes other roles less likely. Thus, your role as
college student diminishes the chances that you will assume the role of homeless person,
drug pusher, or witch doctor, for example. But more mature students might head their
own family, hold full-time jobs, be returning veterans, or be social-political activists.
situationism The view that environmental condi-
tions may influence people’s behavior as much as or
more than their personal dispositions do under some
circumstances.
dispositionism A psychological orientation
that focuses primarily on the inner characteristics of
individuals, such as personality dispositions, values,
character, and genetic makeup. Contrasted with situ-
ationism, the focus is on external causes of behavior.
social role A socially defined pattern of behavior
that is expected of persons in a given setting or group.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
The Person 3 Situation debate is
still hot in both areas (p. 453).

464 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
In addition to specific social roles that individuals enact, groups develop many
“unwritten rules” for the ways that all members should act. Gangs may demand unques-
tioned obedience to their leader and a willingness to fight or kill anyone designated as
the “enemy.” Modern-day male executives in technology businesses usually do not wear
ties and typically wear jeans to work, which would be the wrong attire in other busi-
ness settings, such as selling insurance. Female Muslim students may wear veils to class
(as a religious statement), and must do some in some cultures. Italians greet each other
by kissing on the cheek in a fixed order, right then left, and in Poland, they add a third
kiss for good measure. These expectations, called social norms, dictate socially appropri-
ate attitudes and behaviors in particular behavioral settings. Social norms can be broad
guidelines, such as ideas about which political or religious attitudes are considered
acceptable. Social norms can also be quite specific, embodying standards of conduct such
as being quiet in the library or shining your shoes for a job interview. Norms can guide
conversation, as when they restrict discussion of sensitive or taboo subjects in the pres-
ence of certain company.
Some norms exist in unwritten rules that are built into various situations, such as
when teachers are lecturing, students are expected to listen and not talk simultane-
ously. However, what about the norms governing your behavior in elevators? We bet
you always face the front of the elevator and either stop talking to a friend or talk
lower when others are there as well. Why? Where are those rules written? How did
you learn them? What would happen if the next time you enter an elevator filled with
other people, you face the rear? Try that little experiment and see how others react. (It
is a classic demonstration first shown on TV’s Candid Camera program in the 1960s.)
Or try sitting down when everyone stands up for the national anthem. To know if a
social norm is operating, just try to violate it and check out the reactions of others in
that same setting. If they express distress of some kind, you know you broke a norm.
When a person joins a new group, such as a work group or a group of friends,
there is always an adjustment period during which the individual tries to discover how
best to fit in. Adjustment to a group typically involves discovering its social norms.
Individuals experience this adjustment in two ways: by first noticing the uniformities
and regularities in certain behaviors, and then by observing the negative consequences
when someone violates a social norm.
For example, a new student in your school who carries books and notes in an atta-
ché case will be seen as “out of it” if backpacks are in, and vice versa in other schools.
The same is true of dress codes, which are rarely explicit but can guide how almost
everyone dresses. Guys wearing baseball caps backward or sideways would have been
laughed at a generation ago, before they were “in.” The same is now true with athletes
wearing diamond earrings or flashy tattoos. Also, elaborate handshake rituals among
some guys have replaced the “old-fashioned” simple hand-in-hand shake.
Schemas and Scripts Recall the way in which we form schemas to help organize
lots of information and for guiding our actions. A schema is a cluster of related con-
cepts that provides a general conceptual framework for thinking about a topic, an
event, an object, a person, or a situation in one’s life. Once a schema is formed, it
enables us to make predictions about what to expect in various settings. It is often
upsetting when one of our schemas is violated and fails to predict the expected. Imagine
going into a (non–fast food) restaurant, ordering your meal, and getting the bill before
any food appears. Imagine that the waitperson brings the dessert first, then the main
course, then the appetizer. Violation of expectation! Schemas become “shoulds” about
how people ought to behave in certain settings; and when they do not, this provokes
negative reactions, when we assume that person must be sharing our schema. The res-
taurant example involved a violation of an event schema or script. A script involves
a person’s knowledge about the sequence of events and behavioral actions that is
expected of a particular social role in a given setting.
Social Norms Influence Students’ Political Views Can the political views of fac-
ulty influence those of their students? Social psychologist Theodore Newcomb posed
social norms A group’s expectations regarding
what is appropriate and acceptable for its members’
attitudes and behaviors.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Bandura demonstrated that we
acquire many social behaviors
through observational learning
(p. 159).
script Knowledge about the sequence of events and
actions that is expected in a particular setting.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
Schemas are cognitive structures
that integrate knowledge and
expectations about a topic or
concept (p. 221).

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 465
this question. The college: Vermont’s Bennington College. The time: the 1930s. The
students: women from wealthy, conservative homes with decidedly conservative
values. The faculty: young, dynamic, and liberal. Bennington’s campus culture had
a prevailing norm of political and economic liberalism. The researcher wondered:
Which forces most shape the attitudes of these students, their family’s or their fac-
ulty’s? His data showed that the immediately present norms of the campus won the
war of influence against the remote norms of the family. In most women, their initial
attitude of conservatism was transformed as they progressed through their college
years, so that by their senior year, they had clearly converted to liberal thinking and
causes (Newcomb, 1943). But was that shift in attitudes enduring?
Twenty years later, the social influence of the Bennington experience was still
evident. Women who had graduated as liberals were still liberals; the minority who
had resisted the prevailing liberal norm had remained conservative. This was accom-
plished in part by each of them marrying their “own kind” politically. Most of the
women had married husbands with values similar to their own—either liberal or con-
servative—and created supportive new home environments that sustained those dif-
ferent ideologies. The liberal Bennington allegiance was evident some 30 years later in
the 1960 presidential election, when 60 percent of the class Newcomb had investigated
voted for liberal John Kennedy rather than conservative Richard Nixon—in contrast to
less than 30 percent support for Kennedy among graduates of comparable colleges at
that time (Newcomb et al., 1967).
Campus culture is not the only source of norms and group pressure, of course.
One’s workplace, neighborhood, religious group, and family all communicate stan-
dards for behavior—and threaten sanctions (such as firing, social rejection, or ex-
communication) for violating those norms. But a high school, college, or university
environment can have a powerful impact on young people. This is especially true if
they have had narrow life experiences and had not previously encountered attitudes
radically different from their own. For example, new college students commonly adopt
classmates’ political opinions, as in the Bennington study, and also frequently take on
religious beliefs of classmates, as well as attitudes about sex and alcohol (Prentice &
Miller, 1993; Schroeder & Prentice, 1995).
Conformity
How powerful are these social pressures? We can see the effects of social pressure
in people’s moods, clothing styles, and leisure activities (Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell
et al., 1998). This tendency to mimic other people is called the chameleon effect, after
the animal that changes its skin color to blend into its varied environments (Chartrand &
Bargh, 1999). We have seen how social pressure in political attitudes influenced
Bennington College students. But can social influence be strong enough to make peo-
ple follow a group norm that is clearly and objectively wrong? Could the power of
that situation prove stronger than the evidence of your own eyes? Could a group of
strangers get you to see the world through their distorted eyes?
The Asch Effect: A Minority of One in a Challenging Majority A receptionist
shows the last-arriving participant into a waiting room, where conversation with six
other volunteers reveals that they are all there for the same experiment. What the latest
arrival does not know is that the other six are really confederates of the experimenter.
Together, they have rehearsed an elaborate plan to exert social pressure on the one real
participant.
Soon the experimenter enters and invites all seven into another room where they
sit in a row of seven chairs facing an easel. On the easel, the group sees a stack of large
cards, like the one in Figure 11.1, featuring four vertical lines. The task is to say which
of the lines, A, B, or C, appears to be the same length as Standard line X. Casually, the
experimenter starts to collect judgments from the group, beginning at the other end of
the row from the one real subject. Everyone appears mildly bored at this apparently
simple task.
chameleon effect The tendency to mimic other
people, named after the animal that changes its skin
color to fit into its varied environments.
Conformity and
Influence in Groups
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

466 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
Everything goes smoothly until the third card comes up. On that card (see Figure 11.1),
line B is obviously the correct answer—so the one naive participant cannot believe that
the first person says “A.” As a psychology student, our naive volunteer knows that
different people perceive the world differently, which makes it easy to attribute this
response to an individual perceptual deviation. Then the second person agrees: “A.”
When the third and the fourth persons also say “A,” the naive volunteer begins to won-
der, “Am I the one with the loose perceptual screw?” As the next to last to respond, his
perception has been placed in conflict with the statements of all five people who have
responded before. Squinting at the card again, he stammers, “Uh . . . ‘A.’” The remain-
ing respondent makes it unanimous.
As the experiment proceeds through the deck of 18 cards, the other participants some-
times give the “right” answer, but often they make an apparently incorrect judgment.
Are they crazy? Shaken, our naive volunteer goes along with everyone else’s “mistakes,”
rationalizing that it would be inappropriate to spoil the experiment by disagreeing.
What would you do under these circumstances? You may think that you would
resist the pressure if you really had been in one of Asch’s experiments. Perhaps so. In
fact, almost two-thirds of the naive participants in Asch’s original experiment actually
withstood the group pressure to conform to the plainly erroneous judgments. But, one-
third did conform.
Social psychologists call this the Asch effect: the powerful influence that a group
exerts on the judgments of an individual. And Solomon Asch’s experiment has become
the classic illustration of conformity—the tendency for people to adopt the behavior and
opinions presented by other group members. Even though individuals were judging
matters of fact, not merely personal opinions, many caved in to conformity pressures.
This result encouraged Asch and others to tinker with the experimental conditions a
bit, contriving circumstances under which fully two-thirds of his participants yielded to the
majority. What are the conditions that researchers have found to encourage conformity?
• Unanimity of the majority. If everyone in the group agrees, they can exert a powerful
social pressure. But if even one person defects from the majority, the spell is
broken and yielding drops dramatically (Asch, 1940, 1955, 1956).
Asch effect A form of conformity in which a group
majority influences individual judgments of unambigu-
ous stimuli, as with line judgments.
conformity The tendency for people to adopt the
behaviors, attitudes, and opinions of other members
of a group.
FIGURE 11.1
Conformity in the Asch experiments
In this photo from Asch’s study, the naive
individual, number 6, displays obvious
concern about the majority’s erroneous
judgment. At top right, you see a typi-
cal stimulus array. At top left, the graph
illustrates conformity across 12 critical
trials, when individuals were grouped with
a unanimous majority or had the support
of a single dissenting partner. (A lower
percentage of correct estimates indicates
a greater degree of conformity with the
group’s false judgment.)

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 467
• Size of the group. In a group of only one or two other people, most subjects appar-
ently feel little pressure to conform to the group’s erroneous judgments. The pressure
suddenly increases when confronting a group of three. Surprisingly, there is almost
no difference in the conformity effect of a group of three and a group of 15.
• Making a public commitment rather than a private one. If you believe others in the
group will not hear your responses, you are less likely to go along with them when
you think they are incorrect (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
• Ambiguity. When the lines are nearly the same length—so that the correct answer is
not crystal clear—people seem more prone to self-doubt and to conformity.
• Makeup of the majority. Consistent with the findings on self-esteem, more
conformity occurs when the group has high status (Eagly, 1987) or is otherwise
seen by the individual as being important. Incidentally, women are no more
likely to conform to the group than are men, unless the task is a stereotypically
male-oriented task, such as making judgments about the quality of power tools
(Eagly & Carli, 1981).
• Self-esteem. As you might guess, people who place a low value on themselves are
more likely to conform in the Asch experiment (Aronson, 1991).
• Power of an ally. We want to highlight one finding that can have personal relevance
to you: the importance of even one person challenging the group’s norm. Even in
a large group, giving the person one ally who dissented from the majority opinion
sharply reduced conformity (as shown in Figure 11.1). With such a “partner,”
nearly all subjects resisted the pressures to conform. This is one of the most
positive take-away messages from this research. If you are willing to challenge the
group openly, chances are you will influence others to join your rebellion. Even
one hero can inspire others not to yield to the group pressure.
• Independents. Despite powerful pressures to yield, some individuals are able to
resist and maintain their independence, standing their ground to “call ’em as they
see ’em”—even to the point of deliberately giving a wrong answer when the group
gives a correct one (Friend et al., 1990).
Numerous studies have revealed additional factors that influence conformity. (These
experiments have included both females and males.) Specifically, a person is more
likely to conform under the following circumstances:
• When a judgment task is difficult or ambiguous (Saltzstein & Sandberg, 1979)
• When the group members are perceived as especially competent
• When their responses are given publicly rather than privately
• When the group majority is unanimous—but once that unanimity is broken,
the rate of conformity drops dramatically (Allen & Levine, 1969; Morris &
Miller, 1975)
So now imagine you are about to vote openly in a group, as is common in clubs or on
boards of directors. You will probably conform to the group majority if: (a) the issue
being decided is complex or confusing, (b) others in the group seem to know what they
are talking about, (c) you must vote by raising your hand instead of casting an anony-
mous ballot, (d) the entire group casting their votes before you all vote in a certain
way, and especially if (e) the leader votes first.
Being informed about such conformity pressures should make you wiser about
how you might go along with the group even when they are heading in a wrong or
even immoral direction. Resisting such influence requires critical thinking and being
mindful of what you have learned about the power of social forces.
In the Asch effect, people conform because of normative influences, wanting to be
accepted, approved, liked, and not rejected by others. Another reason for conformity
comes from informational influences, wanting to be correct and to understand the
correct way to act in any given situation.
Clearly this poses ethical problems, when confederates of the researcher lie to
fellow students about their perceptions. How could you do the basic Asch paradigm

468 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
without deception? How about everyone views the lines wearing goggles; the real sub-
ject’s goggles are just clear and show the lines as they are in reality, but the goggles
of the majority of students are altered so that they all see the lines the same way, but
distorted to make dissimilar size lines look the same as the standard. This technique
has been used in a recent study with participants wearing glasses similar to those in 3D
movies with polarizing filters (Mori & Arai, 2010). In that study, with 104 Japanese
students tested in groups of four, where three wore the distorting glasses and the other
wore a different, normal pair of glasses, Asch’s conformity effect was obtained with-
out deceptive confederates. However, the effect was found only for female students
and with an even greater conformity percentage than in the original. But the majority,
totally unlike Asch’s original results with males, did not sway the males. Why do you
think this gender difference might have happened?
Cultural Differences in Conformity The Asch test has gone to several parts of the
world, revealing remarkably similar results from most groups. The proportion of those
who yield to group pressure (under Asch’s original conditions) hovers around one-
third in a wide variety of societies. The following table shows some typical results of
such studies.
The consistency of these results hints that the same force is at work across different
cultures. Nevertheless, some caution is in order. Participants in most of these investi-
gations were college student volunteers, a fact that may make them different in many
ways from other people in their own societies. A few studies have found exceptions
to the apparent trend of consistency, and those exceptions pose interesting questions
about conformity and culture. For example, among those from the Bantu culture in
Rhodesia, 51 percent conformed on the Asch test. We can easily explain this result
because this Bantu culture customarily exacts a heavy penalty for nonconformity to
social customs. At the other extreme, German university students yielded to the group
only 22 percent of the time. This very low percentage was unexpected, but it might be
attributable to the age of the German sample, which was older than the other groups.
The most surprising results, however, may be the high level of nonconformity
among Japanese students. The casual observer of Japanese culture is usually struck by
the conformity to group norms displayed by the Japanese. Yet in the Asch situation,
participants yielded at the remarkably low rate of 25 percent—significantly less than
the reputedly nonconformist Americans. Moreover, the Japanese subjects were espe-
cially high in anticonformity, a deliberate rejection of group norms: 34 percent gave
deliberately wrong answers when the rest of the group gave correct responses! A pos-
sible explanation is that the Japanese culture of conformity may, in reality, be found
TABLE 11.1 Cross-Cultural Differences in Conformity in the Asch Situation
Country
Percentage Yielding
on the Asch Test
Rhodesia 51%
Fiji 36%
Brazil 34%
United States 33%
Hong Kong 32%
Lebanon 31%
Japan 25%
Germany 22%
Source: Mann, L. (1980). Cross-cultural studies of small groups. In H. C. Triandis & R. Brislin (Eds.), Handbook
of cross-cultural psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 155–209). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 469
only within the group to whom the individual Japanese person feels special allegiance.
Thus, when Japanese students were presented with judgments made by a group of
strangers, they felt little pressure to conform because it was not their group.
The Autokinetic Effect An early classic experiment, conducted by Turkish-American
psychologist, Muzafer Sherif (1935), demonstrated how social influence can lead to
internalization of a new norm. Participants were asked to judge the amount of move-
ment of a spot of light that was actually stationary but appeared to move when viewed
with no reference points in total darkness. This is a perceptual illusion known as the
autokinetic effect. Originally, individual judgments varied widely. However, when the
participants came together in a group consisting of strangers to state their judgments
aloud, their estimates began to converge. They began to see the light move in the same
direction and in similar amounts. Even more interesting was the final part of Sherif’s
study—when alone in the same darkened room after the group viewing, these partici-
pants continued to follow the group norm that had emerged when they were together.
As in the Asch studies, the group influenced individuals’ perceptions.
Moreover, once norms are established in a group, they tend to perpetuate them-
selves. In later research, these autokinetic group norms persisted even when tested a
year later when the former participants were retested alone—without former group
members witnessing the judgments (Rohrer et al., 1954). Norms can be transmitted
from one generation of group members to the next and can continue to influence peo-
ple’s behavior long after the original group that created the norm no longer exists
(Insko et al., 1980). How do we know that norms can have transgenerational influ-
ence? In autokinetic effect studies, researchers replaced one group member with a new
one after each set of autokinetic trials until all the members of the group were new to
the situation. The group’s autokinetic norm remained true to the one handed down
to them across several successive generations (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961). Do you see
how this experiment captures the processes that allow real-life norms to be passed
down across generations in businesses or political groups? Such norms come to be part
of the corporate culture that dictates how its members should see the world in com-
mon ways—sometimes for better as in firms like Apple and Google, but sometimes for
the worse, as in the corrupted Enron and Arthur Anderson Accounting firms. (We rec-
ommend viewing of the documentary film, Inside Job, 2011, to understand some of the
social psychological forces that contributed to the financial meltdown in Wall Street
and around the world.)
Conformity and Independence Light Up the Brain Differently New technology,
not available in Asch’s day, offers intriguing insights into the role of the brain in social
conformity. When people conform, are they rationally deciding to go along with the
group out of normative needs, or are they actually changing their perceptions and ac-
cepting the validity of the new, though erroneous, information provided by the group?
A recent study (Berns et al., 2005) used advanced brain-scanning technology to answer
this question. It also answers the question of whether the old Asch effect could work
with the current generation of more sophisticated students. (A peek ahead says, “Yes.”)
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), researchers can now peer
into the active brain as a person engages in various tasks and detect which specific
brain regions are energized as they carry out these tasks. Understanding what mental
functions those brain regions control tells us what it means when they are activated by
any given experimental task.
Here’s how the study worked. Imagine that you are one of 32 volunteers recruited
for a study of perception. You have to mentally rotate images of three-dimensional
objects to determine if the objects are the same or different from a standard object.
In the waiting room, you meet four other volunteers, with whom you begin to bond
by practicing games on laptop computers, taking photos of one another, and chatting.
They are really actors, “confederates” who will soon be faking their answers on the
test trials so that they are in agreement with each other, but not with the correct re-
sponses that you generate. You are selected as the one to go into the scanner while the
autokinetic effect The perceived motion of a
stationary dot of light in a totally dark room; used by
Muzafir Sherif to study the formation of group norms.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Neuroscientists use brain
scanning as a technique for
studying specific brain areas
activated by different mental
tasks (p. 64).

470 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
others outside look at the objects first as a group and then decide if they are same or
different. The rest of the procedure follows Asch’s original experiment with the actors
giving false answers, while you have to decide to go along with the majority or with
your perception.
As in Asch’s experiments, you (as the typical subject) would have caved in to group
pressure, on average giving the group’s wrong answers 41 percent of the time. When
you yielded to the group’s erroneous judgment, your conformity would have been seen
in the brain scan as changes in selected regions of the brain’s cortex dedicated to vision
and spatial awareness (specifically, activity increases in the right intraparietal sulcus).
Surprisingly, there would be no changes in areas of the forebrain that deal with moni-
toring conflicts, planning, and other higher-order mental activities. On the other hand,
if you made independent judgments that went against the group, then your brain lit up
in the areas that are associated with emotional salience (the right amygdala and related
regions). This means that resistance creates an emotional burden for those who main-
tain their independence—autonomy comes at a psychic cost.
The lead author of this research, neuroscientist Gregory Berns (2005), concludes,
“We like to think that seeing is believing, but the study’s findings show that seeing is
believing what the group tells you to believe.” This means that other people’s views,
when crystallized into a group consensus, can actually affect how we perceive important
aspects of the external world, thus calling into question the nature of truth itself.
It is only by becoming aware of our vulnerability to social pressure that we can
begin to build resistance to conformity when it is not in our best interest to yield to
the mentality of the herd. One problem is that many people maintain an illusion of
personal invulnerability—a “Not ME” syndrome. They assume that others may be sus-
ceptible to situational forces, but that they are different, special kind of folks who can
resist such forces. Paradoxically, such a naïve view makes them more susceptible to in-
fluence agents because their guard is down, and they do not engage in mindful, critical
analyses of situational forces acting on them.
It is also important to mention that this research using neurobiology techniques
to study social psychological processes is becoming widespread in the field of social
psychology and is known as social neuroscience. Social neuroscience is a new area of
research that uses methodologies from brain sciences to investigate various types of
social behavior, such as stereotyping in prejudice, attitudes, self-control, and emotional
regulation (Azar, 2002a; Cacioppo & Brentson, 2005).
Groupthink Groups themselves can also be pressured to conform. This important
social psychological process that encourages conformity in the thinking and deci-
sion making of individuals when they are in groups, like committees, has been termed
groupthink by psychologist Irving Janis (1972; Janis & Mann, 1977). In groupthink,
members of the group attempt to conform their opinions to what each believes to
be the consensus of the group. This conformity bias leads the group to take actions
each member might normally consider to be unwise. Five conditions likely to promote
groupthink are:
• Directive leadership, a dominant leader
• High group cohesiveness, with absence of dissenting views
• Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures for evidence collection/evaluation
• Homogeneity of members’ social background and ideology
• High stress from external threats with low hope of a better solution than that of
the group leader
This concept was first developed to help understand bad decisions made by the U.S.
government regarding the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Vietnam War, and
especially the disastrous invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. In that case, highly intelligent
members of President John Kennedy’s cabinet made a foolish decision to start an inva-
sion against Cuba based on faulty reports by anti-Castro Cuban refugees. Later, others
have cited groupthink as a factor that contributed to the faulty decisions in the space
social neuroscience An area of research that
uses methodologies from brain sciences to investigate
various types of social behavior, such as stereotyping
in prejudice, attitudes, self-control, and emotional
regulation.
groupthink The term for the poor judgments and
bad decisions made by members of groups that are
overly influenced by perceived group consensus or the
leader’s point of view.
cohesiveness Solidarity, loyalty, and a sense of
group membership.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
Our judgments and decisions are
often affected by personal biases
(p. 227).

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 471
shuttle disasters and the bankruptcy of Enron Corporation. The 2003 decision by the
Bush administration to wage preemptive war against Iraq was similarly based on sev-
eral false beliefs among Bush’s cabinet of otherwise smart advisors. They wanted to be-
lieve (their lie) that Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons that he would deliver
to Osama bin Laden to use in another terrorist attack on the United States (Schwartz &
Wald, 2003).
The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee investigating the justifications for the Iraq
War cited groupthink as one of the processes involved in that decision. It is interesting
to note the use of this social psychological concept in an official report of that govern-
ment committee:
The Intelligence Community (IC) has long struggled with the need for analysts
to overcome analytic biases. . . . This bias that pervaded both the IC’s analytic
and collection communities represents “group think,” a term coined by psychol-
ogist Irving Janis in the 1970’s to describe a process in which a group can make
bad or irrational decisions as each member of the group attempts to conform
their opinions to what they believe to be the consensus of the group. IC person-
nel involved in the Iraq WMD issue demonstrated several aspects of group-
think: examining few alternatives, selective gathering of information, pressure
to conform within the group or withhold criticism, and collective rationaliza-
tion (U.S. Senate, 2004, p. 4).
Recently, the U.S. Directorate of Intelligence has found a way of minimizing the risk of
groupthink by developing “Red Teams” whose task is to challenge all decisions with
more reliable evidence. They insist on convergence of multiple sources of indepen-
dent evidence to support all action-based decisions by government agencies. Former
CIA Director Porter Goss has encouraged innovation and creativity in how the CIA
approaches its mission. In a report outlining the new defenses against mindless group-
think, Goss said:
The primary criticism was that our analysts were “too wedded to their assump-
tions” and that our tradecraft—the way we analyze a subject and communicate
our findings—needed strengthening. . . . Above all, we seek to foster in each
analyst a sense of individual initiative, responsibility and ownership, as well as
the recognition that providing analysis vital to our national security requires
challenging orthodoxy and constantly testing our assumptions. Mastering the
fundamentals of tradecraft and building expertise are critical, but we also must
aspire to a level of creativity and insight that allows us to look beyond the ob-
vious and flag the unexpected. Only then can we truly fulfill our obligation to
help protect the American people (Kringen, 2006).
Obedience to Authority
So far, we have seen how groups influence individuals. But the arrow of influence also
points the other way: Certain individuals, such as charismatic leaders and authorities,
can command the obedience of groups—even large masses of people. The ultimate
demonstration of this effect was seen in the World War II era, with the emergence of
Adolph Hitler in Germany and Benito Mussolini in Italy. These dictators transformed
the rational citizens of whole nations into mindlessly loyal followers of a fascist ideol-
ogy bent on world conquest. But the same was true in Cambodia in the 1970s where
Pol Pot, the brutal dictator and leader of the Khmer Rouge, decided to eliminate social
classes by forcing everyone to work on farms. Those likely to resist—the educated,
intellectuals, and foreigners—were tortured, starved to death, and murdered. In
a 4-year reign of terror, known as the Killing Fields of Cambodia, nearly 2 million
people were killed.
Modern social psychology had its origins in this World War II wartime crucible
of fear and prejudice. It was natural, then, that many of the early social psychologists

472 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
focused on the personalities of people drawn into fascist groups. Spe-
cifically, they looked for an authoritarian personality behind the fascist
group mentality (Adorno et al., 1950). But that dispositional analysis
failed to recognize the social, economic, historical, and political realities
operating on those European populations at that time. To clarify this
point, let us reflect for a moment on some more modern examples of
unquestioning obedience to authority.
In 1978, a group of American citizens left California to relocate their
Protestant religious order, called Peoples Temple, in the South American
jungle of Guyana. There, following the orders of their charismatic leader,
the Reverend Jim Jones, more than 900 members of the Peoples Temple
willingly administered lethal doses of cyanide to hundreds of their chil-
dren, then to their parents, and then to themselves. Those who refused
were murdered by other members of this cult—by their friends.
Then, in 1993, 100 members of a religious sect joined their leader,
David Koresh, in defying federal agents who had surrounded their com-
pound. After a standoff of several weeks, the Branch Davidians set fire to
their quarters rather than surrender. In the resulting conflagration, scores
of men, women, and children perished. Four years later, the college-
educated members of another group calling itself Heaven’s Gate fol-
lowed their leader’s command to commit mass suicide in order to achieve
a “higher plane” of being. And, on September 11, 2001, followers
of Osama bin Laden weaponized American commercial airliners and
piloted them into the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. In addi-
tion to murdering thousands of people, they knowingly committed sui-
cide. And even more recently, scores of suicide bombers, both men and
women, have blown themselves apart as “revolutionary martyrs” in
the Palestinian campaign against Israel. Were these people mentally de-
ranged, stupid, and totally strange creatures—unlike us? Are there any
conditions under which you would blindly obey an order from a person you love and
respect (or fear) to do such extreme deeds? Would you, for example, obey an author-
ity figure that told you to electrocute a stranger? Of course, you are saying to yourself,
“No way,” “Not me,” “I am not that kind of person.” But think about what each of the
people we have described above must have been thinking before they were caught up
in their obedience trap—the same thing as you, probably.
Let’s return to our opening story of Bill trapped in the experiment created by social
psychologist Stanley Milgram (1965, 1974). His research revealed that the willingness
of people to follow the orders of an authority, even potentially lethal ones, is not con-
fined to a few extreme personalities or deranged individuals. This finding, along with
certain ethical issues that the experiment raises, places Milgram’s work at the center
of one of the biggest controversies in psychology (Blass, 1996). We will look at more
of the findings generated by that program of research on obedience and visit a series of
follow-up studies that expand its relevance and applicability to everyday life settings
and to recent media exploitation of this Milgram effect in French reality TV. But first,
let’s consider how some experts on human behavior failed to predict the high rate of
obedience found in this research.
Milgram’s Research Revisited Milgram described his experimental procedure to
each of 40 psychiatrists and then asked them to estimate the percentage of American
citizens who would go to each of the 30 levels in the experiment. On average, they
predicted that fewer than 1 percent would go all the way to the end, that only sadists
would engage in such sadistic behavior, and that most people would drop out at the
tenth level of 150 volts.
They could not have been more wrong! These experts on human behavior were
totally wrong for two reasons. (This dual tendency of overestimating person power
and underestimating situation power is known as the fundamental attribution error,
FAE.) First, they ignored all the situational determinants of behavior in the procedural
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
In contrast to most personality
theories focusing on internal
processes as detriments of
behavior, social psychology
emphasizes the importance of the
external social situation (p. 419).
Unquestioning obedience to authority led
more than 900 members of an American
cult community in Jonestown to com-
mit mass suicide under orders from their
leader, the Reverend Jim Jones.

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 473
description of the experiment. That is, they failed to recognize the significance of the
authority power, the roles of Teacher and Learner, the rules, the diffusion of personal
responsibility (when the experimenter claimed to the “Teacher” that he would be
responsible for anything that might happen to the “Learner”), the definition of what
were appropriate and expected behaviors by the Teacher, and the other social pressures
toward obedience.
Second, their training in traditional psychiatry led them to rely too heavily on the
dispositional perspective to understand unusual behavior—to look for explanations
within the individual’s personality makeup and not in the external behavioral context.
Thus, their estimate of only 1 percent as blindly obedient to authority, as going all the
way up to the maximum shock level of 450 volts, is a base rate against which we can
assess what actually happened in this research.
Before examining the pattern of results, we need to add that Milgram wanted to
show that his results were not due to the authority power of Yale University—which
is what New Haven is all about. So he transplanted his laboratory to a rundown office
building in downtown Bridgeport, Connecticut, and repeated the experiment as a proj-
ect of a fictitious, private research firm with no apparent connection to Yale. There he
tested another 500 ordinary citizens and added female participants as Teachers to the
experimental mix. So what was the actual level of blind obedience to authority?
As with those tested at Yale, the majority of these Bridgeport participants obeyed
fully: two out of every three (65 percent) went all the way up the maximum shock level
of 450 volts! These “Teachers” shocked their “Learner” over and over again despite his
increasingly desperate pleas to stop. This was as true of the young and old, men and
women, well educated and less so, and across many occupations and careers.
Variations on an Obedience Theme Milgram carried out 19 different experiments—
each one a different variation of the basic paradigm of: Experimenter/-Teacher/-
Learner/-Memory Testing/-Errors Shocked. In each of these studies, he varied one
social-psychological variable and observed its impact on the extent of obedience to the
authority’s pressure to continue to shock the Learner. He added women in one study,
varied the physical proximity or remoteness of either the Experimenter-Teacher link
or the Teacher-Learner link, had peers model rebellion or full obedience before the
Teacher had his chance to begin, and added other social variations in each experiment.
As can be seen in Figure 11.2, the data for 16 of these variations clearly reveal the
extreme pliability of human nature: Under some conditions, almost everyone could be
totally obedient, while under other conditions, almost everyone could resist authority
pressures. It all depends on how the social situation was constructed by the researcher
and experienced by the participants. Milgram was able to demonstrate that compli-
ance rates could soar to more than 90 percent of people administering the 450-volt
maximum if others were seen obeying, or the obedience rate could be reduced to less
than 10 percent by introducing just one crucial social variable of others rebelling into
the compliance recipe.
The Milgram Obedience Experiment
The “shock generator” looked ominous but didn’t actually deliver shocks to the “Learner” (middle
photo), who was a confederate of the experimenter. The last photo shows the experimenter giving
instructions to the “Teacher,” who is seated in front of the shock generator.

474 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
Want maximum obedience? Allow the new Teacher to first observe someone else
administering the final shock level. Want people to resist authority pressures? Provide
social models of peers who rebel. Participants also refused to deliver the shocks if the
Learner said he wanted to be shocked; that’s masochistic, and they are not sadists!
They also were reluctant to give high levels of shock when the Experimenter filled in
as the Learner and they were supposed to shock him. They were more likely to shock
when the Learner was remote than nearby. In each of the other variations on this
diverse range of ordinary American citizens, of widely varying ages, occupations, and
of both sexes, it was possible to elicit low, medium, or high levels of compliant obedi-
ence with a flick of the Situational Switch—as if one were simply turning a Human
Nature Dial within their psyches. This large sample of a thousand ordinary citizens
from such varied backgrounds makes the results of Milgram’s Obedience to Authority
studies among the most generalizable in all the social sciences.
Of course, no shocks were ever delivered to the Learner. The “victim” of the “shocks”
was an accomplished actor who congenially chatted with his “Teacher” after the experi-
ment and assured him he was fine and had never felt any shocks. All of his comments dur-
ing the study had been recorded previously to standardize the procedure across the many
trials and variations of the study. Moreover, the powerful authority figure in the gray lab
coat was not a “real” authority, not Milgram himself, but a high school biology teacher!
And, for all the “Teachers” knew, when once the Learner fell silent after the 330 volt
shock, he may have been unconscious or dead—but in any case his memory could not be
improved by further shocks. Nevertheless, hundreds of people mindlessly obeyed and con-
tinued doing as ordered even though it made no sense—had they thought rationally and
critically about what they were doing. They should have realized that the study was not
about improving the learner’s memory; it was about them as reluctant punishing agents.
British author C. P. Snow reminds us, “When you think of the long and gloomy
history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of
obedience than have been committed in the name of rebellion.”
FIGURE 11.2
Obedience in Milgram’s Experiments
The graph shows a profile of weak
or strong obedience effects across
situational variations of Milgram’s
study of obedience to authority.
Source: Miller, A. G. (1986). The Obedience
Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in the
Social Sciences. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Copyright © 1986 by Praeger Publishers, Inc.
Reproduced with permission of Greenwood
Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT.

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 475
Such research, and the many replications that followed in countries around the
world, challenges our conception that “good people” cannot be seduced into becom-
ing perpetrators of evil. It suggests that the line between good and evil is not fixed and
permanent but rather is sufficiently permeable to allow almost anyone to move across
from one behavioral realm to the other. It all depends on the power of the new, unfa-
miliar situation they face and with which they most cope.
Heroic Defiance This concept of situational power faces one challenge, that of indi-
vidual heroic defiance. Heroes are people who are able to resist situational forces that
overwhelm their peers and remain true to their personal values. They are the “whistle-
blowers” who challenge corrupt or immoral systems by not going along with the com-
pany norm or institutional SOP, standard operating procedures.
An Army Reservist, Joe Darby, became one such hero when, in 2004, he exposed
the horrendous abuses of prisoners by his buddies at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib Prison. He did
so by showing to a senior investigating officer a CD with the images of prisoner abuse
taken by other MPs on the night shift. The officer then initiated an investigation that
stopped those abuses, which had been going on for months.
But such “heroes” are often despised by their former colleagues and made to pay
a high price for not being a silent “team player.” Darby, for example, had to go into
hiding under protective custody for 3 years, along with his wife and mother, because of
death threats against him by soldiers in his battalion and by people in their hometown
for humiliating the American military in exposing those photos of sadistic abuse of
prisoners. After being released in 2007, Darby did finally receive a hero award at the
Kennedy Center in Washington, DC.
Heroes come in all sizes and backgrounds. During the opening ceremonies of the
2008 Olympics in Beijing, China, a little boy was ushered in on the shoulders of Yao
Ming, Houston Rockets’ star basketball player. The boy, Lin Hao, was in his school
in Szechuan province when a massive earthquake hit. He survived the collapse of the
school roof, but most of the other students were killed. While escaping, he noticed two
children struggling to get out from under the debris. He raced back to save them, and
when asked why he risked his life in doing so, Lin’s reply was that of a “duty hero.” He
said that he was the Hall Monitor, and it was his job to look after his classmates. Here
is a fine example of transforming compassion into heroic action. A behavioral definition
of heroism: a voluntary act on behalf of others in need, or in defense of a moral cause,
with potential personal risk or cost, and without expectation of tangible reward.
In February 2011, the world witnessed a remarkable event as hundreds of thou-
sands of Egyptians, mostly young men and women, openly defied the repressive regime
of their President Mubarak. They withstood counterattacks by his civilian supporters
and brutal beatings by his initially loyal Army. However, this leaderless mass persisted
for 18 days to demonstrate in the main Cairo square using social media technology to
keep organized and focused, while Arab TV carried their call for freedom to television
viewers around the globe. In the end, their collective heroism won the day, and hope-
fully the start of a new democratic nation in the Middle East that will be a model for
Egypt’s neighbor states.
Curiously, there is relatively little systematic research on heroes and heroism,
especially compared to the abundance of research on the dark side of human nature,
as revealed throughout this chapter. Why do you think that is so?
Cross-Cultural Tests of Milgram’s Research
Because of its structural design and its detailed protocol, the basic Milgram obedience
experiment encouraged replication by independent investigators in many countries.
A recent comparative analysis was made of the rates of obedience across eight stud-
ies conducted in the United States and of nine replications in European, African, and
Asian countries. There were comparably high levels of compliance by research volun-
teers in these different studies and nations. The majority obedience effect of a mean
61 percent found in the U.S. replications was matched by the 66 percent obedience
heroes People whose actions help others in
emergencies or challenge unjust or corrupt systems,
doing so without concern for reward or likely negative
consequences for them by acting in deviant ways.
Would you risk your life to defy authority
in defense of your beliefs, as this
Chinese student did, defying a tank force
coming to crush the student rebellion at
Tiananmen Square?
A 9-year old Chinese boy acted heroically
to save the lives of classmates in an
earthquake. Here, Lin Hao is with Yao
Ming during the opening ceremony of the
2008 Beijing Olympics.
about the Heroic Imagination
Project
Read
at MyPsychLab

476 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
found across all the other national samples. The range of obedience went from a low of
31 to a high of 91 percent in the U.S. studies, and from a low of 28 percent (Australia)
to a high of 88 percent (South Africa) in the cross-national replications. There was also
stability of obedience over decades of time as well as over place. There was no associa-
tion between when a study was done (between 1963 and 1985) and degree of obedience
(Blass, 2004).
Using a variation of the Milgram paradigm, researchers in Utrecht University,
Holland, and in Palermo University, Sicily, found obedience rates comparable to
those in some of Milgram’s experimental variations. The situation they created was
that of a coach who had to deliver increasingly critical feedback to his performer
when he did poorly, allegedly to build resilience in performers. They had to deliver
a series of graded hostile comments, as if they were their own, for each error.
Critical feedback given to the Performer consisted of a graded series of increasingly
negative comments on his performance and rude remarks about his lack of ability.
For example, a mild criticism was “You are going bad . . .”, a moderately negative
feedback was “You are really ridiculous!”, and an extremely negative feedback was
“You are really the most stupid person I have ever seen!” Obedience to authority
was determined as delivering the full set of 15 hostile comments. In one of the
Utrecht studies, more than 90 percent of the students playing the role of coach went
all the way (Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986). In the Sicilian study using that same pro-
cedure, obedience was only 30 percent, but that was in a condition where coach and
performer were in close proximity and the experimenter was in an adjacent room.
That is exactly what Milgram found for those experimental variations (Bocchiaro &
Zimbardo, 2008).
More than four decades after Milgram’s research, a made-for-TV replication was
conducted with college students at Santa Clara University, in California, by researcher
Jerry Burger (2009). For ethical reasons, the study was terminated when the teachers
pressed the 150-volt switch, the tenth level. Once again, the majority obeyed the dic-
tates of the experiment and presumably would have been likely to continue onward
and upward to the full 450 volts if that were possible.
In 2010, a television show in France staged the Milgram experiment for a live
audience, who got to vote to shock or not to shock the victim in distress. Egged on
by a glamorous presenter, cries of “punishment” from a studio audience and dramatic
music, the overwhelming majority of the participants obeyed orders to continue deliv-
ering the shocks—despite the man’s screams of agony and pleas for them to stop. The
percentage giving maximum shock soared to 80 percent in what the producers term
“The Game of Death”!
Why Do We Obey Authority? From the many variations Milgram conducted on his
original study, we can conclude that people tended to be obedient under the following
conditions (Milgram, 1965, 1974; Rosenhan, 1969):
• When a peer modeled obedience by complying with the authority figure’s
commands
• When the victim was remote from the Teacher and could not be seen or heard,
thereby promoting a sense of anonymity
• When the Teacher was under direct surveillance of the authority figure so that he
was aware of the authority’s presence
• When the authority figure had higher status relative to the Teacher
What are the lessons to be learned? If you carefully review these conditions (refer
back to Figure 11.2), you can see that the obedience effect results from situational
variables and not personality variables. In fact, personality tests administered to the
participants did not reveal any traits that differentiated those who obeyed from those
who refused, nor did they identify any psychological disturbance or abnormality in
the obedient punishers. These findings enable us to rule out individual personality as
a variable in obedient behavior. Going beyond the experimental findings to applying
Egyptian citizens successfully and
peacefully deposed their dictator by acts
of collective heroism despite violent
attacks against them by the Army and the
dictator’s supporters.

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 477
them to real-world settings, we can outline ten basic steps or processes that can seduce
ordinary, even good, people to go down the slippery slope of evil, as seen in Table 11.2.
Some Real-World Extensions of the Milgram Obedience
to Authority Paradigm
Let’s look at blind obedience to authority in two real-life settings: the first, a study of
nurses’ willingness to follow a doctor’s orders that were not legitimate, and the second,
an actual incident in which store managers followed telephoned orders (from a pervert
pretending to be a police officer) to violate the privacy of another employee.
Nurses Obey Doctor’s Dangerous Orders If the relationship between teachers and
students is one of power-based authority, how much more so is that between physi-
cians and nurses? To find out, a team of doctors and nurses tested obedience in their
authority system by determining whether nurses would follow or disobey an illegiti-
mate request by an unknown physician in a real hospital setting (Hofling et al., 1966).
Each of 22 nurses individually received a call from an unknown staff doctor who told
her to administer a medication to his patient immediately, before he got to the hos-
pital. His order doubled the maximum amount indicated as a high dose. When this
dilemma was presented as a hypothetical scenario, 10 of 12 nurses in that hospital said
they would refuse to obey because it violated hospital procedures (Krackow & Blass,
1995). However, the power of the situation took over on the hospital ward:
Twenty-one of 22 nurses put to the test started to pour the medication
(actually a fake drug) to administer to the patient—before the researcher
stopped them from doing so. That solitary disobedient nurse should have
been given a raise and a hero’s medal!
The Fast-Food Restaurant Authority Hoax Another remarkable real-
world illustration of the Milgram effect in action comes from a telephone
hoax perpetrated in 68 fast-food restaurants across 32 states. Assistant
store managers blindly followed the orders of a phone caller, pretending
to be a police officer, who insisted that they strip search a young female
employee he said had stolen property on her.
The alleged officer instructed the assistant manager to detain the
employee in the back room, strip her naked, and search her extensively for
the stolen goods. The caller insisted on being told in graphic detail what
was happening, and all the while the video surveillance cameras were recording these
remarkable events as they unfolded. In some cases, the abuse escalated to having her
masturbate and perform sexual acts on a male assistant who was supposed to be
guarding her (Wolfson, 2005).
TABLE 11.2 Ten Steps Toward Evil—Getting Good People to Harm Others
Now imagine the opposite of each tactic to create the path to heroic behavior.
• Provide people with an ideology to justify beliefs for actions.
• Make people take a small first step toward a harmful act with a minor, trivial action and then
gradually increase those small actions.
• Slowly transform a once-compassionate leader into a dictatorial figure.
• Provide people with vague and ever-changing rules.
• Relabel the situation’s actors and their actions to legitimize the ideology.
• Provide people with social models of compliance.
• Allow verbal dissent but only if people continue to comply behaviorally with orders.
• Encourage dehumanizing the victim.
• Diffuse responsibility.
• Make exiting the situation difficult.
One of the innocent victims of the
Authority Hoax on the witness stand.
She received a large settlement from the
fast-food company where she worked and
had been abused.

478 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
This bizarre authority-influence-in-absentia has seduced dozens of ordinary
people in that situation to violate store policy, and presumably their own ethical
and moral principles, to molest and humiliate honest young employees. In 2007,
the perpetrator was uncovered—a former corrections officer—but freed for lack of
direct evidence.
One reasonable reaction you might have to learning about this hoax is to focus
on the dispositions of the victim and her assailants, as naïve, ignorant, gullible
individuals. However, when we learn that this scam has been carried out successfully
in a great many similar settings across many states, many different and fast-food
restaurants, with dozens of assistant managers deceived, then our analysis must shift
away from simply blaming the victims to recognizing the power of situational forces
involved in this scenario. One of the assistant store managers warned reporters not
to judge them so quickly because they couldn’t predict what they might have done
unless they experienced the same situation (Gibney, 2006). And it is the exact advice
we give to you after reading this chapter and being aware of the fundamental attri-
bution error.
The Bystander Problem: The Evil of Inaction
“Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have acted;
the indifference of those who should have known better; the silence of the voice
of justice when it mattered most; that has made it possible for evil to triumph.”
—Haile Selassie, Former Emperor of Ethiopia
Harm doesn’t always come from a hurtful act. It can also come from inaction when
someone needs help. We can illustrate this fact with an event that stunned the nation
and became a legend about the apparent callousness of human nature. On March
13, 1964, the New York Times reported that 38 citizens of Queens watched for
more than half an hour as a man with a knife stalked and killed Kitty Genovese, one
of their neighbors, in three separate attacks. The article said that the sound of the
bystanders’ voices and the sudden glow of their bedroom lights twice interrupted
the assault, but each time the assailant returned and stabbed her again. Accord-
ing to the report, only one witness called the police—after the woman had been
murdered.
The story of Kitty Genovese’s murder dominated the news for days, as a shocked
nation was served up media commentary that played on the angles of bystander
apathy and the indifference of New Yorkers. Why didn’t they help? Was it something
about New York—or could the same thing happen anywhere?
A recent investigation of police records and other archival materials has found
that the real story was different from the original Times report (Manning, Levine, &
Collins, 2007). For one thing, there was no basis for the claim that 38 people wit-
nessed the event. Further, most of the assault took place in an entry hall, out of view
of neighbors. And, in fact, a few phone calls to the police were made during the attack.
Remember also, at that time, there was no 911 emergency number to facilitate such
calls. It was still a tragedy, of course, but not one that proved the people of New York
to be the indifferent bystanders the original story made them out to be. For psychology,
the important result of this Kitty Genovese incident was that it led to some important
research on bystander intervention that focused on the power of the situation. Under
what circumstances will people help—or not?
Sadly, the general issue of public apathy in failing to get involved in helping
someone in distress is not limited in time or geography. In October 2009, after a
school dance, at Richmond, California High School, a 15-year-old girl student was
brutally gang raped by at least five men and boys, and also beaten over a 2-hour pe-
riod. As many as a dozen people looked on and did nothing; none called 911 emer-
gency on their cell phones; some are reported as having even been texting about
this “event.”
Kitty Genovese, victim of brutality and
bystander apathy

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 479
Contrived Emergencies Soon after the Kitty Genovese murder and the analysis
in the press, two young social psychologists, Bibb Latané and John Darley, began a
series of studies on the bystander intervention problem. These studies all ingeniously cre-
ated laboratory analogues of the difficulties faced by bystanders in real emergency
situations. In one such experiment, a college student, placed alone in a room with
an intercom, was led to believe that he was communicating with one or more stu-
dents in adjacent rooms. During a discussion about personal problems, this indi-
vidual heard what sounded like another student having a seizure and gasping for
help. During the “seizure,” the bystander couldn’t talk to the other students or find
out what, if anything, they were doing about the emergency. The dependent vari-
able was the speed with which he reported the emergency to the experimenter. The
independent variable was the number of people he believed were in the discussion
group with him.
It turned out that the speed of response by those in this situation depended on the
number of bystanders they thought were present. The more people they believed to be
listening in on the situation in other rooms, the slower they were to report the seizure,
if they did so at all. As you can see in Figure 11.3, all those in a two-person situation
intervened within 160 seconds, but only 60 percent of those who believed they were
part of a large group ever informed the experimenter that another student was seri-
ously ill (Latané & Darley, 1968).
Was it the person or the situation? Personality tests showed no significant rela-
tionship between particular personality characteristics of the participants and their
speed or likelihood of intervening. The best predictor of bystander intervention
was the situational variable of group size: that is, the number of other bystand-
ers present. By way of explanation, Darley and Latané proposed that the likeli-
hood of intervention decreases as the group increases in size because each person
assumes that others will help, so he or she does not have to make that commitment.
Individuals who perceive themselves as part of a large group of potential interveners
bystander intervention problem Laboratory
and field study analogues of the difficulties faced by
bystanders in real emergency situations.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
The independent variable refers
to the stimulus conditions or
experimenter-varied conditions for
different groups in an experiment,
while the dependent variable is
the measured outcome (p. 27).
FIGURE 11.3
Bystander Intervention in an
Emergency
The more people present in a crisis, the
less likely it is that any one bystander will
intervene. As this summary of research
findings shows, bystanders act most
quickly in two-person groupings.
Source: Darley, S. M. & Latané, B. (1968).
Bystander intervention in emergencies: diffusion
of responsibilities. Journal of Personality & Social
Psychology, 8 (4), pp. 377–384. Copyright © 1968
by the American Psychological Association.
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e
h
el
p
in
g
Seconds from beginning of emergency
100
80
60
40
20
0
20 80 120 160 200 240 280
2-person groups
3-person groups
6-person groups

480 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
experience a diffusion of responsibility: a dilution or weakening of each group member’s
obligation to help, to become personally involved. You may have experienced
moments of diffused responsibility if you have driven past a disabled car beside a
busy highway because you believed “surely someone else” would stop and help—as
you went on your way.
Another factor was undoubtedly also at work: conformity. As you will remember
from our Core Concept and from Asch’s studies of conformity, when people don’t
know what to do, they take their cues from others. The same thing occurred in the
bystander studies, where those who failed to intervene were observing and conforming
to the behavior of other people who were doing nothing. They allowed the absence of
helping by others to define the situation for them as one in which the norm was that it
was OK to be passively indifferent.
Does Training Encourage Helping? Two studies suggest that the bystander prob-
lem can be countered with appropriate training. Ted Huston and his colleagues (1981)
found no personality traits that distinguished people who had helped in actual emer-
gency situations from those who had not. But they did find that helpers more often
had had some medical, police, first-aid, or CPR training in dealing with emergency
situations. And another study shows that even a psychology class lecture on the by-
stander problem can help (Beaman et al., 1978). Students had an opportunity to help
a “victim” slumped in a doorway while walking by with a nonresponsive confederate
of the experimenter. Those who had attended a lecture on bystander intervention were
twice as likely to stop and attempt to help as those who had not received the lecture
on helping. Education apparently can make a difference; we hope you will also use the
lessons of this chapter in constructive ways.
Need Help? Ask for It!
To demonstrate the positive effects of situational power, social psychologist Tom
Moriarity (1975) arranged two fascinating experiments. In the first study, New Yorkers
watched as a thief snatched a woman’s suitcase in a restaurant when she left her table.
In the second, they watched a thief grab a portable radio from a beach blanket when
the owner left it for a few minutes. What did these onlookers do? Some did nothing,
letting the thief go on his merry way. But others did intervene. What were the condi-
tions under which some helped and others did not?
In each experiment, the would-be theft victim (the experimenter’s accomplice) had
first asked the soon-to-be observer of the crime either “Do you have the time?” or “Will
you please keep an eye on my bag (radio) while I’m gone?” The first interaction elicited
no personal responsibility, and almost all of the bystanders stood by idly as the theft
unfolded. However, of those who had agreed to watch the victim’s property, almost every
bystander intervened. They called for help, and some even tackled the runaway thief on
the beach!
The encouraging message is that we can often convert apathy to action and
transform callousness to kindness just by asking for it. The mere act of request-
ing a favor forges a special human bond that involves other people in ways that
materially change the situation. It makes them feel responsible to you and thereby
responsible for what happens in your shared social world. Under such conditions,
ordinary people can become Good Samaritans. But we will see in research outlined
below that the situation can make a theology student about to deliver a sermon
about the Good Samaritan effect into a Bad Samaritan—if he or she were in a
hurry.
Your chances of getting aid from would-be helpers can be increased in several ways
based on what we have learned across a number of studies (Schroeder et al., 1995):
• Ask for help. Let others know you need it rather than assuming they realize your
need or know what is required.
diffusion of responsibility Dilution or
weakening of each group member’s obligation to act
when responsibility is perceived to be shared with all
group members or accepted by the leader.

How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior? 481
• Reduce the ambiguity of the situation by clearly explaining the problem
and what should be done: “She’s fainted! Call an ambulance right away,”
or “Someone broke into my house—call the police and give them this
address!”
• Identify specific individuals so they do not diffuse responsibility with others present:
“You, in the red shirt: Call 911!” or “Will the person in the blue Toyota please call
for a tow truck right away?”
None of these tactics guarantees the safety of your person or possessions, of course.
Nevertheless, they probably represent your best hope if you find yourself, alone in a
crowd, facing a real emergency.
WHAT MAKES A SAMARITAN GOOD OR BAD?
Now that you know something about
bystander intervention, let’s see how good
you are at picking the crucial variable out
of a bystander situation inspired by the
biblical tale of the Good Samaritan (see
Luke 10:30–37). In the biblical account,
several important people are too busy to
help a stranger in distress. He is finally
assisted by an outsider, a Samaritan, who
takes the time to offer aid. Could the fail-
ure of the distressed individual’s country-
men to help be due to character flaws or
personal dispositions? Or was it determined
by the situation?
Social psychologists decided to put
students at the Princeton Theological Sem-
inary into a similar situation. It was made
all the more ironic because they thought
that they were being evaluated on the
quality of the sermons they were about to
deliver on the parable of the Good Samari-
tan. Let’s see what happened when these
seminarians were given an opportunity to
help someone in distress.
With sermon in hand, each was
directed to a nearby building where the
sermon was to be recorded. But as the
student walked down an alley between the
two buildings, he or she came upon a man
slumped in a doorway, in obvious need
of help. The student now had the chance
to practice what he or she was about to
preach. What would you guess was the
crucial variable that predicted how likely
a seminarian—ready to preach about the
Good Samaritan—was to help a person in
distress? Choose one:
• How religious the seminarian was (as
rated by his classmates).
• How “neurotic” the seminarian was
(as rated on the “Big Five” personality
traits).
• How much of a hurry the seminarian
was in.
• How old the seminarian was.
All of the dispositional variables
(personal characteristics) of the seminarians
were controlled by random assignment of
subjects to three different conditions. Thus,
we know that personality was not the deter-
mining factor. Rather, it was a situational
variable: time. Before the seminarians left
the briefing room to have their sermons
recorded in a nearby building, each was told
how much time he had to get to the studio.
Some were assigned to a late condition in
which they had to hurry to make the next
session; others to an on-time condition in
which they would make the next session just
on time; and a third group to an early
condition in which they had a few spare
minutes before they would be recorded.
What were the results? Of those who
were in a hurry, only 10 percent helped.
Ninety percent failed to act as Good
Samaritans! If they were on time, 45 per-
cent helped the stranger. The greatest
bystander intervention came from
63 percent of those who were not in any
time bind (see Figure 11.4).
Remarkably, the manipulation of
time urgency made those in the “late”
condition six times less likely to help than
those in the “early” condition. While fulfill-
ing their obligation to hurry, these indi-
viduals appeared to have a single-minded
purpose that blinded them to other events
around them. Again, it was the power of the
situation.
FIGURE 11.4
Results of the “Good Samaritan” Study
Even on their way to deliver the Good Samaritan Sermon, the vast majority of seminary
students did not stop to help a distressed victim.
Source: Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study of situational and dispositional
variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 100–108.
10%
0%
100%
45%
63%
Late
condition
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e
o
f
se
m
in
ar
ia
n
s
w
h
o
st
o
p
p
ed
t
o
h
el
p
a
p
er
so
n
in
d
is
tr
es
s
On-time
condition
Early
condition

482 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
On Being “Shoe” at Yale U
When I (PGZ) arrived at Yale University to start my graduate career in the mid-1950s,
I was dressed in all my South Bronx splendor—blue suede shoes, peg pants, long
dangling key chain, big rolled collar, and other cool clothes. A month or two later, I
was wearing chino pants, button-down shirts, and loafer-type shoes. I was not fully
aware of the subtle social pressures to change my “taste” in apparel, but knew that I
felt more “in” in those weird Yalie clothes than I had in my good old Bronx duds. But
as a budding psychologist, I used my personal case study to motivate me to find out
more about that unwritten dress code, one that everyone around the campus at that
time was following as if a Marine drill instructor were ordering our total mindless
compliance.
My interviews with seniors revealed that indeed there was a powerful dress code
that the in-group formulated regularly to distinguish them from the mass of out-group
pretenders. Every single item of clothing could be identified by those in the know as
socially appropriate at that time for real Yale men to wear (it was all male at that
time). I was informed that the underlying concept was termed “shoe.” (Yale men of
that era and earlier could be identified as wearing white buck shoes.) To be “shoe”
was to be in, to be cool, to be with it, to be right on, and so forth. Not only was every
bit of clothing indexed as to its degree of “shoeness,” but so was everything else in
that universe. Tennis, golf, and crew were shoe; basketball was not. Asking questions
in lecture classes was not shoe; tailgating before football games was shoe, but only if
done with the right style or panache. Of equal interest to me was the fact that shoe
ratings changed periodically to keep outsiders from being mistaken as really true blue
shoe. One year, the Yale senior ring was shoe to wear, the next year it might be unshoe;
or handmade bow ties would become unshoe and clip-on bow ties would vault from
low-shoe to high-shoe rating.
My team of informants helped me to form an index of the shoe strengths of
every conceivable item of clothing that a Yale student might wear that year. With
the help of my introductory psychology students, we went into the dormitories and
found out what students from each college class actually had in their wardrobes. We
then multiplied each of those items of clothing by their Shoe Index and averaged
those ratings across each class from frosh to senior. Next, we separated out stu-
dents’ shoe scores by whether they had come from prep schools versus public high
schools.
Three major significant results were obvious from our graphs of the quantification
of shoeness at Yale:
1. Student wardrobes became ever more shoe as they progress from lowly frosh up
to high-powered seniors.
2. Preppy frosh were much more shoe than were their classmates from public high
schools.
3. Over the 4 years, the gap between prep schoolers and high schoolers diminished,
so that by senior year they were almost equally shoe.
When Yale became coed in the next decade, this kind of “shoeness” became less appar-
ent, went underground, and now may exist only in very modified forms. But let this
be a lesson to you whatever school you are in: Much of what you think is the You in
Your Taste is really the Them in social conformity pressures subtly imposed on you
to be like Them in order to be liked by Them. All too often, we go along to get along
(Zimbardo, 2008).
in-group The group with which an individual
identifies.
out-group Those outside the group with which an
individual identifies.

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 483
11.2 KEY QUESTION
Constructing Social Reality: What Influences
Our Judgments of Others?
Powerful as a social situation is, it doesn’t account for everything that people do. For
example, it does not account for the individual differences we see in people’s choices
of friends and romantic partners, nor does it account for their prejudices. To explain
the patterns we find in social interaction, we must also look at cognitive processes. In
the language of social psychology, we need to understand how we construct our social
reality—our subjective interpretations of other people and of our relationships. Thus,
the social reality we construct determines whom we find attractive, whom we find
threatening, whom we seek out, and whom we avoid. This, then, leads us to the second
lesson of social psychology, captured in our next Core Concept:
Core Concept 11.2
The judgments we make about others depend not only on their
behavior but also on our interpretation of their actions within a
social context.
social reality An individual’s subjective interpre-
tation of other people and of one’s relationships with
them.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Which of the following would be a social role?
a. prisoner
b. ordering from a menu
c. defying unjust authority
d. all of the above
2. RECALL: In the Asch studies, which of the following produced a
decrease in conformity?
a. The task was seen as difficult or ambiguous.
b. The subject had to respond publicly, rather than privately.
c. The majority was not unanimous in its judgment.
d. The group was very large.
3. RECALL: In Milgram’s original study, about what proportion of the
“teacher-subjects” gave the maximum shock?
a. about two-thirds
b. about 50 percent
c. about 25 percent
d. nearly all
4. RECALL: Although conformity is a social phenomenon, brain
regions that are activated when someone conforms are different
from those brain regions activated by resisting and being
independent.
True
False
5. APPLICATION: What is the main difference between altruistic
actions and heroic actions?
a. voluntary nature of altruism
b. altruism can be in groups; heroism is a solo action
c. higher costs/risks in heroism
d. none of the above
6. APPLICATION: If you were a victim in an emergency, what
lessons from social psychology would you apply to get the help you
need?
a. Ask for it.
b. Make your request specific.
c. Engage particular individual observers.
d. Do all of the above.
7. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What consequences
does attempting to understand human behavior in terms of
situational causes have for the personal responsibility of the actors
involved?
a. excuses them entirely
b. limits their guilt if they murdered someone
c. does not change personal responsibility and guilt, only severity
of sentence
d. forces the situation to be put on trial as well
Answers 1. a 2. c 3. a 4. True 5. c 6. d 7. c
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484 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
We will illustrate how these cognitive factors operate by analyzing how they affect our
attitudes toward other people. Let’s start out by asking a simple question: What makes
people like each other? That is, what produces interpersonal attraction?
Interpersonal Attraction
It is no surprise that we are attracted to people who have something to offer us (Brehm
et al., 2002; Simpson & Harris, 1994). We tend to like those who give us gifts, agree
with us, act friendly toward us, share our interests, entertain us, and help us in times
of need—unless, of course, we suspect that their behavior is self-serving or hypocriti-
cal. Although we don’t necessarily mind giving something back in the form of a social
exchange, we shrink from relationships that merely take from us and offer nothing in
return. In the best of relationships, as in a friendship, partnership, marriage, or busi-
ness relationship, both parties receive rewards. You might consider whether this is true
in your own relationships as we look at the reward theory of attraction next.
Reward Theory: We (Usually) Prefer Rewarding Relationships Most good
relationships can be seen as an exchange of benefits (Batson, 1987; Clark et al., 1989).
The benefits could be some combination of money and material possessions. Or the
exchange might involve something intangible like praise, status, information, sex, or
emotional support.
Social psychologist Elliot Aronson (2004) summarizes this in a reward theory of
attraction, which says that attraction is a form of social learning. By looking at the
social costs and benefits, claims Aronson, we can usually understand why people are
attracted to each other. In brief, reward theory says that we like best those who give
us maximum rewards at minimum cost. After we look at the evidence, we think you
will agree that this theory explains (almost) everything about interpersonal attraction.
Social psychologists have found four especially powerful sources of reward that pre-
dict interpersonal attraction: proximity, similarity, self-disclosure, and physical attrac-
tiveness. Most of us choose our friends, associates, and lovers because they offer some
combination of these factors at a relatively low social cost.
Proximity An old saying advises, “Absence makes the heart grow fonder.” Another
contradicts with “Out of sight, out of mind.” Which one is correct? Studies show that
frequent sightings best predict our closest relationships and the people we see most
often are the people who live and work nearest us (Simpson & Harris, 1994). In col-
lege dormitories, residents more often become close friends with the person who lives
in the next room than they do with the person who lives two doors down (Priest &
Sawyer, 1967). Residents of apartments make more friendships among people who live
on the same floor than among those who live on other floors (Nahemow & Lawton,
1975). Those who live in neighborhoods more often become friends with the occu-
pants of the house next door than with people living two houses away (Festinger et al.,
1950). This principle of proximity (nearness) also accounts for the fact that many people
end up married to the boy or girl next door (Ineichen, 1979). And it correctly predicts
that people at work will make more friends among those with whom they have the
most contact (Segal, 1974).
Although you don’t have to like your neighbors, the proximity rule says that when
two individuals are equally attractive, you are more likely to make friends with the
nearest one: The rewards are equal, but the cost is less in terms of time and inconve-
nience (Gilbertson et al., 1998). Apparently, another old saying, that familiarity breeds
contempt, should be revised in light of social psychological research: In fact, familiar-
ity more often breeds friendship. Increased contact, itself, often increases peoples’ lik-
ing for each other (Bornstein, 1989).
Similarity Do birds of a feather flock together, or do opposites attract? Which of
these proverbs has the best research evidence to support it? People usually find it
more rewarding to strike up a friendship with someone who shares their attitudes,
reward theory of attraction A social learning
view that predicts we like best those who give us maxi-
mum rewards at minimum cost.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Social learning involves
expectations of rewards and
punishments learned through
social interactions and
observation of others (p. 160).
principle of proximity The notion that people
at work will make more friends among those who are
nearby—with whom they have the most contact.
Proximity means “nearness.”

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 485
interests, values, and experiences than to bother with people who are disagreeable or
merely different (Simpson & Harris, 1994). If two people have just discovered that
they share tastes in music, politics, and attitudes toward education, they will prob-
ably hit it off because they have, in effect, exchanged compliments that reward each
other for their tastes and attitudes (Byrne, 1969). The similarity principle also explains
why teenagers are most likely to make friends among those who share their political
and religious views, educational aspirations, and attitudes toward music, alcohol, and
drugs (Kandel, 1978). Likewise, similarity accounts for the fact that most people find
marriage partners of the same age, race, social status, attitudes, and values (Brehm,
1992; Hendrick & Hendrick, 1992). In general, similarity, like proximity, makes the
hearts grow fonder. However, it is also true that over time, couples can also experience
attitude realignment, as each of them gradually shifts views on various issues to be
more closely aligned to those of their partner (Davis & Rusbult, 2001).
Self-Disclosure Good friends and lovers share intimate details about themselves
(Sternberg, 1998). This practice of self-disclosure not only allows people to know each
other more deeply, but it also sends signals of trust. It is as if I say, “Here is a piece of
information that I want you to know about me, and I trust you not to hurt me with it.”
Friends and lovers usually find such exchanges highly rewarding. When you observe
people exchanging confidences and details about their lives, you can predict that they
are becoming more and more attracted to each other. Given that sharing personal dis-
closures comes after a sense of trust has been created in a relationship, it both takes
time to reach this level of intimacy and is an index of that trust the disclosing person
has in the other. Think about the people with whom you share secrets and those you
never would. What underlies these acts of sharing or withholding secrets? The very
act of telling someone that you want to share a secret with them automatically con-
fers on them a special status in the relationship since secrets are by definition private
and rare events.
Physical Attractiveness Yet another old saying tells us that beauty is only skin deep.
Nevertheless, people usually find it more rewarding to associate with people they con-
sider physically attractive than with those they consider to be plain or homely (Patzer,
1985). Fair or not, good looks are a real social asset. Potential employers, for example,
prefer good-looking job candidates to plainer applicants (Cash & Janda, 1984). Looks
also affect people’s judgments of children. Attractive children are judged as happier
and more competent than their peers (Eagly et al., 1991). Even babies judge people by
their appearances. We know this because babies gaze longer at pictures of normal faces
than at those of distorted faces (Langlois et al., 1987).
Most people are repelled by the idea that they might make judgments based only
on looks. Indeed, when asked what they look for in a dating partner, college students
rank physical attractiveness down toward the middle of the list. But what people say
does not match what they do—at least as far as their first impressions go. Across many
studies involving a variety of characteristics, including intelligence, sincerity, mascu-
linity, femininity, and independence, it was physical attractiveness that overwhelmed
everything else as the best predictor of how well a person would be liked after a first
meeting (Aronson, 2004).
Other research shows that the principle of attractiveness applies equally to same-
sex and opposite-sex relationships (Maruyama & Miller, 1975). Gender differences
do exist, however. While both males and females are strongly influenced by physical
attractiveness, men seem to be more influenced by looks than are women (Feingold,
1990).
These findings may come as bad news for the majority of us, who consider our-
selves rather average-looking at best. But we can take some comfort in a study that
suggests that people actually consider a composite of “average” features to be the most
attractive. Investigators fed images of many students’ faces into a computer program
that manipulated the facial features to be more or less of an average combination of
all features from the many different student portraits. Surprisingly, they found that
similarity principle The notion that people are
attracted to those who are most similar to themselves
on significant dimensions.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 3
The Gestalt principle of similarity
refers to grouping stimulus
objects that shared common
perceptual features (p. 120).
self-disclosure The sharing of personal informa-
tion and feelings with another person as part of the
process of developing trust.

486 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
people usually liked best the images having features closest to the average size and
shape (Rhodes et al., 1999).
Now some bad news for you exceptionally attractive readers: While we usually
associate positive qualities with attractive individuals (Calvert, 1988), extreme attrac-
tiveness can also be a liability. Physically attractive people are seen as more poised,
interesting, sociable, independent, exciting, sexual, intelligent, well adjusted, and suc-
cessful, but they are also perceived as more vain and materialistic (Hassebrauck, 1988).
A “double standard” also comes into play. For example, the public favors good-looking
male politicians but disparages their attractive female counterparts (Sigelman et al.,
1986). It is also double trouble to be shy and handsome or beautiful because others
mistake those with a reserved demeanor as being cold, indifferent, or feeling superior.
These effects of physical attractiveness hint that reward, as powerful as it is, does
not account for everything. We will see this more clearly in the next section, as we
explore some important exceptions to the reward theory of attraction.
Exceptions to the Reward Theory of Attraction While the rules of proximity, simi-
larity, self-disclosure, and physical attractiveness may explain a lot about interpersonal
attraction, a casual look around reveals lots of relationships that don’t seem especially
rewarding. Why, for example, might a woman be attracted to a man who abuses her?
Or why would a person want to join an organization that requires a difficult or degrad-
ing initiation ritual? Such relationships pose most interesting puzzles (Aronson, 2004).
Could some people actually feel more attraction when they find that another person
has less to offer them? Let’s try to uncover the principles of social cognition operating
behind some interesting exceptions to a reward theory of attraction.
Expectations and the Influence of Self-Esteem We have seen that reward theory predicts
our attraction to good-looking people—and, to a lesser degree, those who are nearby,
smart, self-disclosing, like-minded, and powerful. Yet you have probably observed that
most people end up with friends and mates whom they judge to be of about their same
level of overall desirability—the so-called matching hypothesis (Feingold, 1988; Harvey &
Pauwels, 1999). How does this happen? Is our selection of associates the result of a
sort of bargaining for the best we can get in the interpersonal marketplace?
Yes, says expectancy-value theory. People usually decide whether to pursue a rela-
tionship by weighing the value they see in another person (including such qualities as
physical attractiveness, wit, interests, and intelligence) against their expectation of suc-
cess in the relationship (Will the other person be attracted to me?). Most of us don’t
waste time on trying to connect with others who either seem “too good”—or “not
good enough”—for what we think of our important attributes and values. We tend to
seek a match that is harmonious with our self-definition, assuming it is reality based.
Thus, we initiate relationships with the most attractive people we think will probably
like us in return. In this sense, expectancy-value theory is not so much a competitor of
reward theory as it is a refinement of it.
A new look at the matching hypothesis, however, took advantage of a popular
online dating site and also laboratory studies to show that the matching hypothesis is
more complicated than psychologists had thought (Taylor et al., 2011). Unexpectedly,
physical attractiveness, by itself, was not a good predictor in these studies. Rather,
the research showed that two more global factors need to be taken into account: self-
worth (what people think of themselves) and social desirability (popularity). In gen-
eral, participants in these online experiments tended to initiate contacts with those
having similar self-worth and social desirability.
And what happened when they ventured “out of their league?” Men, more so than
women, were successful in initiating contacts with persons rated at or above their own
social desirability level. But woe to those who sought to play “out of their league” in
physical attractiveness: More often than not, they were ignored when they initiated con-
tacts with those (independently judged to be) more physically attractive than themselves.
Other research shows that people with low opinions of themselves tend to establish
relationships with people who share their views, often with people who devalue them.
matching hypothesis The prediction that most
people will find friends and mates that are perceived to
be of about their same level of attractiveness.
expectancy-value theory A social psychology
theory that states how people decide whether to pursue
a relationship by weighing the potential value of the
relationship against their expectation of success in
establishing the relationship.

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 487
Not surprisingly, this can lead to dysfunctional relationships. Such individuals may
actually feel a stronger commitment to a relationship when their partner thinks poorly
of them than they do when the partner thinks well of them (Swann et al., 1992).
Similarly, those individuals who appear to be extremely competent can also be
losers in the expectancy-value game. Why? Most of us keep such people at a distance,
probably because we fear that they will be quick to reject our approaches. But, if you
happen to be one of these stunningly superior people, do not despair: Social psycholo-
gists have found hope! When highly competent individuals commit minor blunders—
spilling a drink or dropping a stack of papers—other people actually like them better,
probably because blunders bring them down to everyone else’s level and “normalize”
them (Aronson et al., 1966, 1970). Don’t count on this, however, unless you are so
awesomely competent as to be unapproachable. The latté-in-the-lap trick only makes
most of us look like klutzes, whom people like less.
Attraction and Dissonance Semper fidelis, says the Marine Corps motto:
“Always faithful.” Considering the discomforting experiences that people
must endure to become Marines (grueling physical conditioning, loss of sleep,
lack of privacy, being yelled at, suffering punishment for small infractions of
rules), it may seem remarkable that recruits routinely develop so much loyalty
to their organization. The same is true of more enduring loyalty to fraternities
that practice hazing compared to college house plans that do not. Obviously,
some powerfully attractive and interesting forces are at work.
Cognitive dissonance theory offers a compelling explanation for the mental
adjustments that occur in people who voluntarily undergo unpleasant expe-
riences (Festinger, 1957). The theory says that when people voluntarily act
in ways that produce psychological discomfort or otherwise clash with their
attitudes and values, they develop a highly motivating mental state called cognitive
dissonance. Those who continue to smoke yet know the negative (lethal health) conse-
quences of cigarette addiction experience dissonance, as do gamblers who continually
lose but keep playing. The same holds true for people who find they are acting in ways
that cause them to experience physical discomfort. Thus, our Marine recruits may feel
cognitive dissonance when they find that they have volunteered for an experience that
is far more punishing than they had imagined from the recruiting ads. And what is the
psychological result?
According to cognitive dissonance theory, people are motivated to avoid the
uncomfortable state of dissonance. If they find themselves experiencing cognitive
dissonance, they attempt to reduce it in ways that are predictable, even if not always
entirely logical. The two main ways of reducing dissonance are to change either one’s
behavior or one’s cognitions. So, in civilian life, if the boss is abusive, you might
avoid dissonance by simply finding another job. But in the case of a Marine recruit,
changing jobs is not an option: It is too late to turn back once basic training has
started. A recruit experiencing cognitive dissonance, therefore, is motivated to adjust
his or her thinking. Most likely, the recruit will resolve the dissonance by rationaliz-
ing the experience (“It’s tough, but it builds character!”) and by developing a stron-
ger loyalty to the organization (“Being a member of such an elite group is worth all
the suffering!”).
In general, cognitive dissonance theory says that when people’s cognitions and
actions are in conflict (a state of dissonance), they often reduce the conflict by chang-
ing their thinking, their attitudes and values, to fit their behavior. Why? People don’t
like to see themselves as being foolish or inconsistent. So, to explain their own behav-
ior to themselves, people are motivated to change their attitudes, which are private,
rather than their overt behavior, which is public. To do otherwise would threaten their
self-esteem.
One qualification on this theory has recently come to light. In Japan, and, per-
haps, in other parts of Asia, studies show that people have a lesser need to maintain
high self-esteem than do North Americans (Bower, 1997a; Heine et al., 1999). As a
result, cognitive dissonance was found to have less power to change attitudes among
cognitive dissonance A highly motivating state
in which people have conflicting cognitions, especially
when their voluntary actions conflict with their atti-
tudes or values. Leon Festinger was its originator.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Social psychologists view
cognitive dissonance as a
powerful psychological motive
(p. 365).
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that
these recruits will increase their loyalty to
the Marine Corps as a result of their basic
training ordeal.
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Dissonance: Need to Justify Our
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488 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
Japanese. Apparently, cognitive dissonance is yet another psychological process that
operates differently in collectivist and individualistic cultures.
The Explanatory Power of Dissonance Despite cultural variations, cognitive dissonance
theory explains many things that people do to justify their behavior and thereby avoid
dissonance. For example, it explains why smokers so often rationalize their habit. It
explains why people who have put their efforts into a project, whether it be volunteer-
ing for the Red Cross or writing a letter of recommendation, become more committed
to the cause as time goes on—to justify their effort. It also explains why, if you have
just decided to buy a Toyota Prius, you will attend to new information supporting your
choice (such as Prius commercials on TV), but you will tend to ignore dissonance-
producing information (such as its higher price, or a Prius broken down alongside the
freeway, or its massive recall for faulty acceleration).
Cognitive dissonance theory also helps us understand certain puzzling social rela-
tionships, such as a woman who is attracted to a man who abuses her. Her dissonance
might be summed up in this thought: “Why am I staying with someone who hurts
me?” Her powerful drive for self-justification may make her reduce the dissonance by
focusing on his good points and minimizing the abuse. And, if she has low self-esteem,
she may also tell herself that she deserved his abuse.
To put the matter in more general terms: Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that
people are attracted to those for whom they believe they have suffered voluntarily. A
general reward theory, by contrast, would never have predicted that outcome. Another
vital contribution made by dissonance theorists is providing a theoretical framework
for understanding why we all come to justify our foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and
even hurtful acts against others—by justification and disowning personal responsibil-
ity for dissonance-generating decisions (Tavris & Aronson, 2007).
To sum up our discussion on interpersonal attraction: You will not usually go far
wrong if you use a reward theory to understand why people are attracted to each
other. People initiate social relationships because they expect some sort of benefit. It
may be an outright reward, such as money or status or sex, or it may be an avoidance
of some feared consequence, such as pain of social isolation or social rejection. (We
will see in our chapter on health and stress that such rejection can cause significant
biological impairments.)
But social psychology also shows that a simple reward theory cannot, by itself,
account for all the subtlety of human social interaction. A more sophisticated and
useful understanding of attraction must take into account such cognitive factors as
expectations, self-esteem, and cognitive dissonance. That is, a complete theory must
take into account the ways that we interpret our social environment. This notion of
subjective interpretation also underlies other judgments that we make about people,
those we love and those we hate.
Loving Relationships
Although people sometimes do terrible things to one another, the complexity and
beauty of the human mind also enable people to be caring and loving. Liking and
loving are essential for happiness (Kim & Hatfield, 2004). Further, the pleasures of
attraction and love appear to be part of the very circuitry and chemistry of our brains
(Bartels & Zeki, 2004).
How do we know when attraction becomes love? To a large extent, our culture
tells us how. Each culture has certain common themes defining love—such as sexual
arousal, attachment, concern for the other’s welfare, and a willingness to make a com-
mitment. But the idea of “love” can vary greatly from culture to culture (Sternberg,
1998).
There are also many kinds of love. The love that a parent has for a child differs
from the love that longtime friends have for each other. Both differ from the com-
mitment found, say, in a loving couple that have been married for 40 years. Yet, for
many Americans, the term love brings to mind yet another form of attraction based on
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
Collectivist cultures socialize
people to value the needs of the
group before the desires of the
individual (p. 367).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 14
Stress can impact on our biological
functioning in many ways, for
better of for worse (p. 600).

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 489
infatuation and sexual desire: romantic love, a temporary and highly emotional condi-
tion that generally fades after a few months (Hatfield et al., 1995; Hatfield & Rapson,
1998). But the American assumption that romantic love is the basis for a long-term
intimate commitment is not universal. In many other cultures, marriage is seen as an
economic bond or, perhaps, as a political relationship linking families. Indeed, a variety
of cultures still promote “arranged marriages” where parents or even grandparents
decide on the best match for the son or daughter that will enhance the status of the
family in power or finances.
Psychologist Robert Sternberg (1998) has proposed an interesting view in his
triangular theory of love. He says that love can have three components: passion (erotic
attraction), intimacy (sharing feelings and confidences), and commitment (dedication to
putting this relationship first in one’s life). Various forms of love can be understood in
terms of different combinations of these three components. Thus, Sternberg suggests that:
• Romantic love is high on passion and intimacy but low on commitment.
• Liking and friendship are characterized by intimacy but not by passion and
commitment.
• Infatuation has a high level of passion, but it has not developed into intimacy or a
committed relationship.
• Complete love (consummate love) involves all three: passion, intimacy, and com-
mitment. Companionate love often follows the consummate kind with a dimming
of the passion but often with greater intimacy and commitment.
The need to understand what strengthens and weakens loving relationships in our own
culture has acquired some urgency because of the “divorce epidemic” in the United
States (Brehm, 1992; Harvey & Pauwels, 1999). If current rates hold, approximately
half of all today’s first marriages—and up to 60 percent of second marriages—will end
in divorce. Much research stimulated by concern about high divorce rates has focused
on the effects of divorce on children (Ahrons, 1994). The negative effects are lessened
when the divorce is amicable and former spouses coparent and do not denigrate each
other to the children. Sometimes removing children from a conflict-ridden family set-
ting, or one with an abusive parent, is clearly better for them.
In the past decade or so, however, research emphasis has shifted to the processes by
which couples maintain loving relationships and the environments that challenge rela-
tionships (Berscheid, 1999). We now know, for example, that for a relationship to stay
healthy and to thrive, both partners must see it as rewarding and equitable. As we saw
in our discussion of reward theory, both must, over the long run, feel that they are get-
ting something out of the relationship, not just giving. What they get—the rewards of
the relationship—can involve many things, including adventure, status, laughter, men-
tal stimulation, and material goods, as well as nurturance, love, and social support.
In addition, for a relationship to thrive, communication between partners must be
open, ongoing, and mutually validating (Monaghan, 1999). Research shows that couples
in lasting relationships have five times more positive interactions than negative ones—
including exchanges of smiles, loving touches, laughter, and compliments (Gottman,
1994). Yet, because every relationship experiences an occasional communication break-
down, the partners must know how to deal with conflicts effectively. Conflicts must be
faced early and resolved fairly and effectively. Ultimately, each partner must take respon-
sibility for his or her own identity, self-esteem, and commitment to the relationship—
rather than expect the partner to engage in mind reading or self-sacrifice.
This has been the briefest sampling from the growing social psychology of relation-
ships. Such research has practical applications. Teachers familiar with research findings
can now inform their students about the basic principles of healthy relationships.
Therapists apply these principles in advising clients on how to communicate with part-
ners, negotiate the terms of their relationships, and resolve inevitable conflicts. More
immediately, as you yourself learn about the factors that influence how you perceive
and relate to others, you should gain a greater sense of self-control and well-being in
your own intimate connections with others (Harvey, 1996; Harvey et al., 1990).
romantic love A temporary and highly emotional
condition based on infatuation and sexual desire.
triangular theory of love Developed by Robert
Sternberg, a theory that describes various kinds of love
in terms of three components: passion (erotic attrac-
tion), intimacy (sharing feelings and confidences), and
commitment (dedication to putting this relationship
first in one’s life).
Is it love? Social psychologists have
been exploring the psychology of the
human heart, collecting and interpreting
data about how people fall in love and
strengthen their bonds of intimacy. Most
recently, the emphasis has shifted to the
factors that keep relationships together.

490 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
Long-Term Romantic Love For too many couples who were initially hot for each
other in romantic, passionate love, they’ve “lost that loving feeling.” However, we can be
encouraged by new research revealing that couples in long-term romantic love relation-
ships can keep the flame burning hot, at least in their brains (Acevedo, Aron, Fisher, and
Brown, 2011). Individual men and women who had been in such relationships for more
than 20 years had their brains scanned in fMRI procedures under two different condi-
tions. They viewed facial images of their partner, as well as comparison images of highly
familiar acquaintances, close, long-term friends, or someone not familiar. The effects
obtained were specific only to their intensely loved, long-term partner; for other images
the brain patterns were random. Areas activated were in the parts of the brain associated
with the dopamine-rich reward and basal ganglia system—similar to activation in new
love. However, there is added cerebral arousal among these long-term lovers that in-
volves brain systems that are also associated with maternal attachment and pair bonding.
Making Cognitive Attributions
We are always trying to explain to ourselves why people do what they do. Suppose you
are riding on a bus when a middle-aged woman with an armload of packages gets on.
In the process of finding a seat, she drops everything on the floor as the bus starts up.
How do you explain her behavior? Do you think of her as the victim of circumstances,
or is she incompetent or eliciting sympathy so someone will give up a seat to her?
Social psychologists have found that we tend to attribute other people’s actions
and misfortunes to their personal traits rather than to situational forces, such as the
unpredictable lurching of the bus. This helps explain why we often hear attributions of
laziness or low intelligence to the poor or homeless rather than an externally imposed
lack of opportunity (Zucker & Weiner, 1993). It also helps us understand why most
commentators on the Kitty Genovese murder attributed the inaction of the bystand-
ers to defects in character of those who did not help rather than to social influences
on them (emergency 911 was not in effect at that time, so it was not clear who to call
in emergencies; it was difficult to view the crime scene at night from high-story apart-
ments, and so on).
On the other side of the attributional coin, we find that people use the same process
to explain each other’s successes. So you may ascribe the success of a favorite singer,
athlete, or family member to personal traits, such as exceptional talent or intense
motivation. In doing so, we tend to ignore the effects of situational forces, such as the
influence of family, coaches, a marketing blitz, long hours of practice, sacrifices, or just
a “lucky break.”
The Fundamental Attribution Error Psychologists refer to the fundamental attribu-
tion error (FAE) as the dual tendency to overemphasize personal traits (the rush to the
dispositional) while minimizing situational influences. Recall our use of the FAE to
explain the low estimates of psychiatrists when predicting the typical shock level of
most American citizens in the Milgram obedience experiment. The FAE is not always
an “error,” of course. If the causes really are dispositional, the observer’s guess is cor-
rect. So the FAE is best thought of as a bias rather than a mistake. However, the FAE
is an error in the sense that an observer may overlook legitimate, situational explana-
tions for another’s actions. For example, if the car in front of you brakes suddenly so
that you almost collide, your first impression may be that the other driver is at fault, a
dispositional judgment. But what if the driver slowed down to avoid hitting a dog that
ran into the road? Then the explanation for the near-accident would be situational, not
dispositional. By reminding ourselves that circumstances may account for seemingly
inexplicable actions, we are less likely to commit the FAE. As a general principle, we
encourage you to practice “attributional charity,” which involves always trying first to
find a situational explanation for strange or unusual behavior of others before blaming
them with dispositional explanations. Blame the situation before rushing to blame the
person. It can help you to change the situation for the better as well as avoid hurting
the feelings of a friend or associate.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Neuroscience researchers use the
technique of functional magnetic
resonance imaging, fMRI, to
“light up” brain regions activated
by a person’s thoughts, emotions,
and perceptions while in the
scanner (p. 64).
fundamental attribution error (FAE) The
dual tendency to overemphasize internal, dispositional
causes and minimize external, situational pressures.
The FAE is more common in individualistic cultures
than in collectivistic cultures.
Attribution at
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Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 491
Despite its name, however, the fundamental attribution error is not as fundamental
as psychologists at first thought. Cross-cultural research has suggested that it is more
pervasive in individualistic cultures, as found in the United States or Canada, than in
collectivist cultures, as found in Japan or China (Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000). Even
within the United States, urban children are more susceptible to the fundamental attri-
bution error than are their country cousins (Lillard, 1999). Why do you think this is so?
Biased Thinking about Yourself Oddly, you probably judge yourself by two differ-
ent standards, depending on whether you experience success or failure. When things
go well, most people attribute their own success to internal factors, such as motiva-
tion, talent, or skill (“I am good at taking multiple-choice tests”). But when things go
poorly, they attribute failure to external factors beyond their control (“The professor
asked trick questions;” Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Psychologists have dubbed this ten-
dency the self-serving bias (Bradley, 1978; Fletcher & Ward, 1988). Self-serving biases
are probably rooted in the need for self-esteem, a preference for interpretations that
save face and cast our actions in the best possible light—both to ourselves and to oth-
ers (Schlenker et al., 1990).
Social pressures to excel as an individual make the self-serving bias, like the funda-
mental attribution error, more common in individualist cultures than in collectivist cul-
tures (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). In addition, when trying to understand the behavior
of others, we tend often to use dispositional explanations, finding things “in them” that
might explain why they did this or that. However, when we are trying to figure out the
reasons for our own actions, we tend to look to the situational factors acting on
us, because we are more aware of them than in our judgments of others. If you
believed that you would have defied the authority in the Milgram study and quit
long before the 450-volt shock level, despite the evidence that the majority went
all the way, a self-serving bias was at work to make you think of yourself as
able to resist situational forces that overwhelmed others.
Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence
Among the most basic social perceptions anyone makes are those of “others”
as friend or foe, intending to do us good or ill, and able to enact those inten-
tions or not. A large body of new research has established that perceived liking
and respecting of others are the two universal dimensions of human social cog-
nition, at both individual and group levels. People in all cultures differentiate
each other by liking (assessed as warmth and trustworthiness) and by respect-
ing (assessed as competence and efficiency). The warmth dimension is captured
in traits that are related to perceived intent, including friendliness, helpfulness,
sincerity, trustworthiness, and morality. By contrast, the competence dimen-
sion reflects those traits that are related to perceived ability, intelligence, skill,
creativity, and efficacy (Fiske et al., 2007).
When these two dimensions are plotted on a graph, as in Figure 11.5, we
see that four quadrants emerge: I. high warmth and low competence; II. high
warmth and high competence; III. low warmth and low competence; and IV.
low warmth and high competence. A large body of research reveals distinct
emotions and behaviors that are associated with each of the social perceptions typical
of the four quadrants (Fiske et al., 2007).
Those who are perceived to be high in warmth fall into quadrants I and II. But,
as you will see, even though we are drawn to those in both groups because of their
perceived warmth, we react to them quite differently depending on how we perceive
their competence. For people that we view as fitting in quadrant I, we tend to feel
pity and may actively seek to help them. (People frequently perceive the elderly and
those with disabilities as falling into quadrant I.) The added perception of competence,
however, produces quadrant II, containing those we like or admire—and with whom
we want to associate. (This quadrant includes those with whom we identify or aspire
to associate—perhaps pastors or rabbis, movie stars, sports heroes, or Bill Gates of
Microsoft, and Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook.)
self-serving bias An attributional pattern
in which one takes credit for success but denies
responsibility for failure. (Compare with fundamental
attribution error.)
Can you think of at least three factors dis-
cussed so far in this chapter that might
be motivating the helping behavior shown
in this situation?

492 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
Now consider how we react to those we perceive as low in warmth. For those
we pigeonhole in quadrant III—whom we perceive as being low in both warmth and
competence—we feel disdain and a desire to avoid, ignore, or neglect them. (For many
people, these would include members of some minority groups or welfare recipients.)
But our most negative feelings are reserved for those we place in quadrant IV: people
whom we perceive as privileged but somehow undeserving. For most of us, the occupants
of quadrant IV provoke feelings of envy and the wish to “bring them down a notch or
two”—perhaps even the desire to cause them harm. (Common examples might include
politicians, lawyers, and the very rich.)
The authors of this research argue that group-based prejudices and stereotypes
appear high on one of these two dimensions and low on the other, thereby creating
ambivalent affect and volatile behavior that has the potential to endanger constructive
intergroup relationships.
Cross-Cultural Research on the Need for Positive Self-Regard Before moving on
to the final section in our exploration of social psychology, it is important to consider a
rather profound question about the self in relationship to others. Is it true that all people
seek positive self-regard—that is, are all people motivated to possess, enhance, and main-
tain a positive self-concept? Is this a basic attribute of humankind? It would seem so if
we consider what people around us do to enhance their self-esteem, the efforts made to
be special, even through self-serving biases and personal affirmations. If we look around
in North America, the answer might be different than if we look around in Japan.
Researchers have carefully examined both cultural contexts to identify how specific
social environmental arrangements of their practices and institutions can promote and
sustain the mentalities associated with self-regard. They have found that many aspects of
life in North America lead both to an excessive focus on the self as an individual entity as
well as encouraging motivation to regard one’s self in positive ways, as special, unique,
and entitled. This can be seen in ads, movies, songs, diaries, and many aspects of con-
temporary American culture. By contrast, what is more typical in Japanese culture is the
development of a self-critical focus. Personal evaluation usually begins with a critique
of the individual’s performance or even lifestyle. That critical orientation is both self-
effacing and humbling, thereby minimizing any tendency toward arrogance. However,
its goal is to seek ways to improve one’s attitudes and behaviors in constructive fashion,
which satisfies both the individual’s needs as well as that of the family, team, business,
and the larger community. Such research is important in qualifying what appear to be
universal aspects of human nature but are actually culturally specific (Heine et al., 1999).
Prejudice and Discrimination
While our attributions about others can be positive or negative, prejudice, as social
psychologists use the term, always involves a negative judgment some people hold
about other people. Prejudice can make an employer discriminate against women
FIGURE 11.5
The Dimensions of Warmth
and Competence
The dimensions of warmth and
competence generate four quadrants of
action and emotion toward others.
Source: Based on data from Fiske, S. T., Cuddy,
A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of
social cognition: warmth and competence. Trends in
Cognitive Science, 11, 77–83.
Competence
W
ar
m
th
Lo
w
H
ig
h
Low High
I.
Attitude: Pity, Sympathy
Motivation: Help & Support
II.
Attitude: Liking, Admiration
Motivation: Desire for
Association
III.
Attitude: Contempt, Disgust
Motivation: Ignore
or Neglect
IV.
Attitude: Hostility, Envy
Motivation: Harm, Attack,
or Eliminate Perceived
Unfair Advantage

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 493
(or men) for a management job. It can make a teacher expect poor work from a mi-
nority student. And, in some places in the world, it has led to genocide, the systematic
extermination of a group of people because of their racial or ethnic origins. We will
define prejudice as negative attitudes, beliefs, and feelings toward an individual based
solely on his or her membership in a particular group or category.
That category may be real, like gender or ethnicity, but it can also be created in the
mind of the prejudiced person, such as considering some people as “poor white trash,”
or others as “left-wing liberals.” Prejudice may be expressed as negative emotions
(such as dislike or fear), negative attributions or stereotypes that justify the attitude,
and/or attempts to avoid, control, dominate, or eliminate those in the target group.
Prejudiced attitudes serve as extreme biasing filters that influence the way others are
perceived and treated. Thus, prejudice exerts a powerful force for selectively process-
ing, organizing, and remembering pertinent information about particular people. It is
also pervasive; most people in most nations harbor prejudices of varying kinds, some
conscious and some nonconscious (as new research is uncovering, to be treated later
in this section).
Let’s distinguish prejudice from discrimination, a related concept. While prejudice
is an attitude, discrimination is a behavior. Discrimination can be defined as a negative
action taken against an individual because of his or her group membership. Racial
profiling, for example, is often considered a discriminatory procedure because it singles
out individual people based solely on racial features. It can result in more arrests of mi-
nority members because police are more likely to confront them than majority mem-
bers for their “suspicious behavior.” But, while discrimination can arise from prejudice,
we will see soon that this is not always the case. In this section, we will review the
causes of prejudice, the role of dehumanization as a basic process in prejudice, and
combating prejudice, and we will end with new research on stereotype threat.
Causes of Prejudice Prejudices can emerge from many sources (Allport, 1954;
Aronson, 2004). Some we acquire at an early age. Some are defensive reactions when
we feel threatened. Some are the result of conformity to social customs. And some help
us distinguish strangers (and possible foes) from friends (Whitley, 1999). An under-
standing of these sources of prejudice will provide us with the foundation necessary
for thinking about possible “cures,” ways to combat these antisocial reactions. Here,
we present five causes of prejudice that have been studied by social psychologists:
dissimilarity and social distance, economic competition, scapegoating, conformity to
social norms, and media stereotyping.
Dissimilarity and Social Distance If similarity breeds liking, then dissimilarity can breed
disdain—and prejudice. So, if you wear baggy shorts, a baseball cap backwards, and a
nose ring, it’s a good bet that some middle-aged people from a traditional background
would feel uncomfortable around you. They are likely to perceive you as a part of a
social group that flaunts values and encourages “radical” behaviors quite distinct from
those of their own group. Even small perceived differences in appearance can easily
become fertile ground for the growth of prejudice.
What psychological principles are at work? When you perceive someone to be
unlike the people in your in-group, you mentally place that person at a greater social
distance than members of your own group. You are then less likely to view that indi-
vidual as a social equal (Turner & Oakes, 1989). This inequality easily translates into
inferiority, making it easier for you to treat members of an out-group with contempt.
Historically, more powerful groups have discriminated against out-groups by with-
holding privileges, sending members of out-groups to different schools, making them
sit in the back of the bus, forcing them into low-wage jobs, sending them to jail and
into restrictive neighborhood ghettos, and otherwise violating their personal dignity.
Economic Competition A second cause of prejudice occurs in highly competitive situ-
ations, where one group wins economic benefits or jobs at the other group’s expense,
which can easily fan the flames of prejudice. For example, in the Pacific North-
west, where competition over old-growth forests threatens jobs and wildlife habitat,
prejudice A negative attitude toward an individual
based solely on his or her membership in a particular
group or category, often without any direct evidence.
discrimination A negative action taken against
an individual as a result of his or her group or
categorical membership. It is the behavior that
prejudice generates.
social distance The perceived difference or
similarity between oneself and another person.
about Prejudice
Would your mother be pleased if you in-
vited this teen to dinner in your home? If
not, would that be a prejudice?
at MyPsychLab
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494 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
prejudice sets timber workers and environmentalists against each other. Likewise,
surveys have found, for example, prejudice against Black Americans to be greatest
among White groups poised at an economic level just above the Black American aver-
age—precisely the ones who would feel their jobs most threatened by Black Americans
(Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971). It is often true that much prejudice exists not only down
from those in privileged positions to those in minority positions but across minority
groups, between recent immigrants from different countries, or when new immigrants
threaten the financial security of established minorities.
This was the case in New York City’s South Bronx area when, after World War II,
thousands of migrants from Puerto Rico emigrated to that neighborhood (after a mas-
sive sugar crop failure and given free government airfare to the United States). They
competed with Blacks living there and others coming back from war service for hous-
ing and low-level jobs. Researchers discovered high levels of antagonism and prejudice
between these two minority groups, each struggling “to make it” in America and also
coping with top-down prejudice against both of them by the majority White population
(Zimbardo, 1953).
Scapegoating To understand a third cause of prejudice, consider how the Hebrew
priests of olden times performed a ritual that symbolically transferred the sins of the
people to a goat—the scapegoat. The animal was then driven into the desert to carry
its burden of guilt away from the community. The term scapegoat has been applied
in modern times to an innocent person or group who receives blame when others feel
threatened. On a large and horrifying scale, German Jews served as scapegoats for the
Nazis in World War II. Hitler’s propaganda program encouraged this by creating visual
images of German Jews as totally different from the rest of the German population;
such terrible images set them apart as the “faces of the enemy” (Keen, 1991). Such
visual propaganda, that most nations use as a prelude to going to war, first creates an
enemy that is hated by the general populace and then feared enough to want to destroy
them or have one’s son kill them as part of the army. This mentality is called
the “hostile imagination” that creates a psychology of enmity—of instilling
hatred of the “Other.”
Scapegoating works most readily when the object of scorn is readily identifi-
able by skin color or some distinctive physical features or when media propa-
ganda can create such differences in the minds of the dominant group (Sax,
2002). It also becomes more probable when conditions worsen in a neighbor-
hood or a country, and people are seeking to blame someone for that change
from the good old days to bad times.
Conformity to Social Norms The source of discrimination and prejudice that
is perhaps the most pervasive is an unthinking tendency to maintain condi-
tions the way they are, even when those conditions involve unfair assump-
tions, prejudices, and customs. For example, in many offices, it is the norm
for secretaries to be female and executives to be male. Only 18 percent of
private corporations have women on their boards in the United States. That
low percentage drops to 2 percent in Italy and less than 1 percent in Japan in
2008. In Arab nations, it would be rare to have any women in such positions
unless they were relatives of the top executives. Because of this norm, it may
be difficult for highly qualified women to break into the executive ranks, to
breach the “glass ceiling” above them. We may find the same process where
the norm says that nurses and lab technicians should be females and engi-
neers and mathematicians should be males. When we see that most people
in a given profession are of a particular gender or race, we assume that is the
way of the world, the way the social order meant it to be, rather than con-
sidering the social and economic conditions that have made it that way. So
when women note that most computer workers are males, they are likely to
avoid taking computer science courses or going into such careers, which then become
for “men only.” The opposite is now true in psychology. The majority of students tak-
ing psychology courses, majoring in it, and going on in psychology careers are now
women, a major gender reversal in the past decade. As our field becomes identified as
scapegoating Blaming an innocent person or a
group for one’s own troubles and then discriminating
against or abusing them.
Schoolchildren in Nazi Germany (1930s
and 1940s) read textbooks describing
Jews as inferior to the “Aryan race.”
Illustrations in those books also depicted
Jewish children excluded from schools.

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 495
“women only,” some psychologists worry that males will be even less likely to enter it,
and salaries for all will decrease.
So we see, then, that a social norm develops for various reasons and it becomes the
accepted standard of what is perceived as appropriate and “right.” When that happens,
behavioral discrimination itself can cause or reinforce prejudiced attitudes. Imagine
that you were the male executive who discriminated against a woman applying for
an executive position. Or imagine that you were the White bus driver in the 1950s
South who routinely sent Black passengers to a special section in the back of the bus.
In both cases, you were simply following the social norm of what others like you were
all doing. However, you would have had to justify your own behavior to yourself and
to others. And if you have just treated people as second-class citizens because of their
gender or ethnicity, it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, for you to think of them
as anything other than inferior beings (without having a severe attack of cognitive
dissonance). In this way, your discriminatory behavior can cause or strengthen our
prejudice attitudes. Because we are rationalizing creatures as much as rational ones, we
endlessly justify our decisions and behavior to make them appear reasonable by gener-
ating “good reasons” for our bad behaviors (Tavris & Aronson, 2007).
Media Stereotypes Our fifth cause of prejudice occurs when stereotyped images used to
depict groups of people in film, in print, and on television reinforce prejudicial social
norms. Such images are far from harmless, because people have learned many of their
prejudices from the stereotypes they saw on TV and in books, movies, and magazines
(Greenberg, 1986). On the other hand, images in the media can also change those
norms. Until the Black Power movement gained media attention, Africans and African
Americans were most often portrayed in movies and on TV as simple, slow, comic
characters, perpetuating the “Sambo” image that many Whites held.
Fortunately, the most blatant racial stereotypes have disappeared from the national
media in the past few decades. Media distortions still occur, of course, but they are
subtler. Prime time features three times as many male as female characters (Aronson,
2004). Most are shown in professional and managerial positions, even though two-
thirds of the U.S. workforce is employed in blue-collar and service jobs. The propor-
tion of non-Whites and older persons who appear on TV is also much smaller than
the general population. For viewers, the result is a biased picture of the world. This
is where it becomes critical to have a variety of role models in the media that portray
positions of influence and credibility to young people from those subgroups, such as
women and ethnic/racial minority members as TV news anchors.
Dehumanization The most powerful psychological process underlying prejudice,
discrimination, and intergroup violence is dehumanization. It does so by causing some
people to view others as less than human, even subhuman. Dehumanization can be
defined as a psychological process that biases perception and cognitions of others in
ways that deprive them of their humanity, rendering them totally dissimilar and worth-
less. It is the mechanism behind thinking of particular disliked other people as objects,
as the enemy, as animals and insects. Just as a retinal cataract blurs one’s visual field,
dehumanization is like a “cortical cataract” that blinds the mind to any perceived simi-
larity between Us and Them. Thinking about others as less than human means that one
can suspend moral reasoning, empathy, compassion, and other processes that constrain
hate and violence. It enables ordinary, even good, people to do bad, even evil deeds
(Sherrer, 2008, Zimbardo, 2007).
A case in point of dehumanization in action occurred in 1994 in Rwanda, Africa. The
Hutu government spread propaganda that the Tutsi people living there were the enemy
of the Hutus; that they were insects, cockroaches, and had to be destroyed. Men armed
with government-supplied machetes and women with clubs massacred 800,000 of their
neighbors in 100 days (Hatzfeld, 2005). A powerful documentary of this dehumaniza-
tion leading to genocide can be seen at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/.
Can such a complex psychological process be studied experimentally? Yes, indeed,
and with a remarkably simple manipulation used by researcher Albert Bandura and his
students (Bandura et al., 1975).
dehumanization The psychological process of
thinking about certain other people or groups as less
than human, like feared or hated animals. A basic pro-
cess in much prejudice and mass violence.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Bandura pioneered the study of
social models and observational
learning (p. 442).

www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/

496 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
A small group of students from one college were supposed to be helping another
group of students from a different local college to improve their decision-making skills.
They were to provide standard problems to be solved collectively and then reward
good solutions and punish bad ones. Punishment was via increasing levels of electric
shock administered to the entire working group (no shocks were actually given; the
participants only believed they were). The experimental manipulation consisted of the
research assistant telling the experimenter that the students from the other school were
ready to begin as the working group. Those who would do the shocking were ran-
domly assigned to one of three conditions: Neutral, hearing only that the other students
were ready; Dehumanizing, hearing that the other students seemed like “Animals,” and
Humanizing, hearing that the other students seemed like “Nice Guys.” The results: Sim-
ply hearing others labeled “Animals” by a stranger and believing they were also college
students was sufficient to induce the students in that condition to administer signifi-
cantly more shock than in the Neutral condition, and increasingly so over the ten trials.
The good news: Humanizing others resulted in significantly less punishment than in the
control condition, where students had no information about those others. So sticks and
stones may break your bones, but bad names and dehumanization might kill you.
Combating Prejudice During the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s,
educators believed that prejudice could be overcome through a gradual process of
information campaigns and education. But experience provided no encouragement for
this hope. In fact, these informational approaches are among the least effective tools
for combating prejudice. The reason? Selective exposure! Prejudiced people (like every-
one else) usually avoid information that conflicts with their view of the world, so they
never watched or listened to those messages. Even for those who want to change their
prejudiced attitudes, erasing the strong emotions and motivational foundations associ-
ated with long-standing prejudices is difficult with merely cognitively based
informational messages (Devine & Zuwerink, 1994). The process is even
more difficult for those who cherish their prejudices because their sense of
self-worth is boosted by perceiving others as less worthy than them.
So, how can one attack the prejudices of people who do not want to
listen to another viewpoint? Research in social psychology suggests several
possibilities. Among them are the use of new role models, equal status contact,
and (surprisingly) new legislation.
New Role Models Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton,
Barack Obama, and many others serve as new role models in prestigious jobs
and leadership positions where few of their race or gender have appeared before.
These role models encourage people in these groups who might never have con-
sidered such careers. What we do not know much about, however, is the ability of role
models to change the minds of people who are already prejudiced. It is likely that they
are perceived as “exceptions to the rule”; but, as the exceptions increase, maybe the rule
bends or changes. Role models may serve better to prevent prejudice than to cure it.
Equal Status Contact Slave owners always had plenty of contact with their slaves, but they
always managed to hang onto their prejudices. Obviously, mere contact with people from
an out-group is not enough to erase in-group prejudices against them. Evidence, however,
from integrated public housing (where the economic threat of lowered property values
is not an issue) suggests that when people are placed together under conditions of equal
status, where neither wields power over the other, the chances of developing understand-
ing increase (Deutsch & Collins, 1951; Wilner et al., 1955). In an extensive review of all
available literature, Tom Pettigrew (1998) found strong support for the power of equal-
status contact to prevent and reduce prejudice among many different kinds of groups.
The Jigsaw Classroom Although we said earlier that educational approaches to dealing
with prejudice proved overly optimistic, one approach has been spectacularly success-
ful. Social psychologist Elliott Aronson and his team showed that prejudice can be
reduced in classrooms from grades 3 to 12 by substituting cooperative learning for
President Barack Obama and Supreme
Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor are role
models for minority youth from Black and
Hispanic communities.

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 497
the usual competitive style typical in traditional classrooms (Aronson, 1978; 1997). In
Aronson’s approach, the key is making each student an expert on one part of the lesson
that all the other students in his or her group need for successful team performance.
Every student becomes an integral part of the “jigsaw puzzle” that cannot be solved
without their input. This strategy promotes active listening, group interaction, peer
teaching, and enhanced appreciation of the value of students from minority groups
who become equals in their knowledge of the new material that the rest of their team
needs and comes to value. But how do we know that this approach actually reduces
prejudice? Here is Aronson’s response:
Because we had randomly introduced the jigsaw intervention into some
classrooms and not others, we were able to compare the progress of the jigsaw
students with that of students in traditional classrooms. After only eight weeks
there were clear differences, even though students spent only a small portion of
their time in jigsaw groups. When tested objectively, jigsaw students expressed
less prejudice and negative stereotyping, were more self-confident, and reported
liking school better than children in traditional classrooms. Moreover, chil-
dren in jigsaw classes were absent less often than were other students, and they
showed greater academic improvement; poorer students in the jigsaw classroom
scored significantly higher on objective exams than comparable students in tra-
ditional classes, while the good students continued to do as well as the good
students in traditional classes (Aronson, 1978, p. 257).
Legislation You can’t legislate morality. Right? Wrong! One of the most convincing
studies showing that the old cliché is wrong comes from an experiment done in the
late 1940s, comparing the attitudes of White tenants toward Black tenants in public
housing projects. In one project, White and Black occupants were assigned to differ-
ent buildings; that is, the project was racially segregated. A second project mixed or
integrated the two racial groups by assigning housing in the same buildings. Only in
the racially integrated project did prejudicial attitudes sharply decrease (Deutsch &
Collins, 1951). This result strongly suggests that rules requiring equal status contact
can diminish prejudice.
This notion is reinforced by a larger social “experiment” that was done under far
less controlled conditions. During the past 60 years, the United States has adopted
laws abolishing racial discrimination. The consequences were sometimes violent, but
prejudice and discrimination have gradually diminished. Nevertheless, evidence for
a shift in prejudiced attitudes comes from polls showing that, initially, in the 1940s,
fewer than 30 percent of White Americans favored desegregation. Yet that percentage
has steadily climbed to well above 90 percent in this era (Aronson, 2004).
Because these changes in public opinion were not part of a carefully controlled
experiment, we cannot say that the data prove that legislation has caused people’s
prejudices to diminish. Nevertheless, we can argue that the increased number of White
Americans favoring desegregation is exactly what one might predict from cognitive
dissonance theory: When the law requires people to act in a less discriminatory fash-
ion, people have to justify their new behavior by softening their prejudiced attitudes.
From this vantage point, it appears that legislation—when enforced—can affect preju-
diced attitudes, after all. We now see that with dramatic changes in attitudes toward
smoking and smokers following legal bans on smoking in many public venues.
Stereotype Threat Who we think we are or how we think others see us may
determine how we perform on various tests of ability. That principle emerges from
a large body of research in this new area of social psychology, started by researcher
Claude Steele, his colleagues, and students (Steele et al., 2002). Stereotype threat refers
to the negative effect on performance that arises when an individual becomes aware
that members of his or her group are expected to perform poorly in that domain. This
research reveals that performance on both intellectual and athletic tasks is shaped by
awareness of existing stereotypes about the groups to which one belongs. It happens
even if the person does not believe the stereotype is true; what matters is that others do
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
Stereotype threat has been shown
to affect people’s academic
performance (p. 257).
stereotype threat The negative effect on
performance that arises when an individual becomes
aware that members of his or her group are expected to
perform poorly in that domain.

498 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
and that the performer becomes aware that such a negative stereotype threatens his or
her self-identity (Haslam et al., 2008).
So college women in a math course take a special math test and do as well as male
students, unless they first have to check off the gender box: Female. When reminded
of their gender, their performance becomes significantly poorer, confirming the stereo-
type about woman and math. Likewise, the stereotype of Blacks having lower IQ than
Whites subconsciously creates anxiety that their performance will risk confirming this
stereotype. That anxiety interferes with optimal cognitive processing and their posi-
tive self-identity, and they end up doing more poorly. Thus, making someone’s identity
salient, where a negative sterotype exists about its deficiency in some domain leads to
diminished performance on a variety of tasks, from spatial reasoning to golf scores (see
McGlone and Aronson, 2006; and Stone et al., 1996).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Stereotype Lift and Values Affirmations
The enhanced performance of a reverse stereotype—that makes you believe you are
superior to another group on any dimension—is known as “stereotype lift.” If Whites
take a test they know to be evaluative of intellectual ability, or a test in which the
negative stereotype of Blacks is made salient, they get a psychological edge from being
on the upside of the negative stereotype and perform better (Walton & Cohen, 2003).
When people feel positively labeled with a stereotype, they also perform better, an
effect known as “stereotype susceptibility.” Accordingly, if Asian women taking a math
test are required to focus on the fact that they are either woman or Asian, they do
worse when reminded of their female status but better than the control condition of no
identity focus when they are reminded of their Asian status (and the implicit stereotype
of Asian math superiority). Again, here is stereotype lift at work. Thus, we can make
stereotypes work for us as well as against our performance (Shih et al., 1999).
Could we use the notion of stereotype lift to counteract stereotype threat? Perhaps we
encourage people to rediscover their best selves before tackling that challenging exam or
course. How about having them affirm the values that matter most to them prior to being
exposed to a course in which people like them often do not do well? More specifically,
what would happen if women affirmed their values just prior to starting an introductory
physics course, where typically the average grade for women is C level, while it is B for
males? Such a study was conducted by Akira Miyake and his research team (Miyake
et al., 2010), which confirmed that the gender gap in college science achievement could
be reduced dramatically by a psychological intervention of values affirmation.
In this double-blind experiment, half of the male students (n 5 283) and half of the
females (n 5 116) were randomly assigned to a writing exercise prior to the start of
their introductory physics course that asked them to write about their most important
values. To paraphrase the instructions: “Think about the things that are important to
you. Perhaps you care about creativity, family relationships, your career, or having a
sense of humor. Pick two or three of these values and write a few sentences about why
they are important to you. You have fifteen minutes.” For the Control condition, the
other half of the students was told to think about their least important values and how
they might relate to other people. The TAs who gave this writing exercise did not know
it was related to the affirmation research, nor did any of the researchers know which
students were assigned to the affirmation or control condition until the data were ana-
lyzed. Two types of data were used to evaluate the effectiveness of this values affirma-
tion: Final grades, largely based on four exams, and a measure of understanding basic
physics concepts, FMCE (force and motion conceptual evaluation). As can be seen
in the graphed data in Figure 11.6, in the control group, men outperformed women
by an average of 10 points, even when controlling for their prior achievement, but
among the students who affirmed their own values, this gender gap nearly vanished.
Those women who were self-affirmed got far more B grades, and far fewer got Cs. The
same effect was found for the FMCE measure of understanding basic physics concepts.

Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others? 499
Thus, it is evident that a simple psychological intervention can have a major impact on
the academic performance of women in the science subject of physics.
Geoffrey Cohen and colleagues established the power of values affirmations in ear-
lier research with White and Black seventh graders, where Black students completing
the exercise improved their grades significantly, and those who were low to moderate
achievers beforehand improved the most (Cohen et al., 2006). There is even more good
news: These gains can be sustained over several years with a few simple booster ses-
sions where children write about a different value or delve more deeply into ones they
had written about earlier (Cohen et al., 2009).
FIGURE 11.6
Values Affirmation Reduces Gender
Gap in Physics Grades and Concept
Knowledge
75
70
65
60
55
80
85
70
75
65
60
50
55
Control
Men
Exam score FMCE score
Values
affirmation
Control Values
affirmation
M
ea
n
o
ve
ra
ll
ex
am
s
co
re
(
%
)
M
ea
n
e
n
d
-o
f-
se
m
es
te
r
FM
C
E
sc
o
re
(
%
)
Women
Answers 1. b 2. a 3. d 4. d 5. c 6. c 7. b 8. a
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: According to Aronson, we can explain almost everything
about interpersonal attraction with a theory of
a. love. c. genetic predispositions.
b. rewards. d gender.
2. RECALL: Which of the following does the research say is most
important in predicting initial attraction?
a. physical attractiveness c. personality
b. money d. nurturing qualities
3. RECALL: In trying to understand why Ron was late for an
appointment, Jane blamed his lack of conscientiousness and
ignored the facts of rush hour traffic and a major storm that hit
town. Jane is guilty of
a. the chameleon effect.
b. the expectancy-value violation.
c. scapegoating.
d. fundamental attribution error.
4. APPLICATION: According to cognitive dissonance theory, which of
the following would be the best strategy for getting people to like you?
a. Give them presents.
b. Show interest in their interests.
c. Tell them that you like them.
d. Persuade them to perform a difficult or unpleasant task for you.
5. RECALL: Prejudice is a(n) , while discrimination
is a(n) .
a. behavior/attitude c. attitude/behavior
b. instinct/choice d. stimulus/response
6. RECALL: The evidence suggests that one of the most effective
techniques for eliminating racial prejudice has been
a. education. c. legislation.
b. threat and force. d. tax incentives.
7. APPLICATION: To reduce prejudice in a working group in a
factory, which is the better strategy? (a) to make some usually
discriminated-against workers feel special by giving them higher
status or (b) create a jigsaw team in which they had special
information to share with their group.
8. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Reward theory,
expectancy-value theory, cognitive dissonance theory, and attribution
theory all tell us that we respond not just to situations but to
a. our cognitive interpretations.
b. our social instincts.
c. the intensity of the stimuli.
d. our biological needs and drives.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

500 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
11.3 KEY QUESTION
How Do Systems Create Situations
That Influence Behavior?
We spend most of our lives in various institutions—family, schools, hospitals, jobs,
military, prison, elderly homes—and may end in a hospice. Each of these settings
involves systems of management and control, explicit and implicit rules of conduct,
and reward and punishment structures, and they come with a history, a culture, and a
legal status. In many cases, it is system power that creates, maintains, and gives mean-
ing and justification to a social situation. System power differs from social norms that
come from within groups because this is top-down power to exercise control over
groups and individuals. Although social psychologists have highlighted the influence
of situations on behavior, as you have seen in this chapter, they have tended not to
acknowledge the greater power that systems have to make those situations work as
they do, sometimes for the better, but sometimes for the worse. This, then, leads us to
the third lesson of social psychology, captured in our final Core Concept:
Core Concept 11.3
Systems shape situations, which in turn affect behavior—and by
understanding systems, we can learn how to change them and modify
their influences on us.
We will illustrate how system power can create a remarkably powerful social situation
that affected the behavior of all within its behavioral context in research known as the
Stanford Prison Experiment. Then, we will briefly examine other systems that have also
generated abusive behavior, such as that in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have the space in this chapter to also illustrate in detail how network
systems work for good causes. Here we are thinking about those involved in most
nonviolent movements that train citizens in passive resistance, such as Gandhi in India,
Martin Luther King, Jr. in the American civil rights struggle, and Nelson Mandela in
opposing apartheid in South Africa. Similar system networks were critical for Christians
who helped Jews escape the Nazi Holocaust.
The Stanford Prison Experiment
On a summer Sunday in California, a siren shattered the serenity of college student
Tommy Whitlow’s morning. A city police car screeched to a halt in front of his home.
Within minutes, Tommy was charged with a felony, informed of his constitutional
rights, frisked, and handcuffed. After he was booked and fingerprinted at the city jail,
Tommy was blindfolded and transported to the Stanford County Prison, where he was
stripped and issued a smock-type uniform with an I.D. number on the front and back.
Tommy became “Prisoner 8612.” Eight other college students were also arrested and
assigned numbers during that mass arrest by the local police.
The prison guards were anonymous in their khaki military uniforms, reflector
sunglasses, and nameless identity as “Mr. Correctional Officer,” but with symbols
of power shown off in their big nightsticks, whistles, and handcuffs. To them, the pow-
erless prisoners were nothing more than their worthless numbers.
The guards insisted that prisoners obey all of their many arbitrary rules without
question or hesitation. Failure to do so led to losses of privileges. At first, privileges in-
cluded opportunities to read, write, or talk to other inmates. Later, the slightest protest
resulted in the loss of “privileges” of eating, sleeping, washing, or having visitors dur-
ing visiting nights. Failure to obey rules also resulted in a variety of unpleasant tasks
such as endless push-ups, jumping jacks, and number count-offs that lasted for hours
on end. Each day saw an escalation of the level of hostile abuse by the guards against
their prisoners: making them clean toilets with bare hands, doing push-ups while a
system power Influences on behavior that come
from top-down sources in the form of creating and
maintaining various situations that in turn have an
impact on actions of individuals in those behavioral
contexts.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Marriage counselors and family
therapists often use a systems
approach to understanding
and resolving family conflicts
(p. 567).
Stanford Prison Experiment Classic study of
institutional power in directing normal, healthy college
student volunteers playing randomly assigned roles of
prisoners and guards to behave contrary to
their dispositional tendencies, as cruel guards or
pathological prisoners.

How Do Systems Create Situations That Influence Behavior? 501
guard stepped on the prisoner’s back, spending long hours naked in solitary confine-
ment, and finally engaging in degrading forms of sexual humiliation.
“Prisoner 8612” encountered some guards whose behavior toward him and the
other prisoners was sadistic, taking apparent pleasure in cruelty; others were just tough
and demanding; a few were not abusive. However, none of the few “good” guards ever
challenged the extremely demeaning actions of the “perpetrators of evil.”
Less than 36 hours after the mass arrest, “Prisoner 8612,” who had become the
ringleader of an aborted prisoner rebellion that morning, had to be released because
of an extreme stress reaction of screaming, crying, rage, and depression. On successive
days, three more prisoners developed similar stress-related symptoms. A fifth prisoner
developed a psychosomatic rash all over his body when the parole board rejected his
appeal, and he too was released from the Stanford County Jail.
Everyone in the prison, guard and prisoner alike, had been selected from a large
pool of student volunteers. On the basis of extensive psychological tests and interviews,
the volunteers had been judged as law-abiding, emotionally stable, physically healthy,
and “normal-average” on all personality trait measures. In this mock prison experi-
ment, assignment of participants to the independent variable treatment of “guard” or
“prisoner” roles had been determined randomly. Thus, in the beginning, there were no
systematic differences between the “ordinary” college males who were in the two dif-
ferent experimental roles of prisoner or guard. By the end of the study, there were no
similarities between these two alien groups. The prisoners lived in the jail around the
clock, and the guards worked standard 8-hour shifts.
As guards, students who had been pacifists and “nice guys” in their usual life
settings behaved aggressively—sometimes even sadistically. As prisoners, psychologi-
cally stable students soon behaved pathologically, passively resigning themselves to
their unexpected fate of learned helplessness. The power of the simulated prison situa-
tion had created a new social reality—a functionally real prison—in the minds of both
the jailers and their captives. The situation became so powerfully disturbing that the
researchers were forced to terminate the 2-week study after only 6 days.
Although Tommy Whitlow said he wouldn’t want to go through it again, he
valued the personal experience because he learned so much about himself and
about human nature. Fortunately, he and the other students were basically healthy,
and extensive debriefing showed that they readily bounced back from the prison
experience. Follow-ups over many years revealed no lasting negative effects on these
students. The participants had all learned an important lesson: Never underestimate
the power of a bad situation to overwhelm the personalities and good upbringing
of even the best and brightest among us, and of a system to create such situations
(Zimbardo, 2007).
The basic results of this study were replicated in cross-cultural research in Australia
(Lovibond et al., 1979). However, there was never the same degree of violence exhib-
ited by the guards, perhaps because this study followed the cultural norm of every-
one having afternoon teatime! For detailed information about this dramatic study and
many related issues, see www.prisonexp.org.
Suppose you had been a subject in the Stanford Prison Experiment. Would you
have been a good guard—or a sadist? Would you be a model compliant prisoner—or
a rebel? Could you have resisted the pressures and stresses of these circumstances?
It is a similar question raised about how you think you might have behaved if you
were the “Teacher” in the Milgram obedience research—obey or defy? We’d all like to
believe we would be good guards and heroic prisoners; we would never step across
that line between good and evil. And, of course, we all believe that we would be able
to keep things in perspective, knowing that it was “just an experiment,” only role play-
ing and not real. But the best bet is that most of us would react the same way as
these participants did. This disturbing study raises many questions about how well we
really know ourselves, our inner dispositional qualities, and how much we appreci-
ate the subtle powers of external forces on us, the situational qualities. Obviously, it
also raises ethical issues about whether such research should have ever been done or
allowed to continue.
Scenes from the Stanford Prison
Experiment

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502 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
By the conclusion of the Stanford Prison Experiment, guards’
and prisoners’ behavior differed from each other in virtually every
observable way (see Figure 11.7). Yet, it was only chance, in the
form of random assignment, that had decided their roles—roles
that had created status and power differences that were validated
in the prison situation and supported by the system of prison
authorities. No one taught the participants to play their roles.
Without ever visiting real prisons, all the participants had earlier
in their lives learned information about the interaction between
the powerful and the powerless. A guard type is someone who lim-
its the freedom of prisoner types to manage their behavior and
make them behave more predictably. This task is aided by the use
of coercive rules, which include explicit punishment for violations.
Prisoners can only react to the social structure of a prisonlike set-
ting created by those with power. Rebellion and compliance are
the only options of the prisoners; the first choice results in punish-
ment, while the second results in a loss of autonomy and dignity.
The student participants had already experienced such power
differences in many of their previous social interactions in various
systems of control: parent–child, teacher–student, doctor–patient,
boss–worker, male–female. They merely refined and intensified
their prior patterns of behavior for this particular setting. Each stu-
dent could have played either role. Many students in the guard role
reported being surprised at how easily they enjoyed controlling
other people. The toughest guard recalled later for a TV documen-
tary that the guards were like puppeteers pulling the strings of their prisoner-puppets—
and “getting our jollies off” in the process. Just putting on the uniform was enough to
transform them from passive college students into aggressive prison guards.
Milgram’s obedience research and the Stanford Prison Experiment form book-
ends of much research, illustrating the power of situations over behavior. However,
the obedience studies were about individual authority power, while the prison experi-
ment is about the power of an institution, a system of domination. The guards main-
tained the situation of abuse, but so did the research team of psychologists; the police
contributed to its reality, as did many others who visited the prison setting—a prison
chaplain, a public defender, parents and friends on visiting nights, and civilians on the
parole board.
Chains of System Command
Psychologists seek to understand behavior in order to promote prosocial forms and
alter for the better antisocial aspects of behavior. Understanding why some people
engage in “bad behaviors” does not excuse them; rather, it leads to new ideas about
changing the causal influences on those behaviors. A full understanding of most com-
plex human behavior should include an appreciation of the ways in which situational
conditions are created and shaped by higher-order factors—systems of power. Systems,
not just dispositions and situations, must be taken into account in order to understand
complex behavior patterns.
Aberrant, illegal, or immoral behavior by individuals in service professions, such
as policemen, corrections officers, or soldiers, or even in business settings, is typically
labeled the misdeeds of “a few bad apples.” The implication is they are a rare excep-
tion and must be set on one side of the impermeable line between evil and good, with
the majority of good apples set on the other side. But who is making that distinction?
Usually it is the guardians of the system—who want to isolate the problem to deflect
attention and blame away from those at the top who may be responsible for creating
impossible working conditions or for a lack of their oversight or supervision. Again the
bad apple-dispositional view ignores the bad apple barrel-situational view and its po-
tentially corrupting situational impact on those within it. A systems analysis focuses on
FIGURE 11.7
Guard and Prisoner Behavior
Source: Gerrig, R. J. & Zimbardo, P. G. (2008).
Psychology and Life. 18th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
Resistance
Individuating
reference
Deindividuating
reference
Use of
instruments
Helping
Information
Questions
Threats
Aggression
Insults
Commands
Frequency
0 3010 20 40 50 60 70 80 90 100110
Guards
Prisoners

How Do Systems Create Situations That Influence Behavior? 503
the next step higher, on the bad barrel makers-systemic view, on those with the power
to design the barrel. It is the “power elite,” the barrel makers, often working behind the
scenes, who arrange many of the conditions of life for the rest of us who must spend
time in the variety of institutional settings they have constructed.
The Situation and the System at Abu Ghraib Prison The world became aware of
the abuses of Iraqi prisoners by American Military Police guards in Abu Ghraib Prison
with the April 2004 televised exposure of horrific images that they had taken (see one
such image on this page).
Immediately, the military chain of command dismissed it all as the work of a few
rogue soldiers, while the president’s chain of command likewise blamed it on a few
bad apples. Both systems were quick to assert that it was not systemic, not occurring
in other military prisons. However, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh (2004a) ex-
posed the lie in that attribution with his analysis of the culpability of both of those sys-
tems of power, those chains of “irresponsible” command. The title of his May 5, 2004,
article in The New Yorker was “Torture at Abu Ghraib. American soldiers brutalize
Iraqis: How far up does the responsibility go?” His answer: all the way to the top of
the military and civilian system of command (see also Hersh, 2004b).
A review of the dozen reports investigating these abuses, most written by gener-
als and government officials, clearly highlights the situational influences on American
Army Reserve soldiers from their impossible working conditions in the Abu Ghraib
dungeon. What is now obvious is that these influences were made possible by sys-
temic failures of military leadership and surveillance. In fact, these reports highlight
many situational and system failures, as well as personal moral failures of the sol-
diers involved (Zimbardo, 2007). In sum, there were three processes interacting at Abu
Ghraib: dispositional, situational, and systemic processes. Tragically, similar abuses
in military prisons and other war zones have occurred before, during, and after the
revelation of events at Abu Ghraib.
The Systems Lesson The most important lesson to be learned from the Core
Concept for this section is that situations are created by systems. Systems provide the
institutional support, authority, and resources that allow situations to operate as they
do. System power involves authorization or institutionalized permission to behave in
prescribed ways or to forbid and punish actions that are disapproved. It provides the
“higher authority” that gives validation to playing new roles, following new rules, and
taking actions that would ordinarily be constrained by existing laws, norms, morals,
and ethics. Such validation usually comes cloaked in the mantle of ideology. Ideology
is a slogan or proposition that usually legitimizes whatever means are necessary to at-
tain an ultimate goal. The programs, policies, and standard operating procedures that
are developed to support an ideology become an essential component of the system.
The system’s procedures are considered reasonable and appropriate as the ideology
comes to be accepted as sacred.
However, although all systems involve individuals at varying levels of power and
status, most systems are not transparent, concealing much of their operation from out-
siders. So even when a system is failing to meet its objectives and goals, as many failing
educational or correctional systems are (as well as corporations that engage in corrupt
practices), higher-ups are hidden from public scrutiny.
Nevertheless, to change undesirable behavior and promote more socially desirable
behavior, it is not sufficient to continue to rely on the individualistic medical model of
treating people (or disciplining) individuals for problem behavior when the situation
might be a fault. And plans to improve situations must involve understanding and
modifying the systems that create and maintain them. Instead, our call is for using
a public health model that recognizes individual affliction and illness as the conse-
quence of a vector of disease in society. Prevention rather than just treatment becomes
the goal; inoculating against a virus prevents the spread of an epidemic. This should
be as true for the evils of prejudice, violence, and bullying in our society as it is for
viral infections.
Abu Ghraib Prison Prison in Iraq made
famous by revelation of photos taken by Army Reserve
MP guards in the acts of humiliating and torturing
prisoners.
One of the many photos taken by Ameri-
can Military Police guards at Abu Ghraib
Prison in Iraq

504 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
Using Psychology to Understand the Abuses at Abu Ghraib Over a 3-month
period, Military Police, Army Reservists, working the night shift at Tier 1-A in that
dungeon, used some of the 1,000 prisoners detained there as their “playthings”—
piling them naked in pyramids, hanging them upside down with women’s panties
over their heads, dragging them around the ground on dog leashes, and sexually
degrading them in various ways. Tier 1-A was the interrogation center run by Military
Intelligence, the CIA, and a civilian interrogator contractor. When the unexpected
insurgency against the U.S. forces suddenly escalated, the chain of command needed
“actionable intelligence” from these detainees. So the Military Police prison guards
were given permission by higher-ups to “soften up” the prisoners, to prepare them for
interrogation, to “take the gloves off.”
Given that official permission for abuse, and with no senior officer ever providing
oversight or surveillance of that night shift, all hell broke loose. However, the soldiers
did not think what they were doing was wrong; one said it was only “fun and games.”
In fact, they documented these games with their own candid photographs of them-
selves with their abused prisoners in hundreds of horrific images.
One investigating committee was headed by James Schlesinger, former Secretary of
Defense, and included generals and other high-ranking officials. The report notes the
relevance of social psychological research and theory to the understanding of these
abuses:
The potential for abusive treatment of detainees during the Global War on
Terrorism was entirely predictable based on a fundamental understanding of
the principles of social psychology coupled with an awareness of numerous
known environmental risk factors. . . . Findings from the field of social psychol-
ogy suggest that the conditions of war and the dynamics of detainee operations
carry inherent risks for human mistreatment, and therefore must be approached
with great caution and careful planning and training.
Such conditions neither excuse nor absolve the individuals who engaged in
deliberate immoral or illegal behaviors [even though] certain conditions height-
ened the possibility of abusive treatment.
The Schlesinger Report boldly proclaims that the “landmark Stanford study provides a
cautionary tale for all military detention operations.” In contrasting the relatively be-
nign environment of the Stanford Prison Experiment, the report makes evident that “in
military detention operations, soldiers work under stressful combat conditions that are
far from benign.” The implication is that those combat conditions might be expected
to generate even more extreme abuses of power by military police than were observed
in our mock prison experiment. The Schlesinger Report concludes with a statement
that underscores much of what we have presented in this chapter: “Psychologists have
attempted to understand how and why individuals and groups who usually act hu-
manely can sometimes act otherwise in certain circumstances.” Among the concepts
this report outlines to help explain why abusive behaviors occur among ordinarily
humane individuals are deindividuation, dehumanization, enemy image, groupthink,
moral disengagement, social facilitation, and other environmental factors.
There are fewer more direct statements that we are aware of that highlight the
value of psychological theories and social psychological research than this official gov-
ernment report. The full report, and especially Appendix G, which is notable for stu-
dents of psychology, can be found at: www.prisonexp.org/pdf/SchlesingerReport .
Preventing Bullying by Systemic Changes and Reframing
Bullying in school and in the workplace is primarily about some students and workers
making life miserable for others by extreme teasing, threatening, physically abusing,
and damaging personal reputations through lies and gossip. Most other students and
coworkers who are neither bullies nor victim but bystanders aware of the problem yet
usually ignore it or passively accept it (see Coloroso, 2008). The traditional method
Schlesinger Report Report issued by one of the
official investigations of the Abu Ghraib Prison abuses,
headed by James Schlesinger, former Secretary of
Defense. It highlighted the social psychological factors
that contributed to creating an abusive environment.

www.prisonexp.org/pdf/SchlesingerReport

How Do Systems Create Situations That Influence Behavior? 505
for dealing with bullies is to identify the culprits and punish them in various ways,
moving them to other classes, schools, or jobs. This is likely to move the abusers and
their abuse to different venues but not change them; often it makes them even angrier
and vengeful. Bullying is defined as systematically and chronically inflicting physical
hurt and/or psychological distress on one or more others, whether they are students in
school or workers in the workplace.
In the 1990s, statistics on the prevalence of bullying revealed it was relatively low
in Sweden, with an estimated 15 percent of all Swedish schoolchildren being bullied or
admitting to being bullies themselves (Olweus, 1993). However, a more recent survey
documented a dramatically higher prevalence in Britain with 73 percent of a British
sample reporting being bullied, being the bully perpetrator, or having witnessed bul-
lying directly (McLeod, 2008). This large-scale study included nearly 2,000 students,
aged 12 through 19, across 14 schools. In a 2010 survey of 43,000 high school stu-
dents in the United States, half said they’ve bullied someone in the past year, and nearly
half said they’d been physically abused, teased, or taunted in a way that seriously upset
them (Dalton, 2010). Among the negative fallout of bullying is shown in the estimated
160,000 students who have refused to go to school because of the possible physical
and verbal aggression of their peers (as reported at www.nobully.com).
What Does Bullying Look Like Today? Below are the most frequently experienced
types:
• Physical bullying: Direct physical force is used to hurt someone else by hitting,
pushing, shoving, kicking, pinching, or holding them down. Physical bullying also
includes taking or breaking someone’s belongings or stealing or extorting money.
• Verbal bullying: Use of words to hurt someone. This includes threatening, taunting,
intimidating, insulting, sarcasm, name calling, teasing, slurs, graffiti, put-downs,
and ridicule. It also includes hostile gestures such as making faces, staring, giving
the evil eye, eye-rolling, and spitting.
• Relational bullying: Leaving someone out of a group or purposely excluding
them, gossiping, teasing, whispering, and spreading rumors. It includes turn-
ing your back on someone else, giving them the silent treatment, ostracizing, or
scapegoating.
• Cyberbullying: Use of cell-phones, text messages, e-mails, instant messages, web
blogs, and postings to bully another student in any of the ways described above.
Examples of cyberbullying are sending threatening or insulting messages by phone
and e-mail and spreading destructive rumors that ruin the reputation of a fellow
student or worker.
• Harassment: Offensive and possibly threatening behavior including the use of
extreme verbal language, offensive questions or statements, stalking, physical
force, or unwanted sexual advances. Sexual harassment is persistent and unwanted
sexual advances, where the consequences of refusing could be harmful to the
victim. Usually harassment is a repeated set of actions, but not always.
Bullying can occur just about everywhere: in any kind of school—poor or wealthy,
public or private, single-sex or co-educational, conservative or progressive. It happens
in or outside the classroom, in the workplace, and online. Boys and girls are equal
targets of bullying. In most cases, boys bully other boys, and girls bully other girls. As
Evelyn Field (2007), author of Bully Blocking: Six Secrets to Help Children Deal with
Teasing and Bullying, explained:
Bullying is a game where some children systematically abuse their power. Bul-
lies can go on a shopping spree at the beginning of every year looking for suit-
able targets . . . Boys often use bullying tactics to make a reputation and girls do
so to protect their reputation. Boys tend to be hunters who belong to large, hi-
erarchical tribes. They typically bully openly and prefer physical bullying. They
focus upon individual achievement and action, supported by their physical
bullying The act of tormenting others, in school
classrooms or work settings, by one or more others, for
personal, sadistic pleasure. It qualifies as a form of
ordinary or everyday evil.
about Preventing Bullying atRead
MyPsychLab

www.nobully.com

506 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
prowess. They are less interested in teasing, exclusion and indirect bullying
[tactics favored by girls] (pp. 7, 8).
Some argue that bullying is no worse than it used to be and kids today should just
“suck it up,” while others are convinced bullies are going too far. Recently bullying
has become an international concern due to escalated violence and a number of teen
suicides traced to cyberbullying. Though “technology is not radically changing what’s
happening, it’s simply making what’s happening far more visible,” says social media
researcher Danah Boyd (Leach, 2010); it is difficult to deny the impact the Internet
has had on the bullying landscape. Because of the permeability and reach of the Net as
well as anonymity of users, dehumanization has not only become easier, the impact has
become greater and even lethal.
Prevention of bullying requires switching from the usual punishment model
of bullies to a systemwide set of practices that give zero tolerance for bullying.
The impetus for change must come top-down from school superintendents and
principals, involving teachers and parents, and then enabling students themselves as
agents of change (Kalman, 2008). Researcher Dan Olweus (1993) has used such a
system change model in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries with considerable
success. In the United States, students who seem “different,” are more shy, have
physical handicaps, and are gay or have alternative sexual orientations are bullied.
“ Actual or perceived sexual orientation is one of the most common reasons that
students are harassed by their peers, second only to physical appearance,” according
to psychologist Peter Goldbaum (Novotney, 2008). At the core of new programs to
combat and prevent bullying is developing curricula and practices from elementary
school throughout all grades that promote respect for the dignity of individuals and for
acceptance and tolerance of human diversity.
For bullying issues that can revolve around the target’s image, your authors
advocate changing the self-image and sense of helplessness of those individuals. They can
learn to stop communicating through body language that they are vulnerable targets.
They can be taught how to cultivate positive self-esteem, new body language, and
effective social communication skills as well as ways to get more social support from
their peers. In their book, Stick Up For Yourself: Every Kid’s Guide to Personal Power
and Positive Self-Esteem, Gershen Kaufman and his colleagues (1999) explain:
Positive self-esteem is the single most important psychological skill we can
develop in order to thrive in society. Having self-esteem means being proud of
ourselves and experiencing that pride from within. Without self-esteem, kids
doubt themselves, cave in to peer pressure, feel worthless or inferior . . . With
self-esteem, kids feel secure inside themselves, are more willing to take positive
risks, are more likely to take responsibility for their actions, can cope with life’s
changes and challenges, and are resilient in the face of rejection, disappoint-
ment, failure, and defeat (p. ii).
Note: Self-esteem should not be confused with arrogance, contempt, or a big ego.
People who have positive self-esteem don’t depend on what other people think of them
because they are confident of their worth and happy in their own skins.
Historically, bullies were viewed as having various mental health deficiencies, but
new research reveals a very different social dynamic is operating. Many people bully
others as a means to climb the social hierarchy among their peers. Most bullying is
occurring among students who are in the middle to upper ranges of social status in
their schools. It is not happening at the highest or lowest status levels. A research team
of sociologists followed approximately 3,700 U.S. students in grades 8 to 10 for one
school year, identifying acts of social aggression and relating them to indices of social
status (Faris & Felmlee, 2011). Each student was asked to list five students who had
been mean to them or picked on them, with aggression defined as activities intend-
ing to cause harm or pain, physically or emotionally. Status was established as how
central a student was in friendship networks where each student nominated his or her

How Do Systems Create Situations That Influence Behavior? 507
five best friends. Those with highest status have no need to bully anyone, and those
with lowest status don’t have the social power to pull off being aggressive.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
You may associate persuasion with advertising and politics, but persuasion does not
stop there. It is woven into all human interaction—including the exchanges of ideas
that occur in the classroom. There, your professors and fellow students will attempt to
persuade you with reasoned arguments, and they will expect you to set out your points
of view in the same fashion. But, aside from the open exchange of ideas and opinions,
there are other, more subtle persuasive pressures of which you should be aware, says
social psychologist Robert Cialdini (2001a). If you don’t know about these, you run the
risk of letting other people make up your mind for you. We will discuss three such sub-
tle forms of influence that you will encounter in your college or university experience.
Social Validation
Although you may see a popular movie because your friends like it, going along with
the crowd is a poor basis for judging the theories you encounter in your classes. Many
of the world’s discarded ideas were once accepted by nearly everyone. In psychology,
these include the false notions that we use only 10 percent of our brain, that personal-
ity is determined by the first 2 years of life, and that IQ tests are a good measure of
innate abilities. So, rather than accepting what you hear and read, questioning even the
most widely held concepts is a good habit. In fact, most famous scientists have built
their careers on challenging ideas that everyone else accepted.
Authority
The lectures you hear and the textbooks you read are full of authority figures. Every par-
enthetical reference in this text, for example, cites an authority. Most are given, in part,
to persuade you that the argument being offered is credible. The problem, of course, is
that ideas are not true merely because some authority says so. For example, just a few
years ago, every introductory psychology text in print taught that no new neurons were
created in the brain after birth. Now we know that the textbooks and the experts they
cited were wrong. Real proof of such assertions, however, requires more objective evi-
dence obtained by the scientific method—not just the declaration of an authority.
The Poison Parasite Argument
In advertising, a good way to undermine a competitor, says Cialdini, is with a message
that calls into question the opponent’s credibility. Then, to get people to remember what
you have said, you can infect your opponent with a “parasite”—a mnemonic link that
reminds people of your message every time they hear your opponent’s pitch (Brookhart,
2001). A classic example involved antismoking ads that looked like Marlboro commer-
cials, except that they featured a coughing, sickly “Marlboro Man.” You may encounter
the same sort of poison parasite argument in a lecture or a textbook that attempts to
hold someone’s ideas up to ridicule. That’s not necessarily bad: In the academic world,
weak ideas should perish. The sneaky, dishonest form of this technique, however, in-
volves a misrepresentation or oversimplification of the opponent’s arguments. The anti-
dote is to be alert for ridicule and to check out the other side of the argument yourself.
The social psychology of persuasion, of course, involves much more than we have dis-
cussed here. A good place to look for more information is Cialdini’s (2007) book Influence:
The Psychology of Persuasion. Perhaps the most important idea is that some knowledge
of persuasion can forearm you against the persuasive techniques you will encounter, both
in and out of the classroom. When you know how effective persuaders operate—as “influ-
ence professionals,” you are less likely to donate money to causes you don’t care about,
buy a car you don’t really like, or accept a theory without examining the evidence critically.

508 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Is Terrorism “a Senseless Act of Violence, Perpetrated by Crazy Fanatics”?
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: The Stanford prison experiment illustrates the power
of to influence people’s behavior.
a. personality c. childhood experiences
b. heredity d. the situation
2. RECALL: What was the independent variable in the Stanford
Prison Experiment?
a. random assignment to prisoner or guard roles
b. IQ level differences of those in the two roles
c. cultural backgrounds of the volunteers
d. all of the above
3. RECALL: The abuses perpetrated by the MPs at Abu Ghraib
Prison were blamed entirely on the soldiers as symptoms of their
being “bad apples.” Who is least likely to make such a negative
dispositional attribution?
a. a social psychologist
b. a trial lawyer for the prosecution
c. military leaders
d. civilian chain of command leaders
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: If you wanted to
stop bullying in your school, what would most likely be an effective
strategy to follow?
a. Punish the bully publicly.
b. Teach the victim to fight back.
c. Reward the bully for not bullying any victims.
d. Change the entire school system to have zero tolerance for bullying.
Answers 1. d 2. a 3. a 4. d
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and suicide bombings in Israel, Iraq, London, Madrid, and elsewhere
around the world raise questions for which there are no
easy answers. Terrorism is really about psychology. It typi-
cally involves a relatively small group of people working as a
network who take dramatic, violent actions against a larger
group with the intention of spreading fear of death among
them and inducing anxiety and uncertainty about their gov-
ernment’s ability to protect them. Terrorists do not want
to conquer other nations’ land, as in traditional wars, but
to conquer the minds of their enemies by making them feel
victimized and fearful of random attacks.
What Are the Critical Issues?
Global terrorism is an escalating threat that many nations
must face in the coming years. Terrorists operate in networks
that vary in their degree of organization, but they are not na-
tional states. A war against terrorism is an asymmetrical war,
of nations against collectives of individuals, without uniforms
or designated sovereign territories. Their tactics are hit and
run, attacking at random times, amplifying the surprise value
of their destructive power.
Some of the critical issues for you to consider include the
following. How can a war against terrorism ever be “won”?
What would winning actually look like if there were no one
leader to surrender? Why is the best strategy for meeting this
global challenge international cooperation and intelligence
resource sharing rather than dominant nations acting unilat-
erally? What is the pipeline that is generating so many terror-
ists? In what sense can the threat of terrorism be reduced by
“winning the hearts and minds” of young people who might
be recruited by elders to join terrorist cells or be trained to
become suicide bombers?
What Critical Thinking Questions Should We Ask?
The reasons for terrorist violence are many and complex.
However, media sources of such claims try to simplify com-
plexity and reduce ambiguity to simple frameworks. They of-
ten exaggerate fears for viewers and listeners. “If it bleeds, it
leads,” is a classic statement about what it takes to be the lead
TV news item (see Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2006, about
mass-mediated fear). When they or the general public do not
understand something, there is a readiness to label it “sense-
less.” That only means it does not make sense to them or that
there is no solid evidence for the motivations behind it. For
example, vandalism has been called senseless until it becomes
apparent that it is often done by have-nots who are trying to
make an impact on society, a destructive, dramatic one when
they are not able to make a more constructive one. As citizens
and critical thinkers, we need to call for better information
from our politicians, educators, journalists, and others who
may try to assign easy answers to complex problems.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

Could Bias Contaminate the Conclusion? Several biases
are at work here: first, the dispositional bias of focusing on
individual perpetrators and ignoring their behavioral context,
the situation, and the system that gives shape and purpose to
their actions; second, a simplification bias that reduces diffi-
cult, complex issues to simple terms that give an illusion of
easy solutions. The reasoning behind making and accepting
this assertion about terrorism and terrorists includes giving in
to common fallacies, as we have seen. Combating it involves
understanding the immediate causal contributions leading to
becoming a terrorist as well as the broader systemic influences
on such extreme decisions that individuals and groups make.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Understanding terrorism requires the combined insights of
many perspectives—and not just those from psychology. Is-
sues of money, power, resources, and ancient grudges must be
considered as well. But—like it or not—many people in the
world perceive the United States as the enemy. Understanding
this perception—and dealing constructively with it—demands
that Americans see the conflict from someone else’s point of
view: those who consider the United States to be the enemy.
We must also realize that terrorism does not always
involve international conflict. Just consider the student shoot-
ings at Columbine High, Virginia Tech University, and the
mass murders and wounding of innocent civilians as recently
as early 2011 in Tucson, Arizona, along with thousands
of racial/ethnic hate crimes, attacks against gays, and vio-
lence directed at abortion providers that have made news in
recent years (Doyle, 2001). It would be a mistake to believe
that terrorism is always an outside threat from foreigners:
Even though some cultures are more violent than others,
every culture can breed violent people who terrorize others
(Moghaddam et al., 1993; Shiraev & Levy, 2001). Just re-
member that the bomber who blew up the Oklahoma City
federal building and killed hundreds of innocent people was
an American terrorist named Timothy McVeigh. The Ku Klux
Klan was (is) a uniquely American terrorist organization act-
ing in violent ways to instill fear and terror in Blacks and
others they considered their enemy.
Supplementing Psychology with a Cross-Cultural and
Historical Perspective A complete picture of terrorism,
however, necessitates taking perspectives that extend beyond
psychology (Segall et al., 1999). When we expand our view of
terrorism, we can see that long-standing hostilities arise from
religious, ethnic, and racial prejudices and from poverty, pow-
erlessness, and hopelessness. To arrive at this understanding,
however, we must view terrorism from historical, economic, and
political perspectives—again, not to excuse violent acts but to
understand their origins. We cannot understand, for example,
the tensions between Christianity and Islam without knowing
about the 200-year war that the Western world calls the Cru-
sades (1095 to 1291) or the fall of the six-centuries-old Otto-
man Empire (1300 to 1922) at the end of World War I. Although
such events may seem remote, they changed the trajectory of
Is the Claim Reasonable or Extreme? Obviously this
is an extreme generalization and simplification of a com-
plex social-political-cultural issue. Unfortunately, the easi-
est and most simplistic response is to demonize those who
perpetrate evil deeds—but that is merely name calling, and
we should resist it, not to excuse it but to learn what fac-
tors lead to such deeds. Mere name calling blinds us to the
power of the situation to create aggression in ordinary peo-
ple, as we have seen in the Milgram and Stanford Prison
research. More important, it prevents us from dealing with
the situations that nurture violence. Labeling others as
“evil” or “pathological” usually prevents any attempt to un-
derstand the reasons for their actions, instead making them
into objects of scorn or disdain. Again, it is a related mis-
take to think of violence and terrorism as “senseless.” On
the contrary, destructive deeds always make sense from the
perpetrator’s frame of reference. As Shakespeare’s Hamlet
said, there is “method” in madness: We must understand the
method in the minds of potential terrorists if we are to deter
them.
What Is the Evidence? A summary of recent perspectives
on what moves people to kill themselves and innocent by-
standers is available in a thorough report by New York Times
correspondent Sarah Kershaw (2010). Research has shown
that aggressive behavior can be induced by situations that
create prejudice, conformity, frustration, threat, or wounded
pride (Aronson, 2004; Baumeister et al., 1996). There is no
evidence that terrorists, even suicide bombers, are pathologi-
cal. Rather, they are filled with anger and desire for revenge
against what they perceive as injustice. They are often well
educated, in stable relationships, and now likely to be from
both sexes. In many cases, they become part of a systematic
training program to learn the skills necessary to effectively
destroy one’s perceived enemy and accept being a martyr for
a cause they believe is just (Merari, 2006).
The flammable combination of poverty, powerlessness,
and hopelessness is the tinder that the September 11 attacks
were intended to ignite, says Jonathan Lash (2001), president
of the World Resources Institute in Washington, D.C. Much
of the world lives in poverty and hunger and sees no way
out. Ethnic hatred and wars aggravate their plight. Moreover,
the number of people living in these miserable conditions is
increasing, as most of the world’s population explosion is oc-
curring in poorer countries. And, to make matters more vola-
tile, says Lash, a large proportion of these desperate people
depend directly on resources that are rapidly being depleted:
fisheries, forests, soils, and water resources. As a result, every
day, thousands flee their traditional homelands and stream
into the largest and poorest cities. Most are young—a result
of the high birth rates in the Third World. Mr. Lash warns
that urban slums, filled with restless, jobless young men, are
“tinderboxes of anger and despair; easy recruiting grounds
for bin Laden or those who may come after him” (p. 1789).
We have seen this in recent violent riots in the slums outside
Paris by young immigrants without jobs and educational
opportunities.
How Do Systems Create Situations That Influence Behavior? 509

510 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
so that the whole group never met together but dealt with
only one other at a time and did body searches for recording
equipment. Those that were open and trusting got whacked
by the “TA secret service agents.”
Consider persuading your instructor to try this role-playing
demonstration.
A Positive Endnote
We can think of no better way to end a chapter that focused
mostly on the way good people go bad than to leave you with
a wonderful statement about the unity of humankind and the
need to respect our kinship with one another. It is from poet
and preacher John Donne (Meditations XV11):
All mankind is of one author, and is one volume; when
one man dies, one chapter is not torn out of the book,
but translated into a better language; and every chap-
ter must be so translated. . . . As therefore the bell that
rings to a sermon, calls not upon the preacher only,
but upon the congregation to come: so this bell calls
us all. . . . No man is an island, entire of itself . . . any
man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in
mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom
the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.
So, when in doubt: Take the high moral road, be mind-
ful of situational forces, be wary of potentially unjust author-
ity, be sensitive to your need to “go along to get along with
others,” accept personal responsibility for your actions, keep
your critical facilities activated, and adopt a heroic imagina-
tion that transforms your sense of compassion for others into
heroic action that changes the world for the better.
history, and their religious significance continues to fuel conflict
in the Middle East today. The role of cultural values in terror-
ism is outlined in a recent issue of the American Psychological
Association’s Monitor on Psychology by reporter Tori DeAngelis
(2009), in which she summarizes the views of Iranian-American
psychologist Fathali Moghaddam (2007) and others.
Exercise: Creating a Terrorist Mindset How might it be
possible to create a class exercise that enables students to get a
sense of what it feels like to adopt the mentality of a destruc-
tive terrorist? How about creating terrorist cells of all stu-
dents in a course, each of which has the mission to blow up a
building on the campus that they think should be destroyed.
Well, not really flamed out, but symbolically destroyed.
Zimbardo did such a class exercise recently by dividing
100 students into 20 terrorist cells of five students in each.
Their mission was to agree on a campus target building, jus-
tify its destruction, check out security, plan a time of attack,
then post a 3-foot duct tape cross prominently on the target,
poise in front of it for 5 minutes, record it in a photo or video,
and if not arrested, they had succeeded as effective terrorists.
Of course, life is not that simple for terrorists because
there are spies and counter-agents of the enemy. So in this
demonstration, the students were informed that some cells
might include spies—in fact, each of them had a fellow stu-
dent instructed to be a spy—collecting hard data on the cell
by means of concealed audio recordings or e-mails and simi-
lar tactics. That data were then turned over to the class TAs,
who would use it to intercept the terrorist plans before they
could be enacted. Half the cells effectively carried out their
mission, half failed. When the students shared their plans
with the rest of the class, the secret ingredient for success
was paranoia and total suspicion of every other cell member
Social psychologists study the behavior of individuals or
groups in the context of particular situations. Much re-
search in this area reveals how norms and social roles can
be major sources of situational influence. The Asch studies
demonstrated the powerful effect of the group to produce
conformity, even when the group is clearly wrong. Another
shocking demonstration of situational power came from
Stanley Milgram’s controversial experiments on obedience
11.1 How Does the Social Situation Affect
Our Behavior?
Core Concept 11.1 We usually adapt our behavior to the
demands of the social situation, and in new or ambiguous
situations, we take our cues from the behavior of others in
that setting.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER PROBLEM: What makes ordinary people
willing to harm other people, as they did in Milgram’s shocking
experiment?
• Individual behavior is influenced by situational factors more
than we recognize, for better or for worse, but awareness of
how they operate can fortify us against their negative power.
• Situations are also personal mental constructions as each of
creates subjective realities of the behavioral contexts around us,
and of the people we deal with in loving or hateful relationships.
• Most psychologists have largely ignored systematic forces, but
effective major behavioral change must include recognizing how
systems create and justify situations, which in turn can come to
exert power on our thinking, feeling and acting.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

chameleon effect (p. 465)
cohesiveness (p. 470)
conformity (p. 466)
diffusion of responsibility (p. 480)
dispositionism (p. 463)
groupthink (p. 470)
heroes (p. 475)
in-group (p. 482)
out-group (p. 482)
script (p. 464)
situationism (p. 463)
social neuroscience (p. 470)
social context (p. 461)
social norms (p. 464)
social psychology (p. 461)
social role (p. 463)
to authority. Situational influence can also lead to inaction:
The bystander studies showed that individuals are inhibited
by the number of bystanders, the ambiguity of the situation,
and their resultant perception of their social role and re-
sponsibility. Groupthink occurs even in the highest level of
government decision making, whereby smart people advo-
cate actions that may be disastrous by mindlessly following
the consensus of the group or its leader’s opinion. Heroes
are often ordinary people who take extraordinary action to
help others or oppose evil activities. We usually adapt our
behavior to the demands of the social situation, and in am-
biguous situations, we take our cues from the behavior of
others.
Asch effect (p. 466)
autokinetic effect (p. 469)
bystander intervention problem (p. 479)
11.2 Constructing Social Reality: What
Influences Our Judgments of Others?
Core Concept 11.2 The judgments we make about
others depend not only on their behavior but also on our
interpretation of their actions within a social context.
The situation, by itself, does not determine behavior. Rather,
it is our personal interpretation of the situation—our con-
structed social reality—that regulates behavior, including
our social interactions. Usually we are attracted to relation-
ships that we find rewarding, although there are exceptions,
predicted by expectancy-value theory and cognitive dissonance
theory. Attribution theory predicts that we will attribute
other people’s blunders to their traits or character (the funda-
mental attribution error) and our own to the situation (the self-
serving bias), although this tendency depends on one’s culture.
Healthy, loving relationships also demonstrate the social
construction of reality, because there are many kinds of love
and many cultural variations in the understanding and prac-
tice of love.
Prejudice and discrimination also demonstrate how we con-
struct our own social reality through such cognitive processes
as the perception of social distance and threats, the influ-
ence of media stereotypes, scapegoating, and dehumanization.
We are all vulnerable to stereotype threat that can have a
negative impact on our performance when we are made
aware that we belong to a group that does poorly on certain
tasks and tests.
The judgments we make about others depend not only on
their behavior but also on our interpretation of their actions
within a social context.
cognitive dissonance theory (p. 487)
dehumanization (p. 495)
discrimination (p. 493)
expectancy-value theory (p. 486)
fundamental attribution error (FAE) (p. 490)
matching hypothesis (p. 486)
prejudice (p. 493)
principle of proximity (p. 484)
reward theory of attraction (p. 484)
romantic love (p. 489)
scapegoating (p. 494)
self-disclosure (p. 485)
self-serving bias (p. 491)
similarity principle (p. 485)
social distance (p. 493)
social reality (p. 483)
stereotype threat (p. 497)
triangular theory of love (p. 489)
11.3 How Do Systems Create Situations
That Influence Behavior?
Core Concept 11.3 Systems shape situations, which in
turn affect behavior—and by understanding systems, we
can learn how to change them and modify their influences
around us.
Many studies in social psychology—particularly those dealing
with obedience and conformity—show that the power of the
situation can pressure ordinary people to commit horrible acts,
such as those of soldiers in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib Prison. Understand-
ing such complex behavior involves three levels of analysis: the
individual’s dispositions, the situation’s forces, and the power of
the system that creates and maintains specific situations.
The Stanford Prison Experiment put “good apples” in a
“bad barrel” for nearly a week to test the dispositional versus
Chapter Summary 511

512 C H A P T E R 1 1 Social Psychology
c. They were hostile toward each other and got nothing done.
d. They worked hard but acted aggressively toward each
other.
4. In Solomon Asch’s experiments, about what percent of partici-
pants went along with the group’s obviously mistaken judgment at
least once?
a. 70 percent c. 30 percent
b. 50 percent d. 90 percent
5. Before Stanley Milgram did his experiments on obedience, experts
were asked to predict the results. The experts
a. overestimated people’s willingness to administer shocks.
b. underestimated people’s willingness to administer shocks.
c. gave accurate estimates of people’s behavior.
d. believed most people would refuse to continue with the
experiment.
Watch the following videos by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the videos, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 19: THE POWER OF THE SITUATION
PROGRAM 20: CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL REALITY
Program Review
1. What do social psychologists study?
a. how people are influenced by other people
b. how people act in different societies
c. why some people are more socially successful than others
d. what happens to isolated individuals
2. What precipitated Kurt Lewin’s interest in leadership roles?
a. the rise of social psychology
b. the trial of Adolf Eichmann
c. Hitler’s ascent to power
d. the creation of the United Nations after World War II
3. In Lewin’s study, how did the boys behave when they had
autocratic leaders?
a. They had fun but got little accomplished.
b. They were playful and did motivated, original work.
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
situational explanations for the adverse outcomes. However,
what has been ignored is the system that generates such bad
barrels. Changing unacceptable behavior, such as bullying, dis-
crimination, or terrorism, requires understanding how to mod-
ify systems of power and the situations they create and sustain,
not just behavior modification of the individual actors.
Systems are complex structures embedded in a matrix of
cultural, historical, economic, political, and legal subsystems
that must be identified and changed if they generate illegal,
immoral, or unethical behavior.
Abu Ghraib Prison (p. 503)
bullying (p. 505)
Schlesinger Report (p. 504)
Stanford Prison Experiment (p. 500)
system power (p. 500)
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
as the political, cultural, economic and religious contributions
to creating this new role of someone becoming a terrorist.
One strategy of prevention is learning how to win the hearts
of minds of potential terrorist recruits away from violence
and toward becoming pro-social change agents to rectify
wrongs in their communities and nations.
Is Terrorism “a Senseless Act of Violence, Perpetrated by
Crazy Fanatics”?
Terrorism is a widespread global phenomenon likely to be
a permanent feature of the threats posed to nations by net-
works of individuals in an asymmetrical war. It is important
to understand terrorist acts as a psychological process as well

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 513
6. Which light did Milgram’s experiment shed on the behavior of
citizens in Nazi Germany?
a. Situational forces can bring about blind obedience.
b. Personal traits of individuals are most important in
determining behavior.
c. Cultural factors unique to Germany account for the rise of the
Nazis.
d. Human beings enjoy being cruel when they have the opportunity.
7. Which statement most clearly reflects the fundamental attribution
error?
a. Everyone is entitled to good medical care.
b. Ethical guidelines are essential to conducting responsible
research.
c. People who are unemployed are too lazy to work.
d. Everyone who reads about the Milgram experiment is shocked
by the results.
8. Why did the prison study conducted by Philip Zimbardo and his
colleagues have to be called off?
a. A review committee felt that it violated ethical guidelines.
b. It consumed too much of the students’ time.
c. The main hypothesis was supported, so there was no need to
continue.
d. The situation that had been created was too dangerous to
maintain.
9. How did Tom Moriarity get people on a beach to intervene during
a robbery?
a. by creating a human bond through a simple request
b. by reminding people of their civic duty to turn in criminals
c. by making the thief look less threatening
d. by providing a model of responsible behavior
10. Which leadership style tends to produce hard work when the leader
is watching but much less cooperation when the leader is absent?
a. authoritative c. democratic
b. autocratic d. laissez-faire
11. Typically, people who participated in Milgram’s study
a. appeared to relish the opportunity to hurt someone else.
b. objected but still obeyed.
c. refused to continue and successfully stopped the experiment.
d. came to recruit others into shocking the learner.
12. Psychologists refer to the power to create subjective realities as
the power of
a. social reinforcement. c. cognitive control.
b. prejudice. d. the Pygmalion effect.
13. When Jane Elliot divided her classroom of third graders into the
inferior brown-eyed people and the superior blue-eyed students,
what did she observe?
a. The students were too young to understand what was expected.
b. The students refused to behave badly toward their friends and
classmates.
c. The boys tended to go along with the categorization, but the
girls did not.
d. The blue-eyed students acted superior and were cruel to the
brown-eyed students who acted inferior.
14. In the research carried out by Robert Rosenthal and Lenore
Jacobson, what caused the performance of some students to
improve dramatically?
a. Teachers were led to expect such improvement and so changed
the way they treated these students.
b. These students performed exceptionally well on a special test
designed to predict improved performance.
c. Teachers gave these students higher grades because they knew
the researchers were expecting the improvement.
d. The students felt honored to be included in the experiment
and, therefore, were motivated to improve.
15. Robert Rosenthal demonstrated the Pygmalion effect in the class-
room by showing that teachers behave differently toward students
for whom they have high expectations in all of the following ways,
except
a. by punishing them more for goofing off.
b. by providing them with a warmer learning climate.
c. by teaching more to them than to the other students.
d. by providing more specific feedback when the student gives a
wrong answer.
16. What happens to low-achieving students in the “jigsaw
classroom”?
a. They tend to fall further behind.
b. They are given an opportunity to work at a lower level, thus
increasing the chance of success.
c. By becoming “experts,” they improve their performance and
their self-respect.
d. By learning to compete more aggressively, they become more
actively involved in their own learning.
17. When Robert Cialdini cites the example of the Hare Krishnas’
behavior in giving people at airports a flower or other small gift,
he is illustrating the principle of
a. commitment. c. scarcity.
b. reciprocity. d. consensus.
18. Salespeople might make use of the principle of scarcity by
a. filling shelves up with a product and encouraging consumers
to stock up.
b. claiming they have a hard time ordering the product.
c. imposing a deadline by which the consumer must make a
decision.
d. being difficult to get in touch with over the phone.
19. Nancy is participating in a bike-a-thon next month and is
having a large group of friends over to her house in order to
drum up sponsorships for the event. She is capitalizing on the
principle of
a. liking. c. commitment.
b. consensus. d. authority.
20. An appropriate motto for the principle of consensus would be
a. “I’ve reasoned it through.”
b. “I am doing it of my own free will.”
c. “It will be over quickly.”
d. “Everyone else is doing it.”

Psychological Disorders12
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
12.1 What Is Psychological Disorder?
Changing Concepts of Psychological
Disorder
Indicators of Abnormality
A Caution to Readers
The medical model views psychological
disorders as “diseases,” while the
psychological view sees them as an
interaction of biological, behavioral,
cognitive, developmental, and
social-cultural factors.
The Plea of Insanity
It’s not a psychological or psychiatric
term, and, contrary to popular opinion,
it is a seldom-used defense.
12.2 How Are Psychological Disorders
Classified in the DSM-IV ?
Overview of the DSM-IV Classification
System
Mood Disorders
Anxiety Disorders
Somatoform Disorders
Dissociative Disorders
Schizophrenia
Developmental Disorders
Personality Disorders
Adjustment Disorders and Other Conditions
Gender Differences in Mental Disorders
The DSM-IV, the most widely used
system for classifying mental disorders,
organizes them by their mental and
behavioral symptoms.
Shyness
If you have it, it doesn’t have to be
permanent. (And, by the way, it’s not a
mental disorder.)
Ideally, accurate diagnoses lead to
proper treatments, but diagnoses may
also become labels that depersonalize
individuals and ignore the social
and cultural contexts in which their
problems arise.
Using Psychology
to Learn Psychology
It will be tempting, but your authors
caution against using your new
knowledge of mental disorders to
diagnose your friends and family.
CHAPTER PROBLEM Is it possible to distinguish mental disorder from merely unusual behavior?
That is, are there specific signs that clearly indicate mental disorder?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Insane Places Revisited—Another Look at the Rosenhan Study
12.3 What Are the Consequences of
Labeling People?
Diagnostic Labels, Labeling, and
Depersonalization
The Cultural Context of Psychological
Disorder

515
T HE VOLUNTEERS KNEW THEY WERE ON THEIR OWN. IF THEY MANAGED to get admitted to the hospital, the five men and three women knew that they would be treated as mental patients, not observers. None had ever been diagnosed with a mental illness, but perhaps they were not so “normal” after all: Would a
normal person lie to get into such a place? In fact, all were collaborators in an experiment
designed to find out whether normality would be recognized in a mental hospital.
The experimenter, David Rosenhan—himself one of the pseudopatients—suspected that terms
such as sanity, insanity, schizophrenia, mental illness, and abnormal might have fuzzier boundar-
ies than the psychiatric community believed. He also suspected that some of the “abnormal” be-
haviors seen in mental patients might originate in the abnormal atmosphere of the mental hospital
rather than in the patients themselves. To test these ideas, Rosenhan and his collaborators decided
to see how mental hospital staff members would deal with patients who were, in fact, not mentally
ill. Could mental health professionals distinguish healthy people from those with mental disorders?
Individually, they applied for admission at different hospitals, complaining that they had
recently heard voices that seemed to say “empty,” “hollow,” and “thud.” Aside from this, they
claimed no other symptoms. All used false names, and the four who were mental health profes-
sionals gave false occupations—but, apart from these minor fibs, they answered all questions
truthfully. They even tried to act as normal as possible, although the prospect of entering the
alien hospital environment made them feel anxious. They also worried about not being admit-
ted and—worse yet—exposed as frauds. That concern vanished quickly, for all readily gained
admittance at 12 different hospitals (some did it twice). All but one was diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia, a major psychological disorder often accompanied by hearing imaginary voices.

516 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
After admission, the pseudopatients made no further claims that they heard voices or had
any other abnormal symptoms. Indeed, all wanted to be on their best behavior to gain release
as soon as possible. Their only apparent “deviance” involved taking notes on the experience—
at first privately and later publicly, when they found that the staff paid little attention. The
nursing records indicated that, when the staff did notice, they interpreted the note taking as
part of the patient’s illness. (One comment: “Patient engages in writing behavior.”)
For the most part, the patients found themselves ignored by the staff—even when they
asked for help or advice. But when the staff did interact with the patients, it was as though
the patients were simply “cases,” not persons. Consequently, it took an average of 19 days
for the pseudopatients to convince the hospital staff that they were ready for discharge,
despite the absence of abnormal symptoms. One unfortunate volunteer wasn’t released for
almost 2 months.
Two main findings from this classic study jarred the psychiatric community to its core.
First, no professional staff member at any of the hospitals ever realized that any of Rosen-
han’s pseudopatients was faking mental illness. Of course, the staff may have assumed that
the patients had been ill at the time of admission and had improved during their hospitaliza-
tion. But that possibility did not let the professionals off Rosenhan’s hook: Despite appar-
ently normal behavior, not one pseudopatient was ever labeled as “normal” or “well” while
in the hospital. And, on discharge, they were still seen as having schizophrenia—but “in
remission.”
Were the hospital staff members unskilled or unfeeling? Rosenhan didn’t think so. He
attributed their failure to perceive the pseudopatients’ behavior as normal to being occupied
with paperwork and other duties, leaving little time for observing and interacting with patients.
The design of the psychiatric wards also contributed to the problem: Staff members spent
most of their time in a glassed-in central office that patients called “the cage.” As Rosenhan
(1973a) said:
It could be a mistake, and a very unfortunate one, to consider that what happened to
us derived from malice or stupidity on the part of the staff. Quite the contrary, our over-
whelming impression of them was of people who really cared, who were committed and
who were uncommonly intelligent. Where they failed, as they sometimes did painfully, it
would be more accurate to attribute those failures to the environment in which they, too,
found themselves than to personal callousness. Their perceptions and behavior were
controlled by the situation (p. 257).
The mental hospital, then, became another example of a “sick” system that we discussed in
the previous chapter.
Could it be that the pseudopatients also got caught up in the system and weren’t behaving
as normally as they believed? Rosenhan noted: To everyone’s surprise, the hospital patients
readily detected the ruse, even though the professional staff did not. The pseudopatients re-
ported that the other patients regularly voiced their suspicions: “You’re not crazy. You’re a jour-
nalist or a professor. . . . You’re checking up on the hospital.” In his report of this experience,
entitled “On Being Sane in Insane Places,” Rosenhan (1973a) noted dryly: “The fact that the
patients often recognized normality when staff did not raises important questions” (p. 252).
You will hear the echo of these “important questions” as we critically examine the “medical
model” of mental disorder.
One of those questions, then, is the problem that threads through this chapter:
PROBLEM: Is it possible to distinguish mental disorder from merely unusual behavior?
That is, are there specific signs that clearly indicate mental disorder?
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 11
Social psychology has also
emphasized the power of both
the situation and the system to
influence behavior (p. 463).

What Is Psychological Disorder? 517
This chapter is organized around these two questions. As we discuss them, please note that
Rosenhan did not dispute the existence of psychological disorders. Rather, he raised questions
about clinical judgments made in the context of mental hospitals.
In fact, many people do experience the anguish of psychopathology (also called mental
disorder or mental illness). According to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH, 2010b),
more than 26 percent of the U.S. population—more than one in four Americans—are diagnosed
with mental health problems in a given year. For one in 17, it will be a mental illness of seri-
ous proportions, such as major depression or schizophrenia. Over their lifespans, an estimated
46 percent of Americans will be diagnosed with some psychological disorder (Butcher et al.,
2008). Again, Rosenhan was not suggesting that these conditions do not exist or do not exact
a horrendous toll in human suffering—just that it can be difficult to distinguish normality from
abnormality, particularly when we expect to see abnormality.
Rosenhan’s pseudopatient study caused a tremendous flap, and many psychiatrists and clini-
cal psychologists cried foul. Several ensuing responses in Science, the journal in which the study
had been published, accused Rosenhan of slipshod research and of damaging the reputation of the
mental health professions. Did they have a point? Was Rosenhan’s study flawed? Or was it simply
the cries of those who perceived Rosenhan’s study as a personal attack? We will take a close look
at these issues in the Critical Thinking Applied section at the end of the chapter. In the meantime,
let’s explore the problem of determining what mental disorder is and how it might be identified.
12.1 KEY QUESTION
What Is Psychological Disorder?
On the world stage, the picture of psychopathology is sobering. According to the
World Health Organization, some 450 million people around the globe have mental
disorders, with a large proportion living in poor countries that have no mental health
care system (Miller, 2006d). Depression, for example, causes more disability among
people aged 15 to 44 than any other condition except HIV/AIDS. In the United States,
nearly half of all households have someone seeking treatment for a mental problem
(Chamberlin, 2004).
Yet, as Rosenhan’s study suggests, distinguishing “normal” from “abnormal” is not
always a simple task. Consider, for example, how you would classify such eccentric
personalities as Lady Gaga and Russell Brand. And what about a soldier who risks his
or her life in combat: Is that “normal”? Or does a grief-stricken woman have a psy-
chological disorder if she is unable to return to her normal routine 6 months after her
husband has died?
Clinicians look for three classic symptoms of severe psychopathology: hallucina-
tions, delusions, and extreme affective disturbances. Hallucinations are false sensory
experiences, such as hearing nonexistent voices or “seeing things.” You may recall that
that Rosenhan’s pseudopatients claimed to have hallucinations in the form of voices
saying, “empty,” “hollow,” and “thud.” By contrast, delusions involve troublesome
irrational beliefs. For example, if you think you are the president of the United States
(and you are not), or if you think people are out to “get” you (and they are not), you
probably have a delusional disorder. The third classic symptom, affective disturbances
are disorders of emotion or affect. Accordingly, a person who characteristically feels
depressed, anxious, or manic may have an affective disorder.
Beyond such extreme signs of distress, the experts do not always agree. What quali-
fies as abnormal becomes a judgment call, a judgment made more difficult because
no sharp boundary separates normal from abnormal thought and behavior. It may
be helpful to think of psychological disorder as part of a continuum ranging from the
absence of disorder to severe disorder, as shown in Table 12.1. The big idea here is
that people with psychological disorders are not in a class by themselves. Rather, their
disorders are an exaggeration of normal responses.
psychopathology Any pattern of emotions,
behaviors, or thoughts inappropriate to the situation
and leading to personal distress or the inability to
achieve important goals. Other terms having
essentially the same meaning include mental illness,
mental disorder, and psychological disorder.
hallucination A false sensory experience that
may suggest mental disorder. Hallucinations can have
other causes, such as drugs or sensory isolation.
delusion An extreme disorder of thinking, involving
persistent false beliefs. Delusions are the hallmark of
paranoid disorders.
affective disturbances Disorders of emotion
or mood.

518 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Hippocrates’ humor theory was a
theory of temperaments (p. 420).
In this section of the chapter, we will focus on two contrasting views of psychopa-
thology. One, coming to us from medicine, is sometimes called the “medical model.”
It portrays mental problems as akin to physical disorders: as sickness or disease. The
other view, a psychological view, sees psychological disorders as the result of multiple
factors that can involve both nature and nurture. As our Core Concept puts it:
Core Concept 12.1
The medical model views psychological disorders as “diseases,” while
the psychological view sees them as an interaction of biological,
behavioral, cognitive, developmental, and social-cultural factors.
No matter how we conceptualize psychopathology, nearly everyone agrees that psy-
chological disorder is common, touching the daily lives of millions. Mental disorder
can be insidious, working its way into thoughts and feelings, diminishing its victims’
emotional and physical well-being, along with personal and family relationships. And
it can create an enormous financial burden through lost productivity, lost wages, and
high costs of treatment. But, the way we think of psychopathology also has a conse-
quence: As we will see, how we conceptualize psychopathology determines how we
treat it—whether with drugs, charms, rituals, talk, torture, brain surgery, hospitaliza-
tion, or commitment to an “insane asylum.”
Changing Concepts of Psychological Disorder
In the ancient world, people assumed that supernatural powers were everywhere,
accounting for good fortune, disease, and disaster. In this context, they perceived psy-
chopathology as a sign that demons and spirits had taken possession of a person’s
mind and body (Sprock & Blashfield, 1991). If you had been living in this ancient
world, your daily routine would have included rituals aimed at outwitting or placating
these supernatural beings.
In about 400 b.c., the Greek physician Hippocrates took humanity’s first step
toward a scientific view of mental disorder by declaring that abnormal behavior
has physical causes. As we saw in Chapter 10, Hippocrates taught his disciples to
interpret the symptoms of psychopathology as an imbalance among four body fluids
called “humors”: blood, phlegm (mucus), black bile, and yellow bile. Those with
an excess of black bile, for example, were inclined to melancholy or depression,
TABLE 12.1 The Spectrum of Mental Disorder
Mental disorder occurs on a spectrum that ranges from the absence of signs of pathology to severe
disturbances, such as are found in major depression or schizophrenia. The important point is that
there is no sharp distinction that divides those with mental disorders from those who are “normal.”
No Disorder Mild Disorder Moderate Disorder Severe Disorder
Absence of signs of
psychological disorder
Few signs of distress
or other indicators of
psychological disorder
Indicators of disorder
are more pronounced
and occur more
frequently
Clear signs of
psychological disorder,
which dominate the
person’s life
Absence of behavior
problems
Few behavior
problems; responses
usually appropriate to
the situation
More distinct behavior
problems; behavior is
often inappropriate to
the situation
Severe and frequent
behavior problems;
behavior is usually
inappropriate to the
situation
No problems with
interpersonal
relationships
Few difficulties with
relationships
More frequent
difficulties with
relationships
Many poor
relationships or lack
of relationships with
others

What Is Psychological Disorder? 519
while those who had an abundance of blood were sanguine or warm-hearted. With
this simple but revolutionary idea, Hippocrates incorporated mental disorders
into medicine, and his view—that mental problems had natural, not supernatural,
causes—influenced educated people in the Western world until the end of the
Roman Empire.
In the Middle Ages, superstition eclipsed the Hippocratic model of mental disorder.
Under the influence of the medieval Church, physicians and clergy reverted to the old
ways of explaining abnormality in terms of demons and witchcraft. In these harsh
times, the belief that Satan incited unusual behavior heaped fuel on the fires of the In-
quisition. The “cure” involved attempts to drive out the demons that possessed the un-
fortunate victim’s soul—literally, “beating the Devil” out of the supposedly possessed.
As a result, thousands of mentally tormented people were tortured and executed all
across Europe.
As late as 1692, the medieval view of mental disorder led
frightened colonists in Massachusetts to convict and execute a
number of their fellow citizens for witchcraft (Karlsen, 1998).
What frightened them? A group of young girls had unexplained
“fits” that neighbors interpreted as the result of witchcraft. A
modern analysis of the witch trials has concluded that the girls
were probably suffering from poisoning by a fungus growing
on rye grain—the same fungus that produces the hallucinogenic
drug LSD (Caporeal, 1976; Matossian, 1982, 1989).
The Medical Model In the latter part of the 18th century, the
“disease” view that had originated with Hippocrates re-emerged
with the rise of science. The resulting medical model held that
mental disorders are diseases of the mind that, like ordinary
physical diseases, have objective causes and require specific treat-
ments. People began to perceive individuals with psychological
problems as sick (suffering from illness) rather than as immoral
or demon-possessed.
And what a difference a new theory made! Treating mental diseases by torture and
abuse made no sense. The new view of mental illness brought human reforms that
called for placing the “insane” in protective “asylums.” In this supportive atmosphere,
many patients actually improved—even thrived—on rest, contemplation, and simple
but useful work (Maher & Maher, 1985). Unfortunately, political pressures eventu-
ally turned the initially therapeutic asylums into overcrowded warehouses of neglected
patients.
Despite such problems, the revived medical model was unquestionably an improve-
ment over the old demon model. Nevertheless, modern psychologists think that we are
ready for yet another revolutionary change in perspective. In their view, the medical
model has shortcomings of its own.
Psychologists argue that the assumption of “disease” leads to a doctor-knows-best
approach, in which the therapist takes all the responsibility for diagnosing the illness
and prescribing treatment. Under this “disease” assumption, the patient may become
a passive recipient of medication and advice rather than an active participant in treat-
ment. And, in fact, we see many mental patients today who are treated simply by the
dispensing of pills. Psychologists believe that this attitude wrongly encourages depen-
dency on the doctor, encourages unnecessary drug therapy, and does little to help the
patient develop good coping skills and healthy behaviors.
Incidentally, a doctor-knows-best approach also makes mental illness a medical
problem, taking responsibility (and business) away from psychologists and giving it to
psychiatrists. Psychologists understandably bristle at the medical model’s implication
that their treatment of mental “diseases” should be done by physicians or under the
supervision of physicians. In effect, the medical model assigns psychologists to second-
class professional status. As you can see, ownership of the whole territory of psycho-
logical disorder is hotly contested.
medical model The view that mental disorders
are diseases that, like ordinary physical diseases,
have objective physical causes and require specific
treatments.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Psychiatrists, but not
psychologists, are trained in
medicine (p. 6).
A painting of the witchcraft trials held in
Salem, Massachusetts, in 1692. Twenty
people were executed before the hysteria
subsided.
Asylum: A History of
the Mental Institution in America
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

520 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
Psychological Models What does psychology have to offer in place of the medical
model? Most clinical psychologists have now turned to combinations of psychologi-
cal perspectives that derive from behaviorism, cognitive psychology, developmental
psychology, social learning, and biological psychology.
Psychological Alternatives to the Medical Model Modern psychologists agree with
proponents of the medical model that biology can influence mental disorder. A biological
perspective is certainly required to account for the genetic influences we see in schizo-
phrenia, the anxiety disorders, mental retardation, and many other conditions. But psy-
chological alternatives to the medical model also take into account behavioral, cognitive,
developmental, and social-cultural factors that the medical perspective tends to neglect.
The behavioral perspective looks outward, emphasizing the influence of the envi-
ronment. Thus, behavioral psychology tells us that many abnormal behaviors can be
acquired in the same way that we learn healthy behaviors—through behavioral learn-
ing. This view helps us focus on the environmental conditions that maintain abnormal
behaviors: rewards, punishments, and contingencies. For example, the behavioral per-
spective would suggest that a fear of public speaking could result from a humiliating
public speaking experience and subsequent avoidance of any opportunity to develop
and be reinforced for public speaking skills.
In contrast, the cognitive perspective looks inward, emphasizing mental processes,
including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and memory. Cognitive psychology focuses
on such questions as these: Do people believe that they have control over their own
lives (an internal or external locus of control)? How do they cope with threat and
stress? Do they regularly experience troublesome emotions, such as depression or
anxiety?
As we saw in the chapter on learning, social-learning theorists and others have built
bridges that link these two perspectives. Both sides of that divide now acknowledge that
cognition and behavior usually occur in a social context, requiring a social perspective.
Through that lens, a psychologist might ask about a client’s social support system, as
well as social sources of stress on the job, at school, or from family and friends.
Albert Bandura typifies those who combine the social, behavioral, and cognitive
perspectives: His concept of reciprocal determinism suggests that behavior, cogni-
tion, and social/environmental factors all mutually influence each other through social
learning, behavioral learning, and cognitive learning. Thus, a fear of public speak-
ing, for example, could have its origins in social learning when you heard people talk
about “stage fright” and their anxiety about public speaking. Against that backdrop,
then, you may have had an unpleasant behavioral learning experience in which people
laughed at you while you were making a speech. That experience, in turn, could easily
make you view yourself as “a poor public speaker”—as a result of cognitive learning.
A result of this chain of social learning, behavioral learning, and cognitive learning—in
which each step reciprocally reinforces the others—is the idea that public speaking is
fear-producing experience.
Likewise, a developmental perspective looks for deviations from the expected pattern
of biological and psychological development. Did the child begin to use language during
the second year of life? Does the person have a functional theory of mind that allows her
to understand other people’s thoughts and intentions? Is emotional control appropriate
to age? Such questions help the clinician identify and treat developmental disorders such
as autism and mental retardation.
The Biopsychology of Mental Disorder Although most psychologists have reservations about
the medical model, they do not deny the influence of biology on thought and behavior.
An explosion of recent research in neuroscience confirms the role of the brain as a com-
plex organ whose mental functions depend on a delicate balance of chemicals and neural
circuits that are continually modified by our experiences. Genetic influences, brain injury,
stress, and infection are still other factors that can tip the biological balance toward psy-
chopathology (see Figure 12.1). Thus, modern biopsychology assumes that many mental
disturbances involve not only cognitive, behavioral, developmental, and social-cultural
factors but also the brain and nervous system (Insel, 2010).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Contingencies involve the timing
and frequency of rewards and
punishments (p. 144).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Reciprocal determinism is a
part of Bandura’s social learning
theory (p. 443).
The biological perspective is one of sev-
eral alternatives to the medical model.
Others include the behavioral perspective,
cognitive perspective, social perspective,
and developmental perspective.
Cognition
Behavior
Environment
Reciprocal determinism is the process
by which our cognitions, behaviors, and
environments mutually influence each
other.

What Is Psychological Disorder? 521
On the heredity front, the Human Genome Project has specified
the complete human genetic package. Many psychologists see this
accomplishment as a ripe opportunity for specialists in behavioral
genetics who are searching for genes associated with specific men-
tal disorders (NIMH, 2003b). But the search won’t be easy. So far,
suspicious genetic abnormalities have been linked to schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders, and autism, yet their exact roles
in these conditions remain unclear. Most experts believe that such
disorders are likely to result from multiple genes interacting with
environmental factors, such as toxins, infections, or stressful events.
Watch the news for further developments.
But let us be clear about the role of biology in mental disorder:
Whatever neuroscience discovers in the future, biology will never
account for everything. Our thoughts and behaviors are always a
product of nature and nurture—biology and experience. And, as we will see in our dis-
cussion of stress, the way we think and feel can actually influence our biological being,
including the very structure of the brain itself.
Indicators of Abnormality
While clinicians sometimes disagree about the etiology (causes) of psychological disor-
ders, they usually agree broadly on the indicators, or signs, of abnormality (Rosenhan &
Seligman, 1995). What are these indicators? Earlier we noted that hallucinations, delu-
sions, and extreme affective disturbances are signs of severe mental disorder. But many
psychological problems don’t reveal themselves so obviously. Accordingly, clinicians
also look for the following more subtle signs that can indicate psychological distur-
bances (see also Table 12.1):
• Distress. Does the individual show unusual or prolonged levels of unease or
anxiety? Almost anyone will get nervous before an important test, but when one
is so overwhelmed with unpleasant emotions that concentration for long periods
becomes impossible, it becomes a sign of abnormality.
• Maladaptiveness. Does the person regularly act in ways that make others fearful
or that interfere with his or her well-being? We can see this, for example, in
someone who drinks so heavily that she or he cannot hold down a job or drive a
car without endangering others.
• Irrationality. Does the person act or talk in ways that are irrational or even incom-
prehensible to others? A woman who converses with her long-dead sister, whose
voice she hears in her head, is behaving irrationally. Likewise, behaviors or emo-
tional responses that are inappropriate to the situation, such as laughing at the
scene of a tragedy, show irrational loss of contact with one’s social environment.
• Unpredictability. Does the individual behave erratically and inconsistently at dif-
ferent times or from one situation to another, as if experiencing a loss of control?
For example, a child who suddenly bursts into tears or smashes his toys with no
apparent provocation is behaving unpredictably. Similarly, an employer who treats
her staff compassionately one day and abusively the next is acting unpredictably.
• Unconventionality and undesirable behavior. Does the person behave in ways that are
statistically rare and violate social norms of what is legally or morally acceptable
or desirable? Being merely “unusual” is not a sign of abnormality—so feel free
to dye your hair red and green for Christmas. But if you decide to go beyond the
bounds of social acceptability, say by painting yourself red and green and strolling
naked in the mall at Christmastime, that would be considered a little abnormal.
Is the presence of just one indicator enough to demonstrate abnormality? It’s a judg-
ment call. Clinicians feel more confidence in labeling behavior as “abnormal” when
they see two or more signs of abnormality. (You will remember that the pseudopatients
in Rosenhan’s study presented only one symptom: hearing voices.) The more extreme
Genetics
Brain injury
Toxins
Infections
Experience/Learning
Stress
Brain circuits
Neurotransmitters
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
FIGURE 12.1
The Biopsychology of Mental Disorder
An explosion of research in neuroscience
implicates a host of possible biological
factors in psychopathology.
Source: Created by author
Behaviors that make other people feel
uncomfortable or threatened may be a
sign of abnormality.

522 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
and numerous the indicators, the more confident psychologists can be about identify-
ing an abnormal condition. On the other hand, none of these criteria apply to all forms
of disorder, as you will see.
While the presence of these indicators may suggest abnormality, the clinician still
must decide which disorder it is. This can be difficult, because psychopathology takes
many forms. Some diagnoses may have a familiar ring: depression, phobia, and panic
disorder. You may be less well acquainted with others, such as conversion disorder or
borderline personality disorder. In all, you will find some 300 specific varieties of psy-
chopathology described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(4th edition), known by clinicians and researchers as the DSM-IV (“DSM-four”). Even
though it has a strong medical-model bias, mental health professionals of all back-
grounds use this volume to diagnose psychopathology. So influential is this DSM-IV sys-
tem that we will devote the entire middle portion of this chapter to an explanation of it.
A Caution to Readers
As you read about the symptoms of psychological disorder, you may begin to wonder
about your own mental health. All students studying abnormal psychology face this
hazard. To see what we mean, please answer the following questions, which are based
on the indicators of abnormality discussed earlier:
1. Have you had periods of time when you felt “blue” for no apparent reason? (an
indicator of distress)
2. Have you ever gone to a party on a night when you knew you should be studying?
(an indicator of maladaptiveness)
3. Have you had an experience in which you thought you heard or saw something
that wasn’t really there? (an indicator of irrationality)
4. Have you had a flash of temper in which you said something that you later regret-
ted? (an indicator of unpredictability)
5. Have you had unusual thoughts that you told no one about? (an indicator of
unconventionality)
6. Have you made someone fearful or distressed because of something you said or
did? (another indicator of maladaptiveness)
The fact is that almost everyone will answer “yes” to at least one—and perhaps all—of
these questions. Yet this does not necessarily mean abnormality. Whether you are or
anyone else is normal or abnormal is a matter of degree and frequency—and clinical
judgment.
So, as we take a close look at specific psychological disorders in the next section
of the chapter, you will most likely find some symptoms that you have experienced. So
will your classmates. (A similar problem is common among medical students, who be-
gin to notice that they, too, have symptoms of the physical diseases they learn about.)
You should realize that this is normal. Another reason, of course, that you may see
yourself in this chapter arises from the fact that no sharp line separates psychopathol-
ogy from normalcy. Psychological disorders involve exaggerations of normal tenden-
cies. We are not suggesting that concerns about psychological disorder should be taken
lightly, however. If, after reading this chapter, you suspect that you may have a prob-
lem, you should discuss it with a professional.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
The Plea of Insanity
Now, let’s look at a closely related issue: the plea of insanity. What is your opinion:
Does the insanity plea excuse criminal behavior and put thousands of dangerous
people back on the streets? Let’s take a critical look at the history and the facts.

What Is Psychological Disorder? 523
In 1843, Daniel M’Naughten, a deranged woodcutter from Glasgow, Scotland,
thought he had received “instructions from God” to kill the British prime minister,
Robert Peel. Fortunately for Peel, this would-be assassin struck down his secretary
by mistake. Apprehended and tried, M’Naughten was found “not guilty by reason of
insanity.” The court reasoned that M’Naughten’s mental condition prevented him from
knowing right from wrong. The public responded with outrage. Fast-forwarding 138
years, a similarly outraged public decried the modern-day insanity ruling involving John
Hinckley, Jr., the young man who shot and wounded then-President Ronald Reagan. Such
infamous cases have molded a low public opinion of the insanity defense. The citizenry
blames psychologists and psychiatrists for clogging the courts with insanity pleas,
allowing homicidal maniacs back on the streets, and letting criminals go to hospitals
for “treatment” instead of prisons for punishment. But this public image of insanity
rests on several mistaken assumptions.
For one, “insanity” appears nowhere among the DSM-IV listing of disorders recog-
nized by psychologists and psychiatrists. Technically, insanity is neither a psychological
nor psychiatric term. Rather, it is a legal term, which only a court—not psychologists or
psychiatrists—can officially apply. By law in most states, insanity can include
not only psychosis but also jealous rage, mental retardation, and a wide vari-
ety of other conditions in which a person might not be able to control his or
her behavior or distinguish right from wrong (Mercado, 2006; Thio, 1995).
So, why can we not simply abolish the laws that allow this technical-
ity? The answer to that question turns on the definition of a crime. Le-
gally, holding a person responsible for a crime requires that two criteria
be met: (a) the person must have committed an illegal act (just wanting
to commit a crime is not enough) and (b) the person must have intention-
ally done so. Merely wishing your boss dead is no crime (because you
committed no illegal act). Neither is running over your boss accidentally
when he steps in front of your moving car in the parking lot. But if you
plan to run down the dastardly dude and then actually do so, you have
committed an intentional and illegal act—and the courts can convict you
of murder. From these examples, you can see why no one wants to give
up the legal requirement of intent. But you can also see why an exception
for intent leaves the door open for the controversial plea of insanity.
With these things in mind, take a moment to recall your estimate of
the percentage of accused criminals who use the insanity plea. (See the
accompanying Do It Yourself! box.) In reality, accused criminals use the
insanity defense far less often than the public realizes. In actuality, it occurs
in less than 1 percent of criminal cases, and of this tiny number, only a fraction are
successful (Chiaccia, 2007), although we would note that it has been tried unsuccess-
fully in several famous murder cases, including those of David Birkowitz, Ted Bundy,
Charles Manson, John Wayne Gacey, Jeffrey Dahmer, and Dan White (infamous for
the “Twinkie defense,” claiming that a diet of sugary foods had made him homicidal).
To repeat: The insanity defense was not successful in any of those cases.
Still, the public has concern about abuses of the insanity plea. And the outcry has
led several states to experiment with alternatives. One promising alternative would
require separate verdicts on the act and the intent, allowing a jury to reach a verdict of
“guilty but mentally ill” (Savitsky & Lindblom, 1986).
insanity A legal term, not a psychological or
psychiatric one, referring to a person who is unable,
because of a mental disorder or defect, to conform his
or her behavior to the law.
The plea of insanity is rare—and it is
usually unsuccessful.
THE INSANITY PLEA: HOW BIG IS THE PROBLEM?
plea of insanity in court: percent.
You will find the correct answer in the
Psychology Matters section that follows. (An
answer within 10 percent indicates that you
have an exceptionally clear grasp of reality!)
Hint: Research shows that the public has
an exaggerated impression of the problem.
How often is the plea of insanity used?
Before you read about the insanity defense
in the next part of the chapter, try to guess
the approximate percentage of accused
criminals in the United States who use a

524 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
12.2 KEY QUESTION
How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV?
In much the same way a bookstore organizes its collection by themes (mystery,
romance, etc.), the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.)
brings order to the universe of psychopathology by placing some 300 mental disor-
ders into just a few diagnostic categories. We will explore the most important of these
categories in this chapter.
Usually called simply the DSM-IV, this manual represents the most widely used sys-
tem for classifying psychopathology. It is important to note that the DSM-IV does
not classify most disorders by cause, since the causes of most mental disorders remain
either unknown or in dispute. Instead, as our Core Concept states:
Core Concept 12.2
The DSM-IV, the most widely used system for classifying mental
disorders, organizes them by their mental and behavioral symptoms.
We will follow the lead of the DSM-IV in this chapter. But with more than 300 disor-
ders described in that volume, it would be impossible to cover all of them here. There-
fore, we will focus this chapter on those you are most likely to encounter either in daily
life or in the study of psychopathology in more advanced courses.
Overview of the DSM-IV Classification System
The DSM-IV has two great virtues. First, it lays out specific criteria for diagnosing
each of the 3001 mental disorders. And second, it gives practitioners a common lan-
guage for the description of psychopathology. Even though the manual was developed
primarily by psychiatrists, its terminology has been adopted by clinicians of all stripes,
including psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. In addition, most health
insurance companies use DSM-IV standards in determining what treatments they will
pay for—a fact that gives this manual enormous economic clout.
DSM-IV The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by
the American Psychiatric Association; the most widely
accepted psychiatric classification system in the
United States.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: How did Rosenhan go about studying the way
psychiatrists diagnose mental disorders?
2. RECALL: What are the three classic symptoms of severe mental
disorder?
3. ANALYSIS: Consider the symptoms presented by the pseudopatients
in Rosenhan’s study. To what cause would their hallucinations have
probably been attributed by (a) Hippocrates, (b) a physician or priest
in the Middle Ages, and (c) a physician in the 1800s?
4. RECALL: Approximately how often do psychologists diagnose
criminals as being insane? How often is the plea of insanity used in
criminal cases in the United States?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Give an example
of what a psychologist might look for in attempting to understand
a person’s mental disorder—but that a psychiatrist using the
“medical model” would probably not explore.
Answers 1. He arranged for mentally healthy volunteers to request admission to mental hospitals, based on the assertion that they had been hearing
voices. Rosenhan interpreted their success (all were admitted) as an indicator that psychiatric diagnoses are not reliable. 2. Hallucinations,
delusions, and severe affective disturbances are the classic symptoms of severe mental disorder. 3. (a) Hippocrates would have said that the
hallucinations stemmed from a physical cause, most likely an imbalance in the four humors. (b) A medieval physician or priest would probably have
attributed hallucinations to demon possession. (c) A physician in the 1800s would have attributed the symptoms to a disease—much as Hippocrates
would have done. 4. Psychologists do not diagnose people as sane or insane: Those are legal terms. In U.S. courts, the plea of insanity is used in less
than 1 percent of criminal cases—most often unsuccessfully. 5. A psychologist might look for many social, cognitive, and behavioral factors, such as
the family environment (social), attention for disturbing behavior (behavioral), or locus of control (cognitive).
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 525
The fourth edition of the DSM, published in 1994 and revised in 2000, brought
with it some big changes, and the fifth edition, due in 2013, promises even more
(American Psychiatric Association, 2010). In particular, the DSM-IV banished the term
neurosis from the official language of psychiatry (although you will frequently hear
the term used in more casual conversation). Originally, a neurosis or neurotic disorder
was conceived of as a relatively common pattern of subjective distress or self-defeating
behavior that did not show signs of brain abnormalities or grossly irrational thinking.
In short, a “neurotic” was someone who might be unhappy or dissatisfied but not con-
sidered dangerously ill or out of touch with reality. In the DSM-IV, the term neurosis
has been dropped. So, for example, “obsessive–compulsive neurosis” is now simply
obsessive–compulsive disorder.
Similarly, psychosis was thought to differ from neurosis in both the quality and severity
of symptoms. Clinicians no longer conceive of psychosis as a more severe form of neurosis
but as a profoundly distinct condition. The DSM-IV now reserves the term psychotic mainly
for disorders that involve loss of contact with reality, such as we see in schizophrenia.
As you may have surmised from its origins in psychiatry, the DSM-IV has close
ties to the medical model of mental illness. Its language is the language of medicine—
symptoms, syndromes, diagnoses, and diseases—and its final form is a curious mixture
of science and tradition. (Note: It contains no diagnosis of “normal.”)
Unlike early versions of the manual, which had a distinctly Freudian flavor, the
DSM-IV manages, for the most part, to avoid endorsing theories of cause or treatment.
It also differs from early versions of the DSM by giving extensive and specific descrip-
tions of the symptoms of each disorder. So, while the DSM-IV has its critics, the need
for a common language of psychological disorder has brought it wide acceptance. In
fact, acceptance has been so wide that some critics complain of the “Americanization
of mental illness”—the notion that the DSM-IV view of mental disorder assumes that
mental disorders are the same the world around, regardless of culture (Watters, 2010).
Five-Dimensional Diagnosis: The Multiaxial System At the heart of the DSM-IV
is a multiaxial system requiring assessment on five “axes,” or dimensions of patient
functioning. The primary diagnosis is usually on Axis I, which specifies the particular
clinical disorder affecting the patient. Examples include major depression, panic disor-
der, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Descriptions on the other four axes, then, typi-
cally describe the context in which the Axis I disorder occurs.
Axis II specifies any long-standing problems, such as the personality disorders and
the developmental disorders. Likewise, a diagnosis on Axis III specifies any relevant
medical problems, such as a stroke or dementia. Axis IV reminds the clinician to note
any psychosocial or environmental issues that may affect the patient’s functioning—
issues such as divorce, death of a loved one, loss of a job, homelessness, legal prob-
lems, or exposure to a disaster. Finally, Axis V calls for an overall assessment of the
patient on the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale. This assessment may
range from a high score of 100 (the total absence of symptoms) to a low of 1 (severe
impairment that poses a danger to self or others).
The multiaxial system, therefore, gives the clinician a way to diagnose the patient’s
specific disorder and the context in which it occurs. In effect, it requires five separate
diagnoses. Here’s an example of a multiaxial diagnosis for a single patient:
Axis I Major Depressive Disorder
Axis II Narcissistic Personality Disorder
Axis III Chronic lumbar pain, hypothyroidism
Axis IV Recently divorced, unemployed
Axis IV GAF = 65
Controversy Surrounding the DSM-IV Many clinicians have reservations about the
DSM-IV system. For one thing, the DSM-IV classifies disorders by symptoms, not by
underlying causes—as we have said. In fact, there are no objective laboratory-style
neurosis Before the DSM-IV, this term was used as
a label for subjective distress or self-defeating behav-
ior that did not show signs of brain abnormalities or
grossly irrational thinking.
psychosis A disorder involving profound distur-
bances in perception, rational thinking, or affect.
Explore the Concept
at MyPsychLab
Axes
of the DSM

526 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
tests for any of the primary disorders—so every DSM-IV diagnosis relies on subjective
clinical judgment.
Another issue involves the “all-or-nothing” nature of a DSM-IV diagnosis: Many
psychologists feel that mental disorders are not distinct categories. Instead, they see
them as exaggerations of normal functioning. In this view, we all fall somewhere
on the schizophrenic spectrum—and also on the spectra of autism, phobia, and
paranoia.
And finally, many psychologists are uncomfortable with the idea of mental disor-
ders being conceptualized as “diseases” and incorporated into the medical model. They
believe that many mental disorders are not medical conditions at all but rather behav-
ior patterns that have been learned. Some mental “illnesses” might even be a normal
response to an abnormal environment.
Despite these points of dispute, most clinicians do use the DSM-IV system because
it standardizes the criteria for diagnosing mental disorders. Moreover, it offers the only
system accepted by most insurance companies in the United States—a powerful incen-
tive for clinicians to go along with a framework widely acknowledged to be imperfect.
With these advantages and disadvantages in mind, then, let us now turn to a sam-
pling of disorders described on Axes I and II of the DSM-IV. A look at the chart in the
margin next to our discussion of each of the major diagnostic categories will give you
an overview of the scheme the manual uses to classify these disorders. We begin with
those that involve sustained extremes of emotion: the mood disorders, also known as
affective disorders.
Mood Disorders
Who has never played on a losing team, fallen in love, or had some terrifying experi-
ence? Everyone experiences occasional strong, even unpleasant, emotional reactions.
Emotional highs and lows are part of our everyday lives and a normal part of our
interpretation of the world. However, when moods careen out of control, soaring
to extreme elation or plunging to deep depression, the diagnosis will probably be
one of the mood disorders. The clinician will also suspect a mood disorder when an
individual’s emotions are consistently inappropriate to the situation. Here we will
discuss the two best-known of these affective disturbances, major depression and
bipolar disorder.
Major Depression If you fail an important examination, lose a job, or lose a love, it
is normal to feel depressed for a while. If a close friend dies, it is also normal to feel
depressed. But if these feelings remain for weeks or months, long after the depressing
event has passed, then you may have the clinically significant condition called major
depression or major depressive disorder—among the commonest of all major mental
disturbances.
Novelist William Styron (1990) wrote movingly about his own experience with
severe depression: The pain he endured convinced him that clinical depression is much
more than a bad mood. This sort of depression does not give way to periods of manic
excitement or euphoria. Nor does it let its victims escape in sleep, because insomnia so
commonly multiplies the suffering of depression (Harvey, 2008).
Incidence Psychologist Martin Seligman (1973, 1975) has called depression the “com-
mon cold” of psychological problems. In the United States, it accounts for the majority
of all mental hospital admissions. Depression is also the stuff of “the blues”—so com-
mon that it has produced a whole genre of music. And even if you have not, at some
time, known major depression, chances are that you have experienced a milder form
that clinicians call dysthymia. Even so, many clinicians believe depression, in both
mild and severe forms, to be underdiagnosed and undertreated (Kessler et al., 2003;
Robins et al., 1991).
The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (2006) estimates that depression
costs Americans about $83 billion each year, including the costs of hospitalization,
mood disorder Abnormal disturbance in emotion
or mood, including bipolar disorder and unipolar disor-
der. Mood disorders are also called affective disorders.
major depression A form of depression that
does not alternate with mania.
c Mood Disorders: Extremes of mood,
from mania to depression
• Major depression
• Bipolar disorder

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 527
therapy, and lost productivity. But the human cost cannot be measured in dollars.
Countless people in the throes of depression may feel worthless, lack appetite, withdraw
from friends and family, have difficulty sleeping, lose their jobs, and become agitated or
lethargic. In severe cases, they may also have psychotic distortions of reality. You can
give yourself a quick evaluation for signs of depression in the box, Do It Yourself!
A Depression Check.
Most worrisome of all, suicide claims one in 50 people with depression (Bostwick &
Pankratz, 2000). Significantly, a person with depression faces a significant risk of sui-
cide both on the way down in a depressive episode and on the upswing. In fact, the risk
of suicide is greater during these swings of mood than during the deepest phase of the
depressive cycle. Why? Because, in the depths of depressive despair, a person may have
no energy or will to do anything, much less carry out a plan for suicide. Other factors
may compound the risk as well. Abuse of alcohol or other drugs, for example, multi-
plies the likelihood of suicide, as do poor impulse control, chronic physical diseases,
and certain brain abnormalities (Ezzell, 2003; Springen, 2010).
Incidentally, your authors advise that a suicide threat always be taken seriously,
even though you may think it is just a bid for attention—and even if you see no
other signs of depression. But don’t try to treat it yourself. You should direct any
person who suggests he or she is thinking about suicide to a competent professional
for help.
Cross-Cultural Comparisons Studies reveal depression as the single most prevalent
form of disability around the globe (Holden, 2000a), although the incidence of major
depression varies widely, as Table 12.2 shows. In fairness, we should note a minority
view holding that the diagnosis of depression is overused, because clinicians attach
the label to people having a normal reaction to misfortune and because drug compa-
nies relentlessly push pills as the answer to life’s unhappiness (Andrews & Thompson,
2009, 2010).
While some of the variation across cultures may be the result of differences in
reporting depression and in readiness or reluctance to seek help for depression, other
factors seem to be at work too. For example, the stresses of war have undoubtedly
inflated the rate of depression in the Middle East (Thabet et al., 2004). And in Taiwan
and Korea, the low rates of depression may reflect low rates of marital separation and
TABLE 12.2 Lifetime Risk of a
Depressive Episode Lasting a Year
or More
Taiwan 1.5%
Korea 2.9%
Puerto Rico 4.3%
United States 5.2%
Germany 9.2%
Canada 9.6%
New Zealand 11.6%
France 16.4%
Lebanon 19%
Source: Weissman, M. M., et al. (1996, July
24–31). Cross-national epidemiology of major
depression and bipolar disorder. Journal of the
American Medical Association, 276, 293–299.
A DEPRESSION CHECK
Most people think that depression is marked
by outward signs of sadness, such as weep-
ing. But depression affects other aspects of
thought and behavior, as well. For a quick
check on your own tendencies to depression,
please answer “yes” or “no” to each of the
following questions:
1. Do you feel sad, hopeless, or guilty most
of the time?
2. Do former friends avoid spending time
with you? Or, do you feel you have lost
interest in activities, events, and people
around you?
3. Have you experienced any major change
in appetite or body weight, though not
from dieting?
4. Do you often feel restless or have
difficulty sleeping, especially because
of thoughts racing through your mind?
5. Do you feel more sluggish and fatigued
than you ought to?
6. Do you spend excessive amounts of time
sleeping?
7. Do you spend a lot of time
“ruminating” about unhappy
experiences you have had or mistakes
you have made?
8. Have you been finding it increasingly
difficult to think or concentrate?
9. Do you have recurrent thoughts of death
or suicide?
10. Do you spend a great deal of time
engaging in “escape” activities that
help you avoid important issues
in your life. (These might include
excessive time spent playing video or
computer games, reading, or alcohol
consumption.)
This checklist is, of course, not a
substitute for a clinical evaluation by a
professional. While there is no “magic
number” of items to which you must an-
swer “yes” to qualify as depressed, if you
answered “yes” to some of them and if
you are concerned, you might want to seek
a professional opinion. Remember that a
diagnosis of depression is always a clinical
judgment call, based on the signs listed in
the DSM-IV. Essentially, the clinician will
look at the pattern and the quality of your
life, your feelings, and your behavior to
determine whether or not they fit the
DSM-IV criteria. Remember also that
self-report is always subject to some bias.
If you are concerned after considering the
signs of depression in your life, we rec-
ommend an examination by a competent
mental health professional.

528 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
divorce—factors known to be associated with high risk of depression in virtually all
cultures.
Causes of Depression We have collected many pieces of the depression puzzle, but no
one has managed to put them all together into a big picture that everyone likes. Some
cases almost certainly have a genetic origin, because severe bouts with depression often
run in families (Plomin et al., 1994). A few observers even suggest that a tendency for
depression, at least in a mild form, may have even been adaptive in our evolutionary
past because mild depression and worry helped people focus intently on problems
that affected survival (Andrews & Thompson, 2009, 2010). And indeed, in people
diagnosed with depression, we often find that they cannot take their minds off their
troubles—a process called rumination.
Further indication of a biological basis for depression comes from the favorable
response that many patients with depression have to drugs that affect the brain’s neu-
rotransmitters norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopamine (Ezzell, 2003). These antidepres-
sant medicines also stimulate growth of new neurons in the hippocampus (Insel, 2007).
This makes sense in light of studies showing that stress can both suppress the growth of
neurons in the hippocampus and precipitate a depressive episode (Jacobs, 2004).
Evidence also connects depression with lower brain wave activity
in the left frontal lobe (Davidson, 1992a,b, 2000a; Robbins, 2000). And,
in a few cases, depression may arise from viral infection (Bower, 1995b;
Neimark, 2005). Such evidence leads some observers to view depression
as a collection of disorders having a variety of causes and involving many
parts of the brain (Kendler & Gardner, 1998).
Recently, neuroimaging has revealed a link between the amygdala and
a part of the frontal lobes called area 25, located at the base of the frontal
cortex, just over the roof of the mouth. In brains of those with depres-
sion, where many functions seem to slow down, area 25 paradoxically
shows up on scans as “hot,” says neuroscientist Helen Mayberg (Dobbs,
2006b; Insel, 2010; Mayberg, 2006, 2009). Moreover, successful thera-
pies for depression—either drugs or psychotherapy—suppress activity in
area 25. It’s a puzzle. No one is sure exactly what area 25 is or exactly
how it works, although Mayberg suspects that it acts as a sort of “switch”
connecting the conscious “thinking” portions of the frontal lobes and the brain’s
unconscious “alarm system.”
Mayberg also believes that area 25 does not act alone but rather interacts with
a whole suite of brain modules that, together, produce depression. Thus, although
Mayberg has fingered area 25, she says that we should not think of depression as a
disorder of a particular region in the brain. Rather, it involves a malfunctioning system
of structures in the cortex, subcortex, and limbic system, along with imbalances in
the neurotransmitters serving these regions. She argues that depressive episodes occur
when a person with a defect in this complex mood-regulating system encounters stress
(see Figure 12.2).
Sunlight and Depression Adding to this rather confusing picture, clinicians have
found that lack of sunlight can also initiate a special form of depression that
appears during the dark winter months among people living in high latitudes (Insel,
2010; Lewy et al., 2006). You can see the relationship between light and depression
in Figure 12.3.
Aptly named, this seasonal affective disorder (SAD) stems from low levels of the
hormone melatonin, mediated by special light-sensitive cells—but not the rods and
cones—in the retina. (Yes, some blind people do develop SAD!) Daily fluctuations in
melatonin regulate our internal biological clocks (Steele & Johnson, 2009). Based on
this knowledge, researchers have developed a simple and effective therapy to regulate
the hormone by exposing those with SAD daily to bright artificial light. Therapists re-
port that combining light therapy with cognitive-behavioral therapy or antidepressants
works even better (DeAngelis, 2006).
seasonal affective disorder (SAD) A form
of depression believed to be caused by deprivation of
sunlight.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 8
The “biological clock,” located in
the hypothalamus, regulates our
circadian rhythms (p. 333).
Mood-regulation
brain circuits
Depression
Biological
vulnerability
External
stressors
FIGURE 12.2
Mayberg’s Model of Depression
In this view, depression results from an
interplay of three major factors: (a) the
brain’s mood-regulating circuitry (including
cortical, subcortical, and limbic system
regions, and their neurotransmitters,
(b) external stressors (including life events,
physical trauma, and disease), and
(c) biological vulnerability (including
genetics and gender).
Source: Adaptation of Figure 1 from Mayberg,
H. S. (2006). Defining neurocircuits in depression:
strategies toward treatment selection based on
neuroimaging phenotypes. Psychiatric Annals,
36(4), 259–268.

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 529
Psychological Factors As with most other disorders, biology alone cannot entirely
explain depression. We must also understand depression as a mental, social, and be-
havioral condition. Considerable evidence implicates stressful events, such as losing a
job or the death of a loved one, as major factors in depression (Monroe & Reid, 2009).
Low self-esteem and a pessimistic attitude can add fuel to a cycle of depressive thought
patterns. Psychologists call this rumination, an incessant mental replay of depressive
thoughts (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). While this whirlpool of depression may
initially elicit attention and sympathy, it eventually turns people away, leaving the indi-
vidual with depression isolated and even more depressed (see Figure 12.4).
Probably because of low self-esteem, depression-prone people are more likely to
perpetuate the depression cycle by attributing negative events to their own personal
flaws or external conditions that they feel helpless to change (Azar, 1994). Martin
Seligman calls this learned helplessness. These negative self-attributions, then, feed the
cycle of depression and despair (Coyne et al., 1991).
Who Becomes Depressed? No one knows why women have higher depression rates
than do men (Holden, 2005). According to Susan NolenHoeksema (2001), the differ-
ence may lie in the differing responses to sadness in men and women. When women ex-
perience sadness, she says, they tend to focus on the possible causes and consequences
of their feelings. On the other hand, men attempt to distract themselves from feelings
of depression, either by shifting their attention to something else or by doing some-
thing physical that will take their minds off their mood. This model suggests, then, that
women ruminate more about their troubles, which increases their vulnerability to de-
pression (Shea, 1998). Another possible source of the gender discrepancy in depression
may involve norms that encourage women to seek help but discourage men from doing
so. Thus, the differences we seen in the rates of depression may be, at least in part, due
to gender differences in seeking help.
In addition to gender, age is also a factor in depression. According to NIMH (2010a),
depression is more common among young adults than among those over 60. While the
average age of onset is about 32 years of age, a large U.S. survey found that the likeli-
hood of depression begins a sharp increase between 12 and 16 years (Hasin et al., 2005).
The same study also found elevated rates of the disorder among Baby Boomers.
Bipolar Disorder The other mood disorder we will consider involves extreme swings
of mood, from periods of depression to times of extreme elation. Formerly known as
manic–depressive disorder, the DSM-IV now lists the condition as bipolar disorder. The
alternating periods of mania (excessive elation or manic excitement) and the profound
sadness of depression represent the two “poles” of bipolar.
During the manic phase, the individual becomes euphoric, energetic, hyperactive,
talkative, and emotionally wound tight like a spring. It is not unusual for people swept
up in mania to spend their life savings on extravagant purchases or to have casual,
unprotected sexual liaisons or to engage in other risky and frisky behaviors. When
rumination A pernicious form of self-reflection in
which a person repeatedly rethinks depressive thoughts
and feelings.
learned helplessness A condition in which
depressed individuals learn to attribute negative
events to their own personal flaws or external
conditions that the person feels helpless to change.
People with learned helplessness can be thought of as
having an extreme form of external locus of control.
bipolar disorder A mental abnormality involving
swings of mood from mania to depression.
FIGURE 12.3
Relationship between Light and SAD
People who have seasonal affective dis-
order are most likely to experience symp-
toms of depression during months with
shortened periods of sunlight.
Source: Based on Figure 1 from Rosenthal,
N. E., Sack D. A., Gillen, J. C., Lewy, A. J., Goodwin,
F. K., Davenport, Y., Mueller, P. S., Newsome, D. A., &
Wehr, T. A. (1984). Seasonal affective disorder: a
description of the syndrome and preliminary findings
with light therapy. Archives of General Psychiatry,
41, pp. 72–80.
100
75
50
25
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e
o
f
d
ep
re
ss
ed
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
Month
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
900
800
700
600
0
A
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
su
n
lig
h
t
(m
in
u
te
s
p
er
m
o
n
th
)Depression
Light

530 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
the mania wanes, they then must deal with the damage they have created during their
carefree and frenetic period. Soon, the depressive phase follows, bringing a dark wave
of melancholy that sweeps over the mind. In this phase, the symptoms mimic those of
major depression (also called “unipolar” depression). Biologically speaking, however,
these two forms of depression differ: We know this because the antidepressant drugs
that work well on major depression don’t usually help victims of bipolar disorder—
sometimes they even make it worse.
Research has established a genetic contribution, although the experts haven’t
yet pinpointed the exact genes involved (Bradbury, 2001). While only 2.6 percent of
American adults have bipolar attacks, the disorder is highly heritable, making it much
more frequent in some families (Kieseppa et al., 2004; NIMH, 2010b). The fact that
bipolar disorder usually responds well to medication also suggests biological factors
at work.
Oddly, the incidence of bipolar disorder has risen in recent years, particularly in
children (Holden, 2008). This hints that the condition may have some environmen-
tal cause. Alternatively, some cases of bipolar disorder may have been overlooked in
the past, or perhaps it is currently being overdiagnosed. Whatever is the truth of the
matter, some sort of influence beyond genetics is at work.
Anxiety Disorders
Everyone has experienced anxiety in threatening or otherwise stressful situations. But
would you pick up a snake? Or would you let a tarantula rest on your shoulder? For
many people the mere thought of snakes or spiders is enough to send chills of fear
down their spines.
Lots of people don’t particularly like snakes or spiders, but that doesn’t necessarily
mean that they have an anxiety disorder. The pathological anxiety seen in the anxiety
disorders is far more debilitating than the normal hesitancy associated with slithering,
crawling things. Pathological anxiety is also relatively common—even more common
than major depression (Barlow, 2000). One estimate says that over our lifetime,
30 percent of us—more women than men—will experience symptoms that are serious
enough to qualify as one of the anxiety disorders recognized in the DSM (Hébert, 2006;
Holden, 2005).
anxiety disorder Mental problem characterized
mainly by anxiety. Anxiety disorders include panic
disorder, specific phobias, and obsessive–compulsive
disorder.
Fred decides to be more
sociable, but when he asks
Teresa for a date, she has
other plans.
Fred concludes that
he is not very interesting
or attractive and that
people don’t like him.
Because of Fred’s
negative behaviors,
people avoid him—
reinforcing his symptoms.
Fred feels completely
alone and unhappy.
Fred avoids people, skips
school, and neglects
personal hygiene.
Negative
events
Low self-esteem
and negative
interpretations
Social rejection
and loneliness
Depression
Negative
behaviors
FIGURE 12.4
The Cognitive–Behavioral Cycle
of Depression
As you follow Fred around the cycle, note
how his depression feeds on itself.
c Anxiety Disorders: Fear, anxiety, panic
attacks
• Generalized anxiety disorder
• Panic disorder
• Agoraphobia
• Specific phobias
• Obsessive–compulsive disorder
Dutch artist Vincent Van Gogh showed
signs of bipolar disorder. This problem
seems to have a high incidence among
very creative people.

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 531
Here we will review four pathologies that have anxiety as their main feature:
(1) generalized anxiety disorder, (2) panic disorder, (3) phobic disorder, and (4) obsessive–
compulsive disorder. The major differences among them have to do with the target and
the duration of anxiety: Does the anxiety seem to come from nowhere—unrelated to the
individual’s environment? Is it provoked by some object or situation, such as the sight of
blood or a snake? Is the anxiety present most of the time or only occasionally?
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Some people spend months or years of their lives
coping with anxiety. Charles, a heavy-equipment operator, says he has dizzy spells,
headaches, cold sweats, and frequent feelings of “free-floating” anxiety. But he has
no clue why he feels this way. A clinician would diagnose his condition as generalized
anxiety disorder.
Charles and others with this problem are not worried or fearful about specific situ-
ations or objects, such as snakes or spiders. Rather, they have a pervasive and persis-
tent sense of anxiety that seems to come from nowhere and lasts for long periods. They
simply feel anxious much of the time, without knowing why.
How common is this condition? According to NIMH (2010b), about 6.8 million
adult Americans have generalized anxiety disorder. As with depression, there is a gen-
der difference, with generalized anxiety disorder affecting about twice as many women
as men.
Panic Disorder While calmly eating lunch, an unexpected wave of panic sweeps over
you, seemingly from nowhere. Your heart races, your body shakes, you feel dizzy, your
hands become clammy and sweaty, you are afraid that you might be dying. You are
having a panic attack.
The distinguishing feature of panic disorder is a recurring strong feeling of anxiety
that occurs “out of the blue,” with no connection to present events (Barlow, 2001). As
in generalized anxiety disorder, the feeling is one of “free-floating anxiety.” The differ-
ence is that the anxiety attacks in panic disorder usually last for only a few minutes
and then subside (McNally, 1994).
Because of the unexpected nature of these “hit-and-run” attacks, anticipatory anx-
iety often develops as an added complication. The dread of the next attack and of
being helpless and suddenly out of control can lead a person to avoid public places yet to
fear being left alone. Cognitive–behavioral theorists view panic attacks as conditioned
responses to physical sensations that may have initially been learned during a period of
stress (Antony et al., 1992).
Biologically, we have strong evidence of genetic influences in panic disorder
(Hettema et al., 2001). We also know that the brain pathways involved include the
unconscious arousal pathway and, especially, the amygdala (Hébert, 2006; LeDoux,
1996; Mobbs et al., 2007). This “fear circuit” easily learns fear reactions but is re-
luctant to give them up—probably a good thing for our ancestors who had to avoid
predators. It also appears that overstimulation of these emotion circuits can produce
lasting physical changes that make the individual even more susceptible to future anxi-
ety attacks (Rosen & Schulkin, 1998).
To complicate matters further, many people with panic disorder also have agora-
phobia, a fearful reaction to crowded public places, open spaces, or other situations
from which they fear that they cannot easily escape. The term agoraphobia literally
translates from the ancient Greek as “fear of the marketplace.” Victims of agorapho-
bia often fear that, if they have a panic attack in one of these locations, help might not
be available or the situation will be embarrassing to them. These fears tend to grow
and eventually deprive afflicted persons of their freedom, with some becoming es-
sentially prisoners in their own homes, unable to hold a job or carry on normal daily
activities.
It’s entirely possible that you may know someone who has panic disorder or ago-
raphobia, because these disorders occur in nearly 4 percent of the population, again
much more commonly in women than in men (Kessler et al., 2005). Fortunately, the
generalized anxiety disorder A psychological
problem characterized by persistent and pervasive
feelings of anxiety, without any external cause.
panic disorder A disturbance marked by panic
attacks that have no obvious connection with events
in the person’s present experience. Unlike generalized
anxiety disorder, the victim is usually free of anxiety
between panic attacks.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 9
The brain has two main emotional
pathways; one operates mainly at
an unconscious level (p. 392).
agoraphobia A fear of public places and open
spaces, commonly accompanying panic disorder.

532 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
treatment outlook is hopeful. Medical therapy involves antianxiety drugs to relieve the
panic attacks. Psychological treatment is also effective: As we will see in the next chap-
ter, cognitive–behavioral therapy may equal or outperform drug therapy in combating
panic attacks.
Phobic Disorder In contrast with panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder,
phobias involve an irrational, debilitating fear of a specific object, activity, or situation—
a response all out of proportion to the circumstances. (These are sometimes called spe-
cific phobias, as contrasted with the broader, nonspecific fears found in agoraphobia.)
Phobias may center on spiders, snakes, thunder, lightning, germs, or any of dozens of
objects or situations.
By affecting more than 10 million Americans each year, phobias do cause sub-
stantial disruption to the lives of many people (Winerman, 2005b). Certain specific
phobias are quite rare, e.g., fear of books, string, or even toads! Others, such as an
extreme fear of closed spaces (claustrophobia), occur so commonly that they seem
almost the norm. (Claustrophobia, for example, often prevents people from getting the
needed MRI scans because of the confined space within the magnet.) Other common
phobic disorders include social phobias, which are irrational fears of normal social
situations, and fear of heights (acrophobia) and snakes (ophidiophobia). Still other
phobias appear in Table 12.3.
What causes phobias? Long ago, John Watson and Rosalie Rayner demonstrated
that fears can be learned. And we also have good evidence that fears and phobias
can be unlearned through cognitive–behavioral therapy based on conditioning
phobia One of a group of anxiety disorders involv-
ing a pathological fear of a specific object or situation.
TABLE 12.3 Phobias
DSM-IV Category Object/Situation Incidence
Agoraphobia Crowds, open spaces Common (3.5–7% of adults)
Social Phobias Fear of being observed or doing
something humiliating
Common (11–15%)
Specific Phobias Varies by category (Up to 16% of adults have one
or more specific phobias)
Animals Cats (ailurophobia)
Dogs (cynophobia)
Insects (insectophobia)
Spiders (arachnophobia)
Birds (avisophobia)
Horses (equinophobia)
Snakes (ophidiophobia)
Rodents (rodentophobia)
Inanimate objects or
situations
Closed spaces (claustrophobia)
Dirt (mysophobia)
Thunder (brontophobia)
Lightning (astraphobia)
Heights (acrophobia)
Darkness (nyctophobia)
Fire (pyrophobia)
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
Watson and Rayner’s infamous
experiment with Little Albert
showed that fears could be learned
by classical conditioning (p. 139).
(Continued)
PhobiasWatch the Video
at MyPsychLab

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 533
DSM-IV Category Object/Situation Incidence
Bodily conditions Illness or injury (nosophobia) (Up to 16% of adults have one
or more specific phobias)
Sight of blood (hematophobia)
Cancer (cancerophobia)
Venereal disease
(venerophobia)
Death (thanatophobia)
Other specific phobias Numbers (numerophobia) Rare
The number 13
(triskaidekaphobia)
Rare
Strangers, foreigners
(xenophobia)
Rare
String (linonophobia) Rare
Books (bibliophobia) Rare
Work (ergophobia) Rare
Note: Hundreds of phobias have been described and given scientific names; this table provides only a sample.
Some of the rare and strange-sounding phobias may have been observed in a single patient.
A common form of social phobia involves
an extreme fear of public speaking.
(Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). But learning may not tell the whole story, says Martin
Seligman (1971), who has argued that humans are biologically predisposed to learn
some kinds of fears more easily than others. This preparedness hypothesis suggests
that we carry an innate biological tendency, acquired through natural selection, to
respond quickly and automatically to stimuli that posed a survival threat to our
ancestors (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). This explains why we develop phobias for
snakes and lightning much more easily than we develop fears for automobiles and
electrical outlets—objects that have posed a danger only in recent times. Again, the
underlying brain mechanism includes the amygdala and the fast-and-unconscious
emotion pathway mapped by Joseph LeDoux and his colleagues (Schafe et al., 2005;
Wilensky et al., 2006).
Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder In literature’s most famous case of obsessive
compulsive disorder, Lady Macbeth cries, “Out, damn’d spot! out, I say!” as she
repeatedly washes her hands, trying to rid herself of guilt for the murder of King
Duncan. Although people with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) don’t usually
hallucinate about blood spots on their hands, Shakespeare got the rest spot-on.
The main characteristics of OCD are persistent, unwelcome thoughts and ritual
behaviors. Obsessive–compulsive disorder affects about 1 percent of us in any
given year, regardless of culture (Steketee & Barlow, 2002).
The obsession component of OCD consists of thoughts, images, or
impulses that recur or persist despite a person’s efforts to suppress them. For exam-
ple, a person with an obsessive fear of germs may avoid using bathrooms outside
his or her home or refuse to shake hands with strangers. Others may obsess about
keeping their houses clean and tidy or arranging shoes in their closets. And because
people with OCD realize that their obsessive thoughts and compulsive rituals are
senseless, they often go to great lengths to hide their compulsive behavior from
other people. This, of course, places restrictions on their domestic, social, and work
lives. Not surprisingly, people with OCD have extremely high divorce rates.
If you have ever been plagued by petty worries or persistent thoughts such as,
“Did I remember to lock the door?” you have had a mild obsessional experience.
preparedness hypothesis The notion that we
have an innate tendency, acquired through natural
selection, to respond quickly and automatically to
stimuli that posed a survival threat to our ancestors.
obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) A
condition characterized by patterns of persistent,
unwanted thoughts and behaviors.
TABLE 12.3 (Continued)
Obsessive–compulsive disorder makes
people engage in senseless, ritualistic
behaviors, such as repetitive hand
washing.

534 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
A haunting phrase or melody that keeps running through your mind qualifies as a
form of obsession too. Such thoughts are normal if they occur only occasionally and
have not caused significant disruptions in your life. As we have noted in other disor-
ders, it is a matter of degree.
Compulsions, the other half of obsessive–compulsive disorder, are repetitive, pur-
poseful acts performed according to certain private “rules” in response to an obsession.
People with OCD symptoms feel that their compulsive behavior will, somehow, reduce
the tension associated with their obsessions. These urges may include an irresistible
need to clean, to count objects or possessions, or to check and recheck “just to make
sure” that lights or appliances have been turned off. When they are calm, individuals
with OCD view these compulsions as senseless, but when their anxiety rises, they can’t
resist performing the compulsive behavior ritual to relieve tension. Part of the pain
experienced by people with OCD comes from realizing the utter irrationality of their
obsessions and their powerlessness to eliminate them.
The tendency for OCD to run in families suggests a genetic link (Insel, 2010).
Another hint comes from the finding that many people with OCD also display tics,
unwanted involuntary movements, such as exaggerated eye blinks. In these patients,
brain imaging often shows oddities in the deep motor control areas (Resnick, 1992).
OCD expert Judith Rapoport tells us to think of compulsions as the brain’s “fixed
software packages,” programmed for worry and repeated rituals. Once activated, she
theorizes, the patient gets caught in a behavioral “loop” that cannot be switched off
(Rapoport, 1989).
Again (at the risk of sounding obsessive!), we must note that biology cannot
explain everything. Some people with OCD have clearly learned that their anxiety-
provoking thoughts are connected to harmful consequences (Barlow, 2000). We can see
further evidence that learning plays a role in behavioral therapy, which effectively reduces
compulsive actions. A behavioral strategy for treating compulsive Lady Macbeth’s
ritual hand washing, for example, would call for a form of extinction, in which the
therapist would prevent her from washing for progressively longer periods. Indeed,
behavioral therapy can produce changes that show up in PET scans of OCD patients’
brains (Schwartz et al., 1996). The general principle is this: When we change behavior,
we inevitably change the brain, demonstrating once again that biology and behavior
are inseparable.
Somatoform Disorders
“Soma” means body. Thus, the term somatoform disorders refers to psychological prob-
lems manifested in bodily symptoms, physical complaints, such as weakness, pain, or
excessive worry about disease—as in the person who constantly frets about cancer.
Not especially common, somatoform disorders occur in about 2 percent of the popu-
lation. Still, they have captured the popular imagination under their more common
names: “hysteria”1 and “hypochondria” (Holmes, 2001).
The DSM-IV recognizes several types of somatoform disorders, but we will cover
only two: conversion disorder and hypochondriasis, shown in the chart in the mar-
gin. And, while we’re talking about somatoform disorders, please note their potential
for confusion with psychosomatic disorders, in which mental conditions—especially
stress—lead to actual physical disease. The DSM-IV places psychosomatic disorders
under a separate heading, “Psychological Factors Affecting Medical Condition.”
Conversion Disorder Paralysis, weakness, or loss of sensation—with no discernible
physical cause—distinguishes conversion disorder (formerly called “hysteria”). People
with this diagnosis may, for example, be blind, deaf, unable to walk, or insensitive to
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
In classical and operant
conditioning, extinction involves
the suppression of a response as
the result of learning a competing
response (p. 138).
1The original term hysteria had nothing to do with “going into hysterics.” Rather, hysteria comes from the Greek
word for “womb.” At one time, physicians thought that only women could have hysteria, because they believed the
physical symptoms to be caused by the womb migrating to the afflicted part of the body.
somatoform disorders Psychological problem
appearing in the form of bodily symptoms or physical
complaints, such as weakness or excessive worry about
disease. The somatoform disorders include conversion
disorder and hypochondriasis.
c Somatoform Disorders: Physical symptoms
or overconcern with one’s health
• Conversion disorder
• Hypochondriasis
conversion disorder A type of somatoform
disorder marked by paralysis, weakness, or loss of
sensation but with no discernible physical cause.
Margo:
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 535
touch in part of their bodies. (“Glove anesthesia,” shown in Figure 12.5, is a rare but
classic form of sensory loss in conversion disorder.) Significantly, individuals with this
condition have no organic disease that shows up on neurological examinations, labo-
ratory tests, X-rays, or body scans. In conversion disorder, the problem really seems to
be “all in the mind.”
The term conversion disorder carries with it some baggage from the Freudian past.
Originally, the term implied an unconscious displacement (or conversion) of anxiety
into physical symptoms—although most clinicians no longer subscribe to that expla-
nation. The diagnosis also has a reputation for being used as a “dumping ground” for
those—especially females—who present physical symptoms but no obvious medical
abnormality (Kinetz, 2006).
Some cases of conversion disorder are now thought to stem from physical stress
responses. Another possibility, suggested by David Oakley (1999) of the University
College in London, is that a common brain mechanism underlies conversion disorder
and hypnosis. Accordingly, he suggests that conversion disorder and related mental
problems be reclassified as auto-suggestive disorders.
Oddly, conversion disorder was much more common a century ago in Europe and
the United States. More broadly, it has declined in industrialized countries, perhaps
due to increased public understanding of physical and mental disorders (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994; Nietzel et al., 1998). Meanwhile, conversion disorder is
still relatively common in economically undeveloped regions, such as parts of China
(Spitzer et al., 1989) and Africa (Binitie, 1975) and among poorly educated people in
the United States (Barlow & Durand, 2005).
Hypochondriasis “Hypochondriacs” worry about getting sick. Every ache and pain
signals a disease. Because of their exaggerated concern about illness, patients with
hypochondriasis often bounce from physician to physician until they find one who will
listen to their complaints and prescribe some sort of treatment—often minor tranquil-
izers or placebos. Naturally, these individuals represent easy marks for health fads and
scams. They also find their way to the fringes of the medical community, where disrep-
utable practitioners may encourage them to buy extensive and expensive treatments.
On the other side of the problem, we find the clinician who is too eager to conclude
that the patient’s concerns are imaginary—much as we found with conversion disorder.
That is, some physicians seem to have a mental set to see hypochondria when they find
no physical evidence of disease. This, of course, can have disastrous consequences, as
when a mistaken impression of hypochondriasis blinds the physician to a very real and
serious physical disease.
Dissociative Disorders
We may speak metaphorically of being “beside ourselves,” but in the dissociative disor-
ders, the feeling is no metaphor. The common denominator for all the dissociative disor-
ders is “fragmentation” of the personality—a sense that some parts of the personality
have become detached (dissociated) from one’s sense of self. Among the dissociative
disorders, we find some of the most fascinating forms of mental pathology, includ-
ing dissociative amnesia, dissociative fugue, depersonalization disorder, and the con-
troversial dissociative identity disorder (formerly called “multiple personality”), made
famous by the fictional Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (see the chart in the margin). Unfortu-
nately, the underlying causes of dissociative disorders remain unclear.
Dissociative Amnesia You may know an amnesia victim who has suffered a memory
loss as the result of a severe blow to the head, perhaps in an auto accident. In many
such cases, we find loss of recent memories, with well-established long-term memories
preserved. But dissociative amnesia is different.
In dissociative amnesia, the memory loss typically is selective for specific personal
events: for portions of episodic memory. The cause can be a stroke, alcoholic black-
outs, head injuries, or a blood sugar crisis. But the origin is not always physical.
hypochondriasis A somatoform disorder involv-
ing excessive concern about health and disease; also
called hypochondria.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
A mental set is the tendency
to respond to a new problem in
the matter used for a previous
problem (p. 225).
dissociative disorders One of a group of
pathologies involving “fragmentation” of the personality,
in which some parts of the personality have become
detached, or dissociated, from other parts.
dissociative amnesia A psychologically
induced loss of memory of personal information,
such as one’s identity or residence.
A B
FIGURE 12.5
Glove Anesthesia
The form of conversion disorder known
as “glove anesthesia” (A) involves a loss
of sensation in the hand, as though the
patient were wearing a thick glove. This
cannot be a neurological disorder because
the pattern of “anesthesia” does not cor-
respond to the actual pattern of nerves in
the hand, shown in (B).
c Dissociative Disorders: Nonpsychotic
fragmentation of the personality
• Dissociative amnesia
• Dissociative fugue
• Depersonalization disorder
• Dissociative identity disorder

536 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
A purely psychological form of dissociative amnesia can result from a psychologically
traumatic or a highly stressful experience.
As you might have guessed, dissociative amnesia has a close kinship with posttrau-
matic stress disorder, which we will discuss more extensively in Chapter 14. In both
conditions, memory loss may relate to a particularly stressful incident or period in the
person’s life. We should note, however, that dissociative amnesia can be a controver-
sial diagnosis when it is associated with recovered memories of childhood abuse, as
we saw in the Memory chapter. As the DSM-IV states, dissociative amnesia may have
“been overdiagnosed in individuals who are highly suggestible” (p. 479).
Dissociative Fugue Now consider the real story of a woman with yet another
dissociative disorder. “Jane Doe” was found near death in a Florida park, incoher-
ent and suffering the effects of exposure. Unlike victims of dissociative amnesia, Jane
Doe had a pervasive memory loss: no memory of her identity or any ability to read or
write. Doctors diagnosed her with dissociative fugue. Therapy revealed only general
information about the kind of past she must have had but no good clues as to her
identity. After a nationwide television appeal, her doctors were flooded with calls. The
most promising lead came from an Illinois couple, certain she was a daughter they had
not heard from for more than 4 years. But despite their confidence that she was their
daughter—even after meeting with her—Jane Doe was never able to remember her
past (Carson et al., 2000).
Jane Doe’s case was an extreme one: In most cases the fugue state lasts only hours
or days, followed by complete and rapid recovery. Less often it may continue for
months—or, as with Jane Doe, for years.
The diagnosis of dissociative fugue requires a combination of amnesia and fugue or
“flight.” In such persons, amnesia takes the form of a lost sense of identity, while the
fugue component may cause them to flee their homes, families, and jobs. Some victims
appear disoriented and perplexed. Others may travel to distant locations and take up
new lives, appearing unconcerned about the unremembered past.
Heavy alcohol use may predispose a person to dissociative fugue. This suggests
that the condition may involve some brain impairment—although no certain cause has
been established. Like dissociative amnesia, fugue occurs more often in those under
prolonged high stress, especially in times of war and other calamities. Some psycholo-
gists also suspect memory dissociation and repression accompany instances of sexual
and physical childhood abuse (Spiegel & Cardeña, 1991). As with dissociative amne-
sia, this conjecture, however, is disputed.
Depersonalization Disorder Yet another form of dissociation involves a sensation
that mind and body have separated. People with depersonalization disorder commonly
report “out-of-body experiences” or feelings of being external observers of their own
bodies. Some feel as if they are in a dream. (Fleeting, mild forms of this are common, so
there is no cause for alarm!) A study of 30 such cases found that obsessive–compulsive
disorder and certain personality disorders often accompany this condition (Simeon et al.,
1997). The causes are unknown.
People who have experienced severe physical trauma, such as a life-threatening
injury in an auto accident, may also report symptoms of depersonalization. So do
some individuals who have had near-death experiences. The effect is also common
with those using recreational drugs. Usually the sensation passes rather quickly,
although it can recur. In such individuals, investigators have attributed the disorder
to hallucinations and to natural changes in the brain that occur during shock
(Siegel, 1980), and one study has found people with depersonalization disorder
to have abnormalities in the visual, auditory, and somatosensory cortex (Simeon
et al., 2000).
Dissociative Identity Disorder Robert Louis Stevenson’s famous story of Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde has become a misleading stereotype of dissociative identity disorder. In
reality, most such cases occur in women, and most display more than two identities
dissociative fugue Essentially the same as dis-
sociative amnesia but with the addition of “flight” from
one’s home, family, and job. Fugue (pronounced FEWG)
means “flight.”
depersonalization disorder An abnormality
involving the sensation that mind and body have sepa-
rated, as in an “out-of-body” experience.
dissociative identity disorder A condition
in which an individual displays multiple identities or
personalities; formerly called “multiple personality
disorder.”
This is “Jane Doe,” a victim of dissocia-
tive fugue who has never recovered the
memory of her identity or her past.

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 537
(Ross et al., 1989). Unlike the homicidal Mr. Hyde in Stevenson’s yarn, seldom do
people with dissociative identity disorder pose a danger to others.
Although it was once thought to be rare, some specialists now believe that this
controversial condition has always been common but hidden or misdiagnosed. Oth-
ers believe that it is primarily the result of suggestion by the therapist—and not a real
disorder at all (Piper & Mersky, 2004a,b). Proponents of the diagnosis say that dis-
sociative identity disorder usually appears in childhood (Vincent & Pickering, 1988).
Those with the disorder frequently report having been sexually abused (Putnam et al.,
1986; Ross et al., 1990). If so, the formation of multiple identities or selves (sometimes
referred to as alters) may be a defense by the dominant personality to protect itself
from terrifying events or memories.
Dissociative identity disorder (DID) has now become a familiar diagnosis because
of its portrayal in books such as Sybil (Schreiber, 1973) and The Flock (Casey & Wilson,
1991) and films such as the 1996 production Primal Fear. Each emerging personality
contrasts in some significant way with the original self. For example, the new alter
might be outgoing if the original personality is shy, tough if the original is weak, and
sexually assertive if the other is fearful and sexually naive. These alternate identities,
each apparently with its own consciousness, emerge suddenly—usually under stress.
What lies behind this mysterious disturbance? Psychodynamic theories explain it as
a fracturing of the ego as a result of ego defense mechanisms that do not allow energy
from conflicts and traumas to escape from the unconscious mind. Cognitive theories
see it as a form of role playing or, perhaps, mood-state dependency, a form of memory
bias in which events experienced in a given mood are more easily recalled when the
individual is again in that mood state (Eich et al., 1997). Others suggest that at least
some cases are frauds (as in the case of a student, charged with plagiarizing a term
paper, who claimed that he had multiple personalities and that one of them copied the
paper without the knowledge of his dominant personality).
To clear up a common point of confusion: In earlier editions of the DSM, disso-
ciative identity disorder was called multiple personality—a term still heard occasion-
ally. Adding to the confusion, DID is sometimes mistakenly called “split personality,”
an obsolete term for schizophrenia—which has no relationship to dissociative identity
disorder at all. In schizophrenia (which literally means “split mind”), the “split” refers
to a psychotic split from reality, not to a fracturing of one personality into many, which
leads us to a discussion of schizophrenia . . . next.
Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is the disorder that comes to mind when we hear the terms “madness,”
“psychosis,” or “insanity.” In psychological terms, schizophrenia encompasses several
related forms of psychopathology in which personality seems to disintegrate, emo-
tional life becomes disrupted, and cognitive processes grow distorted. (It was also the
diagnosis given to all but one of Rosenhan’s pseudopatients.)
The schizophrenic world may turn bleak and devoid of meaning, or it may become
so filled with sensation that everything appears in a confusion of multiple realities lay-
ered with hallucinations and delusions. In schizophrenia, emotions often seem blunted,
thoughts turn bizarre, language may take strange twists, and memory becomes frag-
mented (Danion et al., 1999). The disorder breaks the unity of the mind, often sending
its victims on meaningless mental detours, sometimes spouting sequences of “clang” as-
sociations (associations involving similar-sounding words) and producing confused ver-
balizations that clinicians call “word salads.” Here is an example of this type of speech:
The lion will have to change from dogs into cats until I can meet my father and
mother and we dispart some rats. I live on the front of Whitton’s head. You
have to work hard if you don’t get into bed. . . . It’s all over for a squab true tray
and there ain’t no squabs, there ain’t no men, there ain’t no music, there ain’t no
nothing besides my mother and my father who stand alone upon the Island of
Capri where is no ice. Well it’s my suitcase sir (Rogers, 1982).
schizophrenia (pronounced skits-o-FRENNY-a)
A psychotic disorder involving distortions in thoughts,
perceptions, and/or emotions.
c Schizophrenia: Psychotic deterioration
of the personality, including
disturbances in affect, thinking, and
socialization
• Disorganized type
• Catatonic type
• Paranoid type
• Undifferentiated type
• Residual type

538 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
In a lifetime, more than one of every 100 Americans—more than 2 million over the age
of 18—will become afflicted. Most will struggle with recurrent schizophrenic episodes
all through their lives (Jobe & Harrow, 2010). For as yet unknown reasons, it happens
to men more often, with the first appearance of schizophrenia typically occurring in
men before they are 25 and in women between 25 and 45 years of age (Holden, 2005;
NIMH, 2010b).
Major Types of Schizophrenia Many investigators consider schizophrenia a constel-
lation of distinct disorders, with these five being the most common:
• Disorganized type—everyone’s image of mental illness, featuring incoherent speech,
hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behavior. A person who talks to imaginary
people most likely would receive this diagnosis.
• Catatonic type—appears in two forms: Persons with the more common catatonic
stupor may remain motionless for hours—even days—sometimes holding rigid,
statue-like postures. In the other form, called catatonic excitement, the patient
becomes agitated and hyperactive.
• Paranoid type—features delusions and hallucinations but has no catatonic symp-
toms and little of the incoherence or confusion of disorganized schizophrenia.
The paranoid delusions of persecution or of grandiosity (highly exaggerated self-
importance) found in this type of schizophrenia are less well organized—more
illogical—than those with a purely delusional disorder.
• Undifferentiated type—serves as a catchall category for schizophrenic symptoms
that do not clearly meet the requirements for any of the other categories above.
• Residual type—the diagnosis for individuals who have had a schizophrenic episode
in the past but currently have no major symptoms such as hallucinations or delu-
sional thinking. Instead, their thinking is mildly disturbed, or their emotional lives
are impoverished. The diagnosis of residual type may indicate that the disease is
entering remission or becoming dormant. (This diagnosis was assumed in most of
Rosenhan’s pseudopatients, whom we met at the beginning of the chapter.)
In Table 12.4, you can see the criteria required for a diagnosis of schizophrenia accord-
ing to criteria in the DSM-IV. Consider whether you think the symptoms presented by
the Rosenhan’s pseudopatients would warrant such a diagnosis under today’s standards.
The fact that most such patients display a hodgepodge of symptoms places them
into the “undifferentiated” category, further clouding our picture of the disorder.
TABLE 12.4 Criteria for a Diagnosis of Schizophrenia
A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following; each present for a significant portion of
time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated):
1. delusions
2. hallucinations
3. disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
4. grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
5. negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition
. . . Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or hallucinations consist of a
voice keeping up a running commentary on the person’s behavior or thoughts, or two or more voices
are conversing with each other.)
B. Social/occupational dysfunction . . . [Dysfunction in work, interpersonal relations, or self-care]
C. Duration . . . [Continuous signs of the disorder for at least six months]
Note: The DSM-IV-TR also qualifies the diagnosis of schizophrenia by excluding certain symptoms associated with
medical conditions, drug abuse, and other mental disorders.
Source: American Psyciatric Association. (2000.) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., Text
Revision, p. 312). Washington, DC: Author. 285–286.

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 539
Trying to make more sense of the problem, many investigators now merely divide the
symptoms of schizophrenia into positive and negative categories (Javitt & Coyle, 2004;
Sawa & Snyder, 2002). Positive symptoms refer to active processes, such as delusions
and hallucinations, while negative symptoms refer to passive processes and deficiencies,
such as social withdrawal, “flat” affect (lack of emotional expression), lack of pleasure
in life, and poverty of thinking.
Patient responses to drug therapy support the positive–negative division: Those
with positive symptoms usually respond to antipsychotic drugs, while those with nega-
tive symptoms do not (Andreasen et al., 1995; Heinrichs, 1993). But even this distinc-
tion has its problems because both positive and negative symptoms may occur in a
single patient. Moreover, the negative form of schizophrenia often looks like major de-
pression. All these difficulties have led some researchers to conclude that schizophrenia
is probably a name covering a whole spectrum of disturbances.
Possible Causes of Schizophrenia No longer do most theorists look through the
Freudian lens to see schizophrenia as the result of bad parenting or repressed child-
hood trauma (Walker & Tessner, 2008). Studies show that adopted children with no
family history of the disorder run no increased risk of developing schizophrenia when
placed in a home with a parent who has schizophrenia (Gottesman, 1991). Thus, an
emerging consensus among psychiatrists and psychologists views schizophrenia as fun-
damentally a brain disorder—or a group of disorders (Grace, 2010; Karlsgodt et al.,
2010; Walker et al., 2010).
Biological Factors in Schizophrenia Support for this brain-disorder view comes from
many quarters. As we have noted, the antipsychotic drugs (sometimes called major tran-
quilizers)—which interfere with the brain’s dopamine receptors—can suppress the posi-
tive symptoms of schizophrenia (Mueser & McGurk, 2004). On the other hand, drugs
that stimulate dopamine production (e.g., the amphetamines) can actually produce
schizophrenic reactions. Recently, attention has turned to deficiencies in the neurotrans-
mitter glutamate (Berenson, 2008; Javitt & Coyle, 2004). Other evidence of a biological
basis for schizophrenia comes in the form of abnormalities shown on brain scans, such
as you see in Figure 12.6 (Conklin & Iacono, 2004; NIMH, 2005). In that vein, an es-
pecially provocative finding from MRI studies suggests that the schizophrenic brain fails
to synchronize its neural firing across the cortex (Bower, 2005b; Symond et al., 2005).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Many antipsychotic drugs work
by reducing the activity of the
neurotransmitter dopamine in the
brain (p. 578).
FIGURE 12.6
MRI Scans of a Twin with
Schizophrenia and a Twin without
Schizophrenia
The twin with schizophrenia is on the
right. Note the enlarged ventricles
(fluid-filled spaces) in the brain.

540 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
diathesis–stress hypothesis In reference to
schizophrenia, the proposal that genetic factors place
the individual at risk while environmental stress factors
transform this potential into an actual schizophrenic
disorder.
Yet another line of evidence for the biological basis of schizophrenia comes from
family studies (Conklin & Iacono, 2004; Holden, 2003a). While no gene has been
linked to schizophrenia with certainty, we do know that the closer one’s relationship
to a person with the disorder, the greater one’s chances of developing it (Gottesman,
2001; Pogue-Gille & Yokley, 2010; Walker & Tessner, 2008).
Schizophrenia Is Not All Diathesis Yet again, we sing the same refrain: Biology does not
tell the whole story of schizophrenia. Ethnic background and geographic location also
seem to be factors, although no clear cause-and-effect relationship has emerged (Minkel,
2009). We can see an environmental effect, too, in 90 percent of the relatives of people
with schizophrenia, who do not develop the disorder (Barnes, 1987). Even in identical
twins who share exactly the same genes, the concordance rate (the rate at which the
disorder is shared by both) for schizophrenia is only about 50 percent. That is, in half
the cases in which schizophrenia strikes identical twins, it leaves one twin untouched
(see Figure 12.7).
So, can environment counterbalance heredity? Yes—to some extent—says a
Finnish study. Being raised in a healthy family environment can actually lower the risk
of schizophrenia in adopted children who have a genetic predisposition to the disease
(Tienari et al., 1987). Apparently, schizophrenia requires a biological predisposition plus
some unknown environmental agent to “turn on” the hereditary tendency (Cromwell,
1993; Iacono & Grove, 1993). This agent could be a chemical toxin, stress, or some
factor we have not yet dreamed of. In view of all the evidence, we must remember that
psychological disorder always requires an interaction of biological, cognitive, social-
cultural, behavioral, and environmental factors, as our first Core Concept of the chap-
ter suggested.
This broader perspective is often called the diathesis–stress hypothesis. In this view,
biological factors put certain individuals at risk for mental disorder, but stressors
in their lives transform the potential for psychopathology into an actual disorder
FIGURE 12.7
Genetic Risk of Developing
Schizophrenia
The graph shows average risks for
developing schizophrenia in persons with
a relative that has schizophrenia. Data
were compiled from family and twin
studies conducted in European popula-
tions between 1920 and 1987; the
degree of risk correlates highly with the
degree of genetic relatedness.
Source: Figure 10 from p. 96 of Gottesman, I.
(1991).Schizophrenia Genesis: The Origins of
Madness. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman/Times
Books/Henry Holt & Co. Copyright © 1991.
Reprinted by permission of W. H. Freeman and
Company/Worth Publishers.
Se
co
n
d
-d
eg
re
e
re
la
ti
ve
s
Fi
rs
t-
d
eg
re
e
re
la
ti
ve
s
General population
Spouses of patients
First cousins
(third degree)
Uncles/aunts
Nephews/nieces
Grandchildren
Half siblings
Siblings
Child of 1 parent
with schizophrenia
Siblings with 1 parent
with schizophrenia
Fraternal twins
Child of 2 parents
with schizophrenia
Identical twins
0 10 20 30 40 50
Lifetime risk of developing schizophrenia
1%
2%
2%
2%
4%
5%
6%
9%
13%
17%
17%
46%
48%

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 541
(Walker & Tessner, 2008). (The word diathesis refers to a predisposition or physi-
cal condition that makes one susceptible to disease, and stress can be caused by both
psychological and biological stressors, including drugs and other chemicals.) Thus,
we can see schizophrenia through this lens as a stress response in a person who is
predisposed to the disorder. Conversely, susceptible individuals may never develop
schizophrenia if they are spared certain damaging conditions or stressors that might
push them “over the edge.”
Developmental Disorders
Developmental problems can appear at any age, but several common ones first occur
in childhood, including autism, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and
dyslexia. All are specified on Axis II of the DSM-IV. Here, we will give only a brief
description of these disorders, because you have already encountered them in earlier
chapters.
Autism A complex and poorly understood disorder, autism involves an impoverished
ability to “read” other people, use language, and interact socially. To illustrate, imagine
the following situation: Sally and Shania are playing together, when Sally puts a piece
of candy in a box and then leaves the room. While Sally is gone, Shania opens the box,
removes the candy, and stashes it in her purse. When Sally comes back, where will she
look for the candy?
Children without autism will say that Sally (who didn’t see Shania switch the
candy to her purse) will look in the box. That is, they realize that different people
may hold different beliefs. But children with autism have a poorly developed theory
of mind that, in normal children, helps them understand what others are thinking
and feeling (Frith, 1993). Thus, children with autism are more likely to say (if they
communicate at all) that Sally will look in the purse. They have difficulty imagining
themselves in Sally’s frame of mind, believing something they know is not the case. As
a result of this deficit, they have difficulty in social relationships and are relegated to
a world of social isolation.
Besides the theory-of-mind deficiencies and social isolation, most persons with au-
tism also have language difficulties. In fact, many never achieve functional language
at all. As a consequence of these multiple deficits, autism can easily be misclassified as
mental retardation. (Most persons with mental retardation are not autistic.) In severe
cases, autism may also involve destructive self-stimulation, such as head-banging. In
addition, people with autism may display repetitive behavior, such as rocking, for ex-
tended periods. Typically, a physician or the parents first suspect the disorder at about
1½ to 2 years of age, when the child fails to develop language (Kabot et al., 2003).
Most experts believe that autism is fundamentally a brain disorder of undeter-
mined cause. Some evidence suggests a link between autism and toxic materials in the
environment (Neimark, 2007). Other studies suggest that children with autism have
either fewer mirror neurons in their brains or else the mirror neurons they do have are
defective (Miller, 2005; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006). This finding has grabbed
clinicians’ interest because some of our mirror neurons purportedly do exactly what
persons with autism cannot do: sense what other people’s intentions are (Dobbs,
2006a; Rizzolatti et al., 2006). It remains to be seen whether these developments can
be translated into effective therapies.
The National Institute of Health estimates that some form of the disorder occurs
in about 1 in 500 children. Although you may have seen news reports of a rising inci-
dence of autism in recent decades, experts attribute this primarily to an expanded defi-
nition of the disorder that came into wide use in the 1990s (Gernsbacher et al., 2005).
There appears to be no “autism epidemic.”
At present, the disorder has no cure. Behavioral treatment programs, involving
both parents and the children with the disorder, can improve socialization and speech
and diminish self-destructive behavior. Unfortunately, such programs are time consum-
ing and relatively expensive.
autism A developmental disorder marked by dis-
abilities in language, social interaction, and the ability
to understand another person’s state of mind.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
A theory of mind involves the
understanding that others may
have different beliefs, desires,
and emotions that underlie their
behavior (p. 247).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Mirror neurons in the brain
“reflect” other people’s
responses (p. 70).
c Developmental Disorders: Disorders
usually first diagnosed in infancy,
childhood, or adolescence
• Autism
• Dyslexia
• Attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD)

542 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
Dyslexia Reading is a key that opens many doors in a modern, information-driven
society. But those doors can remain closed for people who have difficulty in reading—
people with dyslexia. The disorder affects about one of five children to some degree,
often leading to poor school performance. And because school is so important in our
society, it often leads to diminished self-esteem and eventually to lost career opportuni-
ties (Shaywitz, 1996).
Contrary to popular presumption, dyslexia is not a visual disorder. It doesn’t cause
letters and words to “jump around” or reverse themselves. That is, dyslexia is not a
problem of visual sensation or perception.
Instead, research over the past 15 years suggests that dyslexia involves abnormali-
ties in the brain’s language-processing circuits (Breier et al., 2003). Ironically, another
“cause” may be language itself: Speakers of English—with its bizarre ways of spelling,
including some 1,120 ways to spell only 40 different sounds—are much more likely to
develop dyslexia than are Italian speakers, who must contend with only 33 combina-
tions of letters for 25 sounds (Helmuth, 2001c; Paulesu et al., 2001).
According to some experts, we should not think of dyslexia as a distinct disorder
at all. Researcher Sally Shaywitz and her colleagues (1990) have made a case that no
diagnostic marker sets individuals with dyslexia clearly apart from others who are
merely poor readers. She argues that dyslexia is simply the diagnosis we give to an
arbitrarily defined group of people occupying the lower end of the reading-abilities
spectrum.
Everyone does agree that dyslexia involves reading difficulties. Everyone also agrees
that recent years have seen great strides made in understanding the neurological basis
of the disorder, developing treatments, and debunking some of the myths surround-
ing dyslexia. (Smart people can have dyslexia: Einstein apparently did!) Currently, the
most effective treatments include special reading programs that emphasize the match-
ing of sounds to letter combinations.
Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Most children have trouble
sitting still and focusing attention on a task, such as solving a math problem or listen-
ing to directions from the teacher—but some have more trouble than others. Many
things can contribute to attention deficit and hyperactivity, including boring assign-
ments, distracting problems at home, abuse from peers, or merely a cultural tradi-
tion that places low value on the tasks that demand quiet attention. Those distractions
aside, some children apparently have a brain-based condition, known as attention-
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), that can interfere with even the best of intentions
to focus attention and sit quietly (Barkley, 1998; Nigg, 2010). ADHD affects some 3 to
5 percent of school-age children (Brown, 2003b; NIMH, 2010b).
ADHD is a controversial diagnosis, and its treatment is even more controversial
(Sax & Kautz, 2003). Critics claim that ADHD is overdiagnosed, often being used
to describe normal rambunctiousness or to blame children for the mistakes made by
unskilled parents and teachers. In addition, drug treatment consisting of stimulant
drugs strikes many people as being wrongheaded. Yet many careful studies have dem-
onstrated that properly administered drug therapy, along with behavioral therapy,
an improve attention and diminish hyperactivity in a majority (about 70 percent) of
individuals diagnosed with ADHD (Daley, 2004; MTA Cooperative Treatment Group,
2004). But do all hyperactive children need such treatment? It’s an issue that can be
resolved only by further research.
Personality Disorders
Disorders of personality account for the quirkiness of many historical and public
figures, including the much-married King Henry VIII, numerous Hollywood bad boys
and girls, and the fatal femme Lizzie Borden, who famously dispatched her parents
with a hatchet. The personality disorders show themselves in chronic patterns of poor
judgment, disordered thinking, emotional disturbances, disrupted social relationships,
dyslexia A reading disability, thought by some
experts to involve a brain disorder.
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) A developmental disability involving short
attention span, distractibility, and extreme difficulty in
remaining inactive for any period.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Hyperactivity is not caused by
eating sugar (p. 9).
personality disorder Condition involving a
chronic pervasive, inflexible, and maladaptive pattern
of thinking, emotion, social relationships, or impulse
control.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Personality refers to the enduring
set of characteristics and
dispositions that provide a thread
of consistency to an individual’s
attitudes and behaviors (p. 414).

How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV? 543
or lack of impulse control (Clark, 2009). The key element is a maladaptive personality
pattern of long standing. And they, like the developmental disorders, are described on
Axis II. Here we consider three of the better-known such conditions: narcissistic per-
sonality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder.
Narcissistic Personality Disorder In Greek mythology, Narcissus was a man so
enamored of his own good looks that, while admiring himself in a reflecting pool,
he fell in and drowned. His sad legacy is the name for a disorder involving an exag-
gerated sense of self-importance, a need for constant attention or admiration, and
often a preoccupation with fantasies of success or power. People with narcissistic
personality disorder may respond inappropriately to criticism or minor defeat. They
usually have problems in interpersonal relationships, feel entitled to favors without
obligations, exploit others selfishly, and have difficulty understanding how others
feel. Seldom do they want treatment. Judging from the (otherwise unreliable) en-
tertainment tabloids, narcissistic personality disorder runs rampant in the film and
recording industries.
Antisocial Personality Disorder Everyone from ruthless executives to con artists to
serial killers is a candidate for this category, which afflicts some 1 percent of the adult
population in the United States and some 70 to 80 percent of those in prison (Pat-
rick, 2007). As we might guess from gender differences in criminality, men are four
times more likely to be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder than are women
(Regier et al., 1988, 1993).
Persons with antisocial personality disorder seem to lack conscience or a sense of re-
sponsibility to others. Characteristically, their violations of social norms begin early
in life: disrupting class, getting into fights, and running away from home. This pattern
may progress to acts of cruelty and wanton disregard for others, such as vandalism,
the abuse of animals, or setting fires. Other common signs of antisocial personality
disorder include chronic lying and stealing.
Even though people with antisocial personalities may frequently find themselves in
trouble, they may not feel anxiety, shame, or any other sort of intense emotion. Often,
in fact, they can “keep cool” in situations that would arouse and upset normal people.
Those who show a violent or criminal pattern of antisocial personality disorder, such
as committing murders and other serious crimes, are popularly referred to as “psy-
chopaths” or “sociopaths,” although these labels are not recognized by the DSM-IV
(Krueger & Markon, 2006; Miller, 2008).
While we commonly find antisocial personalities among convicted criminals, they
are also well represented among successful politicians and businesspeople who put ca-
reer, money, and power above everything and everyone (Babiak & Hare, 2006; Patrick,
2007). Some can be quite charming, having learned to use their charm to take advan-
tage of people’s tendency to be trusting. These same characteristics can also help them
avoid getting caught for long periods of time—and when they do get caught, they are
often able to manipulate their way out of trouble.
What causes antisocial personality disorder? Neuroimaging studies have recently
suggested a malfunction in the amygdala and in a region of cortex just above the eyes
(Kiehl & Buckholtz, 2010; Raine, 2008). We don’t yet know, however, whether this is
the cause or the effect of the disorder.
Borderline Personality Disorder A third form of personality disorder, borderline
personality disorder manifests itself as instability, impulsivity, and chaotic relationships
(Butcher et al, 2010; Selby & Joiner, 2009). People with this diagnosis have unpredict-
able moods and stormy interpersonal relationships, often becoming upset and abusive
in response to perceived slights. They also have little tolerance for frustration. Their
impulsivity may be seen in a tendency for substance abuse, gambling, sexual promiscu-
ity, binge eating, reckless driving, self-mutilation, or suicide attempts. Imaging studies
even show this volatility in the brain (Bower, 2009; Meyer-Lindenberg, 2008).
narcissistic personality disorder Condition
involving an exaggerated sense of self-importance, a
need for constant attention or admiration, and often a
preoccupation with fantasies of success or power.
antisocial personality disorder Condition
involving a lack of conscience or a sense of
responsibility to others.
borderline personality disorder Condition of
instability and impulsivity; persons have unpredictable
moods and stormy interpersonal relationships, with
little tolerance for frustration.
c Personality Disorders: Conditions
involving a chronic and maladaptive
pattern of thinking, emotion, social
relationships, or impulse control
• Narcissistic personality disorder
• Antisocial personality disorder
• Borderline personality disorder
Narcissisism refers to the handsome
Narcissus who, in Greek mythology, fell in
love with his own reflection in a pool, as
shown in this painting by Caravaggio.

544 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
One of these people probably lurks somewhere among your acquaintances. Indeed,
borderline personality disorder accounts for about 2 percent of adults and between
10 and 20 percent of patients in clinical treatment (Meyer-Lindenberg, 2009, NIMH,
2010b). Unfortunately, as with the other personality disorders, the treatment outlook
for borderline personality disorder is guarded.
Adjustment Disorders and Other Conditions:
The Biggest Category of All
Although the majority of everyday psychological problems involve making choices
and dealing with confusion, frustration, and loss, the DSM-IV gives these issues short
shrift under adjustment disorders and under the awkwardly named category other
conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention. Together, these categories rep-
resent a catch basin for relatively mild problems that do not fit well under other
headings. They span a diverse range of conditions that include mild depression, phys-
ical complaints, marital problems, academic problems, job problems, parent–child
problems, bereavement, and even malingering (faking an illness). Consequently, the
largest group of people diagnosed with mental problems may fit these headings—
even though the DSM-IV devotes disproportionately little space to them. Ironically,
because these adjustment difficulties are so prevalent, those who turn to psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists account for a large proportion of the client load seen by pro-
fessionals in private practice.
Gender Differences in Mental Disorders
No one knows exactly why, but the data show large gender differences in susceptibility
to various mental disorders (Holden, 2005). We have seen, for example, that women
more often are diagnosed with mood disorders, especially depression. Women also are
diagnosed more often with anxiety disorders and eating disorders. In contrast, men
are overwhelmingly more likely to have personality disorders that involve aggressive
or control-related disorders, such as drug and alcohol abuse and violence. Thus men,
far more often than women, are diagnosed as having antisocial personality disorder. As
we have noted, one possibility is that social norms encourage more women than men
to report feelings of depression. At the same time, social norms may encourage men to
“act out” their feelings in a more physical manner.
Another possibility is that the differences originate in biology. For example, men’s
brains seem to be more strongly lateralized (that is, they tend to have specific cortical
functions more localized on one side of the brain or the other). This may explain why
men are less likely than women to recover language after a left-side stroke. Some neu-
roscientists also suspect that the “one-sidedness” of the male brain may contribute to
the much higher incidence of schizophrenia and most developmental disorders, such as
autism, dyslexia, and ADHD in males (Holden, 2005). Similarly, there may be some,
as yet undiscovered, biological difference that underlies women’s greater susceptibility
to depression. Unfortunately, deciding between the social and biological explanations
for gender differences in mental disorders awaits further research. Don’t be sur-
prised, however, if the final answer reflects the nature–nurture interaction: It probably
involves both.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Shyness
Being shy is a common problem, but it is not a DSM-IV disorder in itself. Rather,
shyness refers to a distressing pattern of avoiding or withdrawing from social contact.
At the extreme, shy behavior can warrant a diagnosis of social phobia or an avoidant
shyness A common temperamental condition but
not a disorder recognized by the DSM-IV.

What Are the Consequences of Labeling People? 545
Shyness may be painful, but it is not a
DSM-IV disorder.
personality disorder, when afflicted individuals seek to isolate themselves from social
interactions. As we have seen many times before, it is a matter of degree. For most shy
people, however, the tragedy is that they suffer from loneliness and from lost opportu-
nities to pursue interests and relationships.
What causes this often-painful problem? Shyness is one of three basic tempera-
ments found in infants that, for many, will continue through life (Kagan et al., 1988,
1994). Kagan (2001) has proposed that this pattern may have its origin in biology—
specifically in an overly excitable amygdala. But shyness and other forms of social
anxiety can also be learned responses. Even those who are not “born shy” can acquire
shy behavior patterns.
On a hopeful note, shyness does not have to be a permanent condition. Many peo-
ple overcome it on their own. Organizations such as Toastmasters help people build
verbal skills and confidence in social situations. Many others have found the help they
need in cognitive–behavioral therapy groups. For more information, you may want to
read Shyness: What It Is, What to Do about It by Philip Zimbardo (1990). Please for-
give the shameless plug of a book by your senior author.
12.3 KEY QUESTION
What Are the Consequences of Labeling People?
“Mad.” “Maniac.” “Mentally ill.” “Crazy.” “Insane.” “Disturbed.” “Neurotic.” These,
along with all the official diagnostic terms that appear in the DSM-IV, represent labels
used by the public, the courts, and mental health professionals to describe people who
display mental disturbances. Ideally, of course, an accurate diagnostic label leads to
good communication among mental health professionals and an effective treatment
program for afflicted individuals. Sometimes, however, labels create confusion—or
5. RECALL: What mental processes may be disrupted by
schizophrenia?
6. RECALL: In which type of anxiety disorder is the anxiety focused
on a particular object or situation?
7. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: The DSM-IV groups
most mental disorders by their
a. treatments.
b. causes.
c. symptoms.
d. theoretical basis.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
Answers 1. The medical model views mental disorders as diseases—as something wrong within the individual—while the psychological model
encompasses biology, the environment, and mental processes. The medical model also tends to emphasize the patient receiving treatment, while
the psychological model involves patients as partners in the treatment process. 2. Depression runs in families and is more common in women than
in men; the disorder often responds favorably to drugs; people with depression tend to have distinctive patterns on the EEG and on brain scans.
3. a. All the others are relatively modern objects that have not existed long enough to be incorporated into our biological natures. 4. Depression
5. Schizophrenia may disrupt virtually all mental processes, including thinking, perception, motivation, and emotion, 6. Phobias 7. c
Check Your Understanding
1. ANALYSIS: What are the main differences between the medical
model and the psychological model of mental disorder?
2. RECALL: Describe one kind of evidence suggesting that
depression has a biological basis.
3. APPLICATION: According to the preparedness hypothesis, which
one of the following phobias would you expect to be most common?
a. fear of snakes (ophidiophobia)
b. fear of books (bibliophobia)
c. fear of horses (equinophobia)
d. fear of the number 13 (triskaidekaphobia)
4. RECALL: Which of the following is most common: schizophrenia,
depression, phobias, dissociative identity disorder?

546 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
worse. Labeling can turn people into stereotypes, masking their personal characteristics
and the unique circumstances that contribute to their disorders. And, if that were not
enough, labels can provoke prejudices and social rejection.
In this section, we will begin with the problem of labeling as it affects the indi-
vidual. Then we will pursue the issue of labeling in a larger context by asking: Does
psychological disorder mean the same thing in all cultures? Finally, we will bring the
topic home with a critical look at the dangers of applying diagnostic labels to your
friends and family. The Core Concept that organizes all this states:
Core Concept 12.3
Ideally, accurate diagnoses lead to proper treatments, but diagnoses
may also become labels that depersonalize individuals and ignore the
social and cultural contexts in which their problems arise.
Diagnostic Labels, Labeling, and Depersonalization
Labeling a person as mentally disturbed can have both serious and long-lasting con-
sequences aside from the mental disturbance itself. With most physical illnesses, a
person may suffer a broken leg or an attack of appendicitis, but when the illness
is over, the diagnosis moves into the past. Not so with mental disorders. A label of
“depression” or “mania” or “schizophrenia” can be a stigma that follows a person
forever (Farina et al., 1996; Wright et al., 2000). But what about a mistaken diag-
nosis? As Rosenhan pointed out, a mistaken diagnosis of cancer is cause for celebra-
tion, but almost never is a diagnosis of mental disorder retracted. As you will recall
in the “pseudopatient” study, discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the glaring
fact of normalcy never emerged—a situation that Rosenhan attributed to the label
“schizophrenic.”
A diagnostic label may also lead to a cycle of mistreatment and neglect caused by
the second-class status accorded people with mental disorders. Sadly, in our society, to
have severe mental problems is to be stigmatized and devalued. Even worse, mental
hospital treatment can also involve depersonalization—as seen in the Rosenhan study.
That is, treating people as a diagnostic category, such as “schizophrenic” or “bipolar,”
robs them of their individuality and identity by treating them as mere objects rather
than as individuals. Depersonalization can easily result from labeling, but, as Rosenhan
argued, it can also grow out of the impersonal environment of the mental hospital. All
of this, of course, lowers self-esteem and reinforces disordered behavior. Thus, society
extracts costly penalties from those who deviate from its norms—and in the process, it
perpetuates the problem of mental disorder.
Perhaps the most extreme reaction against labeling has come from radical psychia-
trist Thomas Szasz (1961, 1977), who claimed that mental illness is a “myth”. Szasz
argued that the symptoms used as evidence of mental illness are merely medical labels
that give professionals an excuse to intervene in what is really the problem of people
violating social norms. Once labeled, says Szasz, these people can be treated simply for
their “problem of being different.”
We must keep in mind, therefore, that the goal of diagnosis is not just to fit a per-
son into a neat diagnostic box or to identify those who are “different.” Instead, a diag-
nosis should initiate a process that leads to a greater understanding of a person and to
the development of a plan to help. A diagnosis should be a beginning, not an end.
The Cultural Context of Psychological Disorder
Few clinicians would go as far as Thomas Szasz, but many advocate an ecological
view that takes the individual’s external world into account (Levine & Perkins, 1987;
Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, 2009). Unlike the medical model, this view sees abnormality
labeling Refers to the undesirable practice of
attaching diagnoses of mental disorders to people and
then using them as stereotypes—treating the
afflicted individuals as if the labels explained their
whole personalities. Psychiatric labels can also
stigmatize people.
depersonalization Depriving people of their
identity and individuality by treating them as objects
rather than as individuals. Depersonalization can be a
result of labeling.
ecological view A perspective on mental disorder
that emphasizes social and cultural context.

What Are the Consequences of Labeling People? 547
as an interaction between individuals and their social and cultural context. Disorder
results from a mismatch between a person’s behavior and the needs of the situation. If
you are a private investigator, for example, it might pay to have a slightly suspicious or
paranoid complexion to your personality, but if you are a nurse or a teacher, this same
characteristic might be called “deviant.”
In support of this ecological view, studies show beyond doubt that culture influ-
ences both the prevalence of psychological disorders and the symptoms that disturbed
people display (Jenkins & Barrett, 2004; Matsumoto, 1996). For example, work done
by the World Health Organization (1973, 1979) in Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, India, Nigeria, Taiwan, Britain, the United States, and the former USSR has
shown that the incidence of schizophrenia varies from culture to culture. More recent
studies also support this conclusion (Jablensky, 2000).
Psychiatry, too, is beginning to note the effects of culture on psychopathology. The
DSM-IV, in fact, has a section devoted to culture-specific disorders (although this sec-
tion recognizes no disorders that are found specifically in the United States). According
to psychiatrists Arthur Kleinman and Alex Cohen (1997), psychiatry has clung too
long to three persistent myths:
1. The myth that mental disorders have a similar prevalence the world around.
2. The myth that biology creates mental disorder while culture merely shapes the
way a person experiences it.
3. The myth that culture-specific disorders occur only in exotic places rather than
at home.
But are cultural differences so great that a person who hallucinates might be
labeled as having schizophrenia in our culture but a visionary or shaman (a healer
or seer) in another? Jane Murphy (1976) set out to answer this question in a study
of two non-Western groups, the Eskimos of northwest Alaska and the Yorubas of
rural tropical Nigeria, societies selected because of their wide geographic separa-
tion and cultural dissimilarity. In both groups, she found separate terms and dis-
tinct social roles for the shaman and for the psychotic individual. Similar findings
have since come from studies of cultures all over the world (Draguns, 1980). If
mental illness is a socially defined myth, as Szasz asserts, it is a myth nurtured by
cultures everywhere.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Don’t do it! Don’t use your new knowledge of psychological disorders to diagnose
your family and friends. Violating this caveat has caused grief for many an eager
psychology student.
We realize how tempting it is to apply what you are learning to the people in your
life. Some of the disorders that we have considered here are common. So, as you read
through this chapter, you almost certainly have noticed signs of anxiety, paranoia,
depression, mania, and various other impairments of perception, memory, or emotion
that remind you of your friends and relatives. It is a variation on the tendency, discussed
earlier, to see evidence of psychological disorder in oneself. You should recognize this
as a sign that you are acquiring some new knowledge about psycholopathology. But
we suggest that you keep these thoughts to yourself.
Remember that reading one chapter does not make you an expert on psychologi-
cal disorders; so you should be cautious about making amateur diagnoses. What you
especially should not do is to tell someone that you think he or she has schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, obsessive–compulsive disorder—or any other mental condition.
about Personality and Mental
Disorder in Africa
Read
at MyPsychLab

548 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Insane Places Revisited—Another Look at the Rosenhan Study
2. ANALYSIS: Why did Rosenhan claim that mental patients are
depersonalized?
3. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: What are the
positive and negative consequences of diagnostic labeling?
Answers 1. d 2. Rosenhan found that the mental hospital staff rarely interacted with the patients; when they did, they treated the patients as objects
or labels, not as persons. 3. On the positive side, diagnostic labels help mental health professionals communicate about patients’ symptoms and
formulate a treatment plan. On the negative side, people who are labeled can be looked upon as a mere label (“a schizophrenic”). In addition,
psychiatric labels carry a strong social stigma.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: Which one of the following statements is true?
a. Mental disorders have a similar prevalence in all cultures.
b. In general, biology creates mental disorder, while culture merely
shapes the way a person experiences it.
c. Culture-specific stressors occur primarily in developing
countries.
d. Cultures around the world seem to distinguish between people
with mental disorders and people who are visionaries or
prophets.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab
Probably no other experiment in the history of psychology has caused such a furor as did Rosenhan’s “pseudopatient”
study. And no wonder: By raising questions about the reliabil-
ity of psychiatric diagnosis, it threatened the very foundations
of psychiatry and clinical psychology. Rosenhan summarized
his study by saying, “It is clear that we cannot distinguish the
sane from the insane in psychiatric hospitals.” If Rosenhan
was right, the whole mental health enterprise might be built
on nothing but opinion. But was this the correct conclusion?
What Are the Critical Issues?
Our first task in evaluating Rosenhan is to identify the issues
at the heart of the controversy. For Rosenhan, the issue was
the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis and the question of
whether mental disorder can be distinguished from normalcy.
But his critics have claimed that his study was flawed. Let’s
examine their main arguments.
Insanity Is Not a Diagnosis Robert Spitzer (1973),
the leader of the charge against Rosenhan, pointed out
that sanity and insanity are legal terms, as we have seen.
Because these terms have no meaning in psychology or psy-
chiatry, says Spitzer, Rosenhan’s argument is essentially mean-
ingless. While we can agree that Rosenhan was indeed sloppy
with his terminology, your authors suggest that his conclusion
has the effect of tossing the baby out with the bath water. In
fact, Spitzer admits that Rosenhan apparently uses insanity to
mean psychosis. Score one point for Rosenhan.
Unfair! Rosenhan’s critics also claimed that the study was
unfair because people don’t usually lie about their symptoms
because they want to be admitted to mental hospitals. So we
should not fault a psychiatrist for assuming that a person ask-
ing for help is sincere. Moreover, doctors and hospitals can be
held liable if they don’t admit people who might pose a dan-
ger to themselves or the community (Ostow, 1973). Rosenhan
Having said that, we should also note that erring too far in the opposite direc-
tion by ignoring signs of pathology could also be hazardous. If someone you know
is struggling with significant mental problems—and even if he or she asks for your
opinion—you should refrain from putting a label on the problem. But you can—and
should—encourage that person to see a competent professional for diagnosis and possible
treatment.
We will discuss more about how such treatment is done—in the next chapter.

are labeled, medicated, and ignored by the staff. Most of the
time, Rosenhan found, ward attendants and nurses seques-
tered themselves in a small staff cubicle that patients called
“the cage.” Psychiatrists were even less available, making only
rare appearances on the wards. When patients approached
staff members with questions, they often received curt replies
or were ignored.
Rosenhan was not the first person to decry mental hospi-
tals as impersonal places, but he did offer reasons as to why
this might be so. One rests on society’s attitudes toward the
mentally ill, attitudes that are colored by fear, distrust, and
misunderstanding. These attitudes, said Rosenhan, have an
effect on mental health workers.
A second factor involves labeling: the pernicious effect of
a psychiatric diagnosis. Once they make a diagnosis, doctors
are extremely reluctant to change their minds. Part of the rea-
son has to do with pride, but an even bigger problem stems
from the lack of contact the staff—and especially the doc-
tors—have with patients. Therapy in mental hospitals, then,
is largely a matter of medications.
As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, Rosenhan
does not fault the doctors, nurses, ward attendants, or other
staff members. He suggested that the problem lay in “the
situation”—the whole hospital environment, which dep-
ersonalizes patients and discourages staff from interacting
with patients. But that was 1973. What about now? Do these
problems still plague mental hospitals?
A New Controversy Erupts A brand new controversy
erupted in 2005, with the publication of a book entitled
Opening Skinner’s Box. In it, author Lauren Slater describes
her own reenactment of Rosenhan’s classic experiment. In
nine visits to different mental hospitals, Slater told doctors
that she heard a voice saying, “Thud.” Although she was
never hospitalized, she claims that she was “prescribed a
total of 25 antipsychotics and 60 antidepressants.” In most
cases, she was diagnosed as having “depression with psy-
chotic features.” Slater asserts that her experience supports
Rosenhan.
Slater’s assertion did not go unnoticed by Robert Spitzer,
a critic who still sees the Rosenhan experiment as “an em-
barrassment” (Jaffe, 2006). Spitzer and two of his colleagues
responded with a critique of Slater published in the Journal
of Nervous and Mental Disease (2005). In that piece, they
fired back a salvo consisting of their own study, in which they
provided 74 psychiatrists with a written vignette based on
Slater’s “experiment.” They claim that only three gave a diag-
nosis of psychotic depression. (We would note, however, that
Slater’s experiment has its own biases.)
The bottom line? Rosenhan put his finger on some
important problems with mental hospitals and psychiatric
diagnoses. But he did not prove that diagnoses of most men-
tal patients are useless or completely unreliable. And, for our
purposes, that conclusion makes the perfect transition to the
next chapter, where we will study the treatment of mental
disorders.
countered that, even if the doctors were erring on the side of
caution, the fact that the patients were “sane” should have
been detected, if not at admission, then at some time during
their hospitalization. We score a tie on this one.
Not Enough Data A third criticism targets the narrative
approach Rosenhan used in his report of the pseudopatient
study. The article tells a vivid story, but it is, in fact, sparse
in data. Rosenhan’s conclusions are mostly driven by his
impressions rather than by facts—an irony, in view of his
criticism of psychiatric diagnosis as contaminated by un-
reliable “impressions.” We award this one to Rosenhan’s
critics.
Conclusions Applied to the Wrong Group A fourth and
most telling criticism accuses Rosenhan of making a rookie
error. The failure of psychiatrists to detect “sanity” in the
pseudopatients, said Spitzer (1973), tells us nothing about
their ability to diagnose real patients—who aren’t lying
about their symptoms. True enough. But Rosenhan (1973b)
replied that his study is only one small part of a vast lit-
erature attesting to the unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis:
Different psychiatrists quite commonly give different diag-
noses to the same patient. We give Rosenhan the edge on
this point.
Bias We can see the dispute as one between two camps
that each perceived themselves under siege by the other. Psy-
chiatrists thought the original study was a frontal assault on
the integrity of their profession, so they responded in kind.
The counterattack on Rosenhan impugned his integrity as
a researcher. The relevant critical thinking question: Could
each side’s stance be contaminated by bias? The answer is a
resounding Yes.
So, where does that leave us?
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Without doubt, Rosenhan (1973a) is guilty of using the terms
sane and insane inappropriately. He is also guilty of over-
statement and sensationalism, as when he says:
The facts of the matter are that we have known for
a long time that [psychiatric] diagnoses are often not
useful or reliable, but we have nevertheless continued
to use them. We now know that we cannot distinguish
insanity from sanity (p. 257).
Even so, the fact that not one of the pseudopatients was ever
discovered to be mentally sound is a startling finding.
Power of the Situation in Mental Hospitals More im-
portant, in our opinion, is a point to which the critics did not
respond: Mental hospitals, said Rosenhan, are not primarily
places of treatment. Rather, they are places in which patients
What Are the Consequences of Labeling People? 549

• The “medical model,” embodied in the DSM-IV, views mental
disorders as specific diseases. The DSM-IV specifies mental
and behavioral symptoms of over 300 mental disorders,
classified on five axes. This classification system is widely
used by the psychiatric community and other mental health
professionals.
• The medical model is not universally accepted, however,
especially by psychologists, who prefer to view mental disorder
from a combination of biological, cognitive, social, behavioral,
and developmental perspectives.
from the three classic signs of disorder, psychopathology is
usually judged by the degree to which a person exhibits dis-
tress, maladaptiveness, irrationality, unpredictability, and
unconventionality.
It is normal to experience symptoms of psychological dis-
orders on occasion, so psychology students are often unjusti-
fiably concerned that they have a mental disorder. Frequent
signs of abnormality, however, should prompt a consultation
with a mental health professional.
The plea of insanity is often misunderstood by the pub-
lic, because it is infrequently used and even more infrequently
successful. The term insanity is a legal term, not a psychologi-
cal or psychiatric diagnosis.
delusions (p. 517)
hallucinations (p. 517)
affective disturbances (p. 517)
insanity (p. 523)
medical model (p. 519)
psychopathology (p. 517)
12.1 What Is Psychological Disorder?
Core Concept 12.1 The medical model views
psychological disorders as “diseases,” while the
psychological view sees them as an interaction of biological,
behavioral, cognitive, and social-cultural factors.
Psychopathology is common in America. Three classic signs
suggest severe psychological disorder: hallucinations, delusions,
and extreme affective disturbances. But beyond these, the signs
of disorder are more subtle, and a diagnosis depends heavily
on clinical judgment.
Our modern conception of abnormality has evolved from
attributing disorders to demon possession or imbalances of
humors to the current medical model, which sees psychopa-
thology as “illness” or “disease”—a perspective with which
many psychologists disagree. An alternative psychologi-
cal model includes social-cultural, cognitive, developmen-
tal, and behavioral factors as well as biological ones. Aside
RELATING DISORDERS TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THEY DISRUPT
Disrupted Processes Psychological Disorders
Learning phobia
Sensation and Perception
Emotion phobia
Personality and Self-concept
Development ADHD
Memory and Cognition
Socialization
CHAPTER SUMMARY
550 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
Every disorder involves a distortion or break-
down in one or more of the basic psycho-
logical functions, or processes, for which we
have named chapters in this text. (You will
remember that Wundt called them the “ele-
ments of conscious experience.”) It will help
you understand the disorders described in
this chapter if, in the following table, you will
write in the names of the disorders described
in this chapter next to the process that is
most disrupted by each. (You may place some
disorders in more than one category and more
than one disorder in each category.) We have
written in a few to get you started.
CHAPTER PROBLEM: Is it possible to distinguish mental
disorder from merely unusual behavior? That is, are there specific
signs that clearly indicate mental disorder?
• The line between mental disorder and merely unusual behavior
is fuzzy. Everyone agrees that distress, maladaptiveness,
irrationality, unpredictability, unconventionality, and undesirable
behavior may be symptoms of mental disorder. There are no
precise diagnostic tests for most mental disorders. Moreover,
the causes of most mental disorders are either disputed or
unknown.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

12.2 How Are Psychological Disorders
Classified in the DSM-IV?
Core Concept 12.2 The DSM-IV, the most widely used
system for classifying mental disorders, organizes them by
their mental and behavioral symptoms.
The DSM-IV derives from psychiatry and has a bias toward
the medical model. The DSM-IV recognizes more than 300
specific disorders, categorized by symptoms rather than by
cause. It has no category for “normal” functioning. Unlike its
predecessor, it does not use the term neurosis; the term psy-
chosis is restricted to a loss of contact with reality.
Among the DSM-IV categories are the mood disorders
(affective disorders), which involve emotional disturbances.
Major depression is the most common affective disorder, while
bipolar disorder occurs less commonly. Strong gender differ-
ences have also been noted. All severe mental disorders are
believed to have some biological basis.
The anxiety disorders include generalized anxiety disor-
der, panic disorder, phobias, and obsessive–compulsive disorder.
Although they may have some basis in temperament, they are
also affected by experience. The somatoform disorders involve
the mind–body relationship in various ways. People with con-
version disorder have physical symptoms but no organic dis-
ease, while those with hypochondriasis suffer from exaggerated
concern about illness.
The controversial dissociative disorders include dissocia-
tive amnesia, dissociative fugue, depersonalization disorder, and
dissociative identity disorder. All disrupt the integrated
functioning of memory, consciousness, or personal identity.
Among the psychotic disorders, schizophrenia is the most
common. It is characterized by extreme distortions in
perception, thinking, emotion, behavior, and language. It has
five forms: disorganized, catatonic, paranoid, undifferentiated,
and residual types. Evidence for the causes of schizophrenia
has been found in a variety of factors including genetics,
abnormal brain structure, and biochemistry.
The DSM-IV also lists a variety of developmental disor-
ders, including autism, dyslexia, and attention-deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder, which typically emerge as a distortion of the
normal developmental processes, such as socialization, cog-
nition, and attention. By contrast, the personality disorders
involve distorted personality traits. Among the common-
est are narcissistic personality disorder, antisocial personality
disorder, and borderline personality disorder. There are sig-
nificant gender differences across the spectrum of mental
disorder, especially in depression and antisocial personality
disorder.
The most common disorders of all are classified in the
DSM-IV as the adjustment disorders and “other conditions
that may be a focus of clinical attention.” These include a
wide range of problems in living. Shyness is a widespread
problem—and a treatable one—but it is not officially a disor-
der unless it goes to the extreme of a social phobia or avoid-
ant personality disorder.
agoraphobia (p. 531)
antisocial personality disorder (p. 543)
anxiety disorders (p. 530)
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (p. 542)
autism (p. 541)
bipolar disorder (p. 529)
borderline personality disorder (p. 543)
conversion disorder (p. 534)
depersonalization disorder (p. 536)
diathesis–stress hypothesis (p. 540)
dissociative amnesia (p. 535)
dissociative disorders (p. 535)
dissociative fugue (p. 536)
dissociative identity disorder (p. 536)
DSM-IV (p. 524)
dyslexia (p. 542)
generalized anxiety disorder (p. 531)
hypochondriasis (p. 535)
learned helplessness (p. 529)
major depression (p. 526)
mood disorders (p. 526)
narcissistic personality disorder (p. 543)
neurosis (p. 525)
obsessive–compulsive disorder (p. 533)
panic disorder (p. 531)
personality disorder (p. 542)
phobias (p. 532)
preparedness hypothesis (p. 533)
psychosis (p. 525)
schizophrenia (p. 537)
seasonal affective disorder (SAD) (p. 528)
rumination (p. 529)
shyness (p. 544)
somatoform disorders (p. 534)
12.3 What Are the Consequences
of Labeling People?
Core Concept 12.3 Ideally, accurate diagnoses lead to
proper treatments, but diagnoses may also become labels
that depersonalize individuals and ignore the social and
cultural contexts in which their problems arise.
Labeling someone as psychologically or mentally disordered is
ultimately a matter of human judgment. Yet even professional
judgments can be biased by prejudices. Those labeled with
psychological disorders may suffer depersonalization in ways
that most physically ill people do not.
Culture has an effect on whether a behavior is called nor-
mal, abnormal, or merely unusual, although cross-cultural re-
search suggests that people everywhere distinguish between
Chapter Summary 551

552 C H A P T E R 1 2 Psychological Disorders
depersonalization (p. 546)
ecological view (p. 546)
labeling (p. 546)
psychotic individuals and those whom they label shamans,
prophets, or visionaries.
Ideally, accurate diagnoses lead to proper treatments, but
diagnoses may also become labels that depersonalize individ-
uals and ignore the social and cultural contexts in which their
problems arise. Readers are cautioned not to apply diagnostic
labels to people.
Program Review
1. Psychopathology is defined as the study of
a. organic brain disease.
b. perceptual and cognitive illusions.
c. clinical measures of abnormal functioning.
d. mental disorders.
2. What is the key criterion for identifying a person as having a men-
tal disorder?
a. The person has problems.
b. The person’s functioning is clearly abnormal.
c. The person’s ideas challenge the status quo.
d. The person makes other people feel uncomfortable.
3. Which is true about mental disorders?
a. They are extremely rare, with less than one-tenth of 1 percent
of Americans suffering from any form of mental illness.
b. They are not that uncommon, with about one-fifth of Americans
suffering from some form of recently diagnosed mental disorder.
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the videos, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 21: PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
c. The number of Americans with psychotic disorders fluctuates
with the calendar, with more cases of psychosis during the
weekends than during weekdays.
d. The actions of people with mental disorders are
unpredictable.
4. Fran is a mental health specialist who has a PhD in psychology.
She would be classified as a
a. psychiatrist. c. social psychologist.
b. clinical psychologist. d. psychoanalyst.
5. What happened after David Rosenhan and his colleagues were
admitted to mental hospitals by pretending to have hallucinations
and then behaved normally?
a. Their sanity was quickly observed by the staff.
b. It took several days for their deception to be realized.
c. In most cases, the staff disagreed with each other about these
“patients.”
d. Nobody ever detected their sanity.
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Insane Places Revisited—Another Look at the Rosenhan Study
was sparse on data; and still others noted that the results didn’t
apply to patients with real mental disorders. Nevertheless,
Rosenhan’s study did point up the power of the situation and
labeling to skew professional judgment in mental hospitals.
Rosenhan’s “pseudopatient” study drew fire from many critics
in the psychiatric community. Some objected that “insane” is
not a diagnosis; some said it was unfair that the pseudopatients
lied about psychotic symptoms; others noted that the study

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 553
6. Olivia is experiencing dizziness, muscle tightness, shaking, and
tremors. She is feeling apprehensive. These symptoms most
resemble those found in cases of
a. anxiety disorders. c. psychoses.
b. affective disorders. d. schizophrenia.
7. Prior to the 18th century, people with psychological problems
were most likely to be
a. placed in a mental hospital.
b. tortured, trained, or displayed for public amusement.
c. encouraged to pursue the arts.
d. treated through psychotherapy only.
8. When Sigmund Freud studied patients with anxiety, he
determined that their symptoms were caused by
a. actual childhood abuse, both physical and sexual.
b. imbalances in body chemistry.
c. childhood conflicts that had been repressed.
d. cognitive errors in the way patients viewed the world.
9. Which of the following statements about clinical depression is true?
a. Most depressed people commit suicide.
b. Depression is characterized by excessive elation of mood.
c. Depression is often called the cancer of mental illness.
d. In its milder forms, depression is experienced by almost
everyone.
10. People lose touch with reality in cases of
a. neurosis but not psychosis.
b. psychosis but not neurosis.
c. both psychosis and neurosis.
d. all psychoses and some neuroses.
11. The term neurosis is no longer used by psychologists and psychia-
trists as a diagnostic category because
a. it has been replaced by the term psychosis.
b. it is generally understood by everyone in our society.
c. it does not include chronic anxiety.
d. it is considered too general and imprecise.
12. Irving Gottesman and Fuller Torrey have been studying twins to learn
more about schizophrenia. If the brain of a twin with schizophrenia
is compared with the brain of a normal twin, the former has
a. less cerebrospinal fluid.
b. larger ventricles.
c. a larger left hemisphere.
d. exactly the same configuration as the latter.
13. For Teresa LaFromboise, the major issue influencing mental disor-
ders among Native Americans is
a. the prevalence of genetic disorders.
b. alcohol’s impact on family structure.
c. the effect of imposing White American culture.
d. isolation due to rural settings.
14. According to experts, what proportion of Americans suffer from
some form of mental illness?
a. about one-fifth
b. less than one in 10,000
c. about two-thirds
d. about one in 1,000
15. Which of the following people would argue that psychopathology
is a myth?
a. Philippe Pinel
b. Thomas Szasz
c. Teresa LaFromboise
d. Sigmund Freud
16. What might a severe viral infection do to a woman who has a
genetic predisposition toward schizophrenia?
a. make her schizophrenic
b. destroy the genetic marker and make her mentally more
stable
c. redirect the predisposition toward a different class of mental
illness
d. kill her with greater likelihood than if she did not have a
predisposition toward mental illness
17. Which of the following has been nicknamed “the common cold of
psychopathology” because of its frequency?
a. phobia
b. personality disorder
c. schizophrenia
d. depression
18. All of the following are typically true about schizophrenia, except
that
a. less than one-third improve with treatment.
b. the people who have it are aware that they are mentally ill.
c. about 1 percent of the world’s total population is
schizophrenic.
d. it is associated with impaired thinking, emotion, and
perception.
19. Who is credited as being the first to introduce the idea that
insane people are ill?
a. Sigmund Freud
b. Jean Charcot
c. Emil Kraepelin
d. Philippe Pinel
20. Which of the following is characterized by boundless energy,
optimism, and risk-taking behavior?
a. a manic episode
b. paranoid schizophrenia
c. anxiety disorders
d. depression

Therapies for
Psychological Disorders13
Psychology MattersCore Concepts
Key Questions/
Chapter Outline
Therapy for psychological disorders
takes a variety of forms, but all involve
a therapeutic relationship focused
on improving a person’s mental,
behavioral, or social functioning.
Paraprofessionals Do
Therapy Too
Some studies show that the therapist’s
level of training is not the main factor
in therapeutic effectiveness.
13.2 How Do Psychologists Treat
Psychological Disorders?
Insight Therapies
Behavior Therapies
Cognitive–Behavioral Therapy: A Synthesis
Evaluating the Psychological Therapies
Psychologists employ two main forms
of treatment, the insight therapies
(focused on developing understanding
of the problem) and the behavior
therapies (focused on changing
behavior through conditioning).
Where Do Most People
Get Help?
A lot of therapy is done by friends,
hairdressers, and bartenders.
Biomedical therapies seek to treat
psychological disorders by changing
the brain’s chemistry with drugs, its
circuitry with surgery, or its patterns
of activity with pulses of electricity or
powerful magnetic fields.
What Sort of Therapy Would
You Recommend?
There is a wide range of therapeutic
possibilities to discuss with a friend
who asks for your recommendation.
CHAPTER PROBLEM What is the best treatment for Derek’s depression:
psychological therapy, drug therapy, or both? More broadly, the problem is this: How
do we decide among the available therapies for any of the mental disorders?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Evidence-Based Practice
13.3 How Is the Biomedical Approach
Used to Treat Psychological
Disorders?
Drug Therapy
Other Medical Therapies for Psychological
Disorders
Hospitalization and the Alternatives
13.4 How Do the Psychological
Therapies and Biomedical
Therapies Compare?
Depression and Anxiety Disorders:
Psychological versus Medical Treatment
Schizophrenia: Psychological versus
Medical Treatment
“The Worried Well” and Other Problems:
Not Everyone Needs Drugs
While a combination of psychological
and medical therapies is often better
than either one alone for treating
some (but not all) mental disorders,
most people who have unspecified
“problems in living” are best served by
psychological treatment alone.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
Consider the ways in which therapy is
like your college experience.
13.1 What Is Therapy?
Entering Therapy
The Therapeutic Alliance and the Goals of
Therapy
Therapy in Historical and Cultural Context

555
O FF AND ON, DEREK HAD FELT TIRED AND UNHAPPY FOR MONTHS, AND he knew it was affecting not only his work but also the relationship with his partner. Michele, a coworker and friend, tactfully suggested he seek professional help, but Derek was unsure where to turn. As many people do, he asked for a
recommendation from another friend, who he knew had sought therapy three years ago. And
that is how he ended up, somewhat apprehensively, at Dr. Sturm’s office.
She was easy to talk to, it turned out, and it didn’t take long for both of them to agree
that Derek was depressed. After some conversation about the nature of depression, Dr. Sturm
said, “We have several treatment alternatives.” She added, “The one in which I am trained is
cognitive-behavioral therapy, which approaches depression as a learned problem to be treated
by changing the way a person thinks about life events and interpersonal relationships. If we
take that route, we will explore what is happening at work and at home that might trigger de-
pressive episodes. I would also give you ‘homework’ every week—assignments designed to help
you build on your strengths, rather than focusing on your weaknesses. Just like school,” she
added with a little laugh.
“As a second option,” she said, “I could refer you to a colleague who does psychodynamic
therapy. If you choose that approach, you and Dr. Ewing would explore your past, looking for
events that may have pushed you down the path to the feelings you are experiencing now. Es-
sentially, it would be a treatment aimed at bringing some unpleasant parts of your unconscious
mind into the light of day.”
“The other thing I could do is to arrange to get you some medication that has been proven
effective in treating depression. It would probably be one of those antidepressants, like Prozac,

556 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
that you have seen advertised in magazines and on TV. The problem there is that it takes several
weeks for them to have an effect. And, besides, I’m not sure they really treat the problems that keep
making you feel depressed.”
“Oh, yes,” she added, “There are some additional medical options, such as electroconvul-
sive therapy—people often call it ‘shock treatment,’ but I don’t think it is needed in your case.”
“Just hearing that makes me feel better,” Derek sighed. “So, the choice is between drugs
and psychological therapy?”
“Or perhaps a combination of the two,” replied Dr. Sturm.
“How do I decide?” Derek asked.
PROBLEM: What is the best treatment for Derek’s depression: psychological therapy,
drug therapy, or both? More broadly, the problem is this: How do we decide among the
available therapies for any of the mental disorders?
Despite the diversity of approaches that Dr. Sturm and her colleagues bring to their work,
the overwhelming majority of people who enter therapy receive significant help. Not everyone
becomes a success case, of course. Some people wait too long, until their problems become
intractable. Some do not end up with the right sort of therapy for their problems. And, unfor-
tunately, many people who could benefit from therapy do not get it because of the cost. Still,
the development of a wide range of effective therapies is one of the success stories in modern
psychology.
As you read through this chapter, we hope you will weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of each therapy we discuss. Keep in mind, too, that you may sometime be asked by a friend or
relative to use what you, like Derek, have learned here to recommend an appropriate therapy.
It’s even possible that you may sometime need to select a therapist for yourself.
13.1 KEY QUESTION
What Is Therapy?
When you think of “therapy,” chances are that a stereotype pops into mind, absorbed
from countless cartoons and movies: a “neurotic” patient lying on a couch, with a
bearded therapist sitting by the patient’s head, scribbling notes and making interpre-
tations. In fact, this is a scene from classic Freudian psychoanalysis, which is a rarity
today, although it dominated the first half of the 20th century.
The reality of modern therapy differs from the old stereotype on several counts.
First, most therapists don’t have their patients (or clients) lie on a couch. Second, people
now seek therapeutic help for a wide range of problems besides the serious DSM-IV
disorders: Counselors or therapists also provide help in making difficult choices,
dealing with academic problems, and coping with losses or unhappy relationships.
And a third way in which the popular image of therapy is mistaken: Some forms of
therapy now involve as much action as they do talk and interpretation—as you will
see shortly.
At first, the therapeutic menu may appear to offer a bewildering list of choices.
But you will see that one constant threads through them all—as our Core Concept
suggests:
Core Concept 13.1
Therapy for psychological disorders takes a variety of forms, but all
involve a therapeutic relationship focused on improving a person’s
mental, behavioral, or social functioning.
therapy A general term for any treatment process;
in psychology and psychiatry, therapy refers to a variety
of psychological and biomedical techniques aimed at
dealing with mental disorders or coping with problems
of living.

What Is Therapy? 557
Let’s set the stage for our exploration of these many therapies by looking at the variety
of people who enter treatment and the problems they bring with them to the therapeu-
tic relationship.
Entering Therapy
Why would you go into therapy? Why would anyone? Most often, people enter ther-
apy when they have a problem that they are unable to resolve by themselves. They may
seek therapy on their own initiative, or they may be advised to do so by family, friends,
a physician, or a coworker.
Obviously, you don’t have to be declared “crazy” to enter therapy. But you may be
called either a “patient” or a “client.” Practitioners who take a biological or medical
model approach to treatment commonly use the term patient, while the term client
is usually used by professionals who think of psychological disorders not as mental
illnesses but as problems in living (Rogers, 1951; Szasz, 1961).
Access to therapy depends on several factors. People who have money or adequate
health insurance can get therapy easily. For the poor, especially poor ethnic minori-
ties, economic obstacles block the doorway to professional mental health care (Bower,
1998d; Nemecek, 1999). Another problem can be lack of qualified therapists. In many
communities, it is still much easier to get help for physical health problems than for
psychological problems. Even the nature of a person’s psychological problems can inter-
fere with getting help. An individual with agoraphobia, for example, finds it hard, even
impossible, to leave home to seek therapy. Similarly, persons with paranoia may not
seek help because they don’t trust mental health professionals. Obviously, many difficul-
ties stand in the way of getting therapy to all those who need it.
The Therapeutic Alliance and the Goals of Therapy
Sometimes, you simply need to talk out a problem with a sympathetic friend or family
member, perhaps just to “hear yourself think.” But friends and family not only lack the
training to deal with difficult mental problems; they also have needs and agendas of
their own that can interfere with helping you. In fact, they may sometimes be part of
the problem. For many reasons, then, it may be appropriate to seek the help of a pro-
fessionally trained therapist. You might also want professional help if you wish to keep
your problems and concerns confidential. In all these ways, a professional relationship
with a therapist differs from friendship or kinship.
What Are the Components of Therapy? In nearly all forms of therapy there is some
sort of relationship, or therapeutic alliance, between the therapist and the client seeking
assistance—as our Core Concept indicates. In fact, the quality of the therapeutic alliance
is the biggest single factor in the effectiveness of therapy (Wampold & Brown, 2005).
(We must admit, however, that there are experimental computer-therapy programs,
where the idea of a “relationship” is stretching the point.)
What makes for a good therapeutic alliance? You and your therapist must be able
to work together as allies, on the same side and toward the same goals, joining forces
to cope with and solve the problems that have brought you to therapy (Horvath &
Luborsky, 1993). Accordingly, trust and empathy are two of the essential ingredients.
And, as clinicians have become more aware of gender and ethnic diversity among their
clientele, research has shown that the most effective therapists are those who can con-
nect with people in the context of their own culture, experience, and native language
(Griner & Smith, 2006).
In addition to the relationship between therapist and client, the therapy process
typically involves the following steps:
1. Identifying the problem. This may mean merely agreeing on a simple description of
circumstances or feelings to be changed, or, in the case of a DSM-IV disorder, this
step may lead to a formal diagnosis about what is wrong.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
The medical model assumes that
mental disorders are similar to
physical diseases (p. 519).
therapeutic alliance The relationship between
the therapist and the client, with both parties working
together to help the client deal with mental or
behavioral issues.

558 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
2. Identifying the cause of the problem or the conditions that maintain the problem. In some
forms of therapy, this involves searching the past, especially childhood, for the
source of the patient’s or client’s discomfort. Alternatively, other forms of therapy
emphasize the present causes—that is, the conditions that are keeping the problem
alive.
3. Deciding on and carrying out some form of treatment. This step requires selecting a
specific type of therapy designed to minimize or eliminate the troublesome symp-
toms. The exact treatment will depend on the nature of the problem and on the
therapist’s orientation and training.
Who Does Therapy? Although more people seek out therapy now than in the past,
they usually turn to trained mental health professionals only when their psychologi-
cal problems become severe or persist for extended periods. And when they do, they
usually turn to one of seven main types of professional helpers: counseling psycholo-
gists, clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, psychiatric nurse practi-
tioners, clinical (psychiatric) social workers, or pastoral counselors. The differences
among these specialties are highlighted in Table 13.1. As you examine this table, note
that each specialty has its own area of expertise. For example, in most states, the only
therapists who are licensed to prescribe drugs are physicians (including psychiatrists)
and psychiatric nurse practitioners.
TABLE 13.1 Types of Mental Health Care Professionals
Professional Title Specialty and Common
Work Settings
Credentials and Qualifications
Counseling psychologist Provides help in dealing with the common
problems of normal living, such as relationship
problems, child rearing, occupational choice,
and school problems. Typically counselors work
in schools, clinics, or other institutions.
Depends on the state: typically at least a
master’s in counseling, but commonly private
practice requires a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy),
EdD (Doctor of Education), or PsyD (Doctor of
Psychology).
Clinical psychologist Trained primarily to work with those who have
more severe disorders, but may also work with
clients having less-severe problems; usually in
private practice or employed by mental health
agencies or by hospitals; not typically licensed
to prescribe drugs.
Usually required to hold PhD or PsyD; often an
internship and state certification are required.
Psychiatrist A physician with a specialty in treating mental
problems—most often by prescribing drugs;
may be in private practice or employed by
clinics or mental hospitals.
MD (Doctor of Medicine); may be required to be
certified by medical specialty board.
Psychoanalyst Practitioners of Freudian therapy; usually in
private practice.
MD (some practitioners have doctorates in
psychology, but most are psychiatrists who have
taken additional training in psychoanalysis.)
Psychiatric nurse practitioner A nursing specialty; licensed to prescribe
drugs for mental disorders; may work in private
practice or in clinics and hospitals.
Requires RN (Registered Nurse) credential,
plus special training in treating mental
disorders and prescribing drugs.
Clinical or psychiatric social worker Social workers with a specialty in dealing with
mental disorders, especially from the viewpoint
of the social and environmental context of the
problem.
MSW (Master of Social Work).
Pastoral counsellor A member of a religious order or ministry
who specializes in treatment of psychological
disorders; combines spiritual guidance with
practical counseling.
Varies.

What Is Therapy? 559
Currently, through their professional organizations, clinical psychologists are seek-
ing to obtain prescription privileges (Sternberg, 2003). In fact, New Mexico now
grants prescription privileges to civilian psychologists who have completed a rigorous
training program, including 850 hours of course work and a supervised internship
(Dittmann, 2003). Similar legislation has been introduced in more than a dozen other
states. Meanwhile, the U.S. military has embraced prescription privileges for psycholo-
gists (Dittmann, 2004). Nevertheless, the issue remains highly political, contested
especially by the medical profession (Fox et al., 2009). Even some clinical psycholo-
gists oppose prescription privileges, fearing that psychology will “sell its soul” to
serve a public that demands drug therapy. Said former APA President George Albee
(2006):
The current drive for people who are in practice to become drug prescribers is a
matter of survival. Society has been sold the fallacy that mental/ emotional dis-
orders are all brain diseases that must be treated with drugs. The only way for
psychology practitioners to survive is to embrace this invalid nonsense (p. 3).
Whether or not you agree with Albee, it appears that the era of prescription privi-
leges for properly trained psychologists is coming. It remains to be seen how that will
change the face of psychology.
Therapy in Historical and Cultural Context
How we treat mental disorder depends on how we think about mental disorder. If we
believe, for example, that mental problems are diseases, we will treat them differently
from those who believe that mental problems indicate a flaw in one’s character or the
influence of evil spirits. The way society has treated
people with mental disorders has always depended on
its prevailing beliefs.
History of Therapy As we saw in the previous chap-
ter, people in medieval Europe interpreted mental
disorder as the work of devils and demons. In that
context, then, the job of the “therapist” was to per-
form an exorcism or to “beat the devil” out of the
person with the disorder—to make the body an in-
hospitable place for a spirit or demon. In more mod-
ern times, however, reformers have urged that people
with mental illness be placed in institutions called asy-
lums, where they could be shielded from the stresses
of the world—and from the brutal “therapies” that
had been common in a less-enlightened era. Unfortu-
nately, the ideal of the “insane asylums” was not often
realized.
One of the most infamous of the asylums was
also one of the first: Bethlehem Hospital in London,
where, for a few pence, weekend sightseers could
observe the inmates, who often put on a wild and
noisy “show” for the curious audience. As a result, “Bedlam,” the shortened term
Londoners used for “Bethlehem,” became a word used to describe any noisy,
chaotic place.
In most asylums, inmates received, at best, only custodial care. At worst, they were
neglected or put in cruel restraints, such as cages and chains. Some even received
beatings, cold showers, and other forms of abuse. It’s not hard to guess that such
treatment rarely produced improvement in people suffering from psychological
disorders.
In this painting from the 1730s, we see
the chaos of a cell in the London hospital,
St. Mary of Bethlehem. Here, the upper
classes have paid to see the horrors, the
fiddler who entertains, and the mental
patients chained, tortured, and dehuman-
ized. The chaos of Bethlehem eventually
became synonymous with the corruption
of its name—Bedlam.

560 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
Modern Approaches to Therapy Modern mental health professionals have aban-
doned the old demon model and frankly abusive treatments in favor of therapies based
on psychological and biological theories of mind and behavior. Yet, as we will see, even
modern professionals disagree on the exact causes and the most appropriate treat-
ments—a state of the art that gives us a wide variety of therapies from which to choose.
To help you get an overview of this cluttered therapeutic landscape, here is a preview of
things to come.
The psychological therapies are often called simply psychotherapy.1 They focus
on changing disordered thoughts, feelings, and behavior using psychological tech-
niques (rather than biomedical interventions). And they come in two main forms.
One, called insight therapy, focuses on helping people understand their problems
and change their thoughts, motives, or feelings. The other, known as behavior ther-
apy, focuses primarily on behavior change. In fact, many psychotherapists use a
combination of the two, known as cognitive–behavioral therapy.
In contrast, the biomedical therapies focus on treating mental problems by changing
the underlying biology of the brain, using a variety of drugs, including antidepressants,
tranquilizers, and stimulants. Occasionally the brain may be treated directly with
electromagnetic stimulation or even surgery. Sometimes therapists use a combination
approach involving both drugs and psychotherapy.
Disorder and Therapy in a Cultural Context Ways of thinking about and treating
mental disorder also vary widely across cultures (Matsumoto, 1996). People in indi-
vidualistic Western cultures (that is, from Europe and North America) generally regard
psychological disorders as the result of disease processes, abnormal genetics, distorted
thinking, unhealthy environments, or stressors. But collectivist cultures often have
quite different perspectives (Triandis, 1990; Zaman, 1992). Asian societies may regard
mental disorder as a disconnect between the person and the group. Likewise, many
Africans believe that mental disorder results when an individual becomes estranged
from nature and from the community, including the community of ancestral spirits
(Nobles, 1976; Sow, 1977).
In such cultures, treating mentally disturbed individuals by removing them from
society is unthinkable. Instead, healing takes place in a social context, emphasizing a
distressed person’s beliefs, family, work, and life environment. An African use of group
support in therapy has developed into a procedure called “network therapy,” where a pa-
tient’s entire network of relatives, coworkers, and friends becomes involved in the treat-
ment (Lambo, 1978). Such treatments may also involve traditional shamans working
alongside mental health professionals trained in modern psychology and psychiatry.
Had Derek been in such a culture, he would undoubtedly have received treatment
from a sorcerer or shaman who was assumed to have special mystical powers. His
therapy would have involved ceremonies and rituals that bring emotional intensity and
meaning into the healing process. Combined with the use of symbols, these rituals con-
nect the individual sufferer, the shaman, and the society to supernatural forces to be
won over in the battle against madness (Devereux, 1981; Wallace, 1959).
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Paraprofessionals Do Therapy, Too
Does the best therapy always require a highly trained (and expensive) professional?
Or can paraprofessionals—persons who may have received on-the-job training in place
of graduate training and certification—be effective therapists? If you are seeking
1No sharp distinction exists between counseling and psychotherapy, although in practice counseling usually refers to
a shorter process, more likely to be focused on a specific problem, while psychotherapy generally involves a longer-
term and wider-ranging exploration of issues.
psychological therapy Therapy based on
psychological principles (rather than on the biomedical
approach); often called “psychotherapy.”
biomedical therapy Treatment that focuses on
altering the brain, especially with drugs, psychosurgery,
or electroconvulsive therapy.
paraprofessional Individual who has received
on-the-job training (and, in some cases, undergraduate
training) in mental health treatment in lieu of graduate
education and full professional certification.

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 561
treatment, these questions are important because hospitals, clinics, and agencies are
increasingly turning to paraprofessionals as a cost-cutting measure: Those who lack full
professional credentials can be hired at a fraction of the cost of those with professional
degrees. They are often called “aides” or “counselors” (although many counselors do
have professional credentials).
Surprisingly, a review of the literature has found no substantial differences in the
effectiveness of the two groups across a wide spectrum of psychological problems
(Christensen & Jacobson, 1994). This is good news in the sense that the need for men-
tal health services is far greater than the number of professional therapists can possibly
provide. And, because paraprofessional therapists can be effective, highly trained pro-
fessionals may be freed for other roles, including prevention and community educa-
tion programs, assessment of patients, training and supervision of paraprofessionals,
and research. You should be cautioned about overinterpreting this finding, however.
Professionals and paraprofessionals have been found to be equivalent only in the
realm of the insight therapies, which we will discuss in a moment (Zilbergeld, 1986).
Such differences have not yet been demonstrated in the areas of behavior therapies,
which require extensive knowledge of operant and classical conditioning and of social
learning theory.
13.2 KEY QUESTION
How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders?
In the United States and most other Western nations, the sort of therapy Derek receives
would depend on whether he had gone to a medical or psychological therapist. By
choosing a psychologist like Dr. Sturm, he would almost certainly receive one of the
two types of therapy described by the Core Concept for this section of the chapter:
Core Concept 13.2
Psychologists employ two main forms of treatment, the insight therapies
(focused on developing understanding of the problem) and the behavior
therapies (focused on changing behavior through conditioning).
The insight therapies, we shall see, were the first truly psychological treatments
developed, and for a long time, they were the only psychological therapies available.
Answers 1. the family or community 2. Unlike a friend, a therapist is a professional who (a) is trained in therapeutic techniques, (b) will not bring his
or her own needs into the therapeutic relationship, and (c) will maintain confidentiality. 3. A psychodynamic therapist 4. c
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: People in individualistic cultures often view mental
disorder as a problem originating in a person’s mind. In contrast,
people in collectivist cultures are more likely to see mental disorder
as a symptom of a disconnect between the person and .
2. RECALL: Identify three ways in which the relationship with a
trained therapist would differ from that of a friendship.
3. APPLICATION: Which type of therapist would be most likely to
treat depression by searching for the cause in the unconscious mind?
4. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: In what respect are
all therapies alike?
a. All may be legally administered only by licensed, trained
professionals.
b. All make use of insight into a patient’s problems.
c. All involve the aim of altering the mind, behavior, or social
relationships.
d. All focus on discovering the underlying cause of the patient’s
problem, which is often hidden in the unconscious mind.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

562 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
In recent years, they have been joined by the behavior therapies, which are now among
the most effective tools we have. But it is with the insight therapies that we begin.
Insight Therapies
The insight therapies attempt to change people on the inside—changing the way they
think and feel. Sometimes called talk therapies, these methods share the assumption
that distressed persons need to develop an understanding of the disordered thoughts,
emotions, and motives that underlie their mental difficulties.
The insight therapies come in dozens of different “brands,” but all aim at revealing
and changing a patient’s disturbed mental processes through discussion and interpreta-
tion. Some therapies, like Freudian psychoanalysis, assume that problems lie hidden
deep in the unconscious, so they employ elaborate and time-consuming techniques to
draw them out. Others, like Carl Rogers’s client-centered therapy, minimize the impor-
tance of the unconscious and look for problems in the ways people consciously think
and interact with each other. We have space here to sample only a few of the most
influential ones, beginning with the legendary methods developed by Sigmund Freud
himself.
Freudian Psychoanalysis In the classic Freudian view, psychological problems arise
from tension created in the unconscious mind by forbidden impulses and threatening
memories. Therefore, Freudian therapy, known formally as psychoanalysis, probes the
unconscious in an attempt to bring these issues into the “light of day”—that is, into
consciousness, where they can be rendered harmless. The major goal of psychoanalysis,
then, is to reveal and interpret the unconscious mind’s contents.
To get at unconscious material, Freud sought ways to get around the defenses
the ego has erected to protect itself. One ingenious method called for free associa-
tion, by which the patient would relax and talk about whatever came to mind, while
the therapist would listen, ever alert for veiled references to unconscious needs and
conflicts. Another method involved dream interpretation, which you may recall from
Chapter 8.
With these and other techniques, the psychoanalyst gradually develops a clinical
picture of the problem and proceeds to help the patient understand the unconscious
causes for symptoms. To give you the flavor of this process, we offer Freud’s interpre-
tation of a fascinating case involving a 19-year-old girl diagnosed with “obsessional
neurosis” (now listed in the DSM-IV as obsessive–compulsive disorder). Please bear
in mind that Freud’s ideas no longer represent the mainstream of either psychology
or psychiatry, but they remain important because many of his techniques have carried
over into newer forms of therapy. Freud’s ideas are also important because many of
his concepts, such as ego, repression, the unconscious, identification, and the Oedipus
complex, have become part of our everyday vocabulary. The following case, then—in
which you may find Freud’s interpretations shocking—will give you a sense of the way
psychotherapy began about a century ago and is still practiced by a few orthodox
psychoanalysts.
When Freud’s patient entered treatment, she was causing her parents distress with
a strange bedtime ritual that she performed each night. As part of this obsessional
ritual, she first stopped the large clock in her room and removed other smaller clocks,
including her wristwatch. Then, she placed all vases and flower pots together on her
writing table, so—in her “neurotic” way of thinking—they could not fall and break
during the night. Next, she assured that the door of her room would remain half open
by placing various objects in the doorway. After these precautions, she turned her
attention to the bed, where she was careful to assure that the bolster did not touch
the headboard and a pillow must lie diagonally in the center of the bolster. Then,
she shook the eiderdown in the quilt until all the feathers sank to the foot-end, after
which she meticulously redistributed them evenly again. And, finally, she would crawl
into bed and attempt to sleep with her head precisely in the center of the diagonal
pillow.
insight therapy Psychotherapy in which the
therapist helps the patient/client understand (gain
insight into) his or her problems.
psychoanalysis The form of psychodynamic
therapy developed by Sigmund Freud. The goal of psy-
choanalysis is to release conflicts and memories from
the unconscious.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
The ego defense mechanisms
include repression, regression,
projection, denial, rationalization,
reaction formation, displacement,
and sublimation (p. 431).
c Insight Therapies
• Freudian psychoanalysis
• Neo-Freudian therapies
• Humanistic therapies
• Cognitive therapies
• Group therapies
Sigmund Freud’s study, including the
famous couch (right), is housed in London’s
Freud Museum. The 82-year-old Freud
fled to London in 1938 upon the Nazi
occupation of Austria and died there the
following year.
id
ego
su
pe
re
go
The psychodynamic therapies focus on
the client’s motivation—either conscious
or unconscious.

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 563
To complicate matters, the girl was never sure that she had performed her ritual
properly. She would do and then redo first one and then another aspect of the proce-
dure—even though she acknowledged to Freud that all aspects of her nightly precau-
tions were irrational. The result was that it took the girl about two hours to get ready
for bed each night.
Before you read Freud’s interpretation, you might think about how you would
make sense of such strange behaviors. Now then, in Freud’s (1957/1920) own words,
here is the psychoanalytic interpretation of the case:
The patient gradually learnt to understand that she banished clocks and
watches from her room at night because they were symbols of the female geni-
tals. Clocks, which we know may have other symbolic meanings besides this,
acquire this significance of a genital organ by their relation to periodical pro-
cesses and regular intervals. A woman may be heard to boast that menstruation
occurs in her as regularly as clockwork. Now this patient’s special fear was that
the ticking of the clocks would disturb her during sleep. The ticking of a clock
is comparable to the throbbing of the clitoris in sexual excitation. This sensa-
tion, which was distressing to her, had actually on several occasions wakened
her from sleep; now her fear of an erection of the clitoris expressed itself by the
imposition of a rule to remove all going clocks and watches far away from her
during the night. Flower-pots and vases are, like all receptacles, also symbols of
the female genitals. Precautions to prevent them from falling and breaking dur-
ing the night are therefore not lacking in meaning. . . . Her precautions against
the vases breaking signified a rejection of the whole complex concerned with
virginity . . .
One day she divined the central idea of her ritual when she suddenly under-
stood her rule not to let the bolster touch the back of the bed. The bolster had
always seemed a woman to her, she said, and the upright back of the bedstead
a man. She wished therefore, by a magic ceremony, as it were, to keep man and
woman apart; that is to say, to separate the parents and prevent intercourse
from occurring . . .
If the bolster was a woman, then the shaking of the eiderdown till all the
feathers were at the bottom, making a protuberance there, also had a meaning.
It meant impregnating a woman; she did not neglect, though to obliterate the
pregnancy again, for she had for years been terrified that intercourse between
her parents might result in another child and present her with a rival. On the
other hand, if the large bolster meant the mother then the small pillow could
only represent the daughter. . . . The part of the man (the father) she thus played
herself and replaced the male organ by her own head.
Horrible thoughts, you will say, to run in the mind of a virgin girl. I admit
that; but do not forget that I have not invented these ideas, only exposed them . . .
(pp. 277–279).
This case shows how Freud used the patient’s symptoms as symbolic signposts
pointing to underlying and unconscious conflicts, desires, and memories. In the
course of treatment, then, he would help the patient understand how her ego de-
fense mechanisms had morphed her unconscious problems into her obsessive ritu-
als. Thus, by the ego defense mechanism of displacement, her fears about losing
virginity became the ritual of protecting the vases in her bedroom. In this way, her
ego was able to satisfy her unconscious needs. At the same time, it could keep the
“real” problem blocked from consciousness by means of yet another defense mecha-
nism called repression.
A psychoanalyst’s main task, then, is to help a patient break through the barriers of
repression and bring threatening thoughts to awareness. By doing so, the patient gains
insight into the relationship between the current symptoms and the repressed conflicts.
Freud argued that, when the patient comes to understand and accept these uncon-
scious conflicts and desires, they will cease to cause trouble.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Repression is the Freudian
ego defense mechanism that
causes forgetting by blocking
off threatening memories in the
unconscious (p. 431).

564 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
Ultimately, in the final stage of psychoanalysis, patients learn how the relationship
they have established with the therapist reflects unresolved conflicts, especially prob-
lems they had with their parents. This projection of parental attributes onto the thera-
pist is called transference, and so the final phase of therapy is known as the analysis of
transference. According to psychoanalytic theory, this last step in recovery occurs when
patients are finally released from the unconscious troubles established long ago in the
relationship with their parents during early childhood (Munroe, 1955).
Neo-Freudian Psychodynamic Therapies Please pardon us for doing a bit of
analysis on Freud: He obviously had a flair for the dramatic, and he also possessed
a powerful, charismatic personality—or, as he himself might have said, a strong ego.
Accordingly, Freud encouraged his disciples to debate the principles of psychoanalysis,
but he would tolerate no fundamental changes in his doctrines. This inevitably led to
conflicts with some of his equally strong-willed followers, such as Alfred Adler, Carl
Jung, and Karen Horney, who eventually broke away from Freud to establish their
own schools of therapy.
In general, the neo-Freudian renegades kept many of Freud’s basic ideas and tech-
niques while adding some and modifying others. In the true psychodynamic tradition,
the neo-Freudian psychodynamic therapies have retained Freud’s emphasis on motivation.
Most now have abandoned the psychoanalyst’s couch and treat patients face to face.
Most also see patients once a week for a few months, rather than several times a week
for several years, as in classical psychoanalysis.
So how do modern psychodynamic therapists get the job done in a shorter time?
Most have shifted their emphasis to conscious motivation—so they don’t spend so
much time probing for hidden conflicts and repressed memories. Most have also made
a break with Freud by emphasizing one or more of the following points:
• The significance of the self or ego (rather than the id)
• The influence of experiences occurring throughout life (as opposed to Freud’s em-
phasis on early-childhood experience)
• The role of social needs and interpersonal relationships (rather than sexual and
aggressive desires)
And, as we saw in Chapter 10, each of the neo-Freudians constructed a theory of
disorder and therapy that had a different emphasis. We do not have space here to go
into these approaches in greater detail, but let’s briefly consider how a modern psycho-
dynamic therapist might have approached the case of the obsessive girl that Freud de-
scribed. Most likely, such a therapist would focus on the current relationship between
the girl and her parents, perhaps on whether she has feelings of inadequacy for which
she is compensating by becoming the center of her parents’ attention for two hours
each night. And, instead of working so intensively with the girl, the therapist might
also work with the parents on changing the way they deal with the problem. And—to
further illustrate the point—what about Derek, the depressed fellow whom we met at
the beginning of the chapter? While an orthodox Freudian analyst would probe his
early childhood memories for clues as to his depression, the modern psychodynamic
therapist would be more likely to look for clues in his current relationships, assuming
the cause to be social rather than sexual.
Humanistic Therapies In contrast with the psychodynamic emphasis on conflicting
motives, the humanistic therapists believe that mental problems arise from low self-
esteem, misguided goals, and unfulfilling relationships. Indeed, the primary symptoms
for which college students seek therapy would include feelings of alienation, failure to
achieve all they feel they should, difficult relationships, and general dissatisfaction with
their lives. Therapists often refer to these problems in everyday existence as existential
crises, a term emphasizing how many human problems deal with questions about the
meaning and purpose of one’s existence. The humanistic psychologists have developed
therapies aimed specifically at such problems.
analysis of transference The Freudian
technique of analyzing and interpreting the patient’s
relationship with the therapist, based on the assump-
tion that this relationship mirrors unresolved conflicts
in the patient’s past.
neo-Freudian psychodynamic
therapy Therapy for a mental disorder that was
developed by psychodynamic theorists who embraced
some of Freud’s ideas but disagreed with others.
Humanistic therapists often help clients
deal with low self-esteem, difficult rela-
tionships, and existential crises.

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 565
Again, in contrast with the psychodynamic view, humanistic therapists believe that
people are generally motivated by healthy needs for growth and psychological well-
being. They dispute Freud’s assumption of a personality divided into conflicting parts,
dominated by a selfish id, and driven by hedonistic instincts and repressed conflicts. In-
stead, the humanists emphasize the concept of a whole person engaged in a continual
process of growth and change.
In the view of the humanistic psychologists, mental disorder occurs when conditions
interfere with normal development and produce low self-esteem. Humanistic therapies,
therefore, attempt to help clients confront their problems by recognizing their own
freedom, enhancing their self-esteem, and realizing their fullest potential (Schneider &
May, 1995). A humanistic therapist (if there had been one around a century ago) would
probably have worked with Freud’s patient to explore her self-concept and her feelings
about her parents. As for Derek, a humanistic therapist might guess that his depression
arose either from unsatisfying relationships or from a sense of personal inadequacy.
Client-centered therapy, perhaps the most widespread form of humanistic therapy,
was developed by the legendary Carl Rogers (1951, 1977). His approach assumed that
healthy development can be derailed by a conflict between one’s desire for a posi-
tive self-image and criticism by self and others. This conflict creates anxiety and un-
happiness. The task of Rogerian client-centered therapy, then, is to create a nurturing
environment in which people can work through their concerns and finally achieve
self-respect and self-actualization.
One of the main techniques used by Rogerian therapists involves reflection of feel-
ing (also called reflective listening) to help clients understand their emotions. With this
technique, therapists paraphrase their clients’ words, acting as a sort of psychological
“mirror” in which clients can see themselves. Notice how the therapist uses this tech-
nique to capture the emotional tone expressed by a young woman in the following
excerpt from a therapy session (Rogers, 1951):
CLIENT: It probably goes all the way back into my childhood. . . . My mother
told me that I was the pet of my father. Although I never realized it—I mean,
they never treated me as a pet at all. And other people always seemed to think
I was sort of a privileged one in the family. . . . And as far as I can see looking
back on it now, it’s just that the family let the other kids get away with more
than they usually did me. And it seems for some reason to have held me to a
more rigid standard than they did the other children.
THERAPIST: You’re not so sure you were a pet in any sense, but more that the
family situation seemed to hold you to pretty high standards.
CLIENT: M-hm. That’s just what has occurred to me; and that the other people
could sorta make mistakes, or do things as children that were naughty . . . but
Alice wasn’t supposed to do those things.
THERAPIST: M-hm. With somebody else it would be just—oh, be a little naughti-
ness; but as far as you were concerned, it shouldn’t be done.
CLIENT: That’s really the idea I’ve had. I think the whole business of my stan-
dards . . . is one that I need to think about rather carefully, since I’ve been
doubting for a long time whether I even have any sincere ones.
THERAPIST: M-hm. Not sure whether you really have any deep values which you
are sure of.
CLIENT: M-hm. M-hm (p. 152).
Note how most of the therapist’s statements in this example paraphrased, or “reflected,”
what the client has just said.
Is such an approach effective? In fact, client-centered therapy has abundant scien-
tific support. An American Psychological Association task force, charged with finding
science-based practices that contribute to the effectiveness of therapy, found that the
common factor in therapies that work were precisely the Rogerian qualities of empa-
thy, positive regard, genuineness, and feedback (Ackerman et al., 2001).
humanistic therapy Treatment technique based
on the assumption that people have a tendency for
positive growth and self-actualization, which may be
blocked by an unhealthy environment that can include
negative self-evaluation and criticism from others.
client-centered therapy A humanistic
approach to treatment developed by Carl Rogers,
emphasizing an individual’s tendency for healthy
psychological growth through self-actualization.
reflection of feeling Carl Rogers’s technique of
paraphrasing the clients’ words, attempting to capture
the emotional tone expressed.
Humanistic therapist Carl Rogers (right
center) facilitates a therapy group.

566 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
Cognitive Therapies The insight therapies we have discussed so far focus primarily
on people’s emotions or motives (see Figure 13.1). Cognitive therapy, on the other hand,
assumes that psychological problems arise from erroneous thinking and sees rational
thinking as the key to positive therapeutic change (Butler et al., 2006). Cognitive ther-
apy takes multiple forms, but we can give you some of its flavor with one example:
Aaron Beck’s cognitive therapy for depression.
Beck, who was originally trained in classical psychoanalysis, broke from the Freudian
tradition when he began noticing that the dreams and free associations of his depressed
patients were filled with negative thoughts (Beck, 1976; Bowles, 2004). Commonly they
would make such self-deprecating statements as, “Nobody would like me if they really
knew me” and “I’m not smart enough to make it in this competitive school.” Gradually,
Beck came to believe that depression occurs because of this negative self-talk. The thera-
pist’s job, then, is to help the client learn more positive ways of thinking.
Here’s a sample of Beck’s approach, taken from a therapy session with a college
student of about Derek’s age (Beck et al., 1979):
CLIENT: I get depressed when things go wrong. Like when I fail a test.
THERAPIST: How can failing a test make you depressed?
CLIENT: Well, if I fail, I’ll never get into law school.
THERAPIST: Do you agree that the way you interpret the results of the test will
affect you? You might feel depressed, you might have trouble sleeping, not feel
like eating, and you might even wonder if you should drop out of the course.
CLIENT: I have been thinking that I wasn’t going to make it. Yes, I agree.
THERAPIST: Now what did failing mean?
CLIENT: (tearful) That I couldn’t get into law school.
THERAPIST: And what does that mean to you?
CLIENT: That I’m just not smart enough.
THERAPIST: Anything else?
CLIENT: That I can never be happy.
THERAPIST: And how do these thoughts make you feel?
CLIENT: Very unhappy.
THERAPIST: So it is the meaning of failing a test that makes you very unhappy.
In fact, believing that you can never be happy is a powerful factor in producing
unhappiness. So, you get yourself into a trap—by definition, failure to get into
law school equals “I can never be happy” (pp. 145–146).
As you can see from this exchange, the cognitive therapist helps the individual confront
the destructive thoughts that support depression. Studies have shown that Beck’s
cognitive therapy Emphasizes rational think-
ing (as opposed to subjective emotion, motivation,
or repressed conflicts) as the key to treating mental
disorder.
FIGURE 13.1
Types of Psychotherapy
Each of the two major branches of psychotherapy has many variations.
Psychotherapy
Insight therapies
Psychodynamic
therapies
Humanistic
therapies
Cognitive
therapies
Therapies based
on operant
conditioning
Therapies based
on observational
learning
Therapies based
on classical
conditioning
Freudian
psychoanalysis
Neo-Freudian
therapies
Behavior therapies
Cognitive therapies focus on changing the
way clients think about themselves and
their world.

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 567
approach can be at least as effective in the treatment of depression as is medication
(Antonuccio, 1995; Beck, 2005).
In Derek’s case, a cognitive therapist would undoubtedly probe for negative self-
talk that might be feeding his depression. And how might a cognitive therapist have
approached Freud’s 19-year-old obsessive patient? The focus would have been on ir-
rational beliefs, such as the idea that flowerpots and vases could, by themselves, fall
down in the night and break. A cognitive therapist would also challenge the assump-
tion that something catastrophic might happen (such as not being able to sleep!) if
she didn’t perform her nightly ritual. In both cases, the assumption would be that the
symptoms would disappear as positive thoughts replaced negative ones.
Group Therapies The treatments we have discussed to this point usually involve
one-to-one relationships between a patient or client and therapist. Most, however, can also
be done with groups of two or more persons. Such group therapy offers real advantages over
individual therapy, particularly in dealing with troubled interpersonal relationships. In fact,
group therapy is often the preferred approach to therapy involving couples, families, or
other groups of people who have similar problems, such as depression or drug addiction.
Therapy groups usually meet face to face once a week, although some groups are
experimenting with sessions on the Internet (Davison et al., 2000). Most typically, the
therapist employs a humanistic perspective, although psychodynamic and cognitive–
behavioral groups are also common. Whatever the method, group therapy offers clients
the opportunity to observe and imitate new social behaviors in a forgiving, supportive
atmosphere. In the interest of brevity, we will touch on only two representative types
of group therapy below: self-help groups and marital and family therapy.
Self-Help Support Groups Perhaps the most noteworthy development in group therapy
has been the surge of interest in self-help support groups. Thousands of such groups
exist. Many are free, especially those that are not directed by a paid health care profes-
sional. Such groups give people a chance to meet under nonthreatening conditions to
exchange ideas with others having similar problems and who are surviving and some-
times even thriving (Schiff & Bargal, 2000).
One of the oldest support groups, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) pioneered the self-help
concept, beginning in the mid-1930s. Central to the original AA process is the concept of
“12 Steps” to recovery from alcohol addiction. It is noteworthy that the 12 Steps are based
not on psychological theory but on the trial-and-error experience of early AA members.
In the 1960s, the feminist consciousness-raising movement brought the self-help
concept to a wider audience. As a result, self-help support groups now exist for an
enormous range of problems, including:
• Managing life transition or other crises, such as divorce or death of a child.
• Coping with physical and mental disorders, such as depression or heart attack.
• Dealing with addictions and other uncontrolled behaviors, such as alcoholism,
gambling, overeating, sexual excess, and drug dependency.
• Handling the stress felt by relatives or friends of those who are dealing with
addictions.
Group therapy also makes valuable contributions to the treatment of terminally ill
patients. The goals of such therapy are to help patients and their families live their lives
as fully as possible, to cope realistically with impending death, and to adjust to the ter-
minal illness. One general focus of such support groups for the terminally ill is to help
them learn “how to live fully until you say goodbye” (Nungesser, 1990).
Couples and Family Therapy Perhaps the best setting in which to learn about relation-
ships is in a group of people struggling with relationships. Couples therapy (or coun-
seling), for example, may involve one or more couples who are learning to clarify their
communication patterns and improve the quality of their interaction (Napier, 2000).
By seeing couples together, a therapist can help the partners identify the verbal and
nonverbal styles they use to dominate, control, or confuse each other (Gottman, 1994,
1999). The therapist then helps them to reinforce more desirable responses in the other
group therapy Any form of psychotherapy done
with more than one client/patient at a time. Group
therapy is often done from a humanistic perspective.
self-help support groups Groups, such as
Alcoholics Anonymous, that provide social support and
an opportunity for sharing ideas about dealing with
common problems. Such groups are typically
organized and run by laypersons, rather than
professional therapists.
In couples therapy, the therapist can help
people work together to improve the com-
munication patterns that have developed
in their relationship.
While practitioners from many perspectives
use group therapy, they all capitalize on
the social milieu of the group.

568 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
and withdraw from conflicts. Couples are also taught nondirective listening skills that
help clarify and express feelings and ideas without being confrontational (Jacobson
et al., 2000; Wheeler et al., 2001).
In family therapy, the “client” is an entire family group, with each family member
being treated as part of a system of relationships (Fishman, 1993). A family therapist
helps troubled family members perceive the issues or patterns that are creating prob-
lems for them. The goal is to alter the interpersonal dynamics (interactions) among
the participants (Foley, 1979; Schwebel & Fine, 1994). Family therapy not only helps
reduce tensions within a family, but it can also improve the functioning of individual
members by helping them recognize their roles in the group. It is also proved to be
effective in the treatment of anorexia nervosa, depression, and other mood disorders,
and even as a boon to families struggling with schizophrenia (Miklowitz, 2007).
Behavior Therapies
If the problem is overeating, bed wetting, shyness, antisocial behavior, or anything else
that can be described in purely behavioral terms, the chances are good that it can
be modified by one of the behavior therapies (also known as behavior modification).
Based on the assumption that these undesirable behaviors have been learned and there-
fore can be unlearned, behavior therapy relies on the principles of operant and classical
conditioning. In addition to those difficulties listed above, behavior therapists report
success in dealing with fears, compulsions, depression, addictions, aggression, and
delinquent behaviors.
As the label suggests, behavior therapists focus on problem behaviors rather than
inner thoughts, motives, or emotions. They seek to understand how unwanted behav-
iors might have been learned and, even more important, how they can be eliminated
and replaced by more effective patterns. To see how this is done, we will look first at
the behavior therapy techniques borrowed from classical conditioning.
Classical Conditioning Therapies The first example of behavior therapy, reported
by psychologist Mary Cover Jones (1924), treated a fearful little boy named Peter, who
was afraid of furry objects. Jones was able to desensitize the boy’s fear, over a period of
weeks, by gradually bringing a rabbit closer and closer to the boy while he was eating.
Eventually, Peter was able to allow the rabbit to sit on his lap while he petted it. (You
may notice the similarity to John Watson’s experiments on Little Albert. Indeed, Jones
was an associate of Watson and knew of the Little Albert study. Unlike Albert, how-
ever, Peter came to treatment already possessing an intense fear of rabbits and other
furry objects.)
Surprisingly, it was another 14 years before behavior therapy reappeared, this time
as a treatment for bed wetting (Mowrer & Mowrer, 1938). The method involved a
fluid-sensitive pad placed under the patient. When moisture set off an alarm, the pa-
tient would awaken. The treatment was effective in 75 percent of cases—an amazing
success rate, in view of the dismal failure of psychodynamic therapy to prevent bed
wetting by talking about the “meaning” of the symptom. And yet, it took yet another
20 years before behavior therapy entered the mainstream of psychological treatment.
Why the delay? The old Freudian idea—that every symptom has an underlying,
unconscious cause that must be discovered and eradicated—was extremely well rooted
in clinical lore. Therapists dared not attack symptoms (behaviors) directly for fear of
symptom substitution: the idea that by eliminating one symptom, another, which could
be much worse, could take its place. This concern was unfounded.
Systematic Desensitization It took psychiatrist Joseph Wolpe to challenge the
entrenched notion of symptom substitution. Wolpe reasoned that the development
of irrational fear responses and other undesirable emotionally based behaviors might
follow the classical conditioning model rather than the Freudian model. As you will
recall, classical conditioning involves the association of a new stimulus with an un-
conditioned stimulus so that the person responds the same way to both. Thus, a fear
behavior modification Another term for behavior
therapy.
behavior therapy Any form of psychotherapy
based on the principles of behavioral learning, espe-
cially operant conditioning and classical conditioning.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
In classical conditioning, a CS
comes to produce essentially the
same response as the UCS
(p. 137).
c Behavior Therapies
• Systematic desensitization
• Aversion therapy
• Contingency management
• Token economies
• Participant modeling
Behavior therapists focus on the person’s
environment and on problem behaviors,
rather than on internal thoughts, motives,
or feelings.

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 569
response might be associated with, say, crowds or spiders or lightning. Wolpe also real-
ized another simple truth: The nervous system cannot be relaxed and agitated at the
same time because these two incompatible processes cannot be activated simultane-
ously. Putting these two ideas together formed the foundation for Wolpe’s method,
called systematic desensitization (Wolpe, 1958, 1973).
Systematic desensitization begins with a training program, teaching patients to
relax their muscles and their minds (Rachman, 2000). With the patient in this deeply
relaxed state, the therapist begins the process of extinction by having the patient imag-
ine progressively more fearful situations. This is done in gradual steps, called an anxi-
ety hierarchy, that move from remote associations to imagining an intensely feared
situation.
To develop the anxiety hierarchy, the therapist and client first identify all the situa-
tions that provoke the patient’s anxiety and then arrange them in levels, ranked from
weakest to strongest (Shapiro, 1995). For example, a patient suffering from severe fear
of public speaking constructed the hierarchy of unconditioned stimuli seen in Table 13.2.
Later, during desensitization, the relaxed client vividly imagines the weakest anxi-
ety stimulus on the list. If it can be visualized without discomfort, the client goes on
to the next stronger one. After a number of sessions, the client can imagine the most
distressing situations on the list without anxiety (Lang & Lazovik, 1963)—hence the
term systematic desensitization.
It turns out that Wolpe may have been too cautious about inducing anxiety in his
clients. In a newer and more intense form of desensitization, known exposure therapy,
the therapist may actually have the patient confront the feared object or situa-
tion, such as a spider or a snake, rather than just imagining it—and this seems
to be even more effective than Wolpe’s method (Barlow, 2010). You will recall
that Sabra, whom you met at the beginning of Chapter 4, went through a form
of exposure therapy to overcome her fear of flying. The technique has been
used successfully with a multitude of patients with phobias and anxiety disor-
ders, including many whose fears of blood, injections, and germs stand in the
way of getting needed medical or dental treatment (Dittmann, 2005b).
In the past few years, some behavioral therapists have added a high-tech twist
to exposure therapy. By using computer-generated images of fearful situations,
their clients can explore and extinguish fears and anxieties in a virtual-reality
environment that they know is safe. To enter the virtual-reality environment,
patients don a helmet containing a video screen, on which are projected images
to which they will be desensitized: spiders, snakes, high places, closed-in spaces—
all the common phobia-producing objects or images (Winerman, 2005e).
Aversion Therapy So, desensitization and exposure therapy help clients deal with
stimuli that they want to avoid. But what about the reverse? What can be done to
help those who are attracted to stimuli that are harmful or illegal? Examples include
drug addiction, certain sexual attractions, and tendencies to violence—all problems in
systematic desensitization A behavioral
therapy technique in which anxiety is extinguished by
exposing the patient to an anxiety-provoking stimulus.
exposure therapy A form of desensitization
therapy in which the patient directly confronts the
anxiety-provoking stimulus (as opposed to imagining
the stimulus).
TABLE 13.2 A Sample Anxiety Hierarchy
The following is typical of anxiety hierarchies that a therapist and a patient might develop to
desensitize a fear of public speaking. The therapist guides the deeply relaxed patient in imagining
the following situations:
1. Seeing a picture or a video recording of another person giving a speech
2. Watching another person give a speech
3. Preparing a speech that I will give to a small group of friends
4. Having to introduce myself to a large group
5. Waiting to be called on to speak in a meeting or in a large class
6. Being introduced as a speaker to a group
7. Walking to the podium to make a speech
8. Making an important speech to a large group
In “virtual reality,” phobic patients can
confront their fears safely and conve-
niently in the behavior therapist’s office.
On a screen inside the headset, the pa-
tient sees computer-generated images of
feared situations, such as seeing a snake,
flying in an airplane, or looking down
from the top of a tall building.

570 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
which undesirable behavior is elicited by some specific stimulus. Aversion therapy tack-
les these problems with a conditioning procedure designed to make tempting stimuli
repulsive by pairing them repeatedly with unpleasant (aversive) stimuli. For example,
the therapist might use electric shocks or nausea-producing drugs, whose effects are
highly unpleasant but not actually dangerous to the client. In time, the negative reac-
tions (unconditioned responses) to the aversive stimuli come to be associated with the
conditioned stimuli (such as an addictive drug), and so the client develops an aversion
that replaces the desire.
To give another example, if you were to elect aversion therapy to help you quit
smoking, you might be required to chain-smoke cigarettes while having a foul odor
blown in your face—until you develop a strong association between smoking and
nausea (see Figure 13.2). A similar conditioning effect occurs in alcoholics who drink
while taking Antabuse, a drug often prescribed to encourage sobriety.
In some ways, aversion therapy resembles nothing so much as torture. So why
would anyone submit voluntarily to it? Sometimes, the courts may assign a proba-
tioner to aversion therapy. Usually, however, people submit to this type of treatment
because they have a troublesome addiction that has resisted other treatments.
Operant Conditioning Therapies Four-year-old Tyler has a screaming fit when he
goes to the grocery store with his parents and they refuse to buy him candy. He ac-
quired this annoying behavior through operant conditioning, by being rewarded when
his parents have given in to his demands. In fact, most behavior problems found in
both children and adults have been shaped by rewards and punishments. Consider,
for example, the similarities between Tyler’s case and the employee who chronically
arrives late for work or the student who waits until the last minute to study for a test.
Changing such behaviors requires operant conditioning techniques. Let’s look at two
therapeutic variations on this operant theme.
Contingency Management Tyler’s parents may learn to extinguish his fits at the grocery
store by simply withdrawing their attention—no easy task, by the way. In addition, the
therapist may coach them to “catch Tyler being good” and give him all the attention he
needs—but only for good behavior. Over time, the changing contingencies will work to
extinguish the old, undesirable behaviors and help to keep the new ones in place. This
approach is an example of contingency management: changing behavior by modifying its
consequences. It has proved effective in treating behavior problems found in such diverse
settings as families, schools, work, prisons, the military, and mental hospitals. The careful
application of reward and punishment can also reduce the self-destructive behaviors in
autistic children (Frith, 1997). And, if you would like to change some undesirable habit
or acquire a new one, you can even apply contingency management techniques to your-
self: See the accompanying box, Do It Yourself! Behavior Self-Modification.
aversion therapy As a classical conditioning
procedure, aversive counterconditioning involves
presenting the individual with an attractive stimulus
paired with unpleasant (aversive) stimulation to
condition a repulsive reaction.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
In operant conditioning,
behavior changes because of
consequences, such as rewards
and punishments (p. 143).
contingency management An operant condi-
tioning approach to changing behavior by altering the
consequences, especially rewards and punishments,
of behavior.
FIGURE 13.2
Conditioning an Aversion for Cigarette
Smoke
Aversion therapy for smoking might
simultaneously pair a foul odor with
cigarette smoke blown in the smoker’s
face. The foul odor (such as rotten eggs)
produces nausea. This response then be-
comes the conditioned response
associated with cigarette smoke.
Source: Wolpe, J. (1991). The practice of behavior
therapy, 4th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Copyright © 1991 by Pearson Education. Reprinted
by permission of the publisher.
UCS
(foul odor)
UCR
(nausea)
CR
CS
(cigarette smoke)
BEHAVIOR SELF-MODIFICATION
Is there a behavioral habit that you would
like to acquire—studying, initiating conver-
sations with others, exercising to keep fit?
Write this activity in behavioral terms on the
lines below. (Don’t use mentalistic words
such as “feeling” or “wanting.” Behaviorists
require that you keep things objective by
specifying only an observable behavior.)
The desired new behavior:

When or under what conditions would
you like to engage in this new behavior? Be-
low, write in the time or stimulus conditions
when you want to initiate the behavior
(for example: in class, when relaxing with
friends, or at a certain time every morning).
The time or conditions for the new
behavior:

To increase your likelihood of producing
the desired response, apply some positive
reinforcement therapy to yourself. Choose an
appropriate reward that you will give yourself
when you have produced the desired behav-
ior at the appropriate time. Write the reward
that you will give yourself below.
Your reward:

Give yourself feedback on your
progress by keeping a daily record of the
occurrence of your new behavior. This could
be done, for example, on a calendar or a
graph. In time, you will discover that the
desired behavior has increased in frequency.
You will also find that your new habit carries
its own rewards, such as better grades or
more satisfying social interactions (Kazdin,
1994).

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 571
Token Economies A special form of therapy called a token economy is commonly used
in group settings such as classrooms and institutions. Think of it as the behavioral
version of group therapy (Ayllon & Azrin, 1968; Martin & Pear, 1999). The method
takes its name from the plastic tokens sometimes awarded by therapists or teachers as
immediate reinforcers for desirable behaviors.
In a classroom application, for example, a student might earn a token for sitting
quietly for several minutes, participating in a class discussion, or turning in an assign-
ment. Later, recipients may redeem the tokens for food, merchandise, or privileges. Of-
ten, “points” or play money are used in place of tokens. The important thing is that the
individual receives something as a reinforcer immediately after giving desired responses.
With the appropriate modifications, the token economy also works well with children
having developmental disabilities, with mental patients, and with correctional popula-
tions (Higgins et al., 2001).
Participant Modeling: An Observational-Learning Therapy “Monkey see—
monkey do,” we say. And sure enough, monkeys learn fears by observation and imita-
tion. One study showed that laboratory monkeys with no previous aversion to snakes
could acquire a simian version of ophidiophobia by observing their parents reacting
fearfully to real snakes and toy snakes. (You don’t remember that phobia? Look back
at Table 12.3 on pages 532–533.) The more disturbed the monkey parents were at the
sight of the snakes, the greater the resulting fear in their offspring (Mineka et al., 1984). A
follow-up study showed that such fears were not just a family matter. When other mon-
keys that had previously shown no fear of snakes were given the opportunity to observe
unrelated adults responding to snakes fearfully, they quickly acquired the same response,
as you can see in Figure 13.3 (Cook et al., 1985).
Like monkeys, people also learn fears by observing the behavior of others. But for
therapeutic purposes, observational learning in the form of participant modeling can
also encourage healthy behaviors. In participant modeling, then, the client, or participant,
observes and imitates someone modeling desirable behaviors. Athletic coaches, of course,
have used participant modeling for years. Similarly, a behavior therapist treating a snake
phobia might model the desired behavior by first approaching a caged snake, then touch-
ing the snake, and so on. The client then imitates the modeled behavior—but at no time
is forced to perform. If the therapist senses resistance, the client may return to a previ-
ously successful level. As you can see, the procedure is similar to systematic desensitiza-
tion, with the important addition of observational learning. In fact, participant modeling
draws on concepts from both operant and classical conditioning.
The power of participant modeling in eliminating snake phobias can be seen
in a study that compared the participant modeling technique with several other
approaches: (1) symbolic modeling, a technique in which subjects receive indirect
exposure by watching a film or video in which models deal with a feared situation;
(2) desensitization therapy, which, as you will remember, involves exposure to an imag-
ined fearful stimulus; and (3) no therapeutic intervention (the control condition). As
you can see in Figure 13.4, participant modeling was the most successful. The snake
phobia was virtually eliminated in 11 of the 12 subjects in the participant modeling
group (Bandura, 1970).
Cognitive–Behavioral Therapy: A Synthesis
Suppose you are having difficulty controlling feelings of jealousy every time the per-
son you love is friendly with someone else. Chances are that the problem originates in
your cognitions about yourself and the others involved (“Marty is stealing Terry away
from me!”) These thoughts may also affect your behavior, making you act in ways that
could drive Terry away from you. A dose of therapy aimed at both your cognitions and
your behaviors may be a better bet than either one alone.
In brief, cognitive–behavioral therapy (CBT) combines a cognitive emphasis on
thoughts and attitudes with the behavioral strategies that we have just discussed. This
dual approach assumes that an irrational self-statement often underlies maladaptive
token economy An operant technique applied to
groups, such as classrooms or mental hospital wards,
involving the distribution of “tokens” or other indica-
tors of reinforcement contingent on desired behaviors.
The tokens can later be exchanged for privileges, food,
or other reinforcers.
participant modeling A social learning tech-
nique in which a therapist demonstrates and encour-
ages a client to imitate a desired behavior.
cognitive–behavioral therapy A newer form
of psychotherapy that combines the techniques of cog-
nitive therapy with those of behavioral therapy.
Pr
et
es
t
Po
st
te
st
3-
m
o
n
th
f
o
llo
w
-u
p
Number of fear behaviors
0 2 4 6
Real
Toy
Neutral
object
Observe fearful models
FIGURE 13.3
Fear Reactions in Monkeys
In a pretest, young monkeys raised in
laboratories show little fear of snakes (top
bars). But after observing other monkeys
showing a strong fear of snakes, they are
conditioned to fear both real snakes and
toy snakes (middle bars). A follow-up
test shows that the fear persists over a
3-month interval (bottom bars).
Source: Cook, M., Mineka, S., Wokenstein, B., &
Laitsch, K. (1985). Observational conditioning of snake
fear in unrelated rhesus monkeys. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 94, pp. 591–610. Copyright © 1985 by
American Psychological Association. Reprinted by
permission of American Psychological Association.

572 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
behavior. Accordingly, the therapist and client work together to modify irrational
self-talk, set attainable behavioral goals, develop realistic strategies for attaining them,
and evaluate the results. In this way, people change the way they approach problems
and gradually develop new skills and a sense of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986, 1992;
DeAngelis, 2008b; Schwarzer, 1992).
How well does cognitive–behavioral therapy work? Quite well, indeed, particularly
for depression, anxiety disorders, alcoholism, bulimia nervosa, recurring nightmares,
and posttraumatic stress disorder (Baker et al., 2008; Chamberlin, 2008). In fact, it is
one of psychology’s most prominent success stories. In all of these disorders, CBT can
be at least as effective as medication—and sometimes more so. For certain other condi-
tions, such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, a combination of CBT and medica-
tion is more effective than either one alone.
Rational–Emotive Behavior Therapy: Challenging the “Shoulds” and
“Oughts” One of the most famous forms of cognitive–behavioral therapy was de-
veloped by the colorful and notorious Albert Ellis (1987, 1990, 1996) to help people
eliminate self-defeating thought patterns. Ellis dubbed his treatment rational–emotive
behavior therapy (REBT), a name derived from its method of challenging certain “irratio-
nal” beliefs and behaviors.
What are the irrational beliefs challenged in REBT, and how do they lead to mal-
adaptive feelings and actions? According to Ellis, maladjusted individuals base their
lives on a set of unrealistic values and unachievable goals. These “neurotic” goals and
values lead people to hold unrealistic expectations that they should always succeed,
that they should always receive approval, that they should always be treated fairly, and
that their experiences should always be pleasant. (You can see the most common irra-
tional beliefs in the accompanying box, Do It Yourself! Examining Your Own Beliefs.)
For example, in your own daily life, you may frequently tell yourself that you “should”
get an A in math or that you “ought to” spend an hour exercising every day. Further,
he says, if you are unable to meet your goals and seldom question this neurotic self-
talk, it may come to control your actions or even prevent you from choosing the life
you want. If you were to enter REBT, your therapist would teach you to recognize such
assumptions, question how rational they are, and replace faulty ideas with more valid
ones. Don’t “should” on yourself, warned Ellis.
So, how might a cognitive–behavioral therapist have dealt with Freud’s obsessive
patient? First, taking a cognitive approach, the therapist would challenge the girl’s
irrational beliefs, as we suggested earlier. Then, switching to a behavioral mode, the
rational–emotive behavior therapy
(REBT) Albert Ellis’s brand of cognitive therapy,
based on the idea that irrational thoughts and
behaviors are the cause of mental disorders.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Compare Ellis’s “neurotic” goals
with Karen Horney’s neurotic
trends (p. 438).
M
ea
n
a
p
p
ro
ac
h
r
es
p
o
n
se
s
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
Pretest Posttest
participant modeling
symbolic modeling
desensitization
control
FIGURE 13.4
Participant Modeling Therapy
The client shown in the photo first
watches a model make a graduated series
of snake-approach responses and then
repeats them herself. Eventually, she can
pick up the snake and let it move about
on her. The graph compares the number
of approach responses clients made be-
fore and after receiving participant mod-
eling therapy with the responses of those
exposed to two other therapeutic tech-
niques and a control group. The graph
shows that participant modeling was far
more effective in the posttest.
Source: Bandura, A. D. (1970). Modeling therapy.
In W. S. Sahakian (Ed.), Psychopathology today:
Experimentation, theory, and research. Itasca, IL:
Peacock. Reprinted by permission of the author.
Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 573
therapist might teach the girl relaxation techniques to use when she began to get ready
for bed each evening. These techniques then would substitute for the obsessive ritual. It
is also likely that the therapist would work with the parents, focusing on helping them
learn not to reward the girl with attention for her ritual behavior.
Similarly, a cognitive–behavioral therapist would help depressed Derek by chal-
lenging the way he thinks—perhaps blaming himself less and focusing more on con-
structive plans for doing better—can ultimately change how he feels and how he acts.
Indeed, Peter Lewinsohn and his colleagues have found that they can treat many cases
of depression effectively with such cognitive–behavioral techniques (Lewinsohn et al.,
1980, 1990; Lewinsohn & Gottlib, 1995). Their approach intervenes at several points
in the cycle of depression to teach people how to change their helpless thinking, to
cope adaptively with unpleasant situations, and to build more rewards into their lives.
Positive Psychotherapy (PPT) Derek might also be a good candidate for a newer
form of cognitive–behavioral treatment called positive psychotherapy (PPT), developed
by Martin Seligman. Like the humanists, Seligman and his fellow positive psycholo-
gists see their mission as balancing psychology’s negative emphasis on mental disorders
with their own positive emphasis on growth, health, and happiness. So it was a “nat-
ural” for Seligman to tackle the problem of depression by accentuating the positive
(Seligman et al., 2006). Unlike the humanists, however, the PPT approach is largely
cognitive–behavioral, with an emphasis on research.
In both PPT and Lewinsohn’s therapy sessions, Derek might find himself treated
more like a student than a patient. For example, the therapist might give him a “home-
work” assignment, such as the “three good things” exercise: “Before you go to sleep,
write down three things that went well today and why they went well.” Derek would
also learn to focus on positive emotions, respond constructively to others, and oth-
erwise to seek more pleasure in his work and home life. How well does PPT work?
Seligman and his group have applied PPT to dozens of clients and report preliminary
results showing that it relieved depression far more effectively than did conventional
therapy or antidepressant medication (Seligman et al., 2006).
Changing the Brain by Changing the Mind Brain scans now show that cognitive–
behavioral therapy not only helps people change their minds, but it can also change
the brain itself (Dobbs, 2006b). In one study, patients who experienced compulsive
obsessions, such as worrying that they had not turned off their stoves or locked their
positive psychotherapy (PPT) A relatively
new form of cognitive–behavioral treatment that seeks
to emphasize growth, health, and happiness.
EXAMINING YOUR OWN BELIEFS
It may be obvious that the following are
not healthy beliefs, but Albert Ellis found
that many people hold them. Do you? Be
honest: Put a check mark beside each of
the following statements that accurately
describes how you feel about yourself.
1. _________ I must be loved and
approved by everyone.
2. _________ I must be thoroughly
competent, adequate, and achieving.
3. _________ It is catastrophic when things
do not go the way I want them to go.
4. _________ Unhappiness results from
forces over which I have no control.
5. _________ People must always treat
each other fairly and justly; those who
don’t are nasty and terrible people.
6. _________ I must constantly be on my
guard against dangers and things that
could go wrong.
7. _________ Life is full of problems, and
I must always find quick solutions
to them.
8. _________ It is easier to evade my
problems and responsibilities than to
face them.
9. _________ Unpleasant experiences
in my past have had a profound
influence on me. Therefore, they must
continue to influence my current
feelings and actions.
10. _________ I can achieve happiness
by just enjoying myself each day. The
future will take care of itself.
In Ellis’s view, all these statements
were irrational beliefs that can cause men-
tal problems. The more items you have
checked, the more “irrational” your beliefs.
His cognitive approach to therapy, known
as rational–emotive behavior therapy, con-
centrates on helping people see that they
can “drive themselves crazy” with such
irrational beliefs. For example, a student
who parties rather than studying for a test
holds belief #8. A person who is depressed
about not landing a certain job holds irra-
tional belief #3. You can obtain more infor-
mation on Ellis’s system from his books.

574 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
doors, were given cognitive behavior modification (Schwartz et al., 1996). When they
felt an urge to run home and check on themselves, they were trained to relabel their
experience as an obsession or compulsion—not a rational concern. They then focused
on waiting out this “urge” rather than giving in to it, by distracting themselves with
other activities for about 15 minutes. Positron emission tomography (PET) scans of
the brains of subjects who were trained in this technique indicated that, over time, the
part of the brain responsible for that nagging fear or urge gradually became less active.
As that study shows, psychology has come a long way since the days when we
wondered whether thoughts and behavior were the product of nature or nurture. With
cognitive–behavioral therapy, we now know that experience can change the biology
behind behavior.
Evaluating the Psychological Therapies
Now that we have looked at a variety of psychological therapies (see Figure 13.5), let
us step back and ask how effective therapy is. Think about it: How could you tell ob-
jectively whether therapy really works? The answer to this question hasn’t always been
clear (Kopta et al., 1999; Shadish et al., 2000).
Lots of evidence says that most people who have undergone therapy like it. This
was shown, for example, by surveying thousands of subscribers to Consumer Reports
(1995). Respondents indicated how much their treatment helped, how satisfied they
FIGURE 13.5
A Comparison of Different Types of Therapy
Behavior therapies
aim to change things outside the
individual: rewards, punishments,
and cues in the environment in
order to change the person’s
external behaviors.
Psychodynamic therapies
aim to make changes inside the
person’s mind, especially the
unconscious.
Humanistic therapies
aim to change the way people
see themselves and their
relationships.
Cognitive therapies
aim to change the way people
think and perceive.
Group therapies
aim to change the way people
interact.
Biomedical therapies
aim to change the structure
or function of the brain.
id
ego
su
pe
re
go

How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders? 575
were with the therapist’s treatment of their problems, how much their “overall emo-
tional state” changed following therapy, as well as what kind of therapy they had
undergone. Among the results: (a) Therapy works—that is, it was perceived to have
helped clients diminish or eliminate their psychological problems; (b) long-term ther-
apy is better than short-term therapy; and (c) all forms of therapy are about equally
effective for improving clients’ problems (see Jacobson & Christensen, 1996).
We can’t give a thumbs-up to therapy, however, merely because people say they like
it or that it helped them (Hollon, 1996). Testimonials don’t make for good science—
which is why psychologists now demand that therapy be judged by studies having
a comparison group or control group. Let’s turn, therefore, to the controlled studies
of therapy’s effectiveness, beginning with a report that nearly upset the therapeutic
applecart.
Eysenck’s Controversial Proclamation The issue of therapy’s effectiveness came to
a head in 1952, when British psychologist Hans Eysenck proclaimed that roughly two-
thirds of all people who develop nonpsychotic mental disorders would recover within
two years, whether they get therapy or not. Eysenck’s evidence came from a review
of several outcome studies of various kinds of insight therapy, all of which compared
patients who received therapy to those who were on waiting lists, waiting their turn in
treatment. What he noted was that just as many people on the waiting lists recovered
as those in therapy. If taken at face value, this meant that psychotherapy was essen-
tially worthless—no better than having no treatment at all! To say the least, this wasn’t
received happily by therapists. But Eysenck’s challenge had an immensely productive
result: It stimulated therapists to do a great deal of research on the effectiveness of
their craft.
In Response to Eysenck Major reviews of the accumulating evidence on therapy
began to be reported in 1970 (by Meltzoff & Kornreich), in 1975 (by Luborsky
et al.), and in 1977 (by Smith and Glass). Overall, this literature—numbering some
375 studies—supported two major conclusions. First, therapy is, after all, more effec-
tive than no therapy—much to everyone’s relief! And second, Eysenck had apparently
overestimated the improvement rate in no-therapy control groups.
Gradually, then, a scientific consensus supporting the value of psychotherapy
emerged (Meredith, 1986; VandenBos, 1986). In fact, for a broad range of disorders,
psychotherapy has been demonstrated to have an effect comparable or superior to
many established medical practices (Wampold, 2007). Moreover, research began
to show that therapy was effective not only in Western industrialized countries (in the
United States, Canada, and Europe) but also in a variety of cultural settings through-
out the world (Beutler & Machado, 1992; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993).
New Questions But the new studies have raised new questions. Are some therapies
better than others? Can we identify therapies that are best suited for treating specific
disorders? The Smith and Glass (1977) survey hinted that the answers to those ques-
tions were “Yes” and “Yes.” Smith and Glass found that the behavior therapies seemed
to have an advantage over insight therapies for the treatment of many anxiety disor-
ders. And as we noted earlier, the use of cognitive–behavioral therapies for treating de-
pression, anxiety disorders, bulimia nervosa, and a few other disorders now has solid
empirical support. In addition, recent evaluations have found that insight therapies can
also be used effectively to treat problems such as marital discord, depression, and even
the tough-to-treat personality disorders (Shedler, 2010). Indeed, there is now a clear
trend toward matching specific therapies to specific conditions.
Finally, we should note that, in judging the effectiveness of various psychothera-
pies, it is important to realize that success does not necessarily mean a “cure.” Some-
times just making an improvement is all the success we can expect. In the treatment
of schizophrenia, mental retardation, or autism, for example, psychological therapies
may be deemed effective when people with these afflictions learn more adaptive behav-
iors and report leading happier lives (Hogarty et al., 1997).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
A control group is treated exactly
as the experimental group, except
for the crucial independent
variable (p. 27).

576 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Where Do Most People Get Help?
The effectiveness of psychotherapy for a variety of problems seems to be established
beyond doubt. Having said that, we should again acknowledge that most people ex-
periencing mental distress do not turn to professional therapists for help. Rather, they
turn to “just people” in the community (Wills & DePaulo, 1991). Those suffering from
mental problems often look to friends, clergy, hairdressers, bartenders, and others with
whom they have a trusting relationship. In fact, for some types of problems—perhaps
the most common problems of everyday living—a sympathetic friend may be just as
effective as a trained professional therapist (Berman & Norton, 1985; Christensen &
Jacobson, 1994).
To put the matter in a different way: Most mental problems are not the crippling
disorders that took center stage in the previous chapter. Rather, the psychological
difficulties most of us face result from lost jobs, difficult marriages, misbehaving chil-
dren, friendships gone sour, loved ones dying. . . . In brief, the most familiar prob-
lems involve chaos, confusion, choice, frustration, stress, and loss. People who find
themselves in the throes of these adjustment difficulties may not need extensive psy-
chotherapy, medication, or some other special treatment. They need someone to help
them sort through the pieces of their problems. Usually, this means that they turn to
someone like you.
So, what can you do when someone asks you for help? First, you should realize
that some problems do indeed require immediate professional attention. These include
a suicide threat or an indication of intent to harm others. You should not delay finding
competent help for someone with such tendencies. Second, you should remember that
most therapy methods require special training, especially those calling for cognitive–
behavioral therapy techniques or psychodynamic interpretations. We urge you to learn
as much as you can about these methods—but we strongly recommend that you leave
them to the professionals. Some other techniques, however, are simply extensions of
good human relationships, and they fall well within the layperson’s abilities for mental
“first aid.” Briefly, we will consider three of these:
• Listening. You will rarely go wrong if you just listen. Sometimes listening is all the
therapy a person in distress needs. It works by encouraging the speaker to orga-
nize a problem well enough to communicate it. Consequently, those who talk out
their problems frequently arrive at their own solutions. As an active listener, you
take the role a step farther by giving the speaker feedback: nodding, maintaining
an expression that shows interest, paraphrasing, and asking for clarification when
you don’t understand. As we saw in the client-centered therapy excerpts on pages
565 and 566, active listening lets the speaker know that the listener is interested
and empathetic (in tune with the other person’s feelings). At the same time, you
will do well to avoid the temptation of giving advice. Advice robs the recipient of
the opportunity to work out his or her own solutions.
• Acceptance. Client-centered therapists call this a nonjudgmental attitude. It means
accepting the person and the problem as they are. It also means suppressing shock,
disgust, or condemnation that would create a hostile climate for problem solving.
• Exploration of alternatives. People under stress may see only one course of action, so
you can help by identifying other potential choices and exploring the consequences
of each. (You can point out that doing nothing is also a choice.) Remember that,
in the end, the choice of action is not up to you but to the individual who owns
the problem.
Beyond these basic helping techniques lies the territory of the trained therapist. Again,
we strongly advise you against trying out the therapy techniques discussed in this
chapter for any of the serious psychological disorders discussed in the previous chapter
or listed in the DSM-IV.
active listener A person who gives the speaker
feedback in such forms as nodding, paraphrasing,
maintaining an expression that shows interest, and
asking questions for clarification.

How Is the Biomedical Approach Used to Treat Psychological Disorders? 577
13.3 KEY QUESTION
How Is the Biomedical Approach Used to Treat
Psychological Disorders?
The mind exists in a delicate biological balance. It can be upset by irregularities in
our genes, hormones, enzymes, and metabolism, as well as by damage from accidents
and disease. When something goes wrong with the brain, we can see the consequences
in abnormal patterns of behavior or peculiar cognitive and emotional reactions. The
biomedical therapies, therefore, attempt to treat these mental disorders by intervening
directly in the brain. Our Core Concept specifies the targets of these therapies:
Core Concept 13.3
Biomedical therapies seek to treat psychological disorders by
changing the brain’s chemistry with drugs, its circuitry with surgery,
or its patterns of activity with pulses of electricity or powerful
magnetic fields.
Each of the biomedical therapies emerges from the medical model of abnormal mental
functioning, which assumes an organic basis for mental illnesses and treats them as
diseases—as we saw in Chapter 12. We begin our examination of these biomedical thera-
pies with medicine’s arsenal of prescription psychoactive drugs.
Drug Therapy
In the history of the treatment of mental disorder, nothing has ever rivaled the revolu-
tion created by the discovery of drugs that could calm anxious patients, elevate the
mood of depressed patients, and suppress hallucinations in psychotic patients. This
brave new therapeutic era began in 1953 with the introduction of the first antipsy-
chotic drugs (often called “tranquilizers”). As these drugs found wide application,
Explore the Concept Drugs Commonly
Used to Treat Psychiatric Disorders
at MyPsychLab
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: On what form of behavioral learning is the behavioral
technique of counterconditioning based?
2. APPLICATION: You could use contingency management to change
the behavior of a child who comes home late for dinner by
a. pairing food with punishment.
b. having the child observe someone else coming home on time
and being rewarded.
c. refusing to let the child have dinner when he comes home late.
d. having the child relax and imagine being home on time for dinner.
3. RECALL: What is the primary goal of psychoanalytic therapy? That
is, what makes psychoanalytic therapy different from behavioral
therapy or the cognitive therapies?
4. RECALL: Carl Rogers invented a technique to help people
see their own thinking more clearly. Using this technique,
the therapist paraphrases the client’s statements. Rogers
called this _____.
5. RECALL: Which form of therapy directly confronts a client’s
self-defeating and irrational thought patterns?
6. RECALL: Eysenck caused a furor with his claim that people who
receive psychotherapy _____.
7. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: A phobia would be
best treated by _____, while a problem of choosing a major would
be better suited for _____.
a. behavioral therapy/insight therapy
b. cognitive therapy/psychoanalysis
c. insight therapy/behavioral therapy
d. humanistic therapy/behavioral therapy
Answers 1. Classical conditioning 2. c 3. Psychoanalysis seeks to reveal and resolve problems in the patient’s unconscious, particularly repressed
traumatic memories, unfulfilled desires, and unconscious conflicts. 4. reflection of feeling 5. Rational–emotive behavior therapy 6. improve no more
often than people who receive no therapy at all 7. a
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

578 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
many unruly, assaultive patients almost miraculously became cooperative, calm, and
sociable. In addition, many thought-disordered patients, who had previously been
absorbed in their delusions and hallucinations, began to respond to the physical and
social environment around them.
The effectiveness of drug therapy had a pronounced effect on the census of the
nation’s mental hospitals. In 1955, more than half a million Americans were living in
mental institutions, each staying an average of several years. Then, with the introduc-
tion of tranquilizers, the numbers began a steady decline. In just over ten years, fewer
than half that number actually resided in mental hospitals, and those who did were
usually kept for only a few months.
Drug therapy has long since steamrolled out of the mental hospital and into our
everyday lives. Currently, millions of people take drugs for anxiety, stress, depression,
hyperactivity, insomnia, fears and phobias, obsessions and compulsions, addictions,
and numerous other problems. Clearly, a drug-induced revolution has occurred. But
what are these miraculous drugs?
You have probably heard of Prozac and Valium, but those are just two of scores
of psychoactive drugs that can alter your mood, your perceptions, your desires, and
perhaps your basic personality. Here, we will consider four major categories of drugs
used today: antipsychotics, antidepressants and mood stabilizers, antianxiety drugs,
and stimulants.
Antipsychotic Drugs As their name says, the antipsychotics treat the symptoms of
psychosis: delusions, hallucinations, social withdrawal, and agitation (Dawkins et al.,
1999). Most work by reducing the activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine in the
brain—although the precise reason why this has an antipsychotic effect is not known.
For example, chlorpromazine (sold under the brand name Thorazine) and haloperidol
(brand name: Haldol) are known to block dopamine receptors in the synapse between
nerve cells. A newer antipsychotic drug, clozapine (Clozaril), both decreases dopamine
activity and increases the activity of another neurotransmitter, serotonin, which also
inhibits the dopamine system (Javitt & Coyle, 2004; Sawa & Snyder, 2002). While
these drugs reduce overall brain activity, they do not merely “tranquilize” the patient.
Rather, they reduce schizophrenia’s “positive” symptoms (hallucinations, delusions,
emotional disturbances, and agitated behavior), although they do little for the “nega-
tive” symptoms of social distance, jumbled thoughts, and poor attention spans seen in
many patients (Wickelgren, 1998a). Newer drugs have come online in recent years, but
a recent study suggests that, for reducing psychotic symptoms, these “second genera-
tion” antipsychotic drugs may be no more effective than the older ones (Lieberman
et al., 2005; Rosenheck et al., 2006).
Unfortunately, long-term administration of any antipsychotic drug can have
unwanted side effects. Physical changes in the brain have been noted (Gur & Maany,
1998). But most worrisome is tardive dyskinesia, which produces an incurable distur-
bance of motor control, especially of the facial muscles. Although some of the newer
drugs, like clozapine, have reduced motor side effects because of their more selective
dopamine blocking, they also can cause serious problems. Are antipsychotic drugs
worth the risk? There is no easy answer. The risks must be weighed against the severity
of the patient’s current suffering.
Antidepressants and Mood Stabilizers The drug therapy arsenal also includes
several compounds that have revolutionized the treatment of depression and bipolar
disorder. As with other psychoactive drugs, neither the antidepressants nor mood sta-
bilizers can provide a “cure.” Their use, however, has made a big difference in the lives
of many people suffering from mood disorders.
Antidepressant Drugs All three major classes of antidepressants work by “turning up the
volume” on messages transmitted over certain brain pathways, especially those using
norepinephrine and serotonin (Holmes, 2001). Tricyclic compounds such as Tofranil
and Elavil reduce the neuron’s reabsorption of neurotransmitters after they have been
antipsychotics Medicines that diminish psychotic
symptoms, usually by effects on the dopamine pathways
in the brain.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 12
Positive symptoms of
schizophrenia include active
hallucinations, delusions, and
extreme emotions; negative
symptoms include withdrawal and
“flat” emotions (p. 539).
tardive dyskinesia An incurable disorder
of motor control, especially involving muscles of
the face and head, resulting from long-term use of
antipsychotic drugs.
antidepressants Medicines that treat
depression, usually by their effects on the serotonin
and/or norepinephrine pathways in the brain.
c Drug Therapies
• Antipsychotic drugs
• Antidepressants and mood stabilizers
• Antianxiety drugs
• Stimulants

How Is the Biomedical Approach Used to Treat Psychological Disorders? 579
released in the synapse between brain cells—a process called reuptake. A second group
includes the famous antidepressant Prozac (fluoxetine). These drugs, known as SSRIs
(selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors), interfere with the reuptake of serotonin. As a
result, the SSRIs keep serotonin available longer. For many people, this prolonged se-
rotonin effect lifts depressed moods (Hirschfeld, 1999; Kramer, 1993). The third group
of antidepressant drugs, the monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors, limits the activ-
ity of the enzyme MAO, a chemical that breaks down norepinephrine in the synapse.
When MAO is inhibited, more norepinephrine is available to carry neural messages
across the synapse.
Strangely, most patients report that it takes at least a couple of weeks before
antidepressants begin to lift the veil of depression. And recent research seems to suggest
why. In animal studies, antidepressants stimulate the growth of neurons in the brain’s
hippocampus. No one is sure why the hippocampus seems to be involved in depres-
sion, but the animal studies offer another tantalizing clue: Stress slows the growth
of new neurons in this part of the brain—and depression is believed to be a stress
response (Santarelli et al., 2003).
The possibility of suicide poses a special concern in the treatment of depression.
And now, it seems that the very drugs used for treating depression may provoke or am-
plify suicidal thoughts, particularly during the first few weeks of therapy and especially
in children (Bower, 2004b). One study revived hopes by showing that the increased
short-term risk is small—less than 1 percent (Bridge et al., 2007). And another study
shows that patients taking antidepressants have a somewhat lower risk of suicide
over the long haul (Bower, 2007). Obviously, the picture is confusing at the moment,
and the Food and Drug Administration is advising prescribers to use caution (Bower,
2006b; Jick et al., 2004).
Controversy Over SSRIs In his book, Listening to Prozac, psychiatrist and Prozac
advocate Peter Kramer (1993) encourages the use of the drug to deal not only with
depression but also with general feelings of social unease and fear of rejection. Such
claims have brought heated replies from therapists who fear that drugs may merely
mask the psychological problems that people need to face and resolve. Some worry
that the wide use of antidepressants may produce changes in the personality structure
of a huge segment of our population—changes that could bring unanticipated social
consequences (Breggin & Breggin, 1994; Sleek, 1994). In fact, more prescriptions are
being written for antidepressants than there are people who have been diagnosed with
clinical depression (Coyne, 2001). The problem seems to be especially acute on college
and university campuses, where increasing numbers of students are taking antidepres-
sants (Young, 2003). At present, no one knows what the potential dangers might be of
altering the brain chemistry of large numbers of people over long periods.
Just as worrisome for the medical model, another report suggests that antidepres-
sants may owe nearly as much to their hype as to their effects on the brain. According
to data mined from the Food and Drug Administration files, studies showing positive
results find their way into print far more often than do studies showing no effects for
these medicines. While these drugs do better overall than placebos, reports of their ef-
fects seem to be exaggerated by selective publication of positive results (Turner et al.,
2008).
Mood Stabilizers A simple chemical, lithium (in the form of lithium carbonate), has
proved highly effective as a mood stabilizer in the treatment of bipolar disorder
(Paulus, 2007; Schou, 1997). Not just an antidepressant, lithium affects both ends of
the emotional spectrum, dampening swings of mood that would otherwise range from
uncontrollable periods of hyperexcitement to the lethargy and despair of depression.
Unfortunately, lithium also has a serious drawback: In high concentrations, it is toxic.
Physicians have learned that safe therapy requires that small doses be given to build
up therapeutic concentrations in the blood over a period of a week or two. Then, as a
precaution, patients must have periodic blood analyses to ensure that lithium concen-
trations have not risen to dangerous levels. In a welcome development, scientists have
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Reuptake is a process by which
neurotransmitters are taken intact
from the synapse and cycled back
into the terminal buttons of
the axon. Reuptake, therefore,
“tones down” the message
being sent from one neuron to
another (p. 53).

580 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
found a promising alternative to lithium for the treatment of bipolar disorder (Azar,
1994; Walden et al., 1998). Divalproex sodium (brand name: Depakote), originally
developed to treat epilepsy, seems to be even more effective than lithium for most
patients but with fewer dangerous side effects (Bowden et al., 2000).
Antianxiety Drugs To reduce stress and suppress anxiety associated with everyday
hassles, untold millions of Americans take antianxiety drugs, either barbiturates or ben-
zodiazepines. Barbiturates act as central nervous system depressants, so they have a
relaxing effect. But barbiturates can be dangerous if taken in excess or in combination
with alcohol. By contrast, the benzodiazepines, such as Valium and Xanax, work by
increasing the activity of the neurotransmitter GABA, thereby decreasing activity in
brain regions more specifically involved in feelings of anxiety. The benzodiazepines are
sometimes called “minor tranquilizers.”
Many psychologists believe that these antianxiety drugs—like the antidepressants—
are too often prescribed for problems that people should face rather than mask with
chemicals. Nevertheless, antianxiety compounds can be useful in helping people deal
with specific situations, such as anxiety prior to surgery. Here are some cautions to
bear in mind about these compounds (Hecht, 1986):
• If used over long periods, barbiturates and benzodiazepines can be physically and
psychologically addicting (Holmes, 2001; Schatzberg, 1991).
• Because of their powerful effects on the brain, these medicines should not be taken
to relieve anxieties that are part of the ordinary stresses of everyday life.
• When used for extreme anxiety, antianxiety drugs should not normally be taken
for more than a few days at a time. If used longer than this, their dosage should be
gradually reduced by a physician. Abrupt cessation after prolonged use can lead to
withdrawal symptoms, such as convulsions, tremors, and abdominal and muscle
cramps.
• Because antianxiety drugs depress parts of the central nervous system, they can
impair one’s ability to drive, operate machinery, or perform other tasks that
require alertness (such as studying or taking exams).
• In combination with alcohol (also a central nervous system depressant) or with
sleeping pills, antianxiety drugs can lead to unconsciousness and even death.
Finally, we should mention that some antidepressant drugs have also been found useful
for reducing the symptoms of certain anxiety disorders such as panic disorders,
agoraphobia, and obsessive–compulsive disorder. (A modern psychiatrist might well
have prescribed antidepressants for Freud’s obsessive patient.) But because these prob-
lems may arise from low levels of serotonin, they may respond even better to drugs like
Prozac that specifically affect serotonin function.
Stimulants Ranging from caffeine to nicotine to amphetamines to cocaine, any drug
that produces excitement or hyperactivity falls into the category of stimulants. We have
seen that stimulants can be useful in the treatment of narcolepsy. They also have an
accepted niche in treating attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). While it
may seem strange to prescribe stimulants (a common one is Ritalin) for hyperactive
children, studies comparing stimulant therapy with behavior therapy and with place-
bos have shown a clear role for stimulants (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2001;
Meyers, 2006). Although the exact mechanism is unknown, stimulants may work in
hyperactive children by increasing the availability of dopamine, glutamate, and/or
serotonin in their brains (Gainetdinov et al., 1999).
As you can imagine, the use of stimulants to treat ADHD has generated controversy
(O’Connor, 2001). Some objections, of course, stem from ignorance of the well-established
calming effect these drugs have in children with this condition. Other worries have more
substance. For some patients, the drug will interfere with normal sleep patterns. Addition-
ally, there is evidence that stimulant therapy can slow a child’s growth (National Institute
of Mental Health, 2004). Legitimate concerns also center on the potential for abuse
antianxiety drugs A category of medicines that
includes the barbiturates and benzodiazepines, drugs
that diminish feelings of anxiety.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
GABA is the major inhibitory
neurotransmitter in the brain
(p. 54).
stimulants Drugs that normally increase activity
level by encouraging communication among neurons
in the brain. Stimulants, however, have been found
to suppress activity level in persons with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

How Is the Biomedical Approach Used to Treat Psychological Disorders? 581
that lurks in the temptation to see every child’s behavior problem as a symptom of
ADHD (Smith, 2002a). And finally, critics suggest that the prescription of stimulants
to children might encourage later drug abuse (Daw, 2001). Happily, recent studies
have found cognitive–behavioral therapy (CBT) to be comparable to stimulants as a
treatment for ADHD (Sinha, 2005). Even better, say many experts, is a combination
therapy regimen that employs both CBT and stimulants.
Evaluating the Drug Therapies The drug therapies have caused a revolution in the
treatment of severe mental disorders, starting in the 1950s, when virtually the only
treatments available were talk therapies, hospitalization, restraints, “shock treatment,”
and lobotomies. Of course, none of the drugs discovered so far can “cure” any mental
disorder. Yet, in many cases, they can alter the brain’s chemistry to suppress symptoms.
But is all the enthusiasm warranted? According to neuroscientist Elliot Valenstein
(1998), a close look behind the scenes of drug therapy raises important questions
(Rolnick, 1998). Valenstein believes that much of the faith in drug therapy for mental
disorders rests on hype. He credits the wide acceptance of drug therapy to the huge
investment drug companies have made in marketing their products. Particularly dis-
tressing are concerns raised about the willingness of physicians to prescribe drugs for
children—even though the safety and effectiveness of many drugs has not been estab-
lished in young people (K. Brown, 2003a).
Few question that drugs are the proper first line of treatment for certain conditions,
such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. In many other cases, however, the appar-
ent advantages of drug therapy are quick results and low cost. Yet some research raises
doubts about simplistic time-and-money assumptions. Studies show, for example, that
treating depression, anxiety disorders, and eating disorders with cognitive–
behavioral therapy—alone or in combination with drugs—may be both more
effective and more economical in the long run than reliance on drugs alone
(Clay, 2000).
Other Medical Therapies for Psychological Disorders
Describing a modern-day counterpart to Phineas Gage, the headline in the
Los Angeles Times read, “.22-Caliber Surgery Suicide Bid Cures Psychological
Disorder” (February 23, 1988). The article revealed that a 19-year-old man
suffering from severe obsessive–compulsive disorder had shot a 0.22 caliber
bullet through the front of his brain in a suicide attempt. Remarkably, he sur-
vived, his pathological symptoms were gone, and his intellectual capacity was
not affected.
We don’t recommend this form of therapy, but the case does illustrate the
potential effects of physical intervention in the brain. In this vein, we will look
briefly at two medical alternatives to drug therapy that were conceived to alter the
brain’s structure and function, psychosurgery and direct stimulation of the brain.
Psychosurgery With scalpels in place of bullets, surgeons have long aspired
to treat mental disorders by severing connections between parts of the brain or
by removing small sections of brain. In modern times, psychosurgery is usually
considered a method of last resort. Nevertheless, psychosurgery has a history
dating back at least to medieval times, when surgeons might open the skull to
remove “the stone of folly” from an unfortunate madman. (There is, of course,
no such “stone”—and there was no anesthetic except alcohol for these procedures.)
In modern times, the best-known form of psychosurgery involved the
now-discredited prefrontal lobotomy. This operation, developed by Portuguese psychi-
atrist Egas Moñiz,2 severed certain nerve fibers connecting the frontal lobes with deep
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
Phineas Gage survived—with
a changed personality—after a
steel rod was blasted through his
frontal lobe (p. 62).
psychosurgery The general term for surgical
intervention in the brain to treat psychological disorders.
2In an ironic footnote to the history of psychosurgery, Moñiz was shot by one of this disgruntled patients, who
apparently had not become as pacified as Moniz had expected. This fact, however, did not prevent Moñiz from
receiving the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1949.
In medieval times, those suffering from
madness might be treated by trephen-
ation or making a hole in the skull. This
painting portrays the operation as the
removal of the “stone of folly.”

582 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
brain structures, especially those of the thalamus and hypothalamus—much as what
happened accidentally to Phineas Gage. The original candidates for Moñiz’s scalpel
were agitated schizophrenic patients and patients who were compulsive and anxiety
ridden. Surprisingly, this rather crude operation often produced a dramatic reduc-
tion in agitation and anxiety. On the down side, the operation permanently destroyed
basic aspects of the patients’ personalities. Frequently, they emerged from the proce-
dure crippled by a loss of interest in their personal well-being and their surroundings.
As experience with lobotomy accumulated, doctors saw that it destroyed patients’
ability to plan ahead, made them indifferent to the opinions of others, rendered their
behavior childlike, and gave them the intellectual and emotional flatness of a person
without a coherent sense of self. Not surprisingly, when the antipsychotic drug thera-
pies came on the scene in the 1950s, with a promise to control psychotic symptoms
with no obvious risk of permanent brain damage, the era of lobotomy came to a close
(Valenstein, 1980).
Psychosurgery is still occasionally done, but it is now much more limited to precise
and proven procedures for very specific brain disorders. In the “split-brain” opera-
tion, for example, severing the fibers of the corpus callosum can reduce life-threatening
seizures in certain cases of epilepsy, with relatively few side effects. Psychosurgery is
also done on portions of the brain involved in pain perception in cases of otherwise
intractable pain. Today, however, no DSM-IV diagnoses are routinely treated with
psychosurgery.
Brain-Stimulation Therapies Electrical stimulation of the brain, also known as
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), is still widely used, especially in patients with severe
depression who have not responded to drugs or psychotherapy for depression. (You
will recall that the therapist said that Derek was not a good candidate for ECT.) The
treatment induces a convulsion by applying an electric current (75 to 100 volts) to a
patient’s temples briefly—from one-tenth to a full second. The convulsion usually runs
its course in less than a minute. Patients are prepared for this traumatic intervention
by putting them to “sleep” with a short-acting barbiturate, plus a muscle relaxant. This
not only renders them unconscious but minimizes any violent physical spasms during
the seizure (Abrams, 1992; Malitz & Sackheim, 1984). Within half an hour, the patient
awakens but has no memory of the seizure or of the events preparatory to treatment.
Does it work? Crude as it may seem to send an electric current through a person’s
skull and brain, studies have shown ECT to be a useful tool in treating depression,
especially those in whom suicidal tendencies demand an intervention that works far
more quickly than medication or psychotherapy (Shorter & Healy, 2007). Typically,
the symptoms of depression often abate in a three- or four-day course of treatment, in
contrast with the one- to two-week period required for drug therapy.
Although most clinicians regard ECT, properly done, as safe and effective, some
critics fear that it also could be abused to silence dissent or punish patients who are
uncooperative (Butcher et al., 2008; Holmes, 2001). Other worries about ECT stem
from the fact that its effects are not well understood. To date, no definitive theory ex-
plains why inducing a mild convulsion should alleviate disordered symptoms, although
there are some hints that it may stimulate neuron growth in parts of the brain, particu-
larly the hippocampus.
Most worrisome, perhaps, are the memory deficits sometimes caused by electrocon-
vulsive therapy (Breggin, 1979, 1991). Proponents claim, however, that patients gener-
ally recover full memory functions within months of the treatment (Calev et al., 1991).
In the face of such concerns, the National Institute of Mental Health investigated the
use of ECT and, in 1985, gave it a cautious endorsement for treating a narrow range
of disorders, especially severe depression. Then, in 1990, the American Psychiatric
Association also proclaimed ECT to be a valid treatment option. To minimize even
short-term side effects, however, ECT is usually administered “unilaterally”—only to
the right temple—to reduce the possibility of speech impairment.
Another promising new therapeutic tool for stimulating the brain with magnetic
fields may offer all the benefits of ECT without the risk of memory loss. Still in the
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) A treatment
used primarily for depression and involving the applica-
tion of an electric current to the head, producing a
generalized seizure; sometimes called “shock
treatment.”
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
In most people, speech is
controlled in the brain’s left
hemisphere (p. 74).
The sedated patient is about to receive
electroconvulsive therapy. ECT involves
a weak electrical current to a patient’s
temples, causing a convulsion. Some
psychiatrists have found ECT successful
in alleviating symptoms of severe depres-
sion, but it remains a treatment of last
resort for most therapists.

How Is the Biomedical Approach Used to Treat Psychological Disorders? 583
experimental stages, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) involves directing high-
powered magnetic stimulation to specific parts of the brain. Studies indicate that TMS
may be useful for treating not only depression but also schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder (George, 2003). Because TMS therapy does not require the induction of a
seizure, researchers hope also that it offers a safer alternative to ECT.
Most recently, neurologist Helen Mayberg has reported using deep brain stimula-
tion, which requires the surgical implantation of a microelectrode through a small hole
in the skull and directly into the brain, where it delivers a continual trickle of electric
current. Dr. Mayberg likens the treatment to a “pacemaker” for an area of cortex that
seems to range out of control in depression (Gutman, 2006; Price, 2009). Although the
treatment has been used on only a few patients, Mayberg reports highly encouraging
outcomes (Mayberg et al., 2005). She views it not as an alternative to other therapies
but as a promising last resort for severely depressed patients who have not responded
to other approaches.
Hospitalization and the Alternatives
We have seen that mental hospitals were originally conceived as places of refuge—
“asylums”—where disturbed people could escape the pressures of normal living. In fact,
they often worked very well (Maher & Maher, 1985). But by the 20th century, these
hospitals had become overcrowded and, at best, little more than warehouses for the dis-
turbed, with nowhere else to go. Rarely were people with money committed to these
institutions; instead, they were given private care, including individual psychotherapy
(Doyle, 2002a).
The drugs that so profoundly altered treatment in mental hospitals did not appear
until the 1950s, so prior to that time, institutionalized patients often found themselves
controlled by straitjackets, locked rooms, and, sometimes, lobotomies. Meanwhile, in
the large public mental hospitals, what passed for psychotherapy was a feeble form of
“group therapy” performed on a whole ward—perhaps 50 patients—at a time. Too
many patients, too few therapists, and too little time devoted to therapy meant that
little, if any, real benefit accrued.
Deinstitutionalization and Community Mental Health The advent of antipsy-
chotic drugs ushered in huge changes. Thousands of patients who responded to the
new drugs were sent home for outpatient treatment. The goal of deinstitutionalization
was to return as many patients as possible to their communities, where they would (it
was hoped) thrive in a familiar and supportive environment. The concept also gained
popularity with politicians, who saw large sums of money being poured into mental
hospitals (filled, incidentally, with nonvoting patients). Thus, by the 1970s, a consen-
sus formed among politicians and mental health professionals that the major locus of
treatment should shift from mental hospitals back to the community. There, both psy-
chological and drug therapies would be dispensed from walk-in clinics, and recovering
patients could live with their families, in foster homes, or in group homes. This vision
became known as the community mental health movement.
Unfortunately, the reality did not match the vision (Doyle, 2002a; Torrey, 1996,
1997). Community mental health clinics—the centerpieces of the community mental
health movement—rarely received the full funding they needed. Chronic patients were
released from mental hospitals, but they often returned to communities that could
offer them few therapeutic resources and to families ill equipped to cope with them
(Smith et al., 1993). Then, as patients returned to the community and needed care,
they entered psychiatric wards at local general hospitals—rather than mental hospitals.
As a result, hospital care has continued to consume a large share of mental health ex-
penditures in the United States (Kiesler, 1993; U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2002).
Despite the dark picture we have painted, community treatment has had some suc-
cesses. After a review of ten studies in which mental patients were randomly assigned
to hospital treatment or to various community treatment programs, Kiesler (1982)
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) A
treatment that involves magnetic stimulation of specific
regions of the brain. Unlike ECT, TMS does not produce a
seizure.
deinstitutionalization The policy of removing
patients, whenever possible, from mental hospitals.
community mental health movement An
effort to deinstitutionalize mental patients and to
provide therapy from outpatient clinics. Proponents of
community mental health envisioned that recovering
patients could live with their families, in foster homes,
or in group homes.
Deinstitutionalization put mental patients
back in the community—but often with-
out adequate resources for continued
treatment.
Read
at MyPsychLab
about The Therapeutic Community

584 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
reported that patients more often improved in the community-based programs. Fur-
ther, those given community-based treatment were less likely to be hospitalized at a
later date. When these programs have adequate resources, they can be highly effective
(McGuire, 2000).
Unfortunately, some 60 million Americans in rural areas have no easy access to
mental health services. But, thanks to the Internet and the telephone, some of them
now can get help through remote “telehealth” sessions (Stambor, 2006; Winerman,
2006c). Using the telehealth approach, psychologists and other professionals can
quickly establish a link with their rural clients to answer questions, make referrals, and
even provide therapy.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
What Sort of Therapy Would You Recommend?
Now that we have looked at both the psychological and biomedical therapies, consider
the following situation. A friend tells you about some personal problems he or she is
having and requests your help in finding a therapist. Because you are studying psychol-
ogy, your friend reasons, you might know what kind of treatment would be best. How
do you respond?
First, you can lend a friendly ear, using the techniques of active listening, accep-
tance, and exploration of alternatives, which we discussed earlier in the chapter. In
fact, this may be all that your troubled friend needs. But if your friend wants to see
a therapist or if the situation looks in any way like one that requires professional as-
sistance, you can use your knowledge of mental disorders and therapies to help your
friend decide what sort of therapist might be most appropriate. To take some of the
burden from your shoulders, both of you should understand that any competent thera-
pist will always refer the client elsewhere if the required therapy lies outside the thera-
pist’s specialty.
A Therapy Checklist
Here, then, are some questions you will want to consider before you recommend a
particular type of therapist:
• Is medical treatment needed? While you should not try to make a diagnosis, you
should encourage your friend to see a medical specialist, such as a psychiatrist or
nurse practitioner, if you suspect that the problem involves a major mental disor-
der such as psychosis, mania, or bipolar disorder. Medical evaluation is also indi-
cated if you suspect narcolepsy, sleep apnea, epilepsy, Alzheimer’s disease, or other
problems recognized to have a biological basis. If your suspicion is confirmed, the
treatment may include a combination of drug therapy and psychotherapy.
• Is there a specific behavior problem? For example, does your friend want to eliminate
a fear of spiders or a fear of flying? Is the problem a rebellious child? A sexual
problem? Is she or he depressed—but not psychotic? If so, behavior therapy or
cognitive–behavioral therapy with a counseling or clinical psychologist is probably
the best bet. (Most psychiatrists and other medical practitioners are not usually
trained in these procedures.) You can call a prospective therapist’s office and ask
for information on specific areas of training and specialization.
• Would group therapy be helpful? Many people find valuable help and support in
a group setting, where they can learn not only from the therapist but also from
other group members. Groups can be especially effective in dealing with shyness,
lack of assertiveness, and addictions, and with complex problems of interpersonal
relationships. (As a bonus, group therapy is often less expensive than individual
therapy.) Professionals with training in several disciplines, including psychology,
psychiatry, and social work, run therapy groups. Again, your best bet is a thera-
pist who has had special training in this method and about whom you have heard
good things from former clients.
The “telehealth” approach to therapy
brings mental health services to clients in
rural areas, where help might not other-
wise be available.

How Do the Psychological Therapies and Biomedical Therapies Compare? 585
• Is the problem one of stress, confusion, or choice? Most troubled people don’t fall neatly
into one of the categories that we have discussed in the previous points. More typi-
cally, they need help sorting through the chaos of their lives, finding a pattern, and
developing a plan to cope. This is the territory of the insight therapies.
Some Cautions
We now know enough about human biology, behavior, and mental processes to avoid
certain treatments. Here are some particularly important examples:
• Drug therapies to avoid. The minor tranquilizers (antianxiety drugs) are too fre-
quently prescribed for patients leading chronically stressful lives. As we have said,
because of their addicting and sedating effects, these drugs should only be taken
for short periods—if at all. Similarly, some physicians ignore the dangers of sleep-
inducing medications for their patients who suffer from insomnia. While these
drugs have legitimate uses, many such prescriptions carry the possibility of drug
dependence and of interfering with the person’s ability to alter the conditions that
may have caused the original problem.
• Advice and interpretations to avoid. Although psychodynamic therapy can be helpful,
patients should also be cautioned that some such therapists may give ill-advised
counsel in problems of anger management. Traditionally, Freudians have believed
that individuals who are prone to angry or violent outbursts harbor deep-seated ag-
gression that needs to be vented. But, as we have seen, research shows that trying to
empty one’s aggressions through aggressive behavior, such as shouting or punching a
pillow, may actually increase the likelihood of later aggressive behavior.
With these cautions in mind, then, your friend can contact several therapists to see
which has the combination of skills and manner that offer the best fit for her problem
and her personality.
Check Your Understanding
1. APPLICATION: Imagine that you are a psychiatrist. Which type
of drug would you prescribe for a patient diagnosed with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)?
2. RECALL: Which class of drugs blocks dopamine receptors in the
brain? Which type magnifies the effects of serotonin?
3. RECALL: Name three types of medical therapies for mental
disorder, including one that has now been largely abandoned
as ineffective and dangerous.
4. RECALL: The community mental health movement followed a
deliberate plan of _____ for mental patients.
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: _____, _____,
and _____ all are medical techniques for treating mental disorders
by directly altering the function of the brain.
Answers 1. a stimulant 2. Antipsychotic drugs block dopamine receptors in the brain. Antidepressants, particularly the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs), amplify the effects of serotonin. 3. Electroconvulsive therapy, drug therapy, and prefrontal lobotomy; the latter is no longer done
as a treatment for mental disorders. 4. deinstitutionalization 5. Any three of the following would be correct: drug therapies, psychosurgery, ECT, and
transcranial magnetic stimulation.
13.4 KEY QUESTION
How Do the Psychological Therapies and Biomedical
Therapies Compare?
Now that we have looked at both the psychological and medical therapies, can we say
which approach is best? In this section, we will see that the answer to that question
depends on the disorder. But before we look at the treatment choices for several major
conditions, we should acknowledge some other influences that cloud the issue of medi-
cal versus psychological treatments.
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586 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
We have seen that psychologists and psychiatrists have long been at odds over the
best forms of treatment for mental disorders. In part, the dispute is over territory and
money: Who gets to treat people with mental problems—and bill their insurance? The
big pharmaceutical companies, with billions of dollars at stake, play a formidable
role in this dispute, too. You can glimpse the sort of hardball game Big Pharma plays
by noting the advertising for prescription drugs that is directed at the general public.
Because of these conflicting interests and pressures, research on medical and psycho-
logical therapies has been done largely in parallel, with each side promoting its own
approach and ignoring the other’s. Unfortunately, this has meant that comparatively
little research has focused on the effectiveness of combination therapies, involving both
medication and psychotherapy used in concert.
That said, let’s take a look at how we might weigh the options of medical and
psychological treatment in some specific disorders with which you are now familiar.
Here’s the Core Concept:
Core Concept 13.4
While a combination of psychological and medical therapies is of-
ten better than either one alone for treating mental disorders, most
people who have unspecified “problems in living” are best served by
psychological treatment alone.
More specifically, what we will find is that a very large number of people with psy-
chological problems do not have a DSM-IV disorder but need psychological counsel-
ing or therapy to help them work through difficult periods in their lives. On the other
combination therapy A therapeutic approach
that involves both psychological and medical
techniques—most often a drug therapy with a
behavioral or cognitive–behavioral therapy.
Drug companies now do a hard sell on
psychotropic drugs through advertise-
ments like this one aimed at the general
public. Here, the not-so-subtle message
is that unhappy people can be treated
with medication.

How Do the Psychological Therapies and Biomedical Therapies Compare? 587
hand, many of the well-known DSM-IV disorders, including the mood disorders and
schizophrenia, are best treated by a combination of medical and psychological thera-
pies. Let’s begin with the latter.
Depression and Anxiety Disorders: Psychological
versus Medical Treatment
Fluoxetine (Prozac) is the planet’s most widely prescribed drug. Together with other SSRI
medications, it represents a $10 billion, worldwide industry for the treatment of depres-
sion (Bower, 2006b). In addition, antidepressants are often used to treat panic disorder
and other conditions marked by anxiety. These drugs may be worth every penny if they are
effective in alleviating the suffering of these very common disorders. But just how effective
are they? And how effective are they in comparison with psychological therapies?
CBT versus Drugs Studies show that antidepressant drugs and cognitive–behavioral
therapy (CBT)—the psychological treatment for which we have the most evidence of
efficacy—are equally effective ways of treating depression and panic disorder, at least in the
short run. Significantly, however, CBT holds an edge over drug therapy in the long–term—
particularly in depression, where the rate of patient relapse for CTB is about half that of
antidepressant medications (Baker et al., 2009; DeRubeis et al., 2005; Hollon et al., 2002).
But what happens if depressed patients get antidepressants and CBT? The research
shows that they may do even better than with either treatment alone (DeAngelis,
2008a; Keller et al., 2000; Thase et al., 1997). Oddly, combination therapy seems not
to offer an advantage for those with anxiety disorders.
Advances in understanding the brain now suggest why such a combination therapy
approach seems to be effective for depression. Neuroscientist Helen Mayberg has shown
that CBT and the antidepressants work their wonders by affecting different parts of the
brain. Antidepressants apparently target the limbic system—which contains the brain’s
main emotion pathways. In contrast, CBT affects a part the frontal cortex associated with
reasoning. The common factor in both approaches is an “alarm switch” that gets turned
off, either by the effect of drugs on the “fast” emotion pathway in the limbic system or
by the effect of CBT on the brain’s “slow” emotional circuitry in the cortex (Goldapple
et al., 2004). Thus, as research from the clinic and the lab come together, many clinicians
have come to favor a combination therapy approach for depression, using both drugs and
CBT. In fact, a combined approach would be a reasonable option for Derek’s depression
(described at the beginning of the chapter). A recent study also supports a combined drug-
and-medicine approach for bipolar patients (Miklowitz et al., 2007).
ECT And what about electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)? Although clinicians commonly
assert that ECT is the most effective treatment for psychotic depression (Hollon et al.,
2002), only one study, done in Sweden, has compared ECT head-to-head with antidepres-
sants. The principal finding: Suicide attempts were less common among those patients re-
ceiving ECT than among those taking antidepressants (Brådvik & Berglund, 2006). As for
transcranial magnetic stimulation, it is too early to tell. As of this writing, no studies have
reported a one-on-one comparison of TMS with other therapies for depression.
Schizophrenia: Psychological versus Medical Treatment
Ever since the discovery of antipsychotics more than 50 years ago, these drugs have rep-
resented the front line of treatment for schizophrenia. Supplemental treatment, in the
form of family therapy, social skills training (often in community residential treatment
centers), and occupational therapy (through sheltered workshops, such as Goodwill In-
dustries), has brought schizophrenic patients back into contact with their communities.
But until recently, conventional psychological treatments were little used. In the past few
years, however, advocates of cognitive–behavioral therapy have been trying their hands
at treating schizophrenia, with encouraging results, even with patients who have not
responded to medication (McGurk et al., 2007; Rector & Beck, 2001).

588 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
“The Worried Well” and Other Problems: Not Everyone Needs Drugs
While a combination of psychological therapy and drugs may be best for some disorders,
we have seen that drugs are not useful for treating specific phobias. Likewise, medication
has little value as a therapy for most learning disabilities, psychogenic sexual dysfunc-
tions, most personality disorders, and most developmental disorders (with the exception
of ADHD). In addition, we should remember that many people who have psychologi-
cal problems do not have a diagnosed mental disorder, such as depression, a phobia, or
schizophrenia. Rather, they may have financial difficulties, marital problems, stress on the
job, out-of-control children—or perhaps they just experience loneliness and feelings of
inadequacy: These are the people that clinicians sometimes call “the worried well.”
That’s not to say that those whose problems don’t qualify as an “official” disorder
are not suffering. They struggle with what we might term generic “problems in living.”
The difficulty is that people with such issues too often persuade a physician to prescribe
antidepressants or antianxiety medications. What they really need is a referral to a mental
health professional who could help them sort through their problems and choices.
Early Intervention and Prevention Programs: A Modest Proposal A recent fed-
eral report suggests that the United States could save as much as $247 billion a year
by instituting tried-and-true programs that would nip mental health problems of
children and adolescents in the bud (BCYF, 2009; O’Connell et al., 2010). “The effects
of prevention are now quite well documented,” says Irwin Sandler, director of the
Prevention Research Center at Arizona State University (Clay, 2009, p. 42).
The report recommends identifying young people who are at risk for emotional and
behavior disorders and getting early help for them. Such preventive programs include
stress management sessions for youth at risk for depression, cognitive– behavioral
therapy for children exhibiting excessive anxiety, and parenting skills classes and
counseling services for families dealing with adversities, such as divorce or poverty. At
present, such programs exist on only a small scale. What we need now is research on
moving such interventions from the lab into the field, notes Sandler.
But prevention is not just for kids. For adults, it may mean practicing the stress-
reduction and wellness techniques that we will discuss in the next chapter. Here, we will
take special note of the new research showing the value of exercise. Everyone knows, of
course, that exercise is a powerful tool in conquering obesity. Yet, clearly, the connection
between exercise and mental health hasn’t registered in the public mind. Nor is it widely
understood among mental health professionals. Still, for more than 20 years, evidence has
been accumulating that regular exercise works just as well as medication in combating
depression, anxiety, and many of the problems-in-living we discussed earlier (Blumenthal
et al., 2007; Novotney, 2008; Ströhle, 2009). A few studies even suggest that exercise may
help sharpen the mind and fend off dementia (Azar, 2010). Clinical training programs are
just starting to take notice of this valuable old tool with a newly discovered use.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Consider the ways in which psychotherapy is like your educational experiences in college:
• Most therapists, like most professors, are professionals with special training in
what they do.
• Most clients are like students in that they are seeking professional help to change
their lives in some way.
• Much of what happens in therapy and in the classroom involves learning: new
ideas, new behaviors, new insights, and new connections.
Learning as Therapy
It may help you learn psychology (and other subjects as well) to think of your college
education in therapeutic terms. As we have seen, therapy seems to work best when ther-
apist and client have a good working relationship and when the client believes in the

How Do the Psychological Therapies and Biomedical Therapies Compare? 589
value of the experience—and the same is almost certainly true for the student–professor
relationship. You can take the initiative in establishing a personal-but-professional rela-
tionship with your psychology professor by doing the following two things: (a) asking
questions or otherwise participating in class (at appropriate times and without domi-
nating, of course) and (b) seeking your instructor’s help on points you don’t understand
or on course-related topics you would like to pursue in more detail (doing so during
regular office hours). The result will be learning more about psychology because you
will be taking a more active part in the learning process. Incidentally, an active approach
to the course will also help you stand out from the crowd in the professor’s mind, which
could be helpful if you later need a faculty recommendation for a scholarship or admis-
sion to an advanced program.
Now consider a parallel between group therapy and education. In group therapy,
patients learn from each other as well as from the therapist. Much the same can occur
in your psychology course if you consider other students as learning resources. As we
noted earlier in this book, the most successful students often spend part of their study
time sharing information in groups.
Change Behavior, Not Just Thinking
One other tip for learning psychology we borrow from cognitive–behavioral therapy:
the importance of changing behavior as well as thinking. It is easy to “intellectualize”
a fact or an idea passively when you read about it or hear about it in class. But you are
likely to find that the idea makes little impact on you (“I know I read about it, but I
can’t remember it!”) if you don’t use it. The remedy is to do something with your new
knowledge: Tell someone about it, come up with illustrations from your own experience,
or try acting in a different way. For example, after reading about active listening in this
chapter, try it the next time you talk to a friend. Educators sometimes speak of this as
“active learning.”
And, we suggest, it’s one of those psychological therapies that works best without
drugs!
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Evidence-Based Practice
The field of therapy for mental disorders is awash in con-troversy. Psychologists and psychiatrists dispute the value
of drugs versus psychological therapies. Arguments rage over
the advantages and disadvantages of electroconvulsive ther-
apy for treating depression. And, as we saw in the previous
chapter, debates still echo the issues Rosenhan raised more
than three decades ago about the effectiveness of mental hos-
pitals and the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses. But there
is no dispute more acrimonious than the one over evidence-
based practice, a dispute that is particularly bitter among
clinical psychologists (Bower, 2005a).
What Is the Issue?
A decade ago, the American Psychological Association estab-
lished a special task force charged with evaluating the effec-
tiveness of various psychological therapies (Chambless et al.,
1996). The thrust of their findings is that literally dozens of
specific disorders can be treated successfully by therapies that
have been validated in well-designed experiments (Barlow,
1996). Here are a few examples of therapies pronounced
effective by the APA task force:
• Behavior therapy for specific phobias, enuresis (bed
wetting), autism, and alcoholism
• Cognitive–behavioral therapy for chronic pain, anorexia,
bulimia, agoraphobia, and depression
• Insight therapy for couples’ relationship problems
More recently, a report by the Association for Psychological
Science focused specifically on evidence-based treatments for
depression (Hollon et al., 2002). That document asserts that
several varieties of psychotherapy can be effective. These
include cognitive–behavioral and family therapy. (The APS
report also acknowledged that there is a legitimate role for
both drug and electroconvulsive therapies in the treatment
of depression.) As we have seen, some studies now suggest
that, for depression, a combination of cognitive– behavioral
therapy and drug therapy can have a greater effect than
either treatment alone (Keller et al., 2000).

590 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
So, what’s all the fuss about? At issue is whether coun-
selors and therapists should be limited to the use of specific
therapy methods known as empirically supported treatments
(EST), that is, to treatments that have been validated by re-
search evidence showing that they actually work (Kazdin,
2008; Westen et al., 2005). So how could anyone possibly
object to that, you might ask?
Surprisingly, psychologists line up on both sides of this is-
sue (Johnson, 2006). Those in opposition say that the devil
is in the details: They say that they are not antiscience, but
they believe “empirically supported treatments” is a fuzzy
concept (Westen & Bradley, 2005). They also worry about an
overly strict interpretation that might inhibit a practitioner’s
freedom to meet the needs of an individual client. Let’s take a
critical look at these details.
What Critical Thinking Questions Should We Ask?
No one doubts that the people on both sides of the evidence-
based practice issue are decent and honorable and that
among them are genuine experts on therapy. So we won’t
question their credibility. But it might be a good idea to ask:
What biases does each side have that might make them weigh
the options differently?
The Evidence-Based Practice Movement Those pushing
the idea of evidence-based practice point to a long history of
misguided and even harmful therapies—from beatings to lo-
botomies—to which people with mental problems have been
subjected. Even in modern times, some practitioners continue
to advocate techniques that can potentially harm their clients
(Lilienfeld, 2007). These include “scared straight” interven-
tions for juvenile offenders, facilitated communication for
autism, recovered-memory therapies, induction of “alter”
personalities in cases diagnosed as dissociative identity dis-
order, DARE (antidrug education) programs in the schools,
boot-camp programs for conduct disorder in prisoner popu-
lations, sexual reorientation for homosexuality, and catharsis
(“get-it-out-of-your-system”) treatment for anger disorders.
An even longer list (based on a survey of clinical psycholo-
gists), ranging from the merely ineffective to the crackpot,
would include: angel therapy, past lives therapy, treatments
for PTSD caused by alien abduction, aromatherapy, thera-
peutic touch, neuro-linguistic programming, primal scream
therapy, and handwriting analysis (Norcross et al., 2006).
In 2009, the Association for Psychological science issued a
major report on the current status of clinical psychology (Baker
et al., 2009; West, 2009). In that report, the APS blasted clini-
cians for their failure to use treatments grounded in science,
noting that an “alarming number” of clinicians are unaware of
empirically validated treatments. The report states:
Research has shown that numerous psychological
interventions are efficacious, effective, and cost-
effective. However, these interventions are used
infrequently with patients who would benefit from
them . . . (p. 67)
empirically supported treatment (EST) Treatment regimen that has been
demonstrated to be effective through research. Also called emprically supported
therapies.
An independent report by clinical researchers R. Kathryn
McHugh and David Barlow (2010) concurs, emphasizing the
difficulty of moving new treatment methods out of the labo-
ratory and into clinical practice.
Those Favoring Caution While acknowledging that we have
made great strides in developing highly effective treatments for a
number of disorders, those urging caution point out that we are
light-years from having the tools to treat all mental disorders—
even with the use of drugs. Consequently, they fear that insurance
companies and HMOs will be unwilling to pay for treatments
not on the official list or for any deviations from “approved”
treatments, no matter what the needs of the individual patient
(Cynkar, 2007b). They also worry that the managed-care com-
panies will force therapists into a one- size-fits-all approach
that would ignore both the clinician’s judgment and the client’s
complex needs (Shedler, 2006). Because therapy is such a time-
consuming process, they also fear that nonmedical therapists
will be squeezed out of the picture by drug prescribers who may
take only a few minutes with each patient.
Those with reservations about evidence-based practice
have several other, more subtle, concerns (Westen & Bradley,
2005). For example, they point out that therapy is much
more than the application of specific techniques: Researchers
find that a common element in successful therapy is a caring,
hopeful relationship and a new way of looking at oneself and
the world (Wampold et al., 2007). This conclusion has been
supported by studies that find the effectiveness of therapy
to depend less on the type of therapy used and more on the
quality of the relationship (also called the therapeutic alliance)
between the therapist and client (Wampold & Brown, 2005).
Therapy also involves a host of individual client factors, such
as motivation, intelligence, and the nature of the problem itself.
We can represent these three aspects of therapy graphically, as
in Figure 13.6. For some problems (such as a relationship issue
or a vocational choice problem—the “problems in living” that
we discussed earlier), no specific ESTs exist. Moreover, the spe-
cific type of therapy used in such cases may be less important
than a supportive therapeutic relationship (DeAngelis, 2005;
Martin et al., 2000).
Finally, the critics of evidence-based practice also point
out that everyday clinical practice is usually messier than
the controlled conditions of research on therapy. For one
thing, most clinical patients/clients present themselves
with multiple problems, such as an anxiety disorder and a
personality disorder. Yet, most ESTs have been validated on
“pure” samples of people having only one specific DSM-IV
diagnosis (DeAngelis, 2010; Kazdin, 2008). Rarely do
researchers target the largest population in most clinical
practices: individuals with multiple “problems in living,” such
as marital difficulties and financial woes and child-rearing
issues and low self-esteem. Moreover, most research aimed at
validating therapeutic techniques is severely restricted to just

How Do the Psychological Therapies and Biomedical Therapies Compare? 591
FIGURE 13.6
Three Aspects of Therapy
Therapy is more than a set of techniques.
It also involves a number of individual
variables (including the nature of the
problem) and the relationship between
the client and therapist—the therapeu-
tic alliance. All must come together for
therapy to be successful.
Therapeutic Techniques
• Cognitive-behavioral therapy
• Psychodynamic therapy
• Humanistic therapy
• Etc.
Individual Variables
• Nature of the problem(s)
• Client personality traits
and temperament
• Client motivation
• Client expectations
• Etc.
Therapeutic Relationship
Variables
• Mutual respect and liking
• Number of therapy sessions
• Understanding
• Etc.
a few sessions—usually no more than a dozen—after which
most patients still have some residual problems.
To end this discussion on a more encouraging note: A
recent study of 200 practitioners found that they all tended
to modify their approach to treatment to fit the needs of their
clients as the situation unfolds during counseling or psycho-
therapy (Holloway, 2003b). That is, despite our emphasis in
this chapter on conflicting methods for the treatment of psy-
chological disorders, most practitioners are quite willing to
adapt their methods to the individual client rather than hold-
ing rigidly to a particular theoretical orientation. And that is
good news, indeed, coming from a field that has traditionally
had strongly divided allegiances. It appears that the empha-
sis on science-based practice is finally breaking down the old
therapeutic boundaries.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
Both sides make good points (see Table 13.3). On the one
hand, practitioners should favor empirically validated treat-
ments when they are clearly appropriate and effective. And
they certainly should eschew treatments that are ineffective
or harmful. But who is going to make that determination: the
individual practitioners, the insurance companies, legislators,
or professional organizations? Your authors think that the
professional psychology associations, such as the APA, must
take stands against putting the therapist into a straitjacket by
limiting him or her to a cast-in-stone list of treatments and
disorders for which those treatments may be applied.
In fact, the American Psychological Association has a pro-
posed policy under consideration (APA Presidential Task Force,
2006). The policy would define evidence-based practice in psy-
chology as “the integration of the best available research with
clinical expertise in the context of patient characteristics, cul-
ture, and preferences.” Who wouldn’t agree with that? Many
people, it turns out. In particular, the evidence-based practice
advocates are concerned that “clinical expertise” could trump
“research,” with the result that clinicians could ignore the sci-
ence and do as they please (Stuart & Lilienfeld, 2007). It is a
knotty issue that doesn’t lend itself to easy answers.
Is there a solution in sight? A partial solution may lie in a
proposal made by David Barlow (2004) who suggested that
psychologists make a distinction between psychological treat-
ments and what he calls “generic psychotherapy.” The em-
pirically validated therapies for specific disorders listed in the
DSM-IV would fall under the heading of psychological treat-
ments, while reserving the term psychotherapy for work with
the nonspecific “problems-in-living” and the huge “Not Oth-
erwise Specified” DSM-IV category that, together, make up a
large proportion of the caseloads of many counselors and cli-
nicians. Barlow’s proposal would, at least, shrink the disputed
territory.

592 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
CHAPTER SUMMARY
PROBLEM: What is the best treatment for Derek’s depression:
psychological therapy, drug therapy, or both? More broadly, the
problem is this: How do we decide among the available therapies
for any of the mental disorders?
• The most basic choice is between one of the psychological
therapies and a biological therapy—or a combination.
• Psychologists or other nonmedical practitioners opt for a
psychological therapy when they believe the problem is learned
or involves faulty cognitions, behaviors, or relationships.
• The psychological therapies can be further divided into
the insight therapies and behavior therapies—or combined
approaches known as cognitive-behavioral therapy and social
learning. The specific therapy type depends primarily on the
therapist’s training and orientation.
• Biological therapies are delivered by psychiatrists and nurse
practitioners when they believe the problem can best be treated
by altering brain function through drugs or other biological
interventions.
13.1 What Is Therapy?
Core Concept 13.1 Therapy for psychological disorders
takes a variety of forms, but all involve a therapeutic
relationship focused on improving a person’s mental,
behavioral, or social functioning.
People seek therapy for a variety of problems, includ-
ing DSM-IV disorders and problems of everyday living.
Treatment comes in many forms, both psychological and
biomedical, but most involve diagnosing the problem,
finding the source of the problem, making a prognosis,
and carrying out treatment. In earlier times, treatments
for those with mental problems were usually harsh and
dehumanizing, often based on the assumption of demonic
possession. Only recently have people with emotional
problems been treated as individuals with “illnesses,”
which has led to more humane treatment.
Currently in the United States, there are two main ap-
proaches to therapy: the psychological therapy and the biomedi-
cal therapy approaches. Other cultures often have different
ways of understanding and treating mental disorders, of-
ten making use of the family and community. In the United
States, there is a trend toward increasing use of paraprofession-
als as mental health care providers, and the literature gener-
ally supports their effectiveness.
biomedical therapy (p. 560)
paraprofessional (p. 560)
psychological therapy (p. 560)
therapeutic alliance (p. 557)
therapy (p. 556)
TABLE 13.3 Summary of the Evidence-Based Practice (EBP) Debate
Arguments Favoring EBP Arguments Opposing EBP
• Some treatments are clearly harmful, and practitioners should not
be allowed to use them.
• Specific empirically supported therapies (ESTs) have been demon-
strated to be effective in dealing with certain disorders.
• Psychology is a science, and psychological practitioners should
follow what the research shows to be best.
• Giving clinical judgment equal weight with science would lead to
anarchy, in which clinicians could ignore the evidence and do what
they please.
• Empirically supported therapies (ESTs) is a poorly defined, even
meaningless, concept.
• EBP is a “one-size-fits-all” approach that would limit the flexibility of
clinicians to deal with individual clients’ problems, particularly those
who have multiple problems or who do not fit a DSM-IV category.
• Insurance companies would not pay for therapy that was not on an
approved list of empirically validated treatments.
• EBP would prevent practitioners from trying new ideas and
developing even more effective therapies.
• Scientists have not yet validated treatments for many disorders,
so under an EBP approach, many people might have to go without
treatment.
• Evidence suggests that certain common factors (e.g., the therapeu-
tic alliance) are just as important as the specific type of treatment.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

13.2 How Do Psychologists Treat
Psychological Disorders?
Core Concept 13.2 Psychologists employ two main forms
of treatment, the insight therapies (focused on developing
an understanding of the problem) and the behavior therapies
(focused on changing behavior through conditioning).
Psychoanalysis, the first of the insight therapies, grew out of
Sigmund Freud’s theory of personality. Using such techniques
as free association and dream interpretation, its goal is to bring
repressed material out of the unconscious into consciousness,
where it can be interpreted and neutralized, particularly in the
analysis of transference. Neo-Freudian psychodynamic therapies
typically emphasize the patient’s current social situation, inter-
personal relationships, and self-concept.
Among other insight therapies, humanistic therapy focuses
on individuals becoming more fully self-actualized. In one
form, client-centered therapy, practitioners strive to be nondi-
rective in helping their clients establish a positive self-image.
Another form of insight therapy, cognitive therapy, con-
centrates on changing negative or irrational thought patterns
about oneself and one’s social relationships. The client must
learn more constructive thought patterns and learn to apply
the new technique to other situations. This has been particu-
larly effective for depression.
Group therapy can take many approaches. Self-help support
groups, such as AA, serve millions, even though they are not
usually run by professional therapists. Family therapy and
couples therapy usually concentrate on situational difficul-
ties and interpersonal dynamics as a total system in need of
improvement rather than on internal motives.
The behavior therapies apply the principles of learning—
especially operant and classical conditioning—to problem be-
haviors. Among the classical conditioning techniques, systematic
desensitization and exposure therapy are commonly employed
to treat fears. Aversion therapy may also be used for eliminating
unwanted responses. Operant techniques include contingency
management, which especially involves positive reinforcement
and extinction strategies. And, on a larger scale, behavior therapy
may be used to treat or manage groups in the form of a token
economy. Participant modeling, based on research in observational
learning, may make use of both classical and operant principles,
involving the use of models and social skills training to help
individuals practice and gain confidence about their abilities.
In recent years, a synthesis of cognitive and behavioral ther-
apies has emerged, combining the techniques of insight therapy
with methods based on behavioral learning theory. Rational–
emotive behavior therapy helps clients recognize that their irratio-
nal beliefs about themselves interfere with life and helps them
learn how to change those thought patterns. Positive psycho-
therapy (PPT) is a similar approach coming out of the positive
psychology movement. Brain scans suggest that cognitive–
behavioral therapy produces physical changes in brain functioning.
The effectiveness of therapy was challenged in the 1950s
by Eysenck. Since that time, however, research has shown that
psychotherapy can be effective for a variety of psychological
problems. Often, it is more effective than drug therapy. As the
research on mental disorders becomes more refined, we are
learning to match specific psychotherapies to specific disorders.
Most people do not get psychological help from profession-
als. Rather, they get help from teachers, friends, clergy, and oth-
ers in their community who seem sympathetic. Friends can often
help through active listening, acceptance, and exploration of
alternatives, but serious problems require professional assistance.
13.3 How Is the Biomedical Approach Used
to Treat Psychological Disorders?
Core Concept 13.3 Biomedical therapies seek to treat
psychological disorders by changing the brain’s chemistry
with drugs, its circuitry with surgery, or its patterns of
activity with pulses of electricity or powerful magnetic fields.
Biomedical therapies concentrate on changing the physi-
ological aspects of mental illness. Drug therapy includes
antipsychotic, antidepressant, mood stabilizing, antianxiety, and
stimulant drugs. Most affect the function of neurotransmitters.
Such drugs have caused a revolution in the medical treatment
of mental disorders such as schizophrenia, depression, bipolar
disorder, anxiety disorders, and ADHD. Critics, however,
warn of their abuse, particularly in treating the ordinary
stress of daily living.
Psychosurgery is rarely done anymore because of its radical,
irreversible side effects. Electroconvulsive therapy, however, is still
widely used—primarily with depressed patients—although it,
too, remains controversial. A new and potentially less-harmful
alternative involves transcranial magnetic stimulation of specific
brain areas. Meanwhile, hospitalization has been a mainstay
of medical treatment, although the trend is away from mental
hospitals to community-based treatment. The policy of deinstitu-
tionalization was based on the best intentions, but many mental
patients have been turned back into their communities with few
resources and little treatment. When the resources are available,
however, community treatment is often successful.
Chapter Summary 593
active listener (p. 576)
analysis of transference (p. 564)
aversion therapy (p. 570)
behavior modification (p. 568)
behavior therapy (p. 568)
client-centered therapy (p. 565)
cognitive therapy (p. 566)
cognitive–behavioral therapy
(p. 571)
contingency management (p. 570)
exposure therapy (p. 569)
group therapy (p. 567)
humanistic therapy (p. 565)
insight therapy (p. 562)
neo-Freudian psychodynamic
therapy (p. 564)
participant modeling (p. 571)
positive psychotherapy (PPT)
(p. 573)
psychoanalysis (p. 562)
rational–emotive behavior therapy
(REBT) (p. 572)
reflection of feeling (p. 565)
self-help support groups (p. 567)
systematic desensitization (p. 569)
token economy (p. 571)

594 C H A P T E R 1 3 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
If someone asks your advice on finding a therapist, you can
refer him or her to any competent mental health professional.
While you should avoid trying to make a diagnosis or attempt-
ing therapy for mental disorders, you may use your knowledge
of psychology to steer the person toward a medical specialist, a
behavior therapist, group therapy, or some other psychological
treatment that you believe might be appropriate. There are, how-
ever, some specific therapies and therapeutic techniques to avoid.
antianxiety drugs (p. 580)
antidepressants (p. 578)
antipsychotics (p. 578)
community mental health
movement (p. 583)
deinstitutionalization (p. 583)
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)
(p. 582)
psychosurgery (p. 581)
stimulants (p. 580)
tardive dyskinesia (p. 578)
transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) (p. 583)
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the video, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 22: PSYCHOTHERAPY
Program Review
c. the biomedical and the psychological
d. the chemical and the psychosomatic
1. What are the two main approaches to therapies for mental disorders?
a. the Freudian and the behavioral
b. the client-centered and the patient-centered
13.4 How Do the Psychological Therapies
and Biomedical Therapies Compare?
Core Concept 13.4 While a combination of psychological
and medical therapies is often better than either one alone
for treating some (but not all) mental disorders, most people
who have unspecified “problems in living” are best served by
psychological treatment alone.
Both medical and biological therapies can point to their
successes, but until recently, few studies have compared medical
and psychological therapies directly. New studies show that for
depression, a combination therapy, consisting of CBT and medi-
cation, is often best. Comparative data for ECT and the new
transcranial magnetic stimulation are sparse. As for the anxi-
ety disorders, some studies have shown a combination of drugs
and CBT to be effective. A clear exception involves the spe-
cific phobias, for which behavioral therapy is superior to drug
therapy—which may actually aggravate the problem. For schizo-
phrenia, medications are the front line of treatment, although
they do not cure the disorder. Until recently, conventional psy-
chotherapies were not often used with schizophrenia, but new
research suggests that combination therapy may be effective.
Medication is not useful for treating many psychological
problems, such as learning disabilities, many sexual dysfunc-
tions, most personality disorders, and most developmental
disorders. In addition, most people who have psychological
problems do not have a DSM-IV disorder but rather suffer
from “problems in living.”
Education and psychotherapy have many points in com-
mon. In particular, both involve learning and the ultimate
goal of changes in behavior. The authors suggest that both
education and psychotherapy are more likely to be successful
when the client takes an active role.
combination therapy (p. 586)
empirically supported treatment (EST) (p. 590)
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
importance of the therapeutic alliance. Proponents, however,
counter that some treatments are clearly harmful and should
be prohibited. They acknowledge that ESTs have not been
found for all disorders. However, therapists as good scientists
should be willing to practice those treatments for which science
has found support.
Evidence-Based Practice
Psychological therapists are divided on the question of evi-
dence based practice (EBP) and empirically supported treat-
ments (ESTs). Opponents say that ESTs are not clearly
defined, suppress innovative new treatments, offer no help in
treating clients with multiple disorders, and deemphasize the

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11. When Albert Ellis discusses with the young woman her fear of
hurting others, what point is he making?
a. It is the belief system that creates the “hurt.”
b. Every normal person strives to achieve fulfillment.
c. Developing a fear-reduction strategy will reduce the problem.
d. It is the use of self-fulfilling prophecies that cause others
to be hurt.
12. What point does Enrico Jones make about investigating the effective-
ness of different therapies in treating depression?
a. All therapies are equally effective.
b. It is impossible to assess how effective any one therapy is.
c. The job is complicated by the different types of depression.
d. The most important variable is individual versus group therapy.
13. What is the most powerful antidepressant available for patients who
cannot tolerate drugs?
a. genetic counseling c. psychoanalysis
b. electroconvulsive therapy d. family therapy
14. All of the following appear to be true about the relation between
depression and genetics, except that
a. depression has been linked to a defect in chromosome #11.
b. depression appears to cause genetic mutation.
c. most people who show the genetic marker for depression do not
exhibit depressive symptoms.
d. genetic counseling allows families to plan and make choices
based on their risk of mental illness.
15. For which class of mental illness would Chlorpromazine be
prescribed?
a. mood disorder c. personality disorder
b. psychosis d. anxiety disorder
16. Which approach to psychotherapy emphasizes developing the ego?
a. behavioral c. humanistic
b. desensitization d. psychodynamic
17. In behavior modification therapies, the goal is to
a. understand unconscious motivations.
b. learn to love oneself unconditionally.
c. change the symptoms of mental illness through
reinforcement.
d. modify the interpretations that one gives to life’s events.
18. Which style of therapy has as its primary goal to make the client feel
as fulfilled as possible?
a. humanistic c. Freudian
b. cognitive-behavioral d. social learning
19. Which psychologist introduced rational–emotive therapy?
a. Carl Rogers c. Albert Ellis
b. Hans Strupp d. Rollo May
20. Which type of client would be ideal for modern psychoanalytic
therapy?
a. someone who is smart, wealthy, and highly verbal
b. someone who is reserved and violent
c. someone who has a good sense of humor but takes herself
seriously
d. someone who grew up under stressful and economically
deprived conditions
2. The prefrontal lobotomy is a form of psychosurgery. Although no lon-
ger widely used, it was at one time used in cases in which a patient
a. was an agitated schizophrenic.
b. had committed a violent crime.
c. showed little emotional response.
d. had a disease of the thalamus.
3. Leti had electroconvulsive shock therapy a number of years ago. She
is now suffering a side effect of that therapy. What is she most likely
to be suffering from?
a. tardive dyskinesia c. depression
b. the loss of her ability to plan ahead d. memory loss
4. Vinnie suffers from “manic-depressive” (bipolar) disorder, but his
mood swings are kept under control because he takes the drug
a. chlorpromazine. c. Valium.
b. lithium. d. tetracycline.
5. The Silverman family is receiving genetic counseling because a
particular kind of mental retardation runs in their family. What is
the purpose of such counseling?
a. to explain the probability of passing on defective genes
b. to help eliminate the attitudes of biological biasing
c. to repair specific chromosomes
d. to prescribe drugs that will keep problems from developing
6. In psychodynamic theory, what is the source of mental disorders?
a. biochemical imbalances in the brain
b. unresolved conflicts in childhood experiences
c. the learning and reinforcement of nonproductive behaviors
d. unreasonable attitudes, false beliefs, and unrealistic
expectations
7. Imagine you are observing a therapy session in which a patient is
lying on a couch, talking. The therapist is listening and asking occa-
sional questions. What is most likely to be the therapist’s goal?
a. to determine which drug the patient should be given
b. to change the symptoms that cause distress
c. to explain how to change false ideas
d. to help the patient develop insight
8. Rinaldo is a patient in psychotherapy. The therapist asks him to free
associate. What would Rinaldo do?
a. describe a dream
b. release his feelings
c. talk about anything that comes to mind
d. understand the origin of his present guilt feelings
9. According to Hans Strupp, in what major way have psychodynamic
therapies changed?
a. Less emphasis is now placed on the ego.
b. Patients no longer need to develop a relationship with
the therapist.
c. Shorter courses of treatment can be used.
d. The concept of aggression has become more important.
10. In the program, a therapist helped a girl learn to control her
epileptic seizures. What use did the therapist make of the pen?
a. to record data c. to reduce the girl’s fear
b. to signal the onset of an attack d. to reinforce the correct reaction
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 595

14.3 Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress?
Type A Personality and Hostility
Locus of Control
Hardiness
Optimism
Resilience
From Stress to Health
and Well-Being14
Psychology MattersCore ConceptsKey Questions/Chapter Outline
14.1 What Causes Distress?
Traumatic Stressors
Chronic Stressors
Traumatic events, chronic lifestyle
conditions, major life changes, and
even minor hassles can all cause a
stress response.
Student Stress
College students face some unique
stressors in addition to typical
developmental stressors.
14.2 How Does Stress Affect
Us Physically?
Physiological Responses to Stress
Stress and the Immune System
The physical stress response begins
with arousal, which stimulates a series
of physiological responses that in the
short term are adaptive but that can
turn harmful if prolonged.
Cognitive Appraisal of
Ambiguous Threats
Threats to our well being are not always
clear and obvious; thus how we identify
and appraise them becomes vital for
coping with them effectively.
Personality characteristics affect
our individual responses to stressful
situations and, consequently, the
degree to which we are distressed when
exposed to stressors.
Using Psychology to Learn
Psychology
Anyone—even people who don’t think
of themselves as “good writers”—can
use writing as a valuable tool in the
“coping strategies” toolbox.
CHAPTER PROBLEM Were the reactions and experiences of the 9/11 firefighters
and others at the World Trade Center attacks typical of people in other stressful
situations? And what factors explain individual differences in our physical and
psychological responses to stress?
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED Is Change Really Hazardous to Your Health?
14.4 How Can We Transform Negative
Stress Into Positive Life
Strategies?
Psychological Coping Strategies
Positive Lifestyle Choices:
A “Two-for-One” Benefit to Your
Health
Putting It All Together: Developing
Happiness and Subjective
Well-Being
Effective coping strategies reduce
the negative impact of stress on our
health, while positive lifestyle choices
can enhance our mental and physical
health as well as our overall well-being.
Behavioral Medicine and Health
Psychology
These exciting new fields focus on
how psychological and social factors
influence health, and also on how
these same factors can be applied to
successful prevention of illness.

597
O N SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AT 8:46 A.M., RETIRED FIREFIGHTER DENNIS Smith sat outside a New York clinic, waiting for his annual physical, when a nurse rushed in and announced that a plane had just crashed into the North tower of the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan (Smith, 2003b). The engine
and ladder companies of New York’s fire department (FDNY) were already responding to the
alarms—trucks racing to the scene and firefighters running into the same buildings that hordes
of people desperately sought to escape. Smith asked himself what conditions his coworkers
were facing: the heat of the fire, the best access to the buildings, the stairwells’ integrity. How
many were already trapped inside and facing death?
One firefighter later described the chaos: “It looked like a movie scene, where the monster was
coming . . . [W]e got showered with debris. . . . Things were hitting—bing, bang, boom—over your
head” (Smith, 2003b, pp. 70–71). He had climbed high into the North Tower when the South
Tower was hit, and “suddenly, there was this loud, loud noise overhead.” He recalled huddling
inside a stairwell, inventorying his resources: “I was thinking of my situation—what should I do,
what can I do? What do I have that is positive? What tools do I have? . . . The main thing I had was
my helmet. I remember thinking how important it was to have had that helmet” (p. 75).
But the critical need for the helmet was forgotten in one ironic moment by Smith’s fellow
firefighter, Father Mychael Judge. The FDNY chaplain was among the first to arrive and, after
hearing that firefighters were trapped inside, rushed into the smoke. While performing last
rites, he removed his helmet out of respectful habit—just as a shower of debris fell, killing him
instantly (Downey, 2004).
In the weeks and months after the terrorist attacks, firefighters continued to search for bodies.
They buried, memorialized, and mourned their brothers and sisters. Few of the 343 missing were

598 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
ever recovered. Those who had made it—while others died just a few feet away—endured survivor’s
guilt, ambivalent and uncertain why they deserved to live, asking themselves, “Why me?” Some
developed symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), reliving the terrifying moments of
the disaster again and again. And the aftereffects of that day weren’t limited to those individuals
personally involved: Millions of people around the world remained glued to their televisions for days,
repeatedly watching the towers as they fell and hearing firsthand accounts from survivors.
The surviving firefighters continued to grieve. Many of them rejected false reverence or
gloom in remembering their friends, preferring instead to laugh and joke about their fallen
comrades’ quirks and screw-ups. Manhattan’s Engine 40/Ladder 35 lost 12 firefighters, more
than any other firehouse and, like everyone else, wondered what really happened to the missing
victims. Then, five months after 9/11, the members of 40/35 learned of a news tape that ap-
peared to show their 12 lost partners entering the tower minutes before it collapsed on them.
The video had been shot at a distance, but the moving figures gradually became recognizable.
Staring intently at the screen, the surviving firefighters gazed once more on friends who had not
returned. They played the video over and over again (Halberstam, 2002).
Firefighters are different from most other public servants because they spend much of their
time in a shared communal house, their firehouse. Because fires and other emergencies are
relatively rare, they spend lots of down time just hanging out with each other, playing cards
and other games, as well as reading and watching TV. In most houses, a family sense evolves,
with older guys becoming like dads and uncles or big brothers to the new guys. With this in
mind, you can better appreciate the stressful impact on any of them from the sudden deaths
of so many of their everyday families. In addition, each felt obligated to attend as many memo-
rial services as possible, not only for their fallen house members but for all those they knew
in recruit training or from other houses where they had served or had extended-family relatives
working. For some, attending heart-wrenching church services was an enduring tribulation last-
ing more than a year—an unending source of secondary distress.
PROBLEM: Were the reactions and experiences of the 9/11 firefighters and others at the
World Trade Center attacks typical of people in other stressful situations? And what factors
explain individual differences in our physical and psychological responses to stress?
Of course, running into a falling building is not a typical human response; rather, it is a learned
response of trained rescue workers. But what about the survivor’s guilt and subsequent delayed
stress reactions from repeated viewing of the disaster on websites and televisions around the
world—are these “normal” stress responses? What connections can we make between these
reactions and our own reactions to stress? In considering these questions, several related issues
emerge:
• Stress isn’t limited to major tragedies, traumas, and disasters. All of us encounter poten-
tially stressful situations in our everyday lives—at our jobs, in our relationships, at school,
in traffic, or as a result of illness. Have you ever noticed, though, that some people seem
to get “stressed out” at even minor annoyances, while others appear calm, cool, and col-
lected even in a crisis situation? In addition, some people bounce back quickly after major
stress, while others have trouble regaining their equilibrium. How can we explain these
individual differences in our reactions to stress?
• We must also consider how our stress responses have evolved over the years and millennia
and how they functioned to aid our survival. Many cultures today live much faster-paced
lives than those of previous generations. How are the stresses we face today different from
those faced by our ancient ancestors? What impact might the differences in our environ-
ments have on the effectiveness of our stress response?
How do differences in our environments
and cultures create stress and affect our
responses to stress?

C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being 599
Biological Perspective:
Are some individuals just
“hard-wired” in a way that
makes them better able to
cope with stress?
Behavioral Perspective:
Can certain stress responses —
effective or ineffective — be learned?
Developmental Perspective:
Do older people deal with stress
more or less effectively than
younger people?
Whole-Person Perspective:
Do certain personality traits predict
healthier coping?
Sociocultural Perspective:
Are certain stress responses more
prevalent in some cultures than
in others?
STRESS
Cognitive Perspective:
Do some individuals perceive
stress differently than others?
FIGURE 14.1
The Multiple Perspectives Applied to Stress
This figure suggests just a few examples of the many ways that multiple perspectives are necessary to understand the complex nature of stress.
• Multiple perspectives are necessary to understand our human response to stress. What
goes on in the body and the brain that influence our reactions to stress? And how are
these physiological responses mediated by our thought processes, our prior learning, our
personality, our stage in life, and our social context (see Figure 14.1)?

600 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
cognitive appraisal Our interpretation of a
stressor and our resources for dealing with it.
• Finally, to what extent do we have control over our own reactions to stress and to the
potential toll stress is taking on our physical and mental health? The good news is that we are
not “stuck” with our current stress level; there are specific changes we can make to help us
meet the challenges of stress more effectively. Thus, we conclude this chapter on a more
positive note by not only describing effective coping strategies but also introducing you to a
new health psychology perspective promoting well-being, resilience, and happiness.
As we explore these questions, keep in mind the stresses you have faced and consider how
this information can help you understand the sources of stress in your life—and improve the
way you perceive and manage that stress. Although it would seem that college students’ lives
are less stressful than those of firefighters and other first responders, the recent increase in
college students’ visits to mental health facilities and higher rates of suicides forces us to ex-
amine, in a later section, where all this academic stress is coming from.
14.1 KEY QUESTION
What Causes Distress?
What images come to mind when you hear the word stress? Most people think of
the pressures in their lives: difficult jobs, unhappy relationships, financial woes, health
problems, and final exams. You may have some visceral associations with stress too:
a churning stomach, perspiration, headache, or tension in your neck or upper back.
We use the word stress loosely in everyday conversation, referring to a situation that
confronts us (Lazarus et al., 1985). For example, if your employer or professor has
been giving you a difficult time, you may say that you are “under stress,” as though
you were being squashed by a heavy object. You may also say you are “feeling stress”
as a result. Thus, in everyday conversation, we use the word stress to refer both to an
external threat and to our physical and mental response we feel when exposed to it.
Psychologists, however, make a distinction between the outer pressure or event that
causes stress and its inner impact on us as individuals. Stressors are external events that
cause internal stress responses, both psychological and emotional ones, termed distress,
and biological and physiological reactions (Krantz et al., 1985). We will use the term
distress to refer to our personal reactions, both physiological and psychological, to
experienced stressors.
Thus, a stressor is the sight of a police officer climbing out of her car after you
ran through a stop sign while texting. Your response to that sight of the cop about to
ticket you—your racing heart, shaky hands, and sudden perspiration—are signs of the
biological changes induced by this stressor. Your psychological stress, or distress, is the
complex mix of shame, sense of stupidity, and worry about losing your license for this
third moving violation if you cannot plead your way out of this unfortunate situation.
What are the common stressors faced by humans today? We begin this chapter with
a review of stressors found to have the most impact on us. These include everything
from petty daily hassles to relationship problems with family, friends, and romantic
partners to terrorist attacks, as noted in our Core Concept for this section:
Core Concept 14.1
Traumatic events, chronic lifestyle conditions, major life changes, and
even minor hassles can all cause a stress response.
Before embarking on our discussion of stressors and how we respond to them, we
should first recall the concept of cognitive interpretation from our study of emotion
in Chapter 9. There, we learned that a key component in our emotional response to a
situation is the interpretation we make of that situation. Stress is a type of emotional
response—consequently, interpretation or cognitive appraisal plays an important role in
stress The physical and mental response to a
stressor.
distress The psychological reaction created by
external stressors, which can be an emotional,
cognitive, or behavioral response. It is part of the stress
response that also includes biological and physiological
reactions to stressors.
stressor A stressful event or situation.

What Causes Distress? 601
the degree of stress we feel when faced with a stressor. We will see later in this chap-
ter that cognitive appraisal accounts for some individual differences in how people
respond to stressors as well as in how effectively we succeed in dealing with them. In
the previous paragraph, for example, a person who had never before received a ticket
may interpret that situation as less stressful (and thus feel less distress) than one who
had several recent tickets and was at risk for losing his driver’s license or paying higher
insurance rates.
Traumatic Stressors
Catastrophic events, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks, qualify as traumatic
stressors—situations that threaten your own or others’ physical safety, arousing feel-
ings of fear, horror, or helplessness. On a more personal level, a sudden major life
change, such as the loss of a loved one, constitutes a trauma as well—despite the fact
that death and separation are likely to affect everyone at some time. We will examine
traumatic stress by first considering natural and human-made catastrophes, then
personal loss, and finally posttraumatic stress.
Catastrophe In May 2008, shortly before the Olympics in Beijing, a massive earth-
quake in China killed more than 67,000 people. Subsequent quakes in Haiti and Chile
also had devastating consequences on the population for many months after—as did
the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and resulting breach of nuclear reactors in Japan. Natu-
ral disasters such as these, as well as man-made tragedies like terrorist attacks and
warfare, comprise the category of traumatic stressors known as catastrophic events.
These sudden, violent calamities are inevitably accompanied by extreme stress and loss
of loved ones or possessions. Moreover, the psychological and biological consequences
can last far longer than the original event, as in the weeks after 9/11 when firefighters
and emergency workers sometimes found themselves reliving the events in nightmares
and in daytime flashbacks.
Studies of catastrophe survivors provide some insight into the ways individuals
respond to these ordeals (Asarnow et al., 1999; Sprang, 1999). It’s worth noting here
that research of this type is difficult: Obviously, ethical considerations prevent psy-
chologists from creating even minor traumatic events to study their effects on volun-
teer subjects. Instead, field researchers must wait for a catastrophe to occur and then
get to the scene immediately to hear the story and observe survivors in the immediate
aftermath.
A Natural Laboratory for Disaster One opportunity to understand disaster response
presented itself in San Francisco in 1989, just as the baseball World Series was about
to begin at Candlestick Park. Spectators were settling into their seats when the entire
stadium began to shake violently. The lights went out, and the scoreboard turned black
as a major earthquake struck. Elsewhere in the city, fires erupted, a bridge collapsed,
highways were crushed—and people were dying.
One week after the quake, a team of research psychologists began a series of
follow-up surveys with about 800 regional residents. Survey responses revealed a clear
pattern: The lives of respondents who experienced the earthquake continued to revolve
heavily around the disaster for about a month. After this period, they ceased obsess-
ing, thinking, and talking about the quake, but simultaneously reported an increase
in other stress-related symptoms including sleep disruption, relationship problems,
and nightmares (Wood et al., 1992). Although most symptoms diminished gradually,
one year later, as many as 20 percent of residents remained distressed (Pennebaker &
Harber, 1991).
In contrast to natural disasters, human-made catastrophes such as crime and
terrorism have an added dimension of threat because they are produced intentionally
by other people. Terrorism has been defined as a type of disaster caused by “human
malevolence” with the goal of disrupting society by creating fear and danger (Hall
et al., 2002). Like survivors of natural disasters, terrorism survivors report elevated
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Cognitive appraisal is central to
cognitive-behavioral therapy
(p. 571).
traumatic stressor A situation that threatens
one’s physical safety, arousing feelings of fear, horror,
or helplessness.
catastrophic event A sudden, violent calamity,
either natural or manmade, that causes trauma.
terrorism A type of disaster caused by human
malevolence with the goal of disrupting society by
creating fear and danger.
The major recent earthquake in Japan,
recorded as 9.0 on the Richter scale,
triggered an enormous tsunami tidal
wave of more than 33 feet that totally
destroyed many towns in northern Japan,
killing thousands of people. Consider the
stresses it also created.

602 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
symptoms of distress that substantially subside after several months (Galea et al.,
2003). What appears to be different about surviving a terror attack, however, is the
long-term change in perception of threat. Studies of individuals affected—both directly
and indirectly—by the 9/11 attacks in America or by the 2005 bombings at the under-
ground train station in London found that 50 to 75 percent of the public continued to
worry about the safety of themselves and their families for a year or more following
the attack (Rubin et al., 2005; Torabi & Seo, 2004; Weissman et al., 2005).
Psychological Response to Catastrophe Psychological responses to natural and human-
caused disasters have been theorized to occur in stages, as victims experience shock,
feel intense emotion, and struggle to reorganize their lives (Beigel & Berren, 1985;
Horowitz, 1997). Cohen and Ahearn (1980) identified five stages survivors typically
pass through:
1. Immediately after the event, victims experience psychic numbness, including shock
and confusion, and for moments to days cannot fully comprehend what has
happened. Severe, sudden, and violent disasters violate our basic expectations
about how the world is supposed to function. For some of us, the unimaginable
becomes a stark reality.
2. During a phase of automatic action, victims have little awareness of their own
experiences and later show poor recall for many details about what occurred.
3. In the communal effort stage, people pool resources and collaborate, proud of
their accomplishments but also weary and aware they are using up precious
energy reserves.
4. Next, survivors may experience a letdown as, depleted of energy, they comprehend
and feel the tragedy’s impact. Public interest and media attention fade, and
survivors feel abandoned, although the state of emergency may continue.
5. An extended period of recovery follows as survivors adapt to changes created
by the disaster. The fabric of the community changes as the natural and business
environments are altered.
Keep in mind, however, that stage theories don’t necessarily apply to the entire
population but attempt to summarize commonalities among a range of individual
experiences. In this instance, stage theories of stress response are useful for orga-
nizing individual accounts into aggregate summaries and also because they help us
anticipate what future survivors may go through and what kinds of assistance they
may need.
Research also indicates the importance of stories or narratives in working through
catastrophic experiences. To learn from and make sense of catastrophic loss, we
formulate accounts that describe what happened and why. We are especially likely to
develop narratives when an event is surprising or unpleasant (Holtzworth-Munroe &
Jacobson, 1985) or violates our basic expectations (Zimbardo, 1999). And, as we’ll see
later in this chapter, narratives help us find meaning in loss, which in turn facilitates
healing.
Catastrophic events merit extended news coverage, and in this Internet age, the
sounds and images of others’ pain are broadcast and viewed repeatedly. Viewers are not
immune to such programs and may experience a sort of “secondhand” traumatization.
Trauma in the Media Media news coverage expands the experience of catastrophe so
all viewers can experience it. Students, like you, reported repeated viewing of the WTC
towers collapsing on 9/11. Recall that, in our opening story, surviving members of the
Manhattan firefighters’ crew repeatedly viewed a videotape showing their now-dead
comrades rushing into the World Trade Center just before the building collapsed. At
last they knew for certain the fate of their friends. But was repeated viewing really
therapeutic for them? Conventional wisdom suggests that identifying the figures on
the tape as their friends might give them some closure, and their friends’ heroism could
help them find meaning in tragedy, but once that goal is achieved, how can repeated
viewing be anything but stress enhancing?
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 7
Stage theories emphasize
distinctive changes that occur as
one develops or progresses through
a life stage or event (p. 282).
narrative A personal account of a stressful event
that describes our interpretation of what happened
and why.

What Causes Distress? 603
Research clearly shows that revisiting and reliving catastrophe causes its own
stress. Vicarious traumatization is severe stress caused when one is exposed to others’
accounts of trauma and the observer becomes captivated by it (McCann & Pearlman,
1990). Whether it be plane crashes, riots in a far-off country, or natural disasters, what
matters is the amount of exposure: Schuster and colleagues (2001) found that the more
hours viewers spent watching television coverage of the 9/11 attacks, the more likely
they were to report stress symptoms later. What’s more, a whopping 90 percent of
respondents all over the country—even those with no personal or job connection to
New York—reported experiencing at least one symptom of stress in the aftermath of
the attack. By reliving the disaster, heavy viewers of media coverage, including those
who lived safely distant from the actual disaster site, nonetheless became engaged with
the victims’ suffering and experienced measurable stress as a result.
We will note later that one of the most widely mandated techniques for first
responder stress reduction in police, fire, and military units is known as critical in-
cident stress debriefing (CISD). Small groups of those affected by the disaster are
essentially forced to share their horror stories, listening to others and telling their own
tales of woe. Can you reflect on why such a process might backfire and increase rather
than ameliorate distress? (Advance warning: It does not work, according to much solid
research.)
Cultural Variations in Response to Catastrophes The March 2011 disasters that befell Japan
were the worst since its devastation in World War II from atomic bombing. It became a
worst-case scenario of incredible proportions. Initially, the massive 9.0 earthquake that
triggered a 33-foot tidal wave wiped out entire villages, killing thousands and leaving
many homeless and without food in the winter cold. Then, radiation exposure from the
meltdown of nuclear power plants posed long-term threats of widespread cancer among
Japanese residents. Yet, despite these catastrophic experiences, the general response
by most Japanese was a communal sense of calm, civility, and moral courage. Veteran
reporters on the scene expressed amazement at the way in which Japanese people showed
decorum and fought chaos with orderliness. There was no evidence of looting, and no
increase in crime. Indeed, in 10-hour-long traffic jams caused by wrecked highways, not a
single instance of honking was reported.
The collectivistic cultural focus on politeness, group consensus, and concern for
others led to sharing, without complaint, of meager food supplies with strangers. Ex-
perts on Japanese culture trace such behaviors to the spiritual strength found in criti-
cal, comforting rituals of their religion. Most Japanese are Buddhists or follow ancient
Shinto beliefs. Fundamental to these belief systems is alleviating mental and physical
suffering through practicing compassion and acceptance of death as the end part of
the life process. Buddhism as now practiced is less about spirits of the natural world
and more about rituals of society, family, and state, according to scholar of Japanese
religion Duncan Williams (Grossman, 2011).
Personal Loss Like many other species, humans are social creatures: We depend on
each other for survival. The loss of a loved one is very distressing, even if it is antici-
pated (such as after a long illness). A sudden, unexpected loss is traumatic: In a rated
listing of life changes at the end of this section, you will see “death of spouse” is the
most stressful of all life changes (Holmes & Rahe, 1967; Scully et al., 2000). Grief is
the emotional response to interpersonal loss, a painful complex of feelings including
sadness, anger, helplessness, guilt, and despair (Raphael, 1984). Whether grieving the
death of a loved one, the breakup of a romantic relationship, or the betrayal of a
trusted friend, you experience the jolt of separation and loneliness and have difficult
questions to ponder. Some of our core assumptions about life may be challenged, and
we may be forced to adapt to a different reality (Parkes, 2001). As a result, our identi-
ties and future plans may be permanently altered (Davis et al., 1998; Janoff-Bulman,
1992).
Psychologists view grieving as a normal, healthy process of adapting to a major life
change, with no “right” method or “normal” time period (Gilbert, 1996; Neimeyer,
vicarious traumatization Severe stress caused
by exposure to traumatic images or stories that cause
the observer to become engaged with the stressful
material.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 8
One prominent theory of dreams
asserts that dreams reflect
current concerns (p. 339).
grief The emotional response to loss, which includes
sadness, anger, helplessness, guilt, and despair.

604 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
1995, 1999). Some experts recommend achieving closure, a Gestalt term for perceiving
an incomplete stimulus as complete. But grief psychologists oppose the goal of closing
off the pain and memories of loss and instead recommend integration. To understand
this, think for a moment about someone you have lost: Perhaps you have “gotten over
it” and don’t think about it much any more—yet it is still there in your memory, with
images, emotions, and thoughts still vivid and accessible and still part of who you are
(Harvey, 1996; Harvey et al., 1990). Thus, the final phase of grieving is more accu-
rately thought of as an ongoing process of integration in which each life loss becomes
a part of the self-narrative and part of your memory storehouse of meaningful events,
both negative and positive (Murray, 2002).
The mourning process also requires you to interact socially at a time when you feel
especially vulnerable and socially withdrawn. Ironically, friends offering help or sym-
pathy sometimes add to the stress. Hollander (2004) writes of losing first her husband
and then, a few months later, her mother. “Am I all right? Everyone seems to be asking
me that. . . .Often I find I don’t know how to respond to the question” (pp. 201–202).
Her friends feel uncomfortable when she weeps openly, and they encourage her to
cheer up, to be herself again. Hollander concludes that her pain cannot and must not
be rushed: “Closure is not my goal. . . . I am all right exactly because I weep” (p. 204).
Humiliation as Loss Which would be more stressful: losing your romantic partner
when he or she dies, or having that person leave you for another lover? Both tragedies
involve losing your partner, but in addition, being rejected involves not only grief but
also humiliation and abandonment. One study interviewed thousands of adults, cat-
egorizing their experiences of loss and other life-event stressors and diagnosing their
symptoms of major depression and anxiety. Results indicated that rejected respondents
were more likely to develop depression than those whose partners had died (Kendler
et al., 2003). In discussing their findings, researchers observed that the death of one’s
partner is a “pure loss event,” which does not represent a potential failure or deficiency
on the part of the grieving person. In contrast, being left by your spouse or romantic
partner “raises issues . . . [such] as humiliation, which is usually seen as the loss of
status, the loss of a sense of self-esteem and the loss of a sense of your own worth”
(National Public Radio, 2003a).
In a different, more recent study, researchers examined how quickly people became
depressed following different types of stress. Life events were categorized by whether
they involved targeted rejection, defined as the “exclusive, active, and intentional social
rejection of an individual by others.” Results revealed that people who experienced
a recent targeted rejection event became depressed three times faster than those who
experienced other types of stress (Slavich et al., 2009). Interestingly, these effects were
similar regardless of whether the targeted rejection occurred at work (for example, the
person was fired) or in the context of a personal relationship (such as a breakup). In
sum, then, stressors that involve humiliation or social rejection are more likely to cause
depression than are other stressors and also appear to bring about depression more
quickly (Slavich et al., 2009, 2010a).
Why do we feel so bad about humiliation and rejection? Animal studies reveal
that in primate colonies, such as free-roaming baboon groups, individuals who lose
status withdraw, lose their appetite, become more submissive, and show immediate
huge increases in measurable biological stress (Sapolsky, 1998). In evolutionary terms,
loss of social status threatens survival and has serious consequences. By taking action
to prevent such losses, humans and other primates increase their chances of survival.
Thus, perhaps rejection makes us feel bad because we need to feel bad; in other words,
perhaps the depression or loss of self-esteem that accompanies rejection keeps us from
entering into unwise or insecure partnerships, thus protecting us from further rejection
or humiliation.
Disenfranchised Grief Grief is also especially stressful when others minimize your loss
and fail to sympathize. Experiences such as death, divorce, and trauma are recog-
nized with formal condolences, such as funerals, hospital visits, sentimental greeting
integration A final phase of grieving, in which the
loss becomes incorporated into the self.
targeted rejection The exclusive, active, and
intentional social rejection of an individual by others.

What Causes Distress? 605
cards, and professional attention from undertakers, attorneys, and physicians (Lensing,
2001). But other painful losses with no official “status” may be ignored or dismissed
by the community. For example, adults who grieve after a miscarriage, young adults
who have lost friends, and children saddened by the death of a favorite TV or movie
star may find themselves alone in their sorrow, getting little sympathy or understand-
ing from others. Their disenfranchised grief, the emotion surrounding a loss others do
not understand, cannot be mourned through public rituals like memorials or funer-
als. Fearing others’ negative reactions, even behind your back, disenfranchised grievers
may try to hide their sorrow—but continue to suffer (Doka, 1989, 1995; Rickgarn,
1996).
Confiding in others can help people cope with loss and trauma (Harvey, 1996;
Pennebaker, 1990). During these times, keep in mind the role of professional counsel-
ors or psychotherapists, who might be counted on to take your grief seriously. Also, it
is therapeutically worthwhile to “confide” in other ways, such as by keeping a written
private journal of your feelings and what triggers them over time (see the Psychology
Matters section later in this chapter).
Posttraumatic Stress Individuals who have undergone severe ordeals—rape, com-
bat, beatings, or torture, for example—may experience a belated pattern of stress
symptoms that can appear months or even years after their trauma. Those delayed
reactions, however, can last a lifetime. In posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the in-
dividual re-experiences mental and physical responses that accompanied the trauma.
Nearly one adult in 12 in the United States will experience PTSD at some time in his
or her life, with symptoms lasting more than ten years in more than one-third of cases.
Traumas described by PTSD victims most frequently include having witnessed another
person being killed or badly injured, having lived through a natural disaster, and hav-
ing survived a life-threatening accident. Men cite more experiences of physical attack,
military combat, disaster or fire, or being held captive or hostage, whereas women cite
more experiences of rape, sexual molestation, physical abuse, and neglect during child-
hood (Bower, 1995a). Women are more likely than men to develop symptoms of PTSD
after experiencing a traumatic event (Tolin & Foa, 2006), and Hispanic Americans are
more at risk than non-Hispanic Caucasian or Black Americans (Pole et al., 2005).
What Are the Symptoms of PTSD? Victims of posttraumatic stress disorder typically
become distracted and disorganized and experience memory difficulties (Arnsten,
1998). They may feel emotionally numb and alienated from others and experience less
pleasure from positive events. Problems sleeping, guilt about surviving, and an exag-
gerated “startle response” (wide-eyed, gasping, surprised behavior upon perceiving a
sudden threat) are common symptoms as well. Rape survivors, for example, may expe-
rience a barrage of psychological aftereffects, including feelings of betrayal by people
close to them, anger about having been attacked, and fear of being alone (Baron &
Straus, 1985; Cann et al., 1981).
Posttraumatic stress disorder can also have lasting biological consequences (Crowell,
2002; Sapolsky, 1998). The brain undergoes physical changes when stress is extreme in
intensity or duration. Specifically, the brain’s hormone-regulating system may develop
hair-trigger responsiveness, making the victim of posttraumatic stress overreact to mild
stressors.
PTSD in Combat Personnel While the term posttraumatic stress disorder was coined
fairly recently, historical accounts have noted similar symptoms, referred to as “combat
fatigue,” “shell-shock,” or “soldier’s heart,” in soldiers for centuries. In the wake of the
Vietnam War, where early estimates noted symptoms of PTSD in 30 percent of combat
veterans, public attention on the disorder grew. Military psychologists now provide at
least some minimal treatment for combat-related stress at deployment sites in Iraq, for
instance, and a variety of educational programs aim to help soldiers and their families
prepare more effectively for deployment and to cope better with the aftermath of war
once the soldiers have returned home. And even though the military cultural norm has
disenfranchised grief The emotion surrounding
a loss that others do not support, share, or understand.
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) A
delayed stress reaction in which an individual involun-
tarily re-experiences emotional, cognitive, and behav-
ioral aspects of past trauma.
9/11 and PTSDWatch the Video
at MyPsychLab

606 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
historically taught soldiers not to talk about combat experiences, which contributed to
the stigma most veterans felt about asking for help with psychological symptoms, these
new programs are helping participants slowly overcome that barrier to effective cop-
ing. A program entitled Battlemind, for example, was created to help soldiers develop
realistic expectations of deployment prior to combat and also to help them readjust to
life at home when they return from deployment. Initial research indicates that soldiers
who participate in Battlemind report fewer symptoms of PTSD than their comrades
who receive more traditional training (Munsey, 2007).
Increased scrutiny on PTSD in combat personnel has also unearthed a fascinat-
ing new finding about the brain’s role in certain PTSD symptoms. Prompted by the
groundbreaking research of neurologist Ibolja Cernak, U.S. military doctors now rec-
ognize that soldiers exposed to an explosion often develop cognitive symptoms such
as memory loss, reduced ability to concentrate, slowed reaction time, and difficulty
performing simple math tasks—even if the soldier wasn’t hit by the blast. While re-
searchers are still unsure exactly how the brain is affected by the blast, there is general
agreement that the force of the explosion causes damage to brain functioning. Up to
20 percent of soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are estimated to experience
some type of traumatic brain injury such as this, and researchers now think that neu-
rological effects of blast exposure may account for the cognitive deficits seen in some
veterans diagnosed with PTSD (Bhattacharjee, 2008).
Chronic Stressors
The stressors reviewed in the previous section—catastrophe, personal loss, and post-
traumatic stress—involve events that, like the 9/11 attack, occur abruptly. In contrast,
chronic stressors are relatively long lasting and may develop slowly over time. For ex-
ample, they may involve ongoing financial problems, marital difficulties, or poor living
conditions, such as one of the world’s worse stress inducers—living in poverty. Here,
we examine five different chronic stressors: societal stressors, burnout, compassion
fatigue, major life changes, and daily hassles.
Societal Stressors For most of us, stress comes not from sudden cata-
strophic events but from societal stressors or pressures in our social, cultural,
and economic environment. These societal stressors often involve difficul-
ties at home, work, or school that are chronic (recurring or continuing over
time). Societal stressors also include unemployment, poverty, racism, and
other conditions that handicap or oppress individuals because of their social
group or status.
For example, a study of work stress and health revealed that unemployed
men experience more depression, anxiety, and worries about health than
comparable men with jobs. Almost miraculously, these symptoms usually dis-
appeared when the unemployed individuals found work (Liem & Rayman,
1982). The startling results of a recent survey powerfully illustrate the preva-
lence of stress related to money concerns: 83 percent of Americans aged 20
to 45 viewed their current financial situation as “very or somewhat stressful.” Only 14
percent reported they were not at all stressed out by their financial situation (American
Express ZYNC survey, reported in USA Today, March 15, 2011).
Prejudice and discrimination can also be significant sources of stress (Contrada
et al., 2000). How? For one, high blood pressure among African Americans—long
thought to be primarily genetic—is correlated with chronic stress caused by the daily
negative impact of having menial jobs, limited education, and low socioeconomic
status (Klag et al., 1991). Also, people living in poverty have less access to good
health care and are more likely to live in areas containing greater health hazards
such as environmental pollutants, lead in their house paint, greater noise, and drug-
dealing gangs. Such situational factors affect cognitive development in children and
create a variety of adverse physical and emotional factors in adults (Evans et al.,
1998; Staples, 1996).
chronic stressor Long-lasting stressful
condition.
societal stressor A chronic stressor resulting
from pressure in one’s social, cultural, or economic
environment.
Societal stressors include unemployment,
homelessness, and discrimination. Such
conditions can exact a toll on both mental
and physical health, especially among the
poor and minorities.

What Causes Distress? 607
Burnout Having a job, however—even a high-paying one—does not inoculate one
against stress. On the contrary, it can create stress of its own, both emotionally and
physically. Continually stressful work can lead to burnout, a syndrome of overwhelm-
ing exhaustion, feelings of cynicism and detachment from the job, and a sense of inef-
fectiveness and lack of accomplishment (Maslach & Leiter, 1997). Christina Maslach
(1998, 2003; Maslach et al., 2001), a leading researcher on this widespread problem,
notes that burnout was first recognized in professions demanding high-intensity inter-
personal contact, such as physicians with patients, teachers with students, and social
workers with clients. We now know that burnout can occur anywhere—even among
college students, stay-at-home parents, or volunteer workers. People experiencing burn-
out report feelings of detachment, failure, and cynicism about coworkers and clients.
They seek escape and avoid their work, leading to decreased personal accomplishment.
Burnout has been found to correlate with many negative consequences: absenteeism,
job turnover, impaired performance, poor coworker relations, family problems, and
decreased personal health (Maslach & Leiter, 1997; Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998).
In some nations where citizens get extended sick leave based on their level of stress-
related burnout, the cost can run into hundreds of millions in required benefits.
More recently, research has focused on the positive alternative to burnout, labeled
job engagement (Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). The practical significance of this burn-
out–engagement continuum is that engagement represents a desired goal for burnout
interventions. This new framework leads people to consider what factors in the work-
place are likely to enhance employees’ energy, vigor, and resilience; promote their in-
volvement and absorption with work tasks; and ensure their dedication and sense of
efficacy and success on the job.
Although there is some evidence for individual risk factors for burnout, there is far
more evidence for the importance of situational variables. In other words, the work-
place carries far more of the predictive weight for burnout than does personality. More
than two decades of research on burnout across many occupations in various coun-
tries have identified a plethora of organizational risk factors (Maslach, et al., 2001;
Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998). However, rather than posing an “either/or” question (“is
it the person or the job?”)—it may well be that an “and” question is the better way
to frame the issue. That is, there are both personal and situational variables that de-
termine burnout, and the key issue is how best to conceptualize the combination or
interaction of them.
Early models in the field of industrial-organizational psychology (French et al.,
1974) theorized that a better fit between the employee and the workplace would pre-
dict better adjustment and less stress. Building on those models, Maslach and Leiter
(1997) formulated a burnout model that measures the degree of match or mismatch
between the individual and key aspects of his or her organizational environment. The
greater the gap, or mismatch, the greater the likelihood of burnout; conversely, the
greater the match (or fit), the greater the likelihood of job engagement.
What are these key aspects of the organizational environment? Six major areas
of work life have been found relevant to employee/workplace fit: workload, control,
reward, community, fairness, and values (Maslach & Leiter, 2005). Workload and con-
trol refer to the amount of work and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the worker.
Reward refers to the relative match between the rewards offered by the job and those
valued by the employee. The degree of social support and interpersonal conflict in the
organization make up the fourth factor, which is community. Fairness is assessed by
the match between the employee’s sense of equity and social justice and that of the
organization. The final factor, values, recognizes the cognitive and emotional power of
job goals and expectations. Mismatches between the employee and the organization in
these six key areas have been found to predict burnout, making researchers optimis-
tic about the possibility of developing early-detection and intervention procedures to
promote greater job engagement (Maslach & Leiter, 2008).
Thus, burnout is not a personal problem or a weakness in character, as was once
thought. Effective burnout prevention requires both managers and workers to take
responsibility for developing conditions that improve engagement with the job and
burnout A syndrome of emotional exhaustion,
physical fatigue, and cognitive weariness, often related
to work.
job engagement An employee’s sense of being
part of a meaningful work setting where her or his
contribution is valued and equitably rewarded
(the opposite of job burnout).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
Industrial-organizational (I/0)
psychologists focus on tailoring
the work environment to
maximize both productivity and
morale (p. 5).

608 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
create a better “fit” between employee and job and make decisions that focus on the
long-term health of the employees and the organization (Berglas, 2001; Maslach &
Goldberg, 1998).
Compassion Fatigue After the 9/11 attacks, New York Ladder Company 5’s Lieutenant
O’Neill joined others in day after day of fruitless rescue searches. One day, instead of
going home, O’Neill checked into a hospital and asked for help with stress-related
symptoms he was experiencing. He met with a doctor to whom he poured out the
story of the horrors he had seen. Contrary to O’Neill’s assumption that, as a doctor,
“He . . . could handle this,” the doctor himself went to the hospital psychologist after
treating O’Neill. “[H]e kind of lost it,” O’Neill learned. “He had become freaked out
from the story I told him, because he lost a friend from the tragedy. . . . He didn’t show
up for work for a couple of days” (Smith, 2003b, p. 259). Even medical professionals
and therapists, though trained to be objective, are at risk for the stress of vicarious
traumatization (Sabin-Farrell & Turpin, 2003).
When medical professionals, caregivers, and therapists are overexposed to trauma
and its victims, they are at risk for compassion fatigue, a state of psychological exhaus-
tion that leaves caregivers feeling stressed, numb, or indifferent to those in need after
extended contact with sufferers (Figley, 2002). Compassion fatigue is also called sec-
ondary traumatic stress because it afflicts the helpers, who “catch” the stress suffered
by the victims. Consequences are similar to burnout in that it leaves people unhappy
with their work and resistant to contact with people they are supposed to help. Dread-
ing further stories of trauma, fatigued helpers may emotionally withdraw from their
clients and overuse the “silencing response,” distracting, minimizing, or redirecting
what their clients are saying to reduce their own discomfort and pain (Baranowsky,
2002). When therapists or religious counselors feel unable to listen to their clients or
parishioners, they can no longer function as effective healers. Compassion fatigue and
burnout harm not only the providers and receivers of care and attention but entire
professions as well. Fortunately, healers can learn the warning signs in time to take
action—and researchers can suggest what kinds of action to take:
• First, caregivers must focus on their sense of compassion satisfaction, an apprecia-
tion of the work they do that drew them to their professions in the first place.
Compassion satisfaction can be increased by creating and maintaining a sense
of team spirit with coworkers. Whenever possible, caregivers and rescue workers
should be able to see clients recover so they realize their work is effective (Collins &
Long, 2003).
• While it is important to care for those one is helping, helpers must avoid becoming
overinvolved, or their lack of control over most of their clients’ experiences can
lead to a sense of defeat (Keidel, 2002).
• Novice trauma counselors may simply distance themselves from stressful
exchanges; more experienced workers are better able to cope directly with their
own stress (Pinto, 2003).
• Caregivers should resist overvolunteering. Volunteers who worked with more than
one agency or effort after 9/11 were at greater risk for compassion fatigue than
those who volunteered with only one organization, such as the American Red
Cross (Roberts et al., 2003).
compassion fatigue A state of exhaustion
experienced by medical and psychological
professionals, as well as caregivers, which leaves the
individual feeling stressed, numb, or indifferent.
compassion satisfaction A sense of
appreciation felt by a caregiver, medical or
psychological professional, of the work he or she does.
FIGURE 14.2
Worklife and Burnout
A schematic model of six input factors
affecting burnout and four measurable
outcomes.
Worklife
Workload
Control
Reward
Community
Fairness
Values
Exhaustion
Cynicism
Low Efficacy
Burnout Employee Health
Absenteeism
Quality of Work
Patient Satisfaction
Cost-Effectiveness
Outcomes

What Causes Distress? 609
• Finally, professional helpers and emergency workers should use humor—but use it
carefully! While tasteless jokes and dark humor with fellow workers can relieve anxi-
ety and establish a sense of camaraderie among coworkers, workers must be cautious
with these types of humor. Because it is not publicly acceptable to laugh in the face of
tragedy, humor should be expressed selectively, with sensitivity to the environment, so
as not to offend or further hurt those already suffering (Moran, 2002).
Major Life Events The beginning or end of a relationship is always a time of adjust-
ment, accompanied by emotional ups and downs, tension, and turmoil. Earlier in this
section, we discussed the effects of sudden interpersonal loss. Other changes can cause
stress too: a new job, starting or finishing college, or—ironically—even taking a vaca-
tion! Even events we welcome, such as the birth of a child, often require major changes
in our routines and adaptations to new demands and lifestyles. Especially when the
events are considered positive events (such as an exciting new job or getting married),
we may not recognize their potential impact on our stress level. In general, any change
can generate distress; the bigger the change in our lives, the bigger the impact.
What if a simple questionnaire existed that would assess your current stress level?
Several decades ago, psychologists Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe (pronounced
RAY) developed just such a tool. They first identified a variety of common stressful
events and had a large number of respondents rate the events in terms of how stress-
ful each one was in their own lives. After analyzing all the results, they created the
Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS), which lists 43 life events—ranging from death
of a spouse at the high end to pregnancy or a new job in the middle to getting a traf-
fic ticket at the low end. Each life event is assigned a particular number of life-change
units (LCUs), so anyone can calculate his or her current stress level by adding up the
LCUs for each life change that was recently experienced.
Research has indeed found relationships between life changes and stress. The birth
of a child, for example, is often associated with lower marital satisfaction (Cowan &
Cowan, 1988). Since it was developed, the SRRS has been used in thousands of stud-
ies worldwide and has been found to apply cross-culturally. We must be cautious in
interpreting our scores, though, in light of what we know about the role of cognitive
appraisal in stress. We will examine the SRRS more closely at the end of this chapter.
An undergraduate version of the scale, developed specifically to reflect student stress
reactions, gives you the opportunity to assess your own stress level in the Do It Your-
self! feature (Crandall, et al., 1992).
Daily Hassles After a difficult workday, you get stuck in a traffic jam on your way to
the grocery store. Finally arriving, you find they don’t have the very item or brand you
wanted. After selecting a substitute, you proceed to the checkout, only to be snapped
at by an impatient clerk when you don’t have exact change. Taken individually, such
minor irritations and frustrations, known as hassles, don’t seem like much in compari-
son to a natural disaster. But psychologists confirm that hassles can accumulate, espe-
cially when they are frequent and involve interpersonal conflicts (Bolger et al., 1989).
In our fast-moving, highly technological society, a major life hassle is “waiting.”
Waiting for anything, instead of having it instantly available, has become a modern
stressor: waiting for public transportation, waiting for service in a store or restaurant,
waiting in traffic, waiting for your computer to boot up or download files.
Any annoying incident can be a hassle, but some of the most common hassles
involve frustrations—the blocking of some desired goal—at home, work, or school. In a
diary study, a group of men and women kept track of their daily hassles over a one-year
period, also recording major life changes and physical symptoms. A clear relationship
emerged between hassles and health problems: The more frequent and intense the hassles
people reported, the poorer their health, both physical and mental (Lazarus, 1981, 1984,
1999). The opposite was also true: As daily hassles diminish, people’s sense of well-being
increases (Chamberlain & Zika, 1990). Thus, a life filled with hassles can exact as great
a price as that of a single, more intense stressor (Weinberger et al., 1987).
Social Readjustment Rating Scale
(SRRS) Psychological rating scale designed to
measure stress levels by attaching numerical values
to common life changes.
hassle Situation that causes minor irritation
or frustration.
Traffic can be a hassle and consequently
contribute to your stress—if you choose
to interpret it that way.

610 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
THE UNDERGRADUATE STRESS QUESTIONNAIRE: HOW STRESSED ARE YOU?
This scale, developed in 1992 specifically
for undergraduates, initially contained an
event about having problems with your
typewriter—which we have removed for
relevancy. For each of the following events,
check off any item that describes a stressor
that you have experienced in the past
week. Tally up your check marks to com-
pute your total (Crandell et al., 1992).
Lack of money
Someone broke a promise
Death (family member or
friend)
Dealt with incompetence at
the Registrar’s office
Can’t concentrate
Had a lot of tests
Thought about unfinished
work
Someone did a “pet peeve”
of yours
It’s finals week
Living with boy-/girlfriend
No sleep
Applying to graduate school
Felt need for transportation
Sick, injury
Bad haircut today
Victim of a crime
Had a class presentation
Job requirements changed
Applying for a job
Assignments in all classes
due the same day
Fought with boy-/girlfriend
No time to eat
Have a hard upcoming week
Felt some peer pressure
Lots of deadlines to meet
Went into test unprepared
Working while in school
Arguments, conflict of
values with friends
Have a hangover
Problems with your
computer
Lost something (especially
wallet)
Death of a pet
Bothered by having no
social support of family
Performed poorly at a task
Did worse than expected
on test
Problem getting home from
bar when drunk
Used a fake ID
Had an interview
Had projects, research
papers due
Did badly on a test
Can’t finish everything you
needed to do
Heard bad news
No sex for a while
Someone cut ahead of you
in line
Had confrontation with an
authority figure
Maintaining a long-distance
boy-/girlfriend
Crammed for a test
Parents getting divorce
Dependent on other people
Feel unorganized
Breaking up with boy-/
girlfriend
Trying to decide on major
Feel isolated
Having roommate conflicts
Checkbook didn’t balance
Visit from a relative and
entertaining them
Decision to have sex is on
your mind
Parents controlling with
money
Couldn’t find a parking space
Noise disturbed you while
trying to study
Someone borrowed some-
thing without permission
Had to ask for money
Got a traffic ticket
Talked with a professor
Change of environment (new
doctor, dentist, etc.)
Exposed to upsetting TV
show, book, or movie
Got to class late
Erratic schedule
Found out boy-/girlfriend
cheated on you
Can’t understand your
professor
Trying to get into your major
or college
Missed your period and
waiting
Coping with addictions
Registration for classes
Stayed up late writing a paper
Property stolen
Someone you expected to
call did not
Holiday
Sat through a boring class
Favorite sporting team lost
Thoughts about future
TOTAL
How did you do? The following scale
may be useful in providing you a general
sense of how much stress you are experi-
encing as an undergraduate:
0–7: a very low level of stress
16–23: the amount of stress encoun-
tered by the average undergraduate
40+: a very high level of stress
You might want to compare your score
at two different times, or with a friend.
Cognitive appraisal plays a role in the impact of hassles as well. If you interpret
a frustrating situation as “too much” to deal with or as a major threat to well-being,
it will affect you more than if you dismiss it as less important (Lazarus, 1984). Some
people may be especially prone to see the world as hassle filled. One study showed
that college students with a pessimistic outlook experienced both more hassles and

What Causes Distress? 611
poorer health (Dykema et al., 1995). This finding serves as a good reminder that corre-
lation does not imply causation: In other words, we know a correlation exists between
hassles and health but do not know what causes the link. On one hand, experiencing
many hassles may have a negative impact on health—but on the other hand, having
more health problems to begin with might increase a person’s perception of minor
annoyances as hassles. It is also possible that a third variable—something other than
hassles or health—might be driving the correlation: For example, pessimists (as noted
above) might be more likely to perceive minor annoyances as hassles and also more
likely to have health problems.
One way to destress your life is to reconsider your own daily hassles. Look back
on recent frustrations with a sense of humor, put problems in perspective, and consider
just how unimportant such difficulties and delays really turned out to be. By reapprais-
ing everyday difficulties as minor, you enable yourself to remain good natured and
productive and even to have a good laugh. Shake your head, put on the brakes, let the
vending machine keep your dollar—and move along. Daily hassles are idiosyncratic:
They are interpreted uniquely by each person experiencing them. What is a hassle or
an annoyance to you may be unnoticed or even amusing to someone else. One per-
son’s agonizing traffic jam is another person’s opportunity to listen to the radio, play a
favorite CD, or engage in people watching. If your life seems hassle filled, some reap-
praisal of regularly irritating situations can save you psychological wear and tear. It
almost always helps to connect with nature, take a walk in a park or on a beach, swim,
hike, bike, even visit a local zoo. Later, we will see how cognitive reappraisal can play a
central role in one’s general strategies for coping with stress.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Student Stress
It’s timely for you to be studying stress and well-being right now, because merely
being a college student qualifies as a stressor. College freshmen in particular undergo
major challenges in making the transition to college life. One study found that fresh-
man stress unfolds in three phases. First, new students experience the shock and excite-
ment of new roles, environments, and social relationships. Next comes a protracted
period of disillusionment and struggle as students face both the serious work and mun-
dane chores of academic life. Finally, as roles gel and mastery develops in at least some
efforts, a sense of improved well-being and possibilities emerges (Rambo-Chroniak,
1999). But stress isn’t limited to first-year students. All students experience a specific
pattern of stress during the school year, with stress peaks at the beginning, middle, and
end of each term (Bolger, 1997). Two points in time are particularly difficult, the “mid-
winter crash” and the final exam period, when studying competes with regular sleep
and healthy eating and when flu and cold viruses afflict those with low resistance.
Some causes of student stress are obvious, with academic pressure topping the list
(Bolger, 1997). Also, new social interactions increase the possibility of problems in
interpersonal relationships (Edwards et al., 2001). Romantic love, often a source of
joy, can also be a source of stress and illness, especially among college women (Riessman
et al., 1991). And when romance sours, breakup stress soars. An investigation of a
large group of university students who had experienced a recent breakup of a romantic
relationship was studied to determine its causes. Those who felt most distress from
their breakup reported a loss of intimacy as the main cause for the breakup itself,
leading to their failed romance; not as central were affiliation needs, sexuality, or
autonomy reasons (Field et al., 2010).
Perhaps the essential source of stress for traditional-aged college students is free-
dom—specifically, the lack of structure in a college environment as contrasted with
the structure of home and high school curriculum (USA Today, 1996). For students
returning to college after years in the workforce or raising children, stress often

612 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
involves the challenge of “retraining the brain” to process and retain massive amounts
of new information—in quick time for exams.
And stress seems to be on the rise among college students. In a recent national
survey, college freshmen and women reported record-low levels of emotional health:
only 52 percent felt they had “good or above-average emotional health.” This marks
the lowest point since the survey first asked the question in 1985. The same survey also
found that 76 percent rated their drive to achieve as “above average or in the highest
10 percent”—the highest point since 1985. More students than ever before admitted
they frequently felt overwhelmed. Gender effects were also found: Only 46 percent
of women reported their emotional health as “good” compared to a higher 59 percent
of men. What do you think might account for this difference (Sieben, 2011)?
Solutions for student stress, fortunately, may be within arm’s reach—the distance
needed to reach for the phone and call a friend for support or the college health center,
counseling office, or tutoring center for professional advice. Most students express a re-
luctance to seek help (Rambo-Chroniak, 1999); so simply overcoming this ambivalence—
especially as an enlightened student of the many uses of psychology—can be a step toward
feeling better. Young adults do better if they have positive attitudes about becoming inde-
pendent individuals on a course of normal separation from their parents (Smith, 1995).
In terms of self-help, students report better results when taking specific action to
resolve the problem rather than simply dwelling on their emotional response (Smith,
1995). Cultivating more hopeful attitudes and better self-esteem—for example, by set-
ting and meeting realistic goals—also leads to lower stress and better adjustment. Stu-
dents appear to be more adaptive if they report better social support and a greater
sense of control in their lives (Rambo-Chroniak, 1999). Involvement in student orga-
nizations can offer both structure and social contact, but beware of the stress of exces-
sive commitment (Bolger, 1997). Two qualities in particular characterize students who
are most effective in preventing and coping with stress: resilience, based in part in self-
acceptance, effective communication, and coping skills; and cognitive hardiness, an
ability to interpret potential stressors as challenging rather than threatening (Nowack,
1983; Yeaman, 1995). We will examine these two characteristics in detail a little later
in this chapter.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: External events or situations that cause stress are called
, whereas the term denotes the physical and
mental changes that occur as a result.
2. APPLICATION: An example of a chronic societal stressor is
.
a. an earthquake
b. vicarious trauma
c. being stuck in traffic
d. widespread unemployment
3. ANALYSIS: Which of the following statements about daily hassles
is true?
a. Some of the most common hassles involve threats to survival.
b. As daily hassles diminish, people’s sense of well-being increases.
c. More frequent and intense hassles are associated with better health.
d. The effects of hassles do not accumulate: Many hassles are no
worse than a few.
4. SYNTHESIS: Your friend Rob recently lost his wife to cancer.
Devon, another friend, recently found out his partner was cheating
on him, and she left him for someone else. What difference would
you predict between Rob and Devon in terms of the impact of these
two different types of losses on their psychological well-being?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Name four
categories of common stressors, along with an example of each.
Answers 1. stressors; stress 2. d 3. b 4. Both Rob and Devon have suffered a personal loss, which involves grief, stress, and mourning. Devon,
however, is more at risk for depression due to the accompanying humiliation of being rejected, whereas Rob’s loss is a “pure loss event.”
5. Traumatic events, such as catastrophe and personal loss; chronic stressors, such as societal stressors, burnout, and compassion fatigue; major life
events, such as a new job or the birth of a child; and daily hassles, such as traffic jams or computer crashes
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

How Does Stress Affect Us Physically? 613
14.2 KEY QUESTION
How Does Stress Affect Us Physically?
Since our earliest days on Earth, humans have survived by responding quickly and
decisively to potentially lethal attacks by predators or hostile tribes. Our ancestors
adapted to an enormous variety of environmental conditions worldwide, confronting
climate extremes, scarce resources, and hostile neighbors. Faced with these challenges,
quick action was necessary to obtain shelter and protection, to find food, and to
defend themselves. The faster an individual was to feel fear or anger, appraise the situ-
ation accurately, and take appropriate action, the better his or her chances of success
and survival. Those who responded most quickly and effectively to danger survived
and passed those responsive genes to their offspring, whereas slower or less-clever indi-
viduals were less likely to survive and bear children in the course of human evolution.
Some of the serious stressors confronting our ancestors, such as catastrophe or
combat, continue to face us today. Modern life, of course, adds some new dangers:
demanding jobs, financial worries, and computer crashes. More often chronic in
nature, these new threats aren’t necessarily solved effectively with the same responses
that suited our ancestors and their more immediate challenges. Yet, our stress
response system remains the result of our ancestors’ evolutionary legacy, because
human physiology cannot evolve and change nearly as fast as our societies have. This
ancient biological script is retained in our body’s automatic responses to frighten-
ing or enraging conditions. If someone insults you, your face feels hot and your fists
seem to clench by themselves, readying you for a physical contest. Or imagine a very
different sort of “threat”: Your instructor calls on you in a class discussion for which
you are unprepared. Your heart races, your knees feel wobbly, and you feel the urge
to run away.
These examples illustrate the two poles of the fight-or-flight response, a sequence
of internal and behavioral processes triggered when a threat is perceived, preparing
the organism for either struggle or escape. This response worked very well for our
predecessors but doesn’t always suit us as well today. After all, is running out of the
classroom really an effective response to being called on in class? Our Core Concept
summarizes this point:
Core Concept 14.2
The physical stress response begins with arousal, which stimulates a
series of physiological responses that in the short term are adaptive
but that can turn harmful if prolonged.
Amazingly, we deal with stress effectively most of the time, managing to be not only
healthy but even happy. But, as you will see in this section, there can be serious con-
sequences when we don’t deal effectively with stress—no matter what its source. On
the positive side, we should emphasize that the emotional arousal we call stress usu-
ally works to our advantage. It brings threatening events into focus and readies us to
respond. On the negative side, extreme or prolonged emotional arousal threatens our
health. The results can include physical conditions such as heart disease, stroke, high
blood pressure, and ulcers. Our mental health can also suffer.
Some of us are prone to “worrying ourselves sick” by anticipating what might go
wrong, from minor irritants to major traumas (Sapolsky, 1994). Depression, as well
as PTSD and other anxiety disorders, has direct linkages to stress. We see these con-
sequences not only in emergency response workers and air traffic controllers but also
in public- and private-sector employees at all status levels and in people of all ages
and all walks of life. Let’s take a closer look at the physiology of our stress response,
which will lay the foundation for a clear understanding of exactly how this adaptive
response triggers negative health consequences when chronic stress strains the limits of
our resources.
fight-or-flight response Sequence of internal
responses preparing an organism for struggle or escape.

614 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
Physiological Responses to Stress
Firefighters usually report that they love their work, and for some the job is a family
tradition. But their camaraderie and commitment cannot lessen the threat, the risk of
injury and death—the stress they experience—when they answer the alarm and race into
harm’s way. How does the body of an experienced firefighter respond to the perception
of that stressor? And what about your own physical responses to stress?
The Fight-or-Flight Response When a stressful situation begins suddenly—as when a
professional firefighter first hears the alarm—the stress response begins with an abrupt
and intense physiological arousal produced by the autonomic nervous system (ANS).
Signs of this arousal include accelerated heart rate, quickened breathing, increased blood
pressure, and profuse perspiration. This scenario illustrates a case of acute stress, a tem-
porary pattern of stressor-activated arousal with a distinct onset and limited duration
first described by physiologist Walter Cannon almost a century ago (Cannon, 1914).
Almost instantaneously, reactions in our nervous system, endocrine system, and
muscles equip us to make an efficient and effective response—supplying, for example,
extra strength if needed. Figure 14.3 provides a detailed illustration of the many ways
the body prepares for an emergency response.
The fight-or-flight response can be a lifesaver when you need to escape from a
fire, confront a hostile rival, or swerve to avoid an oncoming car. When faced with
a chronic stressor, though, it has a cost: Staying physiologically “on guard” against a
threat eventually wears down the body’s natural defenses. In this way, facing frequent
stress—or frequently interpreting experiences as stressful—can create a serious health
risk: An essentially healthy stress response can become a health hazard. In the next
section, we will explore exactly how and why this occurs.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 2
The autonomic nervous system
(ANS) regulates our most basic
vital functions (p. 57).
acute stress A temporary state of arousal,
caused by a stressor, with a distinct onset and limited
duration.
In cases of acute stress, such as this
woman faces as a forest fire nears her
village in Portugal and threatens her
home, the stressor arises suddenly, and
the stress response begins with abrupt
and intense physiological arousal.
FIGURE 14.3
Bodily Reactions to Stress
An amazing array of physiological reac-
tions prepare us to fight or flee in acute
stressful situations.
Blood vessels in skin,
skeletal muscles, brain,
and viscera constrict.
Sweating increases
Skin and body
hair produce
“goose pimples.”
Adrenal glands
stimulate
adrenalin
secretion,
increasing
blood sugar,
blood pressure,
and heart rate.
Anal sphincter
closes.
Urinary
sphincter closes.
Pupils dilate, accommodate far vision.
Bronchi dilate.
Heart rate accelerates,
strength of
contractions increases.
Digestive tract
decreases peristalsis.
Liver
releases
sugar
into the
bloodstream.
Secretions of
the pancreas
decrease.
Secretions of digestive
fluids decrease.
Urinary bladder relaxes
Blood vessels in external
genitalia dilate.

Hypothalamus
Pituitary
Adrenal glands
Steroid hormones
release
How Does Stress Affect Us Physically? 615
The General Adaptation Syndrome Our understanding of how stress causes illness
began in the mid-20th century with the work of Canadian endocrinologist Hans Selye
(pronounced SELL-yeh). In brief, Selye discovered that different stressors trigger
essentially the same systemic reaction, or general physical response, which mobilizes the
body’s resources to deal with the threat. Moreover, he found, all stressors provoke some
attempt at adaptation or adjustment of the body to the stressor. Because the bodily
response was a general rather than a specific adaptation effort, Selye
dubbed it the general adaptation syndrome (GAS) (see Figure 14.4).
Normally, these responses are helpful, but under chronically stress-
ful conditions, they can lead to heart disease, asthma, headache, gas-
tric ulcers, arthritis, and a variety of other disorders (Carlson, 2007;
Salovey et al., 2000). Selye’s model of the GAS describes a three-phase
response to any threat, consisting of an alarm phase, a resistance
phase, and an exhaustion phase (Johnson, 1991; Selye, 1956, 1991).
The Alarm Phase In the first stage of stress, the body’s warning system
activates and begins to mobilize its resources against the
stressor. Selye called this first stage the alarm phase—but it is
similar to the pattern of reactions Cannon called the fight-or-
flight response. The hypothalamus sets off two parallel emer-
gency messages. One message signals the hormone system,
especially the adrenal glands, through the pathway shown in
Figure 14.5. The result is a flood of steroid hormones into the
bloodstream—chemicals that support strength and endurance (the
reason why some athletes might risk dangerous side effects by
abusing steroids). Endorphins are also released, which reduce the
body’s awareness of pain signals. A concurrent message is relayed
through the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system
to internal organs and glands, arousing the body for action.
It’s the cascade of messages through these two pathways—the sympathetic
nervous system and the endocrine system—that readies us for action. Blood flow to
the heart, brain, and muscles increases, enabling us to think and react better and faster.
Blood flow to the digestive system, conversely, decreases—presumably so our bodies
are not expending precious energy on nonessential functions during an emergency.
general adaptation syndrome (GAS) A
three-phase pattern of physical responses to a chronic
stressor.
alarm phase First phase of the GAS, during which
body resources are mobilized to cope with the stressor.
FIGURE 14.4
The General Adaptation Syndrome
In Stage 1, the body produces an emergency arousal response to a stressor. Then, in Stage 2, the body adapts to the continuous presence of the stressor.
In Stage 3, if the stressor is not reduced, an arousal response begins again, although the body’s defenses are depleted—with dangerous results.
Stage 1: Alarm reaction
General arousal caused by:
• increase of adrenal hormones.
• reaction of sympathetic nervous
system.
If stressor is not removed,
organism moves to Stage 2.
Stage 2: Resistance
Arousal subsides because of:
• decrease in adrenal output.
• counter reaction of
parasympathetic nervous
system.
If stressor is not removed, the
organism moves to Stage 3.
Stage 3: Exhaustion
General arousal of Stage 1
reappears.
Powerful parasympathetic
response opposes arousal.
If stressor is not removed in time,
death occurs.
Illness/death
Level of
normal resistance
Alarm reaction Resistance Exhaustion
FIGURE 14.5
Hormonal Response in the Alarm Phase
In the alarm phase of the GAS, the
hormone system response shown here is
one of the two parallel response pathways
set off by the hypothalamus.

616 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
Pupils dilate, enhancing peripheral vision, and perspiration helps keep the body from
overheating. Available blood sugar increases as well, to provide an additional energy
boost. All in all, our body is highly attuned to immediate danger. Figure 14.6 details
this autonomic series of responses.
The function of the alarm phase is to enable the organism to fight or to flee from
the threat, which usually didn’t last very long for our ancestors. Given the chronic
nature of modern stresses, though, we often progress into the second stage—resistance.
The Resistance Phase If the stressor persists—but is not so strong that it overwhelms
us during the first stage—we enter the resistance phase, during which all the physiologi-
cal changes of the alarm phase remain in effect. During this stage, the body attempts
to fight off the effects of the stressor. The immune system is in high gear as well, and
white blood cell count increases to help fight off infection.
Surprisingly, the resistance during this stage applies only to the original stressor. In
his research, Selye found that if an experimental animal had adapted to one stressor
(e.g., electric shock), but a second stressor was introduced (e.g., extreme cold), the
animal soon died. The animal’s resources were apparently so depleted it could not mo-
bilize a defense against the new stressor. A tragic human example is found in a soldier
who collapses and dies in response to the new stress of a prison camp after surviving
months of stressful combat.
Thus, we see that our alarm and resistance defenses use physical energy. They
reduce the resources available in case of additional stressors. Imagine this scenario, for
example: You’ve just completed final exams; you’ve had minimal sleep, studying day
and night, surviving on junk food and caffeine for a week. Now it’s over. You can re-
lax and rest at last. But the phone rings: It’s the welcome voice of the love of your life,
with an unwelcome note of some negative emotion. Before you can announce the good
news that you survived your exams, the voice says, “I don’t know how to say this,
but—look, we have to talk . . .” This is probably not good news and may signal seri-
ous trouble, even a breakup—definitely a stressor. Already exhausted by the stresses of
finals week, how will you handle this important conversation? You feel stricken, fright-
ened, and even angry: Why this threat? Why now? Because your system is depleted,
you may overreact and find yourself without the cognitive and emotional resources to
handle the situation effectively.
The Exhaustion Phase The resistance phase is the body’s last-ditch effort to combat the
stressor, and if the stressful situation is not ameliorated during that phase, the body
can no longer keep up its intense physiological battle. In this third stage, the exhaustion
phase, body functions drop back into normal range—and then fall below normal. At
this point, the body requires rest and rejuvenation to bring our physiological function-
ing back up to acceptable levels. If it does not get that much-needed respite, as is often
the case in today’s world of chronic stressors, the very responses that were so adaptive
in the first two phases put the body at risk for illness in the third phase.
Several processes may contribute to the physical and mental deterioration
seen in the exhaustion phase. For example, increased blood pressure can cause
headaches in the short term and, over an extended period of time, contribute to
stroke and coronary heart disease (CHD)—two leading causes of death. Mean-
while, the compromised digestive system contributes to formation of certain
types of ulcers and, over the long term, obesity. Chronic stress is also linked to
increased fatty deposits in the bloodstream, which increases risk of stroke. Still
other dangers lurk in the depleted immune system, making the stressed person
a prime candidate for infections or other diseases. In addition, prolonged or
repeated stress may produce long-term changes in the brain that provoke
depression (Sapolsky, 1998; Schulkin, 1994). Stress hormones also act on the
brain, interfering with its ability to regenerate neurons, especially in the hippocam-
pus (Gould et al., 1998; Sapolsky, 1998). This helps explain why prolonged use
of steroids—which are really stress hormones—is dangerous (except under cer-
tain medical conditions): Long-term steroid use effectively sends the body into the
final stage of the GAS, the stage of exhaustion, producing perilous deterioration.
resistance phase Second phase of the GAS,
during which the body adapts to and maintains
resources to cope with the stressor.
exhaustion phase Third phase of the GAS,
during which the body’s resources become depleted.
FIGURE 14.6
Sympathetic Nervous System
Response in the Alarm Phase
This diagram shows the path of the
sympathetic nervous system’s response to
acute stress, which occurs simultaneously
with the parallel response of the hormone
system.
Hypothalamus
Sympathetic division
of the autonomic
nervous system
• Heart rate increases.
• Blood pressure increases.
• Blood sugar rises.
• Blood flow to gut decreases.
• Blood flow to heart, brain,
and muscles increases.
• Perspiration increases.
• Pupils dilate.
Internal
organs
Adrenal
medulla
Epinephrine
After responding to one stressor, such as finishing
a difficult test, you may find your bodily resources
somewhat depleted, leaving you less able to deal
with another, unexpected stressor.

How Does Stress Affect Us Physically? 617
So we see that Selye’s GAS model offers a useful explanation of how stress can lead
not only to the initial fight-or-flight reaction but also to chronic and debilitating condi-
tions. And while new research is beginning to reveal that not all stresses produce exactly
the same response from the endocrine system (Kemeny, 2003), the model remains widely
accepted as the key to understanding the link between stress and illness. Before we look
more closely at the details of the chronic stress response, let’s first consider an intriguing
alternative to fight-or-flight: nurturance.
Tend and Befriend Psychologist Shelley Taylor noticed that the fight-or-flight model
was developed by male theorists doing research with male subjects—male rats, mice,
and humans. The fear and aggression so prominent in fight-or-flight may, noted
Taylor, characterize the responses of males more than females (Taylor, 2003; Taylor
et al., 2000b). A tend-and-befriend model may better explain the behavior of females
in response to threats to themselves and their offspring. Taylor’s theory argues that,
because females are the primary caretakers of offspring, female biology assigns priority
to protecting the survival of the young. From this perspective, fight-or-flight makes no
sense. Aggression (“fight”) can cause injury to oneself or one’s children; escape (“flight”)
leaves children defenseless. Neither response promotes adaptation and survival from the
female caretaker’s point of view (Volpe, 2004).
This tend-and-befriend model proposes that females are biologically predisposed—
through brain and hormonal activity—to respond to threat by nurturing and protect-
ing their offspring. Seeking social support creates networks that increase an individual’s
ability to protect and nurture (Eisler & Levine, 2002; Taylor et al., 2000b). One study
in support of the tend-and-befriend model examined men’s and women’s hormonal
changes and self-reports prior to an important examination. While reported anxiety
levels did not differ, men had significantly higher levels of cortisol production—an im-
portant steroid in the fight-or-flight response—than did women (Ennis et al., 2001).
Additional research reveals that oxytocin, another stress hormone released on exposure
to a stressor, may combine with estrogen in females to prompt affiliation-seeking be-
havior (Taylor, 2006). Higher oxytocin levels are also associated with greater calmness
and decreased anxiety, which are important components of effective nurturing.
It might surprise you to know that both men and women seek social support as
a stress response, although evidence at this point indicates women respond this way
more frequently and consistently than men (Tamres et al., 2002). For women with
early-stage breast cancer, for example, emotional support from their spouses buffered
their daily stress (Gilmore et al., 2011). Importantly, however, the amount of support
they needed from their spouses rose as their level of distress rose. Researchers urge
spouses to understand the greater need and find ways to provide it rather than becom-
ing disheartened and giving up. And doing so may benefit their own health; research
indicates a lower mortality rate for older adults who give help and emotional support
to friends, relatives, and neighbors (Brown et al., 2003).
The picture emerging from these complementary responses to stressful situations—
fight-or-flight and tend-and-befriend—is of a more complex stress response than
previously thought. We now see a response system that has evolved to enable both self-
protection and reaching out to others in times of danger (Pitman, 2003). Tending and
befriending powerfully complements the fight-or-flight pattern, together accounting for
the survival not only of individuals but also of relationships and communities.
Stress and the Immune System
Earlier in this section, we noted that the immune system becomes compromised in the
face of stress—specifically, when we enter the exhaustion phase of the GAS. Research
has shown, for example, that individuals coping with the death of a spouse or the end
of an important long-term relationship are frequently subject to both depression and
immunosuppression (impairment in the function of the immune system), leaving them
more vulnerable to disease (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1987,
2001).
tend-and-befriend Stress response model
proposing that females are biologically predisposed to
respond to threat by nurturing and protecting offspring
and seeking social support.
cortisol A steroid produced by the fight-or-flight
response.
oxytocin A hormone produced (by both women and
men) in response to a stressor.
immunosuppression Impairment in the
function of the immune system.
Explore the Concept
at MyPsychLab
Selye’s General
Adaptation Syndrome

618 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
Psycho-Neuroimmunology In recent years, advances in biotechnology have spurred
the development of an exciting new field that seeks to understand how stress causes
disease. Psycho-neuroimmunology pulls together psychologists with expertise in psycho-
logical factors of stress, such as cognition and emotion; neuroscientists, who study
brain functioning; and immunologists, who have extensive knowledge of the immune
system. While the field has an impressive multisyllabic title, interest in the mind–body
connection is not new: In many ways, psycho-neuroimmunology is simply the rigorous
study of questions pondered more than 2,000 years ago by ancient civilizations such as
the Greeks and Chinese.
Bi-Directional Links between the Brain and Body A primary goal of psycho-
neuroimmunology is to examine how psychological and immunological processes influ-
ence each other and, in turn, how they are influenced by the external social world.
Fundamental to this mission is the fact that the brain and periphery of the body
communicate in a bidirectional fashion (Maier & Watkins, 1999). When a stressor
is experienced, for example, the brain signals the adrenal glands to secrete cortisol,
a major stress hormone. Cortisol then sends signals back to the brain to regulate its
own production (Maier & Watkins, 2000). Psychological stress also activates the im-
mune system. Among the chemical messengers shuttling between the brain and the
immune system are proteins known as cytokines. One of the most interesting aspects
of cytokines is that they signal the central nervous system to elicit behavioral changes
that include fatigue, fever, and social-behavioral withdrawal. These changes are helpful
because they help organisms recuperate and recover from illness or injury (DeAngelis,
2002a). If prolonged, however, these changes can increase risk for disorders, such as
psychological depression. Again, we see the parallels with the functioning of the general
adaptation syndrome, GAS.
In one of the first studies to examine how the brain regulates cytokine responses
to stress, psychologist George Slavich asked participants to give an impromptu speech
in front of an imposing panel of raters wearing white lab coats. As expected, people’s
cytokine levels increased significantly during the impromptu speech (Slavich et al.,
2010b). Next, he scanned participants’ brains while they played a virtual ball-tossing
game in which they were suddenly excluded by two other players. When Slavich ex-
amined the cytokine and brain data together, he noticed that people who had greater
brain-activity responses to being rejected had also exhibited more cytokine activity
during the speech. What conclusions can we draw from these results? You’ll recall
that in addition to acting as “chemical messengers,” cytokines can promote specific
behaviors such as social-behavioral withdrawal. Consequently, the Slavich study helps
explain how social stressors outside the body are translated into biological changes
that can increase some individuals’ risk for disorders like depression.
Stress Ages Cells Psychological stress can also affect physical health by accelerating
the rate at which cells age. One way to assess a cell’s age is to measure the length of its
telomeres. Telomeres are DNA protein complexes that cap the ends of chromosomes
and protect against damage to DNA. In humans, telomeres shorten across the lifespan.
Importantly, however, their length is associated with a number of diseases, including
cancer, cardiovascular disease, and several neurodegenerative diseases (Fitzpatrick
et al., 2007). Shorter telomeres are even associated with early death (Cawthon et al.,
2003).
In a landmark study examining the effects of stress on telomere length, psycholo-
gist Elissa Epel found that women who cared for a child with a serious illness had an
accelerated rate of immune cell telomere shortening (Epel et al., 2004). In fact, women
reporting high levels of stress had telomeres that were nine to 17 years “older.” Subse-
quent research demonstrated that this effect may be explained in part by people’s level
of pessimism or their tendency to expect negative outcomes in the future (O’Donovan
et al., 2009). Thus, those women with high levels of pessimistic tendencies were more
likely, when stressed, to have developed older telomeres than peers with more optimis-
tic outlooks. This is an important point because it shows that cognitive appraisals play
cytokines Hormone-like chemicals that fight
infection and facilitate communication between the
brain and immune system.
telomeres DNA protein complexes that cap the
ends of chromosomes and protect against damage
to DNA.
psycho-neuroimmunology Multidisciplinary
field that studies the influence of mental states on the
immune system.

How Does Stress Affect Us Physically? 619
a critical role in the stress–illness relationship. What are other reasons for why some
people get ill when faced with stress while others do not? We devote the second half of
this chapter to answering that very question.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Cognitive Appraisal of Ambiguous Threats
In the aftermath of 9/11, many of the first responders continued to work on site at the
WTC for months after the explosive destruction of the twin towers. When authorities
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the mayor of New York City
announced that the air was safe to breathe, many workers took off their safety masks,
which were hot and impaired visibility. But was that “all clear” announcement really
accurate? Dust an inch thick covered window frames as far as a mile from the smol-
dering debris on the “pile” at the WTC. Think about what must have been the fall-out
from two airliners crashing into and demolishing two 110-story office buildings. What
would you expect to find upon close inspection of that site? And what do you imagine
was the psychological reason for the upbeat, positive public announcement by the EPA
when on the ground conditions were so unhealthy?
Almost a decade later, the New York Times (2011) published this report on that
“secondary tragedy”—the subsequent health damage to WTC first responders from
having been encouraged by government officials that the air was safe to breathe when,
in fact, it was lethal to do so.
Scientists have called the dust, smoke and ash unleashed by the destruction of
the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001, the greatest acute environmental
disaster in New York City history. Fires burning at 1,000 degrees created a
toxic plume that clouded lower Manhattan and spread to adjoining areas. The
collapsing towers pulverized cement and everything the buildings contained,
including some asbestos, while the tremendous pressure of the collapsing floors
fused materials together in potentially dangerous combinations that scientists
had not seen before.
Officials and medical experts estimate that in all, between 40,000 and
90,000 workers and volunteers spent time on the debris pile and may have been
affected in some way by the dust. More than 9,000 workers at ground zero
brought lawsuits against 90 government agencies and private companies related
to illnesses and injuries they say stemmed from working at the site.
Were officials deliberately lying, then, when they made the announcement that the air
was safe to breathe? Assuming they were fully cognizant of the dangers that were later
discovered could be indicative of a judgment error known as the hindsight bias—similar
to Monday-morning quarterbacks’ analysis of what went wrong in the previous day’s
football game. While—with the benefit of hindsight—it may be easy to see the mag-
nitude of the danger that workers faced, at the time, officials may have been over-
whelmed by a variety of diverse predictions made in the face of a situation they had
never before encountered. Similar processes may have been functioning in Japan’s offi-
cial optimistic announcements in the first few days following the 2011 quake, tsunami,
and subsequent nuclear breach.
We must also acknowledge the power of cognitive appraisal. To make an effective
cognitive appraisal of a situation, we must have a concrete understanding of the nature
of the threat. For example, the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks indisputably ex-
perienced distress, recognizing the specific dangers in which they were immersed. But
in the years following the attacks, airplane travelers also felt some distress when the
government’s color-coded warning system—created to assess terrorist threat level and
keep the public informed—announced an increased terrorist threat level just before
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
Hindsight bias is the tendency,
after an event, to assume that
signs were evident and that the
event could have been predicted
(p. 227).
After the collapse of the twin towers on
9/11, many first responders continued
to work on site for months without the
protection of their safety masks.

620 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
flying. Curiously, the advisory system created enough public confusion and distress—as
well as public distrust about possible political motives for alerts imposed just prior to
national elections (Zimbardo, 2004a)—that the system was scrapped in 2011. Here’s
the point: Uncertainty can add to the perceived stress of a situation. Thus, interpreta-
tion, or cognitive appraisal, can make the accumulated distress from a series of vague
threats evoke essentially the same stress response as a single major traumatic incident.
In light of what you learned in the previous section about the stress response and
about stress and our immune system, if you were a government official, what decisions
and announcements would you make to the public about potential threats if the nature
of the true threat was not yet known?
14.3 KEY QUESTION
Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress?
Why do some people bounce back after severely traumatic experiences such as 9/11
or the death of a loved one, while others are derailed by seemingly minor hassles? The
stress we experience is determined not only by the quality and intensity of the stressful
situation but also by how we interpret the stressor. In this section, we will focus our
attention on the personality characteristics that influence our responses to stressors. A
summary of what we will learn is captured in our Core Concept:
Core Concept 14.3
Personality characteristics affect our individual responses to stressful
situations and, consequently, the degree to which we are distressed
when exposed to potential stressors.
Before we delve into this fascinating field of study, we want to introduce to you a
model of the stress–illness relationship that will serve as our guide for the remainder of
this chapter.
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: The first stage in Selye’s GAS is.
a. attention c. alarm
b. alertness d. activity
2. RECALL: In George Slavich’s research on social rejection as an
external stressor that can lead to depression, what is the chemical
messenger that mediates between the external event and the
psychological state?
a. cytokines c. oxytocin
b. telomeres d. both a and b
3. SYNTHESIS: According to researcher Shelley Taylor, how might
the responses of a man and a woman differ in the face of the same
stressor?
4. APPLICATION: Which of the following stressors would be the
most likely to cause the immune system to malfunction and even
cause harm?
a. accidentally slipping and falling on an icy surface
b. caring for a dying family member for a prolonged period
c. being rejected by someone you are romantically interested in
d. receiving a bad grade on an important test
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Describe how
our stress response system is well suited to acute stress but less
effective in the face of chronic stress.
Answers 1. c 2. a 3. Taylor’s tend-and-befriend model would predict that the woman would be more likely to seek social support, while the man would
be more likely to respond with the aggression characteristic of the fight-or-flight response. 4. b 5. The short-lived alarm phase of the GAS sets off a
host of physiological changes that help us combat stressors. We can maintain these high levels of “combat readiness” during the resistance phase,
but if the stressor is chronic, the exhaustion phase kicks in, and our immune system suffers the effects of depleted resources.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress? 621
Figure 14.7 gives you a visual picture of this model, showing how stressors can
lead to stress, which in turn can cause physical and mental illness. Please take a
close look at this figure before reading further. Note there are two opportunities for
intervention: One lies between stressors and stress, and the other occurs between
stress and illness. To put it another way, one set of factors can prevent stressors from
causing us to feel stress; similarly, a second set of factors can prevent stress from es-
calating into physical or mental illness. The first set of factors—those that can inter-
vene in the relationship between stressors and stress—we call moderators because they
moderate or regulate the impact of stressors on our perceived level of stress. Most
of them are variations on the concept of cognitive appraisal. In other words, these
moderators influence the judgments and interpretations we make of the stressor. It
is this set of possible interventions that we explore in this section, beginning with an
example.
Consider this scenario: Demetria and Cory are newlyweds planning their life
together. They want to buy a home as soon as possible and hope to start a family.
They have recently begun to argue about these issues, however, as their outlooks
toward their goals differ markedly. Demetria is optimistic they’ll be able to afford the
down payment on a home within a year and believes they can achieve this goal as
long as they carefully manage their money. Cory is less positive. In his mind, it seems
as though every time he gets close to reaching a goal, something gets in the way, and
he’s sure this will be no different. To him, “what’s gonna happen will just happen,”
and he is afraid they risk disappointment if they get their hopes up about getting the
house in a year.
Do you see yourself or someone you know in this example? If the different styles of
approaching and perceiving events are long standing, consistent across situations, and
similar to those of others, they could be called personality characteristics. Let’s exam-
ine their impact on the stressor–stress relationship.
moderator Factor that helps prevent stressors
from causing stress.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Personality is the pattern of
characteristics unique to an
individual that persists over time
and across situations (p. 414).
FIGURE 14.7
How Individual Factors Influence Our
Stress Response
Oftentimes, stressors cause stress, which
in turn can cause illness. However, three
categories of psychological responses can
intervene in the stress–illness relation-
ship. Moderators can help keep stressors
from causing stress, coping strategies
can help prevent stress from leading to
illness, and positive lifestyle choices can
intervene in both places.
IllnessStressor Stress
Moderators
These personality characteristics reduce
the impact of stressors on an individual’s
stress level:
1. Type A/B Personality
2. Locus of Control
3. Optimism
4. Hardiness
5. Resilience
Coping Strategies
These learned skills reduce the impact
of perceived stress on physical and
mental health:
1. Problem-Focused and Emotion-
Focused Coping
2. Cognitive Restructuring
3. Social Comparisons
4. Positive Emotions
5. Finding Meaning
Positive Lifestyle Choices
These factors impact both sides of the equation,
acting as moderators and as coping strategies:
1. Social Support
2. Exercise
3. Nutrition and Diet
4. Sleep and Meditation

622 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
Type A Personality and Hostility
When cardiologists Meyer Friedman and Ray Rosenman (1974) hired an upholsterer
to repair furnishings in their waiting room, the upholsterer noticed something the doc-
tors had not: Most of the chairs showed an unusually high degree of wear on the front
edges of the seats. When they became aware of this, the doctors wondered whether
their patients’ heart problems might be related to a certain style of coping with stress—
it was as if they were always “on the edge of their seats.” The doctors began a series
of studies to investigate their hypothesis, and interviews with patients revealed a
striking pattern of common behaviors. Impatience, competitiveness, aggressiveness,
and hostility—all stress-related responses—were noted again and again. Many also
admitted they were notorious workaholics. Friedman and Rosenman ultimately found
this collection of attitudes and behaviors not just correlated with heart disease but was
actually predictive of it. They dubbed it the Type A pattern: Type A men and women
were found to have twice as much risk of heart disease as the Type B individual, who
takes a relaxed approach to life (Matthews, 1982).
Since the initial identification of the Type A personality, careful research has revealed
that it is specifically the anger and hostility common in Type A people that increases
risk of heart disease. Time urgency, perfectionism, and competitiveness, without the
anger and hostility, are not risk factors. Hostile individuals are less trusting, quicker
to anger, and more antagonistic than their nonhostile counterparts. If you’re noticing
a connection to cognitive appraisal, you are right: Hostile people would be more likely
than most to perceive threat in a situation. This interpersonal style makes it more dif-
ficult to maintain relationships, which in turn reduces availability of social support.
Hostility is also associated with a variety of risky health behaviors—such as smok-
ing, drinking alcohol, and overeating—that themselves increase risk of heart disease
(Taylor, 2006).
From a physiological perspective, those high in hostility become aroused more
quickly in the face of a potential stressor, exhibit greater levels of arousal, and take
more time for their arousal level to return to normal once the stressor has passed
(Fredrickson et al., 2000; Guyll & Contrada, 1998). Hostility is also associated with
higher levels of cytokines, which can prolong the stress response (Niaura et al., 2002).
Researchers aren’t yet sure, though, whether these biological differences are entirely
genetic in nature or partially a result of early childhood environment: Boys who grow
up in families rife with conflict and low in acceptance and support are at greater risk
to develop hostility (Matthews et al., 1996). At this time, both nature and nurture
are thought to play roles in development of hostility and later heart disease. Clearly,
though, there are multiple channels through which hostility promotes heart disease.
Let us reassure you that, while many people may sometimes feel angry, there are
important differences between normal anger and a truly hostile personality style. We
all feel angry at times in response to a negative situation—in these instances, anger can
be healthy and even adaptive: It signals us that something is wrong and provides the
energy to take measures to correct the situation. That type of normal anger stands in
marked contrast to the hostile personality style, which reflects a long-term pattern of
hostile behavior that manifests frequently across a variety of situations. The level of
arousal is a distinguishing factor as well: It is reasonable to feel irritated when a slow-
moving vehicle blocks you in traffic, but feeling enraged is irrational and dangerous,
especially if this becomes a common pattern in your life.
Besides cardiovascular diseases, other illnesses have been linked with Type A hab-
its: allergies, head colds, headaches, stomach disorders, and mononucleosis (Suls &
Marco, 1990; Suls & Sanders, 1988). Likewise, the perfectionism characteristic of
Type A has been linked to anxiety (about reaching impossible goals) and to depression
(from failing to reach them; Joiner & Schmidt, 1995).
Understanding the link between hostility and heart disease and between other Type A
behaviors and their associated health risks can help in developing more effective disease
prevention. Regular aerobic exercise, relaxation training, and even a program aimed at
teaching hostile individuals to speak more slowly and quietly have proven effective at
Type A Behavior pattern characterized by intense,
angry, competitive, or hostile responses to challenging
situations.
This basketball coach displays some Type
A behaviors. What are they?

Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress? 623
reducing risk of heart disease (Taylor, 2006). Comprehensive stress management training
may offer some of the most promising benefits, however. One study in particular showed
heart attack survivors given stress-management training had half as many heart attacks in
the next three years as a control group who received no such training (Friedman & Ulmer,
1984). The researchers concluded: “No drug, food, or exercise program ever devised, not
even a coronary bypass surgical program, could match the protection against recurrent
heart attacks” afforded by learning to manage stress (p. 141). Thus, even though Type A
behavior seems to show up early in life and persist into adulthood, well-designed interven-
tions can be effective in helping Type As who are committed to change in their lifestyles.
Locus of Control
How confident are you that you can make your life turn out pretty much the way
you want it to? In our example at the beginning of this section, newlyweds Cory and
Demetria were struggling with their differences on this dimension of personality known
as locus of control (from the Greek loci, meaning place). You probably remember our
discussion of this concept in Chapter 9 on motivation and Chapter 10 on personality,
so you already understand it is a relatively stable pattern of expectations about our
ability to influence the outcomes in our life. Internals (those with an internal locus
of control) generally believe that if they take certain action, they are likely to gain
the outcome they desire—diligent studying, for example, will result in good grades.
Externals, on the other hand, see an unpredictable relationship between their efforts and
their outcomes. They are more likely to believe that factors outside their control, such
as the fairness of the test or how much the professor likes them, will have a decisive
effect on their grades—regardless of how much they study. In the face of a stressful
event, internals are more likely to perceive the stressor as manageable than are exter-
nals, which leads to lower stress and, ultimately, to a variety of health benefits. And
perception of control can, at least to some extent, be learned: Firefighters and other
9/11 personnel who were trained for such disasters experienced lower rates of PTSD in
the years following the attacks (Perrin et al., 2007).
Locus of Control, Health, and Longevity A landmark study illuminating the
importance of perceived control on health took place in a Connecticut nursing home
30 years ago. Elderly residents on one floor were offered a variety of choices about
their daily lives. For example, they were allowed to choose whether and when to watch
available movies, how they wanted the furniture and personal items in their rooms
arranged, and whether or not to have a plant in their room—which they were respon-
sible for watering. In communications with this group, nursing home staff emphasized
the residents’ personal responsibility for their own satisfaction; the nursing home staff
was happy to help in any way (for example, moving the furniture) on request of a
resident. Residents on a different floor, matched on important characteristics such as
health and age, acted as the control group. Here the staff took full charge of the resi-
dents’ care, watering all the plants, assigning movie times, and arranging furniture as
per administrative decisions.
The results? After 18 months, the “more responsible” residents were more
active, more alert, and happier than the control group. What’s more—in an entirely
unexpected outcome—locus of control actually affected the residents’ life spans. By the
end of the study, the mortality rate of the control group was 67 percent higher than
that of the group with increased personal responsibility (Rodin, 1986).
Locus of control impacts a wide range of health-related outcomes. In addition
to being more likely to wear seat belts, exercise regularly, and pay attention to their
diets—all of which have obvious health benefits—internals have better immune sys-
tems than do externals (Chen et al., 2003). They get sick less often and recover more
quickly from illnesses and surgeries alike (Skinner, 1996). What’s more, a strong sense
of internal control actually dissolves the well-documented relationship between social
class and health: Low-income individuals who have an internal locus of control are
just as healthy as those with higher incomes (Lachman & Weaver, 1998).
locus of control A relatively stable pattern of
behavior that characterizes individual expectations
about the ability to influence the outcomes in life.
internals People with an internal locus of control
who believe they can do much to influence their life
outcomes.
externals People with an external locus of control
who believe they can do little to influence their life
outcomes.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Longevity is highly related to
the time perspective future
orientation of those who are
highly conscientious (p. 450).

624 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
Culture Affects Locus of Control Cultural studies have identified an interesting
distinction between perceptions of control in Western and Eastern cultures. Primary
control, prevalent in the West, is the type of control discussed previously: taking ac-
tion aimed at controlling external events. Eastern cultures are more likely to engage in
secondary control, which emphasizes controlling one’s reactions to events (Rothbaum
et al., 1982). A culture’s general value system, such as the individualist and collectiv-
ist perspectives discussed in Chapter 10, influences the type of control most highly
prized and promoted in that culture. In Japan, for example, traditionally a collectivist
culture, child-rearing practices encourage development of secondary control. Children
are taught to adjust their reactions to a situation to help maintain social harmony. This
stands in direct contrast to the individualistic approach to child rearing, which fosters
efforts to control the situation itself. Research indicates that both strategies work well
in the context of their respective cultures (Weisz et al., 1984). Furthermore, when ef-
forts at primary control fail or are not possible for an individual, engaging in second-
ary control improves health—a topic we will explore a little later in this chapter.
Is Locus of Control Innate or Learned? While locus of control does tend to appear
early and run in families—factors that often indicate a genetic component—our
experiences also impact our expectations. Individuals who repeatedly experience fail-
ure when they attempt to escape threatening conditions may simply stop trying, a
concept called learned helplessness. Evidence of learned helplessness originally came
from animal studies performed by Martin Seligman and his colleagues. Dogs receiving
inescapable electric shocks soon gave up their attempts to avoid the punishment and
passively resigned themselves to their fate (Seligman, 1975, 1991; Seligman
& Maier, 1967). Later, when given the opportunity to escape the shocks, the
dogs typically did nothing but whimper and accept them. In contrast, a control
group of dogs that had not been subjected to previous punishment was quick
to escape. Seligman concluded that the experimental group of animals had
already learned that nothing they did mattered or altered the consequences, so
they passively accepted their fate (Seligman & Maier, 1967).
An experiment by Donald Hiroto (1974) employed human participants in
a variation of Seligman’s dog research. One at a time, students were placed in
a very noisy room; some found a way to turn off the noise, but for others, the
noise controls did not work. When the students were sent to a new room and
exposed to a different irritating noise, those who had successfully turned off
the noise in the previous room quickly found the simple solution in the second
room. In contrast, those who had failed in their efforts to shut off the noise
earlier just sat in the new room, making no effort to stop the latest stressor. They had
already learned to be helpless. Seligman and other scholars see symptoms of the same
learned helplessness syndrome in a variety of human populations, including abused
and discouraged children, battered wives, and prisoners of war (Overmier, 2002; Yee
et al., 2003). Conversely, workers at all skill levels in a variety of professions report
greater well-being when given some measure of control over their environment and
working conditions (Faulkner, 2001; Zarit & Pearlin, 2003).
Thus, although we may be born with an individual predisposition to an internal
or external locus of control, our experiences play a role as well. Research with 9/11
rescue personnel and regarding learned helplessness are just two areas in which this
important fact has been illustrated.
Hardiness
One of the most effective stress moderators is hardiness, an outlook based on dis-
tinctive attitudes toward stress and how to manage it. In contrast with risky Type A
behavior, hardiness is a personality pattern that promotes healthy coping. Hardiness
first emerged in a large-scale study of managers working for Illinois Bell Telephone (IBT)
in the 1970s and 1980s. Salvatore Maddi and a team of researchers from the University
of Chicago gathered extensive data from the managers over a period of years, during
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 10
Individualistic cultures value
the individual over the group,
whereas collectivist cultures
prioritize group needs over
individual needs (p. 418).
primary control Efforts aimed at controlling
external events.
secondary control Efforts aimed at controlling
one’s reactions to external events.
learned helplessness Pattern of failure to
respond to threatening stimuli after an organism
experiences a series of ineffective responses.
hardiness Attitude of resistance to stress, based
on a sense of challenge (welcoming change),
commitment (engagement), and control (maintaining
an internal guide for action).
In hospitals and nursing homes, patients
may learn to feel helpless because they
are not given opportunities to make deci-
sions or exert control over their own lives.

Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress? 625
which federal deregulation of public utilities resulted in massive layoffs and downsiz-
ing of IBT. Working conditions, positions, and expectations changed frequently, cre-
ating a highly stressful work environment. Two-thirds of the managers experienced
negative health consequences, including heart attacks, strokes, depression, and anxiety
disorders. The other third—exposed to the same conditions—not only experienced no
ill effects but actually appeared to thrive (Kobasa et al., 1979). The distinguishing fac-
tor, it turned out, came to be known as hardiness, a concept comprised of three specific
characteristics:
• Challenge. Hardy people perceive change as a challenge to be overcome and an
opportunity to learn and grow—rather than as a threat.
• Commitment. Hardy individuals become highly engaged in their lives, demonstrat-
ing a focused commitment to involvement in purposeful activity.
• Control. Hardy persons have an internal locus of control and are good at problem
solving—that is, they have not become victims of learned helplessness.
Let’s apply these three factors—known as “the three Cs” of hardiness—to the life of a
college student. Suppose that on the day you must prepare for a major test, a friend con-
fides in you about a terrible problem and begs for your help. These two stressors—an
important test and a needy friend—could be overwhelming, especially if you are already
stretching some of your resources to the limit. But a hardy individual would employ the
“three Cs” to reduce the stress of the situation: commitment (“I’m committed to my
friend and to preparing for this test; I’m not going to let either one down”); challenge
(“Now I have two important things I need to do—what are my options for meeting both
needs?”); and control (“I’ll study all afternoon, talk to my friend over dinner—after all, I
have to eat to keep my brain functioning—then review more before bed”).
Hardiness has been shown to reduce the effects of stressful situations across a wide
variety of populations: in businesspeople, children, couples, Olympic athletes, military, and
law enforcement (Maddi, 2002). And—like locus of control—although some indications
of a hardy personality show up early in life, hardiness can also be learned. Researchers
have successfully developed hardiness training programs that help individuals learn more
adaptive ways of reacting to stressors in their life (Beasley et al., 2003; Maddi, 1987).
Optimism
When you think about your future, do you generally expect good things to happen,
or do you worry about all the things that could go wrong? Optimists see a future of
bright possibilities; for them, “the glass is half full,” whereas pessimists are far less
positive, instead “seeing the glass as half-empty.” And pessimism isn’t simply a case of
learned helplessness. “Life inflicts the same setbacks and tragedies on the optimist as
on the pessimist,” says psychologist Martin Seligman (1991), “but the optimist weath-
ers them better.” In general, optimistic people have fewer physical symptoms of ill-
ness, recover more quickly from certain disorders, are healthier, and live longer than
pessimists do (Bennett & Elliott, 2002; Taylor et al., 2000a). What accounts for the
differences? Optimism has a direct impact on health in that optimists feel more positive
emotions, which in turn boosts their immune systems (Cohen et al., 2003). In addition,
optimism aids in coping with stress via more active coping strategies, which we will
discuss in the last section of this chapter.
A long-term research program by Seligman (2002) and associates indicates that an
optimistic style of thinking makes three particular assumptions, or attributions, about
negative events:
• They are the result of specific causes rather than global problems: “I got a low
grade on my last psychology test,” instead of “I’m doing badly in school.”
• They are situational rather than personal problems: “It probably happened
because I missed class the day before the exam when the professor gave a review
session,” rather than “I’m not smart enough to do well.”
optimism An attitude that interprets stressors
as external in origin, temporary, and specific in their
effects.

626 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
• They are temporary, rather than permanent: “If I’m careful not to miss class any-
more, I’ll do better on the next test,” rather than “I won’t be able to recover from
this low score.”
Seligman, one of the founders of the International Positive Psychology Association,
believes that an optimistic thinking style can be learned. One way to do so, he advises,
is by talking to yourself in a particular way when feeling depressed or helpless. Posi-
tive self-talk, says Seligman, should concentrate on the meaning and causes of personal
setbacks. For example, if a person on a diet splurges on a piece of dessert, instead of
thinking, “Because I’ve ruined my whole diet, I might as well eat the whole cake!” she
or he should think, “Well, I enjoyed that, but I know I’m strong enough to stick to this
diet most of the time.” In essence, Seligman argues that optimism is learned by adopt-
ing a constructive style of thinking, self-assessment, and behavioral planning.
In considering this, you might be reminded of the importance of cognitive appraisal
in our stress response and of our Problem for this chapter concerning individual varia-
tions in the stress response. Learning to think more optimistically, or to respond with
greater hardiness, changes our interpretation of a potential stressor and, thus, lowers
our perceived stress.
Resilience
Actress Christina Applegate would seem to have a charmed life for her chosen profes-
sion. Born in Hollywood, California (1971), to an actress/singer mother and father
who was a record producer, this beautiful, talented young woman went on to be the
lead or supporting actress in dozens of films, television programs and Broadway stage
shows. Winning numerous awards for her acting, with a popular fan base, she also
hosted Saturday Night Live and was top of the list of the Most Beautiful People in
2009 of People Magazine.
Beneath that public surface is a life filled with many sources of extreme stress. Her
parents divorced soon after her birth. She divorced her first husband a few years after
their marriage. Her close friend and former boyfriend died of an apparent drug over-
dose. The next month, Applegate discovered she had breast cancer that was treated with
a double mastectomy operation. Early detection saved her now cancer-free life. How did
she deal with the knowledge that she, like her mother before her, had developed cancer?
She is reported to have said after her initial diagnosis: “I was just shaking and—and then
also immediately, I had to go into ‘take-care-of-business-mode.’” In an interview with
USMagazine.com (2010), Applegate also said she has turned her life around in response
to that life-threatening disease. “Right away, you kind of go gung-ho—you don’t let
any stress in your life, you don’t eat any crap (food), you do a total 180 from where
you were. You look at life a little bit differently.” She has now dedicated herself to rais-
ing money for cancer research and treatment through her charitable foundation Right
Action for Women.
Like cyclist star Lance Armstong, whom we met in Chapter 9 on emotion and
motivation, Christina Applegate’s life has been filled with successes and setbacks.
Is luck at work here? Instead, psychologists recognize in the decisions, attitudes, and
behavior of both of these celebrities something more precious to well being than either
talent or genius: resilience.
Resilience is the capacity to adapt and achieve well-being in spite of serious threats
to children’s development (Masten, 2001). In fact, the word resilience comes from a
Latin root meaning “buoyant”—literally bouncing amid waves. For more than two
decades, most resilience research has focused on this quality in children and adoles-
cents who have dealt with stressful life conditions, including parental neglect or abuse,
parental mental illness, bereavement, and other serious risk factors. How could some
at-risk children survive and even thrive when others became ill and failed because of
the same types of risks?
Even at young ages, resilient children are distinguished by an assortment of quali-
ties. They tend to have higher cognitive abilities, greater conscientiousness, better
resilience The capacity to adapt, achieve
well-being, and cope with stress, in spite of serious
threats to development.
A cancer-free Christina Applegate arrives at
the “Stand Up To Cancer” event in 2010.
Optimism and
Resilience
Watch the Video
at MyPsychLab

Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress? 627
social skills, greater competence, and access to better caretaking or parenting resources
(Masten, 2001; Riolli, 2002). Identifying resilient qualities so early in life supports the
inference that one is either born resilient or not—it is an innate human quality. More
recently, however, attention has been focused on the quality of resilience among adult
populations and also on whether resilience can be learned.
One study of resilience among adults examined survivors of the 1999 conflict
in Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia. Resilience was related to a combination of
personality traits, including extraversion, conscientiousness, and optimism (Riolli,
2002). Of these, optimism in particular holds promise for helping people to become
more resilient and less vulnerable or brittle. Also, you may have noticed that resil-
ience seems to overlap somewhat with hardiness, and indeed the two concepts are
related. While hardiness is focused on three specific characteristics, though, resilience
encompasses a broader range of qualities. And, because hardiness can be developed with
the help of specific training programs, perhaps the future will bring similar findings to
resilience.
Psychologist George Bonanno of Columbia University is a pioneering figure in the
field of bereavement and trauma. His extensive longitudinal and interview research
on survivors of all sorts of extremely stressful experiences—from children to adults,
in personal loss and major catastrophes—leads to the conclusion that “The ability
to rebound remains the norm throughout adult life” (Bonanno, 2009). Based on his
research, Bonanno finds that resilience and recovery are far more common than
chronic dysfunction or delayed trauma. More detail about Bonanno’s findings can be
found in Figure 14.8.
Bonanno also coined the term coping ugly to refer to a variety of coping strategies
that are helpful in stressful situations but might be inappropriate in normal circum-
stances. Among them are: self-enhancement biases, ego boosting, laughing and smiling,
thought suppression, beliefs in personal mastery to survive no matter what, and others.
His main point is that most of us survive anything and everything surprising well, and
we do so using a range of personally invented strategies. It is a testimony to our human
adaptiveness under almost all challenges. (Bonanno & Mancini, 2008).
The adjustments to crises revealed in the stories of Christina Applegate and Lance
Armstrong are rather extraordinary, but their resilience need not be rare. In fact, many
everyday heroes and “unknown celebrities” overcome terrible difficulties without our
awareness. Their ability to deal with pain and challenge is actually the result not of
extraordinary forces but of ordinary magic. It is the term that resilience researcher Ann
FIGURE 14.8
Bonanno’s Trajectories of
Psychological Functioning
The first two trajectories, Resilience and
Recovery, are common; the last two,
Chronic Dysfunction and Delayed Grief or
Trauma, are rare.
Source: Adapted from Bonanno, G. A. (2009). The
Other Side of Sadness: What the New Science of
Bereavement Tells Us About Life After Loss. New
York: Basic Books; and Bonanno, G. A., & Mancini,
A. D. (2008). The human capacity to thrive in the
face of extreme adversity. Pediatrics, 121, 369–375.
Resilience: The ability of adults in
otherwise normal circumstances who are
exposed to an isolated and potentially
highly disruptive event, such as the death
of a close relative or a violent or life-
threatening situation, to maintain
relatively stable, healthy levels of
psychological and physical functioning
as well as the capacity for generative
experiences and positive emotions.
Recovery: When normal functioning
temporarily gives way to threshold or sub-
threshold psychopathology (e.g.,
symptoms of depression or posttraumatic
stress disorder [PTSD]), usually for a period
of at least several months, and then
gradually returns to pre-event levels.
Chronic Dysfunction: Prolonged
suffering and inability to function, usually
lasting several years or longer.
Delayed Grief or Trauma: When
adjustment seems normal but then
distress and symptoms increase months
later. Researchers have not found
evidence of delayed grief, but delayed
trauma appears to be a genuine
phenomenon.

628 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
Masten (2001) uses for normal adaptation processes, which, she argues, make people
capable of greater outcomes than we might expect. By expecting more, perhaps we
take a step toward greater optimism and resilience in our own lives.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
Imagine you have just suffered a loss: a friend picked a fight and insulted you, violating
your sense of trust; the one you love doesn’t return your feelings and has rejected you;
or your family pet has died, leaving you grief stricken though friends insist you should
“get over it.” Whatever the stress, you aren’t sure where to go or to whom you can
talk—yet you feel a strong need to express your thoughts and feelings. What can you
do? Here’s a place to start: Write it out. In the process, you’ll learn more about your
own psychology.
Why write? Why not just rant and rave and get it out of your system? For one
thing, aggressively venting emotions is not enough to relieve stress or support your
health; on the contrary, it can even have aggravating or harmful effects (Gross &
Psaki, 2004; Smythe, 1998). Conversely, writing about your fears and losses has thera-
peutic emotional effects (Pennebaker, 1990, 1997; Zimmerman, 2002), and writing
about feelings and worries has been found to support the health of patients with
immune disorders (Pennebaker, 1997). When you write out your thoughts and feel-
ings, you talk only to and for yourself. With no audience to perform for and no patient
listener to please, you can use frank language, tell all, and rest assured you don’t have
to explain anything. All you need is a place, a time, the materials you need, and com-
mitment to maintain the habit. There are several ways to make the practice easier and
more effective:
• Write in any medium that is efficient or comforting to you—it’s OK to type at
your keyboard, but you may not always have convenient access to your computer.
Handwriting is more personally expressive, and you don’t have to make it
legible—it’s for your eyes only. By using a pen and paper, you can not only write
but draw or doodle, expressing yourself nonverbally. And a small notebook is
inexpensive and easy to keep handy.
• Choose a topic or theme to get you started. If a loss or fear has prompted your
writing exercise, start with that. If not, choose an “assignment” that prompts
emotions and ideas about important challenges in your life. One professor asks stu-
dents in a class on psychology of loss to develop a journal of loss, referring either
to personal losses or to memorable events such as a terrorist attack or the death of
a celebrity and what that has meant to the writer (Harvey & Hofmann, 2001).
• Write out your thoughts as well as your feelings. Focus on finding the meaning in
difficult experiences. You may not know the answers (“Why didn’t our relation-
ship last?”), but you can reason and fantasize (“Maybe this is a good time for
me to be on my own anyway”). An important purpose in therapeutic writing or
talking is to achieve insight, growth, and change. It may also help to write out
memories as if telling a story: with a beginning, middle, and end; descriptions of
characters and events; and your own conclusions about the “moral of the story”
and lessons you have learned (Harvey et al., 1990; Murray, 2002).
• Write in spare moments, setting a goal such as a few pages every week. Write as if
you were a reporter, including whatever details seem important (DeSalvo, 2000).
Experiment with various forms, such as writing love or hate letters. Identify
blessings in disguise or categorize various things you do (e.g., things you do for
others versus things you do for yourself; Zimmerman, 2002).
• Stick with it. Make writing a habit, not just a release for the bad times. One
researcher found that writing only about trauma intensified the pain and left

How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies? 629
subjects less able to open up or work it through. So even at times when you don’t
“need” to write, write a few lines anyway—because you feel fine—so you can later
remember that you have felt good and remind yourself how you got that way!
Your goal in writing is not to become a great writer (though it’s possible!) but to work
through your stress, learn about your responses and coping patterns, and heal. You
set the goals, you make the rules. In doing so, you might consider how to incorporate
some of what you have learned in this section about perceptions and hardiness. Per-
haps, through writing, we can focus on improving our abilities to perceive stressors in
an adaptive manner. In addition, remember our discussion in the first Core Concept of
this chapter about the importance of narratives. But don’t let it stress you out! Issue
these writing “assignments” to yourself, so you can relax knowing there is no deadline
pressure and no grade to worry about.
14.4 KEY QUESTION
How Can We Transform Negative Stress
Into Positive Life Strategies?
Is it possible to choose to live a long and healthy life? Or will your health be deter-
mined by factors out of your hands, such as your genetic background or your access to
health care? After exposure to a traumatic stressor such as an earthquake or a chronic
stressor such as the ones we have discussed in this chapter, is there something we can
do to reduce its impact on our health?
By now, you’ve probably gathered that taking a hardy approach to these questions,
with an internal locus of control and an optimistic attitude, will increase your odds
of success! And there is more good news: Illness and mortality can also be affected by
the coping strategies we employ and the lifestyle choices we make (Elliott & Eisdorfer,
1982; Taylor, 2006). As you can see by “reading between the lines” in Table 14.1, many
early deaths result from behaviors over which we have control. Stress, of course, is part
of the lifestyle equation too. In this section of the chapter, we will explore effective
Check Your Understanding
1. RECALL: In terms of health, the riskiest component of Type A
behavior is .
a. hostility c. competitiveness
b. perfectionism d. time urgency
2. ANALYSIS: People who believe they can take action to affect their
life outcomes have an locus of control and are more
likely to .
a. internal; suffer more frequent frustrations
b. external; suffer more frequent frustrations
c. internal; live longer
d. external; live longer
3. APPLICATION: Roz recently got a new assignment at work that
she didn’t really want. In responding to this change, she decided
to see it as an opportunity for growth and to fully commit to doing
whatever was necessary to do a good job with it. Which personality
characteristic discussed in this section best describes Roz’s
response?
4. APPLICATION: Think of a recent negative event or situation in
your own life. According to Martin Seligman, what three attributions
should you make in perceiving the event/situation?
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: Describe how
personality characteristics fit into the stress–illness relationship.
Answers 1. a 2. c 3. Hardiness, as evidenced by Roz’s high degree of commitment and challenge 4. Specific (rather than global), situational (rather
than personal), and temporary (rather than permanent) 5. Personality characteristics moderate the relationship between stressors and stress by
influencing the way we perceive and interpret stressors. People with more moderators feel less stressed when exposed to stressors and thus have
greater resistance to stress.
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

630 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
ways of coping with stress, as well as lifestyle choices that can help us ward off the
devastating effects of stress through better health. As our Core Concept puts it:
Core Concept 14.4
Effective coping strategies reduce the negative impact of stress on
our health, while positive lifestyle choices can enhance our mental
and physical health as well as our overall well-being.
Revisiting the model we introduced in the previous section (see Figure 14.7), coping
strategies work by reducing the impact of stress—once we’re feeling it—on our health.
In other words, they decrease the effects of stress on our bodies. Positive lifestyle choices
have the same power to help us cope effectively with stress and have an added benefit:
They also act as stress moderators, diminishing the stress we perceive when exposed
to stressors. That is, positive lifestyle choices increase our resistance to stress as well as
our resistance to illness. We begin this section of the chapter by examining coping strat-
egies that are most useful in combating stress. Then, we examine the lifestyle choices
associated with stress reduction and disease prevention. Finally, we will look at the
characteristics of people who say they have found happiness and a sense of well-being.
Psychological Coping Strategies
Earlier in the chapter, we saw how the Type A personality, pessimism, and learned
helplessness can aggravate the stress response, just as hardiness, optimism, an internal
locus of control, and resilience can moderate it. Certainly, we advise that for serious
stressors and difficulties, you seek out professional advice and help. (If you don’t know
a psychotherapist or licensed counselor, ask a trusted instructor or health care provider
for a referral.) What can you do on your own, however, to cope effectively with stress?
And what exactly is meant by coping?
Defending versus Coping There are two broad categories of stress management
behaviors: defending and coping. Defending involves reducing the symptoms of stress
or reducing one’s awareness of them. For example, if you feel stress over an important
psychology exam for which you feel unprepared, you might simply defend against that
anxious feeling by distracting yourself with some activity that is fun—going to a party
or visiting friends. Your defense won’t make the problem go away—there will still be
an exam, and now you’ll be even less prepared for it! But for a brief period, you might
feel less stress. Defending has the advantage of alleviating some symptoms like worry,
discomfort, or pain; but it has the serious drawback of failing to deal with the stressor.
Inevitably stress returns, only now it may be more difficult to alleviate.
positive lifestyle choices Deliberate decisions
about long-term behavior patterns that increase resis-
tance to both stress and illness.
defending Efforts taken to reduce the symptoms
of stress or one’s awareness of them.
TABLE 14.1 Number of Deaths for Twelve Leading Causes of Death
1. Heart disease: 616,067
2. Cancer: 562,875
3. Stroke (cerebrovascular diseases): 135,952
4. Chronic lower respiratory diseases: 127,924
5. Accidents (unintentional injuries): 123,706
6. Alzheimer’s disease: 74,632
7. Diabetes: 71,382
8. Influenza and pneumonia: 52,717
9. Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome, and nephrosis (kidneys): 46,448
10. Septicemia: (bacterial infections): 34,828
11. Intentional self-harm (suicide): 34,598
12. Assault (homicide): 18,361
Note: In 2007, a total of 23,199 persons died of alcohol-induced causes in the United States. The age-adjusted
death rate for alcohol-induced causes for males was 3.2 times the rate for females.
President Obama made a positive lifestyle
choice in early 2010 when he was finally
able to quit smoking cigarettes.
coping strategy Action that reduces or elimi-
nates the impact of stress.

How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies? 631
In contrast with merely defending against stress, healthy coping involves taking
action that reduces or eliminates the causes of stress, not merely its symptoms. To
cope, you must confront the stress, identify the stressor, and develop a way of solving
the problem or reducing the harm it causes you. This means not just feeling better but
improving the entire stressful situation. To cope with stress over a looming psychol-
ogy exam, you must (a) realize you feel unprepared for the exam, (b) identify effec-
tive strategies to study for the test, (c) implement the strategies in a timely manner,
and (d) take the test. This way you will not only feel prepared, you will be prepared
and feel less anxious. Of course, you may have to postpone having fun until after the
exam, but you’ll enjoy yourself more without the test anxiety. (Remember the Premack
principle?)
Problem-Focused and Emotion-Focused Coping In general, there are two basic
approaches to healthy coping: emotion-focused coping and problem-focused coping.
Problem-focused coping involves clarifying the stressor and taking action to resolve
it. This may involve some advance planning, such as when you are nervous about
starting a new school. Problem-focused coping in that situation could involve a visit
to the school to figure out where your classes are and to talk with an academic ad-
visor to get some tips for success, thus reducing your anxiety about knowing your
way around and about being able to do well. Emotion-focused coping, on the other
hand, involves efforts to regulate your emotional response to the stressor by identify-
ing your feelings, focusing on them, and working through them. Effective emotion-
focused coping must be distinguished from rumination, which is dwelling on negative
thoughts (rather than emotions); not surprisingly, rumination has been found to
compromise our immune systems (Thomsen et al., 2004)—and it doesn’t help us feel
better either!
Both types of coping can be useful. In general, problem-focused coping is best when
there is some concrete action that can be taken to reduce the stressor. In contrast,
emotion-focused coping can help at times when you must simply accept a situation or
when you need to work through your emotions before you can think clearly enough to
act rationally (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Zakowski et al., 2001).
Sometimes, the two coping styles work best together. For example, if you get fired
from your job, you might start looking for another job (problem-focused) but find you
can’t focus on the task because you are too angry and confused about being fired. In
that type of situation, try some emotion-focused coping to help yourself calm down
and think more clearly. You might go for a run or to the gym, talk to a trusted friend,
write in your journal, or engage in some other task that helps you work through your
feelings. Alternatively, you might take a hot bath, get some rest, or eat something nour-
ishing. Such emotion-focused coping is not merely a defense (as in distracting yourself
completely from the problem). Rather, it focuses on processing your emotional re-
sponses before they careen out of control and become hazardous to your health. Then,
when you feel calm and prepared, you can concentrate on what it takes to address the
stressor and solve the problem.
Cognitive Restructuring Throughout this chapter, we have recognized the role
of cognitive appraisal in the stress–illness relationship. And while the personality
factors that make us less vulnerable to stress—such as hardiness and locus of
control—are deeply ingrained in our general outlook, with a little conscious ef-
fort, we can apply their basic principles to our coping efforts (Kohn & Smith,
2003). Cognitive restructuring involves just that: cognitively reappraising stressors
with the goal of seeing them from a less-stressful perspective (Meichenbaum &
Cameron, 1974; Swets & Bjork, 1990). The approach involves recognizing the
thoughts you have about the stressor that are causing anxiety, then challenging
yourself to see the situation in a more balanced or realistic manner. Getting fired,
for example, offers the opportunity to find a new job that is more enjoyable, of-
fers better pay, or has more potential for advancement. Cognitive restructuring is
especially suitable for people experiencing chronic stress. Indeed, it is one of the
cornerstones of cognitive–behavioral therapy, which we discussed in the previous
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 4
The Premack principle
notes the strategy of using a
preferred activity as a reward
for completing a less-preferred
activity (p. 148).
coping Taking action that reduces or eliminates
the causes of stress, not merely its symptoms.
problem-focused coping Action taken to
clarify and resolve a stressor.
emotion-focused coping Regulating one’s
emotional response to a stressor.
rumination Dwelling on negative thoughts in
response to stress, a behavior that compromises the
immune system.
cognitive restructuring Reappraising a
stressor with the goal of seeing it from a more
positive perspective.

632 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
chapter. This approach is more than just putting on a happy face; it puts people
into a constructive problem-solving mode that facilitates effective action strategies.
Making social comparisons is a type of cognitive restructuring that specifically
compares your own situation to others in similar situations. Health psychologist Shelley
Taylor (1983) first noted the use of social comparison in a study of breast cancer
patients. Some of them engaged in downward social comparison, in which they compared
their own situations to those of women worse off than they were, which in turn helped
them see their illness in a more positive light. (Please note that, in making these down-
ward comparisons, no one is taking pleasure in others’ pain; the strategy is simply notic-
ing and acknowledging the existence of grimmer possibilities.) Others engaged in upward
social comparison and used breast cancer patients who were doing better than they were
as models and inspiration for improvement. Corroborating research has demonstrated
that both types are effective coping strategies. In a sense, downward social comparisons
represent a type of emotion-focused coping—in that the comparison ultimately makes
you feel less worried—whereas upward comparisons are a type of problem-focused
coping because the models serve as a guide for specific action (Wills, 1991).
Positive Emotions If negative thinking and negative emotions such as hostility are
stress inducing, then is the opposite true as well: Are positive emotions health induc-
ing? Several areas of study indicate they may be.
One study investigated this question in a group of Catholic nuns who ranged in
age from 75 to 95 years. Researchers gained access to autobiographies the nuns had
written just prior to entering the convent (when most were in their early 20s) and
measured the emotional content of the writings. Each one-page autobiography was
rated for the number of positive, negative, and neutral emotional words used. Clear
differences emerged: Nuns who used the most positive-emotion words lived an average
of 9.4 years longer than those who expressed the fewest positive emotions! Moreover,
expressing a wider variety of positive emotions in their autobiographies increased lifes-
pan by an additional year (Danner et al., 2001).
Cultivating and expressing a sense of humor also buffers the effects of stress.
The ability to find something to laugh about during exposure to a stressor not only
improves mood but also decreases the physiological impact of the stressor (Dillard,
2007). Having a good sense of humor, as a personality characteristic, also appears to
reduce an individual’s cognitive appraisal of a stressor (Lefcourt, 2000; Kulper et al.,
1993). These findings dovetail with work by Harvard psychologist George Vaillant,
whose lifespan study of men noted joy in living as one of the key predictors of health
and long life (Vaillant, 1990).
If you don’t possess a naturally good sense of humor or don’t characteristically
experience a lot of positive emotions, you can still benefit from these tools in your
coping efforts. Making a conscious effort to note positive moments in your life and to
seek out situations in which you find humor and joy can and will improve your life,
says positive psychology proponent Martin Seligman in his book Authentic Happiness
(2002). A poignant expression of this was noted by an AIDS patient, who said this:
Everyone dies sooner or later. I have been appreciating how beautiful the Earth
is, flowers, and the things I like. I used to go around ignoring all those things.
Now I stop to try and smell the roses more often, and just do pleasurable things
(G. M. Reed, cited in Taylor, 1999).
Finding Meaning Viktor Frankl was a well-respected neurologist in Austria when
Nazi forces deported him and his family to a concentration camp. They, along with
thousands of other Jews, were subjected to various forms of deprivation, torture, and
unspeakable atrocities, and many—including Frankl’s wife and parents—died in the
camps. Frankl, however, survived, and after the war ended, he made a significant con-
tribution to the field of psychology with his work on the importance of finding mean-
ing in seemingly inexplicable events such as what he had experienced in the camps.
social comparison A type of cognitive
restructuring involving comparisons between oneself
and others in similar situations.
downward social comparison Comparison
between one’s own stressful situation and others in
a similar situation who are worse off, with the goal
of gaining a more positive perspective on one’s own
situation.
upward social comparison Comparison
between one’s own stressful situation and others in a
similar situation who are coping more effectively, with
the goal of learning from others’ examples.
Feeling and expressing positive emotions
can lengthen your lifespan.

How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies? 633
In his seminal work, Man’s Search for Meaning (Frankl, 1959), he says, “When we are
no longer able to change a situation—just think of an incurable disease such as inoper-
able cancer—we are challenged to change ourselves.”
Frankl’s hypothesis spawned research investigating the benefit of finding meaning
in loss, which has identified two specific types of meaning, sense making and benefit
finding. Following a significant negative life event, people try to make sense of the event
in some way so it fits our perception of the world as predictable, controllable, and non-
random (Tait & Silver, 1989; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). For example, a death might
be explained as inevitable if the person had been battling a long illness or if he or
she had a history of heavy smoking. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, discussions of
long-standing problems with New Orleans’ levees reflected a similar attempt for sense
making. Individuals with strong religious beliefs may make sense of loss by attributing
it to God’s will. A second path to finding meaning lies in recognizing some benefit that
ultimately came from the loss, such as a renewed sense of appreciation for life or other
loved ones, or discovery of a new path in life.
Successful coping appears to involve both sense making and benefit finding,
although at different times. Sense making is the first task people struggle with, but
ultimately working through the loss and regaining momentum in life seems to hinge
on resolving this first question and moving on to the second (Janoff-Bulman & Frantz,
1997). This may explain why people who have lost a child, individuals coping with an
accidental or violent death of a loved one, and others dealing with a loss that defies our
perception of the natural order of life often have a harder time recovering from the loss
(Davis et al., 1998).
Finding meaning in tragedy, then, is not an easy task. Is there anything that can
help? Not surprisingly, perhaps, optimists have an easier time of it than do pessimists,
especially with regard to benefit finding (Park et al., 1996). Strong religious beliefs ap-
pear to facilitate sense making, particularly with the loss of a child, as evidenced in a
study of parents who had lost a child to sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS; McIntosh
et al., 1993). And the benefits of social support—which we will explore shortly—are not
limited to a particular personality type or to the religious but can play an important
role in finding meaning of both types.
Psychological Debriefing: Help or Hindrance? On April 20, 1999, two heav-
ily armed students at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, carried out a
planned massacre, fatally gunning down 12 students and a teacher before turning their
guns on themselves. Those who survived needed help coping, but so did their horrified
loved ones and the larger community. Although the vast majority of trauma survivors
recover from early trauma without professional help, community leaders and men-
tal health professionals may initiate counseling sessions—seeking out individuals or
gathering groups in meeting spaces—in hopes of reducing posttraumatic stress. After
the Columbine massacre, counselors visited all classes regardless of whether individual
students had reported problems. Similarly, after the World Trade Center attacks, a pro-
gram was funded to offer free counseling for New Yorkers—but only a fraction of the
predicted number sought help, leaving $90 million in therapy funds unspent (Gittrich,
2003). Don’t survivors want help—or isn’t such help very effective?
This form of crisis intervention, called psychological debriefing, is a brief, immediate
type of treatment focusing on venting emotions and discussing reactions to the trauma
(McNally et al., 2003). This practice is based on the assumption that it is psychologi-
cally healthier to express negative feelings than to keep them inside. This belief, in turn,
is based on the ancient concept of catharsis, which involves relieving emotional “pres-
sure” by expressing feelings either directly (as by expressing them verbally or hitting
a punching bag) or indirectly (as by watching a violent play or movie). Unfortunately,
the theory of catharsis doesn’t hold up to empirical scrutiny—rather than reducing
arousal and feelings of distress, studies show it often prolongs them.
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) Recently, a specific type of psychological
debriefing known as critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) has emerged and taken
sense making One aspect of finding meaning
in a stressful situation, which involves perceiving the
stressor in a manner consistent with our expecta-
tions of the world as predictable, controllable, and
nonrandom.
benefit finding The second phase of finding
meaning in a stressful situation, which involves seeing
some ultimate benefit from the stressor.
psychological debriefing Brief, immediate
strategy focusing on venting emotions and discussing
reactions to a trauma.
catharsis A theory suggesting that emotional pres-
sure can be relieved by expressing feelings directly or
indirectly.
critical incident stress debriefing
(CISD) A specific type of psychological debriefing
that follows a strict, step-by-step agenda.

634 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
center stage in the field of psychological debriefing. CISD programs typically offer
group sessions to trauma survivors within 72 hours of the traumatic event; these ses-
sions are two to three hours long and often mandated by organizations (such as by
Columbine High School in the aftermath of the shooting and also in many police and
fire departments). CISD programs follow a strict agenda that requires participants to
first describe the facts of the traumatic event, then recount the immediate cognitive
reactions they had to it, followed by their feelings and any symptoms of psychological
distress they have begun to notice as a result. Next, program leaders offer information
about frequently occurring symptoms and provide referrals for follow-up treatment.
This is a commercial program that requires users to pay a fee to the CISD originators
in order to employ these tactics.
Is CISD Effective? Does it really work as advertised? As we have learned, extraordi-
nary claims require extraordinary evidence. Also, remember that we are biased when it
comes to emotionally charged topics—our strong desire to find a “cure” can interfere
with our ability to think critically about the evidence. In cases like this, it is all too easy
to jump on the bandwagon of an exciting new treatment before it has been soundly
tested. And while proponents of CISD argue for its effectiveness, very few studies
have followed sound methodological procedures to accurately measure the outcomes
(Devilly et al., 2006). On the contrary, some trauma experts are cautioning that the
procedures of CISD can actually strengthen the memory of a traumatic experience—the
opposite of helpful intervention. Moreover, the procedures involved in CISD run con-
trary to some long-established findings regarding the ineffectiveness of catharsis, which
casts further doubt on the true efficacy of the program. The initial skepticism of your
authors about this technique has been justified by several systematic evaluations, which
have concluded that there is no value of such debriefing after psychological trauma
work in helping trauma survivors (Beverley, et al., 1995; McNally et al., 2003).
One comprehensive survey of the effects of such techniques on first responders to
the World Trade Center terrorist disaster concludes:
Psychological debriefing—the most widely used method—has undergone
increasing empirical scrutiny, and the results have been disappointing. Although
the majority of debriefed survivors describe the experience as helpful, there is
no convincing evidence that debriefing reduces the incidence of PTSD, and some
controlled studies suggest that it may impede natural recovery from trauma
(McNally et al., 2003, p. 45).
Cognitive and behavioral therapies that focus on cognitive reappraisal and use well-
established procedures to reduce emotional arousal associated with the event may be
more effective than CISD, especially when therapy is delivered not immediately but
many weeks after the traumatic event (McNally et al., 2003).
These, then, are the coping strategies found to be effective in keeping stress from
taking a toll on our health—problem-focused and emotion-focused coping, cognitive
restructuring, upward and downward social comparisons, positive emotions, and find-
ing meaning. Each of these factors offers an additional clue to help us understand
individual differences in how stress affects us. As you consider your own use of these
tools, please remember two things. First, people facing chronic stressors often rely on
a combination of strategies. Second, there are also a number of lifestyle choices we can
add to our “coping strategies toolbox” and gain the added benefit of moderating stress
as well. We turn our attention next to a review of those factors.
Positive Lifestyle Choices: A “Two-for-One” Benefit to Your Health
If you are like most people, you like a bargain! We want the most for our money, the
most for our time, and the most for our efforts. The positive lifestyle choices we will
discuss in this section are bargains for your health, in that each investment you make
in this category gives you not one but two benefits: They act both as moderators and as
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 13
Cognitive–behavioral therapies
treat maladaptive behavior by
helping to change both unwanted
cognitions and unwanted
behaviors (p. 571).

How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies? 635
coping strategies (see Figure 14.7). The more of these you integrate into your life, the
better health you will enjoy. Let’s start with a little help from our friends.
Social Support One of the best antidotes for stress is social support: the psychologi-
cal and physical resources others provide to help an individual cope with adversity.
Research shows that people who encounter major life stresses, such as the loss of a
spouse or job, experience fewer physical and psychological ailments if they have an
effective network of friends or family for social support (Billings & Moos, 1985).
They are less likely to contract colds and have less risk of depression or anxiety. Simi-
larly, social support has demonstrable health benefits for those with physical disease
(Davison et al., 2000; Kelley et al., 1997): Individuals diagnosed with conditions
including heart disease, cancer, arthritis, and diabetes all recover more quickly with
a good social support network (Taylor, 2006). By contrast, people with few close
relationships die younger, on average, than people with good social support networks
(Berkman & Syme, 1979; Pilisuk & Parks, 1986)—even when other factors known to
affect lifespan, such as health and socioeconomic status, are controlled for. Remarkably,
the lack of a reliable support network increases the risk of dying from disease, suicide,
or accidents by about the same percentage as does smoking (House et al., 1988).
Benefits of Social Support What is it about social support that gives it such power
to enhance our health? Research has revealed three specific benefits. Emotional sup-
port may be what immediately comes to mind when you think of social support, and
this indeed is one of its benefits. Having trusted friends and loved ones we can count
on during difficult times lends immeasurable relief. Tangible assistance comes in the
form of specific, task-oriented help, such as rides to the doctor’s office or hospital, help
with housecleaning, or cooking meals. Finally, informational support aims to help an
individual better understand the nature of the stressor as well as available resources to
cope with it. In the aftermath of a serious auto accident, for example, someone with
spinal cord injuries might benefit from information regarding a typical timeline and
strategies for recovery but not be mobile enough to get to a computer to research it. A
friend can help. And even though social support networks often consist of family and
close friends, support groups or other community resources can provide these benefits
as well.
Physiologically, social support reduces the intensity and the duration of the arousal
associated with the fight-or-flight response. This finding has emerged from experimen-
tal studies that first expose participants to a stressor, then measure such responses as
their heart rate, blood pressure, and levels of stress hormones either in the presence
of social support or alone (Christenfeld et al., 1997). Social support in the form of a
friend or loved one provides optimal benefits, but arousal is also reduced when the
support comes from a stranger, a video (Thorsteinsson et al., 1998), or even a pet—
although dogs somewhat outperform cats in this regard (Allen et al., 2002). And when
social support is not present, simply thinking about loved ones even provides some
benefit (Broadwell & Light, 1999).
Physical affection, such as hugs, hand holding, and touch, helps combat stress as
well. Several studies note lower arousal in women exposed to a stressor when their
partners held their hand or gave them a hug—and, recently, this effect was found in
men as well (Coan et al., 2006; Light et al., 2005). For both sexes, as in animals, physi-
cal contact with a trusted partner raises oxytocin levels, which decreases anxiety and
stress. These findings fit nicely with the tend-and-befriend model we introduced earlier
in this chapter.
Supporters Reap What They Sow What impact does social support have on the sup-
porter? People in need of social support sometimes worry they might raise their loved
ones’ stress levels by asking for help. And while this does sometimes occur—caregivers
of Alzheimer’s patients, for example, show greater risk of depression and disease—
overall, support givers benefit from helping. In fact, one study of married couples mea-
sured amounts of support giving and receiving over a 5-year period and found that
social support Resources others provide to help
an individual cope with stress.
These women are doing two things to
improve their health: spending time with
friends and laughing.

636 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
those who provided more support lived longer (Brown et al., 2003). It is important to
note, however, that supporters need support as well.
Exercise For better or worse, our bodies are still better adapted to the strenuous,
Stone Age demands of hunting and gathering than to sedentary life in a digital, urban
world. Spending our days in relative inactivity at a desk or computer terminal is not a
formula for physical or mental health. Unfortunately, while many of us may know this,
few are taking it seriously—two-thirds of Americans aren’t getting enough exercise,
according to the Center for the Advancement of Health (2004).
Just 30 minutes of aerobic exercise per day lowers risk of heart disease, stroke, and
breast cancer, among others (Taylor, 2006). It can increase muscle tone and eliminate
fat—changes that produce a variety of health benefits. Most importantly, perhaps,
it can prolong your life. A long-term study of 17,000 middle-aged men showed that
those who were on an exercise regimen (the equivalent of walking 5 hours a week) had
mortality rates that were almost one-third lower than their couch-potato counterparts
(Paffenbarger et al., 1986). Even smokers who exercised reduced their death rate by
about 30 percent.
Regular exercise has not only physical but psychological benefits, including stress
reduction (McDonald, 1998) and mental health. For example, a regular aerobic
exercise program improved the emotional health of female college students who were
mildly depressed (McCann & Holmes, 1984). Another study found that a 20-week
physical fitness course could produce measurably lower levels of anxiety in sedentary
women (Popejoy, 1967). Exercise programs have also been shown to have a positive
effect on self-concept (Folkins & Sime, 1981). And a study of people with depression
found that compared to a group receiving antidepressant medication, those assigned to
an exercise-only regimen had a similar decline in symptoms. Even better, the exercisers
maintained their improvement longer and were less likely to become diagnosed again
with depression than were nonexercisers (Babyak et al., 2000).
An exercise-for-health program has several big pluses. Exercise usually requires a
change of environment, removing people from their daily hassles and other sources of
stress. It also has a physical training effect by putting short-term physical stress on the
body, which causes the body to rebound and become physically stronger. Third, when
we exercise, we get a boost of endorphins and other pleasure chemicals such as sero-
tonin, which improves our mood and makes us better able to respond effectively to
potentially stressful situations. In this way, it moderates stress. The benefit of exercise
as a coping strategy lies in its use as a healthy outlet for anger, as well as a facilitator
of the cognitive functioning required for good problem solving. These benefits apply to
all ages, from preschoolers to the elderly (Alpert et al., 1990).
Despite these advantages, most resolutions to increase exercise are short lived; people
often find it difficult to maintain their motivation. Nevertheless, studies show that
people can learn to make exercise a regular part of their lives (Myers & Roth, 1997).
The keys are (a) finding an activity you like to do and (b) fitting exercise sessions
into your schedule several times a week. Having an exercise partner often provides the
extra social support people need to stick with their program.
Nutrition and Diet Good health and the ability to cope effectively with stress require
a brain that has the nutrients it needs to function well. Fortunately, a balanced diet can
provide all the nutrients necessary to accurately appraise potential stressors from a
cognitive perspective. When we fuel ourselves with complex carbohydrates instead of
simple sugars, for example, we metabolize the nutrients at a more stable pace, which
may help keep us from overreacting. Many people, however, grab a fast-food meal or
a candy bar instead of taking time for good nutrition. For example, a survey of stu-
dents in 21 European countries revealed that only about half attempt to follow healthy
eating practices. The same study found that women were more likely than men to be
conscious of good nutrition (Wardle et al., 1997).
When chronic nutritional deficiencies occur in childhood—when the brain is grow-
ing fastest—development can be retarded (Stock & Smythe, 1963; Wurtman, 1982).
Exercise is a good way to reduce stress
and improve your general health.
about Transformative ExerciseRead
at MyPsychLab

How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies? 637
Poor nutrition can have adverse affects on adults too. A diet high in saturated fat
increases risk of heart disease and some types of cancer. Excessive salt intake increases
risk of high blood pressure. Potassium deficiency can cause listlessness and exhaustion.
One should be cautious, however, about going to the other extreme by ingesting large
quantities of vitamins and minerals. Overdoses of certain vitamins (especially vitamin A)
and minerals (such as iron) are easy to achieve and can cause problems that are even
more severe than deficiencies.
What can you do to nurture your health through nutrition? The categories in
Table 14.2 are good places to start. We suggest, also, you beware of nutritional fads,
including dietary supplements that come with miraculous promises that seem almost
too good to be true. Nutrition is a science in its infancy, and much remains to be
discovered about its connections to physical and mental health.
Sleep and Meditation In Chapter 8, you learned about the benefits of good sleep.
Sleep affects our health and stress in a variety of ways. First, given the link between
REM sleep and cognitive functioning, we are reminded that to deal effectively with
the cognitive demands of potential stressors, we must get enough sleep to enjoy the
long REM periods that come only after about six hours of sleep. In addition to the
increased risk of accidents we discussed in Chapter 8, chronic sleep deprivation
has been linked to diabetes and heart disease, as well as decreased immune system
functioning.
Meditation, which for many years was viewed with skepticism by Westerners, has
earned increased consideration due to provocative new findings from a spate of studies.
The ancient Buddhist practice of “mindful meditation” originated 2,500 years ago and,
translated, means “to see with discernment” (Shapiro et al., 2005). Mindfulness-based
stress reduction (MBSR), a modern variation on the Buddhist tradition, aims to
increase awareness of one’s reactions to stress, become at ease with them, and
develop healthier responses. These goals are achieved in part through meditation that
teaches the participant first to focus on body sensations and cognitions involved in
stress reactions and then to let them go by fully accepting (rather than judging or
resisting) them. Research on MBSR indicates that participation in an eight-week train-
ing program reduces stress; decreases risk of anxiety, depression, and burnout; and
increases immune system functioning (Carlson et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 2005). This
fascinating work is just one example of how, in the 21st century, the pursuit of health
is relying increasingly on East–West collaborations.
Putting It All Together: Developing Happiness
and Subjective Well-Being
Making changes to live a healthier life can lead to a feeling-good state that researchers
call subjective well-being (SWB), a psychologically more precise term for what you might
call “happiness.” Do you usually have that feeling?
TABLE 14.2 Ten Steps to Personal Wellness
1. Exercise regularly.
2. Eat nutritious, balanced meals (high in vegetables, fruits, and grains, low in fat and cholesterol).
3. Maintain a sensible weight.
4. Sleep 7 to 8 hours nightly; rest/relax daily.
5. Wear seat belts and bike helmets.
6. Do not smoke or use drugs.
7. Use alcohol in moderation, if at all.
8. Engage only in protected, safe sex.
9. Get regular medical/dental check-ups; adhere to medical regimens.
10. Develop an optimistic perspective and supportive friendships.
subjective well-being (SWB) An individual’s
evaluative response to life, commonly called happiness,
which includes cognitive and emotional reactions.

638 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
We cannot observe happiness directly. Instead, in SWB studies, researchers rely on
respondents’ own ratings of their experiences, answers to questions about what they
find satisfying, and assessments of their well-being, mood, or success (Diener, 1984,
2000). To avoid confusion about what words like well-being mean, researchers also
use nonverbal scales like the one in the smiley-faces in Figure 14.9 (Andrews & Withey,
1976).
Happiness, or SWB, is an increasingly popular subject of study with psychologists,
evident in the emerging field of positive psychology. Accumulating research (Myers,
2000; Myers & Diener, 1995) shows that, despite many individual differences, SWB is
defined by three central components:
1. Satisfaction with present life. People who are high in SWB like their work and are
satisfied with their current personal relationships. They are sociable and outgo-
ing, and they open up to others (Pavot et al., 1990). High-SWB people enjoy good
health and high self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 2003; Janoff-Bulman, 1989, 1992).
2. Relative presence of positive emotions. High SWBs more frequently feel pleasant
emotions, mainly because they evaluate the world around them in a generally posi-
tive way. They are typically optimistic and expect success (Seligman, 1991). They
have an internal locus of control and are able to enjoy the “flow” of engaging
work (Crohan et al., 1989; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
3. Relative absence of negative emotions. Individuals with a strong sense of subjective
well-being experience fewer and less-severe episodes of negative emotions such as
anxiety, depression, and anger. Very happy people are not emotionally extreme.
They are positive (but not ecstatic) most of the time, and they do report occasional
negative moods (Diener & Seligman, 2002).
What underlies a healthy response on these dimensions? Twin studies show that feel-
ings of well-being are influenced by genetics (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996), but biology
is not destiny: Environmental effects are revealed in studies showing that people feel
unhappy if they lack social support, are pressured to pursue goals set by others, and
infrequently receive positive feedback on their achievements. Accordingly, experts in
this field suggest that feelings of well-being require the satisfaction of (a) a need to feel
competent, (b) a need for social connection or relatedness, and (c) a need for autonomy
or a sense of self-control (Baumeister et al., 2003; Ryan & Deci, 2000).
So who are the happy people? What characteristics and experiences are linked with
feelings of subjective well-being and happiness? Before reading further, take a moment
to consider whether you think some groups of people are happier than others. If so,
which ones? A review of the SWB evidence by Myers and Diener (1995) shows that:
• Younger (or older, or middle-aged) people are not happier than other age groups. SWB
cannot be predicted from someone’s age. Although the causes of their happiness
may change with age (Inglehart, 1990), an individual’s SWB tends to remain
relatively stable over a lifetime.
FIGURE 14.9
The Faces Scale
“Which face comes closest to expressing how you feel about your life as a whole?” Researchers
often use this simple scale to obtain people’s ratings of their level of well-being. As the percentages
indicate, most people select one of the happy faces.
Source: Andrews, F. M., & Withey, S. B. (1976). The faces scale. Social indicators of well-being: Americans’ perception of life
quality (pp. 207, 306). New York: Plenum Publishers. Copyright © 1976 by Plenum Publishers. Reprinted by permission of
Springer Science and Business Media.
20% 46% 27% 4% 2% 1% 0%

How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies? 639
• Happiness has no “gender gap.” While women are more likely than men to experi-
ence anxiety and depression, and men are more at risk for alcoholism and certain
personality disorders, approximately equal numbers of men and women report
being fairly satisfied with life (Fujita et al., 1991; Inglehart, 1990).
• There are minimal racial differences in happiness. African Americans and European
Americans report nearly the same levels of happiness, with African Americans
being slightly less vulnerable to depression (Diener et al., 1993). Despite racism
and discrimination, members of disadvantaged minority groups generally seem
to think optimistically—by making realistic self-comparisons and by attributing
problems more to unfair circumstances than to themselves (Crocker & Major,
1989).
• Money does not buy happiness. It is true that people in wealthier societies report
greater well-being. However, except for extremely poor nations like Bangladesh,
once the necessities of food, shelter, and safety are provided, happiness is only
weakly correlated with income. Poverty may be miserable, but wealth itself cannot
guarantee happiness (Diener & Diener, 1996; Diener et al., 1993). The happiest
people are not those who get what they want but rather those who want what
they have (Myers & Diener, 1995).
• Those who have a spiritual dimension in their lives most often report being happy (Myers &
Diener, 1995). This may result from many factors, including a healthier lifestyle,
social support, and optimistic thinking. Whatever the reasons, spiritually involved
people enjoy, on average, better mental and physical health (Seybold & Hill,
2001).
These findings tell us that life circumstances—one’s age, sex, race, nationality, or
income—do not predict happiness. The key factors in subjective well-being appear to
be psychological traits and processes, many of which you have learned about in this
chapter or elsewhere in this book. It is impressive to see how well people can adapt
to major changes in their lives and still feel happy. For example, while the moods of
victims of spinal cord injuries were extremely negative shortly after their accidents,
several weeks later, they reported feeling even happier than they had been before
sustaining their injuries (Silver, 1983).
It is possible to work at creating sustained happiness in your life, according to
psychologist Sonja Lyubomirsky (2007), in the summary of her many years of
scientific study of this elusive concept, How of Happiness. To do so involves a kind of
social-emotional fitness training that encourages focusing on positive emotions, creat-
ing vibrant social support networks around yourself, goal setting, making and keeping
commitments, working to stay healthy with an active life style, and being sociocentric,
making others feel special. There is now a Happiness “app” you can buy for your
mobile phone that gives daily exercises and activities that are fun and healthful.
Overall, studies of happiness and well-being show that people are exceedingly resil-
ient. Those who undergo severe stress usually manage to adapt. Typically, they return
to a mood and level of well-being similar to—or even better than—that prior to the
traumatic event (Headey & Wearing, 1992). Using effective coping strategies and mak-
ing smart lifestyle choices both increase the likelihood of positive outcomes. These,
then, are the final components in our search to understand individual differences in the
impact of stress on our health.
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS
Behavioral Medicine and Health Psychology
Amazingly, 93 percent of patients don’t follow the treatment plans prescribed by their doc-
tors (Taylor, 1990). Obviously, this can have terrible consequences. Accordingly, the need
to understand why people fail to take their medicine, get little exercise, eat too much fat,
and cope poorly with stress has stimulated the development of two new fields: behavioral

640 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
medicine and health psychology. Behavioral medicine is the medical field that links lifestyle
and disease. Health psychology is the comparable psychological specialty. Practitioners in
both fields are devoted to understanding the psychosocial factors influencing health and
illness (Taylor, 1990, 2006). Among their many concerns are health promotion and mainte-
nance; prevention and treatment of illness; causes and correlates of health, illness, and dys-
function; and improvement of the health care system and health policy (Matarazzo, 1980).
Both behavioral medicine and health psychology are actively involved in the
prevention and treatment of trauma and disease that result from stressful or dangerous
environments and from poor choices with regard to nutrition, exercise, and drug use.
Both are emerging disciplines in countries all over the world (Holtzman, 1992). The
two fields overlap, and the differences between them are ones of emphasis. Psycholo-
gists have brought increased awareness of emotions and cognitive factors into behav-
ioral medicine, making it an interdisciplinary field rather than an exclusively medical
specialty (Miller, 1983; Rodin & Salovey, 1989). Both fields also recognize the interac-
tion of mind and body and place emphasis on preventing illness as well as on changing
unhealthy lifestyles after illness strikes (Taylor, 1990, 2006).
But—as the saying goes—old habits die hard. To help patients change long-held
habits that are harmful to their health, social psychologists have identified the specific
persuasive strategies that are most effective (Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). For example,
research shows that people are more likely to comply with requests when they feel they
have freedom of choice. Therefore, instead of demanding that a patient strictly adhere
to one course of treatment, a physician could offer the patient several options and ask
him or her to choose one. Studies also suggest that patients are most likely to adhere
to physicians’ requests when they get active social support from friends and family
(Gottlieb, 1987; Patterson, 1985). And one landmark study of heart disease prevention
(see Figure 14.10) found that specific skills training, such as workshops designed to
help participants implement positive changes to their health habits, was the key that
resulted in greatest change (Maccoby et al., 1977).
behavioral medicine Medical field specializing
in the link between lifestyle and disease.
health psychology Field of psychology that
studies psychosocial factors that contribute to pro-
moting health and well being, and also those that
influence illness, with the goal of educating the public
about developing healthier life styles.
FIGURE 14.10
Response to Campaign for Healthy Change
Town A, whose residents received no mass media campaign for heart-healthy behavior, showed the least knowledge gain over two years. Town B
residents, exposed to a media campaign, showed significant improvement. Knowledge gain was greatest for residents of Town C, whose residents
participated in intense workshops and instruction sessions for several months prior to the media blitz. As knowledge increased, risk behaviors (bad
health habits) and signs (indicators) decreased.
Town A
(control)
Town C
(media and workshops)
Tow
n B
(m
ed
ia
on
ly)
Years
Media campaign in progress
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e
o
f
ch
an
g
e
in
h
ig
h
-r
is
k
b
eh
av
io
rs
a
n
d
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
10
0
–10
–20
–30
–40
0 1 2 3
Years
Media campaign in progress
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e
o
f
ch
an
g
e
in
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 1 2 3
Tow
n A
Town C
(media
and w
orksho
ps)
(media
only)
(con
trol)
Town
B
Good
Good
Knowledge Risk behaviors

How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies? 641
Overall, the field of psychology has contributed numerous findings and strategies—
based on solid scientific evidence—that can be applied to our efforts to improve our
health, both physically and mentally. For example, behavioral principles discussed in
Chapter 4 can be combined with what we know about good thinking strategies (from
Chapter 6) and, indeed, often are combined in cognitive–behavioral therapy. Principles
of emotion and motivation—the topics of Chapter 9—provide additional insight into
factors affecting our emotional health and the behaviors that support our basic needs
for food, social support, and other basic needs. You can apply many of these same
principles on your own as you work toward maximizing your health and wellness—
and we wish you well on your journey!
Answers 1. Problem-focused coping 2. a 3. You can compare your situation to those who are worse off, which should make you see your situation in a
different perspective. You can also observe people in similar situation who are coping better than you are and can learn from their examples. 4. You
can seek social support, exercise regularly, eat a healthy diet, get adequate sleep, and meditate. 5. d
Check Your Understanding
1. ANALYSIS: Mai was recently in a car accident. In coping with
the situation, she has focused on getting estimates for her car
repair, seeking medical treatment, and working with her insurance
agent to obtain compensation for the expenses of the car repair
and her medical needs. What type of coping strategy is Mai
employing?
2. RECALL: In coping with a loss, efforts to make sense of what
happened or to find some ultimate benefit from the loss are
examples of , which is an coping strategy.
a. finding meaning; effective
b. finding meaning; ineffective
c. emotion-focused coping; effective
d. emotion-focused coping; ineffective
3. APPLICATION: Think of a recent stressor in your own life. Now
identify at least two ways that you can use cognitive restructuring to
reduce the impact of the stressor on your health.
4. RECALL: Name at least four lifestyle choices you can make that
will reduce the impact of stress on your health.
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CORE CONCEPT: reduce
the effects of stress on our health, while decrease our
vulnerability to both stress and to stress-related illness.
a. Stress moderators; coping strategies
b. Positive lifestyle choices; stress moderators
c. Positive lifestyle choices; coping strategies
d. Coping strategies; positive lifestyle choices
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
Is Change Really Hazardous to Your Health?
The more we hear about the links between stress and illness, the more we might wonder if our own stress levels put us
at risk. In this chapter, we have discussed a variety of factors
that impact the stress–illness relationship. At least one issue,
however, remains in question: To what extent do major life
changes impact our vulnerability to illness?
Recall the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS) intro-
duced in the first section of this chapter. Like many students, you
probably calculated your own score in the Do It Yourself! box
on page 610. But how should you interpret your score? If you
scored high, does that mean you are at greater risk for illness?
What Are the Critical Issues?
Recall, first, that the SRRS lists 43 life events that purport to
be stressful. Given what we’ve learned about the importance
of cognitive appraisal in determining how stressful a situation
is to an individual, we should probably take a close look at
the list of events to see if each one really would qualify as a
stressor in our own lives.
Does the reasoning avoid common fallacies? The SRRS
can allegedly predict your risk of illness based on the events of
the past year of your life. In other words, it presents a cause–
effect hypothesis that the number of LCUs you have experi-
enced in the last year will cause a particular risk of illness.
Are the research findings in support of the LCU–illness rela-
tionship really causal, or are they merely correlational?
Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence.
Second, if the claim that a quick and simple self-administered test
can determine your risk for illness strikes you as extraordinary,
Study and Review at MyPsychLab

642 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
gives some of us a better chance of being optimistic,
hardy, or resilient—just as others of us are more at risk
for hostility and other negative emotions.
• The behavioral perspective influences stress and illness
in the health habits we learn as children growing up, in
situations of learned helplessness, and in the coping strat-
egies we see modeled by our parents and others in our
immediate social environment. Likewise, the sociocultural
context—the culture in which we live—creates social
norms that influence these learned habits and strategies.
Currently, for example, in Western culture, we receive
mixed messages about health. On one hand, we hear a lot
about the importance of a healthy diet and regular exer-
cise. On the other hand, however, the fast-paced nature
of our culture—combined with a barrage of ads for fast
food—encourages us to grab a burger and fries, then sit
on the couch and watch television instead of working out
and preparing a healthy meal.
• The cognitive perspective helps us understand why, in a
particular culture, individual health habits and perspec-
tives vary. Someone with an internal locus of control,
for example, would be more likely than an external to
pay attention to diet and exercise in pursuit of a healthy
life. Likewise, an optimistic thinker or someone high in
hardiness would be more likely to perceive certain life
events as possibilities than as threats. In general, people’s
chances of incurring an illness may be more related to
their interpretations and responses to life changes than to
the changes themselves (Lazarus et al., 1985).
• The developmental perspective illuminates certain
aspects of stress and health as well. College students, for
example—who are primarily in early adulthood—are at
change points in their lives and tend to get high scores; it is
not clear, however, if they are more at risk for illness. Youth
may offer some protection. Similarly, as our bodies age and
our cells become less effective at regeneration, we develop
greater susceptibility to illness in late adulthood. It is possi-
ble, though, that older adults who have mastered the chal-
lenges of generativity and integrity may offset their physical
vulnerability with a better system of stress moderators and
coping strategies. Much research remains to be done at the
intersection of developmental and health psychology.
• The whole-person perspective explains many of the
personal qualities that have an impact on an individu-
al’s vulnerability to stress. Locus of control, optimism,
hardiness, resilience, and Type A behavior all origi-
nated in the study of personality psychology, and we
have seen how these factors moderate an individual’s
response to stressors. Likewise, traits such as openness
to experience and conscientiousness probably affect
the degree to which individuals are willing to try new
coping strategies or lifestyle habits, as well as their
likelihood of sticking to the changes once they’ve made
them.
Clearly, then, there is much more to the relationship be-
tween stress and illness than the particular life events you
you might be right. As we have learned, answers to questions
psychological are rarely simple—humans are complex, and so
are the explanations for our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
At the very least, we might wonder if the SRRS oversimplifies
the relationship between life events and illness.
Does the Issue Require Multiple Perspectives? Finally,
we must acknowledge the many other factors involved in the
link between stress and illness—such as those we have stud-
ied in this chapter—and ask what other perspectives might
help explain the relationship between stress and illness.
What Conclusions Can We Draw?
In the first 15 years after it was published, the SRRS was used
in more than 1,000 studies worldwide (Holmes, 1979), and re-
search consistently found correlations between scores on the
SRRS and both physical and behavioral symptoms. People
with higher scores on the scale were more at risk for heart at-
tacks, bone fractures, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, tuberculosis,
complications of pregnancy and birth, decline in academic per-
formance, employee absenteeism, and many other difficulties
(Holmes & Masuda, 1974). High SRRS scores among federal
prisoners were even associated with the length of their prison
sentences. And the test was effective across cultural boundar-
ies too: Both male and female respondents were found to rate
events with similar scores (Holmes & Masuda, 1974), and rat-
ings were also validated with Japanese, Latin American, Euro-
pean, and Malaysian samples.
However, the number of LCUs accumulated during the
previous year is only a modest predictor of changes in a
person’s health (Johnson & Sarason, 1979; Rahe & Arthur,
1978). Many other factors—such as cognitive appraisal,
stress moderators, and coping strategies—can intervene in the
stress–illness relationship.
Moreover, the implication that stressful events cause illness
is misleading (Dohrenwend & Shrout, 1985; Rabkin & Struen-
ing, 1976). The correlational data merely show a relationship
between certain life changes and health; the research does not
show that life changes are the cause of illness. The reverse could
also be true: Illness can sometimes be the cause of life changes—
someone who frequently gets colds or the flu is more likely to
have problems at school, at work, and in relationships, for
example. And remember the possibility of a third variable driv-
ing the relationship: Several other factors we’ve studied, such as
economic status or Type-A hostility, could also be affecting both
the frequency of life changes and the risk of illness.
The importance of multiple perspectives is critical to a
thorough and accurate understanding of the stress–illness
relationship. Let’s review what we know about stress and
health from the major perspectives we used to learn about
psychology in this text:
• The biological perspective clearly plays a role in an
individual’s vulnerability to stress-related illness. We
have seen that our hereditary makeup predisposes us to
certain illnesses, such as heart disease, diabetes, obesity,
and many forms of cancer. In addition, genetics probably

14.1 What Causes Distress?
Core Concept 14.1 Traumatic events, chronic lifestyle
conditions, major life changes, and even minor hassles can
all cause a stress response.
Stressors are external events that cause internal stress responses,
both psychological and emotional ones, termed distress, and
biological and physiological reactions. And while cognitive
appraisal influences our individual responses to stressors, there
are several major categories of events that typically cause stress.
Traumatic stressors include natural disasters, acts of terror-
ism, or sudden personal loss such as the death of a loved one
or an unforeseen breakup. All of these situations occur with
little or no warning and almost always cause extreme stress
in the immediate aftermath of the event. Research indicates
that about 20 percent of survivors of natural disaster remain
distressed after one year, while as many as 75 percent of those
exposed to a terrorist attack report continued worry at the
one-year mark. Repeated media coverage of the event often
exacerbates and prolongs the effects and can also cause stress
in people who were not directly exposed to the event in a phe-
nomenon known as vicarious traumatization. Grief is a normal,
healthy process in response to a personal loss, and the humili-
ation associated with rejection, such as that caused by targeted
rejection, can put an individual at increased risk for depression.
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can occur in individu-
als who have been exposed to severe circumstances such as
PROBLEM: Were the reactions and experiences of the 9/11 fire-
fighters and others at the World Trade Center attacks typical of peo-
ple in other stressful situations? And what factors explain individual
differences in our physical and psychological responses to stress?
• Surviving firefighters had a variety of responses to their involvement
in the WTC disaster, including physical, behavioral, cognitive,
and emotional stress responses. Aside from physical injuries and
memories peculiar to this particular event, their responses were
typical of others who have experienced stressful situations.
• Despite a cluster of similar symptoms that occur regardless of
the stressor, research is revealing some response differences
that depend on whether the stressor involves personal loss,
humiliation or rejection, experience of a catastrophe, and
possibly other factors.
• Regardless of the cause, however, stress must be understood
from multiple psychological perspectives, including the
biological, behavioral, developmental, social-cultural, cognitive,
and whole-person perspectives.
• There are also individual differences in our responses to stress.
These depend on the intensity and duration of the stressor,
culture background, coping strategies, social support, stress
moderators, as well as other stressors present in our lives.
Shelly Taylor has also suggested that women and men have
different response styles in the face of stress.
Should you, then, pay attention to your SRRS score? We
offer it as one source of information about your own pos-
sible vulnerability—and we trust that you will interpret your
score with caution. Overall, we hope you will keep in mind
the many tools you have accumulated that, together, can help
you respond more effectively to potential stressors—and ulti-
mately live a longer and healthier life.
experience. A high score does not mean that illness is certain,
nor does a low score guarantee health. People differ in their
abilities to deal with change because of genetic differences,
general physical condition, personality and outlook, lifestyles,
and coping skills. The SRRS takes none of these factors into
account, but it remains the most widely used measure of
stress-related risk for illness.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter Summary 643
combat, rape, or other violent attack. Symptoms of PTSD can
be cognitive, behavioral, and emotional, as evidenced (for
example) by difficulty concentrating, an exaggerated “startle
response,” and survivor’s guilt. About 8 percent of Ameri-
cans will experience PTSD at some time in their lives, with
symptoms lasting more than ten years in more than one-third
of the cases. Combat personnel may be especially at risk for
PTSD, and military psychologists are working increasingly to
develop and provide more effective education and treatment
for combat veterans and their families.
Chronic stressors have a more gradual onset and are lon-
ger lasting than traumatic events. Societal stressors such as
poverty and unemployment, as well as difficulties at home,
school, or work, are one type of chronic stressor. Another
is burnout, which is a syndrome of emotional exhaustion,
physical fatigue, and cognitive weariness that results from
demanding and unceasing pressures at work, at home, or
in relationships. Compassion fatigue is found in medical and
psychological professionals as well as caregivers and other
individuals who spend a great deal of time caring for others.
Research in this area offers at least five steps caregivers and
service providers can take to reduce their risk of compassion
fatigue.
Major life changes—whether positive or negative—can be
a source of stress as well, in that they involve changes in our
daily routines and adaptation to new situations and environ-
ments. Finally, minor hassles such as computer crashes or an
incessantly barking dog can accumulate and cause stress that
adds up over time.
Listen at MyPsychLabto an audio file of your chapter

acute stress (p. 614)
alarm phase (p. 615)
cortisol (p. 617)
cytokine (p. 618)
exhaustion phase (p. 616)
fight-or-flight response (p. 613)
general adaptation syndrome
(GAS) (p. 615)
immunosuppression (p. 617)
job engagement (p. 607)
oxytocin (p. 617)
psychoneuroimmunology (p. 618)
resistance phase (p. 616)
telomeres (p. 618)
tend-and-befriend (p. 617)
or survival of offspring is involved. These models complement
each other rather than competing with each other in helping
us understand the complex human stress response.
The field of psycho-neuroimmunology tries to understand
how stress causes illness by studying brain–body relation-
ships. Research in this area has revealed that the central
nervous system and the immune system remain in constant
communication with each other in response to stress. Cyto-
kines are proteins that fight infection but, under prolonged
stress, produce feelings of listlessness and depression. One
way in which stress affects physical health is by acceler-
ating the rate at which cells age, which can be measured
by examining the length of telomeres. Shorter telomeres
are associated with several diseases as well as with early
death. On the positive side, cognitive appraisals affect cell
aging and thus play an important role in the stress–illness
relationship.
14.3 Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress?
Core Concept 14.3 Personality characteristics affect
our individual responses to stressful situations and,
consequently, the degree to which we are distressed when
exposed to stressors.
Stress moderators reduce the impact of stressors on our
perceived level of stress. Most of them function as variations
of cognitive appraisal (although often on a nonconscious
level). Hostile individuals are more likely to perceive stress in
the face of a stressful situation and consequently have twice
the risk of heart disease. Fortunately, stress-management
programs have proven effective at reducing these individu-
als’ response to stress and their resulting health vulnerability.
Locus of control is a second personality characteristic that
has an impact on the stressor–stress relationship. People with
an internal locus of control have greater resistance to stress
burnout (p. 607)
catastrophic event (p. 601)
chronic stressor (p. 606)
cognitive appraisal (p. 600)
compassion fatigue (p. 608)
compassion satisfaction (p. 608)
disenfranchised grief (p. 605)
distress (p. 599)
grief (p. 603)
hassle (p. 609)
integration (p. 604)
narrative (p. 602)
posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) (p. 605)
Social Readjustment Rating
Scale (SRRS) (p. 609)
societal stressor (p. 606)
stress (p. 599)
stressor (p. 599)
targeted rejection (p. 604)
terrorism (p. 601)
traumatic stressor (p. 601)
vicarious traumatization (p. 603)
14.2 How Does Stress Affect Us Physically?
Core Concept 14.2 The physical stress response begins
with arousal, which stimulates a series of physiological
responses that in the short term are adaptive but that can
turn harmful if prolonged.
When faced with acute stressors, our bodies are equipped with
amazing abilities to meet the challenges effectively. The fight-
or-flight response is produced by the autonomic nervous system
and includes such immediate changes as accelerated heart rate,
increased respiration and blood pressure, perspiration, and
pupil dilation. A more comprehensive explanation of our re-
sponse to stress is offered by Hans Selye’s GAS. A three-phase
system, the GAS begins with the alarm phase, then progresses
into the resistance phase and finally the exhaustion phase if
the stressor is chronic in nature. Under such circumstances,
the resources that so effectively helped us combat an acute
stressor become depleted, resulting in a host of physical and
emotional symptoms. Consequently, we become more vulner-
able to illness. While the fight-or-flight response has been well
documented in both animals and humans, psychologist Shel-
ley Taylor notes an alternative pattern of response to stress.
Her tend-and-befriend theory suggests that social support seek-
ing can be a more effective response to stress when protection
than do externals, probably as a result of their perceived ca-
pability to take some action to ameliorate it. Locus of control
has been found to affect not only stress but also health and
longevity. While locus of control may have some genetic un-
derpinnings, our experiences also influence it, as evidenced by
research on learned helplessness. From a cultural perspective,
secondary control involves controlling one’s reactions to events
rather than controlling the events themselves and is more
prevalent in Eastern cultures. Research has found both types
of control to be effective in the cultures in which they operate.
Hardiness is an outlook based on three Cs—a perception of
internal control, of change as a challenge rather than a threat,
and of commitment to life activities rather than alienation or
withdrawal. Individuals with a hardy attitude exhibit greater
resistance to stress. Similarly, optimistic people feel less stressed
in the face of stressful situations, as they are more likely to fo-
cus on the positives rather than the negatives of the situation.
Optimism is also characterized by specific, situational, and tem-
porary attributions about negative situations. Both hardiness
644 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being

and optimism, like locus of control, appear to have some bio-
logical underpinnings but can be improved with well-designed
training programs. Resilience is the ability to rebound and
adapt to challenging circumstances and is related to optimism
and hardiness, as well as social skills, cognitive abilities, and
resources such as caring parents or support providers.
externals (p. 623)
hardiness (p. 624)
internals (p. 623)
learned helplessness (p. 624)
locus of control (p. 623)
moderator (p. 621)
optimism (p. 625)
primary control (p. 624)
resilience (p. 626)
secondary control (p. 624)
Type A (p. 622)
14.4 How Can We Transform Negative
Stress Into Positive Life Strategies?
Core Concept 14.4 Effective coping strategies reduce
the negative impact of stress on our health, while positive
lifestyle choices can enhance our mental and physical health
as well as our overall well-being.
Coping involves taking action that reduces or eliminates
the causes of stress rather than just the symptoms of stress.
Problem-focused coping is accomplished by specific actions aimed
at resolving a problem or stressor, whereas emotion- focused
coping relies on efforts to regulate our emotional response to
stress. Both types of coping can be useful and sometimes best
work together. Cognitive restructuring is another type of effec-
tive coping strategy and involves modifying our perceptions of
the stressor or our reactions to it. Cognitive restructuring can
include upward and downward social comparisons.
Cultivating positive emotions, including humor, also
helps reduce the effects of stress on our health, as can efforts
to find meaning in the stressful situation. In finding mean-
ing, making sense of the event appears to be the first step,
but those who ultimately succeed in finding meaning in trag-
edy must also identify some benefit of the event or situation.
Psychological debriefing, which in some cases takes the form
of critical incident stress debriefing (CISD), has been found to
be relatively ineffective in reducing the link between stress
and illness.
A variety of positive lifestyle choices carry a two-for-one
benefit to the stress–illness puzzle: They can increase our
resistance to stress and also decrease our vulnerability to
stress-related illness. Social support may be the most impor-
tant of these lifestyle factors, as people with stronger social
support live longer and healthier lives than those with little
or no support. Social support is helpful in that it carries emo-
tional, tangible, and informational benefits. Regular aerobic
exercise has both physical and psychological benefits and
has been found to reduce the impact of stress on our health.
Similarly, a healthy diet, adequate sleep, and even meditation
have been found to decrease our vulnerability to stress and
illness.
Subjective well-being (SWB) includes satisfaction with life,
prevalence of positive emotions, and absence of negative emo-
tions. Like many of the concepts we have studied, an individual’s
SWB is influenced both by heredity and by environment. Neither
age nor wealth predicts happiness—happy people can be found
in the youngest and the oldest, the richest and the poorest, and
even in victims of serious illness or life-changing injury.
Chapter Summary 645
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED
this chapter. Illness can be caused by prolonged exposure to
situational stressors, but that link is moderated by a host of
cognitive, affective, social and cultural factors. How we inter-
pret the stressor, how we have learned to cope, the social sup-
port we can rely on, and other processes can alter that link of
external stressor and personal health response.
Is Change Really Hazardous to Your Health?
The relationship between life change events and illness, as
indexed by the SRRS, is much more complex than originally
thought. While extreme high and low scores offer some use-
ful predictions of probabilities of future stress-related effects,
they do not include all the many other factors outlined in
behavioral medicine (p. 640)
benefit finding (p. 633)
catharsis (p. 633)
cognitive restructuring (p. 631)
coping (p. 631)
coping strategy (p. 630)
critical incident stress debriefing
(CISD) (p. 633)
defending (p. 630)
downward social comparison
(p. 632)
emotion-focused coping (p. 631)
health psychology (p. 640)
positive lifestyle choice (p. 630)
problem-focused coping (p. 631)
psychological debriefing (p. 633)
rumination (p. 631)
sense making (p. 633)
social comparison (p. 632)
social support (p. 635)
subjective well-being (SWB)
(p. 637)
upward social comparison
(p. 632)

c. biofeedback.
d. the general adaptation syndrome.
7. Psychologist Neal Miller uses the example of the blindfolded
basketball player to explain
a. the need for information to improve performance.
b. how chance variations lead to evolutionary advantage.
c. the correlation between life-changing events and illness.
d. how successive approximations can shape behavior.
8. In which area of health psychology has the most research been
done?
a. the definition of health
b. stress
c. biofeedback
d. changes in lifestyle
9. Imagine a family is moving to a new and larger home in a safer
neighborhood with better schools. Will this situation be a source
of stress for the family?
a. No, because the change is a positive one.
b. No, because moving is not really stressful.
c. Yes, because any change requires adjustment.
d. Yes, because it provokes guilt that the family does not really
deserve this good fortune.
10. Which response shows the stages of the general adaptation
syndrome in the correct order?
a. alarm reaction, exhaustion, resistance
b. resistance, alarm reaction, exhaustion
c. exhaustion, resistance, alarm reaction
d. alarm reaction, resistance, exhaustion
11. What important factor in stress did Hans Selye not
consider?
a. the role of hormones in mobilizing the body’s defenses
b. the subjective interpretation of a stressor
c. the length of exposure to a stressor
d. the body’s vulnerability to new stressors during the resistance
stage
DISCOVERING PSYCHOLOGY VIEWING GUIDE
Program Review
1. How are the biopsychosocial model and the Navajo concept of
hozho alike?
a. Both are dualistic.
b. Both assume individual responsibility for illness.
c. Both represent holistic approaches to health.
d. Both are several centuries old.
2. Dr. Wizanski told Thad that his illness was psychogenic. This
means that
a. Thad is not really sick.
b. Thad’s illness was caused by his psychological state.
c. Thad has a psychological disorder, not a physical one.
d. Thad’s lifestyle puts him at risk.
3. Headaches, exhaustion, and weakness are
a. not considered to be in the realm of health psychology.
b. considered to be psychological factors that lead to unhealthful
behaviors.
c. usually unrelated to psychological factors.
d. considered to be symptoms of underlying tension and personal
problems.
4. When Judith Rodin talks about “wet” connections to the immune
system, she is referring to connections with the
a. individual nerve cells.
b. endocrine system.
c. sensory receptors.
d. skin.
5. What mind–body question is Judith Rodin investigating in her
work with infertile couples?
a. How do psychological factors affect fertility?
b. Can infertility be cured by psychological counseling?
c. What effect does infertility have on marital relationships?
d. Can stress cause rejection of in vitro fertilization?
6. When Professor Zimbardo lowers his heart rate, he is
demonstrating the process of
a. mental relaxation.
b. stress reduction.
Watch the following video by logging into MyPsychLab (www.mypsychlab.com).
After you have watched the video, answer the questions that follow.
PROGRAM 23: HEALTH, MIND, AND BEHAVIOR
646 C H A P T E R 1 4 From Stress to Health and Well-Being

www.mypsychlab.com

Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide 647
17. What claim is Richard Lazarus most closely associated with?
a. The individual’s cognitive appraisal of a stressor is critical.
b. The biopsychosocial model is an oversimplified view.
c. Peptic ulcers can be healed through biofeedback.
d. The general adaptation syndrome can account for 80% of
heart attacks in middle-aged men.
18. Thomas Coates and Neal Miller are similar in their desire to
a. eradicate AIDS.
b. outlaw intravenous drug use.
c. institute stress management courses as part of standard insur-
ance coverage.
d. teach basic skills for protecting one’s health.
19. How should an advertising campaign ideally be designed in
order to get people to use condoms and avoid high-risk sexual
activities?
a. It should be friendly, optimistic, and completely
nonthreatening.
b. It should have enough threat to arouse emotion but not so
much that viewers will go into denial.
c. It should contain a lot of humor.
d. It should feature an older, white, male doctor and a lot of sci-
entific terminology.
20. Neal Miller is to biofeedback as Judith Rodin is to
a. analgesics.
b. meditation.
c. a sense of control.
d. social support.
12. Today, the major causes of death in the United States are
a. accidents.
b. infectious diseases.
c. sexually transmitted diseases.
d. diseases related to lifestyle.
13. When Thomas Coates and his colleagues, in their study of AIDS,
conduct interview studies, they want to gain information that will
help them
a. design interventions at a variety of levels.
b. determine how effective mass media advertisements are.
c. motivate AIDS victims to take good care of themselves.
d. stop people from using intravenous drugs.
14. The body’s best external defense against illness is the skin,
whereas its best internal defense is
a. the stomach.
b. the heart.
c. T-cells.
d. the spinal cord.
15. In which stage of the general adaptation syndrome are the pitu-
itary and adrenals stimulated?
a. exhaustion c. reaction
b. alarm d. resistance
16. Which stage of the general adaptation syndrome is associated
with the outcome of disease?
a. alarm c. exhaustion
b. reaction d. resistance

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G-1
Absent-mindedness Forgetting caused by
lapses in attention.
Absolute threshold The amount of stimula-
tion necessary for a stimulus to be detected.
In practice, this means that the presence or
absence of a stimulus is detected correctly
half the time over many trials.
Abu Ghraib Prison Prison in Iraq made
famous by revelation of photos taken by
Army Reserve MP guards in the acts of
humiliating and torturing prisoners.
Accommodation A mental process that modi-
fies schemas in order to include (or accom-
modate) new information.
Acoustic encoding The conversion of infor-
mation, especially semantic information,
to sound patterns in working memory.
Acquisition The initial learning stage in
classical conditioning, during which the
conditioned response comes to be elicited
by the conditioned stimulus.
Action potential The nerve impulse caused
by a change in the electrical charge across
the cell membrane of the axon. When the
neuron “fires,” this charge travels down
the axon and causes neurotransmitters to
be released by the terminal buttons.
Activation-synthesis theory The theory that
dreams begin (are activated) with random
electrical activation coming from the
brain stem. Dreams, then, are the brain’s
attempt to make sense of (to synthesize)
this random activity.
Active listener A person who gives the
speaker feedback in such forms as nod-
ding, paraphrasing, maintaining an
expression that shows interest, and
asking questions for clarification.
Acute stress A temporary state of arousal,
caused by a stressor, with a distinct onset
and limited duration.
Addiction A condition in which a person
continues to use a drug despite its ad-
verse effects—often despite repeated at-
tempts to discontinue using the drug.
Addiction may be based on physical or
psychological dependence.
Adolescence In industrial societies, a de-
velopmental period beginning at puberty
and ending (less clearly) at adulthood.
Adoption study A method of separating the
effect of nature and nurture by which
investigators compare characteristics of
adopted children with those of individuals
in their biological and adoptive families.
G L O S S A R Y
Affective disturbances Disorders of emotion
or mood.
Afterimages Sensations that linger after the
stimulus is removed. Most visual after-
images are negative afterimages, which
appear in reversed colors.
Agonists Drugs or other chemicals that
enhance or mimic the effects of neuro-
transmitters.
Agoraphobia A fear of public places and
open spaces, commonly accompanying
panic disorder.
Alarm phase First phase of the GAS, during
which body resources are mobilized to
cope with the stressor.
Algorithms Problem-solving procedures
or formulas that guarantee a correct
outcome, if correctly applied.
All-or-none principle Refers to the fact that
the action potential in the axon occurs
either completely or not at all.
Alzheimer’s disease A degenerative brain
disease usually noticed first by its debili-
tating effects on memory.
Ambiguous figures Images that can be inter-
preted in more than one way. There is no
“right” way to see an ambiguous figure.
Amplitude The physical strength of a wave.
This is shown on graphs as the height of
the wave.
Amygdala A limbic system structure in-
volved in memory and emotion, particu-
larly fear and aggression. Pronounced
a-MIG-da-la.
Analysis of transference The Freudian tech-
nique of analyzing and interpreting the
patient’s relationship with the therapist,
based on the assumption that this rela-
tionship mirrors unresolved conflicts in
the patient’s past.
Analytical intelligence According to Sternberg,
the ability measured by most IQ tests;
includes the ability to analyze problems
and find correct answers.
Anchoring bias A faulty heuristic caused by
basing (anchoring) an estimate on a com-
pletely irrelevant quantity.
Anecdotal evidence First-hand accounts that
vividly describe the experiences of one
or a few people, but may erroneously be
assumed to be scientific evidence.
Animistic thinking A preoperational mode
of thought in which inanimate objects
are imagined to have life and mental
processes.
Anorexia nervosa An eating disorder involv-
ing persistent loss of appetite that endan-
gers an individual’s health and stemming
from emotional or psychological reasons
rather than from organic causes.
Antagonists Drugs or other chemicals that
inhibit the effects of neurotransmitters.
Anterograde amnesia The inability to form
new memories (as opposed to retrograde
amnesia, which involves the inability to
remember information previously stored
in memory).
Antianxiety drugs A category of medicines
that includes the barbiturates and benzo-
diazepines, drugs that diminish feelings
of anxiety.
Antidepressants Medicines that treat de-
pression, usually by their effects on the
serotonin and/or norepinephrine path-
ways in the brain.
Antipsychotics Medicines that diminish psy-
chotic symptoms, usually by effects on
the dopamine pathways in the brain.
Antisocial personality disorder Condition in-
volving a lack of conscience or a sense of
responsibility to others.
Anxiety disorder Mental problem character-
ized mainly by anxiety. Anxiety disorders
include panic disorder, specific phobias,
and obsessive–compulsive disorder.
Anxious-ambivalent attachment One of two
primary response patterns seen in inse-
curely attached children in which a child
wants contact with the caregiver, shows
excessive distress when separated from
the caregiver, and proves difficult to con-
sole even when reunited.
Applied psychologists Psychologists who
use the knowledge developed by experi-
mental psychologists to solve human
problems.
Aptitudes Innate potentialities (as contrasted
with abilities acquired by learning).
Archetype One of the ancient memory images
in the collective unconscious. Archetypes
appear and reappear in art, literature, and
folktales around the world.
Artificial concepts Concepts defined by
rules, such as word definitions and math-
ematical formulas.
Asch effect A form of conformity in which
a group majority influences individual
judgments of unambiguous stimuli, as
with line judgments.

Assimilation A mental process that incor-
porates new information into existing
schemas.
Association cortex Cortical regions through-
out the brain that combine information
from various other parts of the brain.
Attachment The enduring socio-emotional
relationship between a child and a parent
or other regular caregiver.
Attention A process by which conscious-
ness focuses on a single item or “chunk”
in working memory.
Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) A
developmental disorder involving short
attention span, distractibility and difficulty
concentrating, poor impulse control, and
excessive activity.
Authoritarian parent One of the four par-
enting styles, characterized by demands
for conformity and obedience, with little
tolerance for discussion of rules, which
the parent enforces with punishment or
threats of punishment.
Authoritative parent One of the four parent-
ing styles, characterized by high expec-
tations of the children, which the parent
enforces with consequences, rather than
punitive actions. Authoritative parents
combine high standards with warmth
and respect for the child’s views.
Autism A developmental disorder marked
by disabilities in language, social inter-
action, and the ability to understand an-
other person’s state of mind.
Autokinetic effect The perceived motion of
a stationary dot of light in a totally dark
room; used by Muzafir Sherif to study
the formation of group norms.
Autonomic nervous system The portion of
the peripheral nervous system that sends
communications between the central ner-
vous system and the internal organs and
glands.
Autonomy In Erikson’s theory, autonomy
is the major developmental task of the
second stage in childhood. Achieving
autonomy involves developing a sense
of independence, as opposed to being
plagued by self-doubt.
Availability bias A faulty heuristic strategy
that estimates probabilities based on the
availability of vivid mental images of
the event.
Aversion therapy As a classical conditioning
procedure, aversive counterconditioning
involves presenting the individual with an
attractive stimulus paired with unpleas-
ant (aversive) stimulation to condition a
repulsive reaction.
Avoidant attachment One of two primary
response patterns seen in insecurely
attached children, in which a child shows
no interest in contact with the caregiver
and displays neither distress when sepa-
rated from the caregiver nor happiness
when reunited.
Axon In a nerve cell, an extended fiber that
conducts information from the soma to
the terminal buttons. Information travels
along the axon in the form of an electric
charge called the action potential.
Babbling The production of repetitive syl-
lables, characteristic of the early stages of
language acquisition.
Base rate information The probability of a
characteristic occurring in the general
population period.
Basic anxiety An emotion, proposed by
Karen Horney, that gives a sense of un-
certainty and loneliness in a hostile world
and can lead to maladjustment.
Basilar membrane A thin strip of tissue sen-
sitive to vibrations in the cochlea. The
basilar membrane contains hair cells con-
nected to neurons. When a sound wave
causes the hair cells to vibrate, the associ-
ated neurons become excited. As a result,
the sound waves are converted (trans-
duced) into nerve activity.
Behavior modification Another term for be-
havior therapy.
Behavior therapy Any form of psychother-
apy based on the principles of behavioral
learning, especially operant conditioning
and classical conditioning.
Behavioral learning Forms of learning, such
as classical conditioning and operant
conditioning, that can be described in
terms of stimuli and responses.
Behavioral medicine Medical field specializing
in the link between lifestyle and disease.
Behavioral perspective A psychological
viewpoint that finds the source of our
actions in environmental stimuli rather
than in inner mental processes.
Behaviorism A historical school (as well as
a modern perspective) that has sought
to make psychology an objective science
focusing only on behavior—to the
exclusion of mental processes.
Benefit finding The second phase of finding
meaning in a stressful situation, which
involves seeing some ultimate benefit
from the stressor.
Binding problem Refers to the process used
by the brain to combine (or “bind”) the
results of many sensory operations into a
single percept. This occurs, for example,
when sensations of color, shape, boundary,
and texture are combined to produce the
percept of a person’s face. No one knows
exactly how the brain does this. Thus, the
binding problem is one of the major un-
solved mysteries in psychology.
Binocular cues Information taken in by
both eyes that aids in depth perception,
including binocular convergence and ret-
inal disparity.
Biological drive A motive, such as thirst,
that is based primarily in biology. A drive
is a state of tension that motivates an
organism to satisfy a biological need.
Biological perspective The psychological
perspective that searches for the causes of
behavior in the functioning of genes, the
brain and nervous system, and the endo-
crine (hormone) system.
Biomedical therapy Treatment that focuses
on altering the brain, especially with
drugs, psychosurgery, or electroconvul-
sive therapy.
Biopsychology The specialty in psychology
that studies the interaction of biology,
behavior, and mental processes.
Bipolar disorder A mental abnormality in-
volving swings of mood from mania to
depression.
Blind spot The point where the optic nerve
exits the eye and where there are no pho-
toreceptors. Any stimulus that falls on
this area cannot be seen.
Blindsight The ability to locate objects de-
spite damage to the visual system mak-
ing it impossible for a person consciously
to see and identify objects. Blindsight is
thought to involve unconscious visual
processing in the where pathway.
Blocking Forgetting that occurs when an
item in memory cannot be accessed or re-
trieved. Blocking is caused by interference.
Body image An individual’s perception of and
feelings about their physical appearance.
Borderline personality disorder Condition of
instability and impulsivity; persons have
unpredictable moods and stormy inter-
personal relationships, with little toler-
ance for frustration.
Bottom-up processing Perceptual analysis
that emphasizes characteristics of the
stimulus, rather than our concepts and
expectations. “Bottom” refers to the
stimulus, which occurs at step one of per-
ceptual processing.
Brain stem The most primitive of the brain’s
three major layers. It includes the me-
dulla, pons, and the reticular formation.
Brightness A psychological sensation
caused by the intensity (amplitude) of
light waves.
G L O S S A R Y G-2

G-3 G L O S S A R Y
Bulimia nervosa An eating disorder char-
acterized by eating binges followed
by “purges,” induced by vomiting or
laxatives; typically initiated as a weight-
control measure.
Bullying The act of tormenting others, in
school classrooms or work settings, by
one or more people, for personal, sadistic
pleasure. It qualifies as a form of ordi-
nary or everyday evil.
Burnout A syndrome of emotional exhaus-
tion, physical fatigue, and cognitive wea-
riness, often related to work.
Bystander intervention problem Laboratory
and field study analogues of the diffi-
culties faced by bystanders in real emer-
gency situations.
Cannon–Bard theory The counterproposal
that an emotional feeling and an internal
physiological response occur at the same
time: One is not the cause of the other.
Both were believed to be the result of
cognitive appraisal of the situation.
Case study Research involving a single in-
dividual (or, at most, a few individuals).
Catastrophic event A sudden, violent calam-
ity, either natural or manmade, that causes
trauma.
Catharsis A theory suggesting that emo-
tional pressure can be relieved by ex-
pressing feelings directly or indirectly.
Central nervous system (CNS) The brain and
the spinal cord.
Centration A preoperational thought pat-
tern involving the inability to take into
account more than one factor at a time.
Cerebellum The “little brain” attached to
the brain stem. The cerebellum is respon-
sible for coordinated movements.
Cerebral cortex The thin gray matter cover-
ing the cerebral hemispheres, consisting of
a ¼-inch layer dense with cell bodies of
neurons. The cerebral cortex carries on the
major portion of our “higher” mental pro-
cessing, including thinking and perceiving.
Cerebral dominance The tendency of each
brain hemisphere to exert control over
different functions, such as language or
perception of spatial relationships.
Cerebral hemispheres The large symmetrical
halves of the brain located atop the brain
stem.
Chameleon effect The tendency to mimic
other people, named after the animal that
changes its skin color to fit into its varied
environments.
Change blindness A perceptual failure to
notice that a visual scene has changed from
the way it had appeared previously. Unlike
inattentional blindness, change blindness
requires comparing a current scene to one
from the past, stored in memory.
Childhood amnesia The inability to remem-
ber events during the first two or three
years of life.
Chromosome Tightly coiled threadlike
structure along which the genes are orga-
nized, like beads on a necklace. Chromo-
somes consist primarily of DNA.
Chronic stressor Long-lasting stressful
condition.
Chronological age (CA) The number of years
since the individual’s birth.
Chunking Organizing pieces of informa-
tion into a smaller number of meaningful
units (or chunks)—a process that frees
up space in working memory.
Circadian rhythm A physiological pattern that
repeats approximately every 24 hours—
such as the sleep–wakefulness cycle.
Classical conditioning A form of behavioral
learning in which a previously neutral stim-
ulus acquires the power to elicit the same
innate reflex produced by another stimulus.
Client-centered therapy A humanistic ap-
proach to treatment developed by Carl
Rogers, emphasizing an individual’s ten-
dency for healthy psychological growth
through self-actualization.
Closure The Gestalt principle that identifies
the tendency to fill in gaps in figures and
to see incomplete figures as complete.
Cochlea The primary organ of hearing; a
coiled tube in the inner ear, where sound
waves are transduced into nerve messages.
Cognitive appraisal Our interpretation of
a stressor and our resources for dealing
with it.
Cognitive development The global term for
the development of thought processes
from childhood through adulthood.
Cognitive dissonance A highly motivating
state in which people have conflicting
cognitions, especially when their volun-
tary actions conflict with their attitudes or
values. Leon Festinger was its originator.
Cognitive map In Tolman’s work, a cognitive
map was a mental representation of a
maze or other physical space. Psycholo-
gists often used the term cognitive map
more broadly to include an understand-
ing of connections among concepts. Thus,
a cognitive map can represent either a
physical or a mental “space.”
Cognitive neuroscience An interdisciplinary
field involving cognitive psychology, neu-
rology, biology, computer science, linguis-
tics, and specialists from other fields who
are interested in the connection between
mental processes and the brain.
Cognitive perspective Another of the main
psychological viewpoints distinguished
by an emphasis on mental processes,
such as learning, memory, perception,
and thinking, as forms of information
processing.
Cognitive restructuring Reappraising a stress-
or with the goal of seeing it from a more
positive perspective.
Cognitive therapy Emphasizes rational think-
ing (as opposed to subjective emotion,
motivation, or repressed conflicts) as the
key to treating mental disorders.
Cognitive–behavioral therapy A newer form
of psychotherapy that combines the tech-
niques of cognitive therapy with those of
behavioral therapy.
Cohesiveness Solidarity, loyalty, and a sense
of group membership.
Collective unconscious Jung’s addition to
the unconscious, involving a reservoir
for instinctive “memories,” including the
archetypes, which exist in all people.
Collectivism The view, common in Asia,
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle
East, that values group loyalty and pride
over individual distinction.
Color Also called hue. Color is not a prop-
erty of things in the external world.
Rather, it is a psychological sensation
created in the brain from information
obtained by the eyes from the wave-
lengths of visible light.
Color blindness Typically a genetic disor-
der (although sometimes the result of
trauma, as in the case of Jonathan) that
prevents an individual from discriminat-
ing certain colors. The most common
form is red–green color blindness.
Coma An unconscious state, during which
a person lacks the normal cycles of sleep
and wakefulness, that usually lasts only a
few days. The comatose state differs from
the minimally conscious state and the
persistent vegetative state.
Combination therapy A therapeutic approach
that involves both psychological and
medical techniques—most often a drug
therapy with a behavioral or cognitive–
behavioral therapy.
Community mental health movement An
effort to deinstitutionalize mental pa-
tients and to provide therapy from
outpatient clinics. Proponents of com-
munity mental health envisioned that
recovering patients could live with their
families, in foster homes, or in group
homes.

G L O S S A R Y G-4
Compassion fatigue A state of exhaustion
experienced by medical and psychological
professionals, as well as caregivers, which
leaves the individual feeling stressed,
numb, or indifferent.
Compassion satisfaction A sense of apprecia-
tion felt by a caregiver, medical or psy-
chological professional, of the work he
or she does.
Computer metaphor The idea that the brain
is an information-processing organ that
operates, in some ways, like a computer.
Concept hierarchies Levels of concepts, from
most general to most specific, in which a
more general level includes more specific
concepts—as the concept of “animal” in-
cludes “dog,” “giraffe,” and “butterfly.”
Concepts Mental groupings of similar
objects, ideas, or experiences.
Concrete operational stage The third of
Piaget’s stages, when a child understands
conservation but still is incapable of
abstract thought.
Conditioned reinforcer or secondary rein-
forcer A stimulus, such as money or to-
kens, that acquires its reinforcing power
by a learned association with primary
reinforcers.
Conditioned response (CR) In classical condi-
tioning, a response elicited by a previously
neutral stimulus that has become associ-
ated with the unconditioned stimulus.
Conditioned stimulus (CS) In classical condi-
tioning, a previously neutral stimulus that
comes to elicit the conditioned response.
Customarily, in a conditioning experi-
ment, the neutral stimulus is called a con-
ditioned stimulus when it is first paired
with an unconditioned stimulus (UCS).
Cones Photoreceptors in the retina that are
especially sensitive to colors but not to
dim light. You may have guessed that the
cones are cone-shaped.
Confirmation bias The tendency to attend to
evidence that complements and confirms
our beliefs or expectations, while ignor-
ing evidence that does not.
Conformity The tendency for people to
adopt the behaviors, attitudes, and opin-
ions of other members of a group.
Consciousness The process by which the
brain creates a mental model of our
experience. The most common, or ordi-
nary, consciousness occurs during wake-
fulness, although there are can be altered
states of consciousness.
Conservation The understanding that the
physical properties of an object or sub-
stance do not change when appearances
change but nothing is added or taken
away.
Consolidation The process by which short-
term memories become long-term memo-
ries over a period of time.
Contact comfort Stimulation and reassur-
ance derived from the physical touch of
a caregiver.
Contingency management An operant con-
ditioning approach to changing behavior
by altering the consequences, especially
rewards and punishments, of behavior.
Continuous reinforcement A type of rein-
forcement schedule by which all correct
responses are reinforced.
Contralateral pathways Sensory and mo-
tor pathways between the brain and the
rest of the body cross over to the oppo-
site side en route, so messages from the
right side of the body are processed by
the left side of the brain and vice versa.
Control group Participants who are used
as a comparison for the experimental
group. The control group is not given the
special treatment of interest.
Conversion disorder A type of somatoform
disorder marked by paralysis, weakness,
or loss of sensation but with no discern-
ible physical cause.
Coping Taking action that reduces or elimi-
nates the causes of stress, not merely its
symptoms.
Coping strategy An action that reduces or
eliminates the impact of stress.
Corpus callosum The band of nerve cells
connecting and enabling communication
between the two cerebral hemispheres.
Correlational study A form of research in
which the relationship between variables
is studied, but without the experimental
manipulation of an independent variable.
Correlational studies cannot determine
cause-and-effect relationships.
Cortisol A steroid produced by the fight-or-
flight response.
Creative intelligence According to Sternberg,
the form of intelligence that helps people
see new relationships among concepts;
involves insight and creativity.
Creativity A mental process that produces
novel responses that contribute to the so-
lutions of problems.
Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) A
specific type of psychological debriefing
that follows a strict, step-by-step agenda.
Critical thinking skills This book emphasizes
six critical thinking skills, based on the
following questions: What is the source?
Is the claim reasonable or extreme? What
is the evidence? Could bias contaminate
the conclusion? Does the reasoning avoid
common fallacies? Does the issue require
multiple perspectives?
Cross-cultural psychologists Those who
work in this specialty are interested in
how psychological processes may differ
among people of different cultures.
Crystallized intelligence The knowledge a
person has acquired plus the ability to
access that knowledge.
CT scanning or computerized tomography A
computerized imaging technique that
uses X-rays passed through the brain
at various angles and then combined
into an image.
Culture A complex blend of language, beliefs,
customs, values, and traditions developed
by a group of people and shared with oth-
ers in the same environment.
Cytokines Hormone-like chemicals that fight
infection and facilitate communication
between the brain and immune system.
Data Pieces of information, especially infor-
mation gathered by a researcher to be used
in testing a hypothesis. (Singular: datum.)
Daydreaming A common (and quite nor-
mal) variation of consciousness in which
attention shifts to memories, expecta-
tions, desires, or fantasies and away from
the immediate situation.
Declarative memory A division of LTM that
stores explicit information; also known
as fact memory. Declarative memory has
two subdivisions, episodic memory and
semantic memory.
Defending Efforts taken to reduce the
symptoms of stress or one’s awareness of
them.
Dehumanization The psychological process
of thinking about certain other people or
groups as less than human, as like feared
or hated animals. A basic process in
much prejudice and mass violence.
Deinstitutionalization The policy of remov-
ing patients, whenever possible, from
mental hospitals.
Delusion An extreme disorder of think-
ing, involving persistent false beliefs.
Delusions are the hallmark of paranoid
disorders.
Dendrite Branched fiber that extends
outward from the cell body and carries
information into the neuron.
Dependent variable The measured outcome
of a study; the responses of the subjects
in a study.
Depersonalization Depriving people of their
identity and individuality by treating

G-5 G L O S S A R Y
Dyslexia A reading disability, thought by
some experts to involve a brain disorder.
Eclectic Either switching theories to ex-
plain different situations or building
one’s own theory of personality from
pieces borrowed from many perspectives.
Ecological view A perspective on mental dis-
order that emphasizes social and cultural
context.
Ego defense mechanism A largely uncon-
scious mental strategy employed to re-
duce the experience of conflict or anxiety.
Ego The conscious, rational part of the
personality, charged with keeping peace
between the superego and the id.
Egocentrism In Piaget’s theory, the inability
to realize that there are other viewpoints
beside one’s own.
Ego-integrity In Erikson’s theory, the de-
velopmental task of late adulthood—
involving the ability to look back on life
without regrets and to enjoy a sense of
wholeness.
Eidetic imagery An especially clear and
persistent form of memory that is quite
rare; sometimes known as “photographic
memory.”
Elaborative rehearsal A working-memory
process in which information is actively
reviewed and related to information
already in LTM.
Electra complex Concept advanced by Carl
Jung , highlighting a girl’s psychosexual
competition with mother for the father’s
love, which is resolved in psychoanalyitic
theory when girl comes to identify with
same sex adult. Equivalent to Oedipus
Complex in males.
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) A treat-
ment used primarily for depression and
involving the application of an electric
current to the head, producing a gener-
alized seizure; sometimes called “shock
treatment.”
Electroencephalograph (EEG) A device for
recording brain waves, typically by elec-
trodes placed on the scalp. The record
produced is known as an electroencepha-
logram (also called an EEG).
Electromagnetic spectrum The entire range
of electromagnetic energy, including
radio waves, X-rays, microwaves, and
visible light.
Embryo In humans, the name for the devel-
oping organism during the first 8 weeks
after conception.
Emerging adulthood A transition period
between adolescence and adulthood.
Emotion A four-part process that involves
physiological arousal, subjective feelings,
genetic makeup. Contrasted with situ-
ationism, the focus is on external causes
of behavior.
Dissociative amnesia A psychologically
induced loss of memory for personal
information, such as one’s identity or
residence.
Dissociative disorders One of a group of
pathologies involving “fragmentation”
of the personality, in which some parts of
the personality have become detached, or
dissociated, from other parts.
Dissociative fugue Essentially the same as
dissociative amnesia but with the addi-
tion of “flight” from one’s home, fam-
ily, and job. Fugue (pronounced FEWG)
means “flight.”
Dissociative identity disorder A condition in
which an individual displays multiple
identities or personalities; formerly called
“multiple personality disorder.”
Distress The psychological reaction cre-
ated by external stressors, which can be
an emotional, cognitive or behavioral
response. It is part of the stress response
that also includes biological and physi-
ological reactions to stressors.
Distributed learning A technique whereby
the learner spaces learning sessions over
time rather than trying to learn the mate-
rial all in one study period.
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) A long, com-
plex molecule that encodes genetic char-
acteristics.
Double-blind study An experimental pro-
cedure in which both researchers and
participants are uninformed about the
nature of the independent variable being
administered.
Downward social comparison Comparison
between one’s own stressful situation
and others in a similar situation who
are worse off, with the goal of gaining a
more positive perspective on one’s own
situation.
Drive Biologically instigated motivation.
Drive theory Developed as an alternative
to instinct theory, drive theory explains
motivation as a process in which a bio-
logical need produces a drive that moves
an organism to meet the need. For most
drives this process returns the organ-
ism to a balanced condition, known as
homeostasis.
DSM-IV The fourth edition of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, published by the American
Psychiatric Association; the most widely
accepted psychiatric classification system
in the United States.
them as objects rather than as individu-
als. Depersonalization can be a result of
labeling.
Depersonalization disorder An abnormality
involving the sensation that mind and
body have separated, as in an “out-of-
body” experience.
Depressant Drug that slows down mental
and physical activity by inhibiting trans-
mission of nerve impulses in the central
nervous system.
Developmental level of analysis Concerns
changes in the organism’s developmental
progress that might change motivational
priorities.
Developmental perspective One of the six
main psychological viewpoints, distin-
guished by its emphasis on nature and
nurture and on predictable changes that
occur across the lifespan.
Developmental psychology The psychologi-
cal specialty that studies how organ-
isms grow and change over time as the
result of biological and environmental
influences.
Diathesis–stress hypothesis In reference to
schizophrenia, the proposal that genetic
factors place the individual at risk while
environmental stress factors transform
this potential into an actual schizo-
phrenic disorder.
Difference threshold The smallest amount
by which a stimulus can be changed and
the difference be detected half the time.
Diffusion of responsibility Dilution or weak-
ening of each group member’s obligation
to act when responsibility is perceived
to be shared with all group members or
accepted by the leader.
Discrimination A negative action taken
against an individual as a result of his or
her group or categorical membership. It
is the behavior that prejudice generates.
Disenfranchised grief The emotion sur-
rounding a loss that others do not sup-
port, share, or understand.
Display rules The permissible ways of dis-
playing emotions in a particular society.
Disposition Relatively stable personality
pattern, including temperaments, traits,
and personality types.
Dispositional theory A general term that
includes the temperament, trait, and type
approaches to personality.
Dispositionism A psychological orientation
that focuses primarily on the inner char-
acteristics of individuals, such as person-
ality dispositions, values, character, and

G L O S S A R Y G-6
whose mothers drink excessive amounts
of alcohol during pregnancy.
Fetus In humans, the term for the devel-
oping organism between the embryonic
stage and birth.
Fight-or-flight response Sequence of inter-
nal responses preparing an organism for
struggle or escape.
Figure The part of a pattern that com-
mands attention. The figure stands out
against the ground.
Five-factor theory A trait perspective sug-
gesting that personality is composed of
five fundamental personality dimensions
(also known as the Big Five): openness to
experience, conscientiousness, extraver-
sion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.
Fixation Occurs when psychosexual devel-
opment is arrested at an immature stage.
Fixed-action patterns Genetically based be-
haviors, seen across a species, that can be
set off by a specific stimulus. The concept
of fixed-action patterns has replaced the
older notion of instinct.
Fixed interval (FI) schedule A program by
which reinforcement is contingent upon
a certain, fixed time period.
Fixed ratio (FR) schedule A program by
which reinforcement is contingent on a
certain, unvarying number of responses.
Flashbulb memory A clear and vivid long-
term memory of an especially meaningful
and emotional event.
Flow In Csikszentmihalyi’s theory, an in-
tense focus on an activity accompanied by
increased creativity and near-ecstatic feel-
ings. Flow involves intrinsic motivation.
Fluid intelligence The ability to see complex
relationships and solve problems.
FMRI or functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing A newer form of magnetic reso-
nance imaging that records both brain
structure and brain activity.
Forgetting curve A graph plotting the
amount of retention and forgetting over
time for a certain batch of material, such
as a list of nonsense syllables. The typical
forgetting curve is steep at first, becom-
ing flatter as time goes on.
Formal operational stage The last of Piaget’s
stages, during which abstract thought
appears.
Fovea The tiny area of sharpest vision in
the retina.
Frequency The number of cycles completed
by a wave in a second.
Frontal lobes Cortical regions at the front
of the brain that are especially involved
in movement and in thinking.
whether to pursue a relationship by
weighing the potential value of the rela-
tionship against their expectation of suc-
cess in establishing the relationship.
Experiment A kind of research in which
the researcher controls all the conditions
and directly manipulates the conditions,
including the independent variable.
Experimental group Participants in an exper-
iment who are exposed to the treatment
of interest.
Experimental psychologists Psychologists
who do research on basic psychological
processes—as contrasted with applied
psychologists; experimental psychologists
are also called research psychologists.
Experts Individuals who possess well-
organized funds of knowledge, including
the effective problem-solving strategies,
in a field.
Explicit memory Memory that has been
processed with attention and can be con-
sciously recalled.
Exposure therapy A form of desensitization
therapy in which the patient directly con-
fronts the anxiety-provoking stimulus (as
opposed to imagining the stimulus).
Externals People with an external locus of
control who believe they can do little to
influence their life outcomes.
Extinction (in classical conditioning) The
weakening of a conditioned response
in the absence of an unconditioned
stimulus.
Extinction (in operant conditioning) A pro-
cess by which a response that has been
learned is weakened by the absence or
removal of reinforcement. (Compare
with extinction in classical conditioning.)
Extraversion The Jungian personality
dimension that involves turning one’s
attention outward, toward others.
Extrinsic motivation The desire to engage in
an activity to achieve an external conse-
quence, such as a reward.
False positive Mistaken identification of a
person as having a particular characteris-
tic. In polygraphy, a false positive is an er-
roneous identification of a truthful person
as being a liar.
Family systems theory A perspective on per-
sonality and treatment that emphasizes
the family rather than the individual as
the basic unit of analysis .
Feature detectors Cells in the cortex that
specialize in extracting certain features of
a stimulus.
Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) A set of physi-
cal and mental problems seen in children
cognitive interpretation, and behavioral
expression. Emotions help organisms
deal with important events.
Emotional bias The tendency to make judg-
ments based on attitudes and feelings,
rather than on the basis of a rational
analysis of the evidence.
Emotional intelligence The ability to under-
stand and control emotional responses.
Emotion-focused coping Regulating one’s
emotional response to a stressor.
Empirical investigation An approach to re-
search that relies on sensory experience
and observation as research data.
Empirically supported treatment (EST) Treat-
ment regimen that has been demon-
strated to be effective through research.
Encoding specificity principle The doctrine
that memory is encoded and stored with
specific cues related to the context in
which it was formed. The more closely
the retrieval cues match the form in
which the information was encoded, the
better it will be remembered.
Encoding The first of the three basic tasks
of memory, involving the modification of
information to fit the preferred format
for the memory system.
Endocrine system The hormone system—
the body’s chemical messenger system,
including the endocrine glands: pituitary,
thyroid, parathyroid, adrenals, pancreas,
ovaries, and testes.
Engram The physical changes in the brain
associated with a memory. It is also
known as the memory trace.
Episodic memory A subdivision of declara-
tive memory that stores memory of
personal events or “episodes.”
Evolution The gradual process of biologi-
cal change that occurs in a species as it
adapts to its environment.
Evolutionary psychology A relatively new
specialty in psychology that sees behav-
ior and mental processes in terms of
their genetic adaptations for survival and
reproduction.
Executive function Cognitive abilities in
the frontal lobes necessary for complex
thinking, planning, and goal-directed
behavior.
Exhaustion phase Third phase of the GAS,
during which the body’s resources
become depleted.
Expectancy bias The researcher allowing his
or her expectations to affect the outcome
of a study.
Expectancy-value theory A social psychol-
ogy theory that states how people decide

G-7 G L O S S A R Y
the goal of educating the public about
developing healthier life styles.
Heritability The amount of trait variation
within a group raised under the same
conditions, which can be attributed to
genetic differences. Heritability tells us
nothing about between-group differences.
Heroes People whose actions help others in
emergencies or challenge unjust or corrupt
systems, doing so without concern for re-
ward or likely negative consequences for
them by acting in deviant ways.
Heuristics Cognitive strategies or “rules of
thumb” used as shortcuts to solve com-
plex mental tasks. Unlike algorithms,
heuristics do not guarantee a correct
solution.
Hierarchy of needs In Maslow’s theory, the
notion that needs occur in priority or-
der, with the biological needs as the most
basic.
Hindsight bias The tendency, after learn-
ing about an event, to “second guess” or
believe that one could have predicted the
event in advance.
Hippocampus A component of the limbic
system, involved in establishing long-
term memories.
Homeostasis The body’s tendency to main-
tain a biologically balanced condition,
especially with regard to nutrients, water,
and temperature.
Hormones Chemical messengers used by
the endocrine system. Many hormones
also serve as neurotransmitters in the
nervous system.
Humanistic psychology A clinical approach
emphasizing human ability, growth,
potential, and free will.
Humanistic theories A group of personality
theories that focus on human growth and
potential rather than on mental disor-
ders. All emphasize the functioning of the
individual in the present rather than on
the influence of past events.
Humanistic therapy Treatment technique
based on the assumption that people
have a tendency for positive growth and
self-actualization, which may be blocked
by an unhealthy environment that can
include negative self-evaluation and criti-
cism from others.
Humors Four body fluids—blood, phlegm,
black bile, and yellow bile—that, according
to an ancient theory, control personality by
their relative abundance.
Hypnosis An induced state of awareness,
usually characterized by heightened sug-
gestibility, deep relaxation, and highly
focused attention.
psychologists believed that much of per-
ception is shaped by innate factors built
into the brain.
Giftedness Often conceived as representing
the upper 2 percent of the IQ range, com-
mencing about 30 points above average
(at about 130 IQ points).
Gist (pronounced JIST) The sense or mean-
ing, as contrasted with the exact details.
Glial cell One of the cells that provide struc-
tural support for neurons. Glial cells also
provide an insulating covering (the myelin
sheath) of the axon for some neurons,
which facilitates the electrical impulse.
Goal-directed behavior An ability that emerges
during the sensorimotor period by which
infants develop the ability to keep a simple
goal in mind as they pursue it.
Grammar The rules of a language, specify-
ing how to use the elements of language
and word order to produce understand-
able sentences.
Grief The emotional response to loss,
which includes sadness, anger, helpless-
ness, guilt, and despair.
Ground The part of a pattern that does not
command attention; the background.
Group therapy Any form of psychotherapy
done with more than one client/patient at
a time. Group therapy is often done from
a humanistic perspective.
Groupthink The term for the poor judg-
ments and bad decisions made by mem-
bers of groups that are overly influenced
by perceived group consensus or the
leader’s point of view.
Gustation The sense of taste, from the
same word root as “gusto;” also called
the gustatory sense.
Habituation Learning not to respond to the
repeated presentation of a stimulus.
Hallucination A false sensory experience
that may suggest mental disorder. Hallu-
cinations can have other causes, such as
drugs or sensory isolation.
Hallucinogen A drug that creates hallucina-
tions or alters perceptions of the external
environment and inner awareness.
Hardiness Attitude of resistance to stress,
based on a sense of challenge (welcoming
change), commitment (engagement), and
control (maintaining an internal guide
for action).
Hassle Situation that causes minor irrita-
tion or frustration.
Health psychology Field of psychology that
studies psychosocial factors that contrib-
ute to promoting health and well being,
and also those that influence illness, with
Fully functioning person Carl Rogers’s term
for a healthy, self-actualizing individual
who has a self-concept that is both posi-
tive and congruent with reality.
Functional fixedness The inability to per-
ceive a new use for an object associated
with a different purpose; a form of men-
tal set.
Functional level of analysis Concerns the
adaptive function of a motive in terms of
the organism’s survival and reproduction.
Functionalism A historical school of psy-
chology that believed mental processes
could best be understood in terms of
their adaptive purpose and function.
Fundamental attribution error (FAE) The dual
tendency to overemphasize internal, dis-
positional causes and minimize external,
situational pressures. The FAE is more
common in individualistic cultures than
in collectivistic cultures.
G factor A general ability, proposed by
Spearman, as the main factor underlying
all intelligent mental activity.
Gate-control theory An explanation for pain
control that proposes we have a neural
“gate” that can, under some circum-
stances, block incoming pain signals.
Gene Segment of a chromosome that
encodes the directions for the inherited
physical and mental characteristics of an
organism. Genes are the functional units
of a chromosome.
General Adaptation Syndrome (GAS) A three-
phase pattern of physical responses to a
chronic stressor.
General anesthetic Substance that sup-
presses consciousness and awareness of
pain. Most anesthetics also produce seda-
tion and immobility.
Generalized anxiety disorder A psychological
problem characterized by persistent and
pervasive feelings of anxiety, without any
external cause.
Generativity The process of making a com-
mitment beyond oneself to family, work,
society, or future generations. In Erikson’s
theory, generativity is the developmental
challenge of midlife.
Genetic leash Edward Wilson’s term for the
constraints placed on development by
heredity.
Genome The complete set of genetic infor-
mation contained with a cell.
Genotype An organism’s genetic makeup.
Gestalt psychology From a German word
(pronounced gush-TAWLT) that means
“whole” or “form” or “configuration.”
(A Gestalt is also a percept.) The Gestalt

G L O S S A R Y G-8
Intelligence The mental capacity to acquire
knowledge, reason, and solve problems
effectively.
Intelligence quotient (IQ) A numerical score
on an intelligence test, originally computed
by dividing the person’s mental age by
chronological age and multiplying the re-
sult by 100.
Intermittent reinforcement A type of rein-
forcement schedule by which some, but
not all, correct responses are reinforced;
also called partial reinforcement.
Internals People with an internal locus of
control who believe they can do much to
influence their life outcomes.
Interneuron A nerve cell that relays mes-
sages between nerve cells, especially in
the brain and spinal cord.
Interval schedule A program by which rein-
forcement depends on the time interval
elapsed since the last reinforcement.
Intimacy In Erikson’s theory, the main
developmental task of early adulthood,
involving the capacity to make a full
commitment—sexual, emotional, and
moral—to another person.
Intrinsic motivation The desire to engage in
an activity for its own sake rather than
for some external consequence, such as a
reward.
Introspection The process of reporting on
one’s own conscious mental experiences.
Introversion The Jungian dimension that
focuses on inner experience—one’s own
thoughts and feelings—making the intro-
vert less outgoing and sociable than the
extravert.
Intuition The ability to make judgments
without consciously reasoning.
Inverted U function A term that describes
the relationship between arousal and
performance. Both low and high levels of
arousal produce lower performance than
does a moderate level of arousal.
Irreversibility The inability, in the preop-
erational child, to think through a series
of events or mental operations and then
mentally reverse the steps.
James–Lange theory The proposal that an
emotion-provoking stimulus produces a
physical response that, in turn, produces
an emotion.
Job engagement An employee’s sense of
being part of a meaningful work setting
where her or his contribution is valued
and equitably rewarded (the opposite of
job burnout).
Kinesthetic sense The sense of body posi-
tion and movement of body parts relative
to each other (also called kinesthesis).
industry (confidence) will slip into a self-
perception of inferiority.
Infancy In humans, infancy spans the time
between the end of the neonatal period and
the establishment of language—usually at
about 18 months to 2 years.
Information-processing model A cognitive
understanding of memory, emphasizing
how information is changed when it is
encoded, stored, and retrieved.
Informed consent Insures that research par-
ticipants are informed of the procedures
of the research, as well as any potential
dangers involved, so they may opt out if
desired.
In-group The group with which an individ-
ual identifies.
Initiative In Erikson’s theory, initiative is
the major developmental task in the third
stage of childhood. Initiative is charac-
terized by the ability to initiate activities
oneself, rather than merely responding to
others or feeling guilt at not measuring
up to others’ expectations.
Innate ability Capability of an infant that is
inborn or biologically based.
Innate reflex Reflexive response present at
birth.
Insanity A legal term, not a psychological or
psychiatric one, referring to a person who
is unable, because of a mental disorder or
defect, to conform his or her behavior to
the law.
Insight learning A form of cognitive learn-
ing, originally described by the Gestalt
psychologists, in which problem solving
occurs by means of a sudden reorganiza-
tion of perceptions.
Insight therapy Psychotherapy in which
the therapist helps the patient/client un-
derstand (gain insight into) his or her
problems.
Insomnia The most common of sleep
disorders—involving insufficient sleep,
the inability to fall asleep quickly,
frequent arousals, or early awakenings.
Instinct theory The now-outmoded view
that certain behaviors are completely
determined by innate factors. The instinct
theory was flawed because it overlooked
the effects of learning and because it em-
ployed instincts merely as labels rather
than as explanations for behavior.
Instinctive drift The tendency of an organ-
ism’s innate (instinctive) responses to
interfere with learned behavior.
Integration A final phase of grieving, in
which the loss becomes incorporated into
the self.
Hypochondriasis A somatoform disorder
involving excessive concern about health
and disease; also called hypochondria.
Hypothalamus A limbic structure that
serves as the brain’s blood-testing labora-
tory, constantly monitoring the blood to
determine the condition of the body.
Hypothesis A statement predicting the
outcome of a scientific study; a state-
ment predicting the relationship among
variables in a study.
Id The primitive, unconscious por-
tion of the personality that houses the
most basic drives and stores repressed
memories.
Identification The mental process by which
an individual tries to become like another
person, especially the same-sex parent.
Identity In Erikson’s theory, identity is a
sense of who one is—a coherent self.
Developing a sense of identity is the main
goal of adolescence.
Illusion You have experienced an illusion
when you have a demonstrably incorrect
perception of a stimulus pattern, espe-
cially one that also fools others who are
observing the same stimulus. (If no one
else sees it the way you do, you could be
having a hallucination.)
Immunosuppression Impairment in the func-
tion of the immune system.
Implicit memory A memory that was not
deliberately learned or of which you have
no conscious awareness.
Implicit personality theory A person’s set of
unquestioned assumptions about person-
ality, used to simplify the task of under-
standing others.
Imprinting A primitive form of learning in
which some young animals follow and
form an attachment to the first moving
object they see and hear.
Inattentional blindness A failure to notice
changes occurring in one’s visual field,
apparently caused by narrowing the
focus of one’s attention.
Independent variable A stimulus condi-
tion so named because the experimenter
changes it independently of all the
other carefully controlled experimental
conditions.
Individualism The view, common in the
Euro-American world, that places a high
value on individual achievement and
distinction.
Industry Erikson’s term for a sense of con-
fidence that characterizes the main goal
of the fourth developmental stage in
childhood. Children who do not develop

G-9 G L O S S A R Y
Maintenance rehearsal involves no active
elaboration.
Major depression A form of depression that
does not alternate with mania.
Manifest content The story line of a
dream, taken at face value without
interpretation.
Matching hypothesis The prediction that
most people will find friends and mates
that are perceived to be of about their
same level of attractiveness.
Maturation The process by which the ge-
netic program manifests itself over time.
Medical model The view that mental dis-
orders are diseases that, like ordinary
physical diseases, have objective physical
causes and require specific treatments.
Meditation A state of consciousness of-
ten induced by focusing on a repetitive
behavior, assuming certain body posi-
tions, and minimizing external stimu-
lation. Meditation may be intended to
enhance self-knowledge, well-being, and
spirituality.
Medulla A brain-stem structure that con-
trols breathing and heart rate. The sen-
sory and motor pathways connecting the
brain to the body cross in the medulla.
Memory Any system—human, animal,
or machine—that encodes, stores, and re-
trieves information.
Menarche The onset of menstruation.
Mental age (MA) The average age at which
normal (average) individuals achieve a
particular score.
Mental operation Solving a problem by
manipulating images in one’s mind.
Mental representation The ability to form
internal images of objects and events.
Mental retardation Often conceived as rep-
resenting the lower 2 percent of the IQ
range, commencing about 30 points be-
low average (below about 70 points).
More sophisticated definitions also take
into account an individual’s level of
social functioning and other abilities.
Mental set The tendency to respond to a
new problem in the manner used for a
previous problem.
Mere exposure effect A learned preference
for stimuli to which we have been previ-
ously exposed.
Method of loci A mnemonic technique that
involves associating items on a list with
a sequence of familiar physical locations.
Mimicry The imitation of other people’s
behaviors.
Mindset The extent to which one believes
abilities and talents are fixed by nature or
stimulus elements together to form a per-
cept (Gestalt).
Learned helplessness A condition in which
depressed individuals learn to attribute
negative events to their own personal
flaws or external conditions that the per-
son feels helpless to change. People with
learned helplessness can be thought of as
having an extreme form of external locus
of control.
Learned helplessness Pattern of failure to
respond to threatening stimuli after an
organism experiences a series of ineffec-
tive responses.
Learning A lasting change in behavior
or mental processes that results from
experience.
Learning-based inference The view that per-
ception is primarily shaped by learning
(or experience), rather than by innate
factors.
Levels-of-processing theory The explana-
tion for the fact that information that
is more thoroughly connected to mean-
ingful items in long-term memory (more
“deeply” processed) will be remembered
better.
Libido The Freudian concept of psychic
energy that drives individuals to experi-
ence sensual pleasure.
Limbic system The middle layer of the
brain, involved in emotion and memory.
The limbic system includes the hippo-
campus, amygdala, hypothalamus, and
other structures.
Locus of control A relatively stable pattern
of behavior that characterizes individual
expectations about the ability to influ-
ence the outcomes in life; an individual’s
sense of whether control over his or her
life is internal or external; An individual’s
sense of whether control over his or her
life is internal or external.
Long-term memory (LTM) The third of three
memory stages, with the largest capacity
and longest duration; LTM stores mate-
rial organized according to meaning.
Long-term potentiation A biological pro-
cess involving physical changes that
strengthen the synapses in groups of
nerve cells that is believed to be the neu-
ral basis of learning.
Loudness A sensory characteristic of sound
produced by the amplitude (intensity) of
the sound wave.
Maintenance rehearsal A working-mem-
ory process in which information is
merely repeated or reviewed to keep it
from fading while in working memory.
Labeling Refers to the undesirable prac-
tice of attaching diagnoses of mental
disorders to people and then using them
as stereotypes—treating the afflicted in-
dividuals as if the labels explained their
whole personalities. Psychiatric labels can
also stigmatize people.
Language acquisition device (LAD) A biologi-
cally organized mental structure in the
brain that facilitates the learning of lan-
guage because (according to Chomsky) it
is innately programmed with some of the
fundamental rules of grammar.
Latent content The symbolic meaning of ob-
jects and events in a dream. Latent con-
tent is usually an interpretation based on
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory or one of
its variants. For example, the latent con-
tent of a dream involving clocks might
involve fear of the menstrual cycle and,
hence, of one’s sexuality.
Lateralization of emotion The two brain
hemispheres process different emotions.
The left hemisphere apparently focuses
on positive emotions (for example, hap-
piness), while the right hemisphere deals
primarily with negative emotions (such
as anger).
Law of common fate The Gestalt principle
that we tend to group similar objects to-
gether that share a common motion or
destination.
Law of continuity The Gestalt principle that
we prefer perceptions of connected and
continuous figures to disconnected and
disjointed ones.
Law of effect The idea that responses that
produced desirable results would be
learned or “stamped” into the organism.
Law of Prägnanz The most general Gestalt
principle, which states that the simplest
organization, requiring the least cognitive
effort, will emerge as the figure. Prägnanz
shares a common root with pregnant,
and so it carries the idea of a “fully de-
veloped figure.” That is, our perceptual
system prefers to see a fully developed
Gestalt, such as a complete circle—as
opposed to a broken circle.
Law of proximity The Gestalt principle that
we tend to group objects together when
they are near each other. Proximity
means “nearness.”
Law of similarity The Gestalt principle that
we tend to group similar objects together
in our perceptions.
Laws of perceptual grouping The Gestalt
principles of similarity, proximity, con-
tinuity, and common fate. These “laws”
suggest how our brains prefer to group

G L O S S A R Y G-10
Negative punishment The removal of an
attractive stimulus after a response.
Negative reinforcement The removal of an
unpleasant or aversive stimulus, contin-
gent on a particular behavior. Contrast
with punishment.
Neo-Freudian Literally “new Freudian” re-
fers to theorists who broke with Freud but
whose theories retain a psychodynamic
aspect, especially a focus on motivation
as the source of energy for the personality.
Neo-Freudian psychodynamic therapy Ther-
apy for a mental disorder that was
developed by psychodynamic theorists
who embraced some of Freud’s ideas but
disagreed with others.
Neonatal period In humans, the neonatal
(newborn) period extends through the
first month after birth.
Nervous system The entire network of neu-
rons in the body, including the central
nervous system, the peripheral nervous
system, and their subdivisions.
Neural pathways Bundles of nerve cells
that follow generally the same route and
employ the same neurotransmitter.
Neuron Cell specialized to receive and
transmit information to other cells in the
body—also called a nerve cell. Bundles of
many neurons are called nerves.
Neuroscience The field devoted to under-
standing how the brain creates thoughts,
feelings, motives, consciousness, memo-
ries, and other mental processes.
Neurosis Before the DSM-IV, this term was
used as a label for subjective distress or
self-defeating behavior that did not show
signs of brain abnormalities or grossly
irrational thinking.
Neurotic needs Signs of neurosis in Horney’s
theory, the ten needs are normal desires
carried to a neurotic extreme.
Neurotransmitter Chemical messenger that
relays neural messages across the synapse.
Many neurotransmitters are also hormones.
Neutral stimulus Any stimulus that produces
no conditioned response prior to learn-
ing. When it is brought into a condition-
ing experiment, the researcher will call it
a conditioned stimulus (CS). The assump-
tion is that some conditioning occurs
after even one pairing of the CS and UCS.
Night terrors Deep sleep episodes that seem
to produce terror, although any terrify-
ing mental experience (such as a dream)
is usually forgotten on awakening. Night
terrors occur mainly in children.
Nonconscious process Any brain pro-
cess that does not involve conscious
system toward the muscles and glands;
also called efferent neurons.
MRI or magnetic resonance imaging An imaging
technique that relies on cells’ responses in
a high-intensity magnetic field.
Multiple intelligences A term used to refer to
Gardner’s theory, which proposes that there
are seven (or more) forms of intelligence.
Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) A widely
used personality test based on Jungian
types.
Narcissistic personality disorder Condition
involving an exaggerated sense of self-
importance, a need for constant attention
or admiration, and often a preoccupation
with fantasies of success or power.
Narcolepsy A disorder of REM sleep, in-
volving sleep-onset REM periods and
sudden daytime REM-sleep attacks, usu-
ally accompanied by cataplexy.
narrative A personal account of a stressful
event that describes our interpretation of
what happened and why.
Natural concepts Mental representations of
objects and events drawn from our direct
experience.
Natural language mediator Word associated
with new information to be remembered.
Natural selection The driving force behind
evolution by which the environment
“selects” the fittest organisms.
Naturalistic observation A form of descrip-
tive research involving behavioral as-
sessment of people or animals in their
natural surroundings.
Nature–nurture issue The long-standing dis-
cussion over the relative importance of
nature (heredity) and nurture (environ-
ment) in their influence on behavior and
mental processes.
Necker cube An ambiguous two-dimensional
figure of a cube that can be seen from dif-
ferent perspectives: The Necker cube is
used here to illustrate the notion that there
is no single “right way” to view psycho-
logical processes.
Need In drive theory, a need is a bio-
logical imbalance (such as dehydration)
that threatens survival if the need is left
unmet. Biological needs are believed to
produce drives.
Need for achievement (n Ach) In McClelland’s
theory, a mental state that produces a
psychological motive to excel or to reach
some goal.
Negative correlation A correlation coeffi-
cient indicating that the variables change
simultaneously in opposite directions: As
one becomes larger, the other gets smaller.
can change and grow through practice,
and that experience influences success
that requires hard work and effort, and
also one’s reactions to failure.
Mirror neuron A recently discovered class
of neuron that fires in response to (“mir-
roring”) observation of another person’s
actions or emotions.
Misattribution A memory fault that occurs
when memories are retrieved but are
associated with the wrong time, place, or
person.
Misinformation effect The distortion of
memory by suggestion or misinformation.
MMPI-2 A widely used personality assess-
ment instrument that gives scores on
ten important clinical traits; also called
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory.
Mnemonic strategy Technique for improving
memory, especially by making connec-
tions between new material and informa-
tion already stored in long-term memory.
Moderator Factor that helps prevent stress-
ors from causing stress.
Monocular cues Information about depth
that relies on the input of just one eye—
includes relative size, light and shadow,
interposition, relative motion, and atmo-
spheric perspective.
Mood-congruent memory A memory process
that selectively retrieves memories that
match (are congruent with) one’s mood.
Mood disorder Abnormal disturbance in
emotion or mood, including bipolar dis-
order and unipolar disorder. Mood dis-
orders are also called affective disorders.
Morpheme A meaningful unit of language
that makes up words. Some whole words
are morphemes (example: word); other
morphemes include grammatical com-
ponents that alter a word’s meaning
(examples: -ed, -ing, and un-).
Motivation Refers to all the processes involved
in initiating, directing, and maintaining
physical and psychological activities.
Motive An internal mechanism that arouses
the organism and then selects and directs
behavior. The term motive is often used
in the narrower sense of a motivational
process that is learned, rather than bio-
logically based (as are drives).
Motor cortex A narrow vertical strip of cor-
tex in the frontal lobes lying just in front
of the central fissure; controls voluntary
movement.
Motor neuron A nerve cell that carries mes-
sages away from the central nervous

G-11 G L O S S A R Y
Perceptual constancy The ability to recog-
nize the same object as remaining “con-
stant” under different conditions, such
as changes in illumination, distance, or
location.
Perceptual set Readiness to detect a par-
ticular stimulus in a given context—as
when a person who is afraid interprets an
unfamiliar sound as a threat.
Peripheral nervous system (PNS) All parts of
the nervous system lying outside the cen-
tral nervous system. The peripheral ner-
vous system includes the autonomic and
somatic nervous systems.
Permissive parent One of the four parenting
styles, characterized by setting few rules
and allowing children to make their own
decisions. While they may be caring and
communicative, permissive parents give
most decision-making responsibilities to
their children.
Persistence A memory problem in which
unwanted memories cannot be put out of
mind.
Personal unconscious Jung’s term for that
portion of the unconscious correspond-
ing roughly to the Freudian id.
Personality The psychological qualities that
bring continuity to an individual’s behav-
ior in different situations and at different
times.
Personality disorder Condition involving a
chronic pervasive, inflexible, and mal-
adaptive pattern of thinking, emotion,
social relationships, or impulse control.
Personality process The internal working
of the personality, involving motivation,
emotion, perception, and learning, as
well as unconscious processes.
Personality type Similar to a trait, but instead
of being a dimension, a type is a category
that is believed to represent a common
cluster of personality characteristics.
Person–situation controversy Debate over the
relative contributions to understanding
human behavior from personality pro-
cesses, like traits, versus social psychologi-
cal processes, like the power of situational
variables.
PET scanning or positron emission tomography
An imaging technique that relies on the
detection of radioactive sugar consumed
by active brain cells.
Phenomenal field One’s psychological real-
ity, composed of one’s perceptions and
feelings.
Phenotype An organism’s observable physi-
cal and behavioral characteristics.
Pheromones Chemical signals released by
organisms to communicate with other
complementary pairs, such as red or
green or as yellow or blue. The opponent-
process theory explains color sensation
from the bipolar cells onward in the vi-
sual system.
Optic nerve The bundle of neurons that car-
ries visual information from the retina to
the brain.
Optimism An attitude that interprets stress-
ors as external in origin, temporary, and
specific in their effects.
Out-group Those outside the group with
which an individual identifies.
Overjustification The process by which extrin-
sic (external) rewards can sometimes dis-
place internal motivation, as when a child
receives money for playing video games.
Oxytocin A hormone produced (by both
women and men) in response to a stressor.
Panic disorder A disturbance marked by
panic attacks that have no obvious con-
nection with events in the person’s pres-
ent experience. Unlike generalized anxiety
disorder, the victim is usually free of anxi-
ety between panic attacks.
Paraprofessional Individual who has received
on-the-job training (and, in some cases,
undergraduate training) in mental health
treatment in lieu of graduate education
and full professional certification.
Parasympathetic division The part of the
autonomic nervous system that moni-
tors the routine operations of the internal
organs and returns the body to calmer
functioning after arousal by the sympa-
thetic division.
Parietal lobes Cortical areas lying toward
the back and top of the brain; involved in
touch sensation and in perceiving spatial
relationships (the relationships of objects
in space).
Participant modeling A social learning tech-
nique in which a therapist demonstrates
and encourages a client to imitate a
desired behavior.
Peer marriage Marriage in which the couple
see each other as partners and friends,
as contrasted with the older stereotypic
roles of “husband” and “wife.”
Percept The meaningful product of percep-
tion—often an image that has been asso-
ciated with concepts, memories of events,
emotions, and motives.
Perception A process that makes sensory
patterns meaningful. It is perception that
makes these words meaningful, rather
than just a string of visual patterns. To
make this happen, perception draws
heavily on memory, motivation, emotion,
and other psychological processes.
processing, including both preconscious
memories and unconscious processes.
Non-REM (NREM) sleep The recurring pe-
riods, mainly associated with the deeper
stages of sleep, when a sleeper is not show-
ing rapid eye movements.
Normal distribution (or normal curve) A bell-
shaped curve describing the spread of a
characteristic throughout a population.
Normal range Scores falling near the middle
of a normal distribution.
Object permanence The knowledge that
objects exist independently of one’s own
actions or awareness.
Observational learning A form of cogni-
tive learning in which new responses are
acquired after watching others’ behavior
and the consequences of their behavior.
Obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD)  A con-
dition characterized by patterns of persis-
tent, unwanted thoughts and behaviors.
Occipital lobes The cortical regions at the
back of the brain that house the visual
cortex.
Oedipus complex According to Freud, a
largely unconscious process whereby
boys displace an erotic attraction toward
their mother to females of their own age
and, at the same time, identify with their
fathers.
Olfaction The sense of smell.
Operant chamber A boxlike apparatus that
can be programmed to deliver reinforcers
and punishers contingent on an animal’s
behavior. The operant chamber is often
called a “Skinner box.”
Operant conditioning A form of behavioral
learning in which the probability of a re-
sponse is changed by its consequences—
that is, by the stimuli that follow the
response.
Operational definitions Objective descrip-
tions of concepts involved in a scientific
study. Operational definitions may re-
state concepts to be studied in behavioral
terms (e.g., fear may be operationally
defined as moving away from a stimulus).
Operational definitions also specify the
procedures used to produce and measure
important variables under investigation
(e.g., “attraction” may be measured by the
amount of time one person spends look-
ing at another).
Opiate Highly addictive drug, derived from
opium, that can produce a profound
sense of well-being and have strong pain-
relieving properties.
Opponent-process theory The idea that cells
in the visual system process colors in

G L O S S A R Y G-12
have the most contact. Proximity means
“nearness.”
Proactive interference A cause of forgetting
by which previously stored information
prevents learning and remembering new
information.
Problem-focused coping Action taken to
clarify and resolve a stressor.
Procedural memory A division of LTM that
stores memories for how things are done.
Projective test Personality assessment in-
strument, such as the Rorschach and
TAT, which is based on Freud’s ego de-
fense mechanism of projection.
Prospective memory The aspect of memory
that enables one to remember to take
some action in the future—as remember-
ing a doctor’s appointment.
Prototype An ideal or most representative
example of a conceptual category.
Proximal level of analysis Concerns stimuli
in the organism’s immediate environment
that can change motivational priorities.
(In humans, proximal could also refer
to things that the individual is thinking
about.)
Pseudo-psychology Erroneous assertions
or practices set forth as being scientific
psychology.
Psychiatry A medical specialty dealing with
the diagnosis and treatment of mental
disorders.
Psychic determinism Freud’s assumption
that all our mental and behavioral re-
sponses are caused by unconscious trau-
mas, desires, or conflicts.
Psychoactive drug Chemical that affects
mental processes and behavior by its ef-
fect on the brain.
Psychoanalysis A method of treating men-
tal disorders that is based on Sigmund
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. The goal
of psychoanalysis is to release unac-
knowledged conflicts, urges, and memo-
ries from the unconscious. (In common
usage, the term often refers broadly both
to Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and to
his psychoanalytic treatment method.)
Psychoanalytic theory Freud’s theory of per-
sonality and mental disorder.
Psychodynamic psychology A clinical ap-
proach emphasizing the understanding of
mental disorders in terms of unconscious
needs, desires, memories, and conflicts.
Psychodynamic theory A group of theo-
ries that originated with Freud. All em-
phasize motivation—often unconscious
motivation—and the influence of the past
on the development of mental disorders.
Positive psychology A recent movement
within psychology, focusing on desirable
aspects of human functioning, as opposed
to an emphasis on psychopathology.
Positive psychotherapy (PPT) A relatively
new form of cognitive–behavioral treat-
ment that seeks to emphasize growth,
health, and happiness.
Positive punishment The application of an
aversive stimulus after a response.
Positive reinforcement A stimulus presented
after a response and increasing the prob-
ability of that response happening again.
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) A
delayed stress reaction in which an indi-
vidual involuntarily re-experiences emo-
tional, cognitive, and behavioral aspects
of past trauma.
Practical intelligence According to Sternberg,
the ability to cope with the environment;
sometimes called “street smarts.”
Preconscious Freud’s notion that the mind
has a special unconscious storehouse for
information not currently in conscious-
ness but readily available to consciousness.
Example: your telephone number is stored
in the preconscious.
Prejudice A negative attitude toward an in-
dividual based solely on his or her mem-
bership in a particular group or category,
often without any direct evidence.
Premack principle The concept, developed
by David Premack, that a more-preferred
activity can be used to reinforce a less-
preferred activity.
Prenatal period The developmental period
before birth.
Preoperational stage The second stage in
Piaget’s theory, marked by well-developed
mental representation and the use of
language.
Preparedness hypothesis The notion that
we have an innate tendency, acquired
through natural selection, to respond
quickly and automatically to stimuli that
posed a survival threat to our ancestors.
Primary control Efforts aimed at controlling
external events.
Primary reinforcer A reinforcer, such as food
or sex, that has an innate basis because
of its biological value to an organism.
Priming A technique for cuing implicit
memories by providing cues that stimu-
late a memory without awareness of the
connection between the cue and the re-
trieved memory.
Principle of proximity The notion that people
at work will make more friends among
those who are nearby—with whom they
members of their species. Pheromones are
often used by animals as sexual attrac-
tants. It is unclear whether or not humans
employ pheromones.
Phobia One of a group of anxiety disorders
involving a pathological fear of a specific
object or situation.
Photoreceptors Light-sensitive cells (neu-
rons) in the retina that convert light
energy to neural impulses. The photore-
ceptors are as far as light gets into the
visual system.
Physical dependence A process by which
the body adjusts to, and comes to need, a
drug for its everyday functioning.
Pitch A sensory characteristic of sound pro-
duced by the frequency of the sound wave.
Pituitary gland The “master gland” that
produces hormones influencing the secre-
tions of all other endocrine glands, as well
as a hormone that influences growth. The
pituitary is attached to the brain’s hypo-
thalamus, from which it takes its orders.
Placebo (pla-SEE-bo) Substance that ap-
pears to be a drug but is not. Placebos are
often referred to as “sugar pills” because
they might contain only sugar, rather
than a real drug.
Placebo effect A response to a placebo
(a fake drug) caused by the belief that it
is a real drug.
Placenta The organ interface between the
embryo or fetus and the mother. The
placenta separates the bloodstreams, but
it allows the exchange of nutrients and
waste products.
Plasticity The nervous system’s ability to
adapt or change as a result of experience.
Plasticity may also help the nervous sys-
tem adapt to physical damage.
Polygraph A device that records or graphs
many (“poly”) measures of physical
arousal, such as heart rate, breathing,
perspiration, and blood pressure. A poly-
graph is often called a “lie detector,” even
though it is really an arousal detector.
Pons A brain-stem structure that regulates
brain activity during sleep and dreaming.
The name pons derives from the Latin
word for “bridge.”
Positive correlation A correlation coeffi-
cient indicating that the variables change
simultaneously in the same direction: As
one grows larger or smaller, the other
grows or shrinks in a parallel way.
Positive lifestyle choices Deliberate deci-
sions about long-term behavior patterns
that increase resistance to both stress and
illness.

G-13 G L O S S A R Y
The reticular formation arouses the cor-
tex to keep the brain alert and attentive
to new stimulation.
Retina The thin light-sensitive layer at the
back of the eyeball. The retina contains
millions of photoreceptors and other
nerve cells.
Retrieval The third basic task of memory,
involving the location and recovery of in-
formation from memory.
Retrieval cue Stimulus used to bring a mem-
ory to consciousness or to cue a behavior.
Retroactive interference A cause of forget-
ting by which newly learned information
prevents retrieval of previously stored
material.
Retrograde amnesia The inabil ity to
remember information previously stored
in memory. (Contrast with anterograde
amnesia.)
Reuptake The process by which unused
neurotransmitters are drawn back into
the vesicles of their originating neuron.
Revolution in aging A change in the way
people think about aging in modern in-
dustrialized nations. This new perspective
grows out of increased longevity, better
health care, and more lifestyle choices
available to older adults. It has also stim-
ulated the psychological study of adult
development.
Reward theory of attraction A social learning
view that predicts we like best those who
give us maximum rewards at minimum
cost.
Rite of passage Social ritual that marks
the transition between developmental
stages, especially between childhood and
adulthood.
Rods Photoreceptors in the retina that are
especially sensitive to dim light but not to
colors. Strange as it may seem, they are
rod-shaped.
Romantic love A temporary and highly
emotional condition based on infatua-
tion and sexual desire.
Rorschach Inkblot Technique A projective test
requiring subjects to describe what they
see in a series of ten inkblots.
Rumination A pernicious form of negative
self-reflection in which a person dwells
on depressive thoughts and feelings in
response to stress; can compromise the
immune system.
Savant syndrome Found in individuals hav-
ing a remarkable talent (such as the abil-
ity to determine the day of the week for
any given date) even though they are
mentally slow in other domains.
environment mutually influence each
other.
Recognition A retrieval method in which
one must identify present stimuli as hav-
ing been previously presented.
Redemptive self A common self-narrative
identified by McAdams in generative
Americans. The redemptive self involves
a sense of being called to overcome ob-
stacles in an effort to help others.
Reflection of feeling Carl Rogers’s technique
of paraphrasing the clients’ words, at-
tempting to capture the emotional tone
expressed.
Reflex Simple unlearned response triggered
by stimuli—such as the knee-jerk reflex
set off by tapping the tendon just below
your kneecap.
Reinforcement contingencies Relationships
between a response and the changes in
stimulation that follow the response.
Reinforcer A condition (involving either the
presentation or removal of a stimulus)
that occurs after a response and strength-
ens that response.
Reliability An attribute of a psychological
test that gives consistent results.
REM rebound A condition of increased REM
sleep caused by REM-sleep deprivation.
REM sleep A stage of sleep that occurs ap-
proximately every 90 minutes, marked
by bursts of rapid eye movements oc-
curring under closed eyelids. REM sleep
periods are associated with dreaming.
Replicate In research, this refers to doing
a study over to see whether the same re-
sults are obtained. As a control for bias,
replication is often done by someone
other than the researcher who performed
the original study.
Representativeness bias A faulty heuristic
strategy based on the presumption that,
once people or events are categorized,
they share all the features of other mem-
bers in that category.
Repression An unconscious process that
excludes unacceptable thoughts and feel-
ings from awareness and memory.
Resilience The capacity to adapt, achieve
well-being, and cope with stress, in spite
of serious threats to development.
Resistance phase Second phase of the GAS,
during which the body adapts to and
maintains resources to cope with the
stressor.
Resting potential The electrical charge of
the axon in its inactive state, when the
neuron is ready to “fire.”
Reticular formation A pencil-shaped struc-
ture forming the core of the brain stem.
Psychological debriefing Brief, immediate
strategy focusing on venting emotions
and discussing reactions to a trauma.
Psychological dependence A desire to obtain
or use a drug, even though there is no
physical dependence.
Psychological therapy Therapy based on
psychological principles (rather than on
the biomedical approach); often called
“psychotherapy.”
Psychology The science of behavior and
mental processes.
Psycho-neuroimmunology Multidisciplinary
field that studies the influence of mental
states on the immune system.
Psychopathology Any pattern of emotions,
behaviors, or thoughts inappropriate to
the situation and leading to personal dis-
tress or the inability to achieve important
goals. Other terms having essentially the
same meaning include mental illness, men-
tal disorder, and psychological disorder.
Psychosexual stages Successive, instinctive
developmental phases in which pleasure
is associated with stimulation of different
bodily areas at different times of life.
Psychosis A disorder involving profound
disturbances in perception, rational
thinking, or affect.
Psychosocial stage In Erikson’s theory, the
developmental stages refer to eight major
challenges that appear successively across
the lifespan, which require an individual
to rethink his or her goals, as well as rela-
tionships with others.
Psychosurgery The general term for surgical
intervention in the brain to treat psycho-
logical disorders.
Puberty The onset of sexual maturity.
Punishment An aversive consequence which,
occurring after a response, diminishes the
strength of that response. (Contrast with
negative reinforcement.)
Random assignment A process used to as-
sign individuals to various experimental
conditions by chance alone.
Ratio schedule A program by which rein-
forcement depends on the number of cor-
rect responses.
Rational–emotive behavior therapy (REBT)
Albert Ellis’s brand of cognitive therapy,
based on the idea that irrational thoughts
and behaviors are the cause of mental
disorders.
Recall A retrieval method in which one
must reproduce previously presented
information.
Reciprocal determinism The process in
which cognitions, behavior, and the

G L O S S A R Y G-14
Sensory adaptation Loss of responsiveness
in receptor cells after stimulation has re-
mained unchanged for a while, as when
a swimmer becomes adapted to the tem-
perature of the water.
Sensory memory The first of three memory
stages, preserving brief sensory impres-
sions of stimuli.
Sensory neuron A nerve cell that carries
messages toward the central nervous
system from sense receptors; also called
afferent neurons.
Separation anxiety A common pattern of
distress seen in young children when sep-
arated from their caregivers.
Serial position effect A form of interference
related to the sequence in which informa-
tion is presented. Generally, items in the
middle of the sequence are less well remem-
bered than items presented first or last.
Set point Refers to the tendency of the
body to maintain a certain level of body
fat and body weight.
Sex chromosomes The X and Y chromo-
somes that determine our physical sex
characteristics.
Sexual orientation The direction of one’s
sexual interests (usually for individuals
of the same sex, the opposite sex, or both
sexes).
Sexual response cycle The four-stage se-
quence of arousal, plateau, orgasm, and
resolution, occurring in both men and
women.
Shaping An operant learning technique
in which a new behavior is produced by
reinforcing responses that are similar to
the desired response.
Shyness A common temperamental condi-
tion, but not a disorder, recognized by
the DSM-IV.
Signal detection theory Explains how we
detect “signals,” consisting of stimula-
tion affecting our eyes, ears, nose, skin,
and other sense organs. Signal detection
theory says that sensation is a judgment
the sensory system makes about incom-
ing stimulation. Often, it occurs outside of
consciousness. In contrast to older theories
from psychophysics, signal detection theory
takes observer characteristics into account.
Similarity principle The notion that peo-
ple are attracted to those who are most
similar to themselves on significant
dimensions.
Situationism The view that environmen-
tal conditions may influence people’s
behavior as much as or more than their
personal dispositions do under some
circumstances.
Self-disclosure The sharing of personal
information and feelings with another
person as part of the process of develop-
ing trust.
Self-fulfilling prophecy Observations or
behaviors that result primarily from
expectations.
Self-help support groups Groups, such as
Alcoholics Anonymous, that provide so-
cial support and an opportunity for shar-
ing ideas about dealing with common
problems. Such groups are typically orga-
nized and run by laypersons, rather than
by professional therapists.
Self-narrative The “stories” one tells about
oneself. Self-narratives help people sense
a thread of consistency through their per-
sonalities over time.
Self-serving bias An attributional pattern
in which one takes credit for success
but denies responsibility for failure.
(Compare with fundamental attribution
error.)
Semantic memory A subdivision of declara-
tive memory that stores general knowl-
edge, including the meanings of words
and concepts.
Sensation The process by which stimula-
tion of a sensory receptor produces neu-
ral impulses that the brain interprets as
a sound, a visual image, an odor, a taste,
a pain, or other sensory image. Sensa-
tion represents the first series of steps in
processing of incoming information.
Sensation seekers In Zuckerman’s theory,
individuals who have a biological need
for higher levels of stimulation than do
most other people.
Sense making One aspect of finding mean-
ing in a stressful situation, which in-
volves perceiving the stressor in a manner
consistent with our expectations of the
world as predictable, controllable, and
nonrandom.
Sensitive period A span of time during
which the organism is especially re-
sponsive to stimuli of a particular sort.
Organisms may have sensitive periods
for exposure to certain hormones or
chemicals; similarly, they may have sen-
sitive periods for learning language or
receiving the visual stimulation necessary
for normal development of vision.
Sensorimotor intelligence Piaget’s term for
the infant’s approach to the world, rely-
ing on relatively simple physical (motor)
responses to sensory experience.
Sensorimotor stage The first stage in Piaget’s
theory, during which the child relies heav-
ily on innate motor responses to stimuli.
Scaffolding A teaching strategy that em-
phasizes the role of help from others in
providing support for a person’s learning.
Scapegoating Blaming an innocent person or
a group for one’s own troubles and then
discriminating against or abusing them.
Schedule of reinforcement A program spe-
cifying the frequency and timing of
reinforcements.
Schema Cluster of related information that
represents ideas or concepts in seman-
tic memory. Schemas provide a context
for understanding objects and events;
in Piaget’s theory, a mental structure or
program that guides a developing child’s
thought.
Schizophrenia (pronounced skits-o-
FRENNY-a) A psychotic disorder involv-
ing distortions in thoughts, perceptions,
and/or emotions.
Schlesinger Report Report issued by one
of the official investigations of the Abu
Ghraib Prison abuses, headed by James
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense.
It highlighted the social psychological
factors that contributed to creating an
abusive environment.
Scientific method A four-step process for
empirical investigation of a hypothesis
under conditions designed to control
biases and subjective judgments.
Script Knowledge about the events, ob-
jects, and actions expected in a particular
situation.
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) A form
of depression believed to be caused by
deprivation of sunlight.
Secondary control Efforts aimed at control-
ling one’s reactions to external events.
Secure attachment The attachment style of
children who are relaxed and comfort-
able with their caregivers and tolerant of
strangers and new experiences—as con-
trasted with children who are insecurely
attached.
Selective social interaction Choosing to re-
strict the number of one’s social contacts
to those who are the most gratifying.
Self-actualizing personality A healthy indi-
vidual who has met his or her basic needs
and is free to be creative and fulfil his or
her potentialities.
Self-consistency bias The commonly held
idea that we are more consistent in our
attitudes, opinions, and beliefs than we
actually are.
Self-control The ability to delay instant
gratification in pursuit of long-range
positive outcomes.

G-15 G L O S S A R Y
Stimulant A drug that arouses the central
nervous system, speeding up mental and
physical responses. Stimulants normally
increase activity level by encouraging com-
munication among neurons in the brain.
Stimulants, however, have been found
to suppress activity level in persons with
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
Stimulus discrimination Learning to respond
to a particular stimulus but not to stimuli
that are similar.
Stimulus generalization The extension of a
learned response to stimuli that are simi-
lar to the conditioned stimulus.
Storage The second of the three basic tasks
of memory, involving the retention of en-
coded material over time.
Stress The physical and mental response to
a stressor.
Stressor A stressful event or situation.
Structuralism A historical school of psy-
chology devoted to uncovering the ba-
sic structures that make up mind and
thought. Structuralists sought the “ele-
ments” of conscious experience.
Subjective well-being (SWB) An individual’s
evaluative response to life, commonly
called happiness, which includes cogni-
tive and emotional reactions.
Subliminal perception The process by which
a stimulus that is below the awareness
threshold can be sensed and interpreted
outside of consciousness.
Suggestibility The process of memory dis-
tortion as a result of deliberate or inad-
vertent suggestion.
Superego The mind’s storehouse of values,
including moral attitudes learned from
parents and from society; roughly the same
as the common notion of the conscience.
Survey A technique used in descriptive re-
search, typically involving seeking people’s
responses to a prepared set of verbal or
written items.
Sympathetic division The part of the auto-
nomic nervous system that sends mes-
sages to internal organs and glands that
help us respond to stressful and emer-
gency situations.
Synapse The microscopic gap that serves as
a communications link between neurons.
Synapses also occur between neurons
and the muscles or glands they serve.
Synaptic pruning The process of trimming
unused brain connections, making neu-
rons available for future development.
Synaptic transmission The relaying of infor-
mation across the synapse by means of
chemical neurotransmitters.
values, standards, skills, attitudes, and
motives to conform to those regarded as
desirable in a particular society.
Societal stressor A chronic stressor result-
ing from pressure in one’s social, cultural,
or economic environment.
Sociocultural perspective A main psycho-
logical viewpoint emphasizing the im-
portance of social interaction, social
learning, and a culture in explaining
behavior.
Soma The part of a cell (such as a neuron)
containing the nucleus, which includes the
chromosomes; also called the cell body.
Somatic nervous system A division of the pe-
ripheral nervous system that carries sen-
sory information to the central nervous
system and also sends voluntary mes-
sages to the body’s skeletal muscles.
Somatoform disorders Psychological prob-
lem appearing in the form of bodily
symptoms or physical complaints, such as
weakness or excessive worry about dis-
ease. The somatoform disorders include
conversion disorder and hypochondriasis.
Somatosensory cortex A strip of the parietal
lobe lying just behind the central fissure.
The somatosensory cortex is involved
with sensations of touch.
Spontaneous recovery The reappearance
of an extinguished conditioned response
after a time delay.
Stage of moral reasoning Distinctive way of
thinking about ethical and moral prob-
lems. According to Kohlberg, moral rea-
soning progresses through a series of
developmental stages that are similar to
Piaget’s stages of cognitive development.
Stage theory An explanation of develop-
ment that emphasizes distinctive or
rather abrupt changes. A stage theory
of cognitive development, then, empha-
sizes revolutionary changes in thought
processes.
Stanford Prison Experiment Classic study of
institutional power in directing normal,
healthy college student volunteers play-
ing randomly assigned roles of prisoners
and guards to behave contrary to their
dispositional tendencies, as cruel guards
or pathological prisoners.
Stereotype threat An expectation of being
judged by the standard of a negative ste-
reotype. Such expectations can adversely
affect performance. Also the negative ef-
fect on performance that arises when an
individual becomes aware that members
of his or her group are expected to per-
form poorly in that domain.
Skin senses Sensory systems for processing
touch, warmth, cold, texture, and pain.
Sleep apnea A respiratory disorder in
which the person intermittently stops
breathing many times while asleep.
Sleep debt A sleep deficiency caused by not
getting the amount of sleep required for
optimal functioning.
Sleep paralysis A condition in which a
sleeper is unable to move any of the vol-
untary muscles except those controlling
the eyes. Sleep paralysis normally occurs
during REM sleep.
Social comparison A type of cognitive
restructuring involving comparisons
between oneself and others in similar
situations.
Social context The combination of (a)
people, (b) the activities and interactions
among people, (c) the setting in which
behavior occurs, and (d) the expectations
and social norms governing behavior in
that setting.
Social distance The perceived difference or
similarity between oneself and another
person.
Social neuroscience An area of research that
uses methodologies from brain sciences
to investigate various types of social be-
havior, such as stereotyping in prejudice,
attitudes, self-control, and emotional
regulation.
Social norms A group’s expectations re-
garding what is appropriate and ac-
ceptable for its members’ attitudes and
behaviors.
Social psychology The branch of psychology
that studies the effects of social variables
and cognitions on individual behavior
and social interactions.
Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS) Psy-
chological rating scale designed to mea-
sure stress levels by attaching numerical
values to common life changes.
Social reality An individual’s subjective in-
terpretation of other people and of one’s
relationships with them.
Social role A socially defined pattern of
behavior that is expected of persons in a
given setting or group.
Social support Resources others provide to
help an individual cope with stress.
Social-cognitive theories A group of theories
that involve explanations of limited but
important aspects of personality (e.g.,
locus of control). All grew out of experi-
mental psychology.
Socialization The lifelong process of shap-
ing an individual’s behavior patterns,

G L O S S A R Y G-16
the individual and that guide his or her
thoughts and actions under various
conditions.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) A
treatment that involves magnetic stimu-
lation of specific regions of the brain.
Unlike ECT, TMS does not produce a
seizure.
Transduction Transformation of one form
of information into another—especially
the transformation of stimulus infor-
mation into nerve signals by the sense
organs. As a result of transduction, the
brain interprets the incoming light waves
from a ripe tomato as red.
Transience The impermanence of a long-
term memory. Transience is based on the
idea that long-term memories gradually
fade in strength over time.
Transition An individual’s redefinition or
transformation of a life role.
Traumatic stressor A situation that threatens
one’s physical safety, arousing feelings of
fear, horror, or helplessness.
Triangular theory of love Developed by
Robert Sternberg, a theory that describes
various kinds of love in terms of three
components: passion (erotic attraction),
intimacy (sharing feelings and confi-
dences), and commitment (dedication
to putting this relationship first in one’s
life).
Triarchic theory The term for Sternberg’s
theory of intelligence; so called because
it combines three (“tri-”) main forms of
intelligence.
Trichromatic theory The idea that colors
are sensed by three different types of
cones sensitive to light in the red, blue,
and green wavelengths. The trichromatic
(three-color) theory explains the earliest
stage of color sensation. In honor of its
originators, this is sometimes called the
Young-Helmholtz theory.
Trust The major developmental goal dur-
ing the first 18 months of life. According
to Erikson’s theory, the child must choose
between trusting or not trusting others.
Twin study A means of separating the ef-
fects of nature and nurture by which in-
vestigators may compare identical twins
to fraternal twins or compare twins sepa-
rated early in life and raised in different
environments.
Two-factor theory The idea that emotion
results from the cognitive appraisal of
both physical arousal (Factor #1) and an
emotion-provoking stimulus (Factor #2).
Thalamus The brain’s central “relay sta-
tion,” situated just atop the brain stem.
Nearly all the messages going into or out
of the brain go through the thalamus.
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) A projec-
tive test requiring subjects to make up
stories that explain ambiguous pictures.
Theory A testable explanation for a set of
facts or observations. In science, a theory
is not just speculation or a guess.
Theory of mind An awareness that other
people’s behavior may be influenced by
beliefs, desires, and emotions that differ
from one’s own.
Therapeutic alliance The relationship be-
tween the therapist and the client, with
both parties working together to help
the client deal with mental or behavioral
issues.
Therapy A general term for any treatment
process; in psychology and psychiatry,
therapy refers to a variety of psychologi-
cal and biomedical techniques aimed at
dealing with mental disorders or coping
with problems of living.
Timbre The quality of a sound wave that
derives from the wave’s complexity (com-
bination of pure tones). Timbre comes
from the Greek word for “drum” as does
the term tympanic membrane or eardrum.
Token economy An operant technique ap-
plied to groups, such as classrooms or
mental hospital wards, involving the
distribution of “tokens” or other indica-
tors of reinforcement contingent on de-
sired behaviors. The tokens can later be
exchanged for privileges, food, or other
reinforcers.
Tolerance The reduced effectiveness a drug
has after repeated use.
Top-down processing Perceptual analysis
that emphasizes the perceiver’s expecta-
tions, concept memories, and other cog-
nitive factors, rather than being driven by
the characteristics of the stimulus. “Top”
refers to a mental set in the brain—which
stands at the “top” of the perceptual pro-
cessing system.
TOT phenomenon The inability to recall a
word, while knowing that it is in mem-
ory. People often describe this frustrating
experience as having the word “on the
tip of the tongue.”
Trait and temperament psychology A psycho-
logical perspective that views behavior
and personality as the products of endur-
ing psychological characteristics.
Traits Multiple stable personality charac-
teristics that are presumed to exist within
Synchronicity The close coordination be-
tween the gazing, vocalizing, touching,
and smiling of infants and caregivers.
Synesthesia The mixing of sensations across
sensory modalities, as in tasting shapes or
seeing colors associated with numbers.
System power Influences on behavior that
come from top-down sources in the form
of creating and maintaining various situ-
ations that in turn have an impact on ac-
tions of individuals in those behavioral
contexts.
Systematic desensitization A behavioral
therapy technique in which anxiety is
extinguished by exposing the patient to
an anxiety-provoking stimulus.
Tardive dyskinesia An incurable disorder of
motor control, especially involving mus-
cles of the face and head, resulting from
long-term use of antipsychotic drugs.
Targeted rejection The exclusive, active, and
intentional social rejection of an individ-
ual by others.
Teachers of psychology Psychologists whose
primary job is teaching, typically in high
schools, colleges, and universities.
Telegraphic speech Short, simple sequences
of nouns and verbs without plurals,
tenses, or function words like the and
of—somewhat like the language once
used in telegrams.
Telomeres DNA protein complexes that
cap the ends of chromosomes and pro-
tect against damage to DNA.
Temperament An individual’s character-
istic manner of behavior or reaction—
assumed to have a strong genetic basis.
Temporal lobes Cortical lobes that process
sounds, including speech. The temporal
lobes are probably involved in storing
long-term memories.
Tend-and-befriend Stress response model
proposing that females are biologically
predisposed to respond to threat by nur-
turing and protecting offspring and seek-
ing social support.
Teratogen Substances from the environ-
ment, including viruses, drugs, and
other chemicals, that can damage the
developing organism during the prena-
tal period.
Terminal buttons Tiny bulblike structures
at the end of the axon that contain neu-
rotransmitters that carry the neuron’s
message into the synapse.
Terrorism A type of disaster caused by hu-
man malevolence with the goal of disrupt-
ing society by creating fear and danger.

G-17 G L O S S A R Y
temporal lobe, that involves identifying
objects.
Where pathway A neural pathway that proj-
ects visu tion to the parietal lobe; respon-
sible for locating objects in space.
Whole method The mnemonic strategy
of first approaching the material to be
learned “as a whole,” forming an impres-
sion of the overall meaning of the mate-
rial. The details are later associated with
this overall impression.
Whole-person perspectives A group of
psychological perspectives that take
a global view of the person: Included
are psychodynamic psychology, human-
istic psychology, and trait and tempera-
ment psychology.
Wisdom According to Sternberg, using
one’s intelligence toward a common
good rather than a selfish pursuit.
Withdrawal A pattern of uncomfortable or
painful physical symptoms and cravings
experienced by the user when the level
of drug is decreased or when the drug is
eliminated.
Working memory The second of three mem-
ory stages and the one most limited in
capacity. It preserves recently perceived
events or experiences for less than a min-
ute without rehearsal.
Zero correlation When two variables have
no relationship to each other.
Zygote A fertilized egg.
Variable interval (VI) schedule A program by
which the time period between reinforce-
ments varies from trial to trial.
Variable ratio (VR) schedule A reinforce-
ment program by which the number of
responses required for a reinforcement
varies from trial to trial.
Vestibular sense The sense of body ori-
entation with respect to gravity. The
vestibular sense is closely associated
with the inner ear and, in fact, is carried
to the brain on a branch of the auditory
nerve.
Vicarious traumatization Severe stress caused
by exposure to traumatic images or sto-
ries that cause the observer to become
engaged with the stressful material.
Visible spectrum The tiny part of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum to which our eyes
are sensitive. The visible spectrum of
other creatures may be slightly different
from our own.
Visual cortex The visual processing areas of
cortex in the occipital and temporal lobes.
Wave metaphor A way of conceptualizing
cognitive development, as occurring more
gradually—in “waves”—rather than
abruptly, as the stage theory suggests.
Weber’s law The concept that the size of a
JND is proportional to the intensity of
the stimulus; the JND is large when the
stimulus intensity is high and small when
the stimulus intensity is low.
What pathway A neural pathway, project-
ing from the primary visual cortex to the
Tympanic membrane The eardrum.
Type A Behavior pattern characterized by
intense, angry, competitive, or hostile re-
sponses to challenging situations.
Tyranny of choice The impairment of effec-
tive decision making when confronted
with an overwhelming number of choices.
Unconditioned response (UCR) In classical
conditioning, the response elicited by an
unconditioned stimulus without prior
learning.
Unconditioned stimulus (UCS) In classical
conditioning, UCS is the stimulus that
elicits an unconditioned response.
Unconscious In classic Freudian theory, a
part of the mind that houses emotional
memories, desires, and feelings that would
be threatening if brought to consciousness.
Many modern cognitive psychologists,
however, view the unconscious in less
sinister terms, as including all noncon-
scious mental processes.
Uninvolved parent One of the four parent-
ing styles, characterized by indifference
or rejection, sometimes to the point of
neglect or abuse.
Upward social comparison Comparison be-
tween one’s own stressful situation and
others in a similar situation who are
coping more effectively, with the goal of
learning from others’ examples.
Validity An attribute of a psychological test
that actually measures what it is being
used to measure.

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A-1
CHAPTER 1
1. c, 2. c, 3. c, 4. c, 5. b, 6. b, 7. d, 8. c, 9. c, 10. b, 11. d, 12. b
CHAPTER 2
1. d, 2. a, 3. b, 4. c, 5. c, 6. a, 7. a, 8. d, 9. b, 10. a, 11. a, 12. b, 13. d,
14. a, 15. b, 16. b, 17. c, 18. a, 19. c, 20. c
CHAPTER 3
1. d, 2. c, 3. c, 4. a, 5. d, 6. a, 7. a, 8. a, 9. c, 10. c, 11. b, 12. b, 13. c,
14. b, 15. a, 16. d, 17. c, 18. a, 19. d, 20. a
CHAPTER 4
1. b, 2. d, 3. d, 4. a, 5. b, 6. c, 7. c, 8. a, 9. d, 10. c, 11. b, 12. d, 13. c,
14. a, 15. b, 16. d, 17. a, 18. c, 19. b, 20. d
CHAPTER 5
1. d, 2. c, 3. b, 4. b, 5. d, 6. a, 7. b, 8. a, 9. b, 10. b, 11. c, 12. c, 13. d,
14. a, 15. b, 16. d, 17. a, 18. a, 19. b, 20. d
CHAPTER 6
1. d, 2. a, 3. a, 4. c, 5. c, 6. b, 7. a, 8. d, 9. b, 10. a, 11. c, 12. a, 13. b,
14. b, 15. a, 16. d, 17. c, 18. a, 19. a, 20. c
CHAPTER 7
1. d, 2. b, 3. c, 4. d, 5. d, 6. b, 7. b, 8. a, 9. d, 10. d, 11. c, 12. c, 13. a,
14. a, 15. c
CHAPTER 8
1. c, 2. c, 3. b, 4. c, 5. d, 6. b, 7. c, 8. a, 9. d, 10. d, 11. b, 12. d, 13. b,
14. a, 15. d, 16. c, 17. b, 18. a, 19. c, 20. d
CHAPTER 9
1. d, 2. b, 3. b, 4. c, 5. a, 6. c, 7. c, 8. a, 9. d, 10. b, 11. a, 12. b, 13. c,
14. a, 15. d, 16. c, 17. d, 18. b, 19. a, 20. c
CHAPTER 10
1. c, 2. b, 3. a, 4. b, 5. a, 6. d, 7. d, 8. b, 9. c, 10. b, 11. a, 12. c, 13. d,
14. a, 15. b, 16. b, 17. a, 18. a, 19. c, 20. d
CHAPTER 11
1. a, 2. c, 3. d, 4. a, 5. b, 6. a, 7. c, 8. d, 9. a, 10. b, 11. b, 12. c, 13. d,
14. a, 15. a, 16. c, 17. b, 18. c, 19. a, 20. d
CHAPTER 12
1. d, 2. b, 3. b, 4. b, 5. d, 6. a, 7. b, 8. c, 9. d, 10. b, 11. d, 12. b, 13. c,
14. a, 15. b, 16. a, 17. d, 18. b, 19. d, 20. a
CHAPTER 13
1. c, 2. a, 3. d, 4. b, 5. a, 6. b, 7. d, 8. c, 9. c, 10. d, 11. a, 12. c, 13. b,
14. b, 15. b, 16. d, 17. c, 18. a, 19. c, 20. a
CHAPTER 14
1. c, 2. b, 3. d, 4. b, 5. d, 6. c, 7. a, 8. b, 9. c, 10. d, 11. b, 12. d, 13. a,
14. c, 15. b, 16. c, 17. a, 18. d, 19. b, 20. c
ANSWERS TO D I S C O V E R I N G P S Y C H O L O G Y
Program Review Questions

1
A P P E N D I X
Making Sense of the Data: Descriptive
and Inferential Statistics
The famous Bennington College study, discussed in Chapter 11, showed that students’
political views can be profoundly influenced by their campus culture—which should
make it interesting for you to think about the climate of political opinion on your
own campus. Do the students at your college or university lean toward the liberal or
the conservative end of the spectrum? And are the students at your school typical of
their counterparts elsewhere in the country? In the following pages, we will use these
questions as a starting point for an exploration of the statistical methods psychologists
use to make sense of the data they gather in their research.
Every fall, the Chronicle of Higher Education publishes its Almanac Issue, which
reports the results of a survey of first-year students at colleges and universities across
the country. Table A.1 shows how a national sample stood on a number of political
issues (Chronicle of Higher Education, 2009). We will use this survey as the basis for
assessing the political leanings of your classmates and comparing them with those of
other students across the United States.
We will begin by converting the items in the national survey into a scale that mea-
sures liberal and conservative views. The second step will be to determine how you
might use that scale to assess your psychology class or some other sample of students
at your college or university. Next, we will show you how the resulting data might
be organized and analyzed so that you could compare your own survey results with
the national student survey data. In addition, we will discuss how your data could be
linked, or correlated, with other measures, such as income, gender, or grade-point aver-
age. Then, in the final section of this Appendix, we will point out some of the statistical
pitfalls into which the unwary researcher may become trapped.
Developing a Survey of Political Views on Your Campus
A look at Table A.1 reveals that the items on the national survey are written in two differ-
ent ways. Some questions are worded so that agreement is a “conservative” response. (Item
#1 is an example of conservative wording: “There is too much concern in the courts for
the rights of criminals.”) Other items are worded so that agreement is a “liberal” response.
(Item #7, for example, is worded in the liberal direction: “The death penalty should be
abolished.”) Good surveys are constructed in this way to be neutral and to control for the
tendency some people have of simply agreeing or disagreeing with each statement.
In Table A.1, we have indicated on each item whether agreement with the state-
ment indicates a liberal or a conservative attitude. While you may disagree with our
judgment about the liberalness or conservativeness of a particular item, it is important
to note that you can clearly see what we mean by “liberal” and “conservative” by the
way we have designated each item. (In a study such as this, researchers would probably
have panels of judges rate the items as liberal or conservative and then use only those
A-1

A-2 A P P E N D I X Making Sense of the Data: Descriptive and Inferential Statistics
on which there was a consensus.) By doing so, we have given operational definitions of
the terms liberal and conservative. Together, these items comprise what we will call our
Liberal–Conservative Scale (LCS). By administering the LCS to your class, you can not
only obtain political attitude scores for students in your class, but you can also com-
pare the class’s responses with the national survey data.
To score the responses obtained on the LCS, we will give one point for each of the
following “liberal” items with which a respondent agrees: 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 12. Further,
we will give another point for each of the following “conservative” items with which a
respondent disagrees: 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 11. Since there are twelve items on the scale, the
maximum number of points a person could score is 12, and the minimum 0. High scores
will indicate a liberal tendency and low scores will indicate a conservative tendency.
(There is no value judgment here: Neither a high or low score is judged as being better.)
To illustrate how we might use the LCS in a study of students’ political attitudes,
let’s suppose that we have administered the LCS to a class of 50 students. The result-
ing data (which we have contrived) appear in Table A.2. By counting the questions on
which the majority gave a liberal response, we find that our class was more conserva-
tive (with conservative majorities on six items) than was the national sample (which
had liberal majorities on eight items).
While this is an interesting result, there is much more that can be learned by orga-
nizing the data obtained from our survey. Let’s first take a look at the raw data in the
next section.
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 1
An operational definition indicates
the researcher’s meaning in
concrete terms (p. 24).
TABLE A.1 National Student Survey Data
Agree Strongly or Somewhat That:
Agree
(percent)
Majority
Response
Liberal
Response
(percent)a
1. There is too much concern in the courts for the
rights of criminals. (agree = conservative)b
57.4 Conservative 42.6
2. Abortion should be legal. (agree = liberal) 58.2 Liberal 58.2
3. Through hard work, everybody can succeed in
American society. (conservative)
78.6 Conservative 21.4
4. Marijuana should be legalized. (liberal) 41.3 Conservative 41.3
5. Addressing global warming should be a federal
priority. (liberal)
74.3 liberal 74.3
6. It is important to have laws prohibiting
homosexual relationships. (conservative)
23.4 Liberal 76.6
7. The death penalty should be abolished.
(liberal)
34.9 Conservative 34.9
8. Racial discrimination is no longer a problem in
America. (conservative)
20.1 Liberal 79.9
9. The federal government should do more to
control the sale of handguns. (liberal)
72.2 Liberal 72.2
10. Undocumented immigrants should be denied
access to public education. (conservative)
47.2 Liberal 52.8
11. Affirmative action in college admissions should
be abolished. (conservative)
47.6 Liberal 52.4
12. A national health care plan is needed to cover
everybody’s medical costs. (liberal)
70.3 Liberal 70.3
aThe score in this column has been converted to accord with the LCS scoring system. So, when the item has been
worded conservatively, the LCS score is calculated by subtracting the percentage who agree from 100.
bThe notation in parentheses indicates whether the question is worded so that agreement constitutes a liberal or
a conservative answer.

Organizing the Data A-3
Organizing the Data
In addition to the data showing how students responded on each question, we obtained
the following set of LCS scores for the class.
TABLE A.2 Distribution of LCS Responses from a Class of 50 College Students
Agree Strongly or Somewhat That:
Number of
Respondents
Who Agree
Agree
(percent) Majority Response
Liberal
Response
(percent)
1. There is too much concern in the courts for the rights of
criminals.
36 72 Conservative 28
2. Abortion should be legal. 28 56 Liberal 56
3. Through hard work, everybody can succeed in American
society.
24 48 Liberal 52
4. Marijuana should be legalized. 24 48 Conservative 48
5. Addressing global warming should be a federal priority. 13 26 Liberal 74
6. It is important to have laws prohibiting homosexual
relationships.
16 32 Liberal 68
7. The death penalty should be abolished. 19 38 Conservative 38
8. Racial discrimination is no longer a problem in America. 14 28 Liberal 72
9. The federal government should do more to control the sale
of handguns.
24 48 Conservative 48
10. Undocumented immigrants should be denied access to
public education.
19 38 Liberal 62
11. Affirmative action in college admissions should be
abolished
31 62 Conservative 38
12. A national health care plan is needed to cover everybody’s
medical costs.
32 64 Liberal 64
4 2 6 5 8
3 5 8 6 5
6 4 4 10 7
6 3 6 5 5
3 7 8 8 7
7 6 7 2 8
8 6 8 3 4
1 1 1 9 3
4 7 11 9 9
9 1 8 4 1
The fifty scores in this table
represent the individual LCS
scores of the students in our
hypothetical class survey. As
you can see, they range from 1
to 11, with lower scores indi-
cating conservative viewpoints,
and higher scores representing
more liberal viewpoints. Creat-
ing this chart is the first step in
organizing our data.
As you can see immediately, a set of raw data in this form is nearly impossible to
interpret. Accordingly, our next task is to arrange the LCS scores into a frequency
distribution, as shown in Table A.3. In the Frequency column of the table, you will
see, for example, that five students received a score of 1, two scored 2, and so on.
Grouping of the data in this way makes much more sense than did the array of raw
data above. Going one step further, we can convert the data into a bar graph called a
frequency distribution A summary chart,
showing how frequently each of the various scores in a
set of data occurs.

A-4 A P P E N D I X Making Sense of the Data: Descriptive and Inferential Statistics
histogram, which we have drawn in Figure A.1. In this diagram, you can more readily
see that the students’ scores are not evenly distributed across the scale. The histogram
also makes it obvious that the scores are more are clustered near the middle of the
distribution than they are at the ends.
Describing the Data with Descriptive Statistics
We can bring our data into even sharper focus by calculating some simple descriptive
statistics, which are numbers that describe the main characteristics of the data. In par-
ticular, psychologists often find it useful to find a number that represents the middle of
histogram A bar graph depicting a frequency
distribution. The height of the bars indicates the
frequency of a group of scores.
TABLE A.3 Frequency Distribution of LCS Scores for a Class
This table shows how frequently each possible score occurred in our
hypothetical class survey. As you can see, 5 students scored 1, 2
students scored 2, and so on. At the bottom of the Frequency column,
the Greek letter ∑ (sigma) indicates the sum total of that column
(in this case, 50, representing the 50 students who participated in
our survey). The right column, entitled “LCS Score x Frequency” is
something that we will use in one of the next steps of our data analysis.
LCS Score Frequency LCS Score × Frequency
0 0 0
1 5 5
2 2 4
3 5 15
4 6 24
5 5 25
6 7 42
7 6 42
8 8 64
9 4 36
10 1 10
11 1 11
12 0 0
Sum or ∑ = 50 Sum or ∑ = 278
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1211
Liberal–Conservative Scale (LCS) Score
N
=
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
St
u
d
en
ts
ModeMedianMean
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
FIGURE A.1
Graphic Distribution of Scores
on the LCS
The height of each bar indicates how
many respondents obtained exactly that
score on the LCS. Note that the three
averages, the mean, the median, and the
mode, are in different locations, and the
distribution is not perfectly symmetrical.
The mean is heavily influenced by ex-
treme outlying scores, such as the four
students who scored 1 on the LCS.

a distribution—the central point around which the scores seem to cluster. This is called
a measure of central tendency. Additionally, researchers usually want a statistic that
indicates the spread of the distribution—how closely the scores bunch up around the
central point. This is called a measure of variability.
Measures of Central Tendency: Finding the Center
of the Distribution
You are undoubtedly more familiar with the everyday name for measures of central
tendency: averages. As their more formal name suggests, measures of central tendency
help us locate the center of a set of measurements, such as we have from the responses
we obtained on the Liberal–Conservative Scale. Three forms of central tendency are
most commonly used: the mean, the median, and the mode. Let’s look briefly at each
in turn.
The Mean Most people think only of the mean when they hear the word average. The
mean is, no doubt, familiar to you as the statistic used to calculate your grade-point
average. And it is the statistic psychologists most often use to describe sets of data. To
find the mean, you simply add up all the scores in a distribution and divide by the total
number of scores. The calculation is summarized by the following formula:
M 5 SX 4 N
Here M is the mean, S (the Greek letter sigma) is the summation of what immediately
follows it, X represents each individual score, and N represents the total number of
scores. In our example, to calculate the mean, we would first add up all the Liberal–
Conservative Scale scores (SX). The resulting sum is 278. Then we would divide that
sum by the total number of scores (N 5 50). Thus, our mean (M) of the LCS scores for
the class would be as follows:
M 5 278 4 50 5 5.56
Usually the mean is a good indicator of the center of the distribution, as you will
note in Figure A.1. Unfortunately, it has one potential flaw: Under some circum-
stances, the mean can be unduly influenced by extreme scores. When the distribu-
tion is relatively symmetrical, this is not a problem. But when the scores bunch up
toward one end of a distribution (in a skewed distribution), a few extreme scores at
the other end can have a disproportionate effect that pulls the mean toward the ex-
treme score. Because of this effect, researchers sometimes choose one of the other
measures of central tendency to find a more accurate average for a highly skewed
distribution.
The Median One of the alternative measures of central tendency is the median, the
middle score—the score that separates the upper half of the distribution from the
lower half. In our example, the median is 6. That is, half of the scores are 6 or higher,
and the other half are 6 or lower (see Figure A.1). The big advantage of the median is
that it is not distorted by extreme scores.
The Mode The third and simplest of the averages, or measures of central tendency, is
called the mode. It is merely the score that occurs more often than any other. In our data,
more students received a score of 8 than any other number, as shown in Figure A.1. The
modal responses for this class on our conservative/liberal scale, therefore, is 8. While the
mode is the easiest index of central tendency to determine, it is often the least useful,
especially when the sample is relatively small.
Take a look again at the distribution of scores in Table A.3 and Figure A.1. Which
of the averages seems to best fit the distribution? Is it the mean of 5.56, the median of
6, or the mode of 8?
descriptive statistics Statistical procedures
used to describe characteristics and responses of
groups of subjects.
mean The measure of central tendency most often
used to describe a set of data—calculated by adding
all the scores and dividing by the number of scores.
median A measure of central tendency for a
distribution, represented by the score that separates
the upper half of the scores in a distribution from the
lower half.
mode A measure of central tendency for a distribu-
tion, represented by the score that occurs more often
than any other.
Describing the Data with Descriptive Statistics A-5

A-6 A P P E N D I X Making Sense of the Data: Descriptive and Inferential Statistics
Using Averages How can we use averages to compare the class we tested with student
responses on the national survey? As shown in the last two columns of Table A.1, it is
easy to convert the national survey percentages to indicate liberal responses—much as
we did for the LCS scores. The mean of these national percentages is 56.4. That figure
is higher than the mean of our own data set, which is 54. These two scores jibe with
our earlier comparison of the two groups and further confirm that our class gave, on
the average, slightly more conservative responses than did the national sample.
Measures of Variability: Finding the Spread of the Distribution
In addition to knowing which score best represents the distribution’s center, it is often
useful to know how well the average represents the distribution as a whole. That is,
we may want to know whether most of the scores cluster closely near the average
or whether they are spread widely. We use statistics called measures of variability to
describe the spread of scores around some measure of central tendency.
To illustrate why variability is important, suppose that you are a third-grade
teacher, and it is the beginning of the school year. Knowing that the average child in
your class can read a third-grade-level book will help you to plan your lessons. You
could plan more effectively, however, if you knew how similar or how divergent the
reading abilities of the 30 children are. Do they all read at about the same level—that
is, do they have low variability? If so, then you can develop a fairly standard third-
grade lesson. But what if the group has high variability, with several who can read
fourth-grade material and others that can barely read at all? In the latter case, the aver-
age reading level is not so representative of the entire class, and you will have to plan a
variety of lessons to meet the children’s varied needs.
The simplest measure of variability is the range, the difference between the highest
and the lowest values in a frequency distribution. Return to the scores produced by our
hypothetical class on the Liberal–Conservative Scale. Accordingly, Figure A.2 shows
the scores range from 1 to 11. To compute the range, you simply subtract the lowest
score from the highest score. In our sample, then, 11 minus 1 yields a range of 10.
While the range is simple to determine, psychologists usually prefer measures
of variability that that take into account all the scores in a distribution, not just the
extremes. The most widely used alternative is the standard deviation (SD), a measure
of variability that shows an average difference between each score and the mean. To
calculate the standard deviation of a distribution, you need to know the mean of the
distribution, along with the individual scores. Although the arithmetic involved in cal-
culating the standard deviation is easy, the formula is a bit more complicated than
the one used to calculate the mean and will not be presented here. The general proce-
dure, however, involves subtracting the value of each individual score from the mean
and then determining an average of those mean deviations. (Many calculators have a
button for computing the standard deviation of a set of scores.)
range The simplest measure of variability, repre-
sented by the difference between the highest and the
lowest values in a frequency distribution.
standard deviation A measure of variability
that indicates the average difference between the
scores and their mean.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1211
Liberal–Conservative Scale (LCS) Score
N
=
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
St
u
d
en
ts
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean
–1 Standard
Deviation
+1 Standard
Deviation
FIGURE A.2
The Range and Standard Deviation
The range and standard deviation are
both measures of variability or spread of a
distribution. Note that most of the scores
lie within one standard deviation of the
mean.

Correlation: A Relationship Between Two Variables A-7
Happily, the standard deviation is easy to interpret. The larger the standard deviation,
the more spread out the scores are; the smaller the standard deviation, the more the scores
bunch together around the mean. Approximately two-thirds of the scores represented by
a normal distribution lie within one standard deviation on either side of the mean. In our
example, the standard deviation of the LCS scores is about 2.6. This indicates that ap-
proximately two-thirds of the group’s scores can be found within 2.6 points of the mean
(which is 5.56). To say the same thing in different words: about two-thirds of the scores in
our distribution lie between 2.96 and 8.16.
Together, the mean and the standard deviation tell us much about a distribution
of scores. In particular, they indicate where the center of the distribution is and how
closely the scores cluster around the center.
Earlier, we determined that the hypothetical data we obtained with our Liberal–
Conservative Scale revealed that students in the class we surveyed were, on the average,
slightly more conservative than students who took the national survey. The standard
deviation shows, however, that there is considerable variation in opinion. In fact, sev-
eral students in our sample have scores that are more liberal than the national average.
Correlation: A Relationship Between Two Variables
Now, let’s take our research a step further by asking whether a person’s tendency
toward liberalism or conservatism is related to other personal characteristics. Do
conservatives come from more affluent families? Are liberals more introverted?
Do conservatives get better grades? Are liberals more likely to major in the social
sciences and humanities, while conservatives major in business or the natural
sciences? Such questions deal with correlation, which is a relationship between
variables.
To illustrate, suppose we have a hypothesis stating that the conservative stu-
dents at your college or university are more money-oriented than are the liberal
students. (This hypothesis may be true—or it may not be true. Only a scientific test
can tell.) We can put our hypothesis to a test by first defining “money-orientation”
as “expected earnings five years after graduation.” Next, we would obtain a sam-
ple of students from your school and request two items of information from each
of them: (a) how much money they expect to make five years after graduation and
(b) their score on our Liberal–Conservative Scale. Our hypothesis, then, would pre-
dict that scores on the LCS would be associated—or correlated—with expected
income. Specifically, we would predict that lower income estimates would be
associated with higher LCS scores, while higher expected incomes would come from
respondents with lower LCS scores. An analysis of the data should reveal whether
the hypothesis is true.
For certain, we will get one of three possible outcomes: a positive correla-
tion, a negative correlation, or no correlation between expected income and LCS
scores. Each of these possibilities is shown graphically for a class of 26 students in
Figure A.3. Note that, if we were to find a positive correlation, then increasing
LCS scores would be associated with increasing expected incomes. In this case, the
points on the graph would cluster near an upward-sloping line, as in Figure A.3A.
If, however, the two variables turn out to have a negative correlation, then increas-
ing LCS scores would be associated with decreasing income expectations—and the
points on the graph would cluster near a downward-sloping line, as in Figure A.3B.
(A negative-correlation pattern was predicted by our hypothesis.) If there is no
correlation (or a near-zero correlation), the dots would fall randomly all over the
graph, as in Figure A.3C.
We can tell most precisely which one of these relationships we have by looking at
the correlation coefficient: a number that falls between –1.0 and +1.0. (You will also
learn how to calculate this number in your introductory statistics class.) If people with
high scores on one variable tend to have high scores on the other variable, the correla-
tion is positive, and the correlation coefficient will also be positive (greater than 0).
C O N N E C T I O N CHAPTER 6
A normal distribution forms a
bell-shaped curve (p. 237).
correlation A relationship between variables in
which changes in one variable are reflected in changes
in the other variable—as in the correlation between a
child’s age and height.
correlation coefficient A number between –1
and +1 expressing the degree of relationship between
two variables.

A-8 A P P E N D I X Making Sense of the Data: Descriptive and Inferential Statistics
If, however, people with high scores on one variable tend to have low scores on the
other variable, the correlation is negative, and the coefficient will also be negative (less
than 0). If there is no consistent relationship between the scores, the correlation will
be close to 0.
Making Inferences with Inferential Statistics
Now that we have seen how to use descriptive statistics to describe a set of data, let’s
turn to inferential statistics, which are used to determine (infer) whether the scores from
two or more groups are essentially the same or different. For example, if you hypoth-
esize that time spent studying is associated with the grades students receive, you could
use inferential statistics to compare the average amount of study time in a sample of
students with high grades to that of a sample with low grades. The details of the statis-
tical tests we could use in this example are beyond the scope of this brief introduction
to statistics. Suffice it to say that most inferential statistics take into account the differ-
ences between mean scores of each group, along with their standard deviations.
To be sure that any differences you find are real, you must also factor in the size of
the sample you used. As you might expect, with a small sample, a relatively large dif-
ference in grades between the two sample groups is required before you can conclude
that the samples represent truly different populations. In addition, you must consider
the distribution of scores in both groups. Do the sample scores approximate a normal
distribution? If not, you may have to use alternative statistical tests—which you will
learn about in a course on statistics.
Sampling
To have confidence in your results you must, of course, make sure that your sample
was selected in an unbiased manner. The safest way is to select subjects at random, by
a method such as drawing names from a hat. Sometimes obtaining a random sample is
not practicable: Just imagine trying to get a random sample of all college students in
the country! A good alternative is a representative sample. (This is what the Gallup
Poll and other major polling services do.) A representative sample reflects the important
variables in the larger population in which you are interested—variables such as age,
income level, ethnicity, and geographic distribution. Remarkably, a carefully selected rep-
resentative sample of only a few hundred persons is often sufficient for public-opinion
inferential statistics Statistical techniques
(based on probability theory) used to assess whether
the results of a study are reliable or whether they might
be simply the result of chance. Inferential statistics are
often used to determine whether two or more groups are
essentially the same or different.
random sample A sample group of subjects
selected by chance (without biased selection techniques).
representative sample A sample obtained in
such a way that it reflects the distribution of impor-
tant variables in the larger population in which the
researchers are interested—variables such as age,
income level, ethnicity, and geographic distribution.
Liberal–Conservative
Scale (LCS) Score
Liberal–Conservative
Scale (LCS) Score
Liberal–Conservative
Scale (LCS) Score
(B) Negative Correlation(A) Positive Correlation (C) No Correlation
Ex
p
ec
te
d
In
co
m
e
(t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
o
f
d
o
lla
rs
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112
25
50
75
100
125
150
Ex
p
ec
te
d
In
co
m
e
(t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
o
f
d
o
lla
rs
)
25
50
75
100
125
150
Ex
p
ec
te
d
In
co
m
e
(t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
o
f
d
o
lla
rs
)
25
50
75
100
125
150
FIGURE A.3
Three Types of Correlation

Making Inferences with Inferential Statistics A-9
pollsters to obtain a highly accurate reflection of the political opinions of the entire
population of a country.
Statistical Significance
A researcher who finds a difference between the mean scores for two sample groups
must ask if it occurred simply because of chance or if it represents a real difference
between the two populations from which the samples were drawn. To illustrate, sup-
pose that we compare the mean scores on the Liberal–Conservative Scale for the men
and women we surveyed. If gender has no influence on liberal/conservative attitudes,
then you would expect that the two means would be fairly similar, and any slight
difference we find in the samples would be due to chance. This would most likely be
the case, say, if we sampled 25 men and 25 women and their mean LCS scores differed
by only 0.1 point.
But what if the difference between the scores for the two groups is somewhat
larger? Say, 3 points? As you learned earlier, less than a third of the scores in a normal
distribution should be greater than one standard deviation above or below the mean.
So if there is no real difference between the men’s group and the women’s group, the
chances of getting a male sample with a mean score that is more than, say, two stan-
dard deviations above or below the mean for the female sample would be very small.
Thus, a researcher who does get a difference that great would feel fairly confident that
the difference is a real one and is somehow related to gender. The actual computa-
tion required to demonstrate this takes the sample size, the size of the difference, and
the spread of the scores into consideration. Again, the details of this computation are
beyond the scope of this book, but they are not difficult.
By common agreement, psychologists accept a difference between the groups as
“real” or “significant” when the probability that it might be due to chance is less than
5 in 100 (indicated by the notation p , 0.05). A significant difference, then, is one that
meets this criterion. However, in some cases, even stricter probability levels are used,
such as p , 0.01 (less than 1 in 100) and p , 0.001 (less than 1 in 1,000).
As you can see, any conclusion drawn from inferential statistics is only a statement
of the probability that the results reflect a real difference in the world rather than a
chance difference in the samples selected. Science is never about absolute certainty.
Truth in science is always open to revision by later data from better studies, developed
from better hypotheses, and better samples.
REFERENCE
The Chronicle of Higher Education: Almanac Issue 2009–2010. (2009, August 28). Chronicle
of Higher Education 51(1), 18.
significant difference Psychologists accept a
difference between the groups as “real,” or significant,
when the probability that it might be due to an atypical
sample drawn by chance is less than 5 in 100 (indi-
cated by the notation p , 0.05).

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Abelson, R.P., 222
Abrams, A.R., 582
Abrams, M., 386
Acevedo, R.P., 490
Acker, L.E., 140
Ackerman, J.M., 373
Ackerman, P.L., 232
Ackerman, S.J., 565
Acredolo, L.P., 270
Adams, L., 48
Adelson, R., 353, 354, 403, 406
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Agras, W.S., 378
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Ahrons, C.R., 489
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Bakker, A.B., 607
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Bamshad, M.J., 253
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Bard, P., 398
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Barker, L.M., 141
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Barnier, A.J., 346
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Baron, L., 605
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Barthomew, K., 202
Bartlett, T., 278
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Bauer, P.J., 186
Baum, W.M., 150
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Baumrind, D., 33, 289
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Baynes, K., 77
Beaman, A.L., 480
Beardsley, E., 333
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Beasley, M., 625
Bechara, A., 187, 188
Beck, A., 566, 567, 587
Beck, H.P., 140
Beck, M.R., 114
Bédard, J., 232
Bee, H., 280
Behrmann, M., 218
Beigel, A., 602
Beilin, H., 286
Bell, 379
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Bem, D.J., 453
Benassi, V.A., 443
Benedetti, F., 110
Benjamin, L.T., Jr., 145
Bennett, K.K., 625
Bennett, P.J., 269
Benson, E., 105, 255
Benson, H., 347
Berenson, A., 539
Berglas, S., 608
Berglund, M., 587
Berk, L.E., 274, 275, 278, 290, 291,
298, 303
Berkman, L.F., 635
Berman, J.S., 576
Bernieri, Frank, 220
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Bernstein, I.L., 142, 269
Berren, M.R., 602
Berridge, K.C., 348
Berry, J., 12, 246–247
Berscheid, E., 489
Beutler, L.E., 575
Beverley, R., 634
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Binitie, A., 535
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Bird, S.J., 33
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Bjorklund, D.F., 384
Blake, 99
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Blanchard, R., 386
Bland, R.C., 527t
Blashfield, R.K., 518
Blass, T., 472, 476, 477
Blatt, S.J., 417
Bluck, S., 189
Blum, D., 273
Blumenthal, J.A., 588
Bocchiaro, P., 476
Boehm, J.K., 373
Bogaert, A.F., 386
Bolger, M.A., 611, 612
Bolger, N., 609
Bonanno, G., 402, 627
Bond, C.F., Jr., 404
Bornstein, R.F., 484
Bostwick, J.M., 527
Bosveld, J., 334
Bouchard, T.J., Jr., 252, 265–267,
313–314, 422, 423
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340, 386, 390, 431, 487, 539,
543, 544, 557, 579, 589, 605
Bower, J.M., 66
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Bowlby, J., 274
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Boyd, D., 506
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Brett, A.S., 406
Brewer, M.B., 139, 312
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Brislin, R., 123
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Broca, P., 72
Bronfenbrenner, U., 267
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Brooks-Gunn, J., 302
Brown, 110, 355
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Brown, J.D., 194–195
Brown, J.L., 254
Brown, K., 334, 542, 581, 617, 636
Brown, L.L., 490
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Bruck, M., 206
Bruin, J.E., 269
Bruner, J.S., 300
Brunet, A., 161
Brunner, H.G., 47
Büchel, C., 161
Buckholtz, J.W., 543
Buckner, R., 333
Bucy, P., 68
Buhrmester, D., 302
Bulik, C.M., 378
Bullock, T.H., 54
Burger, J., 476
Burnette, M.M., 206, 207, 385
Bush, G.W., 434
Bushman, B.J., 160, 292
Buss, D.M., 13, 44, 69, 292, 384, 389
Bussey, Kay, 292
Butcher, J.N., 425, 517, 543, 582
Butler, A.C., 566
Butterfield, E.C., 240
Button, T.M.M., 269
Buzsáki, G., 113
Byne, W., 386
Byrne, D., 485
Cabeza, R., 311
Cacioppo, J.T., 470
Caldwell, M.R., 300, 394
Calev, A., 582
Calkins, M., 22t, 413–415, 416, 417,
435–433, 441, 444
Callahan, J., 346
Calvert, J.D., 486
Cameron, J., 367, 631
Campbell, S.S., 469
Canino, G.J., 527t
Cannon, W., 398, 614
Caplow, T., 308
Caporeal, L.R., 519
Capps, J.G., 406
Caprara, G.V., 423
Cardeña, E., 536
Carducci, B.J., 418
Carlat, D., 6
Carlsmith, K.M., 150
Carlson, L.E., 110, 351, 615, 637
Carnagey, N.L., 292
Carpenter, 402
Carpenter, G.C., 270
Carpenter, S., 113
Carran, D.T., 240
Carskadon, M.A., 337, 427
Carson, R.C., 536
Carstensen, L.L., 312, 313
Carter, J., 430, 431
Cartwright, R., 339, 340
Carver, C.S., 423, 429, 436
Carver, P., 386
Casey, B.J., 299
N A M E I N D E X
I-1

I-2 N A M E I N D E X
Fleeson, W., 453
Fleischman, J., 62
Fletcher, A., 338, 491
Flier, J.S., 376, 377, 379
Flynn, J., 238, 253
Foa, E.B., 605
Fobes, J.L., 68
Fogel, A., 270
Foley, H.J., 105, 109
Foley, V.D., 568
Folkins, C.H., 636
Folkman, S., 631
Forgas, J.P., 388
Foster, J.B., 111
Fouts, R., 248
Fox, R.E., 559
Frankl, V., 632–633
Franklin, C.L., 22t
Franklin, M.S., 339
Frantz, C.M., 269, 633
Fraser, S., 256, 300
Fredrickson, B.L., 622
French, J.R.P., Jr., 607
Freud, A., 430, 437
Freud, S., 17–18, 327–329, 339,
356–357, 371, 416, 428–436,
562–564
Freund, A.M., 313
Friedman, M., 379, 451, 622, 623
Friend, R., 467
Frincke, J.L., 5
Frith, C.D., 287
Frith, U., 541, 570
Fromm, E., 345
Fujita, F., 639
Funder, D.C., 453
Furnham, A., 427
Furumoto, L., 22, 414, 435
Gage, F.H., 42
Gage, P., 62, 387–388
Gahlinger, P.M., 352, 353
Gailliot, M., 380
Gainetdinov, R.R., 580
Galambos, N.L., 304
Galea, S., 602
Gall, F.J., 69
Gallagher, W., 289
Gallo, P.S., 55, 450
Gambrel, P.A., 373
Gamer, M., 406
Gami, A.S., 343
Ganchrow, J.R., 390
Garces, E., 255
Garcia, J., 140–141
Gardiner, H.W., 273
Gardner, A., 247–248
Gardner, B., 247–248
Gardner, C.O., Jr., 528
Gardner, H., 31, 230–231, 244–245, 325
Garland, A., 303
Garnsey, S.M., 218
Garry, M., 201
Gates, B., 214
Gazzaniga, M., 74, 75–77, 348
Gelman, R., 287
Genovese, K., 478, 490
Gentner, D., 232
George, M.S., 583
Gerard, H.B., 467
Gernsbacher, 541
Gerrie, M.P., 201
Gerrig, R.J., 502
Getzels, J.W., 231
Giambra, L.M., 331
Gibbs, W.W., 46, 115, 379
Gibson, E., 123
Gieler, U., 109
Giffords, G., 419
Gilbert, D., 333
Gilbert, K.R., 445
Gilbert, R.M., 603
Gilbertson, J., 484
Gilchrist, A., 115
Gillen, J.C., 529
Gilligan, C., 12t, 302
Gilmore, T.M., 617
Domhoff, G.W., 339, 340
Doob, L.W., 176
Dowling, J.E., 269
Downey, T., 597
Downing, J., 297
Doyère, V., 188
Doyle, R., 307, 379, 381, 509, 583
Draguns, J., 417, 547
Driscoll, E.V., 385
Druckman, D., 127, 426, 427
Dubner, S.J., 151
Duenwald, M., 107
Dugoua, J., 269
Duncan, S., 243
Dunn, K., 55
Durand, V.M., 535
Dutton, D.G., 399
Dweck, C., 256, 448
D’Ydewalle, G., 20
Dykema, J., 611
Eagly, A.H., 384, 467, 485
Ebbinghaus, H., 196–197
Eberhardt, J.L., 48
Eckensberger, L.H., 302
Edelman, G.M., 325, 329
Edwards, A.E., 140, 611
Ehrlich, P.R., 47
Eich, E., 537
Einstein, A., 230
Einstein, G.O., 194
Eisdorfer, C., 629
Eisenberger, R., 367
Eisler, R., 617
Ekman, P., 389–390, 390–391, 406
Elbert, T., 55
Elfenbein, H.A., 390
Elias, C.L., 278
Eliot, C., 413
Elliott, G.R., 625, 629
Ellis, A., 572–573
Ellison, J., 244
Ellsworth, P.C., 391, 491
Ennemoser, M., 292
Ennis, M., 617
Enzmann, D., 607
Epel, E.S., 618
Epstein, S., 453
Erdberg, P., 433
Ericsson, K.A., 230, 232, 310, 311
Erikson, E., 276–277, 293, 303,
306–308, 310–313, 439, 449
Escher, M.C., 117
Estes, D., 287
Evans, G.W., 606
Everitt, B.J., 355
Eysenck, H., 575
Ezzell, C., 527, 528
Fancher, R.E., 136, 139
Farah, M.J., 252
Faraone, S.V., 294
Faravelli, C., 527t
Farina, A., 546
Faris, R., 506
Fariva, R., 112
Farley, F., 397
Faulkner, A.H., 298
Faulkner, M., 624
Feingold, A., 485, 486
Felmlee, D., 506
Field, E., 505, 506–507
Field, T., 611
Fields, H.L., 55, 110, 313
Figley, C.R., 608
Figueroa, R.A., 250, 425
Finckenauer, J.O., 7
Findley, M.J., 443
Fine, M.A., 568
Finer, B., 346
Fiorillo, C.D., 161
Fiorito, G., 160
Fischer, A.H., 391, 392
Fischhoff, B., 227
Fisher, H.E., 108, 324, 490
Fishman, H.C., 568
Fiske, S.T., 447, 491, 492
Fitzpatrick, A.L., 618
Cross, D.R., 288
Crowder, R.G., 176
Crowell, T.A., 605
Csikszentmihalyi, M., 231, 241, 302,
368, 638
Cuddy, A.J.C., 492
Cynkar, A., 20, 380, 590
Cytowic, R.E., 108
Dabbs, J.M., 267, 292
Dackman, L., 117
Dadds, M.R., 300
Daily, D.K., 240
Dalai Lama, 442
Daley, K.C., 542
Daley, T.C., 238
Dally, J.M., 247
Dalton, A., 505
Damasio, A., 59, 73, 220, 325,
387–388, 398
Dana, R.H., 425
Danion, J., 537
Dannefer, D., 267
Danner, D.D., 632
Darby, J., 475
Darley, J., 479, 481
Darwin, C., 13, 14–15, 43–44, 390–391
Davenport, Y., 529
Davidson, P.S.R., 189
Davidson, R.J., 74, 347, 389, 394, 528
Davis, C.G., 603, 633
Davis, J.L., 485
Davis, L., 206
Davison, K.P., 567, 635
Daw, J., 581
Dawes, R.M., 220
Dawkins, K., 578
Dawson, D.A., 353
Day, N.L., 269
DeAngelis, T., 376, 379, 386, 510, 528,
572, 587, 590, 618
DeCasper, A.J., 270
Deci, E.L., 638
Deckers, L, 369
DeFries, J.C., 251
de Gelder, B., 98
de Groot, A., 232
Delaney, P.F., 333
Delgado, J.M.R., 395
De Martino, B., 389
Dement, W., 334, 336, 337, 338, 339,
341, 342
DeMeyer, G., 312
Dennis, M.G., 273
Dennis, W., 273
DePaulo, B.M., 403, 576
Derbyshire, S.W.G., 346
Dermietzel, R., 54
DeRubeis, R.J., 587
Descartes, R., 12
Deutsch, M., 467, 496, 497
Devereux, G., 560
Devilly, G.J., 634
Devine, P.G., 496
Devor, H., 385
DeVos, J., 287
de Vries, B., 302
DeWall, C. N., 111
Dewey, J., 15
Dewsbury, D.A., 33, 136, 247
Diamond, L., 384, 385
Dickens, W., 253
Diehl, M., 308
Diener, E., 303, 638, 639
DiFebo, H., 413
Dijksterjuis, A., 220, 221
Dillard, A.J., 632
Dingfelder, S.F., 106, 109, 113, 189,
221, 355, 403, 404
Dittmann, M., 559, 569
Dixon, R.A., 253
Dobbins, A.C., 98
Dobbs, D., 70, 528, 541, 573
Dodson, C.S., 176
Dohrenwend, B.P., 642
Doka, K.J., 605
Dolan, R.J., 68, 174, 188, 218, 389
Casey, J.F., 537
Cash, T.F., 485
Cassidy, J., 274
Cassileth, B.R., 34
Cattell, R., 243
Cawthon, R.M., 618
Ceci, S.J., 206, 253, 267
Cernak, I., 605, 606
Cervone, D., 414, 423
Chalmers, D.J., 325
Chamberlin, J., 572, 609
Chambless, D.L., 589
Chan, L., 269
Chapman, P.D., 235
Charcot, J., 428–429
Charles, S.T., 312
Charness, N., 232
Chartrand, T.L., 465
Chaudhari, N., 106
Chen, E., 623
Cherney, E.D., 292
Chi, M.T.H., 232
Chiaccia, K.B., 523
Chisuwa, N., 298
Chittajallu, R., 55
Chivers, M., 383
Chklovskii, D.B., 55
Chodzko-Zajko, W., 311
Chomsky, N., 280
Chorney, M.J., 251
Christakis, D.A., 292, 294
Christenfeld, N., 635
Christensen, A., 561, 575, 576
Chua, H.F., 122
Church, A.T., 449, 454
Cialdini, R., 507
Cianci, R., 373
Clark, M.S., 484
Clark, R.E., 161
Clay, R.A., 6, 309, 581, 588
Cleek, M.B., 308
Clifton, S., 402
Clinton, B., 430
Clinton, H., 496
Coan, J.A., 635
Coe, W.C., 346
Coghill, R.C., 111
Cohen, Alex, 547
Cohen, D., 449
Cohen, G., 498–499
Cohen, J.D., 63
Cohen, M.N., 48
Cohen, R.E., 602, 617
Cohen, S., 114, 625
Colcombe, S.J., 311
Cole, M., 20
Collins, A.W., 304
Collins, M.E., 496, 497
Collins, N.L., 275
Collins, S., 608
Colom, R., 238
Coloroso, B., 504
Conklin, H.M., 539, 540
Conner, D.B., 288
Conrad, J., 356
Conrad, R., 183
Contrada, R.J., 606, 622
Cook, M., 571
Cooper, A., 603
Cooper, R.S., 250, 253, 443
Corkin, S., 187
Costa, P.T., Jr., 452
Coughlin, E.K., 256
Courchesne, E., 271, 379
Covington, M.V., 367
Cowan, N., 609
Cowan, P.A., 609
Coyle, J.T., 538, 539, 578
Coyne, J.C., 34, 529, 579
Craik, F., 183
Crandall, C.S., 609, 610
Cranston, K., 298
Cree, G.S., 218
Crick, F., 336
Crohan, S.E., 638
Cromwell, R.L., 540

N A M E I N D E X I-3
Karlsgodt, K.H., 539
Kasamatsu, A., 347
Kassin, S., 201
Kaufman, G., 506
Kautz, K.J., 542
Kazdin, A.E., 148, 590
Keating, D.P., 300
Keel, P.K., 378
Keen, S., 494
Keidel, G.C., 608
Keller, M.B., 587, 589
Kelley, J.E., 635
Kemeny, M.E., 617
Kendler, K.S., 18, 528, 604
Kenealy, P., 315
Kenny, P.J., 379
Kenrick, D., 373–374, 453
Kern, M.L., 451
Kershaw, S., 509
Kesebir, S., 373
Kessler, R.C., 526, 531
Ketcham, Katherine, 206
Keynes, R., 44
Keysers, C., 71
Kiecolt-Glaser, J.K., 617
Kiehl, K.A., 543
Kierein, N.M., 249
Kieseppa, T., 530
Kiesler, C.A., 583
Kiester, E., 340
Kihlstrom, J.F., 328, 346,
357, 463
Killingsworth, M., 333
Kim, H., 165
Kim, J., 488
Kimble, G.A., 136
Kincade, K., 134
Kindt, M., 161
Kinetz, E., 535
King, P.M., 308
King, S., 324
Kinsey, A., 381
Kippax, S., 160
Kirkpatrick, L.A., 275
Kirsch, I., 345
Kitayama, S., 491
Kitchener, K.S., 308
Klag, M.J., 606
Klagsbrun, F., 308
Klein, P.J., 284
Kleinman, A., 547
Kleinmuntz, B., 405
Kleitman, N., 335
Kliegl, R., 311
Klinger, E., 333, 435
Kluger, J., 248
Klump, K.L., 378
Klüver, H., 68
Knapp, S., 32
Knecht, S., 75
Knox, D., 307
Kobasa, S.O., 625
Kochanska, G., 289, 290
Koechlin, E., 219
Koelling, R., 140–141
Kohlberg, L., 300–302
Köhler, W., 157–158
Kohn, S.J., 631
Kohout, J., 5, 20
Kolb, B., 271
Koltko-Rivera, M.E., 372
Kopta, S.M., 574
Koresh, D., 472
Kornreich, M., 575
Kosko, B., 216
Kosslyn, S.M., 48, 327, 394
Kotchoubey, B., 218
Koyama, T., 109
Krackow, A., 477
Krakovsky, M., 253, 315
Kramer, P., 579
Krampe, R.T., 310, 311
Krätzig, G.P., 165
Krueger, R.F., 543
Kukla, A., 24
Kulik, J., 189
Horne, J.A., 337
Horney, K., 437–439, 564
Horton, S., 399
Horvath, A.O., 557
House, J.S., 635
Howes, C., 291
Hu, F.B., 379
Huang, Y., 98
Hubbard, E.M., 108
Huesmann, L.R., 160
Hull, C.L., 370
Humphreys, L.G., 256
Hunt, E., 216
Hunter, I., 175
Huss, M.T., 6
Huston, Ted, 480
Huttenlocher, J., 280
Hwu, H.G., 527t
Hyde, J. S., 258, 308–309, 386
Hyman, M., 366
Hyman, R., 124, 151
Iacono, W.G., 539, 540
Ineichen, B., 484
Inglehart, R., 638
Insel, T.R., 520, 528, 534
Insko, C., 469
Isaka, S., 216
Ishai, A., 73
Iverson, P., 280
Ivry, R.B., 66
Izard, C., 389
Jablensky, A., 547
Jacobs, B.L., 350, 528
Jacobs, L.F., 159
Jacobs, R.C., 469
Jacobson, N.S., 561, 568, 575, 576, 602
Jaffe, E., 386, 549
Jaffe, S., 162
James, W., 14–15, 269, 329, 398,
413–414, 416
Janda, L.H., 485
Janis, I., 470–471
Janoff-Bulman, R., 603, 633, 638
Janus, C.L., 298
Janus, S.S., 298
Javitt, D.C., 538, 539, 578
Jenkins, J.H., 547
Jensen, A.R., 250, 254, 255
Jitendra, A.K., 221
Jobs, S., 214
Jog, M.S., 161
John, O.P., 423
Johnson, B., 399
Johnson, C., 528
Johnson, J.H., 642
Johnson, M., 615
Johnson, M.H., 271
Johnson, P.M., 379
Johnson, R.L., 5, 590
Johnson, V., 382–383
Johnson, W., 243, 300
Joiner, T.E., Jr., 543, 622
Jones, J., 472
Jones, M.C., 568
Jonides, J., 180, 184
Joseph, R., 77
Joyce, P.R., 527t
Judge, M., 597
Juliano, S.L., 55
Julien, R.M., 353
Julius, D., 110
Jung, C., 426, 436–437, 439, 564
Kabot, S., 541
Kagan, J., 276, 288–289, 422, 545
Kahneman, D., 228
Kairys, A., 452
Kako, E.T., 281
Kalman, I., 506
Kamil, A.C., 159
Kamin, L., 256, 313
Kandel, E.R., 53, 55, 79, 112, 113,
161, 485
Kantrowitz, B., 255
Kanwisher, N., 72
Karam, E.G., 527t
Karlsen, C.F., 519
Hariri, A.R., 47
Harlow, H., 108, 273
Harlow, M., 273
Harrington, D.M., 231
Harris, 140
Harris, B.A., 484, 485
Harris, G., 111, 269
Harris, J.A., 365
Harris, J.R., 302, 417
Harris, M.J., 249
Hartman, P.S., 244
Hartmann, E.L., 337
Harvey, J.H., 486, 489, 526,
604, 605, 628
Harvey, S.M., 298
Hasin, D.S., 529
Haslam, S.A., 221, 498
Hasler, G., 379
Hassebrauck, M., 486
Hastie, R., 227
Hatfield, E., 297, 488, 489
Hatzfeld, J., 495
Hawkins, S.A., 161, 227
Haworth, C.M., 243
Hazan, C., 275, 384
Hazeltine, E., 66
Headey, B., 639
Healy, D., 582
Heath, C., 315–316
Heatherton, T.F., 441
Hébert, R., 377, 530, 531
Hecht, A., 580
Heckhausen, J., 313
Heckler, S., 35
Heidrich, S.M., 309
Heincke, S.G., 309
Heine, S.J., 441, 487, 492
Heinrichs, R.W., 539
Helms, J., 255
Helmuth, L., 72, 219, 311, 355,
395, 542
Hendrick, C., 485
Hendrick, S.S., 485
Herek, G., 385, 386
Herrnstein, R., 256
Herron, W.G., 160
Hersen, M., 44
Hersh, S., 503
Hertwig, R., 33
Hetherington, E.M., 289
Hettema, J.M., 531
Hibbard, S., 433
Hickey, P.R., 268
Hickok, G., 71
Higgins, J.W., 571
Hilgard, E., 346, 347
Hill, J.O., 377, 639
Hilts, P.J., 67, 187
Hinton, I.D., 291
Hirai, T., 347
Hiroto, D., 624
Hirschfeld, L.A., 48, 579
Hirstein, W., 108
Hitch, G., 182
Hitler, A., 471, 494
Hobson, J. A., 341
Hochberg, L.R., 55
Hochwalder, J., 447
Hofling, C.K., 477
Hofmann, W.J., 628
Hogarty, G.E., 575
Holcomb, P.J., 218
Holden, C., 108, 148, 266, 527, 529,
530, 540, 544
Hollander, E.M., 604
Hollon, S.D., 575, 587, 589
Holloway, J.D., 591
Holloway, M., 55
Holmes, T.H., 152, 534, 578, 580, 582,
603, 636, 642
Holmes, T., 609
Holstege, G., 384
Holtzman, W.H., 640
Holtzworth-Munroe, A., 602
Homme, L.E., 148
Honzik, C.H., 159
Girgus, J.S., 114
Gittrich, G., 633
Gladwell, M., 220, 230, 448
Glanz, J., 180
Glaser, D., 273
Glaser, R., 617
Glass, G.V., 575
Gleitman, H., 159
Glick, P., 492
Glutting, J.J., 250
Goddard, H., 251
Goel, V., 68, 218
Gold, D.R., 249, 334
Goldapple, K., 587
Goldbaum, P., 506
Goldberg, C., 122, 608
Golden, C., 425
Goldin-Meadow, S., 280
Goldman-Rakic, P.S., 216
Goldstein, A., 347
Goleman, D., 241, 401–402
Golombok, S., 385
Gomez, R., 275
Gonzalvo, P., 233
Goodale, M.A., 112
Goodall, J., 247
Goodwin, F.K., 529
Goodwin, G., 206
Goodwyn, S.W., 270
Goss, P., 471
Gottesman, I.I., 539, 540
Gottlib, I.H., 573
Gottlieb, B.H., 640
Gottman, J.M., 308, 392, 489, 567
Gould, E., 616
Grace, A.A., 539
Graham, J.R., 425
Grant, B.F., 353
Gray, C.R., 176, 388
Graziano, M.S.A., 72
Greeley, A., 494
Green, C.S., 292
Green, D.M., 93
Greenberg, G., 386
Greene, R.L., 425
Greenshoot, A.F., 206
Greenwald, A.G., 127, 357
Greenwald, S., 527t
Greer, M., 114, 220, 337, 340
Gregory, R., 116–117
Grevert, P., 347
Grewal, D., 400–401
Grigorenko, E.L., 165
Grimm, O., 377
Griner, D., 557
Grinspoon, L., 351
Gross, A.E., 628
Gross, J.J., 389, 402
Grossman, C.L., 276, 603
Grove, W.M., 540
Gruben, D., 406
Guisinger, S., 378, 417
Gulliver, J., 22t
Gummerman, K., 176
Gunz, A., 449
Gur, R.E., 578
Guterman, L., 110
Guthrie, R., 31
Guyll, M., 622
Haber, R.N., 175, 176
Haberlandt, K., 173, 204
Hagen, E., 44
Haidt, J., 302
Haier, R.J., 243
Haimov, I., 337
Halberstam, D., 598
Hall, C., 339, 340
Hall, G.S., 22
Hall, M.J., 601
Halpern, D., 22t
Halpern, D.F., 8, 258
Hamann, S.B., 68, 395
Hamlin, K., 287
Harber, K.D., 601
Harder, B., 342, 343
Hare, R.D., 543

I-4 N A M E I N D E X
Mowrer, O.H., 568
Mowrer, W.M., 568
Mroczek, D.K., 312
Mueller, P.S., 529
Mueser, K.T., 539
Muhle, R., 267
Munakata, Y., 287
Munroe, R.L., 564
Munsey, C., 386, 397, 606
Murphy, G., 417
Murphy, J., 547
Murphy, L.B., 417
Murray, B., 340, 604, 628
Murray, C., 256
Murray, H., 365, 433
Murray, J.P., 160
Mussolini, B., 471
Muzzonigro, P.G., 299
Myers, D.G., 220, 303
Myers, I.B., 426
Myers, K.K., 402
Myers, P.B., 426
Myers, R.S., 636, 638, 639
Mylander, C., 280
Nachson, I., 190
Naglieri, J., 239
Nahemow, L., 484
Naigles, L.G., 281
Naik, G., 48
Nairne, J.S., 61, 177
Nantais, K.M., 315
Napier, A.Y., 567
Nash, M.R., 346
Necker, L., 15
Needleman, H., 254
Neimark, J., 528, 541
Neimeyer, R.A., 603
Neisser, U., 175, 234, 238, 253, 254
Nelson, C.A., III, 390, 417
Nelson, T.D., 113
Nemecek, S., 557
Nesse, R.M., 348
Nestler, E.J., 355
Neuberg, S.L., 447
Neuman, S.B., 281
Neville, H.J., 72
Newberg, A.B., 74
Newcomb, T., 464–465
Newman, B.S., 299
Newman, C., 377
Newman, S.C., 527t
Newport, E.L., 271
Newsome, D.A., 529
Nguyen, L., 347
Niaura, R., 622
Nicholson, I., 372
Nickerson, R.S., 8, 227
Nicoll, R.A., 351
Niedenthal, P.M., 388, 398
Nielsen-Gammon, E., 145
Niemi, M., 110
Nietzel, M.T., 535
Nigg, J.T., 542
Nippold, M.A., 292
Nisbett, R.E., 122, 165, 217, 253, 491
Nobles, W.W., 560
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., 529
Norcross, J.C., 590
Norenzayan, A., 122, 491
Norton, N.C., 576
Notarius, C.I., 308
Novak, M.A., 33
Novotney, A., 6, 378, 506, 588
Nowack, K.M., 612
Nungesser, L.G., 567
Nurnberger, J.I., Jr., 353
Oakes, P.J., 493
Oakland, T., 250
Oakley, D.A., 346
Oakley, D., 535
Obama, B., 496, 630
Oberman, L.M., 70, 541
O’Connell, M.E., 588
O’Connor, E.M., 580
Odbert, H.S., 423
O’Dea, J.A., 298
McCraven, V.J., 331
McCullough, M.L., 434
McDaniel, M.A., 194
McDermott, K.B., 199
McDonald, K.A., 636
McGaugh, J.L., 189
McGlone, M.S., 498
McGue, M., 252, 423
McGuire, P.A., 584
McGurk, S.R., 539, 587
McHugh, R. K., 590
McIntosh, A.R., 633
McKeachie, W.J., 165
McKeag, A., 22t
McLaren, S., 275
McLeod, F., 505
McNally, R.J., 531, 633, 634
McRae, K., 218
McVeigh, T., 509
Medin, C., 216, 224
Medora, N.P., 298
Meeus, W.H.J., 476
Mehl, M.R., 447
Meichenbaum, D.H., 631
Meier, R.P., 280
Meltzoff, A.M., 284, 575
Melzack, R., 109, 110, 352
Merari, A., 509
Mercado, C.C., 523
Meredith, N., 575
Merikle, P.M., 127
Merritte, D., 139–140
Mersky, H., 537
Mervis, C.B., 216
Metzler, J., 326
Meyer, S., 323
Meyer-Lindenberg, A., 543, 544
Meyers, L., 330
Miklowitz, D.J., 568, 587
Milgram, S., 460–461, 472–478
Miller, 640
Miller, A.C., 74
Miller, A.G., 474
Miller, D.T., 465
Miller, G., 69, 161, 180, 336, 340, 388,
389, 517, 541, 543
Miller, N., 485
Miller, P.Y., 298
Miller, R.S., 467
Miller, S.L., 105
Miller, W.R., 355
Milner, A.D., 112
Milner, B., 187, 191
Mineka, S., 533, 571
Minkel, S., 540
Mischel, W., 401, 417, 444, 453–454
Mitchison, G., 336
Miyake, A., 498
Miyake, K., 275, 276
Miyashita, Y., 73
Mizukami, K., 274
M’Naughten, D., 523
Mobbs, D., 531
Moen, P., 309
Moffitt, T.E., 278
Mogelonsky, M., 307
Moghaddam, E., 509, 510
Moise, J., 160
Molden, D.C., 448
Monaghan, P., 489
Mones, A.G., 445
Moñiz, E., 581–582
Monroe, S.M., 529
Monte, C.F., 439
Montgomery, K.D., 370
Moore, M.K., 284
Moore-Ede, M., 334
Moos, R.H., 635
Moran, J.M., 609
Morgan, A.H., 251
Mori, K., 468
Moriarity, T., 480
Morrell, E.M., 347
Morris, W.N., 467
Moskowitz, C., 299
Moss, R., 341
Luborsky, L., 557, 575
Lykken, D.T., 266, 638
Lynn, S.J., 345
Lytton, H., 151
Lyubomirsky, S., 373, 639
Maany, V., 578
Maas, J., 337, 340
Maccoby, E., 22t, 292, 641
MacCoun, R.J., 355
Machado, P.P., 287, 575
Macknik, S.L., 114, 124
Macmillan, J.C., 62
Macrae, C.N., 447
Maddi, S., 624–625
Madsen, L., 406
Maguire, E.A., 67
Maher, B.A., 519, 583
Maher, W.B., 519, 583
Maier, S.F., 110, 618, 624
Maisto, S.A., 352
Malenka, R.C., 355
Malitz, S., 582
Malpass, R., 20
Mancini, A.D., 627
Maner, J.K., 105
Manfredi, M., 110
Mann, L., 468
Mann, T., 379, 470
Maquet, P., 336
Maratos-Flier, E., 376, 379
Marcia, J., 303
Marco, C.A., 622
Marcotty, J., 48
Marcus, G.B., 202
Marcus, G.F., 281
Marentette, P.F., 280
Markman, H.J., 308
Markon, K.E., 543
Marks, J., 45
Markus, H.R., 366, 491
Marschall, J., 343
Marsh, 230
Marsh, H.W., 298
Marsh, P., 403
Martin, D.J., 590
Martin, G., 571
Martin, J.A., 270
Martin, L., 22t
Martinez-Conde, S., 114, 124
Martins, Y., 105
Maruyama, G., 485
Marx, J., 110, 311, 351
Maslach, C., 22t, 607, 608
Maslow, A., 18, 306, 369,
372–374, 440
Mason, M., 333
Massimini, M., 330
Masten, A., 626–628
Masters, W., 382–383
Masuda, M., 642
Matarazzo, J.D., 640
Mather, M., 394
Matlin, M.W., 105, 109
Matossian, M.K., 519
Matsumoto, D., 547, 560
Matthews, K.A., 622
Maurer, D., 271
Mauron, A., 47
May, R., 441, 565
Mayberg, H., 528, 583, 587
Mayberry, R.I., 271
Mayer, J., 400–402
Mayr, E., 44
McAdams, D., 309, 415, 416, 426,
448–449
McAnulty, R.D., 206, 207, 385
McArdle, J.J., 243
McCann, I.L., 603, 636
McCarley, R., 341, 427
McCartney, K., 313
McClelland, D., 306, 365–367
McClintock, C.G., 450
McClure, S.M., 299
McConkey, K.M., 331, 346
McCook, A., 8
McCrae, R.R., 423, 452
Kurdek, L.A., 386
Kurth, S., 299
Lacey, M., 419
Lachman, M.E., 623
Lamb, M.E., 274
Lambo, T.A., 560
Landesman, S., 240
Landry, D.W., 353
Lane, E., 406
Lang, F.R., 312
Lang, P.J., 569
Lange, C., 398
Langens, T.A., 333
Langleben, D., 406
Langlois, J.H., 485
Larson, R.W., 291, 302
Lash, J., 509
Latané, B., 479
Lavie, P., 337
Lawson, R., 31
Lawton, M.P., 484
Lazarus, R.S., 600, 609, 610, 631
Lazovik, D.A., 569
Leach, A., 506
Leaper, C., 281
Learman, L.A., 250
LeDoux, J.E., 55, 59, 73, 140, 357, 389,
393, 394, 395, 398, 435, 531
LeDoux, J., 533
Lee, C.K., 527t
Lee, J.L., 389
Lefcourt, H., 632
Leichtman, M.D., 187
Leippe, M., 640
Leiter, M.P., 607
Lellouch, J., 527t
Lensing, V., 605
Leonard, J., 340
Lepine, J.P., 527t
Lepper, M., 367
Lerner, R.M., 298
Lesgold, A., 224
Leslie, M., 241
Levenson, 395
Leventhal, H., 399
Levin, D.T., 198
Levine, D.S., 617
Levine, J.D., 110
Levine, J.M., 467
Levine, K., 35
Levine, L.J., 189, 202
Levine, M., 546
Levinson, D.J., 309
Levinthal, C.F., 353
Levitt, S.D., 151
Levy, S.R., 373, 509
Lewinsohn, P., 573
Lewis, J., 265–266, 313–314
Lewis, T.L., 271
Lewy, A.J., 528, 529
Li, J., 165
Lieberman, J.A., 578
Lieberman, M., 402
Liegeois, F., 280
Liem, R., 606
Light, K.C., 635
Lilienfeld, S.O., 35, 433, 546, 590
Lillard, A.S., 449, 491
Lin, H., 475
Lindblom, W.D., 523
Linden, E., 248
Linebarger, D.L., 292
Lipsey, M.W., 575
Lipsitt, L.P., 269
Liu, W., 12
Lockhart, R., 183
Loewi, O., 324
Loftus, E., 14, 22t, 200–201, 206
Loftus, E.F., 182, 200, 435
London, K., 292
Long, A., 608
Lonner, W.J., 20
Loughner, J., 419
Lourenço, O., 287
Lovibond, S.H., 501
Lubart, T.I., 231

N A M E I N D E X I-5
Schatzberg, A.F., 580
Schaufeli, W.B., 607
Scheier, M.F., 423, 429, 436
Schellenberg, E.G., 315
Schenk, F., 159
Schick, T., Jr., 7
Schiff, M., 567
Schlenker, B.R., 491
Schmidt, N.B., 622
Schmidt, R.A., 204
Schmitt, D.P., 389, 423
Schmolck, H., 189
Schneider, K., 565
Schneider, W., 292
Schooler, J.W., 333
Schou, M., 579
Schreiber, F.R., 537
Schroeder, D.A., 465, 480
Schroeder, S.R., 240
Schulkin, J., 531, 616
Schultz, D.P., 365–366
Schultz, S.E., 365–366
Schulz, R., 313
Schuster, M.A., 603
Schwartz, B., 229, 257, 288
Schwartz, J., 471
Schwartz, J.M., 534, 573
Schwartz, P., 308
Schwarzer, R., 572
Schwebel, A.I., 568
Scott, K.G., 240
Scotto, P., 160
Scoville, W.B., 187
Scully, J.A., 603
Searleman, A., 175, 176
Seeman, T.E., 347
Segal, M.W., 484
Segall, M.H., 20, 117, 122, 124, 417, 509
Sekuler, 99
Selby, E.A., 543
Selfridge, O.G., 121
Seligman, M., 151, 343, 442, 526, 529,
533, 573, 624, 625–626, 632, 638
Selye, H., 615–617
Seo, D.C., 602
Sethi-Iyengar, S., 229
Seybold, K.S., 639
Shackelford, T.K., 384
Shadish, 574
Shapiro, F., 569
Shapiro, S.L., 637
Sharps, M.J., 118, 157
Shatz, M., 287
Shaver, P.R., 275
Shaw, P., 295
Shaywitz, S., 542
Shea, C., 529
Sheatsley, P., 494
Shedler, J., 575, 590
Shepard, R., 326
Sherif, M., 461, 469
Shermer, M., 8
Sherrer, H., 495
Sherrill, R., Jr., 157
Shiffrin, R.M., 180, 182
Shih, M., 498
Shiraev, E., 373, 509
Shizgal, P., 161
Shoda, Y., 414, 444, 453
Shor, R.E., 345
Shorter, E., 582
Shrader, B., 5
Shrout, P.E., 642
Shweder, R., 424
Sieben, L., 612
Siegel, J.M., 312, 336, 339
Siegel, R.K., 536
Siegert, R., 311
Siegler, Robert, 288
Sigelman, C.K., 486
Silk, J.S., 303
Silver, R.L., 639
Sime, W., 636
Simeon, D., 536
Simon, H.A., 232
Simon, T., 234–235
Robins, R.W., 390, 416, 426
Robinson, N.M., 240, 241
Roche, S.M., 331
Rock, I., 118
Rodin, J., 623, 640
Roediger, R., 17, 199
Roesch, M.R., 161
Rogers, C., 18, 440–441, 557, 562, 565
Rogers, E., 160
Rogers-Ramachandran, D., 112, 118
Rogoff, B., 288
Rohrer, M., 469
Roll, S., 339
Rollman, G.B., 111
Rolls, B.J., 298
Rolnick, J., 581
Romney, D.M., 151
Roozendaal, B., 68
Rosch, E., 216, 347
Rosen, J.B., 531
Rosenhan, D., 476, 515–517, 521,
548–549
Rosenheck, R.A., 578
Rosenman, R., 622
Rosenthal, N.E., 529
Rosenthal, R., 31, 249–250, 402
Rosenthal, S., 220
Rosenzweig, M.R., 20, 187
Ross, A.W., 443
Ross, B.H., 224
Ross, C.A., 537
Ross, P.E., 232, 406
Roth, D.L., 636
Rothbaum, F.M., 624
Rotter, J., 443–444
Roush, W., 310
Rozin, P., 376
Rubenstein, J., 325
Rubin, G.J., 189, 602
Rubio-Stipec, M., 527t
Rudmann, J.L., 5
Rusbult, C.E., 485
Rushton, J.P., 250, 254
Russell, A., 289
Russell, J., 390
Rutter, M., 47
Ryan, R.M., 406, 638
Ryff, C.D., 309, 312
Saarinen, T.F., 219
Sabido, M., 160
Sabin-Farrell, R., 608
Sack, D.A., 529
Sackheim, H.A., 582
Sacks, O., 87
Safer, M.A., 202
Sagi, D., 73
Sakaki, M., 194
Salovey, P., 400–402, 615, 640
Saltzstein, H.D., 467
Sandberg, L., 467
Sanders, G.S., 622
Sanders, L., 114, 124, 312
Sandler, I., 588
Santarelli, L., 579
Sapolsky, R.M., 273, 422,
604, 605, 613, 616
Sarason, I.B., 642
Sarbin, T.R., 346
Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S., 248
Savin-Williams, R.C., 385
Savitsky, J.C., 523
Sawa, A., 539
Sawyer, J., 484
Sax, L., 542
Saxe, L., 405
Scalzo, F.M., 108
Scarborough, E., 22
Scarr, S., 22t, 254, 291
Schachter, S., 399
Schact, C., 307
Schacter, D., 183, 191–192,
195–196, 199, 202, 207
Schafe, G.E., 533
Schaller, M., 374
Schank, R.C., 222
Scharfe, E., 202
Pinel, J.P.J., 50, 66, 68, 334, 351, 379
Pines, A., 418
Pinker, S., 45, 47, 279
Pinto, R.M., 608
Piper, A., 537
Pitman, G.E., 617
Plaud, J.J., 140
Plomin, R., 47, 251, 267, 528
Plous, S., 33
Plucker, J.A., 233
Plutchik, R., 390
Pogue-Gille, M.F., 540
Poldrack, R.A., 190
Pole, N., 605
Pollak, S.D., 402
Pollitt, E., 254
Poole, D.A., 206
Poon, L.W., 311
Popejoy, D.I., 636
Popkin, B.M., 377
Porreca, F., 109
Portner, M., 383, 384
Premack, D., 148
Prentice, D.A., 465
Pretz, J., 220
Price, T., 109
Priest, R.F., 484
Primavera, L.H., 160
Prinzmetal, W., 118
Provine, R.R., 389
Psaki, J., 628
Psotka, J., 175
Qualls, S.H., 310
Quiñones-Vidal, E., 445
Raaijmakers, Q.A.W., 476
Rabkin, J.G., 642
Rachman, S., 569
Rahe, R.H., 603, 642
Rahe, R., 609
Raichle, M.E., 64
Raine, A., 543
Ramachandran, V.S., 70, 108, 109, 112,
118, 541
Rambo-Chroniak, K.M., 611, 612
Ramey, C.T., 255
Ramey, S.L., 255
Randall, J.L., 48
Randerson, J., 342
Raphael, B., 603
Rapoport, J., 534
Rapson, R., 297, 489
Rauschecker, F.H., 112
Rauscher, F.H., 315
Rawlins, W.K., 292
Rayman, P., 606
Rayner, R., 139–140, 532
Raynor, J.O., 365
Raz, A., 346
Read, S.J., 275
Ready, D.D., 281
Reber, A.S., 127
Rechtschaffen, A., 336
Rector, N.A., 587
Reed, G.M., 632
Regier, D.A., 543
Reid, M.W., 529
Reingold, E.M., 127
Rescorla, R.A., 141
Resnick, S.M., 534
Rest, J.R., 302
Reuter-Lorenz, P.A., 74
Reynolds, C.R., 255
Rhodes, G., 486
Rice, C., 496
Rich, LE., 379
Richards, J.M., 402
Rickgarn, R.L.V., 605
Riessman, C.K., 611
Riolli, L., 627
Ripple, C.H., 255
Rips, L.J., 216
Rizzolatti, G., 70, 541
Robbins, D., 146
Robbins, J., 528
Robbins, T.W., 355
Robins, L.N., 526
Oden, G.C., 241
O’Doherty, J., 161
O’Donovan, A., 618
Offer, D., 297, 298
Ofshe, R., 206
Öhman, A., 533
Okazaki, S., 256
Olds, M.E., 68
Olson, C.R., 161
Olson, S.E., 253
Olton, D.S., 159
Olweus, D., 505, 506
Ornstein, R., 311
Orser, B.A., 354
Ortmann, A., 33
Osterhout, L., 218
Ostow, M., 548
O’Sullivan, M., 406
Outtara, K., 248
Overmier, J.B., 151, 624
Owen, A.M., 330
Owen, D.R., 238
Ozer, D.J., 453
Paffenbarger, R.S., 636
Page, L., 213–214, 223, 230
Paikoff, R.L., 302
Palmer, J.C., 200
Palmer, S., 118, 119
Pals, J.L., 415, 416
Pankratz, V.S., 527
Park, C.L., 633
Park, D.C., 378
Park, N., 373, 374
Parke, R.D., 289
Parker-Pope, T., 379
Parkes, C.M., 603
Parks, S.H., 635
Parr, W.V., 311
Parsons, L.M., 66
Pate, W.E., II, 5
Patenaude, A.F., 48
Patrick, C.J., 543
Patterson, C.J., 386
Patterson, D.R., 346, 347
Patterson, F., 248
Patterson, J.M., 640
Patton, G.C., 298
Patzer, G.L., 485
Paulesu, E.D., 542
Paulus, J., 579
Pauwels, B.G., 486, 489
Pavlov, I., 136–139
Pavot, W., 638
Pawlik, K., 20
Pear, J., 571
Pearlin, L.I., 624
Pearlman, L.A., 603
Pearman, R.R., 427
Pearson, H., 406
Pearson, T.A., 308
Pedersen, P., 449
Peel, R., 523
Penfield, W., 64
Peng, K., 217
Pennebaker, J.W., 601, 605, 628
Pennisi, E., 45, 48, 69
Peplau, A., 383–384
Perkins, D.V., 546
Perlmutter, M., 267
Perrin, M.A., 623
Perry, W., 304–305
Peters, J.C., 377
Peterson, C., 373, 374, 442
Petrosino, A., 8
Petrovic, P., 110
Pettigrew, T., 496
Pettito, L.A., 280
Phelan, J., 43
Phelps, J.A., 266
Piaget, J., 200–201, 282–288, 300
Pickering, M.R., 537
Pifer, A., 310
Pilcher, J.J., 338
Pilisuk, M., 635
Pillard, R., 385–386
Pillemer, D.B., 189

I-6 N A M E I N D E X
Wesson, D.R., 352
West, C., 590
Westen, D., 8, 434–435, 590
Wethington, E., 309
Whalen, P.J., 395
Wheeler, J.G., 568
Whitley, B.E., Jr., 493
Whitlow, T., 500–502
Whyte, 147
Wicherski, M., 5, 6
Wickelgren, I., 66, 180, 223, 255, 351,
355, 578
Wickramaratne, P.J., 527t
Widen, S.C., 390
Wiggins, J.S., 234
Wilensky, A.E., 533
Willford, J.A., 269
Williams, C.L., 425
Williams, D., 603
Williams, W.M., 253
Wills, T.A., 576, 632
Wilner, D., 496
Wilson, D.A., 105
Wilson, D.B., 575
Wilson, E., 273
Wilson, L., 537
Wilson, M.M., 291
Wilson, R.I., 351
Wilson, S.M., 298
Wilson, T.D., 357
Windholz, G., 137
Winerman, L., 122, 165, 187, 220, 246,
336, 346, 389, 532, 569, 584
Winkielman, P., 395
Winner, E., 241, 242
Winter, D.G., 422
Winters, J., 160
Wirth, S., 187
Withey, S.B., 638
Wittchen, H., 527t
Wittlinger, R.P., 197
Wolfson, A., 477
Wolpe, J., 140, 568–570
Wolraich, M., 26–27
Wong, M.M., 241
Wood, J.M., 601
Wood, W., 384
Woods, T., 420, 428, 430, 437, 438, 447
Woodworth, R.S., 370
Wozniak, S., 214
Wright, E.R., 546
Wundt, W., 13–14
Wurtman, R.J., 636
Wynn, K., 270
Yacoubian, G.S., Jr., 353
Yao, M., 475
Yeaman, J., 612
Yee, P.L., 44, 624
Yeh, E.K., 527t
Yerkes, R.M., 235
Yokley, J.L., 540
Yufe, J., 266, 313
Young, J.R., 579
Zajonc, R.B., 135
Zakowski, S.G., 631
Zaman, R.M., 560
Zaragoza, M.S., 182
Zarit, S.H., 624
Zeki, S., 488
Zelig, A., 190
Zigler, E., 255, 303
Zika, S., 609
Zilbergeld, B., 561
Zimbardo, P.G., 151, 346, 370, 418, 422,
451, 476, 482, 494, 495, 501, 502,
503, 508, 510, 545, 602, 620, 640
Zimmer, C., 105
Zimmerman, F.J., 292, 294
Zimmerman, S., 628
Zinbarg, R., 533
Zucker, G.S., 490
Zuckerman, M., 397
Zuwerink, J.R., 496
Zweigenhaft, R., 417
Zyphur, M.J., 339
Tversky, A., 228
Twenge, J.M., 381
Tyler, L., 243
Ulmer, D., 623
Ulrich, R.E., 151
Uro, G., 255
Vaillant, G., 632
Valenstein, E., 581
Vallee, B.L., 353
van Dam, L., 347
Van de Castle, R.L., 339, 340
VandeCreek, L., 32
VandenBos, G.R., 575
van den Hurk, P.A.M., 347
Van Dongen, H.P.A., 337
van Praag, H., 311
Vasarely, V., 117
Vaughan, C., 334, 336, 337, 338,
341, 342
Vaughn, L., 7
Verbaten, M.N., 353
Vicary, J., 126–127
Viegas, J., 248
Vincent, M., 537
Vingerhoets, G., 74
Vogel, G., 354
Vokey, J.R., 126
Volpe, K., 617
Von Fritsch, K., 247
von Helmholtz, H., 120, 123, 341
Vuilleumier, P., 98
Vygotsky, Lev, 288
Wade, K.A., 201
Wade, T.J., 298
Wagar, B.M., 394
Wager, T.D., 110
Wagner, A.R., 141
Wagner, U., 336
Wald, M.L., 471
Walden, J., 580
Waldron, E.M., 218
Walk, R., 123
Walker, E., 539, 540, 541
Walker, L.J., 302
Walker, M., 341
Wall, P.D., 109
Wallace, A.F.C., 560
Wallace, B., 324
Wallace, G.L., 242
Wallbott, H.G., 392
Walsh, R., 417
Walter, B., 109
Walters, A.S., 338
Walton, 498
Wampold, B.E., 557, 575, 590
Ward, C., 491
Wardle, J., 636
Wargo, E., 380
Warren, J., 334
Washburn, M., 22t
Watkins, L.R., 110, 618
Watson, J., 532
Watson, J.B., 16, 133, 139–140, 325
Watson, J.D., 156
Watson, K.K., 68
Watters, E., 206, 525
Wearing, A., 639
Weaver, S.L., 623
Weber, M., 228
Wegner, D.M., 340
Wehr, T.A., 529
Weil, A.T., 344
Weinberg, R., 254
Weinberger, M., 609
Weiner, B., 490
Weiner, I.B., 193
Weiner, J., 44
Weisberg, R., 230, 231
Weiss, R., 381
Weissman, M.M., 527t, 602
Weisz, J.R., 624
Wellman, H.M., 287
Wells, B.E., 381
Wells, J.E., 527t
Wertheimer, M., 118, 119–120, 157
Strickland, B.R., 251
Striegel-Moore, R.H., 378
Stringfield, D.O., 453
Ströhle, A., 588
Stromeyer, C., 175
Struening, E.L., 642
Styfco, S.J., 255
Styron, W., 526
Sue, Stanley, 256, 445
Sugarman, L., 309
Sulloway, J. F., 417, 436
Suls, J., 622
Suomi, S.J., 33
Swann, W.B., Jr., 487
Swanson, J.M., 295
Swets, J.A., 93, 631
Syme, S.L., 617, 635
Symond, M.B., 539
Szasz, T., 546, 557
Szucko, J.J., 405
Talarico, J.M., 189
Tallon, J., 206
Tamres, L., 617
Tangney, J.P., 277
Tasker, F., 385
Tasso, A., 347
Tavris, C., 402, 445, 488, 495
Taylor, J.B., 41–42, 47, 55, 57, 72, 74
Taylor, L.C., 291
Taylor, L.S., 486
Taylor, S., 617, 622, 623, 629, 632, 635,
636, 640
Teasdale, T.W., 238
Tellegen, A., 251, 638
Teller, D.Y., 270
Terman, L., 236, 241, 242–243
Terry, K.J., 206
Terry, W.S., 146, 147, 151
Tessner, K., 539, 540, 541
Thabet, A.A.M., 527
Thagard, P., 394
Thase, M.E., 587
Thio, A., 523
Thoma, S.J., 302
Thomas, F.F., 257
Thomas, J., 298
Thomas, J.C., 44
Thompson, D., 199
Thompson, J.A., 527, 528
Thompson, M.R., 353
Thompson, R., 195
Thompson, W.R., 315
Thomsen, D.K., 631
Thorndike, E., 143
Thorsteinsson, E.B., 635
Tian, B., 112
Tienari, P., 540
Tirozzi, G.N., 255
Titchener, E.B., 14
Todes, D.P., 136
Tolin, D.F., 605
Tolman, E., 158–159
Tomarken, A.J., 399
Toneatto, T., 347
Tong, F., 63
Tononi, G., 325, 329
Torabi, M.R., 602
Torrey, E.F., 583
Totterdell, P., 465
Tracy, J.L., 390
Trainor, L.J., 271
Travis, J., 161
Treffert, D.A., 242
Triandis, H., 366–367, 449–450, 560
Tronick, E., 270
Tsao, D., 72
Tse, D., 188
Tulving, E., 183
Turin, L., 105
Turk, D.C., 110
Turkheimer, E., 254
Turner, E.H., 579
Turner, J.C., 493
Turpin, G., 608
Turvey, M.T., 105
Simon, W., 298
Simons, D.J., 198
Simonton, D.K., 232
Simpson, J.A., 275, 484, 485
Sinclair, R.C., 399
Singer, J.L., 229, 331
Singer, T., 388
Singhal, A., 160
Singleton, J.L., 271
Sinha, G., 581
Skinner, B.F., 16–17, 133–134,
143–145, 150
Skinner, E.A., 623
Skotko, B.G., 191
Slater, L., 549
Slavich, G., 604, 618
Sleek, S., 579
Slobin, D.I., 280
Small, D.M., 68
Smith, A.W., 612
Smith, C., 340
Smith, C.A., 491
Smith, D., 32, 160, 342, 581,
597–598, 608
Smith, E.E., 184
Smith, G.B., 583
Smith, G.C., 631
Smith, G.T., 390
Smith, M.L., 575
Smith, T.B., 557
Smythe, J., 628, 636
Snidman, N., 422
Snyder, S.H., 539
Sobel, D., 311
Solms, M., 434
Solso, R.L., 219, 329
Sow, I., 560
Spain, D., 307
Sparling, J.W., 268
Spear, L.P., 299
Spearman, C., 242–243
Spelke, E.S., 270
Spence, M.J., 270
Spencer, R.M.C., 66
Sperling, G., 178–179
Sperry, R., 74, 75–77
Spiegel, A., 278
Spiegel, D., 536
Spigner, C., 298
Spiro, R.J., 202
Spitz, R.A., 417
Spitzer, R.L., 535
Spitzer, R., 548–549
Sprecher, S., 298
Springen, K., 527
Springer, J., 265–266, 313–314
Sprock, J., 518
Squier, L.H., 339, 340
Squire, L.R., 53, 55, 67, 79, 112, 113,
161, 185, 188
Srivastava, S., 423, 439
St. George-Hyslop, P.H., 47
Stahl, S.A., 164
Stambor, Z., 584
Staples, S.L., 606
Staudinger, U.M., 308
Steele, C., 257, 315, 497
Steele, K., 528
Steinberg, L.D., 303
Steketee, 533
Stern, J.A., 346
Stern, W., 236
Sternberg, R., 165, 231, 243–245, 250,
251, 253, 485, 488, 489, 559
Stevens, A.L., 232
Stevenson, H.W., 105
Stickgold, R., 339, 340, 341
Stix, G., 406
Stock, M.B., 636
Stone, A.A., 309
Stone, J., 498
Stör, O., 266, 313
Strasburger, V.C., 292
Straus, M.A., 605
Strayer, D.L., 325

Absent-mindedness, 198
Absolute thresholds, 91–92
Abu Ghraib Prison, 475, 503, 504
Accommodation, 282–283
Acetylcholine, 54t
Acoustic encoding, 182–183
Acquisition, 138–139
Acrophobia, 532
Action potential, 52–53
Activation-synthesis theory, 340–341
Active listening, 576
Acute stress, 614
Addiction, 355–356
ADHD. See Attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder
Adjustment disorders, 544
Adolescence
culture and, 296–297
formal operational stage of
development, 300
moral development, 300–302
neural and cognitive development,
299–300
parents and, 302–303, 303–304
physical maturation, 297–298
psychosocial development, 303
sexuality and, 298–299, 386
turmoil and, 303–304
Adoption studies, 254, 267
Adrenaline, 59. See also Epinephrine
Adult development
changing nature of, 306
early adulthood, 306–308
late adulthood, 310–313
midlife, 308–309
Affective disturbances, 517
Afferent neurons, 50–51
Affiliation needs, 372
Afterimages, 99–100
Age differences, 340, 348, 529
Aging. See Adult development
Agonists/antagonists, 61
Agoraphobia, 531
Agreeableness, 423
Alarm phase, 615–616
Albert (experimental subject), 139–140
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), 567
Alcoholism, 353
Alcohol use, 269, 348, 350t, 352–353.
See also Fetal alcohol syndrome
Algorithms, 223–224
All-or-none principle, 53
Alzheimer’s disease, 188, 312
Ambiguous figures, 115
American Psychological Association,
589
American Sign Language (ASL),
271, 280
Amnesia, 187–188, 535–536
Amphetamines, 350t, 353, 354
Amplitude, 101, 102–103
Amygdala, 68, 187–188, 299, 389,
394–395
Analgesics, 110–111
Analogies, 224–225
Anal stage, 431
Analysis of transference, 564
Analytical intelligence, 243–244
Anchoring bias, 228
Anecdotal evidence, 8
Anesthesia, 354
Angel dust, 350
Anger management, 402
Animal studies, 33
Animistic thinking, 285, 287
Animus/anima, 436
Anorexia nervosa, 378–379
Antagonists/agonists, 61
Anterograde amnesia, 187, 188
An Anthropologist on Mars (Sacks), 87
Antianxiety drugs, 350t, 352–353, 580
Anticipatory anxiety, 531
Antidepressants, 528, 578–579
Antipsychotic drugs, 539, 578
Antisocial personality disorder, 543
Anxiety disorders, 530–534, 587. See
also Antianxiety drugs
Anxiety hierarchy, 569
Anxious-ambivalent attachment, 274
Apple Computers, 214
Applied psychologists, 5, 15
Approach emotions, 389
Aptitudes, 230–231
Archetypes, 436–437
Area 25, 528
Arousal, 396–397
Artificial concepts, 216
Asch effect, 465–468, 470
Asking for help, 480–481
ASL. See American Sign Language
(ASL)
Assimilation, 282–283
Association cortex, 73
Association for Psychological Science,
589–590
Athletic performance, 396–397
Attachment, 274–276, 372
Attention, 326
Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), 294–295, 353, 542,
580–581, 588
Attraction, 484–488
Attributions, 490–492
Auditory cortex, 72, 102
Authentic Happiness (Seligman), 632
Authoritarian parents, 289, 290t
Authoritative parents, 289, 290t
Authority, obedience to, 471–480
Autism, 35, 541
Autokinetic effect, 469
Automatic action, 602
Autonomic nervous system, 57–58, 395
Autonomy, 293
Availability bias, 229
Aversion therapy, 569–570
Avoidance emotions, 389
Avoidant attachment, 274
Axons, 52
Babbling, 280
Bad-apple view, 502–503
Balance, 104–105
Barbituates, 350t, 352, 580
Base rate information, 229
Basic anxiety, 438
Basilar membrane, 102
Bedlam (Bethlehem Hospital), 559
Behavioral learning, 135, 162t, 520.
See also Classical conditioning;
Operant conditioning
Behavioral medicine, 639–641
Behavioral perspective of psychology,
16–17, 21f, 520, 642
Behavioral therapy, 295
Behaviorism, 16
Behavior modification, 568–571
Behavior therapies, 568–571, 574f
The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class
Structure in American Life
(Herrnstein & Murray), 256
Benefit finding, 633
Benzodiazepines, 350t, 352, 580
Bethlehem Hospital (Bedlam), 559
Bias
anchoring, 228
availability, 229
confirmation, 8, 31–32, 227, 357
controlling, 31–32
emotional, 8, 31
expectancy, 31–32, 202, 249–250
hindsight, 227–228, 435, 619
intuition vs., 220
in IQ tests, 255–256
memory and, 201–202
in polygraph tests, 405–406
representativeness, 228–229
self-consistency, 202
self-serving, 491
types of, 8
Big Five traits, 423–424, 426, 452
Binet-Simon IQ test, 234–235
Binocular cues, 123
Biological drives, 370, 372
Biological perspective of psychology,
12–13, 16t, 21f, 42–43, 520, 642
Biomedical therapies, 560, 574f,
577–581, 585–588
Biopsychology, 42–48, 520–521. See
also Neuroscience
Bipolar disorder, 529–530, 579–580,
587
Birth order, 417
Blinding problem, 113, 119
Blindness, 96, 114
Blindsight, 112
Blind spots, 96–97
Blocking, 198–199, 205
Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, 245
Body image, 297–298, 378f
Body position, 104–105
Borderline personality disorder,
543–544
Bottom-up processing, 113
Brain. See also Neuroscience
in adolescence, 299–300
brain-stimulation therapies,
582–583
cerebral cortex, 68–73
cerebral dominance, 73–79
cognitive-behavioral therapy and,
573–574
conformity and, 469–470
depression and, 528
emotions and, 393–396
implants, 55
infant development, 271
language structures, 280
learning and, 161–162
left vs. right, 80–81
limbic system, 66–68
major structures of, 65f
memories and, 187–188
panic disorder and, 531
phobias and, 533
psychosurgery, 581–582
romantic love and, 490
scanning methods, 63–65
schizophrenia and, 539–540
split, 75–77
stem, 65–66
thought/thinking and, 218–219
waves, 63–64
Branch Davidians, 472
Brightness, 98
Brightness constancy, 115
Broca’s area, 72
Bulimia nervosa, 378
Bully Blocking: Six Secrets to Help
Children Deal with Teasing and
Bullying (Field), 505–506
Bullying, 504–507
Bundy, Ted, 220
Burnout, 607–608
Bystander intervention problem,
478–480
Caffeine, 350t, 354
Cannabis, 349t, 350–351
Cannon-Bard theory, 398–399, 400f
Careers, 5–6, 22–23
Careers in Psychology for the Twenty-
First Century (APA), 6
Case studies
definition and overview, 31
Elliott, 387–388, 387–389
H.M., 67, 187–191
Jill Bolte Taylor, p.
Jim twins, 265–266, 313–314
Sabra, 134, 162–163
Washoe, 247–248
Cataplexy, 343
Catastrophic events, 601–603
Catatonic stupor/excitement, 538
Catharsis, 402, 633
Cell body, 52
Central executive (memory), 182
Central nervous system (CNS), 56–57
Centration, 285
Cerebellum, 66
Cerebral achromatopsia, 87–88
Cerebral cortex, 68–73
Cerebral dominance, 73–79
Cerebral hemispheres, 68–69
Cerebrum, 65, 68–69
Chains of command, 502–504
Chameleon effect, 465
Change blindness, 114, 198
Chemotherapy, 142
Childhood
attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), 294–295, 353,
542, 580–581, 588
cognitive development, 282–288
language acquisition, 279–282
S U B J E C T I N D E X
I-7
Note: Page numbers followed by f or t refer to figures or tables.

I-8 S U B J E C T I N D E X
Disenfranchised grief, 604–605
Displacement, 563
Displacement of aggression, 416, 432
Display rules, 390–392
Dispositional theories, 421–422
Dispositionism, 463
Dispositions, 417, 420–421
Dissimilarity, 493
Dissociative amnesia, 535–536
Dissociative disorders, 535–537
Dissociative fugue, 536
Dissociative identity disorder (DID),
536–537
Distress, 600
Distributed learning, 204–205
Divalproex sodium, 580
Divorce, 489
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), 45–47
Dopamine, 54t
Double-blind studies, 32
The Double Helix (Watson), 156
Down syndrome, 47, 240
Downward social comparisons, 632
Dreaming, 323–324, 338–341, 562
Dress codes, 482
Drive reduction, 370
Drive theory, 370
Drug therapy, 577–581
Drug use
addiction, 355–356
dependence and addiction, 354–356
depressants and antianxiety,
352–353
general anesthetics, 354
hallucinogens, 350–351
opiates, 351–352
stimulants, 353–354
trends, 348–350
DSM-IV, 522, 524–526, 538t, 590–592
Dyslexia, 542
Eardrum, 101
Early intervention, 588
Ears, 101–102
Earthquakes, 601, 603
Eating. See Hunger and eating
Eating disorders, 378–379
Ebbinghaus illusion, 116f
Echoic memory, 179
Ecological view of psychological
disorders, 546–547
Economic competition, 493–494
Ecstasy (MDMA), 350t, 353
EEG (electroencephalograph),
63–64, 326
Efferent neurons, 50–51
Ego, 356, 430
Egocentrism, 284–285, 287
Ego defense mechanisms, 431–434
Ego ideal, 430
Egypt, 475
Eidetic imagery, 175–177
Elaboration, 174
Elaborative rehearsal, 181–182,
192, 205
Elavil, 578–579
Electra complex, 431
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT),
582–583, 587
Electroencephalograph (EEG),
63–64, 326
Electromagnetic spectrum, 98–99
Elliot (case study), 387–388, 389
Embryonic phase, 268
Embryos, 268
Emerging adulthood, 307
Emotional bias, 8, 31
locus of control and, 624
moral development and, 302
obedience to authority and,
475–476
parenting styles, 290–291
perception and, 122–123
personality and, 417–418, 423–424,
445, 449–450
positive self-regard and, 492
psychological disorders and,
546–547
race and, 48
reinforcers and, 148–149
schizophrenia and, 547
scripts and, 222
self-esteem and, 298
shyness and, 418
situationism and, 475–477
sociocultural perspective and, 20
terrorism and, 509–510
therapy and, 560
Cyberbullying, 505
Cytokines, 618
Data collection, 26
Date-rape drugs, 352
Day care, 291
Daydreaming, 332–333
Deafness, 271, 280
Debriefing, 33
Deception, 33, 403–406
Decision-making, 226–229
Declarative memory, 184–185
Deep brain stimulation, 583
Defending, 630–631
Defense mechanisms, 431–434
Dehumanization, 495–496
Deinstitutionalization, 583–584
Delusions, 517
Dendrites, 51–52
Denial, 432
Deoxyribonucleic acid. See DNA
Depakote, 580
Dependent variables, 27
Depersonalization, 546
Depersonalization disorder, 536
Depressants, 350t, 352–353
Depression, 526–529, 587. See also
Antidepressants
Depth perception, 123–124
Developmental disorders, 541–542, 588
Developmental level of analysis, 373
Developmental perspectives of psychol-
ogy, 16t, 19, 21f, 520, 642
Developmental psychology
adolescence, 296–305
adulthood, 305–308
cognitive development, 282–288
definition and overview, 266–267
Freud’s psychosexual stages,
430–431
infancy, 271–279
language acquisition, 279–282
late adulthood, 310–313
midlife, 308–309
neonatal period, 269–271
prenatal period, 268–269
social and emotional development,
288–296
Diagnostic and Statistical Model of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). See
DSM-IV
Diathesis-stress hypothesis, 540–541
Diet and nutrition, 636–637
Difference thresholds, 92
Diffusion of responsibility, 480
Discimination, 492–498
Concepts (thought), 215–217
Conceptually driven processing, 113
Concrete operational stage of
development, 285–286, 286t
Conditional vs. unconditional
relationships, 441
Conditioned reinforcers, 147–148
Conditioned response (CR), 138–139
Conditioned stimulus (CS), 138–139
Cones (eye), 96
Confirmation bias, 8, 31–32, 227, 357
Conformity, 465–471, 480, 482,
494–495
Conscientiousness, 423
Consciousness
coma and, 330
daydreaming, 332–333
definition and overview, 324–326
dreaming, 323–324, 338–341
Freud’s levels of, 327–329
functions of, 329–330
hypnosis, 345–347
James’ stream of, 329
meditation, 347–348
psychoactive drug states, 348–356
sleep, 333–338
sleep disorders, 341–344
tools for studying, 326–327
unconscious, 327–329, 356–357
Conservation, 285–286
Consolidation, 188
Contact comfort, 273
Contingency management, 570
Continuous reinforcement, 145–146
Contralateral pathways, 57
Control group, 27
Conversation, 281–282
Conversion disorder, 428, 534–535
Coping strategies, 621f, 629–634
Coping ugly, 627
Corpus callosum, 68–69, 75–77
Correlational studies, 28–30
Cortisol, 617
Counseling psychologists, 6
Couples therapy, 567–568
The Courage to Heal (Bass &
Davis), 206
Creating Minds (Gardner), 31
Creative intelligence, 244
Creativity, 229–233
Critical incident stress debriefing
(CISD), 603, 633–634
Critical thinking, 7–10
Cross-cultural psychologists, 20
Crystallized intelligence, 243, 244t
CT scans, 64
Culture
adolescence and, 296–297
attachment and, 275–276
catastrophic events and, 603
cognitive development and, 288
cognitive dissonance and, 487–488
conceptual differences, 217
conformity and, 468–469
conversion disorder and, 535
deception and, 404
depression and, 527–528
dreams and, 339–340
early memories and, 186
emotions and, 390–392
hunger and eating, 377
individualism vs. collectivism,
366–367, 372–373, 417–418,
449–450, 454, 491
intelligence and, 245–247
IQ tests and, 255–257
socialization, 289–292
temperament, 288–289
Childhood amnesia, 186
Chlorpromazine, 578
Choleric temperament, 420–421
Chromosomes, 45–47
Chronic stressors, 606–610
Chronological age, 235
Chunking, 181, 232–233
Circadian rhythms, 333–334
Circular reasoning, 357
Classical conditioning, 136–142,
153–155
Classical conditioning therapies,
568–570
Claustrophobia, 532
Client-centered therapy, 562, 565
Clinical method, 31
Clinical psychologists, 6
Closure (perception), 119
Clozapine, 578
Clozaril, 578
CNS (central nervous system), 56–57
Cocaine, 348, 350t, 353, 354
Cochlea, 102
Cocktail party phenomenon, 326
Codeine, 349t
Codependence, 445
Cognitive appraisal, 600–601, 610,
619–620
Cognitive attributions, 490–492. See
also Fundamental attribution
error
Cognitive-behavioral therapy, 163,
571–574, 587
Cognitive development, 282–288,
304–305
Cognitive dissonance, 487–488
Cognitive learning
behavioral learning vs., 162t
brain mechanisms and, 161–162
cognitive maps, 158–159
consciousness and, 326
definition and overview, 135
insight learning, 157–158
observational learning, 159–162
reciprocal determinism and, 520
Cognitive maps, 10, 158–159, 217–218
Cognitive neuroscience, 325
Cognitive perspective of psychology,
13–16, 21f, 243–246, 329,
520, 642
Cognitive restructuring, 631–632
Cognitive therapies, 566–567, 574f
Cohesiveness, 470–471
Collective unconscious, 436–437
Collectivism, 366–367, 372–373,
417–418, 449–450, 454, 491
Color, 98–100
Color blindness, 99–100
Color constancy, 113, 115
Columbine High School shootings,
633–634
Coma, 330
Combat fatigue, 605
Combination therapies, 586, 587
Communal effort, 602
Community mental health movement,
583–584
Compassion fatigue, 608–609
Compassion satisfaction, 608
Competence, 491–492
Computerized tomography (CT), 64
Computer metaphor, 214–215, 329
Concept hierarchies, 216, 217f
Concept maps, 10

S U B J E C T I N D E X I-9
Identification, 431
Identity vs. role confusion, 303
Illinois Bell Telephone study, 624–625
Illusion, 114–117
Imitation, 159–161
Immigrants, 251
Immunosuppression, 617–620
Implicit memory, 190–191, 329,
393–394
Implicit personality theories, 447–448
Imprinting, 274
Impulse control, 277–278, 379–380
Inattentional blindness, 114
Independent variables, 27
Individualism, 366–367, 417–418,
449–450, 454, 491
Industrial and organizational (I/O)
psychologists, 5, 365–366
Industry vs. inferiority, 293
Infancy
attachment, 274–276
contact comfort, 273
maturation, 271–273
neural development, 271
psychosocial development, 276–277
self-control, 277–278
Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion
(Cialdini), 507
Information-processing model, 174
Informed consent, 32–33
In-groups, 482
Inheritance, 44–49
Initiative, 293
Innate abilities, 268–269
Innate reflex, 270
Insanity plea, 522–523
Insanity vs. sanity, 523,
548–549
Insight learning, 157–158
Insight therapies, 562–568
Insomnia, 342
Instinctive drift, 148
Instincts, 135
Instinct theory, 369–370
Institutional review boards (IRBs), 33
Integration, 604
Intelligence
of animals, 247–249
differences in, 250–257
exceptional children, 239–241
measurement of, 233–239
theories of, 242–247
Intelligence quotient (IQ). See IQ
Intentional blindness, 114
Interference, 197–198
Intermittent reinforcement, 146
Internal-External Locus of Control
Scale, 443–444
Internals, 623
International Positive Psychology
Association, 626
Interneurons, 50–51
Interpersonal attraction, 484–488
Interpersonal intelligence, 245
The Interpretation of Dreams
(Freud), 339
Interval schedules, 146–147
Intimacy, 306–308
Intrapersonal intelligence, 245
Intrinsic motivation, 365, 374
An Introduction to Psychology
(Calkins), 414
Introspection, 13–14, 325
Introversion, 19, 417, 437
Intuition, 219–221
Inverted U function, 396–397
Germinal phase, 268
Gestalt Rugo (Vasarely), 117
Gestalt psychology, 14, 117–120
g factor, 243, 244t
Giftedness, 239–242
Gist, 192
Glial cells, 55–56
Glove anesthesia, 535
Glutamate, 54t
Goal-directed behavior, 284
Good Samaritans, 481
Google, 213–214
Grammar, 280–281
Grasping reflex, 270
Grief, 603–605
Ground (perception), 118–119
Group cohesiveness, 470–471
Group therapies, 567–568, 574f
Groupthink, 470–471
Gustation, 106–107
Habituation, 135
Haldol, 578
Hallucinations, 517
Hallucinogens, 348, 349t, 350–351
Haloperidol, 578
Happiness, 637–639
Harassment, 505
Hardiness, 612, 624–625
Hassles, 609–611
Head Start, 255
Health psychology, 639–641
Hearing, 100–104
Heart of Darkness (Conrad), 356
Heaven’s Gate, 472
Heredity, 251–252. See Genetics
Heritability, 253–256
Hermann grid, 114–115
Heroes, 475
Heroin, 349t, 351
Heuristics, 223–225, 232–233
Hierarchy of needs, 372–374, 440
Hindsight bias, 227–228, 435, 619
Hippocampus, 67, 187–188,
394–395, 579
Hippocrates, 420, 518–519
H.M. (case study), 67, 187–191
Homeostasis, 370, 377
Homosexuality. See Sexual orientation
Homunculus, 69–70
Hormones, 50, 58–60, 615–616
Hospitalization, 583–584
Hostility, 622–623
How of Happiness (Lyubomirsky), 639
Hue, 98–100
Human Genome Project, 48, 251, 521
Humanistic psychology, 18, 419, 428,
439–442
Humanistic therapies, 564–565, 574f
Humiliation, 604
Humor, 221–222, 389, 632
Humors (bodily fluids), 420–421,
518–519
Hunger and eating, 376–380
Hurricane Katrina, 633
Hyperactivity, 542, 580–581. See also
Attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder
Hypnosis, 345–347, 428
Hypnotic analgesia, 346–347
Hypochondriasis, 534–535
Hypocretin, 343
Hypothalamus, 60, 68, 377, 615–616
Hypotheses, 24–26
Hysteria, 428, 534–535
Iconic memory, 179
Id, 371, 430
Five-factor theory, 423–424, 426, 452
Fixation, 431
Fixed-action patterns, 369–370
Fixed ratio (FR) schedules, 146–147
Flashbulb memory, 189–190
The Flock (Casey & Wilson), 537
Flow, 368
Fluid intelligence, 243, 244t
Fluoxetine, 579, 587
Flying, fear of, 134, 162–163
Flynn effect, 238
fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging), 64, 326,
469–470, 490
Folk psychologies, 12
Food aversions, 140–142
Forensic psychologists, 6
Forgetting curve, 196–197
Formal operational stage of develop-
ment, 286t, 300
Fovea, 96
Free association, 18, 562
Frequency, 101
Frequency (sound), 102–103
Frontal lobes, 69–72
Fully-functioning person, 440
Functional fixedness, 226
Functionalism, 14–15
Functional level of analysis, 373
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), 64, 469–470, 490
Fundamental attribution error (FAE),
449, 454, 472, 490–491
Future-oriented, 450–452
GABA, 54t
Gate-control theory, 109–110
Gender differences and similarities
in ability, 258–259
antisocial personality disorder
and, 543
anxiety disorders, 530
depression rates, 529
dissociative identity disorder and,
536–537
in dreaming, 340
emotions and, 390–392
generalized anxiety disorder, 531
happiness and, 639
in mental disorders, 544
in moral reasoning, 302
panic disorder, 531
personality and, 445
in physical maturation, 297–298
PTSD and, 605
in schizophrenia, 538
in sexuality, 383–384
in socialization, 292
social norms and, 494–495
in stress responses, 617
General adaptation syndrome (GAS),
615–617, 618
General anesthetics, 354
General intelligence, 243
Generalized anxiety disorder, 531
Generative adults, 449
Generativity, 309
Genetic leash, 273
Genetic preparedness, 141
Genetics, 44–49, 540–541
Genetic testing, 48
Genital stage, 431
Genius, 214, 229–233. See also
Thought/thinking
Genocide, 493
Genome, 46
Genotypes, 45
Emotional intelligence, 245, 400–402
Emotion-focused coping, 631
Emotions
amygdala and, 68
arousal and behavior, 396–397
components of, 388–389
control of, 399–406
culture and, 390–392
functions of, 389
motivation and, 387–388
neuroscience of, 393–396
numbers of, 389–390
theories, 397–399
Empirical investigations, 24
Empirically supported treatments (EST),
590–591
Encoding, 174
Encoding specificity principle, 193
Endocrine system, 49–50, 58–60
Endorphins, 54t, 352
Engram, 187–189
Environmental psychologists, 6
Epinephrine, 59, 395–396
Episodic buffer (memory), 182–183
Episodic memory, 185
Equal status contact, 496
Eros, 371, 429–430
Esteem needs, 372
Ethical issues, 32–33
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and
Code of Conduct (APA), 32–33
Even the Rat was White (Guthrie), 31
Evidence-based practice, 589–592
Evolution, 43–45, 384
Evolutionary psychology, 13, 44
Exceptional children, 239–242
Executive function, 278
Exercise, 588, 636
Exhaustion phase, 616
Existential crises, 564
Expectancy bias, 31–32, 202, 249–250
Expectancy-value theory, 486
Expectations, 221, 442–443
Experimental group, 27
Experimental psychologists, 5
Experiments, 27–28
Experts, 230, 232–233
Explicit memory, 191, 192–193, 394
Exposure therapy, 569
Externals, 623
Extinction, 138–139, 146, 161, 569
Extraversion, 19, 417, 423, 437
Extrinsic motivation, 365
Eye, 94–100
Eyewitnesses, 201
Fabricated memories. See Recovered
memories
Facial expressions, 390–391
Facilitated communication, 35
Factor analysis, 423
False Memories
False positives, 405–406
Family systems theory, 445
Family therapy, 568
Fantasy, 431
Fast response system, 393–394
Fearfulness, 288–289
Fear of flying, 134, 162–163
Feature detectors, 112–113
Feminine Psychology (Horney), 439
Fetal alcohol syndrome, 240, 269
Fetal stage, 268
Fetus, 268
Fight-or-flight response, 394–395,
613–614
Figure (perception), 118–119

I-10 S U B J E C T I N D E X
peripheral nervous system,
57–58
psychoactive drugs and, 60–61
Neural development, 271
Neural pathways, 61
Neurons, 50–56
Neuroscience. See also Brain
brain scanning methods, 63–65
brain stem, 65–66
cerebral cortex, 68–73
cerebral dominance, 73–79
definition and overview, 13
of emotions, 393–396
limbic system, 66–68
social neuroscience, 470
Neurosis, 525
Neuroticism, 423
Neurotic needs, 438
Neurotransmitters, 53–54, 61, 422,
528, 578–579
Neutral stimulus, 137
Nicotine, 269, 350t, 354
Night terrors, 343
Nine-dot problem, 226–227
Nociceptors, 109
Nonconscious processes, 325
Non-REM (NREM) sleep, 335, 340
Norepinephrine, 54t, 395–396
Normal distribution/curve, 237–238
Normal range (IQ), 238
Nurture. See Nature vs. nurture
Nutrition and diet, 636–637
Obedience to authority, 471–480
Obesity, 379
Object permanence, 283–284, 287
Observational learning, 159–162, 284,
442–443
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD),
533–534
Occipital lobes, 72–73
Occupational Outlook Handbook, 23
OCD (obsessive-compulsive disorder),
533–534
Oedipus complex, 431, 432, 437
Olfaction, 105–106
Olfactory bulbs, 105
On the Origin of Species (Darwin), 44
Opening Skinner’s Box (Slater), 549
Openness to experience, 423
Operant chamber, 144–145
Operant conditioning
brain mechanisms and, 161
classical conditioning vs., 153–155
definition and overview, 142–143
punishment, 149–152
reinforcement, 143–149
Skinner’s radical behaviorism, 143
therapies, 570–571
Operational definitions, 24–25
Ophidiophobia, 532, 571
Opiates, 349t, 351–352
Opponent-process theory, 99–100
Optic nerve, 96
Optimism, 625–626
Oral stage, 430, 431
Ordinary magic, 627–628
Orgasm, 383
Out-groups, 482
Outliers (Gladwell), 448
Overjustification, 367
Oversimplification, 405
Oxycontin, 348, 351
Oxytocin, 617
Pain, 109–111
Pain management, 346–347,
351–352
Panic attacks, 531
Moderators of stress, 621f
Monitor on Psychology
(DeAngelis), 510
Monoamine oxidase (MAO)
inhibitors, 579
Monocular cues, 124
Mood-congruent memory, 193–194
Mood disorders, 526–530
Mood stabilizers, 579–580
Moral development, 300–302
Morphemes, 281
Morphine, 349t, 351
Motivation
definition and overview, 364–365
drive theory, 370
emotions and, 387–388
flow, 368
hunger and, 376–380
hypothalamus and, 68, 377
instinct theory, 369–370
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs,
372–374
McClelland’s theory, 365–367
psychodynamic theory, 371
rewards and, 367–368
sex and, 380–387
social, 374–375
Motivational hierarchy, 373–374
Motor control, 271–273
Motor cortex, 69–70, 71f
Motor neurons, 50–51
Mozart effect, 315–316
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging),
64, 330
MSCEIT (Mayer-Salovey-Caruso
Emotional Intelligence Test),
401–402
Müller-Lyer illusion, 115–117
Multiaxial system, 525
Multiple intelligences, 244–245
Multiple personality, 537
Multiple sclerosis, 55
Multiple-systems approach to hunger,
376–377
Musical intelligence, 245
Myelin sheath, 55–56
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTN),
426–427
Names, remembering, 204
Narcissistic personality disorder, 543
Narcolepsy, 343
Narratives, 602
Natural concepts, 216
Naturalistic intelligence, 245
Naturalistic observations, 30–31
Natural language mediators, 203
Natural selection, 13, 43–44, 389
Nature vs. nurture, 19, 258, 267,
416–417
Necker cube, 15, 115
Need for achievement (n Ach), 365
Need for affiliation, 365–366
Need for power, 365–366
Needs, 370. See also Motivation
Negative correlation, 29
Negative punishment, 149, 150t
Negative reinforcement, 144–149,
149–150
Neo-Freudians, 436–439, 564–565
Neonatal period, 269–271
NEO Personality Inventory, 424, 452
Nervous system
central nervous system, 56–57
endocrine system and, 49–50,
58–60
neurons, 50–56
organization of, 56t
Malingering, 544
Manic-depressive disorder, 529
Manifest content, 339
Man’s Search for Meaning
(Frankl), 633
MAO inhibitors, 579
Marijuana, 348, 349t, 350–351
Marriage, 307–308
Marshmallow test, 401
Masturbation, 298
Matching hypothesis, 486
Maturation, 271–273
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT),
401–402
MDMA (ecstasy), 350t, 353
Media news coverage, 602–603
Media stereotypes, 495
Media violence, 160
Medical model, 519
Meditation, 347–348, 637
Medulla, 66
Melancholic temperament, 420–421
Memory
absent-mindedness, 198
bias, 201–202
blocking, 198–199, 205
definition and overview, 172–175
dreams and, 340
flashbulb memory, 189–190
hippocampus and, 67, 187–188
impairment, 311–312
long-term, 177–178, 178t, 184–189
misattribution, 199
mnemonics, 203–204
persistence, 202–203
recovered memories, 171–172,
200–201, 206–207
retrieval, 175, 190–195
sensory, 177–180, 178t
suggestibility, 200–201
transience, 195–198, 204–205
working memory, 177, 178t,
180–184
Menarche, 297
Mental age, 235
Mental health professionals, 558t
Mental hospitals, 515–517, 548–549,
583–584
Mental illness, 517, 518t
Mental models, 326–330
Mental operations, 286
Mental represenations, 284, 287
Mental retardation, 239–240
Mental set, 225
Mere exposure effect, 135
Mescaline, 349t, 350
Methadone, 349t, 352
Methamphetamines, 348, 350t, 353
Method of loci, 203
Microsoft, 214
Midlife, 308–309
Mimicry, 270
Mindfulness-based stress reduction
(MBSR), 637
Mindset, 448
Minimally conscious state, 330
Minimum principle of perception, 120
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI), 424–425
Mirror neurons, 70–71, 162, 270, 388
Misattribution, 199–200, 399
Misinformation effect, 200
MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory),
424–425
Mnemonic strategies, 203–204
I/O psychologists, 5
IQ, 231, 233–241, 250–257, 315–316.
See also Intelligence
Iraq War, 470–471
IRBs (institutional review boards), 33
Irreversibility, 285
James-Lange theory, 398, 400f
Japan earthquake, 603
Jealousy, 389
Jet lag, 334
Jigsaw classrooms, 496–497
Jim twins, 265–266, 313–314
JND (just noticeable difference), 92
Job engagement, 607
Job satisfaction, 366
Jonathan I., 87–88, 90, 99, 113
Judging, 226–229
Just noticeable difference (JND), 92
Kinesthetic sense, 104–105
Ku Klux Klan, 509
Labeling, 545–546
Language acquisition, 279–282
Language acquisition device (LAD), 280
Language and communication, 74
Latency, 431
Latent content, 339
Latent learning, 159
Lateralization of emotion, 394
Law of common fate, 120, 121
Law of continuity, 120, 121
Law of effect, 143
Law of Prägnanz, 120, 121
Law of proximity, 120
Law of similarity, 120
Laws of perceptual grouping, 119–120
Learned helplessness, 529, 624
Learning. See also Operant conditioning
classical conditioning, 136–142
cognitive, 157–162, 326
definition and overview, 134
distributed, 204–205
observational, 159–162, 284
punishment, 149–152
styles of, 164–166
Learning-based inference, 120–123, 121
Legislation against prejudice, 497
Leisure, 291–292
Leptin, 377
Letdown, 602
Levels-of-processing theory, 183
Libido, 429–430
Lie detectors, 405–406
Life changes, 609, 641–643
Lifestyle choices, 621f, 634–637
Limbic system, 66–68, 394–395
Linguistic intelligence, 244
Listening skills, 568, 576
Listening to Prozac (Kramer), 579
Lithium, 579–580
Locus of control, 443–444, 445–446,
623–625
Logical errors, 405
Logical-mathematical intelligence, 244
Long-term memory (LTM), 177–178,
178t, 184–189, 328
Long-term potentiation, 161
Loudness, 102–103
Love needs, 372
Loving relationships, 488–490
LSD, 349t, 350
Lying, 403–406
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
64, 330
Maintenance rehearsal, 181
Major depression disorder, 526–529
Major tranquilizers, 539
Making Monsters (Ofshe), 206

S U B J E C T I N D E X I-11
women in, 20, 22, 413–415,
494–495
Psychometrics, 242–243
Psycho-neuroimmunology, 618
Psychopathology, 517
Psychopaths, 543
Psychophysics, 91
Psychosexual stages, 430–431
Psychosis, 525
Psychosocial development, 276–277,
293, 303
Psychosomatic disorders, 534
Psychosurgery, 581–582
PTSD. See Posttraumatic stress disorder
Puberty, 296–298. See also Adolescence
Punishment, 149–152
Race, 47–48, 253, 257
Random assignment, 28
Rational-emotive behavior therapy
(REBT), 572–573
Rationalization, 431, 432
Ratio schedules, 146
Reaction formation, 432
Recall, 192, 331
Receptors, 90–91
Reciprocal determinism, 443, 520
Recognition (memory), 193
Recovered memories, 171–172,
200–201, 206–207
Redemptive self, 448–449
Reflection of feelings, 565
Reflective listening, 565
Reflexes, 56–57, 137, 270–271
Regression, 432
Reinforcement contingencies,
145–149
Reinforcers/reinforcement, 143–149
Relational bullying, 505
Reliability, 425, 427
REM rebound, 336, 352
REM sleep, 335–338, 340–341,
343, 352
Replication, 26–27
Representativeness bias, 228–229
Repression, 431–432, 563
Research, 27–31
Research psychologists, 5
Resilience, 612, 626–628
Resistance phase, 616
Resting potential, 52–53
Reticular formation, 66
Retina, 95–96
Retrieval (memory), 175, 190–195
Retrieval cues, 191–193, 205
Retroactive interference, 197
Retrograde amnesia, 188
Reuptake, 53, 579
Reverse stereotypes, 498–499
Revolution in aging, 306
Rewards, 367–368
Reward theory of attraction, 484,
486–487
Ritalin, 580–581
Rites of passage, 297
Rods (eye), 95–96
Rohypnol, 350t, 352
Role models, 442–443, 496
Romantic love, 489, 490
Rooting reflex, 270
Rorschach Inkblot Technique, 433
Rumination, 528, 529, 631
Rwanda, 495
Sabra (case study), 134, 162–163
SAD (seasonal affective disorder),
528–529
Safety needs, 372
Sanguine temperament, 420–421
Projection, 432
Projective tests, 432–433
Prospective memory, 194
Prototypes, 216
Proximal level of analysis, 373
Proximity, 484
Prozac, 579, 587
Pseudo-psychology, 7–10, 33–36
Psilocybin, 349t, 350
Psychiatry, 6–7
Psychic determinism, 434
Psychic numbness, 602
Psychoactive drugs, 60–61, 348–356
Psychoanalysis, 4, 18, 429,
562–564, 574f
Psychoanalytic theory, 17, 429
Psychobabble, 10
Psychodynamic psychology, 17–18, 371,
428–439
Psychological debriefing, 633–634
Psychological dependence/addiction,
355–356
Psychological disorders
abnormality, 521–522
adjustment disorders, 544
antisocial personality disorder, 543
anxiety disorders, 530–532
attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder, 542
autism, 541
bipolar disorder, 529–530
borderline personality disorder,
543–544
conversion disorders, 534–535
cultural context, 546–547
definition and overview, 517–518
depersonalization disorder, 536
depression, 526–529
dissociative amnesia, 535–536
dissociative fugue, 536
dissociative identity disorder, 536–537
DSM-IV classification system,
524–526
dyslexia, 542
gender differences, 544
historical perspectives, 518–519
hypochondriasis, 535
insanity pleas, 522–523
labels, 545–546
medical model, 519
narcissistic personality disorder, 543
obsessive-compulsive disorder,
533–534
phobia disorder, 532–533
psychological models, 520–521
Rosenhan study, 515–517, 548–550
schizophrenia, 537–541
shyness, 544–545
Psychological motives, 370
Psychological therapies, 560, 585–588
Psychologists’ work settings, 5
Psychology
behavioral perspective, 16–17, 21f,
520, 642
biological perspective, 12–13, 16t,
21f, 42–43, 520, 642
careers in, 5–6, 22–23
cognitive perspective, 13–16, 21f,
243–246, 329, 520, 642
definition and overview, 4–9
developmental perspectives, 16t, 19,
21f, 520, 642
as a major, 22–23
sociocultural perspectives, 16t,
19–20, 21f
whole-person perspectives, 16t,
17–19, 21f, 642–643
PGD (pre-implementation genetic
diagnosis), 48
Phallic stage, 430–431
Phantom limbs, 109
Phenomenal field, 440–441
Phenotypes, 45
Pheromones, 105
Phleglmatic temperament, 420–421
Phobias, 44, 394, 532–533, 588
Phonological loop (memory), 182
Phosphenes, 91
Photographic memory, 175–177
Photoreceptors, 95
Phrenology, 69
Physical attractiveness, 485–486
Physical bullying, 505
Physical dependence, 354–356
Physical maturation, 297–298
Pinna, 101
Pitch, 102–103
Pituitary gland, 59–60
PKU, 240
Placebos, 32, 110
Placenta, 268–269
Plasticity, 55
Plea of insanity, 522–523
Pleasure centers, 68
Poggendorf illusion, 116f
Political views, 464–465
Pol Pot, 471
Polygraphs, 405–406
Pons, 66
Ponzo illusion, 122f
Populations Communications
International, 160
Positive correlation, 28–29
Positive emotions, 632
Positive psychology, 442
Positive psychotherapy (PPT), 573
Positive punishment, 149, 150t
Positive reinforcement, 144–149, 150t
Positive self-regard, 492
Positron emission tomography (PET), 64
Post hoc fallacy, 207
Posthypnotic amnesia, 346
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
188, 205–206, 536, 605–606
Postural reflex, 270
Poverty, 254–255, 606, 639
Practical intelligence, 243–244
Prägnanz, 120, 121
Preconscious, 327–328
Prefrontal lobotomy, 581–582
Pre-implementation genetic diagnosis
(PGD), 48
Prejudice, 492–498, 606
Premack principle, 148
Prenatal development, 268–269
Preoperational stage of development,
284–285, 286t
Preparedness hypothesis, 533
Prescription drugs, 348
Prescription privileges, 559
Present-oriented, 450–452
Prevention, 588
Primal Fear, 537
Primary control, 624
Primary reinforcers, 147–148
Priming, 192, 329
Principle of opposites, 437
Principle of proximity, 484
Proactive interference, 197
Problem-focused coping, 631
Problem solving, 223–229
Procedural memory, 184, 185
Process theories, 417
Progressive education movement, 15
Panic disorder, 531–532
Papillae, 106–107
Parallel processing, 328
Paraprofessionals, 560–561
Parasympathetic division of the PNS,
58, 395
Parenting styles, 289–291
Parietal lobes, 72
Partial reinforcement, 146
Participant modeling therapy, 571–572
Past-oriented, 450–452
PCP, 349t, 350
Peer marriages, 308
Penis envy, 435, 437
Peoples Temple, 472
Perception
consciousness and, 330
cultural influences, 122–123
definition and overview, 89 (See also
Sensation)
depth perception, 123–124
Gestalt theory, 117–120
illusions, 114–117
learning-based inference, 120–123
seeing and believing, 124–125
sensation and, 112–114
stimulation and, 89–91
subliminal, 126–127
Percepts, 112–114
Perceptual constancy, 113
Perceptual grouping, 119–120
Perceptual psychology, 89. See also
Perception
Perceptual set, 121–122
Peripheral nervous system (PNS), 57–58
Permissive parents, 289–290
Persistence (memory), 202
Persistent vegetative state, 330
Personality
biology and human nature, 416
cultural effects, 417–418, 423–424,
445, 449–450
definition and overview, 413–415
disorders, 542–544, 588
dispositions and, 417, 420–421
Freud and psychoanalysis, 428–436
Horney’s neurotic needs, 437–439
humanistic theories, 419, 428,
439–442
implicit personality theories,
447–448
Jung and the unconscious,
436–437
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,
426–427
neo-Freudians, 436, 439
nurture and, 416–417
person-situation controversy,
453–454
processes, 417, 419, 428
psychodynamic theories, 419,
428–439
self-narratives, 448–449
social-cognitive theories, 419, 428,
442–444
temperament, 419–422
time perspective and, 450–452
traits, 419, 422–427, 453–454
trends, 445
types, 426–427, 437
unusual behaviors, 418–420
Personal loss, 603–605
Personal unconscious, 436
Person-situation controversy, 453–454
Persuasion, 507
PET scans, 64, 326, 327f, 330

I-12 S U B J E C T I N D E X
hardiness and, 612, 624–625
individual differences, 620–621
life changes and, 641–643
lifestyle choices, 621f,
634–637
locus of control and, 623–624
multiple perspectives of, 599
optimism and, 625–626
physiological responses to,
613–619
resilience and, 612, 626–628
of students, 610–612
subjective well-being and, 637–639
traumatic stressors, 601–606
type A personality and hostility,
622–623
World Trade Center attacks,
597–598, 603, 608,
619–620, 634
Stressors
chronic, 606–610
definition and overview, 600–601
traumatic, 601–606
Structuralism, 14
Student shootings, 509
Student stress, 610–612
Subgoals, 225
Subjective well-being (SWB), 637–639
Sublimation, 432
Subliminal perception, 126–127
Sudden infant death syndrome
(SIDS), 343
Suggestibility, 200–201
Suicide, 527
Sunlight, 528–529
Superego, 430
Suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN), 334
Surveys, 30
Sybil (Schreiber), 537
Symbolic modeling, 571
Sympathetic division of the PNS, 57–58
Symptom substitution, 568
Synapses, 53
Synaptic pruning, 271, 299–300
Synaptic transmissions, 53
Synchronicity, 270
Synchronous firing, 54–55
Synesthesia, 108
Systematic desensitization, 568–569
Systems of power
bullying, 504–507
chains of command, 502–504
persuasion, 507
Stanford Prison experiment,
500–502
Takahashi, Naoko, 366
Talk therapies, 562–568
Tardive dyskinesia, 578
Targeted rejection, 604
Taste aversions, 142
Taste, sense of, 106–107
Teaching psychologists, 5
Teens. See Adolescence
Telegraphic speech, 281
Television viewing, 292, 293
Telomeres, 618–619
Temperament, 19, 288–289, 419–422
Temporal lobes, 72, 102
Tend and befriend model, 617
Teratogens, 269
Terminal buttons, 53
Terrorism, 508–510, 601–602
Test taking, 331
Thalamus, 66
Thanatos, 371, 430
THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), 351
cultural differences, 475–477
definition and overview, 461–462
interpersonal attraction, 484–488
loving relationships, 488–490
obedience to authority, 471–475,
477–480
persuasion, 507
prejudice and discrimination,
492–498
social standards of behavior,
463–465
Stanford Prison experiment,
500–502
stereotype lift, 498–499
terrorism, 508–510
Social Readjustment Rating Scale
(SRRS), 609, 641–643
Social reality
cognitive attributions, 490–492
defined, 483
interpersonal attraction, 484–488
loving relationships, 488–490
prejudice and discrimination,
492–498
stereotype lift, 498–499
Social roles, 463–464
Social support, 635–636
Societal stressors, 606
Sociocultural perspective of psychology,
16t, 19–20, 21f
Socioeconomic status, 281
Sociopaths, 543
Soldier’s heart, 605
Soma, 52
Somatic-marker hypothesis, 398–399
Somatic markers, 388
Somatic nervous system, 57
Somatoform disorders, 534–535
Somatosensory cortex, 71f, 72
Sounds, 100–104
Sound waves, 101–102
Spatial intelligence, 245
Split brain, 75–77
Split personality, 537
Spontaneous recovery, 138–139
Sports psychologists, 5–6
SRRS (Social Readjustment Rating
Scale), 609, 641–643
SSRIs. See Selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors
Stages of moral reasoning, 300–302
Stage theory of development, 282–288
Stanford-Binet IQ test, 236–239
Stanford Prison Experiment, 500–502
Stepping reflex, 270–271
Stereotype lift, 498–499
Stereotypes, 495
Stereotype threat, 256–257, 497–498
Steroids, 354, 395–396
Stick Up For Yourself: Every Kid’s
Guide to Personal Power and
Positive
Self-Esteem (Kaufman), 506
Stimulants, 353–354, 580–581
Stimulation, 89–91. See also Sensation
Stimulus discrimination, 139
Stimulus-driven processing, 113
Stimulus generalization, 139
Storage (memory), 175
Stress
behavioral medicine and health
psychology, 639–641
chronic stressors, 606–611
cognitive appraisal of, 600–601,
610, 619–620
coping strategies, 621f, 629–634
hierarchy of needs and, 384–385
in late adulthood, 311
motivation and, 380–381
psychosexual stages, 430–431
scientific study of, 381–384
Sexual orientation, 298–299, 382t,
385–387
Sexual response cycle, 382–383
Shadow (Jung), 436–437
Shamans, 560
Shape constancy, 113
Shaping, 145–146
Shell-shock, 605
Short-term memory (STM), 177
Shyness, 418, 422, 544–545
Shyness: What It Is, What to Do about
It (Zimbardo), 545
Sibling rivalry, 436
SIDS (sudden infant death syndrome),
343
Signal detection theory, 93
Similarity principle, 484–485
Situationism
asking for help, 480–481
conformity, 465–471, 480, 482,
494–495
cultural differences, 475–477
obedience to authority, 471–475,
477–480
social standards of behavior,
463–465
Size constancy, 113
Sketchpad (memory), 182–183
Skinner box, 144–145
Skin senses, 107–108
Sky and Water (Escher), 117
Sleep paralysis, 335
Sleep, 333–338, 637. See also Dreaming
Sleep apnea, 342–343
Sleep debt, 337–338
Sleep disorders, 341–344
Sleepwalking, 335
Smell, sense of, 105–106
Snoring, 342–343
Social class, 254–255
Social-cognitive theories of personality,
419, 428, 442–444
Social comparisons, 632
Social context, 461
Social desirability, 486
Social development
of adolescents, 302–304
of children, 288–293
of early adulthood, 306–309
of late adulthood, 312
of midlife, 309
of neonates, 270
Social distance, 493
Social interest, 375
Socialization, 289–292
Social learning, 442–443, 520
Social motivation, 374–375
Social neuroscience, 470
Social norms, 464–465, 494–495
The Social Organization of Sexuality:
Sexual Practices in the United
States (Lauman), 381
Social perspective, 520
Social phobias, 532
Social psychology
asking for help, 480–481
bullying, 504–507
chains of command, 502–504
cognitive attributions, 490–492
conformity, 465–471, 480, 482,
494–495
Sanity vs. insanity, 523, 548–549
Savant syndrome, 231, 242
Scaffolding, 288
Scapegoating, 416, 494
Scared straight, 8–9
Schedules of reinforcement, 146–147
Schemas, 185–186, 221–222, 232–233,
282–283, 464
Schizophrenia, 537–541, 587
Schlesinger, James, 504
Schlesinger Report, 504
School psycholgists, 6
Scientific evidence, 8
Scientific method, 23–27
Scripts, 222, 464
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD),
528–529
Secondary control, 624
Secondary emotions, 390
Secondary reinforcers, 147–148
Secondary traumatic stress, 608
Secure attachment, 274
Selective attention, 326
Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs), 579
Selective social interaction, 312
Self-actualization, 372, 440
Self-consistency bias, 202
Self-control, 277–278, 379–380
Self-disclosure, 485
Self-esteem, 441–442
Self-fulfilling prophecy, 249–250, 426
Self-help support groups, 567
Self-imposed limitations, 226
Self-narratives, 448–449
Self-regard, 492
Self-serving bias, 491
Self-transcendence, 372
Self-worth, 486
Semantic memory, 185
Sensation. See also Perception
absolute thresholds, 91–92
definition and overview, 88–89
gustation, 106–107
hearing, 100–104
in neonates, 269–270
olfaction, 105–106
pain, 109–111
perception and, 112–114
sensory adaptation, 93–94
signal detection theory, 93
skin senses, 107–108
stimulation and, 89–91
synesthesia, 108
vision, 94–100
Sensation seekers, 397
Sense making, 633
Sensitive periods, 271
Sensorimotor intelligence, 283
Sensorimotor stage of development,
283–284, 286t
Sensory adaptation, 93–94
Sensory memory, 177–180, 178t
Sensory neurons, 50–51
Sensory pathways, 90–91
Sensory psychology, 88–89. See also
Sensation
Separation anxiety, 274
Serial position effect, 197–198
Serotonin, 54t, 61f, 350, 395–396, 579
Set point, 377
Sex chromosomes, 46–47
Sex in America (Gagnon), 381
Sexuality. See also Sexual orientation
in adolescence, 298–299
evolutionary perspective, 384

S U B J E C T I N D E X I-13
Weber’s law, 92
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS), 238–239
Wechsler, David, 238
Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale
of Intelligence (WPPSI), 238–239
Weight control, 379
Weisberg, 230
Wernicke’s area, 72
What pathway, 112
Where pathway, 112
Whole method, 204
Whole-person perspective of psychol-
ogy, 16t, 17–19, 21f, 642–643
Will power, 379–380
Wisdom, 244
Witchcraft, 519
Withdrawal, 355
Women in psychology, 20, 22,
413–415, 494–495
Working backward, 224
Working memory, 177, 178t,
180–184, 326
World Trade Center attacks, 472, 509,
597–598, 603, 608,
619–620, 634
WPPSI (Wechsler Preschool and
Primary Scale of Intelligence),
238–239
Writing as therapy, 628–629
Xanax, 352, 580
Zero correlation, 29
Zimbardo’s Time Perspective Inventory
(ZTPI), 451–452
Zöllner illusion, 116f
Zone of proximal development, 288
Zygotes, 268
Twilight (Meyer), 323
Twins, 265–267, 313–314, 385–386
Two-factor theory, 399, 400f
Tympanic membrane, 101–102
Type A personality, 622–623
Tyranny of choice, 229
Umami, 106
Unconditional positive regard, 441
Unconditioned response (UCR), 138–139
Unconditioned stimulus (UCS), 137–139
Unconscious, 327–329, 356–357,
393–394, 429–430, 435, 436–437
Undergraduate Stress
Questionnaire, 610
Unemployment, 606
Uninvolved parents, 289–290
Upward social comparisons, 632
Validity, 425, 427
Valium, 352, 580
Variable interval (VI) schedules, 147
Variable ratio (VR) schedules, 147
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC), 394
Verbal bullying, 505
Vestibular sense, 104–105
Vicarious traumatization, 603
Vicodin, 348, 351
Visible spectrum, 98
Vision, 94–100
Visual cortex, 72–73, 97–98, 112
Vocabulary, 280–281
WAIS (Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale), 238–239
Walden Two (Skinner), 133–134
Warmth, 491–492
Washoe (case study), 247–248
Wave metaphor, 288
intellectual differences, 250–257
intelligence measurement, 233–239
intelligence theory, 242–247
intuition, 219–221
problem solving, 223–229
schemas and scripts, 221–222
test scores, 249–250
Thresholds, 91–92
Thrill seekers, 397
Timbre, 102–103
Time perception, 450–452
TMS (transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion), 74–75, 583, 587
Tobacco use, 348, 350t, 354
Tofranil, 578–579
Token economies, 148, 571
Tolerance (to drugs), 355
Top-down processing, 113
TOT phenomenon, 194–195, 198–199
Trait and temperament psychology, 18,
419–427
Traits, 419–427, 453–454
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS), 74–75, 583, 587
Transduction, 90–91, 95–96
Transference, 564
Transience, 195–198, 204–205
Transitions, 309
Transsexualism, 385
Transvestism, 385
Traumatic stressors, 601–606
Triangular theory of love, 489
Triarchic theory of intelligence, 244
Trichromatic theory, 99
Tricyclic antidepressants, 578–579
Trust, 276–277
Tsunami, 603
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT),
365, 433
Theory, defined, 24
Theory of mind, 247, 287–288,
520, 541
Therapeutic alliance, 557–559, 590
Therapies
access to, 557
behavior therapies, 568–571
brain-stimulation therapies,
582–583
cognitive-behavioral, 571–574
components of, 557–558
culture and, 560
definition and overview, 556–557
drug therapy, 577–581
effectiveness of, 574–575
evidence-based practice, 589–592
first aid, 576
historical perspectives, 559–560
hospitalization, 583–584
insight therapies, 561–568
mental health professionals, 558t
paraprofessionals, 560–561
psychological vs. biomedical,
585–588
psychosurgery, 581–582
Thorazine, 578
Thought/thinking
animal intelligence, 247–249
brain and, 218–219
concepts, 215–217
creative genius, 229–233
exceptional children, 239–242
gender differences, 257–258
imagery and cognitive maps,
217–218

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com; p. 14: Don Shrubshell, Pool/AP Images; p. 20, top: Philip G.
Zimbardo, Inc.; p. 20, bottom: Richard Lord/The Image Works; p. 31, top:
Jean-Marc Bouju/AP Images; p. 31, bottom: Archives of the History of
American Psychology/The University of Akron; p. 33: John McPherson.
Reproduction rights obtainable from www.CartoonStock.com; p. 35: Alan
Carey/The Image Works
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Johnson
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p. 215: Seth Wenig/AP Images; p. 216, top: FloridaStock/Shutterstock;
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top: Emese/Shutterstock; p. 253, bottom: Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert/Alamy;
p. 255: Michael Newman/PhotoEdit, Inc.; p. 257: Nomad Soul/Shutterstock
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SPL/Photo Researchers Inc.; p. 273: Nina Leen/Time Life Pictures/Getty
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p. 298: Ted Foxx/Alamy; p. 299: Creatas/Thinkstock; p. 303: ImageState/
Alamy; p. 308 & 311: Bob Daemmrich/The Image Works; p. 309: Steve
Skjold/Alamy
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Dupor; p. 329, bottom: StockShot/Alamy; p. 331: William Perugini/Shutter-
stock; p. 334: Timurpix/Shutterstock; p. 338: Adrian Sherratt/Alamy; p. 339:
Paul Conklin/PhotoEdit, Inc.; p. 341: Digital Image © The Museum of Modern
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p. 353, top: Colin Young-Wolff/PhotoEdit, Inc.; p. 353, bottom: Yale University
Office of Public Affairs; p. 355: Istvan Csak/Shutterstock
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Images/Alamy; p. 385: First Light/Alamy; p. 389: Larry Williams/
CORBIS; p. 391, all: David Matsumoto; p. 397: 2happy/Shutterstock;
p. 399, top: Randy Faris/Corbis; p. 399, bottom: Robert L. Johnson;
p. 400: Newhouse News Service/Landov; p. 401: Pearson; p. 404, left &
right: Dacher Keltner, UC Berkley
Chapter 10: p. 413: Lifesize/David Sacks/Thinkstock; p. 414: Archives of
the History of American Psychology; p. 416: Harvard University Archives,
HUP James, W. (2); p. 419: Dicko/Splash News/Newscom; p. 420: George
Bernard/Photo Researchers, Inc.; p. 422 & 442: Philip G. Zimbardo, Inc.;
p. 429: ND/Roger-Viollet/The Image Works; p. 430: Mary Evans Picture
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stock; p. 433, bottom: PhotosIndia.com LLC/Alamy; p. 435: The Advertis-
ing Archives; p. 436: Courtesy Everett Collection; p. 437: Bettmann/Corbis;
p. 440: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; p. 443: Richard T. Nowitz/Corbis;
p. 449: Michael Newman/PhotoEdit, Inc.
Chapter 11: p. 459: Apic/Getty Images; p. 466: William Vandivert/
Scientific American; p. 472: Bettmann/Corbis; p. 473, all: From the film
Obedience copyright © 1968 by Stanley Milgram. Copyright renewed
1993 by Alexandra Milgram, distributed by Penn State Media Sales.;
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Images; p. 476, top: Claudia Wiens/Alamy; p. 477: Brian Bohannon/AP
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The Image Works; p. 489: Michael Newman/PhotoEdit, Inc.; p. 491:
Michael Blann/Digital Vision/Getty images; p. 493: Andrey Arkusha/
Shutterstock; p. 49s4, top & bottom & 501: Philip G. Zimbardo, Inc.;
p. 496: Kristoffer Tripplaar/Alamy; p. 503: AP Images
Chapter 12: p. 515: Lex van Lieshout/ANP/Newscom; p. 519: Peabody
Essex Museum; p. 521: Paul Seheult; Eye Ubiquitous/Corbis;
p. 523: A. Ramey/PhotoEdit Inc.; p. 530: Burstein Collection/Corbis;
p. 533, top: Sky Bonillo/PhotoEdit, Inc.; p. 533, bottom: John Greim/Photo
Researchers, Inc; p. 536: Susan Greenwood; p. 539: Dr. E. Fuller Torrey
and Dr. Weinberger/National Institute of Mental Health; p. 543:
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P H O T O C R E D I T S

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Trustees of Sir John Soane’s Museum, London/The Bridgeman Art Library
International; p. 562: Freud Museum, London; p. 565: Michael Rougier/
Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images; p. 567: Nancy Sheehan/PhotoEdit, Inc.;
p. 569: Bebeto Matthews/AP Images; p. 572: Philip G. Zimbardo, Inc.;
p. 581: The Gallery Collection/Corbis; p. 582: Will & Deni McIntyre/Photo
Researchers, Inc.; p. 583: Michael Newman/PhotoEdit Inc.; p. 584: Simon
Price/Alamy; p. 586: The Advertising Archives
Chapter 14: p. 597: AF archive/Alamy; p. 598, top: Steve Welsh/Alamy; p. 598,
bottom: imagebroker/Alamy; p. 601: The Yomiuri Shimbum, Miho Iketani/AP
Images; p. 606: Denis Poroy/AP Images; p. 609: Tony Freeman/PhotoEdit Inc.;
p. 614: Reuters/Jose Manuel Ribeiro; p. 616: Gary Conner/PhotoEdit, Inc.;
p. 619: Anthony Correia/Shutterstock; p. 622: LM Otero/AP Images; p. 624:
Mark Richards/PhotoEdit, Inc.; p. 626: Helga Esteb/Shutterstock; p. 630: Walter
G Arce/Shutterstock; p. 632: Daniele La Monaca/Reuters/Landov; p. 635: Jack
Hollingsworth/Blend Images/Corbis; p. 636: Jerry Wachter/Photo Researchers, Inc.

Psychology: Core Concepts—Discovering Psychology Telecourse
CHAPTER-VIDEO PROGRAM PREVIEW GUIDE
Textbook
Chapter
Number

Textbook
Chapter Title

Discovering Psychology
Video Program

Discovering Psychology
Video Program Summary
Chapter 1 Mind, Behavior, and
Psychological Science
Program 1: Past, Present,
and Future
Program 1 introduces psychology as the scientific study of behavior and
mental processes. It looks at how psychologists work from a variety of
theoretical models and traditions, record and analyze their observations, and
attempt to unravel the mysteries of the mind.
Program 2: Understanding
Research
Program 2 demonstrates the hows and whys of psychological research.
By showing how psychologists rely on systematic observation, data
collection, and analysis to find out the answers to their questions, this
program reveals why the scientific method is used in all areas of empirical
investigation.
Chapter 2 Biopsychology,
Neuroscience, and
Human Nature
Program 3: The Behaving
Brain
Psychologists who study the structure and composition of the brain believe
that all our thoughts, feelings, and actions have a biological and chemical
basis. Program 3 explains the nervous system and the methods scientists
use to explore the link between physiological processes in the brain and
psychological experience and behavior.
Program 4: The Responsive
Brain
Program 4 takes a closer look at the dynamic relationship between the brain
and behavior. We’ll see how the brain controls behavior and, conversely,
how behavior and environment can cause changes in the structure and the
functioning of the brain.
Program 25: Cognitive
Neuroscience
Program 25 introduces cognitive neuroscience and the techniques now
available for studying mental processes by studying the brain’s activities.
Cognitive neuroscience is a highly interdisciplinary field that unites
psychologists with brain researchers, biologists, and physicists in what has
become the most dramatic advance in the last decade of psychological
research.
Chapter 3 Sensation and
Perception
Program 7: Sensation and
Perception
Program 7 explores how we make contact with the world outside our brain
and body. We’ll see how biological, cognitive, social, and environmental
influences shape our personal sense of reality, and we’ll gain an
understanding of how psychologists use our perceptual errors to study how
the constructive process of perception works.
Chapter 4 Learning and
Human Nurture
Program 8: Learning Learning is the process that enables humans and other animals to profit
from experience, anticipate events, and adapt to changing conditions.
Program 8 explains the basic learning principles and the methods
psychologists use to study and modify behavior. It also demonstrates
how cognitive processes, such as insight and observation, influence
learning.
Chapter 5 Memory Program 9: Remembering
and Forgetting
Program 9 explores memory, the complex mental process that allows us
to store and recall our previous experiences. It looks at the ways cognitive
psychologists investigate memory as an information-processing task and
at the ways neuroscientists study how the structure and functioning of the
brain affect how we remember and why we forget.
Chapter 6 Thinking and
Intelligence
Program 10: Cognitive
Processes
The study of mental processes and structures—perceiving, reasoning,
Imagining, anticipating, and problem solving—is known as cognition.
Program 10 explores these higher mental processes, offering insight into how
the field has evolved and why more psychologists than ever are investigating
the way we absorb, transform, and manipulate knowledge.
Program 11: Judgement
and Decision Making
Program 11 explores the decision-making process and the psychology of risk
taking, revealing how people arrive at good and bad decisions. It also looks
at the reasons people lapse into irrationality and how personal biases can
affect judgement.
Program 16: Testing and
Intelligence
Just as no two fingerprints are alike, no two people have the same set of
abilities, aptitudes, interests, and talents. Program 16 explains the tools
psychologists use to measure these differences. It also describes the long-
standing controversy over how to define intelligence and how IQ tests
have been misused and misapplied. Is it wise, accurate, or fair to reduce
intelligence to a number? Researchers are currently debating the value of
intelligence and personality tests.

Textbook
Chapter
Number

Textbook
Chapter Title

Discovering Psychology
Video Program

Discovering Psychology
Video Program Summary
Chapter 7 Development Over the
Lifespan
Program 5: The Developing
Child
Program 5 looks at how advances in technology and methodology have
revealed the abilities of newborn infants, giving researchers a better
understanding of the role infants play in shaping their environment. In
contrast to the nature-versus-nurture debates of the past, today’s researchers
concentrate on how heredity and environment interact to contribute to the
developmental process.
Program 6: Language
Development
Program 6 examines how children acquire language and demonstrates the
methods psychologists use to study the role of biology and social lnteraction
in language acquisition. It also looks at the contribution of language to
children’s cognitive and social development.
Program 17: Sex and
Gender
Program 17 looks at the similarities and differences between the sexes
resulting from the complex interaction of biological and social factors. It
contrasts the universal differences in anatomy and physiology with those
learned and cultural, and it reveals how roles are changing to reflect new
values and psychological knowledge.
Program 18: Maturing
and Aging
Thanks to growing scientific interest in the elderly, research on aging has
replaced many myths and fears with facts. Program 18 focuses on what
scientists are learning about life cycle development as they look at how aging
is affected by biology, environment, and lifestyle.
Chapter 8 States of Consciousness Program 13: The Mind
Awake and Asleep
Program 13 describes how psychologists investigate the nature of sleeping,
dreaming, and altered states of conscious awareness. It also explores the ways
we use consciousness to interpret, analyze, and even change our behavior.
Program 14: The Mind
Hidden and Divided
Program 14 considers the evidence that our moods, behavior, and even our
health are largely the result of multiple mental processes, many of which are out
of conscious awareness. It also looks at some of the most dramatic phenomena
in psychology, such as hypnosis and the division of human consciousness into
“two minds” when the brain is split in half by surgical intervention.
Chapter 9 Motivation and Emotion Program 12: Motivation
and Emotion
What moves us to act? Why do we feel the way we do? Program 12 shows
how psychologists study the continuous interactions of mind and body in an
effort to explain the enormous variety and complexities of human behavior.
Chapter 10 Personality: Theories of
the Whole Person
Program 15: The Self What makes each of us unique? What traits and experiences make you?
Program 15 describes how psychologists systematically study the origins and
development of self-identity, self-esteem, and other aspects of our thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors that make up our personalities.
Chapter 11 Social Psychology Program 19: The Power of
the Situation
Program 19 investigates the social and situational forces that influence our
individual and group behavior and how our beliefs can be manipulated by
other people.
Program 20: Constructing
Social Reality
Program 20 explores our subjective view of reality and how it influences
social behavior. It reveals how your perceptions and reasoning ability can be
influenced in positive and negative ways, and it increases our understanding
of how psychological processes govern interpretation of reality.
Chapter 12 Psychological Disorders Program 21:
Psychopathology
Program 21 describes the major types of mental illnesses and some of
the factors that influence them—both biological and psychological. It also
reports on several approaches to classifying and treating mental illness and
explains the difficulties of defining abnormal behavior.
Chapter 13 Therapies for
Psychological Disorders
Program 22:
Psychotherapy
Program 22 looks at psychotherapy and therapists, the professionals trained
to help us solve some of our most critical problems. You will learn about
different approaches to the treatment of mental, emotional, and behavioral
disorders and the kind of helping relationships that therapists provide.
Chapter 14 From Stress to Health
and Well-Being
Program 23: Health,
Mind, and Behavior
A profound rethinking of the relationship between mind and body has led to
an approach to health that assumes that mental and physical processes are
constantly interacting. Program 23 looks at what health psychologists know
about the factors that increase our chances of becoming ill and what we can
do to improve and maintain our health.
Psychology: Core Concepts—Discovering Psychology Telecourse
CHAPTER-VIDEO PROGRAM PREVIEW GUIDE

Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
CONTENTS
TO THE STUDENT . . .
TO THE INSTRUCTOR . . .
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
CHAPTER 1 Mind, Behavior, and Psychological Science
PROBLEM: How would psychologists test the claim that sugar makes children hyperactive?
1.1 What Is Psychology—And What Is It Not?
Psychology: It’s More Than You Think
Psychology Is Not Psychiatry
Thinking Critically about Psychology and Pseudo-Psychology
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
1.2 What Are Psychology’s Six Main Perspectives?
Separation of Mind and Body and the Modern Biological Perspective
The Founding of Scientific Psychology and the Modern Cognitive Perspective
The Behavioral Perspective: Focusing on Observable Behavior
The Whole-Person Perspectives: Psychodynamic, Humanistic, and Trait and Temperament Psychology
The Developmental Perspective: Changes Arising from Nature and Nurture
The Sociocultural Perspective: The Individual in Context
The Changing Face of Psychology
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Psychology as a Major
1.3 How Do Psychologists Develop New Knowledge?
Four Steps in the Scientific Method
Five Types of Psychological Research
Controlling Biases in Psychological Research
Ethical Issues in Psychological Research
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Perils of Pseudo-Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Facilitated Communication
Chapter Summary
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 2 Biopsychology, Neuroscience, and Human Nature
PROBLEM: What does Jill Bolte Taylor’s experience teach us about how our brain is organized and about its amazing ability to adapt?
2.1 How Are Genes and Behavior Linked?
Evolution and Natural Selection
Genetics and Inheritance
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Choosing Your Children’s Genes
2.2 How Does the Body Communicate Internally?
The Neuron: Building Block of the Nervous System
The Nervous System
The Endocrine System
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: How Psychoactive Drugs Affect the Nervous System
2.3 How Does the Brain Produce Behavior and Mental Processes?
Windows on the Brain
Three Layers of the Brain
Lobes of the Cerebral Cortex
Cerebral Dominance
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Left Brain versus Right Brain
Chapter Summary
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 3 Sensation and Perception
PROBLEM: Is there any way to tell whether the world we “see” in our minds is the same as the external world—and whether we see things as most others do?
3.1 How Does Stimulation Become Sensation?
Transduction: Changing Stimulation to Sensation
Thresholds: The Boundaries of Sensation
Signal Detection Theory
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Sensory Adaptation
3.2 How Are the Senses Alike? How Are They Different?
Vision: How the Nervous System Processes Light
Hearing: If a Tree Falls in the Forest . . .
How the Other Senses Are Like Vision and Hearing
Synesthesia: Sensations across the Senses
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Sense and Experience of Pain
3.3 What Is the Relationship between Sensation and Perception?
Perceptual Processing: Finding Meaning in Sensation
Perceptual Ambiguity and Distortion
Theoretical Explanations for Perception
Seeing and Believing
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Subliminal Perception and Subliminal Persuasion
Chapter Summary
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 4 Learning and Human Nurture
PROBLEM: Assuming Sabra’s fear of flying was a response she had learned, could it also be treated by learning? If so, how?
4.1 What Sort of Learning Does Classical Conditioning Explain?
The Essentials of Classical Conditioning
Applications of Classical Conditioning
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Taste Aversions and Chemotherapy
4.2 How Do We Learn New Behaviors By Operant Conditioning?
Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism
The Power of Reinforcement
The Problem of Punishment
A Checklist for Modifying Operant Behavior
Operant and Classical Conditioning Compared
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
4.3 How Does Cognitive Psychology Explain Learning?
Insight Learning: Köhler in the Canaries with Chimps
Cognitive Maps: Tolman Finds Out What’s on a Rat’s Mind
Observational Learning: Bandura’s Challenge to Behaviorism
Brain Mechanisms and Learning
“Higher” Cognitive Learning
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Fear of Flying Revisited
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Do Different People Have Different “Learning Styles”?
Chapter Summary
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 5 Memory
PROBLEM: How can our knowledge about memory help us evaluate claims of recovered memories?
5.1 What Is Memory?
Metaphors for Memory
Memory’s Three Basic Tasks
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Would You Want a “Photographic” Memory?
5.2 How Do We Form Memories?
The First Stage: Sensory Memory
The Second Stage: Working Memory
The Third Stage: Long-Term Memory
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: “Flashbulb” Memories: Where Were You When . . . ?
5.3 How Do We Retrieve Memories?
Implicit and Explicit Memory
Retrieval Cues
Other Factors Affecting Retrieval
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: On the Tip of Your Tongue
5.4 Why Does Memory Sometimes Fail Us?
Transience: Fading Memories Cause Forgetting
Absent-Mindedness: Lapses of Attention Cause Forgetting
Blocking: Access Problems
Misattribution: Memories in the Wrong Context
Suggestibility: External Cues Distort or Create Memories
Bias: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Opinions Distort Memories
Persistence: When We Can’t Forget
The Advantages of the “Seven Sins” of Memory
Improving Your Memory with Mnemonics
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Recovered Memory Controversy
Chapter Summary
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 6 Thinking and Intelligence
PROBLEM: What produces “genius,” and to what extent are the people we call “geniuses” different from others?
6.1 What Are the Components of Thought?
Concepts
Imagery and Cognitive Maps
Thought and the Brain
Intuition
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Schemas and Scripts Help You Know What to Expect
6.2 What Abilities Do Good Thinkers Possess?
Problem Solving
Judging and Making Decisions
Becoming a Creative Genius
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
6.3 How Is Intelligence Measured?
Binet and Simon Invent a School Abilities Test
American Psychologists Borrow Binet and Simon’s Idea
Problems with the IQ Formula
Calculating IQs “on the Curve”
IQ Testing Today
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: What Can You Do for an Exceptional Child?
6.4 Is Intelligence One or Many Abilities?
Psychometric Theories of Intelligence
Cognitive Theories of Intelligence
The Question of Animal Intelligence
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Test Scores and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
6.5 How Do Psychologists Explain IQ Differences Among Groups?
Intelligence and the Politics of Immigration
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence Is Influenced by Heredity?
What Evidence Shows That Intelligence is Influenced by Environment?
Heritability (Not Heredity) and Group Differences
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Stereotype Threat
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Question of Gender Differences
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide

CHAPTER 7 Development Over the Lifespan
PROBLEM: Do the amazing accounts of similarities in twins reared apart indicate we are primarily a product of our genes? Or do genetics and environment work together to influence growth and development over the lifespan?
7.1 What Innate Abilities Does the Infant Possess?
Prenatal Development
The Neonatal Period: Abilities of the Newborn Child
Infancy: Building on the Neonatal Blueprint
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Not Just Fun and Games: The Role of Child’s Play in Life Success
7.2 What Are the Developmental Tasks of Childhood?
How Children Acquire Language
Cognitive Development: Piaget’s Theory
Social and Emotional Development
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Puzzle of ADHD
7.3 What Changes Mark the Transition of Adolescence?
Adolescence and Culture
Physical Maturation in Adolescence
Adolescent Sexuality
Neural and Cognitive Development in Adolescence
Moral Development: Kohlberg’s Theory
Social and Emotional Issues in Adolescence
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology: Cognitive Development in College Students
7.4 What Developmental Challenges Do Adults Face?
Early Adulthood: Explorations, Autonomy, and Intimacy
The Challenges of Midlife: Complexity and Generativity
Late Adulthood: The Age of Integrity
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: A Look Back at the Jim Twins and Your Own Development
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Mozart Effect
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 8 States of Consciousness
PROBLEM: How can psychologists objectively examine the worlds of dreaming and other subjective mental states?
8.1 How Is Consciousness Related to Other Mental Processes?
Tools for Studying Consciousness
Models of the Conscious and Nonconscious Minds
What Does Consciousness Do for Us?
Coma and Related States
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
8.2 What Cycles Occur in Everyday Consciousness?
Daydreaming
Sleep: The Mysterious Third of Our Lives
Dreaming: The Pageants of the Night
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Sleep Disorders
8.3 What Other Forms Can Consciousness Take?
Hypnosis
Meditation
Psychoactive Drug States
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Dependence and Addiction
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Unconscious—Reconsidered
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 9 Motivation and Emotion
PROBLEM: Motivation is largely an internal and subjective process: How can we determine what motivates people like Lance Armstrong to work so hard at becoming the best in the world at what they do?
9.1 What Motivates Us?
Why People Work: McClelland’s Theory
The Unexpected Effects of Rewards on Motivation
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
9.2 How Are Our Motivational Priorities Determined?
Instinct Theory
Drive Theory
Freud’s Psychodynamic Theory
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
Putting It All Together: A New Hierarchy of Needs
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Determining What Motivates Others
9.3 Where Do Hunger and Sex Fit into the Motivational Hierarchy?
Hunger: A Homeostatic Drive and a Psychological Motive
The Problem of Will Power and Chocolate Cookies
Sexual Motivation: An Urge You Can Live Without
Sex, Hunger, and the Hierarchy of Needs
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The What and Why of Sexual Orientation
9.4 How Do Our Emotions Motivate Us?
What Emotions Are Made Of
What Emotions Do for Us
Counting the Emotions
Cultural Universals in Emotional Expression
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Gender Differences in Emotion Depend on Biology and Culture
9.5 What Processes Control Our Emotions?
The Neuroscience of Emotion
Arousal, Performance, and the Inverted U
Theories of Emotion: Resolving Some Old Issues
How Much Conscious Control Do We Have Over Our Emotions?
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Detecting Deception
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Do Lie Detectors Really Detect Lies?
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 10 Personality: Theories of the Whole Person
PROBLEM: What influences were at work to produce the unique behavioral patterns, high achievement motivation, and consistency over time and place that we see in the personality of Mary Calkins?
10.1 What Forces Shape Our Personalities?
Biology, Human Nature, and Personality
The Effects of Nurture: Personality and the Environment
The Effects of Nature: Dispositions and Mental Processes
Social and Cultural Contributions to Personality
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Explaining Unusual People and Unusual Behavior
10.2 What Persistent Patterns, or Dispositions, Make Up Our Personalities?
Personality and Temperament
Personality as a Composite of Traits
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Finding Your Type
10.3 Do Mental Processes Help Shape Our Personalities?
Psychodynamic Theories: Emphasis on Motivation and Mental Disorder
Humanistic Theories: Emphasis on Human Potential and Mental Health
Social-Cognitive Theories: Emphasis on Social Learning
Current Trends: The Person in a Social System
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
10.4 What “Theories” Do People Use to Understand Themselves and Others?
Implicit Personality Theories
Self-Narratives: The Stories of Our Lives
The Effects of Culture on Our Views of Personality
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Personality of Time
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: The Person–Situation Controversy
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 11 Social Psychology
PROBLEM: What makes ordinary people willing to harm other people, as they did in Milgram’s shocking experiment?
11.1 How Does the Social Situation Affect Our Behavior?
Social Standards of Behavior
Conformity
Obedience to Authority
Cross-Cultural Tests of Milgram’s Research
Some Real-World Extensions of the Milgram Obedience to Authority Paradigm
The Bystander Problem: The Evil of Inaction
Need Help? Ask for It!
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: On Being “Shoe” at Yale U
11.2 Constructing Social Reality: What Influences Our Judgments of Others?
Interpersonal Attraction
Loving Relationships
Making Cognitive Attributions
Prejudice and Discrimination
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Stereotype Lift and Values Affirmations
11.3 How Do Systems Create Situations That Influence Behavior?
The Stanford Prison Experiment
Chains of System Command
Preventing Bullying by Systematic Changes and Reframing
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Is Terrorism “a Senseless Act of Violence, Perpetrated by Crazy Fanatics”?
Chapter Summary
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 12 Psychological Disorders
PROBLEM: Is it possible to distinguish mental disorder from merely unusual behavior? That is, are there specific signs that clearly indicate mental disorder?
12.1 What Is Psychological Disorder?
Changing Concepts of Psychological Disorder
Indicators of Abnormality
A Caution to Readers
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: The Plea of Insanity
12.2 How Are Psychological Disorders Classified in the DSM-IV?
Overview of the DSM-IV Classification System
Mood Disorders
Anxiety Disorders
Somatoform Disorders
Dissociative Disorders
Schizophrenia
Developmental Disorders
Personality Disorders
Adjustment Disorders and Other Conditions: The Biggest Category of All
Gender Differences in Mental Disorders
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Shyness
12.3 What Are the Consequences of Labeling People?
Diagnostic Labels, Labeling, and Depersonalization
The Cultural Context of Psychological Disorder
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Insane Places Revisited—Another Look at the Rosenhan Study
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 13 Therapies for Psychological Disorders
PROBLEM: What is the best treatment for Derek’s depression: psychological therapy, drug therapy, or both? More broadly, the problem is this: How do we decide among the available therapies for any of the mental disorders?
13.1 What Is Therapy?
Entering Therapy
The Therapeutic Alliance and the Goals of Therapy
Therapy in Historical and Cultural Context
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Paraprofessionals Do Therapy, Too
13.2 How Do Psychologists Treat Psychological Disorders?
Insight Therapies
Behavior Therapies
Cognitive–Behavioral Therapy: A Synthesis
Evaluating the Psychological Therapies
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Where Do Most People Get Help?
13.3 How Is the Biomedical Approach Used to Treat Psychological Disorders?
Drug Therapy
Other Medical Therapies for Psychological Disorders
Hospitalization and the Alternatives
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: What Sort of Therapy Would You Recommend?
13.4 How Do the Psychological Therapies and Biomedical Therapies Compare?
Depression and Anxiety Disorders: Psychological versus Medical Treatment
Schizophrenia: Psychological versus Medical Treatment
“The Worried Well” and Other Problems: Not Everyone Needs Drugs
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Evidence-Based Practice
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Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
CHAPTER 14 From Stress to Health and Well-Being
PROBLEM: Were the reactions and experiences of the 9/11 firefighters and others at the World Trade Center attacks typical of people in other stressful situations? And what factors explain individual differences in our physical and psychological responses to stress?
14.1 What Causes Distress?
Traumatic Stressors
Chronic Stressors
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Student Stress
14.2 How Does Stress Affect Us Physically?
Physiological Responses to Stress
Stress and the Immune System
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Cognitive Appraisal of Ambiguous Threats
14.3 Who Is Most Vulnerable to Stress?
Type A Personality and Hostility
Locus of Control
Hardiness
Optimism
Resilience
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Using Psychology to Learn Psychology
14.4 How Can We Transform Negative Stress Into Positive Life Strategies?
Psychological Coping Strategies
Positive Lifestyle Choices: A “Two-for-One” Benefit to Your Health
Putting It All Together: Developing Happiness and Subjective Well-Being
PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS: Behavioral Medicine and Health Psychology
CRITICAL THINKING APPLIED: Is Change Really Hazardous to Your Health?
Chapter Summary
Discovering Psychology Viewing Guide
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