3-8 Discussion

EABO (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) makes assumptions about future challenges, technology, and what is required to best support the needs of national security. There are tradeoffs that the USMC must make in order to have enough resources to support EABOs. They must make the choices we discussed in Module 7 about buying more existing stuff, buying new stuff, and/or researching new things to buy in the future. Force design is about making connections among technology, threats, and missions. EABO attempts to do that for the future. From what we learned, does EABO get it right?

Post a response a minimum of 250 words to the question below. Please ensure that your response cites at least two scholarly sources or government reports:

Does EABO make the correct assumptions about future challenges and how to make things harder for the enemy? Support your answer with material from the course.

-attach turn it in report

-provide details from sources attached

-other resource: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015/january/distributed-lethality

Force Design 2030
March 2020

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 0 1

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT
This report describes the progress of the Marine Corps on my watch in preparing for the sweeping changes
needed to meet the principal challenges facing the institution: effectively playing our role as the nation’s naval
expeditionary force-in-readiness, while simultaneously modernizing the force in accordance with the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) – and doing both within the fiscal resources we are provided. A certain degree of
institutional change is inevitable when confronting modernization on this scale, and that type of change is
hard. As such, I want to be clear up front: our force design effort is a work in progress. Thanks to the dedication
and effort of a great many Marines, Sailors, and civilians over the last six months, we have come to a clearer
understanding of some force design changes we can confidently make today, while identifying other areas that
require additional analysis. This reports explains, at length and in some detail, my argument for change, our
force design methodology and organization, my personal assessment of the work to date, and the steps we are
taking to move the force design effort into the next phase.

“Transformation is a process, not an event.”

— John P. Kotter
Harvard Business School

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 02

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE – THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
The 2018 National Defense Strategy redirected the
Marine Corps’ mission focus from countering violent
extremists in the Middle East to great power/peer-level
competition, with special emphasis on the Indo-Pacific.
Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral,
and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily
requires substantial adjustments in how we organize,
train, and equip our Corps. A return to our historic role in
the maritime littoral will also demand greater integration
with the Navy and a reaffirmation of that strategic
partnership. As a consequence, we must transform
our traditional models for organizing, training, and
equipping the force to meet new desired ends, and
do so in full partnership with the Navy.

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE

Our current force design, optimized for large-scale
amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations
ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential
inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details
of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced
toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems.
In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy,
and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist
powers with the technical acumen and economic heft
to integrate those weapons and other technologies for
direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the
persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of
those attributes to threaten United States interests, I
am convinced that the defining attributes of our current
force design are no longer what the nation requires of
the Marine Corps.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCE DESIGN

This imperative for change explains why I concur with
the diagnosis of my predecessor that, “The Marine
Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured
to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future
operating environment.” I assess that the current force
is unsuited to future requirements in size, capacity, and
specific capability:

Size and Capacity

Operating under the assumption that we will not receive
additional resources, we must divest certain existing
capabilities and capacities to free resources for essential

new capabilities. The most logical way to approach
divestment is to take a systems perspective and
reduce infantry battalions while proportionally
reducing the organizations dedicated to supporting
these battalions – direct support artillery, ground
mobility assets, assault support aviation, light attack
aviation, and combat service support capabilities whose
capacity is similarly related to the size of the ground
and air combat elements to be supported.

Specific Capability

With the shift in our primary focus to great power
competition and a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific
region, the current force has shortfalls in capabilities
needed to support emerging joint, naval, and Marine
Corps operating concepts.

We have shortfalls in expeditionary long-range precision
fires; medium- to long-range air defense systems;
short-range (point defense) air defense systems;
high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR),
Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal strike capabilities;
and disruptive and less-lethal capabilities appropriate for
countering malign activity by actors pursuing maritime
“gray zone” strategies.

Similarly – and understandably, in a force that was
designed with different assumptions regarding threat
and environment – there are some capabilities that I
assess we are over-invested in. A partial list includes
heavily armored ground combat systems (tanks), towed
cannon artillery, and short-range, low endurance
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) incapable of employing
lethal effects. Finally, as an element of the integrated
naval force, we have capability and capacity excesses
and shortfalls in areas not organic to the Marine Corps,
but which are essential to our ability to contribute
to sea control and sea denial in a contested littoral
environment.

These include a requirement for smaller, lower signature,
and more affordable amphibious ships and a shortfall
in affordable, distributable platforms that will enable
littoral maneuver and provide logistical support in a
very challenging theater for the kind of operations
envisioned in our current concepts.

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 0 3

STARTING POINT FOR FORCE DESIGN
– VISION AND EXPECTATIONS

The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) I issued
in July 2019 identified force design as my number one
priority. That prioritization was the result of my direct
participation in five years of naval and global war games
while the Commanding General of I MEF, Commander of
Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and Deputy Commandant
for Combat Development and Integration. Those war
games helped shape my conclusion that modest and
incremental improvements to our existing force structure
and legacy capabilities would be insufficient to overcome
evolving threat capabilities, nor would they enable us
to develop forces required to execute our approved
naval concepts.

In my planning guidance I outlined expectations
regarding future force design, to include describing
a number of specific attributes I saw as essential.
Informed by trends in military technology, specifically
the emergence and proliferation of the Mature Precision
Strike Regime (MPSR), the rise of gray zone activities,
and the Service imperative for maritime campaigning,
I provided the following direction:

(1) “We must acknowledge the impacts of proliferated
precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart
weapons, and seek innovative ways to overcome
these threat capabilities.”

(2) “Future force development requires a wider range
of force options and capabilities. The Marine Corps
must be able to fight at sea, from the sea, and from
the land to the sea; operate and persist within range
of adversary long-range fires; maneuver across the
seaward and landward portions of complex littorals;
and sense, shoot, and sustain while combining the
physical and information domains to achieve desired
outcomes. Achieving this end state requires a force that
can create the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities
of concentration, thanks to mobile and low-signature
sensors and weapons.”

(3) In the context of force design, we need better answers
to the question “what does the Navy need from the
Marine Corps?”

(4) I highlighted the naval operating concepts that shape
the current, evolving vision of how we will fight in the
future. Central among these are the Navy’s vision of
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and the related

Marine Corps and Navy concepts of Littoral Operations
in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary
Advance Base Operations (EABO). I also referenced the
draft Marine Corps concept of “Stand-In Forces,” an
offshoot of EABO that emphasizes the generation of,
“technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements
that confront aggressor naval forces with an array of
low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms
and payloads.”

(5) “While we stand by to perform such other duties as the
President may direct, foreign humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuations do not
define us – they are not our identity. Rather, they are the
day-to-day consequence of being the force-in-readiness.
We are not designing an across-the-ROMO force; but
rather, a force intended to prevent major conflict and
deter the escalation of conflict within the ROMO.”

(6) “I do not believe joint forcible entry operations
(JFEO) are irrelevant or an operational anachronism;
however, we must acknowledge that different
approaches are required given the proliferation of
anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threat capabilities in
mutually contested spaces.”

(7) “As the preeminent littoral warfare and expeditionary
warfare service, we must engage in a more robust
discussion regarding naval expeditionary forces and
capabilities not resident with the Marine Corps such as
coastal/riverine forces, naval construction forces, and
mine countermeasure forces. We must ask ourselves
whether it is prudent to absorb some of those functions,
forces, and capabilities to create a single naval
expeditionary force whereby the Commandant could
better ensure their readiness and resourcing.”

“We must transform…to
meet new desired ends,
and do so in full partnership
with the Navy.”

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 04

Broadly speaking, our future force must align to the
NDS. Thus, we will purpose-build forces capable of
assurance and deterrence – forces that are “combat
credible” in accordance with the NDS. In short, our
future forces:

• Will be capable of successfully competing
and winning in the gray zone

• Will be a single, integrated total force, and
not distinct and semi-independent active
and reserve components

• Will be, while purpose-built to support joint
maritime campaigning, inherently capable
of facilitating other joint operations

Enabling these core characteristics, our future Marines
will possess the physical and mental toughness, tenacity,
initiative and aggressiveness necessary to win in close
combat, along with the intellectual and technical skills
required to innovate, adapt, and succeed in the rapidly
changing 21st century operating environment. We will
equip our Marines with mobile, low-signature sensors
and weapons that can provide a landward complement
to Navy capabilities for surface warfare, antisubmarine
warfare, air and missile defense, and airborne early
warning. And in partnership with the Navy, our units
will possess littoral maneuver capabilities to include
high-speed, long-range, low-signature craft capable of
maneuvering Marines for a variety of missions.

“war games helped shape
my conclusion that
modest and incremental
improvements to our
existing force structure
and legacy capabilities
would be insufficient to
overcome evolving threat
capabilities.”

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 0 5

about elements of the force design the IPT ultimately
proposed. A much more comprehensive follow-on effort
must be made to wargame and analyze all aspects of
our force design conclusions. Of particular importance in
informing the Phase II effort were a series of war games
conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL), including the POM-20 wargame in March 2018
and a series of games in October 2019, the June 2019
Naval Services wargame, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s
(INDOPACOM) August 2019 Global XI Wargame, and
the Joint Staff J7’s Globally Integrated Wargame in
September and November 2019. While these war games,
again, were not designed to test the specific force design
recommendations advanced by the IPT, they did offer a
number of key insights. These include:

• The individual / force element which shoots
first has a decisive advantage.

• Forces that can continue to operate inside
an adversary’s long-range precision fire
weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more
operationally relevant than forces which must
rapidly maneuver to positions outside the
WEZ in order to remain survivable. These
“stand-in” forces attrite adversary forces,
enable joint force access requirements,
complicate targeting and consume adversary
ISR resources, and prevent fait accompli
scenarios.

• Range and operational reach matters in the
Indo-Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR).

• The hider-versus finder competition is real.
Losing this competition has enormous and
potentially catastrophic consequences. This
makes success in the reconnaissance/counter-
reconnaissance mission an imperative for
success.

• Forward bases and stations and fixed
infrastructure are easily targeted, and
extremely vulnerable to disruption.

• Mobility inside the WEZ is a competitive
advantage and an operational imperative.

• Logistics (sustainability) is both a critical
requirement and critical vulnerability. Forces
that cannot sustain themselves inside the

METHODOLOGY

Our force design effort is framed in four phases. Phase
I focused on problem framing, began in July 2019,
and centered on a small operational planning team
(OPT) that worked directly with me to establish an initial
visualization of the future force as well as aim points
for follow-on work.

Phase II began in September 2019, when the OPT’s
initial work transitioned to the Deputy Commandant for
Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I). The
DC CD&I subsequently established twelve functionally
and organizationally-focused Integrated Planning
Teams (IPTs) to assess our current design and develop
future force design recommendations. These IPTs
were organized to address: (1) MEU reconfiguration;
(2) the Marine Littoral Regiment construct; (3) Maritime
Prepositioning Force reconfiguration; (4) aviation in
support of the FMF; (5) logistics in support of the FMF;
(6) anti-ship capabilities; (7) medium-range air defense
capabilities; (8) infantry battalion reorganization; (9)
manned-unmanned capability balance; (10) objective
network requirements; (11) training and education; and
(12) the reserves.

Upon completion of these twelve IPTs, an overarching IPT
was established in February 2020 tasked with synchronizing
and integrating all previous outputs and producing a plan
of action for Phase III. Phase III will concentrate on rapid
and iterative wargaming, analysis, and experimentation,
while Phase IV will focus on refinement, validation,
and implementation via the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). This interim
report summarizes the results of our efforts in Phase I and
II, while articulating our plan of action for subsequent
phases of force design.

WARGAMING

Phase II of Force Design devised and executed a
series of deliberate war games providing both an initial
analysis of the Phase I effort as well as guidance to
inform subsequent efforts. Additionally, the Phase II
effort drew upon the results of a wider body of Marine
Corps and Naval Service wargaming and analysis that had
been conducted before its work began. It is important
to note that, although much has been learned from
this body of earlier work, to date we have explored
initial implications of the EABO and LOCE concepts in a
limited number of scenarios, permitting some inferences

FORCE DESIGN EFFORT

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 06

WEZ are liabilities; however, those that
can sustain themselves while executing
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
missions create a competitive advantage.

• There is no avoiding attrition. In contingency
operations against peer adversaries, we will
lose aircraft, ships, ground tactical vehicles,
and personnel. Force resilience – the ability
of a force to absorb loss and continue to
operate decisively – is critical.

MODELING AND SIMULATION

Phase II was informed by the large body of previous
campaign modeling done in conjunction with the
wargaming efforts described above (as well as other
related projects), along with modeling associated with
the concurrent Navy-led Integrated Naval Force Structure
Assessment (INFSA). This modeling informed the IPT’s
analysis on a number of considerations including munitions
and other logistical requirements; probabilities of success
in various types of surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-
to-air and air-to-surface engagements; and the range
and probability of detection of sensors employed against
various target arrays.

EXPERIMENTATION

Limited experimentation has been conducted upon
discrete elements of the future force utilizing approved
naval concepts, to include some carefully constrained tests
of the ability of the F-35B to operate and be sustained
from austere, undeveloped landing sites. Some of this
work has been conducted in the Indo-Pacific region in
conjunction with scheduled training exercises conducted
by 31st MEU. A single, limited-objective experiment
addressing aspects of the organization, training, and

equipment of a Marine infantry battalion was conducted
in support of the Force 2025 force structure review in
2016. We will need to conduct full-scale, empirically-
based experimentation of the future force in realistic
maritime and littoral terrain. Our experimentation
must be deliberate and iterative, informed by both
threat developments and technology advancements.

INITIAL CMC DESIGN GUIDANCE

I provided the following specific guidance to bound
the Phase II planning effort:

• Use the 2019 Commadant’s Planning
Guidance as REF A.

• Use approved naval concepts (DMO, EABO,
and LOCE) as REF B.

• The legacy 2 MEB JFEO requirement is
unsuitable as a force-sizing construct.

• Aside from the CPG’s general guidance,
orientation, and framing, start with the
proverbial intellectual blank sheet of paper
or white board, and build the operationally
suitable force for 2030.

• Do not be constrained by current programs-
of-record.

• The force will be uniquely capable
of performing EABO and Distributed
Operations (DO).

• Use a threat-informed approach and naval
warfare perspective.

• Plan for sufficient capacity to return the force
to a 1:3 deployment to dwell ratio.

“We will need to conduct full-scale, empirically-based
experimentation of the future force in realistic maritime
and littoral terrain. Our experimentation must be deliberate
and iterative, informed by both threat developments and
technology advancements.”

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 0 7

The outcome of the Phase I and II effort was a redesigned
“Objective Force” with the following characteristics:

Total Fleet Marine Force (FMF) structure

• Reduction of approximately 12,000 Marines
relative to the current Total Force by 2030

Command Element

• Divestment of 3 active component law
enforcement battalions

Ground Combat Element

• 7 infantry regimental headquarters
(divestment of 1 regimental headquarters)

• 21 active component infantry battalions
(divestment of 3 battalions)

• 6 reserve component infantry battalions
(divestment of 2 battalions)

• Redesign of remaining infantry battalions in
the direction of greater lethality and flexibility,
with reduced structure (a proposed reduction
per infantry battalion of approximately 200
Marines).

• 5 cannon artillery batteries (divestment of
16 batteries)

• 21 rocket artillery batteries (increase of 14
batteries over current force)

• Zero tank companies (divestment of entire
capacity of 7 companies and prepositioned
capacity)

• 12 Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR)
companies (increase of 3 companies over
current force)

• 4 Assault Amphibian (AA) companies
(divestment of 2 companies)

Air Combat Element

• 18 active component fighter attack (VMFA)
squadrons, with a reduction in the number
of aircraft per squadron to 10

• 14 active component medium tiltrotor (VMM)
squadrons (recommended divestment of 3
squadrons)

• 5 active component heavy lift helicopter
(HMH) squadrons (recommended divestment
of 3 squadrons)

• 5 active component light attack helicopter
(HMLA) squadrons (divestment of 2
squadrons)

• 4 active component aerial refueler transport
(VMGR) squadrons (increase of one squadron
over current force)

• 6 active component unmanned aerial
vehicle (VMU) squadrons (increase of three
squadrons over current force)

OBJECTIVE FORCE

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 08

OBJECTIVE FORCE IMPLICATIONS

“The recommendations of the Phase II IPT result in a
potential savings of $12B to be reallocated towards
equipment modernization, training modernization, and
force development priorities.”

The recommendations of the Phase II IPT result in a
potential savings of $12B to be reallocated towards
equipment modernization, training modernization,
and force development priorities. However, I must
emphasize that these initial results are just that: it remains
for us to evaluate and refine during the upcoming
Phase III effort. I have high confidence in several of
the recommendations advanced by the Phase II IPTs,
however, others require additional deliberate analysis
during Phase III.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

I am not convinced that we have a clear understanding
yet of F-35 capacity requirements for the future
force. As a result, the Service will seek at least one
external assessment of our Aviation Plan relative to
NDS objectives and evolving naval and joint warfighting
concepts.

As described in Congressional testimony, our continued
pilot shortfalls are a factor we must consider and either
scale programs of record accordingly or implement a
sustainable, affordable solution. Other Services face
similar shortfalls. This issue has recruiting, training,
and retention factors – as well as fiscal and industrial
base factors – that we must consider in reconciling the
growing disparity between numbers of platforms and
numbers of aircrew.

While the decrease in the number of infantry battalions
is clearly articulated in the Phase II material, the absence
of a major reduction in ground tactical combat vehicles
is inconsistent with the systems-oriented reduction
discussed above. DC CD&I will need to assess existing
ground tactical vehicle programs of record and
recommend appropriate adjustments to approved
acquisition objectives.

FINDINGS IN WHICH I HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE

Divestment of three infantry battalions

Based on the evolution of joint OPLANS that previously
influenced capacity in our “base unit,” and on my
elimination of the requirement to size the force for a
generic “2 MEB JFEO,” the remaining 21 battalions
will satisfy naval and joint requirements.

Investment in additional rocket artillery batteries

This investment provides the basis, over time, for
generating one of the fundamental requirements for
deterrence, and ultimately successful naval campaigns
– long-range, precision expeditionary anti-ship missile
fires. This requirement is based on one of the more
well-supported conclusions from wargaming analysis
conducted to date.

Divestment of tanks

We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this
capability, despite its long and honorable history in
the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our
highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground
armor capability will continue to be provided by the
U.S. Army.

Divestment of three heavy helicopter squadrons

Based on analysis by our aviation subject-matter-experts,
five squadrons provide sufficient capacity to satisfy our
requirements as well as our future force as described
in approved naval concepts.

Divestment of three medium-lift tiltrotor squadrons

Given the reduction of infantry battalion capacity and
associated combat support, the remaining tiltrotor force
should be sufficient to our needs.

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 0 9

Expansion and increased resourcing of training
and education

The level of detailed planning and analysis done by
the Training and Education IPT is commendable.
I am confident that the issues identified by the IPT
are accurate, and have full confidence in its overall
recommendations. The warfighting impact of all
other future capabilities is directly tied to the level of
commitment we make to training modernization. We
have a lot of ground to make up in this area, and must
allocate adequate resources now and into the future
to close this gap.

FINDINGS WHICH DEMAND ADDITIONAL
ANALYSIS DURING PHASE III

Based upon my assessment of the results of the first
two phases of our force design effort, we must now
spend additional time ensuring that we have accurately
framed the problem before us and continue to refine our
understanding of assumptions, constraints, restraints,
and operational realities that may affect the design of
our future force.

Additionally, there are specific outputs from the initial
phases that must be refined through focused analytic work
and deliberate experimentation. These outputs include:

Redesign of the infantry battalion

I am not confident that we have adequately assessed all
of the implications of the future operating environment
on the proposed structure of our future infantry battalion.
While I fully support redesign of the infantry battalion
in principle, I remain unconvinced that the specific
proposed new construct makes the force more capable
of Distributed Operations. We must conduct more
live-force experimentation to ensure our proposed
design results in a truly DO-capable force. I would
like to see intensive further analysis of this proposed
new structure during Phase III.

Divestment of at least two light attack
helicopter squadrons

While this capability has a certain amount of relevance
to crisis and contingency missions which we must still be
prepared to execute, it is operationally unsuitable for our
highest-priority maritime challenges and excess to our
needs with the divestment of three infantry battalions.

Investment in additional Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS)

As a “stand-in” force of the future, the Marine Corps
requires a family of UAS capabilities. We need to
transition from our current UAS platforms to capabilities
that can operate from ship, from shore, and able to
employ both collection and lethal payloads. These future
capabilities must be expeditionary and fully compatible
with Navy platforms and command and control networks.

Divestment of 2 AA companies and reduction
of AAV and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
requirements

With the reduction of infantry battalions and the
elimination of the 2 MEB JFEO force development
sizing construct, it follows that the requirement for
protected mobility to support them also decreases.

Divestment of three law enforcement battalions

This capacity is excess to our current needs, which can
be met by the remaining force with some adjustments
in current operational practice.

Divestment of Marine Wing Support Groups
(MWSG)

We have sufficient evidence dating back to the 2010
Force Structure Review Group analysis to support
this move.

Divestment of three bridging companies

This capability is primarily relevant to sustained land
operations. Given my guidance to avoid such criteria
in designing the force, this capability is clearly excess
to our requirements.

“The warfighting impact of all other future capabilities
is directly tied to the level of commitment we make to
training modernization.”

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 010

existing capacity, or committing billions of dollars
in procurement funds towards the acquisition of an
Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV).

Retention of 18 VMFA squadrons

Employment of the F-35 in support of future naval
expeditionary TACAIR requirements requires additional
study, as I noted previously. We will continue to learn
more about the various roles that platform will fulfill,
and we must be willing to assess and adjust our VMFA
force structure and program of record accordingly.
In addition, as noted earlier, our continued inability
to build and sustain an adequate inventory of F-35
pilots leads me to conclude that we must be pragmatic
regarding our ability to support the existing program-
of-record. We must conduct a more thorough review of
our VMFA capacity requirements and ability to satisfy
those requirements. This will require an external review
of the issue that will inform our subsequent decisions.

Emerging naval expeditionary force formations

I am convinced that a transformation of our current
formations is essential for successful integration and
employment of future capabilities. While the Marine
Littoral Regiment (MLR), recommended as an output
from Phases I and II, appears to possess the required
characteristics, there is simply not enough evidence at
this time to support a wholesale reorganization of III
MEF. Therefore, as a first step, we will initially create a
singular MLR formation. We will use that initial formation
to test and validate our concepts and refine the structure
of the Marine Littoral Regiment during Phase III. Before
we undertake an ambitious force wide transformation,
we must validate our assumptions, wargame rigorously,
pursue the necessary modeling, and ensure that our
primary warfighting partner – Fleet Commanders – share
our conclusions.

Littoral maneuver and sustainment

I am not confident that we have identified the additional
structure required to provide the tactical maneuver and
logistical sustainment needed to execute DMO, LOCE
and EABO in contested littoral environments against
our pacing threat. While not an afterthought by any
means, I do not believe our Phase I and II efforts gave
logistics sufficient attention. Resolving these two areas
must be a priority for Phase III.

MEU redesign recommendations

The Phase II IPT seems to have produced an incrementally
improved version of today’s 3-ship ARG/MEU. This vision
falls short of our future needs. We cannot accept or
accede to recommendations for incremental change or
better versions of legacy capabilities, but must pursue
transformational capabilities that will provide naval
fleets and joint force commanders with a competitive
advantage in the gray zone and during contingency. I am
confident that, with refined planning guidance, we can
develop more operationally suitable recommendations
for analysis and consideration.

Increase in Light Armored Reconnaissance

While I have repeatedly stated that all-domain
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance will be
a critical element of any future contingency, I remain
unconvinced that additional wheeled, manned armored
ground reconnaissance units are the best and only
answer – especially in the Indo-Pacific region. We need
to see more evidence during Phase III to support this
conclusion before engaging in an expansion of our

“We cannot accept or accede
to recommendations for
incremental change or
better versions of legacy
capabilities, but must
pursue transformational
capabilities that will provide
naval fleets and joint
force commanders with a
competitive advantage in
the gray zone and during
contingency.”

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 0 11

In addition to the refinement areas addressed above,
we have logical next steps to take in addressing
Marine Corps structure outside the Active Component
Fleet Marine Force. Those follow-on efforts include
a comprehensive assessment of our Reserve
Component and our Supporting Establishment.

MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
(MARSOC)

Force design places new demands on our FMF that
require us to revisit our current manpower policies
supporting MARSOC. We must develop assignment
policies that continue to satisfy MARSOC personnel
requirements while ensuring appropriate rotation
of personnel in and out of MARSOC. Any change
to the current policies should not limit MARSOC’s
ability to recruit, assess and develop relationships and
candidates, in coordination with FMF units and leaders.
Recommended changes to policy should ensure Marines
remain competitive for promotion and have broad
opportunities for assignment within the Marine Corps
and the joint force.

INFANTRY

I concur with IPT conclusions that our current entry-
level and advanced infantry training programs
and policies will not meet future demands of our
infantry elements. We will need to increase our up-
front, entry-level training investment, and then look
to make corresponding modifications to advanced
infantry training to develop the quality, maturity and
capabilities envisioned – including the multi-disciplinary
infantry approach – in the IPT findings. This effort should
include looking at ways to include all components of
the 03XX occupational field, including reconnaissance
and LAR. Explore ways to challenge existing models
and paradigms to yield a more capable and mature
infantry and reconnaissance force. TECOM will develop
options for a modernized and more comprehensive
entry-level infantry school to fundamentally improve
the initial proficiency and skills of our infantry force.

EXPERIMENTATION AND WARGAMING
RECOMMENDATIONS

To further refine and develop our understanding of
force design changes, I am directing the immediate
implementation of an intensive program of iterative

concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and
simulation, and experimentation. I will be personally
involved in and responsible for setting priorities and
ensuring that necessary resources are made available
for this effort. This will be a time-limited “surge” effort
aimed at expanding and deepening the analytical basis
underpinning our force design conclusions in support of
future budget submissions. The effort will be led by the
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), with
additional resourcing and personnel augmentation.

I fully understand the challenges of establishing and
sustaining a rapidly iterating research cycle, given the
realities of resourcing and available time and personnel.
It is also no panacea; there are uncertainties in the
future we must account for. Technology and available
funding are major factors, as is the rate at which our
pacing threat modernizes and expands its operational
reach. We must commit to a continuous cycle of
learning and adjustment that ensures a margin of
advantage over our adversaries, while remaining
ready to respond to crisis 24/7/365.

DESIGN LEVERS AND FUNDAMENTALS

As we continue to refine our efforts and engage in
additional IPTs, we must remain grounded in the
fundamentals of force design vice pursuing only
incremental change and minor adjustments to the current
force. When visualizing the future naval expeditionary
force, we will keep the following design levers in mind:

Organizational Design: Developing the form and
function of elements (e.g. squad, etc.)

Force Design: Combining elements to form an
organization (e.g. Brigade, FMF, JTF, etc.)

Force Structure: Capacities of elements and
organizations; aggregate force structure capacities;
setting end-strength

Force Posture: Where organizations are physically
located and their anticipated activities

Naval and Joint Force Integration: Combining
components into a system for employment; scalability
and interoperability

New Capabilities: Enablers for doing things differently;
impacts all other levers

FOLLOW-ON GUIDANCE

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 012

In addition to the design levers identified above,
participants in our follow-on planning efforts should
remain mindful of the following design fundamentals
that will facilitate their efforts.

• Focus on capabilities and force postures that
maximize conventional deterrence such as
capabilities that provide the option for us
to strike effectively first from a force posture
(location and disposition) that balances
forward presence and integration with allies
and partners and allows for the flexibility to
dictate the time and place of action.

• Focus on capabilities required to satisfy
approved naval concepts of DMO, EABO,
and LOCE.

• Focus on capabilities that create a
competitive, asymmetrical advantage in
maritime gray zone operations globally.

• Focus on capabilities required to develop
a truly DO-capable force that can mass
effects while minimizing signature; maximize
efficient tactical mobility; reduce logistics
demand; and expand the range of mutual
support across all tactical echelons.

• Minimize organization reliance on
attachments; goal should be to maximize
unit cohesion and implicit communication.

• Develop multi-axis, multi-domain precision
fires organic at all echelons, enabled by a
federated system of networks to ensure all
elements can fight in a degraded command
and control environment.

• Develop smaller but better-connected
formations that organically possess a
complete kill chain appropriate to echelon,
and that can prevail in a contested operating
environment.

• Factor in the increased importance of
range and endurance of manned systems,
unmanned systems, and munitions given the
expanse and non-contiguous nature of Indo-
Pacific geography and the ever-expanding
range of threat systems.

• Focus on rapid employment and the
scalability of Marine force elements.

• Ensure composable force elements
constructed from purpose-built modified
formations.

• Maintain an all-domain (air, surface,
subsurface, space, cyberspace) perspective.

• Create greater resilience in our C4 and ISR
systems to counter more sophisticated threat
capabilities.

• Develop military deception, camouflage,
cover, concealment, and obscurant
capabilities to defeat terminal phase attack
and challenge broad area surveillance.

• Pursue the development of organic C4ISR,
maneuver, and fires capabilities (organic
network) at all echelons.

• Create purpose-built forces. (Ensure all
elements are equipped and trained for their
specified purposes. Aggregating specialized
units with base elements creates a tailored
multi-domain force in order to provide
maximum relevant combat power (RCP)
on-demand.)

“We will need to increase our
up-front, entry-level training
investment, and then look
to make corresponding
modifications to advanced
infantry training to develop
the quality, maturity and
capabilities envisioned
– including the multi-
disciplinary infantry approach
– in the IPT findings.”

F o r c e D e s i g n 2 0 3 0 13

CONCLUSION
We have made significant progress to date in our force
design efforts. While these efforts have undeniably
been productive and will inform our divestment and
investment decisions going-forward, we should view
them as first steps in a longer journey. We have much
more work to do to ensure our recommendations rest
upon a solid analytic foundation. While I am confident
in the merits and operational suitability of many of the
IPT recommendations, in other areas we have a ways
to go before making decisions. We simply must have
more analysis and evidence, which comes from modeling
and experimentation.

While the Future Force we are developing is different in
terms of structure and capabilities, it is consistent with
our historical roots as Fleet Marine Forces and directly
supports our Title 10 responsibility to seize and defend
advanced naval bases, and perform all such duties
as directed by the President. It is also important to
note that methods and concepts such as Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations are not the sum total of our
contribution to the joint force. We will continue to serve
as the nation’s premier crisis response force around the
globe, and contribute to the deterrence and warfighting
needs of all combatant commands.

Semper Fidelis,

David H. Berger
General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Marines To Radically
Remodel Force,
Cutting Tanks,

Howitzers In Favor
Of Drones, Missiles
The Marine Corps says the ambitious shift

toward smaller units, distributed operations,

and unmanned capabilities is essential to

staying relevant.

SEA U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCE DESIGN 2030

JOSEPH TREVITHICK

POSTED ON MAR 23, 2020

278

WWW.TWZ.COM

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 1/39

https://www.twz.com/category/sea

https://www.twz.com/category/us-marine-corps

https://www.twz.com/category/force-design-2030

https://www.twz.com/authors/joseph-trevithick

https://www.twz.com/

he U.S. Marine Corps has an ambitious 10-year transformation

plan that could see the service eliminate its entire tank force,

dramatically scale back howitzer batteries, and cut a

significant number of aviation units in favor of land-based

rocket artillery and stand-off missile launchers and unmanned

aircraft. The proposal follows an already dramatic announcement from

the Corpsʼ top officer last year about the need to move away from reliance

on large traditional amphibious warfare ships, something The War Zone

explored in depth. All of this is rooted in the prevailing view that Marines

will have to fight in small groups and in a distributed fashion in any major

conflict in the future, especially in the Pacific region, in order to remain

relevant.

The Wall Street Journal was the first to report on the Marines plans for the

radical shift on Mar. 23, 2020. The newspaper interviewed Marine

Corps Commandant General David Berger about his proposal, which

would fundamentally change the face of his service for years to come.

“China, in terms of military capability, is the pacing threat,” Berger told

the Journal. “If we did nothing, we would be passed.”

“I have come to the conclusion that we need to contract the size of the

Marine Corps to get quality,” he added.

“The wargames do show that, absent significant change, the Marine Corps

will not be in a position to be relevant” in a high-end conflict against a

“peer competitor,” U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Eric Smith, head

of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, also explained to

the Journal. Berger had been head of this command, which is responsible

for developing new and improved concepts of operations for the Corps,

before becoming Commandant.

Berger s̓ contraction is significant and wide-ranging. Over the next

decade, he wants to shrink the entire size of the Corps from

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 2/39

https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Marines%20To%20Radically%20Remodel%20Force%2C%20Cutting%20Tanks%2C%20Howitzers%20In%20Favor%20Of%20Drones%2C%20Missiles%20https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles

https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles

https://www.pinterest.com/pin/create/button/?url=https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles&media=https://www.twz.com/wp-content/uploads/images-by-url-twz/content/2020/03/marine-tank-top ?quality=85&w=1920&description=The%20U.S.%20Marine%20Corps%20has%20an%20ambitious%2010-year%20transformation%20plan%20that%20could%20see%20the%20service%20eliminate%20its%20entire%20tank%20force%2C%20dramatically%20scale%20back%20howitzer%20batteries%2C%20and%20cut%20a%20significant%20number%20of%20aviation%20units%20in%20favor%20of%20land-based%20rocket%20artillery%20and%20stand-off%20missile%20launchers%20and%20unmanned%20aircraft.

mailto:?subject=Marines%20To%20Radically%20Remodel%20Force%2C%20Cutting%20Tanks%2C%20Howitzers%20In%20Favor%20Of%20Drones%2C%20Missiles&body=https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles

https://www.twz.com/32692/the-marines-most-wicked-looking-armored-vehicle-looks-even-scarier-making-a-beach-landing

https://www.twz.com/15733/marines-burned-out-two-howitzer-barrels-during-the-raqqa-offensive

https://www.twz.com/15527/us-marines-want-pint-sized-rocket-artillery-they-can-carry-in-an-mv-22-osprey

https://www.twz.com/32483/marines-set-to-be-the-first-to-bring-back-land-based-tomahawk-missiles-post-inf-treaty

https://www.twz.com/23835/bell-unveils-v-247-vigilant-tilt-rotor-combat-drone-mock-up-at-usmc-tech-expo

https://www.twz.com/29608/marine-bosss-audacious-plan-to-transform-the-corps-by-giving-up-big-amphibious-ships

https://www.wsj.com/articles/marines-plan-to-retool-to-meet-china-threat-11584897014

approximately 189,000 personnel to 170,000.

Kingston Reif
@KingstonAReif · Follow

“To reinvent themselves as a naval expeditionary force
within budget limits, the Marines plan to get rid of all of
their tanks, cut back on their aircraft and shrink in total
numbers from 189,000 to as few as 170,000, Gen. Berger
said.” wsj.com/articles/marin…

10:40 PM · Mar 22, 2020

62 Reply Copy link

Read 8 replies

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 3/39

https://twitter.com/KingstonAReif?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1241917759459602432%7Ctwgr%5Ed0bcbafe191e6b81811dd36a486ba08b738f19ba%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.twz.com%2F32703%2Fmarines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles

https://twitter.com/intent/follow?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1241917759459602432%7Ctwgr%5Ed0bcbafe191e6b81811dd36a486ba08b738f19ba%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.twz.com%2F32703%2Fmarines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles&screen_name=KingstonAReif

“To reinvent themselves as a naval expeditionary force within budget limits, the Marines plan to get rid of all of their tanks, cut back on their aircraft and shrink in total numbers from 189,000 to as few as 170,000, Gen. Berger said.” https://t.co/ubSemEHyYk pic.twitter.com/I8j6oDMlfb

— Kingston Reif (@KingstonAReif) March 23, 2020

https://t.co/ubSemEHyYk

https://x.com/KingstonAReif/status/1241917759459602432/photo/1

“To reinvent themselves as a naval expeditionary force within budget limits, the Marines plan to get rid of all of their tanks, cut back on their aircraft and shrink in total numbers from 189,000 to as few as 170,000, Gen. Berger said.” https://t.co/ubSemEHyYk pic.twitter.com/I8j6oDMlfb

— Kingston Reif (@KingstonAReif) March 23, 2020

https://help.twitter.com/en/twitter-for-websites-ads-info-and-privacy

https://twitter.com/intent/like?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1241917759459602432%7Ctwgr%5Ed0bcbafe191e6b81811dd36a486ba08b738f19ba%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.twz.com%2F32703%2Fmarines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles&tweet_id=1241917759459602432

https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1241917759459602432%7Ctwgr%5Ed0bcbafe191e6b81811dd36a486ba08b738f19ba%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.twz.com%2F32703%2Fmarines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles&in_reply_to=1241917759459602432

“To reinvent themselves as a naval expeditionary force within budget limits, the Marines plan to get rid of all of their tanks, cut back on their aircraft and shrink in total numbers from 189,000 to as few as 170,000, Gen. Berger said.” https://t.co/ubSemEHyYk pic.twitter.com/I8j6oDMlfb

— Kingston Reif (@KingstonAReif) March 23, 2020

To do this, he would get rid of a number of units, including all seven

existing Marine tank companies, along with their M1 Abrams and support

vehicles. Three bridging companies, necessary to get those heavy vehicles

across waterways, would go get shuttered. Marine armored vehicles fleets

would be limited to the service s̓ existing fleet of LAV-25 8×8 wheeled

armored vehicles and its new Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV),

another 8×8 wheeled design. The ACV will increasingly supplant the

tracked Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV) in the coming years.

“We need an Army with lots of tanks,” Berger said. “We donʼt need a

Marine Corps with tanks.”

The total number of 155mm howitzer batteries would also drop from 21 to

just five. Three of the 24 infantry battalions are also set to get cut under

the plan, though the Marines have talked about increasing the size of

infantry squads, and by extension the remaining infantry units, at the

same time.

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 4/39

https://www.twz.com/26606/picture-of-newest-m1-abrams-tank-variant-with-previously-unseen-turret-armor-emerges

https://www.twz.com/32692/the-marines-most-wicked-looking-armored-vehicle-looks-even-scarier-making-a-beach-landing

https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/589271/bridge-company-bridging-the-gap-on-obstacles/

https://www.twz.com/24543/armys-newest-airborne-unit-gets-second-hand-but-air-droppable-usmc-lav-25-armored-vehicles

https://www.twz.com/26229/the-usmc-already-wants-to-up-gun-their-new-amphibious-combat-vehicle-with-a-30mm-cannon

https://www.twz.com/21650/the-usmc-is-buying-new-amphibious-vehicles-that-cant-swim-faster-than-what-they-have-now

https://www.twz.com/15733/marines-burned-out-two-howitzer-barrels-during-the-raqqa-offensive

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/08/09/15-marine-rifle-squad-an-exclusive-look-inside-the-future-infantry/

The total number of Marine fighter attack squadrons, all of which are

transitioning to variants of the F-35, would remain at 18. However, the size

of each of these squadrons will shrink from 16 aircraft to just 10,

according to a separate report from USNI News.

Three MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor squadrons, two light attack helicopter

squadrons equipped with AH-1Z Vipers and UH-1Y Venoms, and three

heavy helicopter squadrons are all set to get cut from the overall force

structure. The latter of these units are equipped with CH-53E Super

Stallion helicopters, which are set to get replaced by CH-53K King

Stallions. Trimming those squadrons could impact the total number of

CH-53Ks, which have had a long-troubled development, the Marines

expect to buy in the end.

Despite this contraction, Berger is planning to make additions, as well,

including tripling the size of land-based rocket artillery and stand-off

missile units from seven to 21. This would include M142 High Mobility

Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers that the Marines want to be

able to fire Naval Strike Missile anti-ship missiles in the future, in addition

A Marine 155mm M777 howitzer in Norway during an exercise in March 2020., USMC

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 5/39

https://www.twz.com/29078/marines-winding-down-weapon-system-officers-position-f-a-18ds-to-fly-with-pilot-only

https://www.twz.com/30003/top-marines-transformational-plan-manifesting-itself-in-talk-of-smaller-ships-f-35-buy-changes

New Marine Corps Cuts Will Slash All Tanks, Many Heavy Weapons As Focus Shifts to Lighter, Littoral Forces

https://www.twz.com/32309/osprey-rear-ramps-and-carrier-aircraft-elevators-make-for-great-fast-rope-training

https://www.twz.com/5629/whomp-over-the-desert-floor-in-an-ah-1z-attack-helicopter

https://www.twz.com/15467/latest-bell-uh-1y-venom-variant-of-the-iconic-huey-finds-an-export-customer

https://www.twz.com/15146/the-ch-53s-dark-present-but-bright-future-on-this-the-choppers-53rd-birthday

https://www.twz.com/25920/usmcs-huge-new-ch-53k-king-stallion-helicopter-has-not-so-tiny-problems-faces-more-delays

https://www.twz.com/27884/usmcs-ch-53k-king-stallions-woes-have-put-it-in-a-duel-with-the-ch-47-chinook

https://www.twz.com/15410/himars-goes-to-sea-us-marines-now-fire-guided-artillery-rockets-from-ships

https://www.twz.com/21233/its-official-the-navys-next-anti-ship-cruise-missile-will-be-the-naval-strike-missile

to 227mm guided artillery rockets and short-range quasi-ballistic missiles.

The Corps is also planning to introduce land-based launchers able to fire

the Tomahawk cruise missile.

The Marinesʼ unmanned aircraft force would also double in size, from

three to six squadrons. The service is very much in the process of defining

exactly how it envisions the composition of these drone fleets. In its most

recent budget request for the 2021 Fiscal Year, submitted as part of the

larger U.S. Navy proposal, the Corpsʼ revealed that it was reassessing its

Marine Air Ground Task Force Unmanned Aircraft System Expeditionary

program, or MUX, as well as scaling back plans to acquire MQ-9 Reapers

in the interim.

The present plan includes exploring a “system of systems” that could

including various smaller drones, as well as larger, land-based unmanned

aircraft. The original MUX concept, which you can read about in more

detail in this past War Zone piece, had envisioned large Marine unmanned

aircraft capable of performing various complex roles and intended to

operate from large amphibious warships.

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 6/39

https://www.twz.com/31440/lockheed-conducts-first-test-of-its-new-precision-strike-missile-for-the-army

https://www.twz.com/32483/marines-set-to-be-the-first-to-bring-back-land-based-tomahawk-missiles-post-inf-treaty

https://www.twz.com/21376/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-usmcs-ambitious-vertical-takeoff-combat-drone

https://www.twz.com/32379/abrupt-end-of-air-force-mq-9-reaper-buys-points-to-new-focus-on-survivable-drones

Marines Ditch MUX Ship-Based Drone to Pursue Large Land-Based UAS, Smaller Shipboard Vehicle

https://www.twz.com/21376/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-usmcs-ambitious-vertical-takeoff-combat-drone

The Marines would also add another squadron of KC-130J Hercules aerial

refueling tankers, which can also serve as airlifters and gunships.

These massive force structure changes are driven in part by budgetary

concerns, as well as a new, over-arching operating concept the Marines

have been experimenting with, on paper and during exercises, called

Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO), for some years now.

EABO is heavily center on an idea of an island-hopping blitzkrieg of sorts

during a major conflict in the Pacific region where ground units could

easily find themselves distributed across a front thousands of miles long

separated by large expanses of water.

Unlike the other U.S. military services, even the U.S. Army, the Marines do

not expect to have the capacity to conduct large-scale stand-off operations

and plan to fight almost exclusively inside “the weapons engagement

zone” of a potential opponent, such as China, according to the Journal.

China, in particular, has invested significant resources in the development

and fielding of anti-access and area denial capabilities, including air, sea,

and ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as medium and

intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including air-launched ones, some

An official Marine graphic from 2016 showing an early vision of what the Expeditionary Advance
Base Operations concept might look like in practice., USMC

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 7/39

https://www.twz.com/20697/germany-france-move-ahead-with-joint-c-130j-unit-amid-budget-woes-and-a400m-delays

https://www.twz.com/21805/marine-kc-130js-are-getting-a-much-more-potent-bolt-on-weapons-and-sensor-kit

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/03/21/marines-seize-an-airfield-and-small-island-alongside-special-operations-airmen-and-soldiers-while-testing-tactics-for-fight-against-china/

https://www.twz.com/16904/the-marine-corps-wants-to-craft-a-fleet-of-1000-itty-bitty-boats

https://www.twz.com/32667/the-army-and-navy-have-conducted-the-first-joint-test-of-their-new-hypersonic-weapon

https://www.twz.com/30058/lets-talk-about-this-previously-unseen-ground-launched-missile-that-china-just-leaked

https://www.twz.com/29975/new-photos-point-to-chinese-bomber-being-able-to-carry-huge-anti-ship-ballistic-missiles

of which carry hypersonic boost-glide vehicles or that may have anti-ship

capabilities. Longer-range surface-to-air missiles and supporting sensors

are also part of the picture. All of this forces large traditional amphibious

warfare ships to operate further and further from actual objectives,

limiting the ability of the Marine Corps in its present configuration to

contribute in the minds of Berger and other senior service officials.

Under the EABO concept, smaller elements of Marines would use air

assaults and smaller ships, including unmanned surface vessels, to seize

control of small islands and rapidly set up forward operating bases.

Unmanned platforms, including drones, unmanned ships, and unmanned

ground vehicles, including remotely-operated mobile artillery systems,

would be important to giving these Marine units additional capabilities

without the need for significant amounts of additional manpower.

Missile units, especially with anti-ship missiles, would then be able to

conduct strikes on hostile ships from this constellation of island outposts.

Depending on the facilities available or that could be readily made

available, they might also support forward manned or unmanned aviation

operations. Targeting data from forward-deployed Marine units would

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 8/39

https://www.twz.com/30119/four-of-the-biggest-revelations-from-chinas-massive-70th-anniversary-military-parade

https://www.twz.com/28810/chinas-reported-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-test-in-the-south-china-sea-is-a-big-deal

https://www.twz.com/31279/chinas-new-surveillance-blimp-in-the-south-china-sea-is-likely-just-the-beginning

https://www.twz.com/29608/marine-bosss-audacious-plan-to-transform-the-corps-by-giving-up-big-amphibious-ships

https://www.twz.com/30003/top-marines-transformational-plan-manifesting-itself-in-talk-of-smaller-ships-f-35-buy-changes

https://www.twz.com/31574/white-house-asks-navy-to-include-new-unmanned-vessels-in-its-ambitious-355-ship-fleet-plan

https://www.twz.com/25350/this-robot-the-10th-mountain-is-testing-could-become-the-armys-revolutionary-mechanical-donkey

https://www.twz.com/32483/marines-set-to-be-the-first-to-bring-back-land-based-tomahawk-missiles-post-inf-treaty

https://www.twz.com/23682/usaf-wants-units-to-rapidly-build-and-fly-from-new-bases-in-the-middle-of-a-future-war

https://www.twz.com/18502/glimpse-of-the-future-mc-130-sets-up-forward-refueling-point-for-mq-9-reaper-drone

also be passed back to other assets, including Navy ships and U.S. Air

Force aircraft, which could then conduct their own stand-off attacks.

To keep the enemy on edge and to prevent them from effectively counter-

attacking, Marines would reposition from one outpost to another every 48

to 72 hours. Decoy movements, which could be physical or generated

using electronic warfare systems, would further confuse the enemy.

Constantly changing positions would also enable Marines to attack from

different vectors, forcing an opponent to be constantly evaluating their

own defenses and potentially spreading their forces thin to protect against

all avenues of attack.

“The Marine Corps will have three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs)

organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish sea denial and sea control

within actively contested maritime spaces as part of a modernized III MEF

[Marine Expeditionary Force],” U.S. Marine Corps Major Joshua Benson, a

Marine Corps Combat Development Command spokesperson, separately

told USNI News in a statement. “This Pacific posture will be augmented by

three globally deployable Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) that possess

both traditional and Expeditionary Advanced Base capabilities that can

deploy with non-standard Amphibious Ready Groups.”

In principle, the EABO concept certainly presents a number of potential

benefits. There are also real questions about just how viable it would be in

practice, especially from a logistical standpoint.

In his interview with the Journal, General Berger highlighted how 3D

printing in small field workshops could help manufacture on-demand

replacement parts to support distributed operations. But you canʼt 3D

print fuel, water, ammunition, or food. Water is a resource that U.S.

military units particularly take for granted and which is absolutely

essential to any operation.

The fuel demands for modern U.S. military units are also only increasing

as more and more is required on a daily basis to power the generators that

supply electricity for ground-based sensors, communications systems,

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 9/39

https://www.twz.com/28305/carrier-group-in-recent-ufo-encounters-had-new-air-defense-tech-just-like-nimitz-in-2004-incident

https://www.twz.com/31471/f-35-cueing-artillery-to-take-out-air-defense-site-during-test-is-a-glimpse-of-the-future

https://www.twz.com/29505/the-navys-secretive-nemesis-electronic-warfare-capability-will-change-naval-combat-forever

https://www.twz.com/16904/the-marine-corps-wants-to-craft-a-fleet-of-1000-itty-bitty-boats

New Marine Corps Cuts Will Slash All Tanks, Many Heavy Weapons As Focus Shifts to Lighter, Littoral Forces

https://news.usni.org/2019/01/03/navy-tests-littoral-combat-group-concept-that-pairs-ddg-lpd-in-south-america-deployment

https://www.twz.com/24816/the-army-wants-its-brigades-to-be-able-to-fight-for-an-entire-week-without-resupply

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/10/28/soldiers-bottled-water-consumption-is-unsustainable-in-the-next-war-army-report-says/?utm_source=clavis

living facilities, and more. There is work being done on alternate

battlefield power concepts, including small nuclear reactors and hydrogen

fuel cells, but these efforts are still in the very early stages of

development.

The Marines have been looking at various distributed logistics concepts,

including using unmanned ships and expendable supply drones, and even

seaplanes, as ways to get critical supplies to forward units with limited

risk. None of these proposals entirely eliminate supply chain disruption

that could potentially have serious impacts on the ability of Marine units

to operate under the EABO concept.

A look at how fuel distribution operations under the EABO concept might occur, including the use
of unmanned surface vessels to tow floating “fuel pods” to intermediate distribution sites., USMC

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 10/39

https://www.twz.com/26152/the-u-s-military-wants-tiny-road-mobile-nuclear-reactors-that-can-fit-in-a-c-17

https://www.twz.com/15000/gm-thinks-its-stealthy-optionally-manned-truck-platform-could-change-the-us-army

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/01/15/with-the-us-marines-looking-for-unmanned-logistics-to-fight-china-textron-sees-opportunity/

https://www.twz.com/9271/this-throw-away-drone-could-rush-supplies-to-marines-in-need

https://www.twz.com/29727/watch-japans-giant-us-2-amphibious-flying-boat-land-in-an-amazingly-short-distance

https://www.twz.com/29987/this-old-tanker-looks-like-its-about-to-sink-but-its-just-doing-its-job-for-the-marines

“Some of the capabilities we assume might pan out, will not pan out, and

other technological things will come along that we have not even

considered,” Berger told the Journal. He described his plan “as an aim

point” and that the Corps would “monitor the threat all along as we go.”

It certainly remains to be seen how much of the Commandant s̓ ambitious

proposal comes to fruition. However, it is clear that the Marine Corpsʼ

present senior leadership sees radical changes as essential to ensure that

the force continues to be useful in future major wars, especially in the

Pacific region.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

AIR ARTILLERY DRONES LAND

TANKS

UNMANNED

A Marine Corps briefing slide from 2016 showing the potential capabilities seaplanes might offer
to the EABO concept., USMC

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 11/39

https://www.twz.com/category/air

https://www.twz.com/category/artillery

https://www.twz.com/category/drones

https://www.twz.com/category/land

https://www.twz.com/category/tanks

https://www.twz.com/category/unmanned

Conversation 278 Comments

Sort by Best

What do you think?

View 3 replies

Shortleash
23 March, 2020

Funny he wants to cut the V22 which has the legs to actually deploy across these
large expanses of water. At least they suggested another KC130 unit. Found odd
as well he wants to cut the heavy lift units but it’s clear from the exercise photo
and other media in the article, the CH-53K would be sor…See more

Reply · 9 · Share

View 3 replies

RDML_Kittypnch
23 March, 2020

i think backing away from major over the beach operations based on large slow
targets is probably the right idea. However, I don’t see how that equates to no
tanks and minimal cannon artillery.

The marines are still going to be a primary infantry type outfit. If I’m a rifleman I
want organic ta…See more

Reply · 4 · Share

Greyvagabond
24 March, 2020

Air Force and Navy: We need a new, cheap, simple, common stealth attack jet.

Marines: Well I need it to be STOVL.

Air Force and Navy: OK I guess we can massively complicate the project and
severely compromise the design, forgoing super cruise and maneuvering, to
accommodate you….See more (Edited)

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 12/39

JOSEPH TREVITHICK

Deputy Editor

View 1 replies

Reply · 15 · Share

View 2 replies

SilentH
23 March, 2020

Not gonna lie, it would be pretty cool if the Marines brought seaplanes back into
our arsenal. The Japanese US-2 seaplane is pretty cool, and it’s a proven design,
maybe we could build it under license here, like they’ve done with U.S. designs in
the past.

Also, moving to missiles over tanks and art…See more
Reply · 4 · Share

View 1 replies

M Mako35
23 March, 2020

I like it. People say great things about the work tanks and arty do, and it is great
work, from desert storm Marine tank battles to burning out arty tubes against ISIS
a few years back. But THE pacing threat has an answer to our current strengths.
We put a arty battery ashore and lay it out in say,…See more
Reply · 4 · Share

Show More Comments

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 13/39

https://www.twz.com/authors/joseph-trevithick

https://www.openweb.com/powered-by

https://www.openweb.com/legal-and-privacy/terms-of-use?utm_source=Product&utm_medium=Footer

https://www.openweb.com/legal-and-privacy/privacy?utm_source=Product&utm_medium=Footer

LATEST IN FORCE DESIGN 2030

Navy Now Seeking Commercial Ship Design To Propel Its Long-Delayed
Medium Landing Ship Program Forward

The Navy halted the Medium Landing Ship effort last month after high cost

estimates and is now seeking commercial vessel designs to move Marines in a

Pacific fight.

GEOFF ZIEZULEWICZ

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 14/39

https://www.twz.com/news-features/navy-now-seeking-commercial-ship-design-to-propel-its-long-delayed-medium-landing-ship-program-forward

https://www.twz.com/authors/geoff-ziezulewicz

THE WAR ZONE WIRE
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest

developments in military technology, strategy,

and foreign policy.

By signing up you agree to our Terms of Service and

Marine-Moving Medium Landing Ship Critical To China Fight Put On Hold Again
By Navy

The Marines say they really need a Medium Landing Ship for a future conflict in

the Pacific, but Navy requirements have ballooned its costs.

GEOFF ZIEZULEWICZ

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 15/39

https://www.twz.com/sea/marine-moving-medium-landing-ship-critical-to-china-fight-put-on-hold-again-by-navy

https://link.twz.com/join/79r/signup-war-zone&hash=17c8efa9ea653b18b1ef3b7c3e112940

Terms and Conditions

Privacy Policy

https://www.twz.com/sea/marine-moving-medium-landing-ship-critical-to-china-fight-put-on-hold-again-by-navy

https://www.twz.com/authors/geoff-ziezulewicz

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 16/39

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 17/39

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 18/39

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 19/39

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 20/39

2/6/25, 2:18 PM Marines To Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles

https://www.twz.com/32703/marines-to-radically-remodel-force-cutting-tanks-howitzers-in-favor-of-drones-missiles 21/39

More From Our Experts

Paul B. Stares

Securing Ukraine’s Future: What Should the United States Do?

Lori Esposito Murray

The Risk of Nuclear War Continues to Rise

Jacob Ware

The Revenge of the Me-Too Martyrs

Yes. China’s economy has grown tenfold over the last thirty years, and the country is

nearing completion of a decades-long transformation of its military, the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA), which is shifting from a territorial defense force to a maritime

power. This overhaul has been supported by a sevenfold increase in defense spending,

which has modernized the PLA into a top-tier military distinguished by its potent missile

defense systems. Foreign policy experts suggest that by 2027, Beijing will have completed

its military modernization, nearly a decade ahead of schedule.

How is the U.S. military preparing?

The Defense Department is reassessing the structure, size, and capabilities of the joint

force. This includes moving away from legacy systems and toward cutting-edge

technologies and capabilities.

December 2020, the Defense Department issued a new strategy for maritime deterrence,

called Advantage at Sea [PDF], that includes the three U.S. sea services: the Navy, the

Marines, and the Coast Guard. The strategy focuses on forward-deployed forces (i.e.

those stationed abroad) being more assertive, without being too aggressive, in day-to-day

competition with China and Russia. And it addresses the dramatic changes in security

2/6/25, 2:18 PM The Marine Corps’ Shifting Focus: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.cfr.org/article/marine-corps-shifting-focus-what-know 3/8

https://www.cfr.org/expert/paul-b-stares

https://www.cfr.org/article/securing-ukraines-future-what-should-united-states-do

https://www.cfr.org/expert/lori-esposito-murray

https://www.cfr.org/article/risk-nuclear-war-continues-rise

https://www.cfr.org/expert/jacob-ware

https://www.cfr.org/blog/revenge-me-too-martyrs

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-05/kevin-rudd-usa-chinese-confrontation-short-of-war

https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2019/09/04/defending-the-pacific-requires-a-joint-force-concept/

https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/16/2002553074/-1/-1/0/TRISERVICESTRATEGY.PDF

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/02/four-ways-us-naval-forces-should-be-more-assertive/172278/

environment that have occurred since its predecessor [PDF] was issued in 2015, including

that the United States “can no longer presume unfettered access to the world’s oceans in

times of conflict.”

As part of the new approach, the navy prioritizes controlling the high seas, a hand-in-

glove fit for its “blue-water” strength. The coast guard brings its legal authorities and its

expertise in global engagement and capacity building. And, for its part, the Marine Corps

focuses on generating expeditionary combat power while operating within the range of

the PLA weapons systems that are designed to deny the U.S. military access.

Is the Marine Corps ready?

The Marine Corps is not equipped, trained, or organized to fulfill this role, so the force

must be fundamentally redesigned. Over the past two years, the Marine Corps has

undertaken a foundational shift in mission focus, moving from three decades of sustained

land operations to becoming a naval expeditionary force optimized for contested

maritime spaces. The Marine Corps of the future will be much different than today’s. Its

new focus is China, the only peer competitor capable of mounting a sustained challenge

to a stable and open international system.

What changes is the Marine Corps making?

The top priority for General David H. Berger, commandant of the Marine Corps, is

implementing a new strategic plan called Force Design 2030 [PDF], a threat-based

endeavor designed to provide the United States with a globally employable naval

expeditionary force. Among the important changes planned, several stand out:

First, the new Marine Corps will be lighter, more mobile, and able to operate from more

diverse maritime platforms and aboard allied partner ships. It will possess the capability

and maneuverability to join allies and partners in shallow littoral waters, using smaller,

2/6/25, 2:18 PM The Marine Corps’ Shifting Focus: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.cfr.org/article/marine-corps-shifting-focus-what-know 4/8

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/21st-century-seapower_strategy_201503

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sea-power-us-navy-and-foreign-policy

https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/impact-stories/what-is-a2ad-and-why-does-it-matter-to-the-united-states/

https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II ?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/09/23/first-marine-corps-f-35-fighters-deploy-aboard-british-aircraft-carrier.html

less provocative platforms such as the newly designed light amphibious warships. New

formations will integrate into small naval task forces to support joint and combined

activities.

Second, it will be more resilient and survivable. This does not necessarily mean armored

and invisible. It means there will be smaller, distributed Marine Corps elements that can

persist inside an adversary’s missile systems, such as the first island chain off China’s east

coast. These forces will be the eyes and ears of the joint force, contributing to what the

chief of naval operations calls “sea-control and sea-denial missions.” Consistent with the

Defense Department’s recent Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy [PDF], the

Marine Corps is prioritizing cybersecurity and information to better enable freedom of

action in the electromagnetic spectrum.

The U.S. Military in the Western Pacific

NORTH KOREA

JAPAN
SOUTH KOREA

86 U.S. bases
64 U.S. bases

CHINA EAST

CHINA

SEA

PACIFIC OCEA

TAIWAN

First

island

chain Second

island

chain
SOUTH

CHINA

SEA

GuamVIETNAM
PHILIPPINES 32 U.S. bases

2/6/25, 2:18 PM The Marine Corps’ Shifting Focus: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.cfr.org/article/marine-corps-shifting-focus-what-know 5/8

https://news.usni.org/2020/11/19/navy-officials-reveal-details-of-new-100m-light-amphibious-warship-concept

https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/29/2002525927/-1/-1/0/ELECTROMAGNETIC_SPECTRUM_SUPERIORITY_STRATEGY.PDF

Third, the force will be more maritime in nature. For example, ground aviation units that

were used in the Middle East in the past decade are being transformed for naval missions.

Investments are being made in more naval-oriented platforms, such as long-range

precision weapons, and away from less relevant, land-centric systems such as tanks.

Fourth, unmanned systems will be much more prominent. The Marine Corps is doubling

the number of unmanned aerial squadrons for maritime reconnaissance competition.

Likewise, future units will have surface and subsurface unmanned platforms equipped

with sonar buoys specifically tailored to help deny adversaries use of areas of the sea. The

Marine Corps is also the Defense Department’s lead for developing an aerial unmanned

logistics system [PDF], or “delivery drones,” to help automate the distribution of supplies

in the maritime environment.

Finally, there will be changes in talent-management processes and a modernization of

training and education establishments. A highlight of this initiative is an overhaul of the

promotion-board process to facilitate a more inclusive, diverse force.

Will this entail an increase in defense spending?

The Biden administration has already signaled it will seek to sustain the United States’

military advantage to avoid ceding any further ground to China or Russia. The Marine

Corps is planning to keep spending stable to fulfill its role in the new strategy.

0 400 mi

0 1,0
INDONESIA

Source: David Vine, American University.

2/6/25, 2:18 PM The Marine Corps’ Shifting Focus: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.cfr.org/article/marine-corps-shifting-focus-what-know 6/8

https://www.navy.mil/Portals/1/Strategic/20210315%20Unmanned%20Campaign_Final_LowRes ?ver=LtCZ-BPlWki6vCBTdgtDMA%3d%3d

When will the new Marine Corps be ready?

Force redesign is intended to be completed by 2030 and will include ongoing

experimentation. The first of many redesigned units will be ready by 2023.

Will military readiness suffer at all along the way?

It depends on how readiness is defined. This was the subject of a recent article by the

chiefs of the Air Force and Marine Corps, in which they argue that the Defense

Department’s definition of readiness is limiting and outdated.

The Marine Corps is currently able to meet all Joint Staff mission assignments. However,

readiness is an articulation of available units and assumes combat preparedness,

irrespective of the adversary’s capability. The current definition therefore encourages

defense industry spending on a “fight-tonight” force. But to compete with China and

Russia, the military needs to adopt a new framework for readiness that more accurately

indicates when a service is prepared to meet future mission requirements. This would

help establish the critical link between financial resources and force strategy.

What role will the revamped force play in U.S. foreign policy?

Marine Corps Has Smallest Budget of Defense Department Branches
Fiscal year 2020 budget (total budget authority)

Air ForceAir Force

ArmyArmy

NavyNavy

MarineMarine
CorpsCorps

Defense-Defense-
widewide

$207B

$180B

$163B

$47B

$121B

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense; U.S. Secretary of the Navy.

2/6/25, 2:18 PM The Marine Corps’ Shifting Focus: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.cfr.org/article/marine-corps-shifting-focus-what-know 7/8

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/01/brown-berger-military-readiness/

Although the future force will be different in terms of structure and capabilities, it is

consistent with the Marine Corps’ historic roots and directly supports the Title 10 legal

requirement to seize and defend advanced naval bases. As General Berger commented,

“It is also important to note that the Marine Corps will continue to serve as the nation’s

premier crisis response force around the globe, and contribute to the deterrence and

warfighting needs of all combatant commands.”

The conclusions and opinions expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the official

i i f h

Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.

2/6/25, 2:18 PM The Marine Corps’ Shifting Focus: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations

https://www.cfr.org/article/marine-corps-shifting-focus-what-know 8/8

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/8063

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:

Background and Issues for Congress

September 24, 2024

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov

RL32665

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service

Summary
The current and future size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship

procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, the capacity of the

U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and Navy proposals for

retiring existing ships have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for

many years. Congressional focus on these matters has been heightened over the past decade by

the increasing size and capabilities of China’s navy, and by the capacity of China’s shipbuilding

industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry.

The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships (the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of

the Navy) in August 2003 and has generally remained between 270 and 300 battle force ships

since then. As of September 16, 2024, the Navy included 297 battle force ships.

In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that called for achieving and

maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship goal was made U.S.

policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-

91 of December 12, 2017). The 355-ship goal predated the Trump and Biden Administrations’

national defense strategies and did not reflect the new, more distributed fleet architecture (i.e.,

new mix of ships) that the Navy wants to shift toward in coming years.

In June 2023, the Navy sent its preferred new force-level goal to the congressional defense

committees. In March 2024, as part of its FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan,

the Navy released the details of this new goal, which calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of

381 manned ships of certain types and numbers, plus 134 large unmanned surface and underwater

vehicles. The Biden Administration to date has not explicitly endorsed, as an Administration

objective and funding priority, either the 381-ship goal, the earlier 355-ship goal, or any other

force-structure goal for the Navy.

The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $32.4 billion in shipbuilding funding for, among

other things, the procurement of six new ships—a figure that is one less than the seven ships that

the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission had projected for FY2025, and less than the long-term

average of 10 or 11 new manned ships per year that would be need to be achieved over a period

of about 35 years to achieve and maintain a fleet of about 355 or 381 manned ships.

The Navy projects that 10 new ships will be delivered to the fleet in FY2025. The Navy’s

FY2025 budget proposes retiring 19 existing ships in FY2025, including 10 ships that would be

retired before reaching the ends of their expected service lives. As a result, the Navy projects that,

under the Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget, the total number of ships in the Navy would decline

by a net 9 ships during FY2025, from 296 ships at the start of FY2025 to 287 ships at the end of

FY2025. The Navy’s budget submission projects that during the period FY2025-FY2029 (i.e., the

years of the FY2025 Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP]), the Navy would include 287, 283, 280,

286, and 291 ships, respectively. Under the Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054)

shipbuilding plan, the fleet would grow to more than 300 ships in FY2032 and reach a total of

more than 381 ships in FY2042.

Oversight issues for Congress for FY2025 include whether to amend U.S. law to make the Navy’s

preferred new 381-ship goal U.S. policy; the Biden Administration’s position on a force-level

goal for the Navy; significant projected delays in deliveries of several types of Navy ships;

industrial base capacity constraints for building Navy ships; inflation in Navy shipbuilding costs;

the Navy’s request to procure one Virginia-class submarine rather than two in FY2025; the

Navy’s proposal for retiring 19 ships in FY2025; and the estimated procurement costs of certain

ships included in the Navy’s FY2025 five-year (FY2025-FY2029) shipbuilding plan.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service

Contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1

Issue for Congress ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
CRS Reports on Individual Navy Shipbuilding Programs ……………………………………………….. 1

Background ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2

Current Number of Ships in Navy………………………………………………………………………………… 2
Navy Force-Level Goal ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3

Two Elements of Navy Ship Force Structure Are Mandated by Statute ……………………….. 3
355-Ship Force-Level Goal of 2016 ……………………………………………………………………….. 3
Navy’s Preferred New 381-Ship Force-Level Goal of 2023 ……………………………………….. 3
Biden Administration Has Not Explicitly Endorsed a Navy Force-level Goal ………………. 4
Navy Force-Level Goals Result from Force Structure Assessments (FSAs) …………………. 5
Navy’s Force-Level Goal Is Not Just a Single Number ……………………………………………… 5
Commission on the Future of the Navy …………………………………………………………………… 5

Navy’s FY2025 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans …………………………………………….. 5
FY2025 Five-Year (FY2025-FY2029) Shipbuilding Program ……………………………………. 5
FY2025 30-Year (FY2025-FY2054) Shipbuilding Plan …………………………………………….. 7
Projected Force Levels Under FY2025 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan …………………………….. 7

Issues for Congress ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9

Amending U.S. Law to Reflect Navy’s Preferred New 381-Ship Goal ……………………………… 9
Biden Administration’s Position on Force-Level Goal for the Navy …………………………………. 9
Appropriateness of Navy’s Preferred New 381-Ship Goal ………………………………………………. 9
Delays in Navy Shipbuilding Programs ………………………………………………………………………. 10

Overview …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10
Observations ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12
Oversight Questions ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 14

Industrial Base Capacity Constraints for Building Navy Ships ………………………………………. 15
Overview …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15
Submarines ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15
Surface Ships …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 16
New Navy Maritime Industrial Base Office …………………………………………………………… 17
Options for Addressing Shipbuilding Capacity Constraints ……………………………………… 18
Options for Using Available Shipbuilding Capacity ………………………………………………… 24

Inflation in Navy Shipbuilding Costs ………………………………………………………………………….. 29
Impacts of a Continuing Resolution (CR) on Shipbuilding Programs ……………………………… 30
FY2025 Request for Procuring One Rather than Two Virginia-Class Submarines …………….. 32
Proposed Retirement of 19 Ships in FY2025 ……………………………………………………………….. 33
Procurement Costs of Certain Ships in Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan ………………………………. 33

Legislative Activity for FY2024 and FY2025 ……………………………………………………………………. 33

CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs ………………….. 33
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2025 Shipbuilding Funding Request ………………… 34
FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638) …………………………………. 37

House ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 37
Senate ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 42

FY2025 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 8774/S. 4921) ………………………………………………… 47
House ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47
Senate ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 49

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service

Figures

Figure 1. Ship-Procurement Profiles in FY2025 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ……………………………. 8

Figure 2. Projected Force Levels Under FY2025 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan ………………………….. 8

Figure 3. Navy One-Page Summary of Delays in Shipbuilding Programs ……………………………… 11

Figure 4. Shared Modular Build of LPD-17 Flight I Class Ships …………………………………………. 22

Tables

Table 1. 355-Ship Force-Level Goals …………………………………………………………………………………. 4

Table 2. FY2024 Five-Year (FY2025-FY2029) Shipbuilding Plan…………………………………………. 6

Table 3. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2025 Funding Request …………………………….. 36

Table A-1. Earlier Navy Force-Structure Goals Dating Back to 2001 …………………………………… 51

Table G-1. Total Number of Ships in Navy Since FY1948 ………………………………………………….. 63

Table G-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2029 ………………………………. 64

Appendixes

Appendix A. Earlier Navy Force-Structure Goals Dating Back to 2001 ………………………………… 51

Appendix B. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to Current or Potential Future Levels ………….. 53

Appendix C. Employment Impact of Additional Shipbuilding Work ……………………………………. 56

Appendix D. A Summary of Some Acquisition Lessons Learned for Navy Shipbuilding ………… 57

Appendix E. Some Considerations Relating to Warranties in Shipbuilding Contracts …………….. 58

Appendix F. Avoiding Procurement Cost Growth vs. Minimizing Procurement Costs ……………. 60

Appendix G. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate ……………………………………………….. 62

Contacts

Author Information ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 64

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 1

Introduction

Issue for Congress

This report presents background information and issues for Congress concerning the Navy’s force

structure and shipbuilding plans. The current and future size and composition of the Navy, the

annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding

plans, the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and

Navy proposals for retiring existing ships have been oversight matters for the congressional

defense committees for many years. Congressional focus on these matters has been heightened

over the past decade by the increasing size and capabilities of China’s navy,1 and by the capacity

of China’s shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry.2

Oversight issues for Congress for FY2025 include whether to amend U.S. law to make the Navy’s

preferred new 381-ship force-level goal U.S. policy; the Biden Administration’s position on a

force-level goal for the Navy; significant delays in deliveries of several types of Navy ships

announced by the Navy in April 2024; industrial base capacity constraints for building Navy

ships; inflation in Navy shipbuilding costs; the Navy’s request to procure one Virginia-class

submarine rather than two in FY2025; the Navy’s proposal for retiring 19 ships in FY2025; and

the pricing of certain ships included in the Navy’s five-year (FY2025-FY2029) shipbuilding plan.

Decisions that Congress makes on these issues can substantially affect Navy capabilities and

funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.

CRS Reports on Individual Navy Shipbuilding Programs

Detailed coverage of certain individual Navy shipbuilding programs can be found in the

following CRS reports:

• CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile

Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS

Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

1 For more on China’s navy, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy

Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

2 See, for example, Matthew P. Funaiole, “The Threat of China’s Shipbuilding Empire,” Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS), May 10, 2024; Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “In the Shadow

of Warships, How Foreign Companies Help Modernize China’s Navy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS), undated, but with data through 2022, and accessed May 17, 2024; Mackenzie Eaglen, “The U.S. Navy Is

Falling Behind China, And The Pentagon Knows It,” 19FortyFive,” October 31, 2023; Cathalijne Adams, “China’s

Shipbuilding Capacity is 232 Times Greater Than That of the United States,” Alliance for American Manufacturing,

September 18, 2023; Kwan Wei Kevin Tan, “China Has the Capacity to Build PLA Combat Ships at 200 Times the

Rate that the US Can, Per Leaked US Navy Intelligence,” Business Insider, September 15, 2023; Michael Lee,

“Chinese Shipbuilding Capacity Over 200 Times Greater than US, Navy Intelligence Says,” Fox News, September 14,

2023; James Holmes, “China’s Shipbuilding Capability: A Threat To The U.S. Navy?,” National Interest, July 16,

2023; Joseph Trevithick, “Alarming Navy Intel Slide Warns Of China’s 200 Times Greater Shipbuilding Capacity,”

The War Zone, July 11, 2023; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is the World’s Biggest Shipbuilder, and Its Ability to Rapidly

Produce New Warships Would Be a ‘Huge Advantage’ in a Long Fight with the US, Experts Say,” Business Insider,

September 8, 2020.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 2

• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship

Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light

Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by

Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Light Replenishment Oiler (TAOL) (Previously

Next-Generation Logistics Ship [NGLS]) Program: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11838, Navy TAGOS-25 Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Background

Current Number of Ships in Navy

The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships3 in August 2003 and has generally remained between

270 and 300 battle force ships since then. As of September 16, 2024, the Navy included 297 battle

force ships. The total number of ships in the Navy each fiscal year since FY1948 is shown in

Table G-1.

3 Battle force ships are the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy and the Navy’s ship force-level

goal. In this CRS report, references to numbers of ships generally refer to numbers of battle force ships.

The battle force ships method for counting the number of ships in the Navy was established in 1981 by agreement

between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense, and has been modified somewhat over time, in part by

Section 1021 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2015 (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 of December 19, 2014). Battle force ships “are commissioned United States Ship (USS)

warships built or armed for naval combat and capable of contributing to combat operations or other naval ships

including United States Naval Ships that contribute directly to Navy warfighting or support missions.” Such ships

“include combat-capable ships and ships that contribute to warfighting missions, specified combat support missions, or

service support missions.” Ships and craft that are not counted as battle force ships include, among other things, certain

types of support ships; combatant craft such as patrol boats; unmanned surface and underwater vehicles; and support

craft such as floating dry docks, tugs, and lighters and barges. (Department of the Navy, “General Guidance for the

Classification of Naval Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures,” SECNAVINST [Secretary of the Navy

Instruction] 5030.8D, June 28, 2022.)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 3

Navy Force-Level Goal

Two Elements of Navy Ship Force Structure Are Mandated by Statute

Two elements of Navy ship force structure are mandated by statute: 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires

the Navy to include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31 operational

amphibious warfare ships. The 31 amphibious ships are to include not less than 10 LHA/LHD-

type “big deck” amphibious assault ships, with the remaining amphibious ships being LPD/LSD-

type amphibious ships.

The requirement regarding aircraft carriers was established by Section 126 of the FY2006

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006), which

set the number at 12 carriers. The requirement was changed from 12 carriers to 11 carriers by

Section 1011(a) of the FY2007 NDAA (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006).

The requirements regarding amphibious ships were added by Section 1023 of the FY2023

(NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022).

355-Ship Force-Level Goal of 2016

In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that called for achieving and

maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship goal was made U.S.

policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-

91 of December 12, 2017).4 The provision, which is shown as a note to 10 U.S.C. 8661, does not

include an enforcement mechanism.

The 355-ship goal predated the Trump and Biden Administration’s national defense strategies and

did not reflect the new, more distributed fleet architecture (i.e., new mix of ships) that the Navy

wants to shift toward in coming years—an architecture that includes significant numbers of large

unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. In 2019, the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) began working on a successor to the 355-ship goal that would reflect current U.S.

defense strategy and a more distributed fleet architecture.

Navy’s Preferred New 381-Ship Force-Level Goal of 2023

In June 2023, the Navy sent its preferred new force-level goal to the congressional defense

committees in a document called the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement (BFSAR)

report. In March 2024, as part of its FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan, the

Navy released the details of this new goal, which calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of

381 manned ships of certain types and numbers, plus 134 large unmanned surface and underwater

vehicles. Table 1 compares the 355-ship and 381-ship force-level goals. (For Navy force-level

goals prior to the 355-ship goal, see Appendix A.)

4 Section 1025 of P.L. 115-91 states

SEC. 1025. Policy of the United States on minimum number of battle force ships.

(a) Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to have available, as soon as practicable, not

fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised of the optimal mix of platforms, with funding subject

to the availability of appropriations or other funds.

(b) Battle force ships defined.—In this section, the term “battle force ship” has the meaning given

the term in Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5030.8C.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 4

Table 1. 355-Ship Force-Level Goals

355-Ship

Goal (2016)

381-Ship

Goal (2023) Difference

Battle force ships (i.e., manned ships)

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 12 12 0

Attack submarines (SSNs) 66 66 0

Aircraft carriers (CVNs) 12 12 0

Large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers [CGs] and destroyers [DDGs]) 104 87 -17

Small surface combatants 52 73 +21

Frigates (FFGs) (24) (58)a (+34)

Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) (28) (15)a (-13)

Larger amphibious ships 38 31 -7

LHA/LHD amphibious assault ships (12) (10) (-2)

LPD/LSD amphibious ships (26) (21) (-5)

Smaller amphibious ships (i.e., Medium Landing Ships [LSMs]) 0 18b +18

Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships) 34 46 +12

TAO oilers and TAOE replenishment ships (20) (20) 0

TAKE dry cargo chips (14) (13) (-1)

TAOL light replenishment oilers (0)b (13) (+13)

Command and support ships 37 36b -1

LCC command ships (2) (2) (0)

AS submarine tenders (2) (2) (0)

ESD Expeditionary Transfer Dock ships (2) (0) (-2)

EPF Expeditionary Fast Transport ships (10) (8) (-2)

ESB Expeditionary Sea Base ships (6) (6) (0)

ARS and ATF salvage ships and fleet ocean tugs (8) (8) (0)

TAGOS ocean surveillance ships (7) (10) (+3)

Subtotal battle force ships (i.e., manned ships) 355 381 +26

Large unmanned vehicles

LUSV and MUSV (Large and Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles) 0 78 +78

XLUUV Extra Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicles) 0 56 +56

Subtotal large unmanned vehicles 0 134 +134

TOTAL battle force ships and large unmanned vehicles 355 515 +160

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for

Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025, p. 4 (Table 1).

a. Under its FY2025 budget submission, the Navy wants to maintain a force of 25 (rather than 15) LCSs. This

could imply a total of 48 (rather than 58) frigates.

b. The Navy states in a note to its table: “The 2022 Amphibious Force Requirements Study determined an

initial capacity goal of 18 LSM[s], with a total requirements [sic] of 35.” The Navy’s table categories LSMs as

command and support ships, and thus shows a total of 54 command and support ships. CRS and the

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) categorize them as smaller amphibious ships—a category that is not

shown in the navy table.

Biden Administration Has Not Explicitly Endorsed a Navy Force-level Goal

The Biden Administration to date has not explicitly endorsed, as an Administration objective and

funding priority, either the 381-ship goal, the earlier 355-ship goal, or any other force-structure

goal for the Navy.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 5

Navy Force-Level Goals Result from Force Structure Assessments (FSAs)

Navy force-level goals are produced by Navy analyses called Force Structure Assessments

(FSAs). The Navy conducts a new FSA or an update to the existing FSA every few years, as

circumstances require.5 In conducting an FSA, the Navy solicits inputs from U.S. regional

combatant commanders (CCDRs) regarding the types and amounts of Navy capabilities that

CCDRs deem necessary for implementing the Navy’s portion of the national military strategy,

and then translates those CCDR inputs into required numbers of ships, using current and

projected Navy ship types. The analysis takes into account Navy capabilities for both warfighting

and day-to-day forward-deployed presence.6

Navy’s Force-Level Goal Is Not Just a Single Number

Although the result of an FSA is often reduced for convenience to a single number (e.g., 355 or

381 ships), FSAs take into account a number of factors, including types and capabilities of Navy

ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons, as well as ship homeporting arrangements and

operational cycles. Thus, although the number of ships called for by an FSA might appear to be a

one-dimensional figure, it actually incorporates multiple aspects of Navy capability and capacity.

Commission on the Future of the Navy

Section 1092 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022) established

an independent commission in the legislative branch to be known as the Commission on the

Future of the Navy. Section 1092 states that the commission is to “undertake a comprehensive

study of the structure of the Navy and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of

the Navy, in order… to make recommendations on the size and force mixture of ships; and … to

make recommendations on the size and force mixture of naval aviation.” Under Section 1092, the

commission is to submit a report with its findings, conclusions, and recommendations not later

than July 1, 2024. As of May 30, 2024, all eight members of the commission reportedly had been

named.7

Navy’s FY2025 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans

FY2025 Five-Year (FY2025-FY2029) Shipbuilding Program

The Navy’s FY2025 five-year (FY2025-FY2029) shipbuilding plan (Table 2) includes a total of

57 ships, or an average of 11.4 per year. Given a 35-year average surface life for Navy ships (a

5 The Navy is also required by law (10 U.S.C. 8695) to submit to the congressional defense committees a battle force

ship assessment and requirement not later than 180 days after the date of occurrence of any of the following events:

• strategic guidance that results in changes to theater campaign plans or warfighting scenarios;

• a strategic laydown [i.e., homeporting and basing plan] of vessels or aircraft that affects sustainable

peacetime presence or warfighting response timelines;

• operating concepts, including employment cycles, crewing constructs, or operational tempo limits, that affect

peacetime presence or warfighting response timelines; or

• assigned missions that affect the type or quantity of force elements.

6 For further discussion, see U.S. Navy, Executive Summary, 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA), December

15, 2016, pp. 1-2.

7 “So, How is that National Commission on the Future of the Navy Doing?” CDR Salamander, May 29, 2024. See also

Steven Wills, “Congressional Commissions on Afghan War and Future of Navy Lack Recipe for Success,” Defense

Opinion, June 24, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 6

planning factor that assumes that all Navy ships would be kept in service to the end of their

expected service lives), an average shipbuilding rate of 10 to 11 ships per year, if sustained for 35

years, would increase the size of the Navy over a 35-year period to a size about equal to the 355-

ship or 381-ship force-level goals.

Table 2. FY2024 Five-Year (FY2025-FY2029) Shipbuilding Plan

FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 Total

Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine 1 1 1 1 4

Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine 1 2 2 2 2 9

Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier 0

Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer 2 2 2 2 2 10

FFG-62 frigate 1 2 1 2 1 7

LHA amphibious assault ship 1 1

LPD-17 Fight II amphibious ship 1 1 1 3

Medium Landing Ship (LSM) 1 1 2 2 2 8

John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler 2 1 2 1 6

Light replenishment oiler (TAOL) 1 1 1 3

Submarine tender (AS[X]) 1 1 2

TAGOS(X) ocean surveillance ship 1 1 1 1 4

TOTAL 6 11 14 13 13 57

Projected total size of Navy 287 283 280 286 291 n/a

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2025 Navy budget submission.

The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $32.4 billion in shipbuilding funding. As shown in

Table 2, this funding would be used for, among other things, the procurement of six new ships,

including one Virginia-class attack submarine, two Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, one

Constellation (FFG-62) class frigate, one LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ship, and one

Medium Landing Ship (LSM).

The figure of six requested ships is one less than the seven ships that the Navy’s FY2024 budget

submission had projected would be requested for FY2025, and less than the long-term average of

10 or 11 new manned ships per year that would be need to be achieved over a period of about 35

years to achieve and maintain a fleet about equal in size to the 355-ship or 381-ship force-level

goals.

The Navy’s FY2023 five-year (FY2023-FY2027) shipbuilding plan included no LPD-17 Flight II

class amphibious ships for FY2024-FY2027, and the Navy’s FY2024 five-year (FY2024-

FY2028) shipbuilding plan included no LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ships for FY2024-

FY2028. As shown in Table 2, the Navy’s FY2025 five-year (FY2025-FY2029) shipbuilding

plan includes the programmed procurement of three LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ships in

FY2025-FY2029 in support of maintaining a force of 31 larger amphibious ships.

As also shown in Table 2, the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission projects that during the period

FY2025-FY2029 (i.e., the years of the FY2025 Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP]), the Navy

would include 287, 283, 280, 286, and 291 ships, respectively. The figure of 291 ships in FY2029

is five ships less than the figure of 296 ships that the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission projects

for the end of FY2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 7

FY2025 30-Year (FY2025-FY2054) Shipbuilding Plan

The top half of Figure 1 shows the primary 30-year ship-procurement profile in the Navy’s

FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan. The Navy refers to this profile as the

PB2025 (President’s [proposed] Budget for FY2025) Shipbuilding Plan, and states that it

reflects growing a larger Navy to approach the requirement reflected in the [June 2023]

BFSAR [i.e., the 381-ship force-level goal]. This profile assumes industry eliminates

excess construction backlogs and produces future ships on time and within budget. This

profile reflects growth matched to planned, but not yet achieved, industrial capacity and a

larger force requiring additional resources beyond the FYDP….

The first profile, the PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan, is based on showing a potential path to a

larger Navy based on the BFSAR objective. It is however, constrained beyond the FYDP

by the Navy’s assessment of current industrial base capacity and the expectation of funding

efforts to improve production. This plan would requires additional resources beyond the

FYDP to procure the platforms necessary to reach the objective inventory requirement….

The cost to procure a larger Navy is represented by the PB2025 shipbuilding plan in support

of the BFSAR objective… and assumes industry produces future ships on-time and within

budget. The high range represents an average of $2.7B per year in real growth beyond the

FYDP in FY2024 constant dollars.8

The bottom half of Figure 1 shows an additional 30-year ship-procurement profile in the Navy’s

FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan. The Navy refers to this profile as the

Resource Constrained Alternative or the Alternative Profile, and states that it

reflecting a budget with no real topline growth above inflation. The Alternative Profile

assumes industry eliminates excess construction backlog and produces future ships on time

and within budget. The alternative was constrained to 2.1% SCN inflation growth after the

FYDP….

The Alternative Profile provides ready and battle-worthy platforms to operational

commanders with minimal budget growth.9

Projected Force Levels Under FY2025 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan

As shown in the top half of Figure 2, under the PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan, the fleet would grow

to more than 300 ships in FY2032, reach a total of more than 381 ships in FY2042, and include

387 ships at the end of the 30-year period. As shown in the bottom half of Figure 2, under the

Resource Constrained Alternative, the fleet would again grow to more than 300 ships in FY2032,

reach a peak total of 346 ships in FY2040, and include 342 ships at the end of the 30-year period.

8 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year

2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, pp. 8, 17-18, 21.

9 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year

2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, pp. 8, 18.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 8

Figure 1. Ship-Procurement Profiles in FY2025 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan

Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year

2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, p. 18 (Table A1-2).

Figure 2. Projected Force Levels Under FY2025 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan

Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year

2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, p. 20 (Table A1-5).

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 9

Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress concerning Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans include but

are not necessarily limited to those discussed below.

Amending U.S. Law to Reflect Navy’s Preferred New

381-Ship Goal

One issue for Congress concerns U.S. policy regarding the Navy’s force-level goal. As mentioned

earlier, the 355-ship force-level goal of 2016 was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the

FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017). The

provision, which is shown as a note to 10 U.S.C. 8661, does not include an enforcement

mechanism. One issue for Congress is whether to amend this provision to reflect the Navy’s

preferred new 381-ship force-level objective, and/or include an enforcement mechanism.

Biden Administration’s Position on Force-Level Goal for the Navy

Another issue for Congress concerns the Biden Administration’s position regarding the Navy’s

force-level goal. As mentioned earlier, the Biden Administration to date has not explicitly

endorsed, as an Administration objective and funding priority, either the 381-ship goal, the earlier

355-ship goal, or any other force-structure goal for the Navy. Potential questions for Congress

include the following:

• Why has the Administration to date not explicitly endorsed, as an Administration

objective and funding priority, either the 381-ship goal, the earlier 355-ship goal,

or any other force-structure goal for the Navy?

• What future Navy force-level and fleet composition does the Administration

support as an Administration goal and funding priority?

• In the absence of an Administration endorsement of a specific Navy force-level

goal as an Administration goal and funding priority, how well can Congress

assess the intention and funding adequacy of the Administration’s proposed

budgets for the Navy?

• Should Congress respond to the absence of an Administration endorsement of a

specific Navy force-level goal as an Administration goal and funding priority by

amending 10 U.S.C. 8062 to include mandatory minimum force-level figures not

just for aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, but for other ship categories as

well?

Appropriateness of Navy’s Preferred New 381-Ship Goal

Another issue for Congress is whether the Navy’s preferred new 381-ship force-level goal would

be appropriate for performing the Navy’s missions in coming years. Factors that Congress may

consider in assessing this question include but are not limited to the following:

• U.S. national security strategy, U.S. national defense strategy, and the Navy’s

roles and missions in contributing to the implementation of those strategies;

• the current and potential future naval and other military capabilities of potential

adversaries, particularly China and Russia;

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 10

• the current and potential future naval and other military capabilities of U.S. allies

and partners for performing missions in support of U.S. interests;

• U.S. defense funding levels, the Navy’s share of that funding, and the funding

needs of other Department of Defense (DOD) priorities; and

• industrial base capacity for building and maintaining Navy ships, aircraft,

weapons, and other assets.

As mentioned above, congressional focus on the question of the future size and composition of

the Navy has been heightened over the past decade by the increasing size and capabilities of

China’s navy, and by the capacity of China’s shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of

the U.S. shipbuilding industry.

The question of the size and composition of the Navy needed to perform the Navy’s missions in

coming years is a perennial matter of congressional oversight. In assessing this issue, Congress

from time to time has sought independent (i.e., non-DOD) views on the matter. Congress did so in

Section 216 of the FY2004 defense authorization act (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24,

2003),10 in Section 1067 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92

of November 25, 2015),11 and, as noted above, in Section 1092 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R.

7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022), which established an independent commission in the

legislative branch to be known as the Commission on the Future of the Navy. Section 1092 states

that the commission is to “undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Navy and

policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Navy, in order… to make

recommendations on the size and force mixture of ships; and … to make recommendations on the

size and force mixture of naval aviation.”

Delays in Navy Shipbuilding Programs

Overview

Another issue for Congress concerns delays in Navy shipbuilding programs. On April 2, 2024, the

Navy announced significant projected delays in several of its shipbuilding programs.12 The

Navy’s announcement reflected the results of a 45-day Navy review of its shipbuilding programs

that Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro directed on January 11, 2024.13 Figure 3 shows the

Navy’s one-page summary of the 45-day review and its findings regarding delays in its

shipbuilding programs.

10 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33955, Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure Studies of

2005—Background for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke,

11 For further discussion, see Appendix F to the December 8, 2017, edition of this CRS report.

12 For press reports about the Navy’s announcement, see, for example, Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Ship Programs Face

Years-Long Delays amid Labor, Supply Woes,” Defense News, April 2, 2024; Justin Katz, “Navy Lays Out Major

Shipbuilding Delays, in Rare Public Accounting,” Breaking Defense, April 2, 2024; Nick Wilson, “Navy Shipbuilding

Review Details Delays across Submarine and Ship Acquisition Portfolio,” Inside Defense, April 2, 2024; Cal

Biesecker, “Navy Confirms Delays In Shipbuilding Programs As Part Of Ongoing Review,” Defense Daily, April 3,

2024; Chris Panella, “As It Looks to Keep Its Edge over Rivals, the US Navy’s Biggest Shipbuilding Projects Are

Delayed by Years, New Review Finds,” Business Insider, April 3, 2024; Joe Saballa, “US Navy Review Exposes Major

Shipbuilding Delays in Nine Key Programs,” Defense Post, April 3, 2024; Thomas Black, “US Navy Shipbuilding Has

Fallen Dangerously Behind,” Bloomberg, April 17, 2024; Lauren Frias, “See the 10 Types of New US Navy Warships

Plagued by Shipbuilding Delays,” Business Insider, April 17, 2024; Steve Cohen, “Almost All Navy Shipbuilding Is

Hopelessly Behind Schedule,” The Hill, May 2, 2024.

13 See, for example, Rich Abott, “SECNAV Directs Shipbuilding Review Amid Reports Frigate Running Late,”

Defense Daily, April 12, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 11

Figure 3. Navy One-Page Summary of Delays in Shipbuilding Programs

Summary of Findings from Navy’s 45-Day Shipbuilding Review

Source: Navy summary slide posted at Inside Defense on April 2, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 12

Observations

Observations that might be made about the information presented in the Navy’s one-page

summary include the following:

• Projected delays of these lengths extending across this number of Navy

shipbuilding programs at the same time amount to an unusual and arguably

extraordinary situation in the post-World War II history of the Navy.

• Some observers, commenting these projected delays (or more generally on the

comparative shipbuilding capacities of the United States and China), have

characterized the situation as a strategic liability or major cause for concern for

the United States in competing militarily with China.14

• The Navy’s current challenges in designing ships and building ships can be

viewed as part of a larger situation in which the Navy additionally faces

challenges in crewing ships (due to recruiting shortfalls)15 and maintaining ships

(particularly nuclear-powered attack submarines, but also certain conventionally

powered surface ships).16 Stated differently, the Navy is currently facing

challenges in designing, building, crewing, and maintaining ships.

14 See, for example, Peter Apps, “China Looks to Its Shipyards to Beat US in Any Future War,” Reuters, August 8,

2024; Justin Katz, “State Dept’s Campbell: Gap between US, China Shipbuilding Is ‘Deeply Concerning,’” Breaking

Defense, July 30, 2024; Seong Hyeon Choi, “China Could Match US in Military Conflict Thanks to Shipbuilding

Strength, Analysts Say, Observers Said China’s Ability to Rapidly Reconstitute Its Combat Losses May Give It an

Advantage, Including against ‘Hellscape’ Strategy,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 2024; David Axe, “It’s Just a

New, Small Chinese Stealth Ship. But Its Arrival Is Terrifying,” Telegraph (UK), May 26, 2024; Gil Barndollar and

Matthew C. Mai, “The U.S. Navy Can’t Build Ships,” Foreign Policy, May 17, 2024; Steve Cohen, “Almost All Navy

Shipbuilding Is Hopelessly Behind Schedule,” The Hill, May 2, 2024; Thomas Black, “US Navy Shipbuilding Has

Fallen Dangerously Behind,” Bloomberg, April 17, 2024; Jeffrey M. Voth, “Charting a New Course: Why the US Navy

Must Confront Unrealistic Optimism,” Diplomat, April 15, 2024.

15 See, for example, Heather Mongilio, “At-Sea Billet Gaps Rise to 22,000 for E1-E4 Sailors, CNP [Chief of Naval

Personnel] Says,” USNI News, January 10, 2024; Lolita C. Baldor, “New Recruiting Programs Put Army, Air Force on

Track to Meet Enlistment Goals. Navy Will Fall Short,” Associated Press, April 16, 2024; Timothy H.J. Nerozzi,

“Navy Expects to Miss Recruiting Goal by More than 6,000 amid Worldwide Threats from China, Russia,” Fox News,

April 16, 2024; Heather Mongilio, “Navy Set to Miss Recruiting Goals by 6,700, Chief of Naval Personnel Tells

House,” USNI News, April 17, 2024; Diana Stancy, “Navy Continues to Struggle in Recruiting as Other Services Near

Goal,” Military Times, April 17, 2024; Jared Serbu, “Navy Grapples With At-Sea Shortages as Recruiting Lags,”

Federal News Network, May 20, 2024.

16 For further discussion of delays in maintaining nuclear-powered attack submarines, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy

Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by

Ronald O’Rourke.

For a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on delays in maintaining conventionally powered surface ships,

see Government Accountability Office, Weapon System Sustainment[:] Navy Ship Usage Has Decreased as Challenges

and Costs Have Increased, GAO 23-106440, January 2023, 98 pp.

For press reports regarding delays in maintaining conventionally powered surface ships, see, for example, Audrey

Decker, “Navy Heading in ‘Wrong Direction’ with On-Time Shipyard Repair,” Inside Defense, September 20, 2022;

Megan Eckstein, “Ship Repair Delays Increased in 2022 Due to Labor, Material Challenges,” Defense News,

September 20, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “Chinese Fleet Expansion Pushing U.S. Navy to Catch Up on Maintenance,” USNI

News, September 20, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Aims for 75 ‘Mission-Capable’ Surface Ships amid Readiness

Drive,” Defense News, January 10, 2023; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Fewer Than 1/3 of Navy’s Amphibious Ships Are Ready

to Deploy,” Defense One, March 11, 2023; Carl Delfeld, “America’s Navy Remains Crippled by Service and Repair

Delays,” National Interest, July 3, 2023; Craig Hooper, “America’s Waterfront Buckles As Big U.S. Navy

Maintenance Plans Go AWOL,” Forbes, September 21, 2023; Paul McLeary, “As the Middle East Heats Up, the Navy

Struggles to Deploy Replacement Ships,” Politico Pro, January 12, 2024; “SECNAV Del Toro Meets with Vigor

Shipyard as Part of Continued Efforts to Improve Navy Ship Repair and Modernization Work,” U.S. Navy, February

(continued…)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 13

• Workforce challenges—including challenges in recruiting and retaining sufficient

numbers of production workers at shipyards and supplier firms, lower

productivity of newly hired workers compared with more experienced workers,

and limited numbers of ship designers (i.e., naval architects and marine

engineers)—appear to be a central factor in the projected delays.17 Several of the

initiatives listed in the Navy’s one-page summary for responding to the projected

delays relate to workforce development.

• Some of the delays shown in the one-page summary, such as those for Virginia-

class submarines, were previously reported. Others were not as widely reported

or the amount of delay that was previously reported was less than the amount

shown on the one-page summary.

• Some of the contributing factors cited in the one-page summary, such as

workforce and supply chain challenges, are generally consistent with previous

press reporting on the causes of delays in Navy shipbuilding programs.

• Other contributing factors, such as limitations on the design workforce, were

previously not as widely reported. Shipbuilding programs reportedly affected by

limitations on the design workforce include the FFG-62 frigate program18 and the

Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter (PSC, i.e., heavy polar icebreaker) program,

which is a program being jointly managed by the Coast Guard and Navy.19

Although the PSC program is not included in the Navy’s one-page summary, the

estimated delivery of the first PSC has been delayed from 2024 to 2029—a delay

of about five years, or about 60 months.

• The approximate 12- to 16-month delay in the Columbia-class ballistic missile

submarine program has occurred in spite of this program being the Navy’s top

program priority since 2013—a status that has given the program first call on

Navy and industry resources for more than a decade. The program has a tight

schedule for designing and building the lead ship, and the Navy and industry for

years have put significant management attention and resources into monitoring

13, 2024; Sean Carberry, “Navy Chasing North Star of 75 Available Surface Ships,” National Defense, March 14,

2024; Megan Eckstein, “Navy, Marines Launching Study to Improve Readiness of Amphibious Fleet,” Defense News,

April 8, 2024; Sam LaGrone, “Lack of Free San Diego Dry Docks Complicates USS Boxer Repair,” USNI News, April

19, 2024; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Looks to Apply Jet Readiness Gains to Surface Ship Fleet,” Defense News, April 22,

2024; Megan Eckstein, “Boxer Deployment Delay Highlights Aging Fleet, Lack of Repair Capacity,” Defense News,

May 2, 2024; Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines, Navy Crafting Long-Term Fixes for Amphibious Warship Shortages,”

USNI News, May 3, 2024.

17 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Workforce Woes Are Top ‘Strategic Challenge’ for Navy, Admiral Says,”

Defense News, January 31, 2023; John Grady, “Attracting Quality Workforce Biggest Issue Facing Shipyards, Experts

Tell Congress,” USNI News, February 8, 2023; Bryant Harris, “Gulf Shipyards Struggle to Find Workers amid

Shipbuilding Spree,” Defense News, April 25, 2023; Megan Eckstein, “Coast Guard Ship Programs Facing Delays

amid National Worker Shortage,” Defense News, January 22, 2024; Paul McLeary and Lee Hudson, “Navy Shipyards

Compete with Fast Food, and Are Losing,” Politico Pro, April 9, 2024; Richard R. Burgess, “SECNAV: Frigate Delay

Due to ‘Atrocious’ Shipyard Worker Retention,” Seapower, May 16, 2024.

18 See CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

19 For more on the PSC program, see CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker)

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS Testimony TE10100, Building the

Fleet: Assessing the Department of Homeland Security’s Role in the United States Coast Guard’s Acquisitions Process,

by Ronald O’Rourke.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 14

and executing this program with a goal of avoiding a schedule delay.20 That this

program faces an approximate delay of 12 to 16 months in spite of these efforts

can be viewed as an indication of the significance of the challenges now facing

Navy shipbuilding.

• The approximate 36-month delay for the lead ship in the FFG-62 frigate program

is more than twice the 15-month delay reflected in the March 2024 budget-

justification book for the Navy’s FY2025 shipbuilding account.

• The Navy’s one-page summary notes that the 45-day review examined the DDG-

51 destroyer program, and states that this program and three other shipbuilding

programs have delivery dates that are late to contract but are stable and tracking

to program manager estimates. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of

DDG-51 delivery dates shown in annual budget-justification books for the

Navy’s shipbuilding account shows, in the FY2025 budget-justification book, an

average 18-month delay for DDG-51s procured between FY2015 and FY2022

compared with delivery dates for those ships shown in the FY2023 budget

justification book.21

An April 9, 2024, press report stated

A new Navy office is assessing how to fix the years of delays plaguing the service’s major

shipbuilding programs, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro said on Tuesday.

Del Toro ordered his Office of Strategic Assessment to perform a “deep dive” on how the

service can implement recommendations from his recently released 45-day shipbuilding

review.

“I’ve also tasked OSA to develop innovative new approaches for how the Navy can better

organize itself to procure ships more effectively,” Del Toro said in remarks at the Navy

League’s annual Sea Air Space symposium.

“I created OSA for just this kind of purpose: to propose data-driven assessments and

recommendations that will help drive smart choices for our department.”22

Oversight Questions

Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

• When will the follow-on study discussed in the above April 9, 2024, press report

be completed?

• What actions can the Navy take to mitigate these projected delivery delays and

avoid similar delays in other shipbuilding programs? What are the potential costs

of these actions, and how long will they take to produce results?

• What lessons can the Navy learn from this situation regarding ways to avoid such

delays in future shipbuilding efforts?

20 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

21 Source: CBO email to CRS, May 15, 2024.

22 Mallory Shelbourne, “SECNAV Del Toro Calls for ‘Deep Dive’ Into Latest Shipbuilding Review,” USNI News,

April 9, 2024. See also Justin Katz, “SECNAV Says 45-Day Shipbuilding Review Will Be Followed by Another

Review,” Breaking Defense, April 9, 2025; Allyson Park, “Del Toro: Navy Has ‘Significant Plans’ to Address

Shipbuilding Delays,” National Defense, April 9, 2024; Mike Schuler, “Navy Secretary Del Toro Calls for

Modernization and Expansion of Domestic Shipbuilding,” gCaptain, April 9, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 15

• What are the potential strategic consequences of these projected delays,

particularly in terms of the Navy’s ability to counter China’s improving naval

capabilities?

Industrial Base Capacity Constraints for Building Navy Ships

Overview

A related issue for Congress—one that has become more prominent as an oversight matter for the

congressional defense committees since about 2022—are industrial base capacity constraints for

building Navy ships. Even if the projected delays in delivering new ships discussed in the

previous section are mitigated or eliminated, capacity constraints could limit the number of new

Navy ships whose construction could be started or completed each year.

Industrial base capacity constraints for building Navy ships are present at both shipyards and

supplier firms, and arise from limits on production facilities (i.e., numbers and ages of production

spaces and equipment) and the workforce challenges discussed in the previous section. The

situation is discussed at length in the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan.23

Submarines

Current Challenge

The most prominent shipbuilding industrial base capacity constraints are those for building

submarines. Virginia-class attack submarines have been procured at a rate of two boats per year

since FY2011, but the submarine construction industrial base since about 2019 has not been able

to complete two Virginia-class boats per year, resulting in a growing backlog of Virginia-class

boats that have been procured but not completed. Since 2022, the completion rate has been about

1.2 to 1.4 Virginia-class boats per year. The Navy aims to increase the completion rate two 2.0

Virginia-class boats per year by 2028.

The Navy’s goal for increasing the Virginia-class production rate to 2.0 Virginia-class boats per

year by 2028 is part of a larger goal for ramping submarine production up to a rate of one

Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and two Virginia-class submarines per year by 2028—

a workload that that is referred to in short as 1+2 by 2028, and which in terms of tonnage is five

times what the industry was contracted to do in FY2010 and prior years.24 The industry is facing

significant challenges in ramping up production to meet this goal.

Industrial Base Funding

As discussed in the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan, the submarine construction

industrial base is receiving billions of dollars in Navy industrial base funding, with the aim of

meeting the 1+2 by 2028 goal so as to meet U.S. Navy needs, and of subsequently increasing the

Virginia-class production rate to 2.33 boats per year, so as to meet both U.S. Navy needs and

additional Virginia-class production associated with the attack submarine portion (aka Pillar 1) of

23 See U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal

Year 2025, pp. 12-14.

24 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class

Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 16

the AUKUS (Australia-UK-U.S.) trilateral security arrangement.25 The industrial base funding

began in FY2018, and is to continue through at least FY2029. The funding includes both funds

requested by the Navy and funds provided by Congress that are in addition to those requested by

the Navy. The funding is being used at both the country’s two submarine construction shipyards

(General Dynamics/Electric Boat Division of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington

Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding of Newport News, VA) and supplier firms. It is

being used for both improvements to production facilities (aka capital expenditures, or CAPEX)

and workforce development.

Using Navy-provided industrial base funding for these efforts can reduce the cost of capital for

the submarine shipyards and submarine supplier firms by avoiding a potential need for the

shipyards and supplier firms to finance these efforts by borrowing money from banks or capital

markets and eventually paying the money back to lenders with interest. In addition, the Navy-

provided industrial base funding is largely not being incorporated into the stated procurement

costs of submarines whose construction is facilitated by these efforts. If shipyards and supplier

firms were to instead finance these Navy-funded facility improvements and workforce

development efforts with funds borrowed from banks or capital markets, the shipyards and

supplier firms would seek recover those borrowed funds and their associated interest costs by

incorporating them into the prices they charge the Navy for their work, which would increase the

stated procurement costs of the submarines, potentially by hundreds of millions of dollars per

boat.

Strategic Outsourcing

In addition to the above-discussed Navy-funded efforts at shipyards and supplier firms, the two

submarine construction shipyards are also responding to constraints on their capacity by making

greater use of what they and the Navy refer to as strategic outsourcing, meaning that the

shipyards are now offloading some of their submarine-construction work to industrial facilities in

other locations.26 As of mid-2024, there were about 20 strategic outsources for submarine

production, including three that are referred to as focus factories because of the details of their

production relationships with the two submarine construction shipyards.27

Surface Ships

Shipbuilding capacity constraints are also affecting the construction rates for surface ships such

as DDG-51 class destroyers.28 Similar to the submarine construction industrial base, the Navy is

25 See U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal

Year 2025, pp. 5-6. For more on AUKUS Pillar 1, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program

and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

26 The difference between a strategic outsource and a traditional supplier firm is that a supplier firm makes individual

components (such as pumps and valves) that are delivered to the shipyard for installation into the structure of the

submarine, while a strategic outsource makes parts of the submarine’s structure, and might also install components onto

that piece of structure, before the structural unit is then transported to the shipyard for incorporation into the submarine.

27 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class

Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

28 See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “CNO Gilday: Industrial Capacity Largest Barrier to Growing the Fleet,”

USNI News, August 25, 2022; Rich Abott, “CNO: Industry Cannot Build Three Destroyers Per Year Yet,” Defense

Daily, September 14, 2022; Justin Katz, “Citing Industry Capacity, Navy’s Gilday Throws Cold Water on Three

Destroyers Per Year,” Breaking Defense, September 14, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “OSD Comptroller Says U.S.

Shipyards Can’t Build 3 Destroyers a Year,” USNI News, March 21 (updated March 22), 2023; Edward D. Murphy,

(continued…)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 17

providing industrial base funding to the surface combatant construction industrial base, though in

smaller amounts. Similar to the submarine construction industrial base, the funding is being used

at both shipyards and supplier firms, and for both facility improvements and workforce

development efforts.

New Navy Maritime Industrial Base Office

A July 26, 2024, press report stated

The Navy is standing up a new maritime industrial base program office and has tapped one

of its career civil servants to take the helm.

Jay Stefany, who previously performed the duties of the assistant secretary of the Navy for

research, development and acquisition (RDA), will lead the office as a direct reporting

program manager, according to a Friday Navy news release.

“Building on the progress and achievements of the Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) and

Surface Combatant Industrial Base (SCIB) programs, DPRM-MIB creates a cohesive

organization focused on the health of the maritime industrial base centered on construction

and sustainment,” the Navy said in the release.

Stefany will lead the new office as of Aug. 1 and relocate to the Washington Navy Yard,

according to a June 3 memo, obtained by USNI News, that details the new office’s

establishment. Both surface and submarine shipbuilding and sustainment will fall under

the office’s purview.

“While this is not a formal Acquisition Category program, the size and scope of the

program require it to be treated like a major acquisition category (ACAT 1) program,”

reads the memo. “To that end, the program manager will be a fully acquisition certified

executive dedicated full-time to this mission. The Program Manager will establish an

acquisition strategy and a set of output performance metrics to guide this ACAT equivalent

major program.”

In the new role, Stefany will report to Nickolas Guertin, the Navy’s chief acquisition

executive, who signed the June 3 memo. Stefany is currently the principal civilian deputy

to Guertin.

“The DRPM for MIB will play an instrumental role in realizing Secretary Del Toro’s vision

to engage in a whole-of-government effort to rebuild the Nation’s comprehensive maritime

power and position the Navy and industry to build the expanded surface and submarine

fleet that is required to achieve our National Defense Strategy,” reads the Navy release.

Guertin wants an execution plan from Stefany, the program executive office for ships, the

program executive office for strategic submarines, the commander of Naval Sea Systems

Command and Naval Reactors within a month of the office’s creation, according to the

memo.29

“Bath Iron Works, Mississippi Shipyard Can’t Produce Destroyers Fast Enough, Navy Says,” Portland [ME] Press

Herald, April 3 (updated April 4), 2023; Elizabeth Lawrence, “US Shipyards Can’t Build Destroyers Fast Enough;

Can’t Even Build 2 a Year, Official Says,” American Military News, May 2, 2023; Justin Katz, “HII, Bath to Build 9

Destroyers Total in New Multiyear Deals, Navy Mum On Price,” Breaking Defense, August 1, 2023.

29 Mallory Shelbourne, “Jay Stefany to Lead Navy’s New Maritime Industrial Base Program Office,” USNI News, July

26 (updated July 29), 2024. See also Rich Abott, “Stefany To Head New Navy Industrial Base Program Office,”

Defense Daily, July 29, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 18

Options for Addressing Shipbuilding Capacity Constraints

In addition to using strategic outsourcing for building submarines and providing industrial base

funding for shipyards and supplier firms, other options for addressing industrial base capacity

constraints for building Navy ships (i.e., for increasing available shipbuilding capacity) include

but are not limited to those discussed briefly below, which are not mutually exclusive and not

listed in any particular order.30

Worker Nationwide Advertising

As one workforce development effort funded in part with Navy-provided submarine industrial

base funding, the submarine construction industry has raised awareness across the country of

openings for submarine construction jobs through nationwide advertising efforts such as the Build

Submarines advertising campaign and its associated website, buildsubmarines.com.31 Similar

efforts could be used to more widely advertise job openings for building surface ships. This

option could raise awareness of shipbuilding jobs in regional U.S. labor markets that are distant

from the shipyards that build Navy ships.

Worker Pipeline

Worker pipeline efforts involve shipyards and supplier firms working with state and local

governments, state and local school systems, labor unions, and other organizations to not only

increase awareness within the regional labor markets surrounding shipbuilding firms of

shipbuilding as a potential line of work or career option, but also to encourage instruction of

students in basic trade skills that could help prepare them for potential future work in

shipbuilding. Such efforts have been underway for years and have been expanded in part with

Navy-provided industrial base funding. This effort could be expanded further, to other parts of the

country not currently involved in Navy shipbuilding.32

30 For a policy paper discussing options that are in addition to those discussed below, see Wilson Beaver and Jim Fein,

Reforms Needed to Reduce Delays and Costs in U.S. Shipbuilding, Heritage Foundation, May 28, 2024, 6 pp.

31 For press reports discussing this effort, see, for example, Justin Katz, “Navy Investment in BlueForge Alliance Up to

$500 million, and Growing,” Breaking Defense, June 7, 2024; Lauren C. Williams, “Inside the Navy’s Slick Effort to

Find Workers to Build Submarines,” Defense One, June 5, 2024.

32 For a White House statement and examples of press reports about such efforts, see White House, “Biden-⁠Harris

Administration Announces the Michigan Maritime Manufacturing (M3) Initiative,” statement dated July 22, 2024; John

Hill, “US Navy Secretary Expands Michigan Maritime Manufacturing Skills,” Naval Technology, July 24, 2024;

Candice Williams, “Michigan, Feds in $50 Million Partnership to Train Workers for Defense Production,” Detroit

News, July 22, 2024; Nick Williams, “SECNAV Announces $50 Million Michigan Workforce Development

Initiative,” Inside Defense, July 22, 2024; U.S. Navy, “SECNAV Del Toro Announces Michigan Maritime

Manufacturing Initiative,” press release dated July 22, 2024; Executive Office of the Governor, “Gov. Whitmer

Announces New $50M Federal Michigan Maritime Manufacturing (M3) Initiative,” press release dated July 22, 2024;

Megan Eckstein, “Newport News Yard Seeks Experienced Workforce for Nuclear Shipbuilding,” Defense News, May

28, 2024; The Maritime Executive, “Union Deal Will Send Construction-Industry Welders to U.S. Navy Shipyards,”

Maritime Executive, May 1, 2024; U.S. Navy, “Innovative Union Agreement Brings Midwest Construction Workforce

to Bear on SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] Shipbuilding Priorities,” press release dated April 30, 2024.

See also U.S. Department of Labor, “Acting Secretary Su, Navy Secretary Del Toro Tout Workforce Development,

National Security in Visit to Newport News’ Apprentice School in Virginia,” news release dated August 28, 2024;

Mike Gooding, “Navy Looking to Close the Gap on Shipyard Labor Shortages,” 13NewsNow, August 28, 2024; Nick

McNamara, “Regional Apprenticeship Hub Announced During U.S. Labor Secretary Visit to Newport News,” WHRO,

August 28, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 19

Worker Immigration

A February 27, 2024, press report stated

Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro suggested changes in immigration laws and policies for

visas could open a new avenue to build up the workforce in the nation’s public and private

shipyards.

“We need to do a lot more to get the kind of workers we need in our shipyards,” he told

attendees at a National Defense Industrial Association Expeditionary Warfare conference

last week.

Del Toro, using his own family as an example of coming to the United States in 1962 from

Cuba, said that the open-door policy for refugees led him to join the Navy out of a sense

of gratitude. He graduated from the Naval Academy and served 22 years before retiring.

He added other first-generation and second-generation immigrants to America feel the

same way and could be attracted to careers in public service in uniform or in the defense

industrial base.

The U.S. needs more blue-collar workers, Del Toro said. New arrivals with these skill sets

could fill the gap, he said, mentioning changes in immigration policy concerning

Venezuelans.33

An April 23, 2024, press report similarly stated

The secretary of the Navy said the shortage of workers in the U.S. shipbuilding industry

could be partially alleviated by allowing more legal immigrants into the country to work

in the shipyards.

Speaking April 23 at the Stimson Institute, a Washington think tank, SECNAV [Secretary

of the Navy] Carlos Del Toro acknowledged that supply chain issues caused by the

COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected the ability on shipyards to meet delivery

schedules of Navy ships, said he thought “the bigger problem than that … is actually the

lack of blue-collar workers that we have in this country.

“Regretfully, we’re a pretty divided country politically, you might say, but it really is time

for Congress to get together and pass comprehensive reform and increase the amount of

legal immigration that we actually allow into this country [and] increase the amount of

work visa programs that are authorized for blue-collar workers to come from other nations

and actually do the work here as has actually existed since the founding of our government,

very much so,” Del Toro said.

The SECNAV noted the current unemployment rate in many U.S. states is low, “but what

we’ve got to do is open up the spigot a bit, basically, on legal immigration to allow blue-

collar workers to come here and also to devote an enormous amount of resources into re-

training individuals so they can actually work in our shipyards and be employed by the

types of trades that are open to shipyard workers, for example.”34

One issue that might arise in connection with this option would concern the citizenship of such

workers, as contracts for U.S. Navy ships might require that workers building the ships be U.S.

citizens.

33 John Grady, “SECNAV Del Toro Says Changes to Immigration Law, Policy Could Help with Shipyard Workforce

Shortage,” USNI News, February 27, 2024.

34 Richard R. Burgess, “SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] Advocates Increased Legal Immigration to Increase

Shipbuilder Workforce,” Seapower, April 23, 2024. See also Valerie Insinna, “From Kabul to Keel Laying: Afghan

Immigrants Find New Careers at US shipyards,” Breaking Defense, August 29, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 20

Worker Wages and Benefits

Shipyards and associated supplier firms face challenges in recruiting and retaining new workers

in part because wages and benefits in service and retail jobs have grown more in recent years than

have wages and benefits at shipbuilders and supplier firms. As a result, the differential in wages

and benefits between shipbuilding jobs and service and retail jobs has narrowed, and workers

consequently might now more likely to choose service and retail jobs, where the work, while still

paying less than shipbuilding work, is more likely to be done in air-conditioned and cleaner

indoor settings, involve less heavy lifting or risk of serious injury, take place in locations offering

easier daily commutes, and in other respects offer better quality-of-work and/or quality-of-life

features.35 Reestablishing a larger differential in wages and benefits between shipbuilding jobs

and service and retail jobs could require substantially increasing total wages and benefits for

shipbuilding workers. Such a change could, in turn, substantially increase ship procurement costs,

since shipyard labor can account for roughly 40% of a military ship’s total procurement cost.

Worker Quality of Work and Quality of Life

Related to the discussion in the previous section, efforts to improve retention of shipbuilding

workers can also involve various initiatives to improve their quality of work or quality of life,

such as providing affordable housing within certain commuting times of shipyards, ensuring

sufficient parking at shipyards for workers arriving by car, building recreational or other support

facilities for shipyard workers and their families at or close to shipyards,36 providing child care

for workers, or paying retention bonuses to workers.

Robotics and Automation

Increasing where possible the use of robotics and automation for accomplishing manufacturing

work at both shipyards and supplier firms could increase production capacity beyond what might

otherwise be possible with a production workforce of a given size.37 Shipyards and supplier firms

are already making use of robotics and automation; under this option, use of robotics and

automation would be increased to take advantage of new advances in robotics and automation, or

35 See, for example, Paul McLeary and Lee Hudson, “Navy Shipyards Compete with Fast Food, and Are Losing,”

Politico Pro, April 9, 2024.

36 For press reports discussing such projects, see, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “Newport News Shipbuilding

Constructing 2 New Quality of Life Facilities for Navy Submariners,” USNI News, August 6 (updated August 7), 2024;

Mallory Shelbourne, “HII Awarded $78M for Quality of Life Improvements at Newport News,” USNI News, July 15

(updated July 16), 2024.

37 For more on the use of robotics and automation in shipyards, see, for example, the following articles, some of which

discuss the use of robotics for ship maintenance rather than ship construction: Robotics in Shipbuilding Market Size,

Share & COVID-19 Impact Analysis (truncated title), Fortune Business Insights, updated July 1, 2024; Peter Suciu,

“MR4Weld Ready to Build Warships: Can Robots Rebuild the U.S. Navy?” ClearanceJobs, January 9, 2024; Tom

Kington, “Fincantieri Taps Welding Robots to Build US Navy Frigates Faster,” Defense News, January 8, 2024;

“Ingalls Shipbuilding Sees Better Efficiency and Quality with Automated Bulkhead Production,” Pemamek, Ltd., April

24, 2023; Justin Katz, “A Ship-Scaling Robot Is Getting New Work with the US Navy’s Fleet,” Breaking Defense,

March 27, 2023; Kristi R. Britt, “Norfolk Naval Shipyard Demonstrates Robotic Technology to Bring Innovative Tools

to the Workforce,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), January 5, 2023; Robot Report Staff,

“Sarcos Demonstrates Robots for Shipyard Operations to the US Navy,” Robot Report, November 3, 2022; Shephard

News Team, “Robots Put to Test for Naval Maintenance, Inspection And Repair,” Shephard News, October 27, 2022;

Latasha Ball, “Navy Debuts Future State Technology to Automate Maintenance on Ships,” Defense Visual Information

Distribution Service (DVIDS), May 12, 2021; Josh Farley, “Shipyard Partners with Robotics Firm to Put Exoskeletons

to Work,” Kitsap Sun, March 17, 2019; Laxman Pai, “Robots to Optimize Shipyard Operations,” Marine Link, March

12, 2019; Xavier Vavasseur, “U.S. Navy Partners With Sarcos Robotics For Exoskeletons & Inspection Robots,” Naval

News, march 12, 2019’ Chris Lo, “The Digital Shipyard: Robotics in Shipbuilding,” Ship Technology, August 26, 2013.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 21

to perform work that in theory could be done more cost effectively by people, but that cannot be

done by people due to insufficient numbers of production workers.

Federated Shipbuilding/Nation as a Shipyard

Another option—one that might be called federated shipbuilding or nation as a shipyard38—

would involve expanding the use of strategic outsourcing, which is currently used for building

submarines, to the construction to surface ships as well, so as to apply strategic outsourcing to

Navy shipbuilding programs in a more systematic and comprehensive manner. This option could

also involve designing Navy ships and their production strategies with this approach in mind.

Under this approach, ship modules would be built at facilities that are some distance from the

final assembly shipyard, and the modules would then be transported by truck, train, or barge to

that shipyard for incorporation into the ship. The aim of this option would be to gain access to

production facilities and (perhaps more important) regional labor markets in parts of the country

that currently are not significantly involved in Navy shipbuilding.39 The manufacturing facilities

that are some distance from the final assembly shipyard can be owned and operated by an owner

of a final assembly shipyard40 or by an owner other than the owner of a final assembly shipyard.

Navy ships that have been built with modules produced at locations distant from the final

assembly yard include certain submarines built by General Dynamics/Electric Boat (GD/EB)

since 1975,41 every Virginia-class submarine procured since the start of Virginia-class

procurement in FY199842 and several LPD-17 Flight I class amphibious ships that were built

using this approach as a way of responding to damage to shipyards building San Antonio (LPD-

17) Flight I class amphibious ships that was caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Figure 4).43

38 Federated shipbuilding and nation as a shipyard are terms used in this CRS report. RAND has referred to the

approach as shared modular build—see Laurence Smallman, Hanlin Tang, John F. Schank, and Stephanie Pezard,

Shared Modular Build of Warships, How a Shared Build Can Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND, TR-852-NAVY,

2011, 81 pp.

39 See, for example, Collin Fox, “Distributed Manufacturing for Distributed Lethality,” Center for International

Maritime Security (CIMSEC), February 26, 2021; Jeffrey L. Seavy, “The United States Must Improve Its Shipbuilding

Capacity,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2024.

40 The Quonset Point, RI, facility of submarine builder General Dynamics/Electric Boat (GD/EB), which GD/EB

established in 1973 to provide off-site support to GD/EB’s shipyard in Groton, CT, can be considered an example of a

distant facility owned and operated by the owner of a final assembly shipyard. For more on the Quonset Point facility,

see General Dynamics Electric Boat, “Electric Boat, Quonset Point Facility,” accessed July 17, 2024, at

https://www.gdeb.com/about/locations/quonset/, and General Dynamics Electric Boat, “Quonset Point History,”

accessed July 17, 2024, at https://www.gdeb.com/qp/about/history/.

41 GD/EB states that the first hull cylinder section for an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine was shipped from

GD/EB’s Quonset Point, RI, facility to GD/EB’s shipyard in Groton, CT, in June 1975. See General Dynamics Electric

Boat, “Quonset Point History,” accessed July 17, 2024, at https://www.gdeb.com/qp/about/history/.

42 Virginia-class boats are built jointly by General Dynamics/Electric Boat (GD/EB)—the program’s prime

contractor—and Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS). Under the arrangement, GD/EB

builds certain parts of each boat, HII/NNS builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards have taken turns

building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats. Parts built by the yard not doing the

final assembly work are barged to the yard doing the final assembly work. For additional discussion, see CRS Report

RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

43 See Laurence Smallman, Hanlin Tang, John F. Schank, and Stephanie Pezard, Shared Modular Build of Warships,

How a Shared Build Can Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND, TR-852-NAVY, 2011, pp. 43-48 (Appendix C). See

also other mentions of the shared modular production for the LPD-17 Flight I program earlier in the report.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 22

Figure 4. Shared Modular Build of LPD-17 Flight I Class Ships

Following damage to shipyards caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Source: Laurence Smallman, Hanlin Tang, John F. Schank, and Stephanie Pezard, Shared Modular Build of

Warships, How a Shared Build Can Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND, TR-852-NAVY, 2011, p. 43 (Table C.1).

Implementing federated shipbuilding/nation as a shipyard could require altering ship designs to

facilitate the production of ship modules in locations other than final assembly yards, and could

make shipbuilding programs more complex to manage.

Additional Shipyard Facilities

Another option would be to construct new shipyard facilities for building Navy ships at

waterfront sites other those currently used for building Navy ships. One version of this option

would be to establish such facilities at sites that were once used to build Navy ships, such as—to

name only three notional possibilities as examples, one each from the West Coast, Gulf Coast,

and East Coast—the former Todd Seattle shipyard (now operated by Vigor Industrial), which

once built surface combatants, including Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates; the East

Bank site of Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) in Pascagoula, MS,

which was once used to build nuclear-powered submarines;44 and the site of the former

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (a portion of which is currently operated by Philly Shipyard). As

stated, these are only three notional possibilities, one each from the West Coast, Gulf Coast, and

East Coast. Other waterfront locations around the country offer additional possible sites for

building new shipyard facilities.45 Constructing a shipyard facility capable of building large ships

for the Navy could require hundreds of millions or billions of dollars of investment and years to

build.

Smaller Ships

Another option would be to change the Navy’s planned mix of ships (i.e., the Navy’s planned

fleet architecture) to include a larger number of smaller ships (such as missile-armed corvettes)

44 For a press report discussing the East Bank site, see Justin Katz, “At Ingalls, Plenty of Space for Shipbuilding but

Ramping Up Workforce Will Be the Challenge,” Breaking Defense, August 23, 2024.

45 For a press report about a new facility at the Austal USA shipyard of Mobile, Alabama, see Sam LaGrone, “Austal

USA Awarded $450M to Build a Submarine Construction Facility in Mobile,” USNI News, September 16, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 23

that can be built by smaller shipyards that are not able to build larger Navy ships. This could

increase the number of shipyards that participate in Navy shipbuilding.46 Changing the Navy’s

planned mix of ships to include a larger number of smaller ships would produce a fleet mix that

might be less optimal for performing missions than the Navy’s currently preferred mix.

Foreign Shipyards

Another option would be to build Navy ships or parts of such ships in foreign shipyards, such as

shipyards in Japan, South Korea, or allied countries in Europe. An April 23, 2024, press report

stated

Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro today said he’d be open to having foreign shipyards

assemble certain US Navy warship modules overseas to increase domestic production

rates.

“We do this in the aircraft industry … where in India for example, we’re building aircraft

engines now and … re-instituting them here in the United States,” he said during an event

at the Stimson Center. “So, there are opportunities that I think we can pursue and we need

to keep open minded about those opportunities.”….

Del Toro did not elaborate today on whether co-production was a subject of discussion

when he visited Asia, but the idea would almost certainly be met with resistance from

American industry.

“There is more than enough capacity to accomplish all the fleet’s maintenance needs, and

yet the Navy is looking abroad for ship maintenance, as well as the capability to build

combatant and logistics ships, plus vessels for the Coast Guard and the Army,” Matthew

Paxton, president of the Shipbuilders Council of America, wrote in a Defense News op-ed.

“These efforts are driving layoffs to the very domestic workforce Navy leadership says it

wants to preserve.”

“This shortsighted approach creates market uncertainty and instability, complicating

additional investments in the industrial base, and undermines the substantial capital

investments the U.S. shipbuilding industry has made in its workforce and facilities,” he

continued.47

One issue that would arise in connection with this option are U.S. laws that prohibit U.S. Navy

ships or major components of Navy ships from being built in foreign shipyards. These laws

46 See, for example, Collin Fox, “Distributed Manufacturing for Distributed Lethality,” Center for International

Maritime Security (CIMSEC), February 26, 2021; Frederick “Andy” Cichon, “Rebooting the High-Low Mix of Ships,”

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2024. See also Megan Eckstein, “Small Shipyards Consolidate amid Navy

Program Delays,” Defense News, November 8, 2022; Bryan Clark, Timothy A. Walton, and Seth Cropsey, American

Sea Power at a Crossroads: A Plan to Restore the US Navy’s Maritime Advantage, October 2020, p. 50.

47 Justin Katz, “SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] Floats Idea of Co-Production with Foreign Shipyards,” Breaking

Defense, April 23, 2024. See also Seth Cropsey, “Rebuilding the U.S. Navy Won’t Be Easy, But It Can Be Done with

the Help of Shipbuilding Allies and More Money to Train Defense-Industry Workers,” Wall Street Journal, July 30,

2024; Choi Kang and Peter K. Lee, “Why U.S. Naval Power Needs Asian Allies,” War on the Rocks, January 12, 2024;

Douglas Robb, “Japan, South Korea and the US Should Mirror AUKUS for Destroyers,” Defense News, October 5,

2023. The op-ed by Matthew Paxton that is mentioned in the quoted passage is Matthew Paxton, “Outsourcing Navy

Shipbuilding Weakens the United States,” Defense News, March 21, 2024. See also Matthew Paxton, “Outsourcing the

US Shipyard Industrial Base Will Outsource American Sovereignty,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2024.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 24

include, among others, 10 U.S.C. 8679, which includes a presidential waiver for national security

interest,48 and a recurring provision in the annual DOD Appropriations Act.49

Another issue that would arise in connection with this option would concern the ability to

safeguard sensitive U.S. naval technology and ship-design know-how in foreign shipyards and

supplier firms whose employees would not be U.S. citizens. This issue currently arises in

connection with repairing and maintaining certain U.S. Navy ships in shipyards in locations such

as Japan; one question would be how this issue might differ for a situation of building (rather than

repairing and maintaining) U.S. Navy ships.

Challenges and Limitations of These Options

In addition to challenges and limitations noted for certain individual options discussed above,

many of the above options could be very expensive, could take years to produce results, or both.

Options for Using Available Shipbuilding Capacity

In addition to the above options for addressing shipbuilding capacity constraints (i.e., for

increasing available shipbuilding capacity), additional options for using available ship-design and

shipbuilding capacity include but are not limited to those discussed briefly below, which are not

mutually exclusive and not listed in any particular order.

World-Standard Shipbuilding Practices and Methods

One option for maximizing the use of available shipbuilding capacity is to incorporate world-

standard shipbuilding practices and methods—including those used by leading shipbuilders in

Japan and South Korea—into the operations of U.S. shipyards that build Navy ships. Some of

these practices and methods relate to monitoring and managing the flow of work through the

shipyard on a continuous and real-time basis; others relate to the design and fabrication of ship

sections and components.

48 The text of U.S.C. as of September 16, 2024 is as follows:

§8679. Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards: prohibition

(a) Prohibition.-Except as provided in subsection (b), no vessel to be constructed for any of the

armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may be

constructed in a foreign shipyard.

(b) Presidential Waiver for National Security Interest.-(1) The President may authorize exceptions

to the prohibition in subsection (a) when the President determines that it is in the national security

interest of the United States to do so.

(2) The President shall transmit notice to Congress of any such determination, and no contract may

be made pursuant to the exception authorized until the end of the 30-day period beginning on the

date on which the notice of the determination is received by Congress.

Secretary of the Navy, is not a vessel for the purpose of the restriction in subsection (a).

49 The provision, which is included each year in the paragraph of the annual DOD Appropriations Act that makes

appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (i.e., the Shipbuilding and Conversion, or SCN, account) states

… Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction or

conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended

in foreign facilities for the construction of major components of such vessel: Provided further, That

none of the funds provided under this heading shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel

in foreign shipyards:…

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 25

DOD and Navy interest in this option dates back to at least 2005.50 GAO has focused on this

option in multiple reports since at least 2009.51 Other observers have also focused on this

option.52 Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has encouraged Japanese and South Korean

shipbuilders to consider investing in U.S. shipyards and transferring their shipbuilding practices

and methods to U.S. shipyards.53 Some builders of Navy ships have pursued the option. For

example, General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (GD/NASSCO) of San

Diego, a builder of both Navy auxiliary ships and commercial cargo ships, has done so since at

least 1990.54

In adopting commercial world-standard shipbuilding practices and methods into naval

shipbuilding, differences between commercial and naval ships need to be taken into account.

Examples of such differences include ship production quantities; interior density and complexity;

commercial vs. military construction standards; specialty steels and welding techniques

(particularly for submarines); propulsion systems (including nuclear propulsion); ship design and

construction for reduced detectability and high survivability; the installation, integration, and

testing of complex combat systems; and intended service lives.55

50 See Department of Defense, Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study, Part I: Major Shipyards,

May 2005, 70 pp. Related to this report, see also Testimony of Damien Bloor, Principal Consultant, First Marine

International Limited, before the Seapower Subcom[m]ittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Status and

Trends in Shipbuilding, and the Industrial Base, April 6, 2006, 2 pp. As a 2016 update to this report, see First Marine

International, 2014 US Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry Benchmarking, Part 1: Shipbuilding, [sponsored by]

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development & Acquisition, March 18, 2016, 101 pp.

51 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Increased Use of Leading Design

Practices Could Improve Timeliness of Deliveries, GAO-24-105503, May 2024, 64 pp.; Government Accountability

Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP,

June 2018, 36 pp.; Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices

Affecting Quality, GAO-14-122, November 2013, 99 pp.; Government Accountability Office, Best Practices[:] High

Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322, May

2009, 70 pp.

52 See, for example, McKinsey & Company, “Charting a New Course: The Untapped Potential of American

Shipyards,” June 5, 2024.

53 See, for example, Rich Abott, “SECNAV Looks To Allied Yard Practices To Fix Shipbuilding Delays,” Defense

Daily, April 10, 2024; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Secretary Points to Foreign Shipyards’ Practices to Fix Delays,”

Defense News, April 9, 2024; Sam LaGrone, “SECNAV Del Toro Tells U.S. Shipyards ‘Invest More’, Encourages

Foreign Investment,” USNI News, March 7, 2024; Ken Moriyasu, “U.S. Seeks to Revive Idled Shipyards with Help of

Japan, South Korea,” Nikkei Asia, March 4, 2024; Justin Katz, “In South Korea, Del Toro Courts Major Shipbuilders to

Set up Shop in US,” Breaking Defense, February 29, 2024; U.S. Navy, “Secretary of the Navy Del Toro Meets with

Leaders of HD Hyundai and Hanwha in the Republic of Korea, Tours Shipyards,” press release dated February 28,

2024.

54 See, for example, Kate Callen, “The Resurrection of NASSCO: San Diego Shipyard Skirts Reefs, Sails On,” United

Press International, September 11, 1990, which states that “NASSCO, rejuvenated by new construction methods it was

forced to borrow from the Japanese, prepared for more business…. The last half of the 1980s seemed like a death

march for San Diego’s pre-eminent shipbuilder [NASSCO]. Like other domestic yards, it lost business to foreign

shipyards after the Reagan administration shut off a federal subsidy program for commercial shipbuilding…. The end

of federal subsidies forced the shipyard to cut costs and step up production. With the help of a Japanese consulting

team, NASSCO began replacing outdated construction methods with newer internationally-accepted techniques.” See

also National Shipbuilding Research Program, Investigate Methods of Improving Production Throughput in a Shipyard,

U.S. Department of the Navy, Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, in cooperation with National Steel

and Shipbuilding Company, San Diego, California, NSRP 0450, September 1995 (report submitted by National Steel

and Shipbuilding Company, San Diego, CA), 112 pp.; Center for Naval Shipbuilding Technology (CNST), Nested

Material Manufacturing Technology Improvement, project final report March 18, 2008 (report submitted by General

Dynamics—NASSCO), 23 pp.

55 For further discussion, see John Birkler, et al., Differences Between Military and Commercial Shipbuilding,

Implications for the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, RAND, MG-236, 2005, 111 pp. See also Justin Katz,

(continued…)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 26

Navy as a Kit of Parts

Under an option that might be called Navy as a kit of parts,56 the design of the Navy would be

modified over time toward one in which, more fully than is now the case, standardized

components would go into standardized weapon systems that would be incorporated into a

collection of ready hull designs, with the aim of making the Navy easier to design and build (and

also easier to crew and maintain). Such an approach has been proposed and considered since the

1970s,57 and the Navy since the 1970s has taken some steps in this direction, particularly in terms

of pursuing commonality in its ship propulsion and ship combat system equipment. This option

would expand the effort into one that is more systematic and comprehensive, so as to optimize the

Navy more fully for ship design and ship construction (and also ship crewing and ship

maintenance) at the fleet-wide level rather than optimizing the design of individual ship classes at

the potential cost of reducing or missing opportunities for optimizing at the fleet-wide level. This

option could involve de-optimizing individual ship designs (when those designs are viewed

individually) in exchange for better optimizing the Navy at the fleet-wide level.

Ship Designs Requiring Fewer Labor Hours to Build

Another option—one used by South Korean warship designers—would be to design ship sections

with an eye toward reducing the labor hours needed to produce them. This option—which can be

viewed as an example of the world-standard shipbuilding practices and methods discussed

above—can involve enlarging ship sections somewhat so as to improve worker access to spaces

in the ship sections and allow the sections to be filled with things like straighter pipe runs that

take up more space but require less labor to produce and install, rather than space-saving but

more convoluted pipe runs that require more labor to produce and install. In such cases, the aim is

for the reduction in labor costs to be greater than the increase in material costs that would result

from making the ship section larger. Some observers argue, based on South Korea’s experience,

that this can result in ship designs that are somewhat larger—but nevertheless easier and less

expensive to build, maintain, and modernize over their life cycles.58

Continuous, Steady Production Rates

Another option would be to construct Navy shipbuilding plans that

“How SECNAV’s Claims about S. Korean, Japanese Shipbuilders Do and Do Not Line Up,” Breaking Defense, July

15, 2024.

56 The term Navy as a kit of parts is a term used in this CRS report. Other terms that have been used over the years refer

to ship designs that are modular, flexible, or adaptable. See, for example, the citations in the next footnote.

57 See, for example, Jack W. Abbott, “Modular Payload Ships: 1975 – 2005,” presentation to Naval Postgraduate

School, April 27, 2006, 38 slides; Matthew Smidt and Michael Junge, “A Modular Warship for 2025, A Common Hull

Design Adaptable to Multiple Missions Would Make Tomorrow’s Navy Flexible, Versatile, and Affordable,” U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2014; Shawna Garver and Jack Abbott, “Embracing Change, Reducing Cost and

Maximizing Mission Effectiveness with the Flexible Warship,” Marine Technology, July 2014: 22-28; N. [Norbert] H.

Doerry, “Institutionalizing Modular Adaptable Ship Technologies,” Journal of Ship Production and Design, August

2014, 18 pp.; Jack W. Abbott, “Flexible Warships – An Update,” presentation to ASNE Tysons Corner Chapter,

September 30, 2014, 33 slides; John F. Schank et al., Designing Adaptable Ships, Modularity and Flexibility in Future

Ship Designs, RAND, report RR-696, 2016, 139 pp.; Norbert Doerry and Philip Koenig, “Modularity and Adaptability

in Future U.S. Navy Ship Designs,” conference paper, November 2017, 9 pp.; Tony Jang, Lois Pena, and Nicholas

Abbott, “Realizing Flexible Ships: Lessons from Allies to Improve the U.S. Shipbuilding, Affordability, Capacity, and

Schedule,” Naval Engineers Journal, December 2019: 59-71.

58 See Peter E. Jaquith, “Asian vs. U.S. Warship Design, Production Engineering, and Construction Practice,” Naval

Engineers Journal, December 2019: 55-58.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 27

• emphasize continuous steady, production rates;

• avoid year-to-year changes in production profiles that are made in an attempt to

more precisely match targeted downstream force levels;

• manage the size of the Navy through end-of-life retirement decisions rather up-

front changes in procurement profiles; and

• characterize the Navy more in terms of production rates than a precise targeted

downstream force-level.

Compared with current practice, this option would place more emphasis on avoiding the potential

costs and inefficiencies of irregular or changing procurement profiles, and recognize the

likelihood that targeted downstream force levels could change, perhaps multiple times, between

now and the year that the targeted downstream force levels are to be achieved. (For examples of

past changes in U.S. Navy force-level goals, which tend to occur once every few years, see

Appendix A.)

This option would be similar to the approach that Japan uses for building its submarines and

managing the size of its submarine fleet: to provide stability for its submarine construction

industrial base and maximize efficiency in the production of its submarines, Japan aims to

maintain a steady submarine production rate of one boat per year. When Japan planned to

maintain a force of 18 submarines, it did so with the one-per-year build rate by keeping its

submarines in service to about age 18. When Japan increased its submarine force-level goal to 22

boats, it maintained the one-per-year build rate and started keeping its submarines in service to

about age 22. If Japan were to decide to further increase its submarine fleet to 30 boats, it could

again maintain the one-per-year build rate and start keeping its boats in service to age 30. Under

this approach, the one-per-year build rate is held constant even while the planned force size

changes, because the size of the force is managed through end-of-life retirement decisions.59

Pursuing this option for the U.S. Navy could lead to a change in how the future Navy is described

and discussed. Instead of describing and discussing the future Navy as a fleet that is to consist of

a certain precise number of ships (e.g., 381 ships), the future Navy might instead be described and

discussed as a fleet of a certain general size range that will be produced by building a certain

number of attack submarines each year, a certain number of destroyers per year, and so on, with

the precise number of ships in the future fleet to be determined in the future, through end-of-life

retirement decisions.

Up-Front Fleet Design, and a Related Vetting Question

Another option would be for the Navy to engage more substantially in up-front, broad-scale, end-

to-end design for the future fleet, with an eye toward designing a fleet that collectively would be

inherently easier (particularly in terms of the number of people needed) to design, build, crew,

and maintain.60 Under this option, instead of designing the Navy incrementally, one ship class at a

59 See, for example, Jeong Soo “Gary” Kim, “Japan’s Submarine Industrial Base and Infrastructure – Unique and

Stable,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), July 15, 2024; Bradley Perrett, “How Japan Could

Quickly Build Up Its Submarine Force,” Strategist, April 18, 2023; Craig Hooper, “If Japan Expands Submarine Fleet

To 30, It Will Shape The Pacific’s Undersea Defenses,” Forbes, July 19 (updated July 20), 2020.

60 As used here, broad-scale means an effort that includes many or all of the Navy’s ship categories, and end-to-end

means an effort that includes all stages of a ship’s life cycle, from design and construction through operation,

maintenance, and potential modification, to retirement and disposal. Another potential term for referring to up-front,

broad-scale, end-to-end design is fleet design, though this term has various meanings. For articles bearing on up-front,

broad-scale, end-to-end design, see Arthur H. Barber III, “Rethinking the Future Fleet, The U.S. Navy Has No Overall

(continued…)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 28

time, and producing a future Navy through the accretion over time of separately considered,

bespoke ship designs, the Navy would place more up-front emphasis on how its ship acquisition

programs collectively place demands on U.S. ship design, production, crewing, and maintenance

capabilities, and on how up-front Navy decisions regarding its ship acquisition programs could

shape those capabilities over time so as to better support future Navy needs.61

This option could also involve the use of a new up-front vetting question for proposed

shipbuilding programs that would require those proposing a new program to show how the

proposed program reflects the results of an up-front, broad-scale, end-to-end design effort, and

how the proposed program would make the Navy inherently easier to design, build, crew, and

Requirements Process for Designing a Fleet, and It Needs One—Desperately,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May

2014; Arthur H. Barber III, “Redesign the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2019; Bryan Clark, “The

Surface Navy Should Design for Competition, Rethink Fleet Make-Up,” Breaking Defense, January 8, 2024; Robert C.

“Barney” Rubel, “Roadblock to Strategy and Fleet Design: Platform-Centric Thinking,” Center for Maritime Strategy,

September 19, 2023; Jeffrey E. Kline, “Revamping Fleet Design and Maritime Strategy: An Integrated Naval

Campaign For Advantage,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), September 18, 2023; James G.

Foggo, “The US Navy Needs a Comprehensive Strategy to Support Future Fleet Design,” The Hill, April 3, 2023;

61 One observer—the Navy’s chief analyst of future force structure and capability requirements within the Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations from 2002 to 2014—stated

It is time to rethink how we will design the future Fleet in a way that rebalances affordability,

platform capability, and deployment processes. We must build it as a whole instead of continuing

to “let it happen” one platform requirements decision at a time….

Today the Navy operates about 50 different types of ships and aircraft with individual design-

service lives of 20 to 50 years. On average, about two classes of ship or aircraft annually come up

for a decision on replacement at the end of their service lives. Each of these decisions, a multi-year

joint bureaucratic process with dozens of participating organizations, is made individually….

The future Fleet is being designed ad hoc, one platform at a time, and we cannot afford this. How

can we change the trend toward an ever-smaller Fleet of ever-better platforms while maintaining

the capability superiority needed to execute our missions? It will take a top-down design to provide

a structure in which individual platform requirements can be shaped and disciplined despite all of

the pressures….

Developing an overall fleet design to structure and discipline individual platform requirements is

no small task. Simply constraining platform cost without dealing with how capabilities might be

delivered differently is not sufficient. This is not a once-and-done process, as changes in threat and

in our own technology options will never stop. But neither can it be a process that changes the

design in some fundamental way every year or two—it will have to influence platform

requirements for a long period of time to affect a significant number of new platform designs.

We cannot afford to retire legacy platforms prematurely simply because they are not optimized

within our new Fleet design, which will take time to implement and have to be done incrementally.

Real and fundamental change in the roles, missions, and interdependencies among platform types,

and in the balance between manned and unmanned and between platform and payload, is an

inevitable outcome of a Fleet design process. That is the point. Change is hard, and it will have to

be authorized and directed by the Navy’s leadership or risk not happening….

The only way to meet these demands within available resources is to develop a design that provides

a structure within which the capabilities of future platforms can be shaped to meet the Fleet’s

missions efficiently as an overall force. Doing this will require a systems-level approach to defining

what it must be able to do, and will mean abandoning some cherished traditions of what each type

of platform should do. The alternative is a Navy no longer large or capable enough to do the

nation’s business.

(Arthur H. Barber III, “Rethinking the Future Fleet, The U.S. Navy Has No Overall Requirements

Process for Designing a Fleet, and It Needs One—Desperately,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,

May 2014.)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 29

maintain by doing one or more of the things discussed in the previous three sections, by doing

other things, or both.

Challenges and Limitations of These Options

The above options for using available ship-design and shipbuilding capacity could take years to

produce results. They could require significant changes in Navy fleet design practices, ship

acquisition practices, and Navy organization. They could also have potentially significant impacts

for maintaining congressional oversight of Navy shipbuilding programs and maintaining year-to-

year congressional flexibility for determining shipbuilding-related spending.

Inflation in Navy Shipbuilding Costs

Another issue for Congress concerns inflation in Navy shipbuilding costs. Shipbuilding, like

other sectors of defense procurement and the U.S. economy in general, has experienced

significant inflation since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic due to supply chain disruptions

and other impacts. The Department of the Navy states in its FY2025 budget highlights book that

“the residual effects of inflationary pressures of the past few years, workforce challenges, plus

increased labor and supply costs across the defense enterprise, all drove costs associated with our

shipbuilding account up roughly 20% over the past couple of years.”62

This inflation has increased the estimated procurement costs of multiple Navy shipbuilding

programs, reducing the purchasing power of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. For an annual Navy

shipbuilding account of about $32 billion, a 20% inflation rate applied across the account could

reduce the purchasing power of the account to a pre-inflation equivalent of about $26.7 billion, or

about $5.3 billion less. Stated differently, a 20% inflation rate applied across the new-construction

portion of the Navy’s shipbuilding account could reduce the number of ships that could be

procured for a certain amount of funding from 12 ships to 10 ships.

Inflation can also affect shipyards and their associated supplier firms, particularly those operating

under fixed-price contracts. Contracts for building Navy ships sometimes include Economic Price

Adjustment (EPA) clauses that permit costs within the contract to be adjusted up to certain

amounts to account for inflation. EPA clauses may cover some of the ships being built at a

shipyard but not others, and might cover changes in costs for labor but not materials (or vice

versa).63 Firms also have the option of filing a Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA).64

62 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2025 Budget, 2024, page 1-12.

63 For more on EPA clauses, see Garry Murphy and Amy Hoffer, “Economic Price Adjustment (EPA),” Naval

Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) briefing, March 22, 2023, 16 slides, accessed May 21, 2024, at

https://atlantic.navfac.navy.mil/Portals/71/NAVFAC_SOUTHEAST/Documents/Industry%20Day%20Briefs/

Unique%20Challenges%20and%20Innovation ; and Leslie Overturf, “Striking the Balance: Constructing Fair

Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) Clauses,” DOD briefing, August 23, 2022, 112 slides, accessed May 21, 2024, at

https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/Migrate/EventAttachments/679/

Striking%20the%20Balance_Constructing%20EPA%20clauses_22%20Aug .

64 For more on REAs, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10640, Legal Mechanisms for Dealing with Changed Circumstances

in Federal Contracting, by David H. Carpenter; “Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA),” Defense Acquisition

University (DAU), undated, accessed May 21, 2024, at https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia-article/request-equitable-

adjustment-rea; and “Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA),” AcqNotes, The Defense Acquisition Encyclopedia,

2024, accessed May 21, 2024, at https://acqnotes.com/acqnote/careerfields/request-for-equitable-adjustment-rea.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 30

Impacts of a Continuing Resolution (CR) on Shipbuilding

Programs

Another issue for Congress concerns the potential impacts on the execution of Navy shipbuilding

programs of operating under a continuing resolution (CR) for some portion of FY2025,

particularly if the period of operating under a CR extends beyond the first quarter of FY2025.

An attachment to a September 7, 2024, letter from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to the

House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the potential impacts of a six-month CR on the

execution of various DOD programs, including Navy shipbuilding programs, states in part

(emphasis as in the original):

Although not all of these efforts are impacted on day one of the fiscal year, the following

are examples of specific activities of each Service that would be impacted under a six-

month CR….

Delays a critical Refueling and Complex Overhaul [RCOH] to CVN-74, reducing aircraft

carrier availability in the future….

Prohibits multiyear procurement, such that the Department cannot proceed with the award

of multiyear procurement contracts for the CH-53K (Heavy Lift – 321 engines) and for

Virginia Class submarines….

Put at risk the modernization of the sea-base leg of the triad by preventing fully funding

the second Columbia Class Submarine leading to future cost increases and potential

schedule delays. This restriction would delay the Advanced Procurement (AP) award for

future Columbia Class Submarines.

A reduction in Columbia (CLB) Class Advance Procurement (AP) compared to the FY

2025 request would cause construction delays to SSBNs 827 – 830 with associated delivery

delays. There is no schedule margin remaining between the first operational availability

of the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and the retirement of the Ohio

SSBNs.

◼ Columbia class requires a total of $6.2B of AP funding in FY 2025, which exceeds the

FY 2024 enacted amount of $3.4B by $2.8B or 82 percent. The increase in advanced

procurement funding includes a $1.55B increase in investments in the submarine

industrial base to help increase production of Columbia and Virginia Class

submarines….

Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN):

◼ Prohibitions against new starts and increases in rates of operations in prior year

Shipbuilding Programs (Cost to Complete) could result in work stoppages, future cost

increases, and delays in turning the ships over to the fleet.

◼ The FY 2025 increase in Virginia and Columbia class submarines AP would cause

future start of construction delays and future cost increases for these ships. Further, a

CR would:

o Delay the award of the Carrier (CVN) Refueling and Complex Overhauls and

would worsen already challenged delivery schedules for ships under

construction requiring Cost to Complete funding for the first time in FY 2025;

and

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 31

o Delay the award to fully fund two DDG-51s for FY 2025 and $1.68B to fully

fund the FY 2023 and FY 2024 ships.65

A September 12, 2024, letter from Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro to the House and Senate

Appropriations Committees on the potential impacts of a six-month or 12-month CR on the

execution of various Department of the Navy (DON) programs, including shipbuilding programs,

states in part:

Enclosed with this letter is a detailed list articulating the impacts of a six-month and year-

long CR on the DON, but here are some of the most consequential:

◼ Delays in the Virginia Class submarine will impact submarine deliveries and future

force structure availabilities, which are already running over cost and behind schedule.

A CR risks setting back the program even further.

◼ Further delaying delivery of Columbia Class submarine due to postponed construction,

and result in future cost increases.

◼ A six-month CR risks delaying critical investments in the submarine industrial base

and the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) partnership.

◼ Restriction of Cost-to-Complete funding for prior year shipbuilding programs

including CVN-74 refueling resulting in maintenance delays and potential cost

increases….

Additionally, a long-term CR would impact a multitude of programs within the

Department, having a lasting impact on industry stabilization efforts for both shipbuilding

and munitions. These include twenty construction projects, five research and development

projects, up to fifty-eight ship maintenance availabilities, procurement of five ships,

aircraft programs and munitions critical for our warfighters.66

A point paper attached to the letter states in part:

Six-Month Continuing Resolution Impacts

◼ Erodes Technology Investment for the Future Force

o Delay of new contract award for Medium Landing Ship.

o Rate of production increase for Columbia class submarine advance procurement

(AP) and full funding; LHA Replacement AP will cause construction delays and

potential future cost increases….

Yearlong Continuing Resolution Impacts By Appropriation Group

SCN,67 $10.8B Misalignment: Slippage of new contract award for CVN 75 refueling and

complex overhaul (RCOH) resulting in maintenance delays and potential cost increases.

Slippage of awarding LPD 33 will erode savings gained in the multi-ship procurement

contract. Rate of production and misalignments in cost to complete will cause delivery

delays, potential future cost increases, and may result in potential work stoppages. Unable

65 Attachment entitled “6-Month Continuing Resolution (CRr) Impacts for FY 2025” to letter dated September 7, 2024,

from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to The Honorable Susan Collins, Vice Chairman, Committee on

Appropriations, United States Senate. The letter states: “A copy of this letter is being sent to the other Chairs and

Ranking Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.”

66 Letter dated September 12, 2024, from Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy, to the Honorable Ken Calvert,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives. The letter states:

“A copy of this letter is being sent to the other Chairs and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations.”

67 This is a reference to the Navy’s shipbuilding account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy

(SCN) account.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 32

to award the FY25-FY29 Virginia Class Multiyear Procurement (MYP) contract (no MYP

during CR).

A September 17, 2024, letter from Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Chief of Naval Operations, to the

House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the potential impacts of a six-month CR on the

execution of various Navy programs, including shipbuilding programs, states in part:

Highlighted below is a partial list of priorities that would be undermined by a six-month

CR:

◼ Columbia Class Submarine: risks further delaying delivery of Columbia class

submarine due to construction delays and would result in future cost increases.

◼ CVN 75 Refueling (RCOH): risks slippage of new contract award resulting in

maintenance delays and potential cost increases.68

FY2025 Request for Procuring One Rather than Two

Virginia-Class Submarines

Another issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s request to procure one Virginia-class submarine

rather than two Virginia-class submarines in FY2025, as was projected for FY2025 under the

Navy’s budget submissions for FY2024 and prior years. Navy officials state that the Navy’s

decision to request the procurement of one Virginia-class submarine rather than two Virginia-

class submarines in FY2025 was due to limits on the Navy’s overall budget combined with the

growing backlog of Virginia-class submarines procured in prior years but not yet completed.69

Supporters of procuring two Virginia-class submarines in FY2025 argue that procuring two is

needed to maintain stability for the submarine construction industrial base and to send a strong

signal of resolve to China and other potential adversaries. The issue of the Virginia-class attack

submarine procurement rate is discussed further in the CRS report on the Virginia-class

program.70

68 Letter dated September 17, 2024, from Admiral L. [Lisa] M. Franchetti, to The Honorable Jon Tester, Chairman,

Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate. The letter states: “A similar letter has

been sent to Chairman Calvert, Chair Murray, and Chairman Cole.”

69 Source: Navy FY2025 budget rollout briefing for CBO and CRS, March 12, 2024. See also the Department of the

Navy’s FY2025 budget highlights book, which states

Aligned with Congressional intent, this budget request delivers the most ready and lethal Naval

Forces feasible under the FRA [Fiscal Responsibility Act—H.R. 3746/P.L. 118-5 of June 3, 2023]

budget caps. These caps, paced well below even historical inflation targets, force hard choices. Due

to the residual effects of inflationary pressures of the past few years, workforce challenges, plus

increased labor and supply costs across the defense enterprise, all drove costs associated with our

shipbuilding account up roughly 20% over the last couple of years. Hard choices were made,

particularly in the procurement accounts. An analytic review of production performance identified

areas where we could take risk to comply with the congressional fiscal caps. The Department

requests only 1 Virginia Class submarine in PB25 [the President’s [proposed] budget for FY2025],

dropping the total number of ships requested down one from what we estimated we would request

in FY 2025 during last year’s budget.

(Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2025 Budget, 2024, pages

1-12 to 1-13.)

70 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and

Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 33

Proposed Retirement of 19 Ships in FY2025

Another issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s proposal for retiring 19 ships in FY2025,

including 10 ships that would be retired prior to reaching the ends of their service lives. The Navy

states that “decommissioning these ships frees up additional resources to construct more capable

and lethal platforms relative to current threats. Legacy platforms that are expensive to repair and

maintain and unable to provide relevant capability in contested environments must be retired in

order to invest in essential capabilities the Navy needs for our national security.”71

In acting on proposed Navy budgets for FY2024 and prior fiscal years, Congress has approved

the Navy’s proposals for retiring some ships but not others, and has included legislative

provisions in NDAAs and annual DOD Appropriations Acts prohibiting the Navy from retiring

certain ships. Opponents of retiring ships that the Navy has proposed for retirement have argued

that doing so would reduce Navy ship force levels and associated missile capacities, which would

reduce the Navy’s ability to deter or respond to potential aggression by China or other potential

adversaries, and that keeping the ships in service is a higher priority than other elements of the

Navy’s proposed budget.

Procurement Costs of Certain Ships in Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan

Another issue for Congress concerns the estimated procurement costs shown for certain ships in

the Navy’s FY2025 five-year (FY2025-FY2029) shipbuilding plan, including

• seven Medium Landing Ships (LSMs) programmed for procurement in FY2026-

FY2029;

• one AS(X) submarine tender programmed for procurement in FY2027; and

• four TAGOS ocean surveillance ships programmed for procurement in FY2026-

FY2029

The estimated procurement costs shown for these 12 ships are noticeably lower than those for

ships in those same classes with procurement dates in fiscal years prior to FY2026 and/or after

FY2029. This could raise a question as to whether the Navy reduced the estimated procurement

costs of these 12 ships to unrealistically low figures for some reason, such as to help keep total

programmed Navy spending below a certain level during FY2026-FY2029 (i.e., the final four

years of the FY2025 Future Years Defense Plan, or FYDP).

Legislative Activity for FY2024 and FY2025

CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding

Programs

Detailed coverage of legislative activity on certain Navy shipbuilding programs (including

funding levels, legislative provisions, and report language) can be found in the following CRS

reports:

• CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile

Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

71 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year

2025, p. 6.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 34

• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS

Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship

Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light

Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by

Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Light Replenishment Oiler (TAOL) (Previously

Next-Generation Logistics Ship [NGLS]) Program: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS In Focus IF11838, Navy TAGOS-25 Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

• CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs that are not covered in detail in the

above reports is covered below.

Summary of Congressional Action on FY2025 Shipbuilding

Funding Request

The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $32.4 billion in shipbuilding funding for, among

other things, the procurement of six new ships, including one Virginia (SSN-774) class attack

submarine, two Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, one Constellation (FFG-62) class

frigate, one LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship, and one Medium Landing Ship (LSM). The

Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget proposes retiring 19 ships, including 10 that would be retired

prior to the ends of their expected service lives.72

72 The 19 proposed retirements include three nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), four cruisers (CGs), two

Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship, four mine countermeasures ships (MCMs), one

Expeditionary transport dock (ESD) ship, and four expeditionary fast transport (EPF) ships. The 10 ships proposed for

retirement prior to the end of their expected service lives include two of the CGs, the two LCSs, the LSD, the ESD, and

the four EPFs.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 35

Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2025 funding request for Navy

shipbuilding. The table shows the amounts requested and congressional changes to those

requested amounts, with blank cells indicating no change from the requested amount.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 36

Table 3. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2025 Funding Request

Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding

Line

number Program Request

Congressional changes to requested amounts

Authorization Appropriation

HASC SASC Enacted HAC SAC Enacted

Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account

001 Columbia-class SSBN 3,341.2 5.0 20.6

002 Columbia-class SSBN (AP) 6,215.9

003 CVN 80 aircraft carrier 1,186.9 -100.0 75.0 -63.7

004 CVN-81 aircraft carrier 721.0 175.0 -46.1

005 Virginia-class SSN 3,615.9 700.0 650.0 357.0

006 Virginia-class SSN (AP) 3,720.3 480.0

007 CVN RCOH 1,061.1 -200.0 -250.0 -250.0

008 CVN RCOH (AP) 0

009 DDG-1000 61.1

010 DDG-51 6,409.2 50.0 1,430.0 1,542.7

011 DDG-51 (AP) 41.7 41.5 41.5

012 LCS 0

013 FFG-62 1,170.4 -1,170.4 50.0 -1,170.4 100.0

013A FFG-62 (AP) 0 37.5

014 LPD-17 Flight II 1,562.0 1,000.0

015 LPD-17 Flight II (AP) 0 500.0

016 LPD-17 Flight I 0

017 Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) 0

018 LHA amphibious assault ship 0

019 LHA amphibious assault ship (AP) 61.1 195.0

020 Expeditionary fast transport ship (EPF) 0

021 Medium Landing Ship (LSM) 268.1 -238.0 -238.4

021A Medium-sized landing vessel 238.0

022 AS(X) submarine tender 0

023 TAO-205 oiler 0

023A TAO-205 oiler (AP) 0 398.0 334.5

024 TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ship 0 60.0 60.0 60.0

025 Oceanographic ships 0

026 LCU-1700 landing craft 0 95.0

027 Outfitting 674.6 -88.6 -68.8

028 Ship-to-shore connector (SSC) 0 417.0 417.0

029 Service craft 11.4 30.0 30.0 30.0

030 Auxiliary Personnel Lighter (APL) 76.2

031 LCAC landing craft SLEP 45.1

032 Auxiliaries (used sealift ships) 204.9 -63.0

033 Completion of prior-year ships 1,930.0 1,760.0

992 TAGOS-25 ocean surveillance ship 0

TOTAL 32,378.3 -655.9 4,204.5 -760.9 4,645.0

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 37

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on original Navy FY2025 budget submission, committee reports, and

explanatory statements on the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2025 DOD Appropriations

Act.

Notes: Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth. A blank cell indicates no change to requested amount.

Totals may not add due to rounding. AP = advance procurement funding; HASC = House Armed Services

Committee; SASC = Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC = House Appropriations Committee; SAC =

Senate Appropriations Committee; SLEP = service life extension program.

FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638)

House

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-529 of May 31, 2024) on H.R.

8070, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 3. Among other

things, H.Rept. 118-529 recommends funding for the procurement in FY2025 of

• two Virginia-class attack submarines, rather than the one that was requested for

procurement in FY2025;

• no FFG-62 class frigate, rather than the one that was requested for procurement

in FY2025;

• one additional YRBM (Yard Repair Berthing and Messing) service craft (i.e., a

type of Auxiliary Personnel Lighter [APL] or personnel barge); and

• one used sealift ship, rather than the two requested that were for procurement in

FY2025.

The additional Virginia-class submarine would be incrementally funded, with part of the ship’s

procurement cost to be provided in one or more fiscal years after FY2025. As noted below, H.R.

8070 includes a provision (Section 1018) authorizing the use of incremental funding for

procuring the ship.

Section 809 of H.R. 8070 would prohibit DOD from contracting with shipyards controlled by a

foreign adversary.

Section 818 would extend by one year a temporary authority to modify certain contracts and

options based on the effects of inflation under P.L. 85-804 as amended (50 U.S.C. 1431-1435), a

law that authorizes certain federal agencies to provide certain types of extraordinary relief to

contractors who are encountering difficulties in the performance of federal contracts or

subcontracts relating to national defense.73

Section 1011 would amend 10 U.S.C. 231—the statute that requires an annual Navy 30-year

shipbuilding plan—to require the plan to include an assessment of certain factors if the it includes

a reduction in the number of battle force ships during the 10-year period following the submission

of the plan, as compared with the number of such ships included in the 30-year plan for the

preceding fiscal year.

Section 1012 would amend 10 U.S.C. 8062—a statue that establishes minimum force-levels for

certain Navy force elements—to require the Navy to operate not less than four public-sector naval

shipyards (NYSs), and to define the term “amphibious warfare ship” as used in the statute to

mean an LHA-, LHD-, LPD-, or LSD-type ship. (These are the Navy’s larger amphibious ships,

73 For more on P.L. 85-804, see CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 38

as opposed to the Navy’s proposed Medium Landing Ships [LSMs], which are to be much-

smaller amphibious ships.)

Section 1013 would make modifications to certain ship-repair authorities.

Section 1015 would amend 10 U.S. C. 8669c(a)(3) to prohibit the Navy from approving the start

of construction of the first ship for any major shipbuilding program until a period of 30 days after

the Secretary of the Navy, among other things, certifies that the basic and functional design of the

ship is 100% complete.

Section 1016 would amend 10 U.S.C. 8669c to require additional certifications and assessments

prior to starting construction on first ship of a shipbuilding program.

Section 1017 would require the Navy to submit a strategy for delivering a rearm-at-sea capability

for the Navy’s surface fleet. (See also the report language shown below from page 255 of H.Rept.

118-529.)

Section 1018 would provide authority for using incremental funding for procuring a Virginia-

class attack submarine in FY2025. (As noted earlier, this authority would be used for the second

of two Virginia-class boats that would be procured under H.R. 8070.)

Section 1019 would direct the Navy to carry out a pilot program on the use of automated

inspection technologies at shipyards.

Section 1020 would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated

by the FY2025 NDAA or otherwise made available for FY2025 for retiring, preparing to retire,

inactivating, or placing in storage the cruisers USS Shilo (CG-67) or USS Lake Erie (CG-70), or

more than two other cruisers.

Section 1022 would require the Navy to conduct a study on the recruitment and retention of

apprentices at public-sector naval shipyards (NSYs).

Section 1058 would require a report on the price elasticity of the labor supply for the industrial

base for building and maintaining naval vessels.

Section 1069D would require the Navy, in consultation with the Coast Guard, to submit a report

on recommended modifications to Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) ships that will best enable

at-sea sustainment of Joint Interagency Task Force South partner nation patrol vessels and Coast

Guard Fast Response Cutters (FRCs).

Section 1074 would extend to July 1, 2025, the date by which the Commission on the Future of

the Navy is to submit a report with its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Section 1702 would exclude oceanographic research vessels operated by academic institutions

from sourcing requirements under Section 70912(5)(C) of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs

Act (P.L. 117-58).

Section 3512 would amend Title 46 of the U.S. Code to include a new chapter on strategic sealift.

Section 3531 would extend by five years (from 2035 to 2040) certain provisions relating to the

tanker security fleet program.

Section 3533 would amend Section 3546 of the FY2023 (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of

December 23, 2022) regarding the recapitalization of the National Defense Reserve Fleet

(NDRF).

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 39

Section 3536 would “address the shortage of workers in the maritime sector and stimulate growth

in the United States merchant marine and shipbuilding industries by providing funding for a

comprehensive marketing, recruiting, and public relations campaign.”

Section 3537 would amend 46 U.S.C. 53733 to apply Buy America requirements to a shipyard

modernization and improvement.

H.Rept. 118-529 states

Implications of continuing resolutions and government shutdowns on DoD shipbuilding

efforts

The committee recognizes the critical role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in

maintaining and modernizing the nation’s naval fleet through its shipbuilding programs.

However, the committee is concerned about the potential impact of continuing resolutions

and government shutdowns on the progress and effectiveness of these vital efforts.

Continuing resolutions and government shutdowns disrupt the normal functioning of

government agencies, including the DOD, by limiting funding availability and creating

uncertainty in budgetary planning and execution. These disruptions have direct and indirect

consequences on DOD shipbuilding activities, including delays in contract awards,

disruptions in production schedules, and challenges in workforce retention and recruitment.

The committee emphasizes that such disruptions undermine the Navy’s ability to maintain

a robust and modern fleet capable of addressing evolving threats and strategic challenges.

Delays in ship construction and maintenance not only increase costs but also reduce

operational readiness and jeopardize national security objectives.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the

House Armed Services Committee not later than December 31, 2024, on the implications

of continuing resolutions and government shutdowns on DoD shipbuilding efforts over the

previous five fiscal years that includes the following:

(1) an analysis of the financial costs associated with these disruptions, including increased

project costs, penalties for schedule delays, and potential long-term consequences for the

Navy’s fleet modernization goals;

(2) an evaluation of the effects on the shipbuilding industrial base, including disruptions in

supply chains, workforce stability, and the ability of contractors to meet contractual

obligations; and

(3) recommendations for mitigating the adverse effects of continuing resolutions and

government shutdowns on DoD shipbuilding efforts, including strategies for minimizing

schedule disruptions, ensuring timely funding availability, and enhancing workforce

resilience. (Page 24)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states

Implementation of Comptroller General Recommendations to Improve Navy

Maintenance and Sustainment

The committee remains concerned about Navy practices for maintenance and sustainment

of its fleet due to persistent delays and a growing backlog that directly impacts operational

readiness. These issues not only undermine the Navy’s ability to execute its missions but

also contribute to increased costs and reduced survivability of the fleet. Additionally, the

Navy’s lack of transparency and inefficiency in its maintenance and sustainment practices

have prompted the committee to take action, including requiring studies from the

Government Accountability Office (GAO) to identify deficiencies and recommend

improvements.

These studies have produced several recommendations for the Navy, only a fraction of

which have been implemented to date. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 40

Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, to provide a briefing to the House

Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2025, on detailed plans and

timeframes for fully addressing open recommendations in the following GAO reports

regarding Navy maintenance and sustainment:

(1) Navy Ship Maintenance: Actions Needed to Monitor and Address the Performance of

Intermediate Maintenance Periods, GAO–22–104510;

(2) Navy Ships: Applying Leading Practices and Transparent Reporting Could Help

Reduce Risks Posed by Nearly $1.8 Billion Maintenance Backlog, GAO–22–105032;

(3) Navy Shipyards: Actions Needed to Address the Main Factors Causing Maintenance

Delays for Aircraft Carriers and Submarines, GAO–20–588;

(4) Navy Ship Maintenance: Actions Needed to Address Maintenance Delays for Surface

Ships Based Overseas, GAO–20–86; and (5) Navy Shipbuilding: Increasing Focus on

Sustainment Early in The Acquisition Process Could Save Billions, GAO–20–2.

The briefing shall include, with respect to each recommendation in these reports that the

Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Navy has not yet implemented, the following

elements:

(1) a summary of actions that have been or will be taken to fully implement the

recommendation;

(2) a schedule, with specific milestones, for completing implementation of the

recommendation; and

(3) offices of primary and collateral responsibility for the actions to implement the

recommendations. (Page 107)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states

Modernization of the Shipyard Industrial Plant Equipment and Processes

The committee recognizes the need for further investment to modernize shipyard industrial

plant equipment and process. The committee further recognizes the mining equipment

industry may possess crossover expertise with the potential to design and provide advanced

processes, techniques, and equipment within the naval ship construction and maintenance

enterprise. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing

to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2025, on areas in which

the naval ship construction and maintenance enterprise can leverage the mining equipment

industry’s expertise to increase efficiency and reduce costs of existing industrial processes.

The briefing shall evaluate, at a minimum:

(1) Corrosion-resistant, lightweight, and high-strength materials used in the mining

industry that could be adapted for naval ship construction and maintenance;

(2) Autonomous and semi-autonomous robotic systems used in mining that could be

utilized for welding and repair operations; and

(3) Feasibility of integrating advanced mining technologies into the naval shipyard

enterprise. (Page 126)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states

Ship Repair in a Contested Environment

The committee notes that the Navy has struggled to execute regularly scheduled

maintenance. Unplanned, deferred, and delayed maintenance has had damaging effects on

the operational availability of ships, sailor morale, and the workforce at public and private

shipyards and regional maintenance centers. While the Navy is working to implement

several efforts to prevent the maintenance backlog and uphold more predictive

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 41

maintenance schedules, the benefits of these initiatives have yet to be fully realized. Given

these continuing challenges, the committee is particularly concerned about how ships will

be maintained in a contested environment. Further, the Comptroller General has indicated

that in a conflict scenario, the Navy lacks a developed strategy for repairing battle-damaged

ships.

Sustaining fleet readiness in a contested environment requires an analysis of overseas

repair capacity to meet emergent needs. Currently, the Navy may execute maintenance in

foreign ports on forward deployed naval forces (FNDF), as outlined in section 8680 of title

10, United States Code, and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, as they are not

technically homeported in the United States. Therefore, the committee strongly encourages

the Navy to use these existing authorities, to their fullest extent practicable, in order to test,

monitor, and maintain critical skillsets in foreign ports while minimizing impacts to

deployment schedules, sailor morale, and the domestic industrial base.

The committee recalls that following a series of naval collisions in 2017, the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232) mandated that ships

homeported overseas must return to a domestic homeport after 10 years, in order to address

the challenges FDNF ships face due to high operational demands and required training and

maintenance schedules. While the Navy has made gains in maintenance availabilities, the

Navy must continue to pursue avenues to maintain and sustain high levels of readiness for

surface ships based overseas. The committee understands and supports the Navy’s intent

to shift initial intermediate maintenance periods for surface ships to 6 years, in an effort to

improve material readiness. Using the authorities outlined in section 8680 of title 10,

United States Code, the committee encourages the Navy to execute scheduled maintenance

availabilities with our allies to exercise maintenance skillsets at foreign overseas ports so

we may be better prepared for a conflict scenario. The committee also encourages the Navy

to continue the use of overseas private shipyards for maintenance availabilities of MSC

ships to further prove the overseas capacity should emergent repairs be required. The

committee urges the Navy to use the information it collects from each availability to assess

the capacity at foreign shipyards both now and in a potential contested or conflict scenarios.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a comprehensive

briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025,

regarding its strategy to both improve the long-term health of the shipbuilding and ship

repair defense industrial base and to maximize its existing authorities to assess maintenance

capacity and capabilities in overseas ports. This strategy shall inform decision making

about the Navy’s competing priorities, such as promoting competition within the industrial

base, protecting existing domestic industrial capacity, and seeking new avenues for

building and repair capacity. The ship industrial base strategy should reflect the desirable

characteristics of a national strategy such as:

(1) purpose;

(2) risks;

(3) milestones;

(4) performance measures;

(5) responsible organizations; and

(6) required resources, including, but not limited to, ship repair infrastructure needed

domestically and overseas, including drydock and pier capacity, to meets its needs for

emergent and wartime repairs. (Pages 129-130)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states

National Naval Shipbuilding Academy

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 42

The committee notes the shortage of shipyard workers in the United States. Shipyard

workers built the fleet that helped to win World War II and deter the former Soviet Union

during the Cold War. Today, the United States Navy is no longer the largest Navy in the

world and will have to expand the size of its fleet. To do so, the United States must train

more shipyard workers.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the

House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2025, on the feasibility of establishing

a National Naval Shipbuilding Academy operated by the Department of the Navy. The

briefing shall include, at a minimum: the roles, mission, organization, budget, recruitment,

possible academy locations, and any other issues of interest to Congress. (Page 252)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states

Rearm at Sea

The committee is aware that the ability to quickly rearm cruisers, destroyers, and other

ships at sea is a critical part of ensuring the Navy is effectively prepared for a potential

conflict in the Pacific. However, the committee is concerned that the Navy’s progress in

developing this capability has been too slow and that the Navy’s leadership focus and

resource investment is not sufficient to meet the Navy’s stated goals in this area. While the

Navy has conducted demonstrations of certain steps in the process, significant challenges

remain to be addressed before the Navy could effectively leverage this capability in a

contested environment.

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the Navy’s

efforts to develop a rearm-at-sea capability. At a minimum, the review should address:

(1) the Navy’s current efforts and future plans to develop this capability;

(2) the Navy’s current and planned technology development investments to achieve this

capability, to include planned cost and schedule for these investments; and

(3) alternative courses of action the Navy is considering to address this capability gap, to

include the use of uncrewed technologies. The committee further directs the Comptroller

General to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than

February 15, 2025, on the Comptroller General’s preliminary findings and to submit a final

report to the congressional defense committees on a date agreed to at the time of the

briefing. (Page 255; see also Section 1017 of H.R. 8070, noted above.)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states

Ship Repair Grant Program

The committee is aware of significant readiness challenges impacting the surface fleet. As

such, the committee supports capitalization efforts within the domestic ship repair industry.

Last year, Congress enacted section 1017 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) to provide grants for improvement of ship repair

and alterations capability. In executing this new authority, the committee supports Navy

consideration of ship repair facilities that are undercapitalized or are otherwise not

currently certified to perform Navy ship repair of surface combatants. (Page 256)

Senate

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-188 of July 8, 2024) on S.

4638, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 3. Among other

things, S.Rept. 118-188 recommends funding for the procurement in FY2025 of

• two Virginia-class attack submarines, rather than the one that was requested for

procurement in FY2025, and

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 43

• three DDG-51 destroyers, rather than the two that were requested for

procurement in FY2025.

The recommended increase of $398.0 million for the TAO-205 oiler program is shown in S.Rept.

118-188 as being for line 23 (TAO-205 program procurement funding), but the notation in

S.Rept. 118-188’s funding table (page 444) shows the funding as being for TAO-205 advance

procurement (AP) funding, so it is recorded in line 23A of Table 3.

The recommended increase of $60.0 million for the TATS program (line 24) is for “Acceleration

of T-ATS (+1 ship).” (Page 444)

The recommended increase of $95.0 million for the LCU 1700 program (line 26) is for “LCU

second shipyard.” (Page 444)

The recommended net change of zero for completion of prior-year (PY) shipbuilding programs

(line 33) includes a reduction of $225.0 million for completion of prior-year DDG-51s within line

33, and an increase of $225.0 million for “SCN cost to complete increase.” (Page 444)

Section 125 of S. 4638 would require an annual report analyzing suppliers of components for

surface ships.

Section 128 would amend 10 U.S.C. 2218 to authorize the Navy to buy up to 13 used, foreign-

built vessels (rather than the previous limit of up to 9) under the National Defense Sealift Fund

(NDSF) to modernize the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The RRF consists of the high-readiness

ships within the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) of sealift ships.

Section 826 would amend Section 818 of the FY2007 NDAA (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of

October 17, 2006) to add certain conditions for using fixed-price contracts for certain

shipbuilding programs.

Regarding Section 826, S.Rept. 118-188 states:

Use of fixed-price type contracts for certain shipbuilding programs (sec. 826)

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 818 of the John Warner

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364) to limit

the number of ships that can be procured under fixed-price type options to no more than

two if the contract includes detail design and construction for the lead ship.

The committee recognizes that existing limitations on fixed price contracts for Major

Defense Acquisition Programs to no more than one Low-Rate Initial Production lot if the

scope of work includes post-Milestone B development do not apply to U.S. Navy

shipbuilding. Unlike other classes of weapon systems, Milestone B for U.S. Navy ships

authorizes production. The committee notes that the U.S. Navy has awarded fixed price

detail design and construction contracts with several fixed price option ships on programs

which have led to extensive schedule delays and financial difficulties for the contractors.

The committee intends for the recommended provision to align limitations on U.S Navy

shipbuilding with the existing statute for fixed-price type low-rate initial production

contracts for other classes of weapon systems included in section 808 of the James M.

Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263).

The committee further encourages the Secretary of the Navy to review existing contracts

that include the lead ship and multiple follow-on ships under a fixed price arrangement to

evaluate whether industrial base stability should be supported with cost-to-complete

funding, particularly for smaller or dual-use shipyards. The committee notes that

shipbuilding has traditionally been a low-margin business, making it difficult for smaller

shipyards to remain viable when they are required to take on excessive risk to win U.S.

Navy programs. Moreover, these shipyards often do not have a large engineering

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 44

workforce to handle the volume of instructions from the U.S. Navy related to design

maturity, incentivizing the shipyard to prematurely initiate construction in hopes that

concurrent effort will save on cost and schedule. Often, this can exacerbate cost and

schedule problems. The Government Accountability Office report titled ‘‘Navy

Shipbuilding Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for Future Investments’’

(GAO–18–238SP) found that recent Navy lead ships experienced significant cost growth,

concurrency, schedule delays, and deficiencies during sea trials. These systematic issues

suggest that the U.S. Navy plays an important role in shipbuilding challenges. However,

smaller shipyards are more likely bear to the burden under fixed price arrangements. As a

result, the committee encourages cost-to-complete funding for challenged fixed price

contracts that include the lead ship and several fixed price option ships, including the

modification of contracts to accommodate reasonable change orders given shifts in

economic conditions or design choices, in order to preserve a competitive shipbuilding

industrial base.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees

on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May 1,

2025, on all open contracts that include fixed price detail design and construction as well

as follow-on ships and provide information on target price at the time of award, cost-to-

complete provided subsequent to award, and original production schedules compared to

current estimates. (Pages 186-187)

Section 905 would direct DOD to develop a methodology for analyzing U.S. military force sizing

necessary to conduct DOD activities in support of strategic competition, and submit a report on

that methodology.

Section 1021 would amend 10 U.S.C. 8669c—a provision that requires certain assessments prior

to starting construction on first ship of a shipbuilding program—to include additional

requirements for those assessments.

Regarding Section 1021, S.Rept. 118-188 states:

Improving Navy assessments required prior to start of construction on first ship of a

shipbuilding program (sec. 1021)

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8669c of title 10, United

States Code, to clarify the definition of basic and functional design to include three-

dimensional modeling and the positioning and routing of all major distributive systems.

The provision would also create a requirement to provide a written determination that detail

design will be completed for each block of a ship’s construction before beginning

construction of that block. Finally, the provision would require the U.S. Navy to report on

the status of vendor- and government-furnished information.

The committee notes that the U.S. Navy used a flawed metric to measure the completeness

of basic and functional design on the Constellation-class frigate, leading to the start of

construction being more than 2 years ahead of the expected final approval of the design

packages. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Secretary of the

Navy’s certification of the completeness of basic and functional design was flawed, and

that his findings relating to the production readiness review in support of the start of

construction for the Constellation-class frigate did not demonstrate a clear connection

between design maturity data and decision-making.

The GAO’s May 2, 2024 report titled ‘‘Navy Shipbuilding: Increased Use of Leading

Design Practices Could Improve Timeliness of Deliveries’’ (GAO–24–105503), stated that

leading commercial shipbuilders do not start construction on a block, or a basic building

unit, for the lead ship in a class until after detail design is complete for that block.

Moreover, commercial shipbuilders finalize agreements with vendors as early as possible

to avoid design uncertainty or instability. These practices help commercial shipbuilders

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 45

control costs and reduce schedules. The committee believes that the U.S. Navy should use

such best practices in the acquisition of new classes of Navy ships. (Page 223)

Section 1024 would extend to July 1, 2025, the date by which the Commission on the Future of

the Navy is to submit a report with its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Regarding Section 1024, S.Rept. 118-188 states:

Extension of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy (sec. 1024)

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1092 of the James M.

Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) to

extend the termination date for the National Commission on the Future of the Navy from

July 1, 2024, to January 15, 2026. Delays in appointing commissioners and creating

supporting structures for the Commission necessitate an extension on the due date of the

final report. (Page 224)

Section 1025 would amend 10 U.S.C. 4862—a provision known as the Berry Amendment74 that

establishes a requirement to buy certain articles from American sources, with certain

exceptions—to explicitly allow for the acquisition of nondomestic items, not only by vessels in

foreign waters, but also by other DOD activities that are making purchases on behalf of vessels

operating in foreign waters.

Section 1026 would make certain changes to Navy ship acquisition procedures, direct the Navy

to adopt certain GAO recommendations relating to shipbuilding, and require the Navy, as part of

its annual 30-year shipbuilding plan, to provide an explanation for reductions to the planned

procurement of a class of vessels in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) from year to year.

The FYDP covers the five-year period consisting of the budget year and the next four years. For

Navy shipbuilding programs, the FYDP comprises the first five years of the 30-year shipbuilding

plan.

Section 1047 would provide for a longer term in office and eligibility for appointment to rank of

Admiral for the commander of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

S.Rept. 118-188 also states:

Defense Production Act for shipbuilding

The committee recognizes the importance of enhancing the capacity of the shipbuilding

industry to support investments in Navy vessels. The committee commends the work the

Department of Defense (DOD) to invest in shipbuilding capacity and sub-tier suppliers

through efforts such as the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program. The

committee encourages DOD to use all available authorities and tools to support domestic

shipbuilding and the industries that support it.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later

than March 1, 2025, describing the feasibility and advisability of DOD to use authorities

available under title III of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (Public Law 81–774) to: (1)

Support U.S. Navy shipbuilding and ship repair, including supporting critical sub-tier

industries such as castings and forgings; and (2) Establish, improve, or enhance both the

public and private shipyard infrastructure of the United States. (Page 203)

S.Rept. 118-188 also states:

Innovative incentives for naval shipyard employees

74 For more on the Berry Amendment , see CRS In Focus IF10609, Defense Primer: The Berry and Kissell

Amendments, by Christopher D. Watson and Alexandra G. Neenan.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 46

The committee notes the Chief of Naval Operations stated in testimony before the

committee on May 16, 2024, ‘‘Through the [Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization

Program] and our recapitalization of century-old infrastructure, we are improving [Quality

of Service] for our 30,000 shipyard employees. But, we must do more.’’ The committee

agrees and notes these employees are vital to the maintenance and modernization of our

nuclear-powered fleet of battle force ships. The committee urges the Secretary of the Navy

and Chief of Naval Operations to consider additional voluntary innovative incentives to

attract, retain, and improve the quality of service of the tens of thousands of employees

who perform this critical work at our four naval shipyards. In particular, the committee

believes providing such employees with a tailored opportunity to affiliate with the Navy

Reserve in a new category specifically for shipyard employees could provide

compensation, retirement, health care, and other valuable benefits not otherwise

achievable.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later

than March 1, 2025, that assesses the feasibility and advisability of such innovative

incentives, including: (1) A voluntary form of the military technicians (dual status)

program pursuant to section 10216 of title 10, United States Code; (2) A voluntary special

category of United States Navy Selected Reserve status; (3) A voluntary special category

of other Reserve status; and (4) Such other options as the Secretary deems appropriate. For

each incentive or option, the Secretary shall provide the notional key elements, eligibility

requirements, benefits to the employee, benefits to the U.S. Government, estimated cost to

the U.S. Government per fiscal year, and statutory or other legislative changes required.

(Pages 243-244)

S.Rept. 118-188 also states:

Modernizing strategic sealift

The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD) has requested the authority to

procure used vessels to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and the Military Sealift

Command (MSC) surge sealift fleets. The committee believes that DOD needs to

modernize the RRF and the MSC fleets, which could be done by purchasing used vessels

or by building new sealift vessels domestically. The committee requires a better

understanding of the existing cargo ship market, including vessels that might be available

for purchase, and how new ships from the U.S. Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plans and

purchases of used vessels will meet our strategic sealift needs.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command

(TRANSCOM), to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later

than January 31, 2025, that includes: (1) A survey of the market for used cargo ships,

identifying ships that might be candidates for purchase to modernize U.S. cargo fleets; (2)

An assessment of the extent to which long-term U.S. Navy plans that include new

construction of cargo ships could meet TRANSCOM’s needs; and (3) A recommendation

for the proper mix of the sealift fleets to be derived from new construction and purchasing

used cargo vessels. (Page 245)

S.Rept. 118-188 also states:

Shipbuilding industrial base cost estimate

The committee recognizes the limitations on the ability of the Department of the Navy’s

30-year shipbuilding plan to achieve the policy of having not fewer than 355 battle force

ships available as soon as practicable, due to the anticipated capacity of the shipbuilding

industrial base. The fiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plan in support of the Battle Force Ship

Assessment and Requirements objective reaches 355 ships in fiscal year 2038, of which

277 ships are conventional surface ships. This plan accepts significant risk by assuming

that industry will increase manufacturing capacity and produce future ships on time and

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 47

within budget. However, shipbuilding plans over the past decade have been unstable and

failed to achieve their goals. The committee appreciates the submarine industrial base (SIB)

2023 and SIB 2025 studies that provided insight into the cost of achieving Columbia-class

and Virginia-class construction requirements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the

Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to perform a study for conventional

battle force ship programs to evaluate potential risks and inform future resourcing

decisions. The Secretary of the Navy shall deliver to the congressional defense committees,

not later than June 1, 2025, an unconstrained cost estimate of industrial base investments,

above regular construction, necessary to meet the inventory plan for conventional surface

ships outlined in the Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year

2025 in support of the Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirements objective of June

2023. The cost estimate may be of rough order of magnitude, shall be phased by fiscal year,

and shall include the following elements:

(1) Supplier development required to expand the capability and capacity of existing

suppliers, develop alternate sources for fragile sources including qualification and testing,

manage obsolescence, and mitigate delays of sequence critical material;

(2) Shipbuilder infrastructure improvements, such as facilities, equipment, and other

capital expenditures;

(3) Strategic outsourcing opportunities for ship modules, such as steel fabrication,

machining, and outfitting workload from the shipyards including the cost of shipbuilder

and supplier efforts;

(4) Workforce development requirements for shipbuilding labor, engineering and design

labor, and manufacturing labor at critical suppliers, such as the creation of training centers,

hiring and retention incentives, and national marketing campaigns;

(5) Government oversight required for shipyard and industrial base expansion;

(6) Technology opportunities to transition and qualify suppliers to more effective, modern

production processes, such as additive manufacturing and robotic automation; and

(7) Any additional elements the Secretary finds appropriate. (Pages 247-248)

FY2025 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 8774/S. 4921)

House

The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-557 of June 17, 2024) on H.R.

8774, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 3. Among other

things, H.Rept. 118-557 recommends funding for the procurement in FY2025 of

• no FFG-62 class frigate, rather than the one that was requested for procurement

in FY2025;

• no Medium Landing Ship (LSM), rather than the one that was requested for

procurement in FY2025;

• one additional TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ship;

• three additional Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) landing craft; and

• one additional YRBM (Yard Repair Berthing and Messing) service craft (i.e., a

type of Auxiliary Personnel Lighter [APL] or personnel barge).

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 48

Section 8016 of H.R. 8774, a recurring annual provision, would continue U.S. content

requirements for welded shipboard anchor and mooring chain.

Section 8074 would prohibit funds appropriated or otherwise made available by H.R. 8774 from

being obligated or expended for the purpose of decommissioning any Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

or the cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG-70). (See also the report language below from page 10 of

H.Rept. 118-557.)

Section 8088 would provide $204.939 million for the procurement of two used sealift vessels for

the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), as noted above in line 32 of Table 3.

Section 8094, a recurring annual provision, would continue U.S. content requirements for

TARC(X) cable laying and repair ships (and also for TAGOS-25 ocean surveillance ships, as

noted in the CRS report on the TAGOS-25 program).75

Section 8165 would provide authority, with certain conditions, for DOD to transfer funds from

any available Department of the Navy appropriation (except military construction) to any

available Navy ship construction appropriation for the purpose of liquidating necessary changes

resulting from inflation, market fluctuations, or rate adjustments for any ship construction

program appropriated in law.

H.Rept. 118-557 states

NAVY LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS

The Committee is incensed that, despite repeated rejections by Congress, the Navy is once

again proposing to decommission several Independence Class Littoral Combat Ships

(LCS) well before the end of their expected service lives. The Committee strongly believes

that these ships, though not aligned with the Navy’s original plan, can provide operational

value to the fleet in support of combatant commander requirements. Further, the

Committee views the Navy’s response to the Committee’s concerns as inadequate. The

Committee believes it is premature to divest these ships before the completion of a

thorough assessment of the potential uses for these ships. Therefore, the Committee directs

the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not

later than 30 days after the enactment of this Act, on the proposed alternative uses for the

Independence Class LCS. (Page 10; see also Section 8074 of H.R. 8774, noted above.)

H.Rept. 118-557 also states

SHIP MAINTENANCE

The Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to continue to submit quarterly reports to

the congressional defense committees, beginning not later than 30 days after the enactment

of this Act, regarding private contracted ship maintenance as directed in House Report

116–453 and to submit the annual report on ship maintenance required by section 1016 of

Public Law 117–81 to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in conjunction

with its submission to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

SHIPYARD INFRASTRUCTURE OPTIMIZATION PROGRAM

The Committee recognizes the critical role the four public shipyards play in readiness of

the United States Navy and the security of the nation. To address chronically unmet

infrastructure needs at the shipyards, in 2018 Congress directed the Department of Defense

to create and implement a Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). Since its

inception, the Committee has strongly supported SIOP efforts to modernize and improve

facilities at the Navy’s public shipyards. Continued investments in shipyard infrastructure

75 CRS In Focus IF11838, Navy TAGOS-25 Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 49

are critical if the Navy is to maximize the execution of maintenance availabilities within

the funds requested, as directed in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2024. For fiscal year 2025, the Committee

recommendation fully funds the Navy’s SIOP request and encourages the Navy to continue

to invest in these strategic naval assets. (Page 64)

H.Rept. 118-557 also states

45-DAY SHIPBUILDING REVIEW

The Committee notes the findings of the Navy’s 45-day Shipbuilding Review found

significant delays to several critical shipbuilding programs. Notably, the review’s findings

revealed 12–16 months delay in lead boat construction of the Columbia-class submarine,

24–36 months delay in Virginia-class submarine construction, 18–26 months delay in

delivering the third Ford-class carrier, and at least 3 years delay in the lead Constellation-

class frigate. Recognizing the importance of fleet capacity in power projection and the

Chief of Naval Operations’ new force-level goal of 381 ships, the Committee is

increasingly concerned by the long-term impacts of these delays. The Committee directs

the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the House and Senate Appropriations

Committees not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, on the Navy’s

recommended actions following the 45-day Shipbuilding Review and the Navy’s follow-

on Shipbuilding Review, outlining plans and funding requirements for implementation.

(Page 131)

Senate

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-204 of August 1, 2024) on S.

4921, recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 3. The recommended

funding increases for lines 11, 15, 19, and 28, and $1.0 billion of the recommended increase for

line 33, are shown in S.Rept. 118-204 as emergency spending, meaning that they would be

designated as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to Section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the

Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. For further discussion of

recommended additional emergency appropriations in S. 4921, see pages 8-9 of S.Rept. 118-204.

Among other things, S.Rept. 118-204 recommends funding for the procurement in FY2025 of

• three DDG-51 destroyers, rather than the two that were requested for

procurement in FY2025;

• three additional Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) landing craft; and

• one additional YRBM (Yard Repair Berthing and Messing) service craft (i.e., a

type of Auxiliary Personnel Lighter [APL] or personnel barge).

Section 8016 of S. 4921, a recurring annual provision, would continue U.S. content requirements

for welded shipboard anchor and mooring chain.

Section 8074 would provide authority, with certain conditions, for DOD to transfer funds from

any available Department of the Navy appropriation to any available Navy ship construction

appropriation for the purpose of liquidating necessary changes resulting from inflation, market

fluctuations, or rate adjustments for any ship construction program appropriated in law.

Section 8088 would provide $204.939 million for the procurement of two used sealift vessels for

the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), as noted above in line 32 of Table 3.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 50

Section 8094, a recurring annual provision, would continue U.S. content requirements for

TARC(X) cable laying and repair ships (and also for TAGOS-25 ocean surveillance ships, as

noted in the CRS report on the TAGOS-25 program).76

S.Rept. 118-204 states

45–Day Shipbuilding Review.—The Committee notes the findings of the Navy’s 45-day

Shipbuilding Review found significant delays, cost overruns, and workforce recruitment

and retention challenges in no fewer than eight Navy shipbuilding programs. These include

a 12–16 months delay in lead boat construction of the COLUMBIA Class Submarine

[COL], 24–36 months delay in VIRGINIA Class Submarine [VCS] construction, 18–26

months delay in delivering the third FORD Class Aircraft Carrier, and at least 3 years delay

in the lead CONSTELLATION Class Frigate. Therefore, the Committee directs the

Secretary of the Navy to submit, on a quarterly basis after the enactment of this act, a report

to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate for each

ship class identified in the Navy’s review which includes a ship delivery schedule by hull;

required workforce by trade and fiscal year, including associated required recruitment and

retention data by quarter; Navy and local industrial base investments delineated by fiscal

year; an assessment of any at-risk shipbuilding supplier; and design maturity curves.

Further, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a

report to the congressional defense committees not later than 90 days after the enactment

of this act which assesses the root causes of the recent cost increases and schedule delays

in Navy ship, submarine, and aircraft carrier programs cited in the Navy’s review, and

makes recommendations to address those factors. (Pages 132-133)

S.Rept. 118-204 also states

Domestic Source Content for Navy Shipbuilding Critical Components.—The Committee

remains concerned with the fragility of the domestic shipbuilding supply base and notes

the report on ‘‘Domestic Source Content for Navy Shipbuilding’’ submitted to the

congressional defense committees in accordance with direction accompanying the

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023. Given the long-term impact of

shipbuilding programs, the Committee believes that understanding and managing the

domestic supply base is critical. Therefore, the Committee reiterates direction to the

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) to submit to the

congressional defense committees, concurrent with submission of the fiscal year 2026

President’s budget request, a plan to incorporate upfront domestic sourcing requirements

for key materials, components and subsystems into current and future acquisition strategies

for shipbuilding programs. Further, the report shall identify a supply chain strategy that

identifies existing horizontal and vertical gaps and redundancies in the domestic industrial

base to support such acquisition strategies, and efforts by the Navy to ensure the domestic

industrial base and supply chain can address domestic source content of Navy shipbuilding

requirements. Finally, to the extent the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,

Development and Acquisition) plans to prioritize foreign content over domestic content,

the Assistant Secretary is directed to provide the statutory basis for doing so, including a

detailed risk assessment of such a strategy, and the cost estimate of growing a

commensurate domestic capability. Such report shall be delivered in unclassified format

and may contain a classified annex. (Page 134)

76 CRS In Focus IF11838, Navy TAGOS-25 Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for

Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 51

Appendix A. Earlier Navy Force-Structure Goals

Dating Back to 2001
The table below shows earlier Navy force-structure goals dating back to 2001. The 308-ship

force-level goal of March 2015, shown in the first column of the table, is the goal that was

replaced by the 355-ship force-level goal released in December 2016.

Table A-1. Earlier Navy Force-Structure Goals Dating Back to 2001

Ship type

308-

ship

goal of

March

2015

306-

ship

goal of

January

2013

~310-

316

ship

goal of

March

2012

Revised

313-ship

goal of

Septem-

ber

2011

Changes
to

February

2006 313-

ship goal

announced

through

mid-2011

February

2006

Navy

goal for

313-ship

fleet

Early-2005

Navy goal

for fleet of

260-325

ships

2002-
2004

Navy

goal

for

375-

ship

Navya

2001

QDR

goal

for

310-

ship

Navy

260-

ships

325-

ships

Ballistic missile submarines

(SSBNs)

12b 12b 12-14b 12b 12b 14 14 14 14 14

Cruise missile submarines

(SSGNs)

0c 0c 0-4c 4c 0c 4 4 4 4 2 or

Attack submarines (SSNs) 48 48 ~48 48 48 48 37 41 55 55

Aircraft carriers 11e 11e 11e 11e 11e 11f 10 11 12 12

Cruisers and destroyers 88 88 ~90 94 94g 88 67 92 104 116

Frigates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) 52 52 ~55 55 55 55 63 82 56 0

Amphibious ships 34 33 ~32 33 33h 31 17 24 37 36

MPF(F) shipsi 0j 0j 0j 0j 0j 12i 14i 20i 0i 0i

Combat logistics (resupply) ships 29 29 ~29 30 30 30 24 26 42 34

Dedicated mine warfare ships 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26k 16

Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) 10l 10l 10l 10l 21l 3 0 0 0 0

Otherm 24 23 ~23 16 24n 17 10 11 25 25

Total battle force ships 308 306 ~310-

316

313 328 313 260 325 375 310

312

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.

Notes: QDR = Quadrennial Defense Review. The “~” symbol means approximately.

a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified.

b. The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.

For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

c. Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late

2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire. This situation can be expressed in a

table like this one with either a 4 or a 0.

d. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration’s proposed

FY2001 DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 52

SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a

plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.

e. With congressional approval, the goal has been temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers for the period

between the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in December 2012 and entry into service of the

carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently scheduled for September 2015.

f. For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers.

g. The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure

and missile defense.

h. The Navy acknowledged that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine

Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships

shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious

Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

i. Today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps

operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force

ships. The planned MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for

example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron
were counted by the Navy as battle force ships. The planned MPF(F) squadron was subsequently

restructured into a different set of initiatives for enhancing the existing MPF squadrons; the Navy no longer

plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron.

j. The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to

procure some of the ships that were previously planned for the squadron—specifically, TAKE-1 class cargo

ships, and Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)/Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ships. These ships are

included in the total shown for “Other” ships. AFSBs are now called Expeditionary Sea Base ships (ESBs).

k. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships included 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status

called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as

battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness

status.

l. Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily

for the performance of Army missions.

m. This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.

n. The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February 2006 313-ship goal to 24 ships under the

apparent 328-ship goal included the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into

this category of six ships—three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform

(MLP) ships—that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 53

Appendix B. Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to

Current or Potential Future Levels
In assessing the appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy,

observers sometimes compare that number to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. Historical

figures for total fleet size, however, can be a problematic yardstick for assessing the

appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy, particularly if the

historical figures are more than a few years old, because

• the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the

Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing

missions all change over time; and

• the number of ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been

inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more than enough) for meeting the Navy’s

mission requirements in that year.

Regarding the first bullet point above, the Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of

568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987,77 and as of September 16, 2024, included a total of

297 battle force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission

requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multitheater

NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the May 2024 fleet is intended to meet a considerably

different set of mission requirements centered on countering China’s improving naval capabilities

and, secondarily, Russia’s naval capabilities. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed

substantially from the May 2024 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided weapons and

the sophistication of C4ISR systems and networking capabilities.78

In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely

have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive

implementation of networking technology, increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles, and

the potential fielding of new types of weapons such as lasers.79

The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated

missions; the 297-ship fleet of September 2024 may or may not be capable of performing its

stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be

capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship

mixes, and technologies, however, these past, present, and future relationships of Navy ship totals

to stated Navy missions are to a substantial degree independent of one another.

77 Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however,

is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle

force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total

number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval History and

Heritage Command (formerly the Naval Historical Center) states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a

total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle

force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another

year is thus an apples-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of

ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the

Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.

78 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

79 For more on Navy programs for developing high-energy shipboard lasers, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard

Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 54

For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a

reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions. An

increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to

perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be

increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing

number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated

missions is decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly

than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships

are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in

total ship numbers.

Regarding the second of the two bullet points above, it can be noted that comparisons of the size

of the fleet today with the size of the fleet in earlier years rarely appear to consider whether the

fleet was appropriately sized in those earlier years (and therefore potentially suitable as a

yardstick of comparison), even though it is quite possible that the fleet in those earlier years

might not have been appropriately sized, and even though there might have been differences of

opinion among observers at that time regarding that question. Just as it might not be prudent for

observers years from now to tacitly assume that the 294-ship Navy of September 2021 was

appropriately sized for meeting the mission requirements of 2021, even though there were

differences of opinion among observers on that question, simply because a figure of 294 ships

appears in the historical records for 2021, so, too, might it not be prudent for observers today to

tacitly assume that the number of ships of the Navy in an earlier year was appropriate for meeting

the Navy’s mission requirements that year, even though there might have been differences of

opinion among observers at that time regarding that question, simply because the size of the Navy

in that year appears in a table like Table G-1.

Previous Navy force-structure plans, such as those shown in Table A-1, might provide some

insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time

in mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other force-

planning factors, as well as the possibility that earlier force-structure plans might not have been

appropriate for meeting the mission demands of their times, suggest that some caution should be

applied in using past force-structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force-

structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era goal for a 600-ship Navy, for

example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces

at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today, and there was considerable

debate during those years as to the appropriateness of the 600-ship goal.80

80 Navy force-structure plans that predate those shown in Table A-1 include the Reagan-era 600-ship goal of the 1980s,

the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush

Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes

also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR. The table below

summarizes some key features of these plans.

Features of Recent Navy Force-Structure Plans

Plan 600-ship Base Force 1993 BUR 1997 QDR

Total ships ~600 ~450/416a 346 ~305/310b

Attack submarines 100 80/~55c 45-55 50/55d

Aircraft carriers 15e 12 11+1f 11+1f

Surface combatants 242/228g ~150 ~124 116

Amphibious ships ~75h 51i 41i 36i

(continued…)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 55

Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.

a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship goal, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999.

b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55

from 50.

c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.

d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.

e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).

f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.

g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.

h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (MEB).

i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Changing numbers needed to meet this goal reflect in part

changes in the design and capabilities of amphibious ships.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 56

Appendix C. Employment Impact of Additional

Shipbuilding Work
This appendix presents background information on the employment impact of additional

shipbuilding work.

Building the additional ships that would be needed to achieve and maintain the 355-ship fleet

could create many additional manufacturing and other jobs at shipyards, associated supplier

firms, and elsewhere in the U.S. economy. A 2021 Maritime Administration (MARAD) report on

the economic importance of the U.S. private-sector shipbuilding and repair industry states

In 2019, the U.S. private shipbuilding and repairing industry directly provided 107,180

jobs…, $9.9 billion in labor income, and $12.2 billion in gross domestic product, or GDP,

to the national economy…. Including direct, indirect, and induced impacts, on a nationwide

basis, total economic activity associated with the industry reached 393,390 jobs, $28.1

billion of labor income, and $42.4 billion in GDP in 2019….

Considering the indirect and induced impacts, each direct job in the U.S. private

shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another 2.67 jobs in other parts of

the U.S. economy; each dollar of direct labor income and GDP in the U.S. private

shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another $1.82 in labor income and

$2.48 in GDP, respectively, in other parts of the U.S. economy….

The importance of the industry is not limited to the direct output and employment it

generates (i.e., “direct impact”). Companies in the shipbuilding and repairing industry

purchase inputs from other domestic industries, contributing to economic activity in those

sectors (i.e., “indirect” impact). Employees spend their incomes, helping to support the

local and national economies (i.e., “induced” impact). Thus, the economic importance of

the U.S. private shipbuilding and repairing industry includes direct, indirect, and induced

effects….

Average labor income per job [in the U.S. private-sector shipbuilding and repair industry,

including wages and salaries and benefits as well as proprietors’ income] was

approximately $92,770 in 2019, 49 percent higher than the national average for the private

sector economy ($62,090)….

Total revenues for the U.S. shipbuilding and repairing industry are estimated to be $27.9

billion in 2019, up from $26.9 billion in 2018.10 In 2019, 78.7 percent of these revenues

came from military shipbuilding and repairs, and 21.3 percent from commercial

shipbuilding and repairs….81

81 Maritime Administration (MARAD), The Economic Importance of the U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing

Industry, March 30, 2021, pp. 1, 2, 3, 9.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 57

Appendix D. A Summary of Some Acquisition

Lessons Learned for Navy Shipbuilding
This appendix presents a general summary of lessons learned in Navy shipbuilding, reflecting

comments made repeatedly by various sources over the years. These lessons learned include the

following:

• At the outset, get the operational requirements for the program right.

Properly identify the program’s operational requirements at the outset. Manage

risk by not trying to do too much in terms of the program’s operational

requirements, and perhaps seek a so-called 70%-to-80% solution (i.e., a design

that is intended to provide 70%-80% of desired or ideal capabilities). Achieve a

realistic balance up front between operational requirements, risks, and estimated

costs.

• Use mature technologies. Use land-based prototyping and testing to bring new

technologies to a high state of maturity before incorporating them into ship

designs, and limit the number of major new technologies to be incorporated into

a new ship design.

• Impose cost discipline up front. Use realistic price estimates, and consider not

only development and procurement costs, but life-cycle operation and support

(O&S) costs.

• Employ competition where possible in the awarding of design and construction

contracts.

• Use a contract type that is appropriate for the amount of risk involved, and

structure its terms to align incentives with desired outcomes.

• Minimize design/construction concurrency by developing the design to a high

level of completion before starting construction and by resisting changes in

requirements (and consequent design changes) during construction.

• Properly supervise construction work. Maintain an adequate number of

properly trained Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) personnel.

• Provide stability for industry, in part by using, where possible, multiyear

procurement (MYP) or block buy contracting.

• Maintain a capable government acquisition workforce that understands what

it is buying, as well as the above points.

Identifying these lessons is arguably not the hard part—most if not all these points have been

cited for years. The hard part, arguably, is living up to them without letting circumstances lead

program-execution efforts away from these guidelines.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 58

Appendix E. Some Considerations Relating to

Warranties in Shipbuilding Contracts
This appendix presents some considerations relating to warranties in shipbuilding contracts and

other defense acquisition.

In discussions of Navy (and also Coast Guard) shipbuilding, one question that sometimes arises is

whether including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract is preferable to not including one. The

question can arise, for example, in connection with a GAO finding that “the Navy structures

shipbuilding contracts so that it pays shipbuilders to build ships as part of the construction

process and then pays the same shipbuilders a second time to repair the ship when construction

defects are discovered.”82

Including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract (or a contract for building some other kind of

defense end item), while potentially valuable, might not always be preferable to not including

one—it depends on the circumstances of the acquisition, and it is not necessarily a valid criticism

of an acquisition program to state that it is using a contract that does not include a warranty (or a

weaker form of a warranty rather than a stronger one).

Including a warranty generally shifts to the contractor the risk of having to pay for fixing

problems with earlier work. Although that in itself could be deemed desirable from the

government’s standpoint, a contractor negotiating a contract that will have a warranty will

incorporate that risk into its price, and depending on how much the contractor might charge for

doing that, it is possible that the government could wind up paying more in total for acquiring the

item (including fixing problems with earlier work on that item) than it would have under a

contract without a warranty.

When a warranty is not included in the contract and the government pays later on to fix problems

with earlier work, those payments can be very visible, which can invite critical comments from

observers. But that does not mean that including a warranty in the contract somehow frees the

government from paying to fix problems with earlier work. In a contract that includes a warranty,

the government will indeed pay something to fix problems with earlier work—but it will make

the payment in the less-visible (but still very real) form of the up-front charge for including the

warranty, and that charge might be more than what it would have cost the government, under a

contract without a warranty, to pay later on for fixing those problems.

From a cost standpoint, including a warranty in the contract might or might not be preferable,

depending on the risk that there will be problems with earlier work that need fixing, the potential

cost of fixing such problems, and the cost of including the warranty in the contract. The point is

that the goal of avoiding highly visible payments for fixing problems with earlier work and the

goal of minimizing the cost to the government of fixing problems with earlier work are separate

and different goals, and that pursuing the first goal can sometimes work against achieving the

second goal.83

82 See Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for

Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP, June 2018, p. 21. A graphic on page 21 shows a GAO finding that the

government was financially responsible for shipbuilder deficiencies in 96% of the cases examined by GAO, and that

the shipbuilder was financially responsible for shipbuilder deficiencies in 4% of the cases.

83 It can also be noted that the country’s two largest builders of Navy ships—General Dynamics (GD) and Huntington

Ingalls Industries (HII)—derive much of their revenues from U.S. government work. These two shipbuilders operate

the only U.S. shipyards currently capable of building several major types of Navy ships, including submarines, aircraft

(continued…)

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 59

The Department of Defense’s guide on the use of warranties states the following:

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46.7 states that “the use of warranties is not

mandatory.” However, if the benefits to be derived from the warranty are commensurate

with the cost of the warranty, the CO [contracting officer] should consider placing it in the

contract. In determining whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific acquisition, FAR

Subpart 46.703 requires the CO to consider the nature and use of the supplies and services,

the cost, the administration and enforcement, trade practices, and reduced requirements.

The rationale for using a warranty should be documented in the contract file….

In determining the value of a warranty, a CBA [cost-benefit analysis] is used to measure

the life cycle costs of the system with and without the warranty. A CBA is required to

determine if the warranty will be cost beneficial. CBA is an economic analysis, which

basically compares the Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of the system with and without the warranty

to determine if warranty coverage will improve the LCCs. In general, five key factors will

drive the results of the CBA: cost of the warranty + cost of warranty administration +

compatibility with total program efforts + cost of overlap with Contractor support +

intangible savings. Effective warranties integrate reliability, maintainability,

supportability, availability, and life-cycle costs. Decision factors that must be evaluated

include the state of the weapon system technology, the size of the warranted population,

the likelihood that field performance requirements can be achieved, and the warranty

period of performance.84

carriers, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships. Thus, even if a warranty in a shipbuilding contract with one

of these firms were to somehow mean that the government did not have pay under the terms of that contract—either up

front or later on—for fixing problems with earlier work done under that contract, there would still be a question as to

whether the government would nevertheless wind up eventually paying much of that cost as part of the price of one or

more future contracts the government may have that firm.

84 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Warranty Guide, Version 1.0, September 2009, accessed July 13,

2017, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/uid/docs/departmentofdefensewarrantyguide[1] .

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 60

Appendix F. Avoiding Procurement Cost Growth vs.

Minimizing Procurement Costs
This appendix presents some considerations relating to avoiding procurement cost growth vs.

minimizing procurement costs in shipbuilding and other defense acquisition.

The affordability challenge posed by the Navy’s shipbuilding plans can reinforce the strong

oversight focus on preventing or minimizing procurement cost growth in Navy shipbuilding

programs, which is one expression of a strong oversight focus on preventing or minimizing cost

growth in DOD acquisition programs in general. This oversight focus may reflect in part an

assumption that avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is always synonymous with

minimizing procurement cost. It is important to note, however, that as paradoxical as it may seem,

avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is not always synonymous with minimizing

procurement cost, and that a sustained, singular focus on avoiding or minimizing procurement

cost growth might sometimes lead to higher procurement costs for the government.

How could this be? Consider the example of a design for the lead ship of a new class of Navy

ships. The construction cost of this new design is uncertain, but is estimated to be likely

somewhere between Point A (a minimum possible figure) and Point D (a maximum possible

figure). (Point D, in other words, would represent a cost estimate with a 100% confidence factor,

meaning there is a 100% chance that the cost would come in at or below that level.) If the Navy

wanted to avoid cost growth on this ship, it could simply set the ship’s procurement cost at Point

D. Industry would likely be happy with this arrangement, and there likely would be no cost

growth on the ship.

The alternative strategy open to the Navy is to set the ship’s target procurement cost at some

figure between Points A and D—call it Point B—and then use that more challenging target cost to

place pressure on industry to sharpen its pencils so as to find ways to produce the ship at that

lower cost. (Navy officials sometimes refer to this as “pressurizing” industry.) In this example, it

might turn out that industry efforts to reduce production costs are not successful enough to build

the ship at the Point B cost. As a result, the ship experiences one or more rounds of procurement

cost growth, and the ship’s procurement cost rises over time from Point B to some higher

figure—call it Point C.

Here is the rub: Point C, in spite of incorporating one or more rounds of cost growth, might

nevertheless turn out to be lower than Point D, because Point C reflected efforts by the

shipbuilder to find ways to reduce production costs that the shipbuilder might have put less

energy into pursuing if the Navy had simply set the ship’s procurement cost initially at Point D.

Setting the ship’s cost at Point D, in other words, may eliminate the risk of cost growth on the

ship, but does so at the expense of creating a risk of the government paying more for the ship than

was actually necessary. DOD could avoid cost growth on new procurement programs starting

tomorrow by simply setting costs for those programs at each program’s equivalent of Point D. But

as a result of this strategy, DOD could well wind up leaving money on the table in some

instances—of not, in other words, minimizing procurement costs.

DOD does not have to set a cost precisely at Point D to create a potential risk in this regard. A risk

of leaving money on the table, for example, is a possible downside of requiring DOD to budget

for its acquisition programs at something like an 80% confidence factor—an approach that some

observers have recommended—because a cost at the 80% confidence factor is a cost that is likely

fairly close to Point D.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 61

Procurement cost growth is often embarrassing for DOD and industry, and can damage their

credibility in connection with future procurement efforts. Procurement cost growth can also

disrupt congressional budgeting by requiring additional appropriations to pay for something

Congress thought it had fully funded in a prior year. For this reason, there is a legitimate public

policy value to pursuing a goal of having less rather than more procurement cost growth.

Procurement cost growth, however, can sometimes be in part the result of DOD efforts to use

lower initial cost targets as a means of pressuring industry to reduce production costs—efforts

that, notwithstanding the cost growth, might be partially successful. A sustained, singular focus

on avoiding or minimizing cost growth, and of punishing DOD for all instances of cost growth,

could discourage DOD from using lower initial cost targets as a means of pressurizing industry,

which could deprive DOD of a tool for controlling procurement costs.

The point here is not to excuse away cost growth, because cost growth can occur in a program for

reasons other than DOD’s attempt to pressurize industry. Nor is the point to abandon the goal of

seeking lower rather than higher procurement cost growth, because, as noted above, there is a

legitimate public policy value in pursuing this goal. The point, rather, is to recognize that this goal

is not always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost, and that a possibility of some

amount of cost growth might be expected as part of an optimal government strategy for

minimizing procurement cost. Recognizing that the goals of seeking lower rather than higher cost

growth and of minimizing procurement cost can sometimes be in tension with one another can

lead to an approach that takes both goals into consideration. In contrast, an approach that is

instead characterized by a sustained, singular focus on avoiding and minimizing cost growth may

appear virtuous, but in the end may wind up costing the government more.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service 62

Appendix G. Size of the Navy and Navy

Shipbuilding Rate

Size of the Navy

Table G-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the

numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count

toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures

reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and

subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules

established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy.

As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War

peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.85 The Navy fell below 300

battle force ships in August 2003 and remained below 300 ships for the next 16 years. The Navy

briefly returned to a level of 300 ships in early July 2020, for the first time in almost 17 years,

subsequently fell back below 300 ships, reached 300 ships again briefly during periods in August

and September 2022, and as of September 16, 2024, included 297 battle force ships.

As discussed in Appendix B, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick

for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy,

particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be

performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are

available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time, and because the number of

ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been inappropriate (i.e., not enough or more

than enough) for meeting the Navy’s mission requirements in that year.